This Strategic Studies Institute book provides a comprehensive research guide to radical Islamist English-language online magazines, eBooks, and assorted radical Islamist news magazines, reports, and pocketbooks published between April-May 2007 and November 2016, and generates strategic insights and policy response options.
Given the potential explosiveness of the Cuban crisis and the possibility that it might lead to U.S. military involvement, it would seem appropriate to take a closer look at the Cuban situation. In particular, we need a better understanding of those forces promoting both political stability and instability. In this report, the distinguished Latin American scholar Enrique Baloyra argues that Castro's current policy of "re-equilibration" is unlikely to succeed and that his options will increasingly boil down to two choices: One, he can deepen the process of government-led reform, or, two, he can continue the current policy, with growing chances of violence and turmoil. Baloyra suggests that since the former might jeopardize his hegemonic position, the latter is the more probable option. The future, in short, is likely to be grim.
Dr. Thomas Wilborn examines Japan's defense policy and the capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to determine if the fears of a remilitarized Japan have any basis in fact. He concludes that Japanese defense policy places rigid restraints on the SDF, and that currently there is no support for anything but a thoroughly defensive military posture. Moreover, the SDF lack the force projection ability to attack any of Japan's neighbors, and could not develop the ability in less than a decade--even if there were a political decision to do so. Finally, the preponderance of evidence suggests that future generations of leaders are no more likely to pursue a military role in the region than the generation which has governed since the end of American occupation, in 1952.
Now that the armed forces of the United States have entered Haiti, what is the exit strategy? As the United States, the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the United Nations coalition establish order, it is best to be mindful of the tasks ahead: building a new authority system based on the rule of law, instilling respect for human rights, and developing those values common to democratic communities around the world. The two keys to the success of this strategy will be how Haiti handles the amnesty question and what kind of judicial and police system is developed. The United States should not allow its exit strategy to be determined by the success or failure of the above. In this paper, Professor Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army War College proposes an interlocking strategy that emphasizes the achievement of limited objectives by the United States. He contends that our strategy should emphasize the humanitarian dimensions of our assistance rather than pursue the open-ended goal of the restoration of democracy. Such an approach provides the United States greater hope for success and the probability of a dignified exit.
Drs. Stephen Wager and Donald Schulz examine the causes, nature and implications of the Zapatista uprising, emphasizing in particular its impact on Mexican civil-military relations. They argue that, together with the onset of democratization, the Chiapas rebellion has strained these relations and led to a certain mutual distancing between the Mexican army and government. Interestingly enough, however, they argue that this may actually be a good thing since it means that the military is becoming a more politically neutral institution and will likely be more open to the idea of an opposition electoral victory than in the past. Of more immediate importance, Wager and Schulz note that there has been little progress toward resolving the rebellion, and that as long as this is so fighting could very well break out anew, with disastrous results. They therefore urge the incoming Zedillo administration to move quickly to "bring the Zapatistas in from the cold" by co-opting them and their supporters both economically and politically. This means fulfilling not only the socioeconomic promises that have been made by the government, but reforming state and local political power structures to assure the rule of law and the access of those who have been shut out of the system. They further argue that the process of national political reform should be broadened and deepened, since without democratization on the national level any other gains that might be made would probably be ephemeral.
In April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosted its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tactitus to Force XXI.
Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky of the Royal Military College of Canada made the point that for Canada defense policy and strategy traditionally have been made in times of penury. During the Cold War, Canadian policy was one of a strategy of commitment. Since the end of the Cold War, Ottawa has adopted a strategy of choice derived from Canadian national interests. The document upon which Canada bases its defense policy is the 1994 Canadian White Paper. Dr. Sokolsky argues that the current defense policy acknowledges the problems endemic to peacekeeping, but that the rising tide of peacekeeping operations may have passed. Fortunately, Dr. Sokolsky maintains, the current White Paper also allows for a general commitment to multilateral approaches to security. Canada and the United States have stood together for more than half a century; allies and partners in war and peace. As the Canadian Defence Forces and the U.S. Army seek to shape change rather than to be shaped by it, they cannot help but profit from an open debate of the difficult issues that confront them.
This is the first of a two-part report on the causes and nature of the crisis in Mexico, the prospects for the future, and the implications for the United States. In this initial study, the author analyzes the crisis as it has developed over the past decade-and-a-half, with the primary focus being on the 6-year term of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and the first few months of his successor, President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon. Contrasting the euphoric hopes generated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the explosive events of 1994 and early 1995, he explains how a country with such seemingly bright prospects went so wrong. He argues that the United States has few foreign policy concerns more profoundly consequential for its national interests including its security interests than the political stability and general welfare of Mexico. For that reason, it is especially important that we understand what has happened and why.
Dr. Schulz s preliminary findings are sobering. Despite some promising moves by the new administration with regard to judicial and police reform and a more cooperative approach to the political opposition, he questions President Zedillo's willingness to challenge the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) elite and the narcotraffickers. The fundamental problem, he suggests, is that Mexico s political economy is dominated by an oligarchy that has grown accustomed to borrowing from foreigners to enrich itself. If he is correct, then there is likely to be trouble ahead, for the current bailout will only perpetuate the system, virtually assuring that there will be another crisis down the road.
The recent traumatic developments in Mexico caught both the Mexican and U.S. governments, as well as most academic observers, by surprise. Until the Zapatista National Liberation Army burst onto the scene in January 1994, Mexico s future seemed assured. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had just been ratified by the U.S. Congress, and there was a widespread expectation that Mexico would take off economically and would, within the reasonably near future, join the ranks of the developed countries. And while the outlook for democracy seemed more problematic, few questioned the essential stability of the political system. Since then, much has changed. What happened and why are explored by Donald Schulz in an earlier SSI study, Mexico in Crisis. Dr. Schulz goes beyond that preliminary assessment to look at the prospects for democratization, socioeconomic development, political stability, U.S.-Mexican relations, and the national security implications for both countries. His findings are unsettling, and so are some of his policy recommendations, for they cut at the heart of many of the assumptions U.S. and Mexican leaders have made about the effects of current policies and where Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican relationship are headed.
One of the more serious dangers to peace and security in Latin America is the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru, which broke out into warfare in February-March 1995. In this monograph, Dr. Gabriel Marcella explores the critical historical and strategic dimensions of the conflict. He argues that unless this age-old dispute is settled amicably and soon, it could very well generate a more disastrous war in the future. Dr. Marcella proposes a basis for settlement and provides specific policy recommendations for the United States and the inter-American community.
Dr. Donald E. Schulz looks at the prospects for political stability, democratization, and socioeconomic development. His conclusions are sobering. While by no means dismissing the possibility that Haiti can "make it," he presents a portrait of the imposing obstacles that must still be overcome and a detailed discussion of the things that could go wrong. In a nutshell, he argues that without a much greater willingness on the part of the United States and the international community to "stay the course" in terms of providing long-term security and socioeconomic aid, Haiti is unlikely to make a successful transition to a stable, democratic, economically modernizing nation. (Even with continuing assistance, the outlook will be problematic.) He argues that unless the United States and other foreign donors recognize this and do what is necessary to give the Haitian experiment a better chance to succeed, the "tactical success" that has been enjoyed so far will sooner or later be transformed into a "strategic failure." His policy recommendations, in particular, deserve close scrutiny.