Building Partner Capacity in Africa: Keys to Success

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Frank L. Jones

The passage of the fiscal year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has far-reaching implications for the Department of Defense (DoD) in two particular areas for which this study is relevant. The first is that the legislation enacts sweeping changes to how the DoD and its components, including the Department of the Army (DA), budget, manage, assess, monitor, evaluate, and report their security cooperation activities to Congress. The legislation establishes a “single, comprehensive chapter in Title 10 of the U.S. Code,” dedicated to the reform of the DoD’s security cooperation practices. Further, as the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee notes, “the Department of Defense continues to place greater emphasis on security cooperation, to include building partner capacity [BPC].” By including the term “building partner capacity” in his comments on the law, the chairman uses a more comprehensive term that not only includes the security sector, but also widens the focus of security cooperation as a whole-of-government effort and makes clear congressional interest in treating security cooperation as a defense institution building endeavor.

In response to the congressional direction, four of the study’s chapters address directly the law’s intent and its provisions regarding security cooperation in general and Africa specifically. These chapters examine and offer recommendations on the following issues: (1) the concept of absorptive capacity, which the DoD considers the crucial first step in security cooperation planning regardless of the region involved; (2) professional military education (PME) in Africa as a defense institution building activity; (3) current security cooperation programming in Africa, its aims and outcomes; and, (4) use of public health engagement in Africa as a form of military-to-military engagement and a capacity-building venture in support of the DoD’s policy
regarding humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, which contribute to regional stability and U.S. homeland security.

The second major area of the law that is of concern to the DoD focuses specifically on Africa and links directly to security cooperation activities in the region. Section 1273 requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit to the congressional defense committees a “strategy for the U.S. defense interests in Africa.” The law indicates that the strategy must address: defense objectives in Africa; courses of action to achieve these objectives, to include cooperative efforts with other U.S. agencies; and “security cooperation activities to advance defense objectives in Africa.” This study points out that the success of security cooperation and defense institution building projects relies heavily on clearly defining U.S. policy objectives at the national, regional, and country levels, which is not currently the case among some of the departments and agencies involved in BPC. Moreover, the statute’s language includes a sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense needs to build a framework for security cooperation with foreign partners to “ensure accountability and foster implementation of best practices.” The final chapter assesses where difficulties exist in the interagency policymaking process that hamper the development of a collaborative framework and its implementation. Lastly, it defines what constitutes effective assessment, monitoring, and evaluation to ensure accountability, and offers relevant criteria for achieving the legislation’s purpose.

The FY 2017 NDAA is a watershed event for both security cooperation and for the Defense Department’s policy objectives with respect to its partners in Africa. The law recognizes specific challenges and opportunities that the DoD must consider in developing a strategic approach on the continent that does not principally emphasize U.S. support to foreign security forces that assist in attaining U.S. counterterrorism objectives. This is not to suggest that the current U.S. policy goals or the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) lines of effort contained in its theater campaign
plan are mistaken. However, in view of the law’s provisions, the study proposes that the U.S. Government (USG) and the DoD concentrate security sector assistance in other areas where it can be effective in building and sustaining partner capacity over the long term as well as obtaining a reasonable return on investment and, at the same time, remaining consistent with wider U.S. foreign policy and defense objectives.
INTRODUCTION

Frank L. Jones

U.S. interests in Africa have expanded in the past decade beyond such traditional areas as economic development through trade and investment, democratic governance and the rule of law, and conflict prevention with an emphasis on peacekeeping and rapid response capacities. The continent is now at the center of a number of critical security issues. These issues range from the emergence of potent violent extremist movements (Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), with the capacity to destabilize fragile states, to a health security agenda catalyzed by the spread of infectious disease with global impacts (e.g., Ebola and Zika viruses). For the past several years, the U.S. Government (USG), in its national security strategy and related documents, has stressed building partner capacity (BPC) as an essential military mission, especially for the U.S. Army, to counter these threats and reduce their risk to African governments and societies.

The term “building partner capacity” is less a term of art than when it first entered the Department of Defense (DoD) lexicon a little more than a decade ago. The most expansive definition of the term appeared in the 2011 edition of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, which defined it as, “The outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.” This definition denotes that the enumerated actions require
a whole-of-government approach and interagency effort.\textsuperscript{1} Today, the term is understood to mean: “Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the [DoD] and its partners.”\textsuperscript{2} Regardless of the definition the DoD now uses, the purpose and means of BPC in Africa remain important because of recent congressional direction.

The enactment of the fiscal year (FY) 2017 \textit{National Defense Authorization Act} (NDAA) brought the importance of BPC into clearer relief in two areas that the study specifically addresses. In many respects, the far-reaching reforms that this legislation prompts will have significant impact on the management of U.S. security assistance programs and their implementation. First, the law recognizes that security cooperation initiatives can advance U.S. defense objectives in the region, but it also undertakes a reform of DoD security cooperation to improve program effectiveness and visibility.\textsuperscript{3} To achieve these goals, it creates a single comprehensive chapter in Title 10, U.S. Code, entitled “Security Cooperation,” which has the effect of changing the way the DoD manages, budgets, assesses, and reports security cooperation activities. Certainly, this revision to Title 10 has an impact well beyond U.S. defense objectives in Africa. However, given the study’s focus, the authors attempt to address a set of BPC activities within the context of the new legislation and how the DoD, and in particular the Army, undertakes and enhances its mission effectiveness.

Second, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to develop a strategy concerning U.S. defense interests in Africa. The law specifies several issues the strategy is to address, to include assessing “threats to global and regional United States national security interests
emanating from the continent.” The law’s language suggests that U.S. defense interests are not solely dedicated to countering the activities of violent extremist organizations and that attainment of U.S. defense objectives in Africa requires a collaborative effort, not only among the DoD components but also with other USG agencies.

To build partner capability in this changed strategic environment, that includes the U.S. domestic environment and Africa, this study explores five elements crucial to fostering security cooperation and building sustainable security institutions and capabilities. Specifically, it examines:

- How U.S. stakeholders understand the absorptive capacity of partner nations taking into consideration various factors;
- A comparative analysis of professional military education (PME) for African security forces in the current operational and threat environments;
- The use of the military instrument to improve African public health systems in conjunction with African militaries and other governmental agencies;
- The role of U.S. security cooperation activities in advancing U.S. national security aims in the current operational and threat environments; and,
- The interaction between U.S. military personnel and interagency partners that is necessary to implement capacity-building endeavors in African nations through a framework that promotes accountability.

The first chapter examines the concept of absorptive capacity of partner nations and underscores that
this topic is increasingly important because the NDAA levies a new demand on those managing security cooperation efforts. It not only requires the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the absorptive capacity of a foreign partner’s ability to sustain the training and equipment prior to delivery of such capabilities, but, more importantly, to evaluate the specific organizational unit that is receiving such capabilities prior to delivery. This NDAA language is a dramatic deviation from the past. Until now, the national security understanding of absorptive capacity has been limited to a country-level unit of analysis, typically conducted through a macroeconomic lens and framed through mathematical modeling. Now, in order to assess an organizational unit’s capacity, the unit of analysis resides well below the country-level. A behavioral lens is needed to capture the complex interaction among individual, group, organizational, and interorganizational behaviors. It is within this human dimension that the evaluation of absorptive capacity must take place. Yet, the security cooperation community does not have an analytic framework from which to pursue such a behavioral lens for Africa, or any other region where it may provide such support.

This chapter creates an analytic framework for the DoD, the military services, and other interagency players involved with security cooperation efforts to evaluate absorptive capacity within the intent of the NDAA language. The analytic framework is based on a set of three-prong, interlinked competencies: a detailed understanding provided by this chapter of what absorptive capacity looks like within the complexity of multiple levels of analysis; a detailed understanding provided by this chapter of the perceptual skill set, called perspective-taking, needed by U.S. and
other security cooperation providers to detect the full breadth of absorptive capacity; and the development of inferential judgment to fill in the normal and expected limitations of detecting a unit’s absorptive capacity in especially complex contexts.

With such a framework, policymakers will have evidence-based knowledge from which to assess risk in their decision-making process. This evidence-based knowledge about human behavior will allow policymakers to determine the level of absorptive capacity, as well as determine under what conditions nations and units with low absorptive capacity should be supported, what the sequencing of support should be, and which institutional processes are worth developing within the assessed risk factors.

The second chapter examines the U.S. military’s support to African PME institutions and the conduct of BPC as a whole. As this section notes, the concept of BPC has been in existence for a little more than a decade, and there have been numerous programs covered under this rubric. For the most part, these activities have focused on the generation of capability at the tactical level (i.e., training and equipping) and not institution building. However, PME has as its foundation institutions and systems, in addition to curricula and events. Further, as the NDAA language substantiates, the emphasis is now on outcomes or results that further U.S. national security policy objectives and, in particular, theater strategic objectives. PME can be an effective instrument for transforming military capability and generating sustainable capacity, but success requires the DoD, and the U.S. Army in particular, to create the means to measure outcomes and results. Additionally, reliably measuring outcomes requires
the DoD and its components to have a detailed understanding of African PME systems.

The chapter offers observations based on interviews and field studies conducted in the past several months, and reaches three major findings. First, U.S. military doctrine is robust and provides sufficient guidance on how to conduct BPC. There is no deficiency in this area. The second finding is that the doctrine has only been partially applied on account of several factors. Due to a lack of resourcing in the generating force, the majority of BPC-related activities are geared toward the tactical level. Because of this focus, the emphasis is on the short-term capability generation rather than on institutional development. This approach is understandable. There is a need to confront immediate security challenges, such as terrorism in several subregions. Additionally, event-driven activity is easier to conduct and to account for, while institution building necessitates a long-term commitment and the impacts are not easily recognizable or measured. These two findings, consistent with the analysis contained in the first chapter, underscore the difficulty of assessing student knowledge. Even more importantly, education remains the quintessential example of the transfer of knowledge, one that occurs over a lengthy period in comparison to a training event, which may last a matter of days or weeks.

The third finding is that the DoD lacks an in-depth knowledge of African PME. This conclusion is based on travel to four countries, numerous interviews with African military officers, and discussion of this subject with North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally personnel to validate the findings. African PME programs are built on legacy systems, derived from British and French military education. To enhance African PME
institutions, an understanding is required of the current foundations so that curriculum development can proceed; the DoD cannot simply graft its curriculum or impose a pedagogical approach onto the legacy system. A more sophisticated methodology is needed.

Given the scope that institution building demands, neither U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) nor U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) can accomplish this aim on their own, despite the view that BPC is a theater shaping activity. Combatant commands are not designed or staffed with personnel who have the expertise needed to assess educational outcomes. Instead, the command must rely on experts located in the U.S. Army and other military services’ training centers, often referred to as schoolhouses. Thus, AFRICOM and USARAF are dependent on an ability to reach back to the institutional Army for support. However, as the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) noted, the first priority of the schoolhouses is to their respective military services, and there is insufficient surge capability, especially qualified personnel, to meet the needs of the military services and provide support to partner nations in the various geographical combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility. This lack of surge capacity exacerbates the tactical focus of current BPC activities. Most importantly, there must be strategic direction from the relevant military leaders at the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) level and a culture of assessment has to be established. As a recent CALL bulletin indicates: “senior leader engagements are arguably the most cost-effective activities for making a difference in immature theaters.”

The third chapter explores the use of the U.S. military instrument to help improve public health systems in collaboration with African militaries and
governments. The 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa serves as both a case study and as a foundation upon which the DoD can build, given its engagement in public health activities on the continent for several years. The DoD’s global health engagement is consistent with U.S. policy objectives for Africa and the activities intended to build partner capacity. As the Ebola emergency demonstrated, the outbreak of infectious disease might not only destabilize the nation in which the event occurs, but it can also have enormous global consequences. Moreover, the ability of U.S. partners in Africa to respond effectively to a complex health emergency has political, economic, and social implications. For these reasons, the DoD regulations and military doctrine have addressed these concerns directly, concentrating principally in two areas: preparedness (which includes research and development as well as surveillance) and response.

The Ebola crisis is an example of a successful response, principally because the USG had instituted programs to combat infectious disease outbreaks in West Africa for years, including those undertaken by AFRICOM, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Walter Reed Institute of Research, the U.S. Navy, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. These activities were collaborative efforts with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and African governments. Thus, there was a framework for response in this particular instance, although there were a few gaps in coverage. Nonetheless, the USG’s surge response, to include that of the U.S. military, was a turning point in dealing with the outbreak. The U.S. Army built treatment units and maintained an air bridge for the movement of needed personnel and supplies. The very presence of the 101st Airborne
Division had a salutary effect psychologically and helped strengthen the Liberian Government’s morale and resolve, as well as offering assistance and confidence to the numerous NGOs involved in treatment of the afflicted. It is important to note that the Ebola response was truly a joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational event, as it involved joint, interagency, interorganizational, and multinational partners.

The USG has learned numerous lessons from the Ebola crisis, but a few areas would benefit from additional attention. The first is better coordination between the U.S. military and other U.S. interagency partners as well as with international organizations, principally the World Health Organization (WHO), to prepare for a worst-case scenario: a disease outbreak that turns into a slow-onset disaster, as was the case with Ebola. Second, the USG and especially the U.S. military must incorporate the “Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief” (commonly referred to as the Oslo Guidelines), which the USG agreed to in 1994, into planning and training events. Heightened awareness of, and adherence to, the Oslo Guidelines on the part of the DoD will help mitigate in the future some of the interagency coordination problems that occurred in the USG’s Ebola response. Third, AFRICOM should continue to build relationships with other U.S. agencies, especially the U.S. country team, and with the CDC and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) with respect to their response systems. Building relationships with WHO and African regional organizations would be worthwhile as well; the African Union (AU)
has recently established a Center for Disease Control that the U.S. CDC helped create.

Lastly, the chapter recommends 11 long-term initiatives the Army and AFRICOM should consider implementing with support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. As these suggestions underscore, there are significant strategic benefits to supporting the strengthening of African public health systems as both capacity-building and engagement activities. These benefits include: the access that joint, interagency, interorganizational, and multinational work on health issues offers; the opportunity for AFRICOM to enhance the relationships, expertise, and effectiveness that these partnerships provide; and the need to be ready to provide humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or respond to a disease outbreak.

The fourth chapter explores security cooperation in Africa from a broad perspective, while linking it to provisions of the FY 2017 NDAA. Such activities can be a turning point in the direction of security cooperation on the continent, but they must take into account that they cannot be solely the purview of the DoD, but remain an interagency effort, requiring a whole-of-government approach. It also emphasizes that the legislation’s provision for the development of a defense strategy, conducted in coordination with the Department of State, is a requisite first step, as it is the means of forming clear and comprehensive goals across the entire USG security sector enterprise, linked to overall U.S. foreign policy for the region. Moreover, since the Defense Department is now the principal source of funding for USG’s security sector assistance budget, it is crucial for the two departments to: institute a common lexicon; establish priorities at the regional, subregional, and country levels; clarify
agency roles and responsibilities; synchronize the variety of assistance programs; and devise implementation criteria for assessment and accountability purposes during a time of potentially diminished resources for the Department of State and the other principal inter-agency partner in the security sector—the U.S. Agency for International Development. Unity of effort and the minimization of bureaucratic friction are of the utmost importance in meeting the NDAA provisions that affect the management, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation activities. The chapter also addresses the challenges involved in planning and program execution, particularly as the focus regarding Africa in both the executive and legislative branches is largely on counterterrorism. While the concentration on violent extremist organizations in the U.S. AFRICOM’s area of responsibility is reasonable, as well as the longstanding interest in building peacekeeping forces among African states, overemphasis may distract from key institution building in other areas. When such a narrowed vision results in critical gaps, then the USG might be left with a crisis that could have been averted or mitigated by the Defense Department’s shaping activity in the region.

The chapter highlights that one of the biggest challenges the Defense Department confronts in the near-term is building a security cooperation workforce. The NDAA provides substantial direction for the formation of such a professional program, which is no small task because it means a major cultural change in the DoD’s management of security cooperation. The chapter addresses the current organizational structure for security cooperation management at the country level and explains why the congressional direction will require a significant amount of time to implement. It
also points out, again, that while the Defense Department will be responsive to the congressional requirement, success will require full partnership with the Department of State and USAID, to include training their personnel alongside the DoD military officers to ensure a common baseline of knowledge regarding the various security sector assistance programs.

This chapter, like the others, also grapples with the issue of assessing security cooperation activities writ large, and in Africa specifically. It offers sensible advice about dealing with factors beyond U.S. control and the practice of identifying success in program implementation. With respect to both of these matters, the chapter delves into the formation of the U.S. Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). As is indicated in the chapter on PME, the Defense Department and Congress should recognize the limitation of this organization. While it may have a beneficial impact on tactical capability, this is a limitation in that some of the most important organizations for security cooperation and defense institutional building reside in existing Army organizations.

Ultimately, as has been the finding in other recent studies of security cooperation and defense institution building in Africa, the most essential step is setting clear, achievable goals to ensure sustainable results or, if fortunate, solutions. As this chapter points out, and consistent with the observations and findings in the preceding ones, there must be a well-defined linkage between national objectives, theater objectives, and country-specific objectives. This can only be accomplished by interagency and partner dialogue, planning (to include understanding a partner nation’s absorptive capacity and institutional strengths and weaknesses), and agreed upon methods of assessment, to
include accountability in all its dimensions—financial, legal, and policy.

The final chapter addresses accountability, that is, the achievement of policy, financial, and legal commitments by the United States and its African partners, which is an overarching consideration in security cooperation planning and is a central feature of program assessment. This is another area of congressional disquiet. In 2015, the House Committee on the Armed Services expressed its concern “about the lack of strategy guiding these efforts [security cooperation, to include BPC] and how effective these are.” A year later, that concern had not abated. Section 1205 of the FY 2017 NDAA provides a sense of Congress that states that the Secretary of Defense:

should develop and maintain an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework for security cooperation with foreign countries to ensure accountability [emphasis added] and foster implementation of best practices.

Additionally, Section 1252 of the law addresses security assistance programs, of which security cooperation is a part. It specifies, “It is the policy of the United States that the principal goals of the security sector assistance programs and authorities of the United States Government,” including the promotion of “universal values,” such as, “transparent and accountable oversight of security forces.” The Commander, U.S. AFRICOM, General Thomas Waldhauser, shares this concern. In his March 2017 testimony before Senate Committee on Armed Services, he asserted that the United States must remain engaged in the continent, “investing in the capability, legitimacy, and accountability of African defense institutions.”
As these quotes indicate, accountability, in all its aspects, is not only a USG responsibility, but is an activity requiring collaboration with African partners so that U.S. policy goals for security cooperation are achieved successfully. While internationally recognized accounting and auditing standards or assessment criteria are in place to determine financial accountability, the methods of determining accountability in the realm of policy execution are not. Thus, this chapter focuses on what constitutes accountability, as this concept is ambiguous and requires delineation if it is to be put into practice. In discussing this issue, the chapter examines the relationship between these objectives and accountability. It contends that clarity of objectives is a required antecedent to identifying and constructing accountability criteria. It also explains the difference between internal and external accountability, the latter an imperative for meeting congressional concerns, but the former is essential for those managing security cooperation programs. Lastly, the chapter offers criteria for establishing external accountability measures. These criteria, when linked to accountability mechanisms, serve as the building blocks for U.S. and African institutions to use for promoting accountability.

The five chapters address only some of the congressional concerns articulated in the FY 2017 NDAA, but they are also consistent with DoD guidance. The DoD Directive, 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” emphasizes that security cooperation is designed to advance “specific U.S. security interests.” Moreover, defense institution building, as stipulated in DoD Directive 5205.82, deals not only with the support of defense strategy and policy priorities, in such areas as defense education (the subject of the second chapter), but also recognizes
the importance of dealing with humanitarian crises (the subject of the third chapter). Developing a partner nation military’s capacity to support and work with civilian agencies responsible for disaster management and response is a key element of defense institution building. All of these activities are related because they shape the security environment, but they must be achieved in a cost-effective manner, using tools that evaluate the absorptive capacity prior to program start, assess the effectiveness of program implementation on an ongoing basis, and ensure accountability from program start to completion.

The FY 2017 NDAA presents huge challenges for the DoD and its components, as it now demands that a system be established that can link foreign and defense objectives, theater security objectives, and partner nation capacity and accountability. This task in its complete sense cannot be undertaken as a solo act; it requires coordination with other civilian agencies, especially the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. With respect to Africa, the most important step will be formulating the strategy that Congress requires under Section 1273 of the NDAA. It prompts a critical examination of the long-range implications of U.S. policy and strategy toward Africa. The strategy demands a whole-of-government approach and underscores the importance of U.S. national interests as an essential factor in the formulation of this document, but also in its execution. It accentuates as well the emerging Trump administration’s foreign policy, a pragmatic policy in which transactions and the interest of both parties, the United States and its partners, will be important. These interests and policy objectives need to be defined clearly and understood by both parties. Congress has the attention
of the DoD because of the FY 2017 NDAA; it is now up to the DoD to refine its processes and methods to meet the legislative intent of enhancing program effectiveness and transparency.\footnote{This study is an attempt to help in this regard and provide suggestions on how to respond effectively to the law’s provisions.}

ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, \textit{Unified Land Operations}, October 2011, p. 3.


5. \textit{Ibid.}


CHAPTER 1

ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: UNDERSTANDING THE COMPETENCIES NEEDED FOR ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS

Adrian Wolfberg

In November 2016, the U.S. Congress levied a requirement on the Department of Defense (DoD) to evaluate the absorptive capacity of a partner nation prior to initiating security cooperation programs with its receiving institution, organization or unit.¹ This mandate reflects the consensus of the American foreign policymaking, military, and think tank communities that the absence or lack of partner nation absorptive capacity has a negative effect on improving a partner nation’s stability. Few within these communities understand what absorptive capacity is, although everyone claims it is an important factor for achieving American security-related goals in a region.² Yet, if the concept is not understood, then congressional compliance will be an impossible task to achieve.

Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the components of absorptive capacity and determine what it means to evaluate it. Where absorptive capacity has been a most visible topic is in the economic literature where mathematical modeling is used to evaluate the causal relationship between foreign aid and economic growth at the country level.³ To complicate matters, disputes exist within that community as to whether such a causal relationship even exists theoretically or empirically.⁴ Can a macroeconomic lens help answer why a partner nation general officer will gladly accept military systems or assistance from the
United States, but only reluctantly consider the bigger picture of how such systems or forms of assistance fit upward into their culture and institutions, or fail to understand how to integrate such systems downward into their operations? It cannot because human behavior is the object of analysis. Hence, a macroeconomic approach will not be appropriate for a unit and organizational-level analysis of absorptive capacity.

Given that such an approach is inappropriate, this chapter uses the lenses of an organizational view and a competency-based perspective to shed light on the process of absorptive capacity and the ability to evaluate it. Unfortunately, the literature created by the foreign policymaking, military, and think tank communities, and even the economic literature, fails to define absorptive capacity in human terms, or its internal mechanisms and external interfaces to others in organizations, leaving its implementers hamstrung with questions of how to comply with congressional mandates in order to make improvements. All that interested parties know is that something must be done. However, what exactly must be done? Hence, this chapter will also reframe the understanding and role of absorptive capacity in social and organizational contexts. It will do so by elucidating the meaning of absorptive capacity, its internal complexity, its external relationship to related phenomenon (in particular, that of perspective-taking) and how a combined focus on both phenomena is needed to develop competencies in order to achieve sustainable solutions to improve security cooperation. A sustainable solution means that after the assistance program ends, if the partner nation is able to self-generate the resources and/or capability in order to maintain, or even expand upon, the original program intent, then a sustainable solution exists.
Here, the continent of Africa is used to illustrate the imperative for developing a deeper understanding of absorptive capacity, although its application can be applied globally.

AFRICA AS A COMPLEX POLICY AND STRATEGY PROBLEM

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the responsible American geographic combatant command for the African continent (except for Egypt), where more than $1 billion (fiscal year [FY] 2017) of security assistance aid is either controlled (i.e., Title 10 funded) by or monitored (i.e., Title 22 funded). The conditions in Africa are, for the most part, typical of complex problems. Complex problems occur most frequently in social contexts often intertwined with physical constraints. Policy efforts at solving complex problems cannot produce optimal or efficient solutions; at best, complex problems in the domain of policy challenge the notion of even attaining goals, especially if they are unrealistic and unachievable. In terms of strategies that might carry out policies targeted at complex problems, these strategies succumb to the characteristics of being a complex problem. Indicators of complex problems include having many stakeholders, each with their own agendas; having deep-seated and long-term reasons for the problem; being difficult to sustain forward progress; having little foundation for building upon success in the particular context; and having no clear and obvious answer.

For those organizations, like AFRICOM, faced with this double whammy of a complex policy and strategy problem, it becomes imperative to understand the underlying dynamics of the human system, its
mechanisms, and its interfaces within its psychological, social, and physical environment. Africa satisfies these conditions. Outsiders tend to have stereotypical views about Africa, its regions, and its people. Americans in particular tend to view Africans one-dimensionally, using tribal affinity as the dominant characteristic to understand differences among peoples; even though Africans, like anyone else in the world, have nested and multiple identities and loyalties: kinship, language, region, religion, country, town, school, profession, and economic class, to name a few.

While some trends indicate economic progress and political stability have been made in selected areas of the continent, Africa is faced with deep-seated economic and historical structural problems that expose it to vulnerabilities ripe for the spread of terrorism. Four such economic structural problems are most pronounced in Africa. First, civil wars are common and, once begun, the tendency to continue with violence is difficult to stop. Second, corruption is widespread, and, again, once a society has become corrupt, the tendency is to continue to be corrupt. Third, many of its countries are dependent on a single or few resources from which it can derive financial value, a condition that makes it susceptible to instability. Lastly, in general, there is low political accountability to its citizens. Historically, the tradition of colonial intervention in Africa has left its ugly mark, making it difficult for the domestic population to develop its own capacity to function in an information age. Poverty and corruption are rampant, interlinked, and self-reinforcing.

When combining these economic and political forces, it makes perfect sense to leverage security assistance aid to strengthen institutions and improve governance, under the umbrella of security cooperation.
However, the policy objectives that drive security cooperation cannot, by themselves, create sustainable solutions in Africa.¹⁷ A commitment by African nations to their domestic reform is also necessary.¹⁸ With these complex external and internal dynamics at play, it behooves advocates of security cooperation to be realistic about what assistance partner nations in Africa can absorb.

**A POLICY FOCUS ON ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY**

The *National Defense Authorization Act* (NDAA) of 2017 defines security cooperation, in part, as developing a partner nation’s security capabilities.¹⁹ In order to achieve this outcome, a country needs institutions capable of sustaining and controlling capabilities delivered through security cooperation programs.²⁰ Further, to build partner nation institutions, Congress dictates the Secretary of Defense provide to Congress a detailed evaluation of a partner nation’s capacity to absorb the assistance prior to program start.²¹ Evaluating such absorption requires a people- and context-centered focus because people operate in their unique situations, and they are the agents and recipients of such assistance.²²

Yet, the U.S. Government (USG) has never done any systematic evaluation on its security assistance programs.²³ The lack of such a systematic evaluation makes it difficult to establish standards for measurement, which is exactly what the law requires.²⁴ To date, American efforts at monitoring and evaluating foreign assistance programs—the mechanisms for building security cooperation—have typically been limited to accounting for the money spent, not evaluating the recipient’s capacity prior to program implementation.²⁵
The reasons for the focus on accountability of expenditures have been the pervasiveness of corruption and waste in foreign countries; the resultant concern by funding sources and program managers is to track where money goes (instead of its impact), and the requirement by law to do so.26

As a direct result of how evaluation has been framed in this specific way, policymakers are disadvantaged in that these analyses do not provide a significant understanding of a partner nation’s ability to absorb the capacity delivered at the unit, organizational, or institutional level.27 AFRICOM decision makers face the same disadvantage, as they must align their theater campaign plan and the security cooperation activities they are responsible for with what a country and its units can absorb.28 This alignment is especially important since the likelihood of providing assistance to partner nations with low absorptive capacity actually reduces American influence and makes it unlikely it will achieve program outcomes.29

Nowhere in security cooperation policy documents is absorptive capacity defined; nor, it turns out, in think tank research either, which is where almost all of the discussion surrounding absorptive capacity related to security cooperation has resided. Yet, most, if not all, studies conclude that security cooperation efforts should be prioritized based on partner nations with sufficient absorptive capacity. How, then, does one evaluate absorptive capacity? This is an especially relevant question if the emphasis on helping partner nations is based on their sufficient absorptive capacity. There is a consistent call on what needs to be done with reference to the need for an evaluation of absorptive capacity, but voices demanding to know
what absorptive capacity actually is or how to assess absorptive capacity are absent.

For example, in a 2016 RAND study focusing exclusively on defense institution building in Africa—using Liberia and Libya as its two case studies—researchers concluded successful absorptive capacity by a partner nation is correlated to the degree of governance in the partner nation. Efforts helping partner nations to achieve good governance support the objectives of the U.S. Army’s strategy for building partner capacity. The 2016 study indirectly alludes to a definition of absorptive capacity by using the status of a nation’s governance capability as a proxy for evaluating its antecedent to absorb capacity, not the actual absorptive capacity. Their research suggested that for countries that have weak governance, it is of the utmost importance to consider absorptive capacity before a decision is reached to provide foreign assistance because the partner nation may face such severe difficulties, thereby making foreign cooperation difficult and risky. It is well known that achieving a high level of absorptive capacity is difficult because it requires an intense level of exposure to the new knowledge, but once achieved, if indeed possible, having good absorptive capacity helps to thwart the construction of overly ambitious goals set by funding sources and program managers.

Another recent RAND study has reinforced the importance of absorptive capacity in successful foreign assistance to build partner capacity. In an exhaustive 2013 study covering 20 years of data on 29 countries around the world, RAND researchers found that building partner capacity is causally dependent on aligning such delivered capabilities with the partner nation’s absorptive capacity. They concluded that
the strongest and most consistent correlation for success, besides alignment of interests and objectives, is the ability for the partner nation to absorb the goods and services provided. While this RAND study did not define absorptive capacity, it identified the kinds of knowledge—none of which is macroeconomic—needed in an evaluation of it. The study concluded that the DoD must be able to determine the baseline absorptive capacity of a partner nation, which includes, but is not limited to, understanding the following: existing equipment in use, organizational structure and characteristics, readiness, the scope of existing training, technical sophistication, education, language abilities, and doctrine.\textsuperscript{35} Having sufficient absorptive capacity of these and other organizational aspects is a key requirement for security cooperation success.

**ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: MECHANISMS AND CONTEXT**

The phrase “absorptive capacity” has its roots in the sciences where it is used in biology, chemistry, physics, metallurgy, agriculture, food science, forestry, and atmospheric sciences, to name a few. Absorptive capacity—in the physical sciences—involves the use of mathematical modeling to answer outcome questions. For example, at what point will the structural integrity of a skyscraper no longer be able to withstand the effect of an earthquake? How much vitamin C can a human assimilate into their body before its effect becomes positive or, at the other extreme, its effect causes an overdose? When will the percentage of carbon dioxide become so high that it will cause a negative effect to the health of humans? How much salt can be leached into farmland before crops die? Absorptive capacity, at
some point, became a metaphor in the social sciences of economics and aspects of political science, both relying heavily on mathematical modeling and concerned with outcomes such as the gross domestic product (GDP) of a country.

In the economic context, absorptive capacity is a measurement used to determine when a country reaches the marginal rate of return to economic growth falling below an objective, analyzed at the macroeconomic level, or the linkages between macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. In political science, for example, it could be used to address how many more countries the European Union can admit into its membership before it loses its effectiveness and efficiency. The field of psychology was the likely transfer source for its adoption by the managerial sciences. Psychology includes a mathematical and experimental orientation, but also a humanistic and clinical side, which is an orientation conducive to individual and group-level process inquiries.

In the realm of management science, absorptive capacity is a theoretical construct; that is, something that explains human behavior that is not yet able to be observed directly. Absorptive capacity is an abstraction that unfortunately has been reified—taken for granted but without an understanding of what it actually means. It no longer has a meaning at the level of individual or group absorption of knowledge. This reification is why the policy and think tank literature does not define it. The problem with reification is that a word or phrase, such as “absorptive capacity,” can be used to mean anything misplaced; that is, a meaningless substitute for something that is assumed to be concrete. Such would be the case when an unquestioned assumption mistakenly has applied
the macroeconomic dimension of absorptive capacity to the level of individual and group behaviors, as is the case when dealing with societies and institutions like foreign militaries and governments. To correct this misplacement, this chapter uses the following definition of absorptive capacity as a starting point, which originated in management literature in the early 1990s:

The premise of absorptive capacity is that the organization needs prior related knowledge to assimilate and use new knowledge. Accumulated prior knowledge increases both the ability to put new knowledge into memory and the ability to recall and use it.  

This definition has two behavioral mechanisms that potentially could be observed: the taking in of new knowledge and then use of the new knowledge. Figure 1-1 conveys this two-mechanism feature of absorptive capacity.

Figure 1-1. Basic Behaviors of Absorptive Capacity.

This 1990 conceptualization of absorptive capacity has three implications. First, absorptive capacity occurs at multiple levels — the individual, the organizational,
and interorganizational—and each subordinate level contributes to the superior level’s capacity. The key for understanding a partner nation’s absorptive capacity, then, is to understand absorptive capacity at the unit level where individuals and groups work, and how absorptive capacity flows upward and outward into the organization and across to other organizations. The bottom-to-top flow of absorptive capacity also occurs in the reverse, from top-to-bottom. Second, what the individual person or unit already knows prior to contact with new knowledge affects their degree of absorptive capacity. Individual and organizational knowledge is therefore the currency of absorptive capacity. Third, that the cumulative effect of decisions made within a unit and its organization, as well as those between organizations, is their path dependency, which shapes their degree of absorptive capacity. Path dependency is essentially the narrowing effect that an individual’s and an organization’s past decisions have in shaping the degree of openness or flexibility in how one considers the factors involved with decision-making in the present. A well-known yet extreme example of the narrowing effect is the long-standing use of the QWERTY keyboard instead of the adoption of an alternate keyboard configuration that may be more efficient.

By the early 2000s, scholars began to delve deeper into the original 1990 idea of absorptive capacity. Keeping in mind that absorptive capacity is a multilevel phenomenon, this newer conceptualization divided absorptive capacity into four components: knowledge acquisition and knowledge assimilation as the subcomponents of taking in new knowledge, and transformation of knowledge into routines, and exploitation of knowledge to extend its organizational
expertise, as the subcomponents of using new knowledge.\textsuperscript{46} The acquisition of new knowledge means one can identify knowledge external to one’s self and organization as new and relevant rather than ignore, deny, or distort it. Assimilation refers to the extent that individual and organizational frames of reference, norms, schemas, and routines allow one to understand the new knowledge; if one does not have the background to place the new knowledge into a context relevant to existing cognitive frames, then the new knowledge will not be absorbed. Transformation refers to the extent to which the new knowledge changes the status quo and becomes integrated into routines. Exploitation is the ability to use existing or develop new organizational know-how to implement and integrate the routines necessary to operationalize the new knowledge.

By the early 2010s, scholars began understanding absorptive capacity as a complex activity with internal components that are interactive, and that it occurs within a multidimensional external framework, both internally and externally moving through space and time. As to spatial orientation, the four internal components of absorptive capacity were envisioned as highly interactive, not necessarily sequenced in a linear fashion, and connected by social and material translations made by individuals communicating with other individuals.\textsuperscript{47} Externally, as mentioned above, absorptive capacity occurs at multiple levels of human activity: within a single individual, within one’s organization by individuals working in units, and in relationships between individuals from different organizations who interact from within their units representing their organizations to another organization. Most of the empirical research at these levels has occurred in the management field; typically, with for-profit organizations.
What scholars now recognize is the simultaneous interplay across these levels of analysis in how absorptive capacity affects the flow of knowledge and decision-making. At the core of this multilevel system, however, is the role of the individual and the manner in which absorptive capacity is exhibited within and through that individual, and his or her communicative interaction with other individuals.

Absorptive capacity also flows through time; that is, it has a temporal component. In a recent article within the security cooperation literature, the author notes that absorptive capacity occurs across three sequential stages of security assistance:

1. At the front end of the requirement planning process, a determination of whether the end-state (i.e., the outcome that is supposed to result from delivery of goods and/or services provided) is sustainable;

2. Monitoring and assessing during the engagement stage, i.e., seeing whether the process of U.S. implementation can be absorbed by the partner nation; and,

3. Completion of the specific program, long-term monitoring through dynamic feedback loops, the identification of impediments to absorptive capacity and solutions to overcome them.

Figure 1-2 depicts the multidimensional complexity of absorptive capacity and its evolution from the initial, more simplistic conceptualization.
ANTECEDENTS OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

Recently, scholars have identified environmental factors affecting an individual’s, an organization’s, and interorganizational abilities to possess a high level of absorptive capacity.\textsuperscript{50} For example, antecedents (precursors) of absorptive capacity must be considered as critical enablers. Antecedents include the need for a positive management philosophy that ensures porous organizational boundaries so that employees can be open to and identify new sources of knowledge from outside of their particular organizational unit and “silo,” and receive such knowledge from those who have identified it. Similarly, it behooves management to identify those personnel within their organization
who can further identify employees playing roles as boundary spanners, individuals who are particularly good at translating new knowledge into existing knowledge contexts; as well as identify employees who are gatekeepers, individuals who control access to knowledge. When boundary spanners and gatekeepers do not share knowledge, boundaries become opaque and absorptive capacity for those who rely on it becomes low. When boundary spanners and gatekeepers do share knowledge freely and openly, boundaries remain porous and absorptive capacity has the potential to become high.

Organizational features also contribute to effective absorptive capacity. In addition to the pathways that help disseminate knowledge, many other internal features of organizations can have a positive or negative effect on absorptive capacity; but these features are not well studied, though they are suspected as being important considerations. These internal features include the design of the organization and its internal units, the size of the organization, the informal and formal communication networks, and the reward and punishment policies. There are also external features surrounding an organization that come into play. Such external features include how an organization has generally viewed and treated knowledge originating from sources external to it, which is an indication of its path dependence. Path dependency occurs not only within a partner nation’s context but also within the American funding source and program manager’s context.

For a sense of how the phenomenon of path dependency operates, an example from the American context is provided. Some observers have identified historical elements that DoD and civilian security assistance
programs use in the planning of sustainable solutions. These elements represent the effect of path dependency on the ability of institutions to change.\textsuperscript{53} Two elements have been identified in this regard: visibility and viability.\textsuperscript{54} The motivation for visibility is to promote goodwill toward the United States, while the motivation for viability is to have sustainable economic outcomes. Reinforced by path dependency, DoD places more emphasis on access and influence (i.e., visibility), while civilian agencies put more emphasis on sustainability (i.e., viability).\textsuperscript{55} Examples of civilian agencies are the partner nation’s civil society and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) providing goods and services.\textsuperscript{56}

In another example of American path dependency, observers have questioned the reliability of focusing exclusively on governance as a critical success factor and, instead, shifted the focus on the orientation of the American actor involved with foreign assistance. The economist William Easterly, while discussing efforts to combat poverty in less developed countries, identifies two very different path dependencies framing foreign assistance. He suggests that U.S. efforts tend to fail when designed and implemented by those with the “big plan,” those he calls “planners” who focus on the “delivery model,” whereas efforts that tend to succeed occur when projects are designed and implemented by those he calls “searchers,” who create sustainable solutions by adapting to local conditions, understanding what really works at the ground level, and creating dynamic feedback mechanisms with those in receipt of goods and services.\textsuperscript{57} Examples of planners are project and program managers within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department
of State, DoD, the U.S. Army, and combatant commands. Examples of searchers are NGOs.\textsuperscript{58}

Similarly, how a partner nation has viewed and treated alliances within its national security apparatus, other government entities outside of the national security institutions, as well as foreign non-security organizations are key indicators of how path dependency can affect absorptive capacity. Nevertheless, it is not only how knowledge is treated across organizations; it is also how individuals are viewed and treated, and interrelated, because who they are and where they are organizationally aligned affect absorptive capacity. When individuals within partner nation organizations view and treat individuals from other organizations as threats, then low levels of absorptive capacity result. In the same vein, when individuals within organizations view and treat individuals from other organizations as allies, then high levels of absorptive capacity can be reached.

Other path dependency factors can have a moderating effect on absorptive capacity. The culture, both organizational and national, can have a significant positive or negative effect on absorptive capacity. One such key factor that can influence the effects of culture is the style and norms of communication and interrelatedness between individuals, including the practices, values, and beliefs assumed.\textsuperscript{59} When cultural differences are extreme, absorptive capacity is expected to be low. When they are closely aligned, it is expected to be high. In addition to relatively static influences of culture, there are dynamic features in the environment that affect absorptive capacity. These include the political, economic, and technological differences between organizations and the level of stability of these differences.\textsuperscript{60}
How individuals, units, organizations, and institutions adapt to these dynamic features is indicative of their absorptive capacity. In the United States, when the environment is chaotic and unstable, absorptive capacity is often hoped for and used in order to be innovative, to seek new solutions or new ways of doing business.\textsuperscript{61} Instability can trigger the need for high levels of absorptive capacity. However, in other countries such as those in Africa, instability may narrow the organization’s viewpoint, decrease flexibility in new approaches, and result in low absorptive capacity. If an American, who assumes instability can ignite absorptive capacity, applies this assumption to a country where instability diminishes absorptive capacity, then this error in judgment would be an example of mirror imaging.\textsuperscript{62} An accurate evaluation of absorptive capacity would reduce the chances for making mirror-imaging judgments.

**ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: THE IMPACT OF BOUNDARIES**

How new knowledge is encountered by individuals within and between organizations is a function of the relationship between these individuals and the unit and organizational boundaries where they and the knowledge crosses.\textsuperscript{63} Boundaries are defined within the context of human behavior: boundaries are socially constructed conceptual distinctions created intentionally to foster specific patterns of behavior by one set of individuals that are different from other sets of individuals.\textsuperscript{64} The management value of boundaries is their control over individuals, units, and organizations by establishing specialized patterns of behavior by which one devotes his or her energy, distinct from
other patterns of behavior within other boundaries. Unfortunately, what could be considered a positive feature of boundaries—deeper specialized knowledge for the organization—is also a negative feature because it retards the needed effort of integrating knowledge across boundaries.

Ease of boundary crossing varies from open to restricted, and is subject to the influences of the antecedents and effects of external context discussed above. Detecting the existence and recognizing the character of a boundary are therefore key competencies for organizational members who evaluate the absorptive capacity of individuals, units, and organizations. The reason is because communication across boundaries requires an understanding of a common linguistic basis: the structure of expressions, sentences, and paragraphs (syntax); the meaning of these elements (semantics); and the knowledge of how these meanings can be applied to understand each actor’s world and shape action (pragmatics). When there is a large difference between two linguistic bases, there is great difficulty in moving knowledge across boundaries, because each party has difficulty understanding the other’s meaning, which has the effect of lowering absorptive capacity.

When boundary-crossing challenges become intense and divisive, the search for a unifying common knowledge necessary for absorption seems unlikely. What needs to occur in this case, or even in cases where boundary challenges are not so extreme, is to create a shared artifact—conceptual or physical—that can be used to help negotiate the different interests and meanings by laying down the foundation for introducing new knowledge to either side. What is needed is an artifact that can preserve the worldviews of both
the person carrying knowledge through a boundary and the person on the other side of the boundary, the expected recipient, while at the same time provide enough flexibility to overcome the limitations of path dependence and increase absorptive capacity. Such an artificially created artifact is called a boundary object.68

Creating boundary objects to fit such a need can be a tremendously difficult task. There are many examples of boundary objects. A representative sample of the types of boundary objects that have been studied includes charts,69 machines and machine parts,70 metaphors,71 narratives,72 stories and storytelling,73 production development,74 biological samples,75 and simulation technology.76 All these boundary objects typically come into existence because of specific organizational problems that individuals involved in crossing boundaries experienced in the course of sharing new knowledge. The challenge is then to create boundary objects that operate at the intersection of the two disparate knowledge communities. Boundary objects that achieve a pathway for new knowledge to be exchanged and understood will facilitate higher levels of absorptive capacity than those that fail.

Cultural contexts may be too extremely different to establish and maintain boundary objects as a mechanism for transiting boundaries to increase absorptive capacity. Creating such common ground may not be possible or likely. For example, other countries sometimes fear the idea of a centralized, federal government, an idea that Americans take for granted, so assumptions about new knowledge by one side will not be valid by the other. In a country like Libya, many have a deep-seated mistrust of having a centralized government because of path dependency, the fact that the history of a centralized government reminds its citizens
of the negative effects and inequality by its past totalitarian regime and colonialism. However, what can be done is to construct common procedures and interpretations, rather than an underlying common ground, with the receiving individuals and organizations of new knowledge. Called a trading zone, this artificially created cultural artifact operates at the local level, within the context of the recipient. Trading zones are symbolic spaces where differences in beliefs and actions will not appreciably change, yet the zones are designed so they are mutually recognizable, provide valid procedures, and standardize interpretations. Establishing and maintaining a trading zone supports higher levels of absorptive capacity.

Beyond the role of boundary objects and trading zones, how and whether knowledge successfully crosses boundaries to be absorbed is highly dependent on the political, organizational, and social power of the individual sending knowledge across boundaries as well as those who are the recipients. Power is defined as the ability to achieve a desired outcome, and it is a fundamental motivation by individuals and units within organizations, as well as the motivation for achieving higher order organizational goals. Power relations operate within units of an organization, across organizations and stakeholders. As a result, powerful individuals—like those with positional authority—can have a significant impact on the absorptive capacity process. This effect occurs through individuals acting alone or influencing others acting as boundary spanners and gatekeepers, and those operating within the boundary, where boundary objects and trading zones can be artificially constructed and cooperatively constructed. Identifying sources of power, then, becomes a key competency to identify prospects and strategies for understanding absorptive
capacity. Figure 1-3 summarizes how antecedents and boundary effects surround the hierarchically diverse and temporally phased nature of absorptive capacity, which is involved in the processing of new knowledge into absorbable and usable knowledge.

Figure 1-3. Absorptive Capacity: Antecedents and Boundary Effect.

THE ROLE OF PERSPECTIVE-TAKING TO DETECT ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

The next part of this chapter is introduced by way of analogy. In the domain of national security and domestic law enforcement, the goal of intelligence analysis is to provide decision makers with the knowledge they need to take action, if any. The creation of
such knowledge can be broadly explained as a three-step process. The first step is for the intelligence analyst to understand how the phenomenon manifests itself in contextually relevant conditions. In other words, the first step is to understand the threat. Up to this point in this chapter, the phenomenon of absorptive capacity has been revealed in some detail, displayed in Figures 1-1 through 1-3. The second step for the intelligence analyst is to understand how various sensor-based resources available to him or her can detect the threat; this is an important step because understanding how a phenomenon is evolving in real-time is a dynamic situation and, quite often, sensor-based information does not completely detect or explain the threat behavior. However, at a minimum, the analyst must understand the collection sources and methods available, their limitations and capabilities, the information provided at the moment, and the degree to which that information supports or discounts the existence of a threat. To evaluate absorptive capacity also requires understanding how one observes or detects it. The third step is making inferential judgments based on imperfect and limited data and determining how it applies to understanding and expressing the threat conditions.

To recap, there are a lot of moving parts to understanding absorptive capacity, an extremely complex phenomenon that occurs as a human activity, and one in which aspects may be transparent or invisible—aspects almost guaranteed to be interdependent. Detecting absorptive capacity, like the intelligence analyst’s second step, requires an understanding of how the phenomenon presents itself. In terms of absorptive capacity, the U.S. service or civilian member of the DoD, the U.S. Army, or other security cooperation actor must be able to detect the absorptive capacity of
individuals in partner nations. Such detection involves perspective-taking. Briefly, perspective-taking is the ability to understand how other’s think and act, putting oneself in the shoes of the other, in order to detect their level of absorptive capacity. Perspective-taking provides oneself the ability to diagnose socially interactive contexts, another reason why it is an important antecedent to assessing absorptive capacity.83

Scholars have recently taken a deeper look into the components of perspective-taking. First, perspective-taking is very specific to the other person being perceived.84 The uniqueness, the context, and the transparency and complexity of the other person will shape the demands upon perspective-taking. Second, perspective-taking consists of three components: cognitive, emotional, and perceptual.85 Cognitive perspective-taking has to do with how one understands the other’s perspective, and how that perspective relates to the other’s goals. Emotional perspective-taking judges the degree of similarity between the two—the one doing the perspective-taking and the one being assessed—to include how interpersonal relations are viewed, how establishing and maintaining professional and personal friendships are viewed, and what is socially acceptable or not. Perceptual perspective-taking is the self-assessment, by both actors, of their ability to use perspective-taking on the other, and the communication mechanisms—verbal and nonverbal—for making such assessments.

How perspective-taking relates to absorptive capacity can now be made explicit. The cognitive and emotional components of perspective-taking help the one doing the perspective-taking of “seeing” the knowledge being conveyed and how the new knowledge is positioned by the other person to be absorbed.
The cognitive and perceptual components, meanwhile, help the one doing the perspective-taking to “believe” what he or she is seeing. This relationship implies that absorptive capacity operates recursively; that is, as a recurrent or repeated process, with perspective-taking. The perspective taker can hopefully see and interpret the absorptive capacity of the other, but only to the extent the perspective taker’s own level of absorptive capacity from seeing and believing will afford. Accuracy of detection and interpretation are key competencies for both absorptive capacity and perspective-taking. Thus, perspective-taking is a necessary antecedent for the detection and understanding of how others take in knowledge, and how their antecedents to absorptive capacity such as beliefs, goals, and intentions affect them.

CONTEXTS THAT INFLUENCE PERSPECTIVE-TAKING

Culture, like absorptive capacity, is a theoretical construct that is not directly observable, but only detected and interpreted by physical, communication, and behavioral symbolic forms. One challenge that immediately comes to mind is that differences in society, economics, and social norms make it very difficult to see the other person accurately; in fact, scholars have known for a long time that failure to take the perspective of the other person results in the failure to understand their background and expectations. Moreover, the direction of causality can be reversed as well. A second compounding challenge is that individuals within units of organizations—affected by its unit and organizational culture—see the world through that unit’s frame. This means that the U.S. actor, who is
embedded within his or her unit’s framework, has an especially difficult time taking the perspective of the individual within the partner nation unit’s framework.

A seminal American example from the 1950s demonstrates this well-known phenomenon: vice-presidents from a large organization, ranging from departments such as marketing, engineering, manufacturing, research and development, and sales, were given a hypothetical problem to solve, but they were asked to assume the vantage point of the president of the organization. Each provided a solution, but each solution was centered on their department’s culture and capabilities, not the view that the president would have spanning across functions. The vice presidents were not able to take the perspective of another, yet the survival of the organization was dependent on them taking a different perspective. A key factor in why perspective-taking is so difficult is that humans, operating in organizations of any type, have their unique “life world” or “thought world.” Life or thought worlds are the socially constructed assumptions, procedures, norms, and goals that individuals possess, and individuals within units typically share. To achieve successful perspective-taking requires one to value the diversity of knowledge, to recognize and accept that other persons may have different ways of thinking and acting, and to engage in inferential and judgmental cognitive processes.

For an example of how life or thought worlds come into play, scholars have investigated whether perspective-taking is affected at a systemic level. In one interesting study, the cultural differences between American and East-Asian cultures were contrasted. China has a collectivist culture whereas America has an individualistic one. The results of the study indicate
that in cultures focused on interdependence between its members, perspective-taking is enhanced, whereas cultures focused on independence have a more difficult time being effective at perspective-taking. In a different study about the effects of culture, three East African countries (the Republic of Kenya, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and the Republic of Zambia) and three West African countries (the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of Ghana, and the Republic of Sierra Leone) had a very high level of collectivism.97 While not all African countries were included in the study, the results are informative. In this same study, American culture had a very high level of individualism, which strongly suggests that Americans have a difficult time gaining insight into the perspective of others.

Another relevant aspect of this study is the value placed on power distance. Power distance is the degree people working in organizations view the centralization of authority within the management structure, whether it is a high or low barrier to freedom of decision-making at any hierarchical level.98 The study concluded that the West and East African countries had a high power distance, while Americans exhibited a very low power distance. These conclusions mean that perspective-taking in the face of significant cultural differences will demand competencies perhaps not yet routinely exhibited by Americans.

In contexts such as Africa, where multicultural perspective-taking is needed, the kind of competencies required by Americans include not only regional expertise, but also, more importantly, self-awareness, personal, and interpersonal social skills.99 More advanced perspective-taking competencies are needed as well. These include knowledge extraction skills,
interpretation skills, and an understanding of how other cultures have framed the individual’s model of reality. How one achieves these basic and advanced competencies becomes important. An individual must be able to leave their ego at the door in order to see the cognitive processing and emotional context of the other; he or she must be willing to exert the effort necessary to understand the knowledge processing activities of the other; and the individual must be proficient at inferential thinking, tapping into relevant experience, and detecting and interpreting nonverbal cues.

Like absorptive capacity, there is an antecedent dispositional factor to perspective-taking: being willing and motivated to engage in perspective-taking. This dispositional factor is important because perspective-taking is not only a cognitive activity, it also involves the existence and influence of relationship activities between the one doing the perspective-taking and the one being observed. Perspective-taking also allows one to detect and understand the power motivations of the other person, which is especially relevant if hidden agendas and agreements with other actors exist. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, sent President John F. Kennedy two proposals. The first one was influenced by a hidden agenda, but the second was not. It was the second one that Kennedy accepted, because an advisor to Kennedy, Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson, who had lived with Khrushchev and his wife in the Soviet Union, had intimate knowledge of Khrushchev’s interests, motives, and behaviors, and was able to identify the second proposal as the one that allowed Khrushchev to be perceived domestically as a winner by withdrawing from Cuba. Hidden agendas
and agreements are common behavioral patterns associated with corruption.

In addition to the perspective-taking’s antecedent dispositional factor, there are cognitive and emotional antecedents. Cognitive antecedents include one’s cognitive complexity, emotional regulation, working memory, level of and triggering context of anxiety, time pressure involved, and cognitive load. Emotional antecedents include the level of one’s emotional intelligence and flexibility in operating in the role one is placed.

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY AND PERSPECTIVE-TAKING**

Evaluating absorptive capacity is a complex, recursive human activity intimately dependent on perspective-taking. First, how absorptive capacity in another person and units of organization manifests themselves, as discussed above, must be known. Second, perspective-taking provides the seeing and believing capabilities needed to detect absorptive capacity. Antecedents and context affect perspective-taking. Its antecedents include dispositional, cognitive, and emotional factors, while cultural contexts include differences in life/thought worlds, extent of individualist versus collectivistic culture, and view toward power within organizational contexts. These antecedents and cultural contexts affect how one takes in perspectives and how one diagnoses the absorptive capacity of others. Third, the incoming information resulting from perspective-taking then succumbs to one’s own absorptive capacity in interpreting and using the incoming knowledge. The level of complexity of the absorptive capacity of one’s self will be dependent on his or her
cognitive and emotional context, which requires one to be able to assess one’s absorptive capacity in context. Although not further discussed in this chapter, the recursive feature of absorptive capacity will trigger the repetitive process of perspective-taking by the other person who needs it to assess one’s absorptive capacity of the other, and on and on the iterative relationship between absorptive capacity and perspective-taking will continue.107 The recursive nature of communication behavior between two people is a natural feature of human communication, providing the foundation for evaluating absorptive capacity based on perspective-taking.108 Figure 1-4 summarizes the overall complexity of evaluating absorptive capacity, building on information in Figures 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3, and what it takes to understand the absorptive capacity of other individuals, units, and organizations.
Figure 1-4. Complexity of Evaluating Absorptive Capacity.

COMPETENCIES FOR DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS

There is broad agreement that the key to achieving sustainable solutions in Africa and elsewhere is an accurate evaluation of the partner nation’s unit and organizational absorptive capacity. Because the security cooperation community has typically framed absorptive capacity in macroeconomic terms, this chapter’s function has been to reframe absorptive capacity at a human scale. In so doing, it has identified three major competencies as being necessary to evaluate absorptive capacity:
1. Understand the factors associated with absorptive capacity in and between individuals, units, and organizations of specific partner nations;
2. Understand an individual’s competency in perspective-taking of that absorptive capacity; and,
3. Have and/or develop an analytic skill of inferential judgment to fill in the uncertainty gaps from less than complete knowledge gained through perspective-taking of absorptive capacity.

This chapter has explained the evaluation process as well as what it takes to carry out such an evaluation process since, at this point, no one has come forth with the competencies required for project and program managers to evaluate absorptive capacity. While this chapter does not provide specific instructions on procedures, or how to measure such procedures—neither does it attempt to narrow such an application to apply only to Africa—what follows next are proposals for developing these competencies. Improvements entail, for the most part, reliance on educating DoD, the U.S. Army, and supporting personnel; although improvements can be supplemented by on-the-job experiences.

**Understand Absorptive Capacity**

The proposed way ahead involves a new type of thinking; first, in terms of leadership expectations about learning, how to do things differently by conceptualizing progress in terms of process, not on achieving an immediate outcome. Second, in terms of employees and other supporting personnel following through with such expectations, an interdisciplinary and self-developmental approach is needed. However, such an approach will be challenging, and it will
take time to make significant progress. Regarding the first type of thinking for leadership, this will mean a commitment to becoming a learning organization. A learning organization is one in which new ideas are embraced, which can be very challenging for employees who are expected to follow established policies, rules, and procedures. The need for the U.S. Army to be a learning organization is becoming exceedingly more important. A learning organization is the antidote to path dependency, the former difficult to create, the latter difficult to overcome.

Leadership can use two key levers to help employees become a learning organization. One is ensuring that the capacity and capability for reflection and analysis exist in order to pay attention to the mechanisms involved with absorptive capacity and perspective-taking; and the other, since boundaries are such a key component of knowledge considerations for absorptive capacity and perspective-taking, is taking steps to make boundaries more open and porous. Both leadership efforts will be challenging, because in the DoD and uniformed military services, especially the U.S. Army, there is a tendency to create a one-size-fits-all approach to learning; instead, what is needed is an approach designed around the situational context. Why such a focus on situational context is needed is especially relevant for Africa, because what Africa needs for achieving a sustainable solution requires individuals to have an improved knowledge of oneself, the other person (the principal involved), and the environment in which the other person operates.

Attention is now turned to the civilian employees, service personnel, and contractors who will be in the business of evaluating absorptive capacity, and require an interdisciplinary and self-developmental approach.
Returning to the intelligence analysis analogy mentioned earlier, one requirement is to understand the components of the threat, which, in this case, is the understanding of the interdisciplinary components of absorptive capacity as depicted in Figures 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, and 1-4. This is a knowledge acquisition process: something that can be learned through the design and implementation of an educational program. Expertise from NGOs—both U.S.-based and partner nation-based—that live and work in the partner nation could be invaluable and desirable sources of contextual information for such a program. Other sources are principals of the partner nation’s civil society such as individuals within academia, foundations, polity, and professional associations.

Understand Perspective-taking

Regarding the second type of thinking, the more complex requirement is to understand how to make use of and improve one’s perspective-taking in order to detect absorptive capacity. Perspective-taking, like the intelligence analysis analogy, is the method by which an evaluation of absorptive capacity occurs based on perceived information of absorptive capacity. While perspective-taking can be learned, it also can be improved through experience. For perspective-taking, four focus areas are recommended for self-development: paying attention, suspending judgment, figuring out what is important, and being open to new knowledge. These four areas are discussed next.

Paying Attention.

The mechanisms by which individuals pay attention to elements in their social and organizational
environment consists to a large degree of selective attention, attentional vigilance, and executive attention.\textsuperscript{114} Selective attention is the motivation and process by which an individual focuses his or her information processing energy on some particular aspect in his/her environment at any one time. In real world conditions, the effects of information overload and ambiguity in one’s personal context confound the degree to which one can pay attention to any one aspect of their environment.\textsuperscript{115} Being aware of these confounding effects and measures to mitigate them would be an imperative to improving selective attention and, therefore, a necessary competency. In real world conditions, individuals have to be aware of and pay attention to many aspects in their environment simultaneously; this is called mindfulness and is a highly desirable competency.\textsuperscript{116} Attentional vigilance is spending sufficient time focusing and considering the meaning of something or someone in one’s environment and, therefore, also an important competency. How much time one spends depends on the individual, but the more important indication of sufficiency of time is the depth of understanding achieved. Of course, the effects of information overload and ambiguity will be present. Finally, executive attention is a higher order conceptual process by which one incorporates the knowledge gained through selective attention and attentional vigilance into one’s decision-making about the meaning and implications of the environment.

\textit{Suspending Judgment.}

The results of what one pays attention to in selective attention and attentional vigilance succumb to the human tendency to judge the other person. This calls
for individuals to suspend judgment on what they think is right or wrong.\textsuperscript{117} As discussed above, many aspects are involved in absorptive capacity where fundamental differences exist between Americans and Africans, which makes it easier for the former to make judgments about the latter, and of course, it works in reverse as well. Being able to pay attention without making a judgment is a competency in which the individual listens and observes to the maximum extent possible to achieve the best understanding of a situation.

\textit{Deciding on Importance}.

Deciding what is important from what one understands is another key area that supports effective perspective-taking. What makes something important to understand is usually something one does not already understand. Indications of confusion are then sources to focus energy to clarify. Specific sources of confusion are the appearance and recognition of contradictions.\textsuperscript{118} Effort spent on resolving contradictions is one pathway to developing a competency of self-development.\textsuperscript{119}

\textit{Open to New Knowledge}.

Finally, how one applies the new insight from new knowledge will determine whether new learning occurs. Either an individual fits new knowledge into an existing cognitive frame or his/her cognitive frame expands or shifts, thereby creating a new way of seeing the world.\textsuperscript{120} The components of absorptive capacity also affect the self in determining whether frames of reference remain the same or change over the course of time while interacting with one’s social world. This
is the recursive nature of perspective-taking discussed above.

**Inferential Judgment**

Since perfect knowledge of the human behavior domain is not possible due to the limitations of bounded rationality in organizational settings, dealing with uncertainty is a normal feature of everyday and scientific life. An accurate understanding of absorptive capacity in others (and one’s self) and one’s perspective-taking is not immune to this limitation. Dealing with uncertainty generally affords individuals two options: one is to attempt to eliminate it, while the other is to manage it. Because the context of partner nations, such as many of those in Africa, manifests itself in a multitude of complex dimensions, as discussed above, the latter is deemed achievable and therefore, most appropriate. In order to manage uncertainty, one needs an abundance of meta-cognition: to be sensitive to what one thinks is known, what one thinks is not known, what one thinks is happening in the environment one is paying attention to, what one thinks is driving the behavior of others, and where one thinks the events unfolding in the environment are headed. Meta-cognition, the ability to detect and accurately interpret one’s own thought processes, is a critical competency to assess one’s inferences and performance.

The means by which one manages uncertainty is dependent on the methods one uses to handle inferences made about the world. An inference is the character of the cause-and-effect relationship an individual makes about the world, whether implicit or explicit. Inferential judgment is a cognitive journey, moving
upwards on a “ladder of inference” that begins by the individual naming the data or phenomenon he or she observed; next, it develops into ways of describing the named thing or related things based on its meanings, and then further develops by applying these meanings onto the interpretations of the actions and communication behavior of others, and finally terminates with a conclusion about the meaning of the broader event or behavior. There are an abundant number of opportunities during this inferential journey for reasoning to stumble as one moves from the lowest data level to the highest conclusion level.

The challenges in making accurate inferential judgments abound but it is in this analytic space that evaluating the limitations of what we know about absorptive capacity and perspective-taking reside. Examples of key analytic challenges include not examining the validity or rigor of the inferences one makes; placing too much importance or too little importance on a specific piece of data or phenomenon; interpreting conflicting information in a way that merely reinforces one’s view of the world instead of challenging it; relying on inferences that are difficult for others or one’s self to examine; and not taking advantage of analytic techniques that reside in the social sciences.

One way to improve the construction of valid inferences from perspective-taking of the other person’s absorptive capacity is to consider alternative explanations as to why the event or behavior observed is interpreted. Another way is, when confronted with explanations that conflict with one’s view of the world, to work through the conflict using critical thinking to accommodate a different view of the world. Another way to assess one’s inferences is to ask others what they think and listen to the logic of their inference
development, compare it to one’s own, and discuss where there are differences. Faulty inferences lead to overconfidence and inaccurate conclusions about events and behaviors, which lead to faulty evaluations of absorptive capacity. All of these suggestions require a sufficient competency in meta-cognition.

Figure 1-5 summarizes the competencies needed to evaluate absorptive capacity. The first skill is to understand the complex nature of absorptive capacity and perspective-taking, and why perspective-taking is the key method for detecting it. The second is to improve one’s perspective-taking abilities through both education and experience to pay attention, suspend judgment, figure out what is important, and incorporate new insights. The third is to use the analytical skills associated with inferential judgment, especially meta-cognition, which is an awareness of how one’s inferences are constructed and evaluated, in order to manage the uncertainty associated with incomplete knowledge of others’ absorptive capacity and one’s perspective-taking.
CONCLUSION

Countries in Africa, like others in the world, have their complex natures and characters. Perhaps, as an extreme example of a continent, Africa has a combination of historical and contextual factors that make it especially unstable and difficult to stabilize, thus creating a security vacuum in parts of the continent. In unstable situations, American efforts at security cooperation have focused on strengthening institution building. Policy guidance and those charged with implementing a theater strategy have called for better outcomes. Studies by think tanks have confirmed that evaluating absorptive capacity prior to cooperative engagement is critical because security assistance efforts into countries with a low absorptive capacity will fail and have
a negative blowback toward the United States. It is no longer a question of what needs to be done; it is now the question of how to do it. This is especially important because statutory change dictates the requirement for the DoD, geographic combatant commands, and the U.S. Army to evaluate a partner nation’s absorptive capacity prior to the start of security assistance programs.

No one in the defense community has spelled out who should, and what is needed, to evaluate absorptive capacity at a human scale. Policymakers and think tanks alike have assumed that “absorptive capacity” is a well-known and well-formed concept, derived from a macroeconomic lens. This chapter has attempted to correct this fallacy of misplaced concreteness by reframing absorptive capacity based on its conceptualization in the management sciences and incorporating a competency-based approach. Temporal and spatial factors relating to absorptive capacity were overlaid, and finally, antecedents were incorporated. Perspective-taking was introduced and explained along with its mechanisms and antecedents by which the evaluation of absorptive capacity is made.

The important relationship between absorptive capacity and perspective-taking was made explicit, as well as the recursive nature of both. Recommendations were made for leadership and the implementers: the employees, uniformed service members, and contractors who will be the ones evaluating the absorptive capacity of individuals, units, and organizations in partner nations. Leadership responsibilities included creating the vision that evaluating absorptive capacity is a process that will take some time to implement successfully. Those who do the evaluating will need three fundamental competencies: to learn about the
multi-dimensional and interdisciplinary nature of absorptive capacity and perspective-taking; to develop the interpersonal skills to pay attention, suspend judgment, determine what is important, and integrate new knowledge; and, to reflect upon, accurately assess, and modify their inferential judgments as they move from data observation to conclusion.

From a strategic perspective, the 2017 NDAA’s requirement for evaluating absorptive capacity prior to initiating security cooperation programs has been a forcing function for the DoD, the U.S. Army, the future of military foreign aid within geographic combatant commands, and this chapter’s reframing contribution. In doing so, this chapter specifies the characteristics of and linkages between absorptive capacity and perspective-taking, as well as the competencies where further developmental work is needed. It offers military and civilian leaders the potential opportunity to moderate security cooperation programs by those variables specific to a particular partner nation; and more importantly, the partner nation units, and its key individuals.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1


2. As an example of the few, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), responsible for civilian foreign aid, is attempting to deal with the challenge of assessing absorptive capacity beyond the macroeconomic lens. USAID considers it important, in this regard, to understand the entire human system when evaluating the local context, which includes the multitude of individuals who work in a partner nation potentially affected by assistance programs, their interrelationships, and the incentives that drive their behaviors. See USAID, Local Systems: A

3. For examples in scholarly literature, see Simon Feeny and Ashton de Silva, “Measuring Absorptive Capacity Constraints to Foreign Aid,” Economic Modelling, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2012, pp. 725-733; and Paolo de Renzio, “Increased Aid vs Absorptive Capacity: Challenges and Opportunities Towards 2015,” IDS Bulletin, Vol. 36, No. 3, July 2005, pp. 20-27. For an example in the policy community, where macroeconomic measures are deemed appropriate, see Department of State, Plan to Implement a Security Sector Assistance Planning Process, 2013-2015, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, September 24, 2013, p. 39. However, for an example from the think tank community, where in at least one case involving the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, something more than a macroeconomic measure is needed, such as access to a legal advisor, see Walter L. Perry, Stuart E. Johnson, Stephanie Pezard, Gillian S. Oak, David Stebbins, and Chaoling Feng, Defense Institution Building: An Assessment, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016, p. 55.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


32. Ibid.


35. Ibid., p. xx.


37. Cohen and Levinthal.


41. Cohen and Levinthal, p. 129.

43. Cohen and Levinthal.

44. Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 98-99. In the social sciences, a phenomenon closely related to path dependence is imprinting, which essentially means that the decisions we make in the present are shaped by our past, regardless of the changed conditions in the present while making the application of past patterns of decision-making not particularly relevant. See, for example, Christopher Marquis and András Tilcsik, “Imprinting: Toward a Multilevel Theory,” *Academy of Management Annals*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2013, pp. 193-243.


48. Ibid.


50. Volberda et al.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.
53. Path dependency means that the ability of institutions to change is affected by the decisions made during the evolution of the institutions, while considering the political, social, cultural, etc. contexts within and outside it. See Douglass C. North, “Institutions,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1991, p. 97-112.


55. Ibid.


57. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

58. Whether the distinctions of planners and searchers remain as polarized as Easterly depicted in *The White Man’s Burden* (2006) is uncertain, although it would seem that by working together, planners and searchers would deliver better outcomes than either working independently.


60. Volberda *et al*.

61. Ibid.


63. Marabelli and Newell.


75. Star and Griesemer.


79. Ibid., p. 784.


82. Todorova and Durisin.


85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.
87. Scholars have discussed at length the recursive relationship of absorptive capacity and organizational learning, including innovation, for example: Lane et al. (2006) and Volberda et al. (2010). Perspective taking is known to be an element of organizational learning, see Richard J. Boland, Jr. and Ramkrishnan V. Tenkasi, “Perspective Making and Perspective Taking in Communities of Knowing,” Organization Science, Vol. 6, No. 4, July-August 1995, pp. 350-372; and Litchfield and Gentry.


94. Dougherty.

95. Boland and Tenkasi.

96. Wu and Keysar.

98. Ibid.


100. Ibid., p. 11.

101. Ibid., p. 12.


103. Ibid.


106. Ku et al.


112. Keim, p. 102.


119. Ibid.


123. *Ibid*.


128. Wolfberg, “When Generals Consume Intelligence.”

129. Argyris.

130. Nickerson.
INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The term “building partner capacity” (BPC) has a long history in the Department of Defense (DoD) since entering its lexicon in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Since then, BPC has become a useful term of art throughout the DoD and among Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) as they develop and execute theater-level strategies in support of U.S. national security objectives. In 2011, Army doctrine defined BPC as:

the outcome of comprehensive, interorganizational activities, programs and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.

Although that definition does not appear in the updated version of the relevant doctrinal publication, it does emphasize the breadth of effort and activities involved in building capacity for security and the interagency coordination necessary between the DoD and other organizations involved in such an enterprise.

Over the years, BPC and Africa appeared made for each other. U.S. foreign policy embraced the concept of “African Solutions for African Problems,”
a notion predicated on the idea that African states, using their inherent resources, would be the primary means for dealing with African security issues. Multiple U.S., African, and partner programs, going back to the African Crisis Response Initiative, the French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities, and the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, labored under the goal of creating a capable body of African troops that, by themselves, would have both the capability and sustained capacity to intervene in security crises on the continent in a manner consistent with U.S. and international interests and values.

This approach proved to be easier said than done. In the past decade, a number of studies recognized that the United States has had difficulty building sustainable capacity because the DoD BPC enterprise has been overly focused on tactical capability generation based on a “train and equip” mentality. In 2016, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) discussed the impact of this approach. CALL observed, particularly with respect to Africa, that the available legal authorities address efforts “only at the tactical and operational levels; more focus is needed at the institutional level.” This is a major point; a short-term focus hampers institutionalization of capacity in partner nations’ military processes and practices that ultimately enable them to deploy and resolve security crises in their own nation or elsewhere on the continent. The establishment of sustainable processes and practices, in many cases, means changing the way of thinking of partner nations’ militaries, a very difficult, and certainly a long-term undertaking. It also means that such activities cannot be solely embarked upon and achieved through the
efforts of U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), or even U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

BPC has been viewed largely as a theater shaping activity (Phase 0) based on the assumption that building the capability and capacity of partners enables weak states to overcome deficiencies so they can effectively manage their own, and regional, security problems. In these terms, BPC is an economy of force option that generates non-U.S. means to mitigate threats, and thereby lowers the probability that U.S. forces will have to be deployed in large numbers to resolve a situation through the use of military power in any of its manifestations. More recently, the DoD focus has been on enabling the security partner to deal with instability on its own, thereby BPC becomes inherently a security force assistance (SFA) task focusing on the development of sustainable autonomous capability and capacity.

However, such lines of attack miss some important points of emphasis in the definition provided previously. First, the stress based on the new provisions regarding security cooperation in the fiscal year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is on outcomes, or results, focused on strategic ends; not on shaping activities, which are ways. While Phase 0 activities are important, sometimes critical, the essential aspect is not whether a training plan was executed successfully, or an accounting of the number of personnel trained or the exercises conducted, but on how did the activities conducted by the U.S. Army, or other entities, contribute to the achievement of theater security objectives. Second, by emphasizing outcomes, there is a need for clear and precise measures of performance and effectiveness for evaluating whether progress is being made toward attaining those theater objectives.
Granted, such measures are difficult to construct, but the NDAA mandates that the Army has the means to conduct such assessments across the spectrum of activities within the scope of security cooperation, which includes professional military education (PME).  

PME can be an effective tool for transforming militaries and generating sustainable capacity because it provides a means of changing the way military personnel think about problems. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) succinctly captures this point in one of its recent reports: “Professional military education is the key to the development of the nation’s armed forces.” The U.S. Defense Department has long been interested in PME systems and Africa. AFRICOM’s first U.S. Army War College (USAWC) and the Command and General Staff College Alumni Symposium in 2012 focused on the benefits of PME as one of its plenary sessions. Additionally, PME curricula and the formation of military schools and development programs are included in current country plans for African nations.

However, despite this interest and investment in African PME, the question remains: How well does DoD understand the PME systems that it is dealing with in Africa? Has DoD developed the means to help African PME systems evolve as educational institutions, ensuring successful outcomes and sustainable capacities in the face of a dynamically changing security environment? The emphasis, again, is on outputs or capacity, not on capability, which a former senior DoD official defined as a complex and interlocking system of inputs. Therefore, without a detailed, highly developed understanding of partner nation PME systems, the effects of generating educational capacity in a partner are likely to be ephemeral and not linked to
specific U.S. strategic goals and priorities in the present and future security environments.\textsuperscript{13}

**OBSERVATIONS**

The purpose of this section of the study is to offer an assessment of the U.S. security cooperation community’s level of understanding of African PME systems and to determine how this knowledge translates into PME-centered BPC engagements. The methodological approach used a combination of academic research, participation in engagement activities in the field, and independent field research in selected African nations and with U.S. military personnel. In addition, using four baseline assessment questions, the author examined four PME case studies, two British-based legacy PME systems and two French-based legacy PME systems, focusing in particular at the highest level of PME in each country. The wider implications regarding how AFRICOM and USARAF conduct BPC in Africa became evident during the course of the study through this combined approach. The paper presents a set of observations, examines their implications for AFRICOM and USARAF BPC efforts, and makes recommendations for enhancing BPC, especially PME BPC engagements with African partners.

During the course of the study concerning U.S. BPC doctrine, U.S. BPC efforts, and African PME systems, the following observations were made.

**U.S. Doctrine: Army and Joint doctrine for conducting BPC activities is robust and functional.** While GAO and Congressional Research Service studies claim that BPC is not well defined, a review of Field Manuals (FMs), Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 11-31, the *Army Security Cooperation*
Handbook, and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, Security Force Assistance, provide a different view. These doctrinal publications, when used in combination, effectively differentiate between capability and capacity in BPC, communicating to military planners that BPC requires a systemic approach across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in order to be effective.

Doctrine effectively differentiates between capability and capacity, two terms that tend to be used interchangeably. DA PAM 11-31, Army Security Cooperation Handbook, makes the clearest differentiation between capability and capacity. It defines capability as, “The ability to execute a specified course of action,” and it defines capacity as, “The ability to maintain and employ a capability with sufficiency over time.” Other doctrinal publications note this differentiation. For example, Army FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, makes a differentiation between capability and capacity in the geographical combatant commander’s operational design process when developing the Theater Campaign Plan. FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, implies differentiation between capability and capacity when it discusses the need to ensure long-term sustainment. JDN 1-13, Security Force Assistance, recognizes this differentiation when it discusses the need for a partner’s independent sustainment of capability over time.

Army and Joint doctrine builds upon this differentiation between capability and capacity by promoting an integrated approach to BPC, aimed at synchronizing these efforts across the operating, generating, and executive direction levels of the force with respect to both the partner and U.S. military systems. FM 3-22 specifically addresses the need to integrate capabilities across all levels of the force (executive direction,
generating force, and operating force) to achieve BPC objectives. It further addresses the capabilities the generating force brings to BPC. JDN 1-13 also specifies the support that the organizations at these various levels of the force bring to BPC activities when it defines the functional activities of the executive, generating, and operating forces and their relationship to BPC.

More importantly, Army regulations (AR) and doctrine specifically recognize the importance of the institutional and generating force to the institutionalization of partner capability over time, which leads to the development of genuine capacity. AR 11-31, Army Security Cooperation Policy, explicitly states there is a role in security cooperation for the institutional Army and generating force assets. DA PAM 11-31 is equally specific in its treatment of the importance of these specialized assets in terms of BPC: “These capabilities are often [times] necessary to develop capacity at the institutional level providing the partner enough capability to achieve desired end states.” This access to specialized knowledge and capabilities by the GCC and the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) is in line with, and builds upon, what is already stated in FM 3-22 and JDN 1-13, which identify the need for generating force capabilities in developing partner security forces across the domains of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). This doctrinal linkage of the institutional and generating forces to BPC is significant, given that doctrine places PME clearly in the security force generating function.

Given these factors, doctrine effectively provides the needed guidance to conduct BPC. In addition, doctrine’s differentiation between capability and capacity is a critical one and crucial to success as it adds
sustainability to BPC efforts, meaning the institutionalization of capability by the partner. By comprehending this distinction, the military planner has the necessary frame of reference to determine which BPC events are tactical in nature (capability generation) and which are operational, or strategic, in nature (capacity generation). This determination also enables the identification of the necessary means to apply against the event and identifies where the means reside within the force to institutionalize a capability effectively within the partner nation.

If these steps are taken, then the probability of turning a capability into a capacity is amplified, provided an adequate amount of time and investment is made and sustained. Furthermore, institutionalized capacity means a greater return on U.S. investments in security cooperation, in terms of funding and human resource commitment, for two reasons. First, it defines a recognizable end to security cooperation activities tied to the desired outcomes. Second, it precisely links the BPC activity to specific U.S. national security objectives in the combatant commander’s area of responsibility.

Partial application of doctrine and the lack of Generating Force resourcing inhibit a fully integrated approach to BPC. While the GCC and ASCC apply doctrine using the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model, the use of the executive or strategic direction, generating force, and operating force functions is incomplete. The vast majority of observed planned BPC engagement events are conducted in the operational force realm, with minimal engagement at the strategic or executive direction level, and little or no activities taking place at the generating force level. A lack of knowledge about a partner nation’s generating function systems and lack of resourcing at the U.S.
generating force level aggravates this tendency when it comes to PME. The result is an incomplete approach to conducting BPC in Africa.

Doctrinal literature is very clear: generating functions develop and sustain capabilities in the operating force function.26 BPC doctrine emphasizes the need to include generating functions in the ASCC commander’s mission analysis.27 Doctrine also underscores the risk of “focusing security cooperation efforts in one area or type of relationship at the expense of others based on short-term goals.” Instead, to lessen this risk, “security cooperation activities should be regarded as providing means and ways to achieve meaningful mid- to long-term objectives with partners” and equally, important theater strategic objectives.28 With respect to BPC and Africa, the majority of observed engagement activities being discussed and planned at AFRICOM’s Synchronize the Resources Working Group (STRWG) dealt with the operating force level and did not include generating force function events designed to tie together discrete tactical level security cooperation events to institutionalized capacity.29

This focus on discrete tactical events is recognized by the GCC. Multiple leaders admitted privately that there is no understanding of defense institution building or PME systems within AFRICOM.30 This lack of understanding is causing difficulties in transitioning from short-term tactical activities, so-called kinetic actions, dealing with immediate security threats from violent extremist organizations, to long-term, sustainable effects.31 As one working group participant remarked, “It’s easier to do kinetics.”32 Other personnel characterized the situation as a lack of strategic patience in the face of demands for dealing with immediate threats.33 These comments support the conclusion
several participants offered: that the enterprise (both AFRICOM and DoD) is still outlining the problem of how to pursue defense institution building, especially in the area of defense education.\textsuperscript{34}

Successful implementation of BPC, however, requires a balance between discrete capability-generating events and longer-term integrating events focused on institutionalizing capacity over time. This balanced approach is consistent with the doctrinal emphasis on the need to conduct multiple activities over time to achieve the desired effects across the multiple functions and at various levels of the partner force.\textsuperscript{35} The comments above indicate that there is a significant tension within AFRICOM on how to balance immediate threats with long-term theater strategic objectives. This overemphasis by the GCC on the tactical level of BPC, which is understandable given the current security environment on the continent, generates operational risk in that it prioritizes short-term capability development over sustainable capacity development.

This tension, however, is not caused solely by current threats. Instead, pressures for immediate results are exacerbated by the lack of knowledge and resourcing at the generating force level for the conduct of BPC. As previously mentioned, a review of country plans and discussions with STRWG participants on engagement events showed there is some executive direction activity at the strategic level. The gap in focus exists at the generating force level, as activities here are almost nonexistent. This gap becomes especially evident when it comes to PME-related activities that lie within the purview of the generating force function.\textsuperscript{36}

AFRICOM STRWG participants admitted they do not understand African PME systems (more than the existence of individual institutions), nor are AFRICOM
or USARAF structured to absorb and execute PME-related requirements. This lack of knowledge at the GCC level is intensified by the lack of requisite knowledge at the country-team level in conducting PME analysis. Personnel in security cooperation offices (SCOs) are not trained and the offices are not resourced to conduct complete DOTMLPF analyses of partner nations when it comes to PME.

Doctrine recognizes this condition can exist and provides guidance that U.S. military personnel should reach back to the generating force to take advantage of its capabilities as a means of alleviating the lack of operating force capability in the generating and executive function areas. What this means is that DOTMLPF analysis requires two steps. The GCC staff and SCOs conduct a DOTMLPF analysis of the partner to determine needs, and then they must conduct a DOTMLPF analysis of U.S. systems to determine where the appropriate expertise to support these requirements, consistent with U.S. policy objectives, is located.

AFRICOM planners understand that these two steps exist and have reached back to the U.S. military’s PME institutions (schoolhouses) to obtain support for PME-related events in theater. However, many of their requests for schoolhouse support were denied because of a lack of available personnel; or in some cases, because the planners did not know who to contact within the U.S. military PME institutions to support emerging GCC requirements, to include assistance with existing planning needs. The long lead-times required for support from the schoolhouses has the additional problem of delaying incorporation of required subject matter experts into the planning and execution of education-related events. Specifically, DA PAM 11-31 emphasizes the use of the Global Force
Management Request for Forces process or the Forces Command Army Force Generation Synchronization Tool, both of which require a clear statement of need. However, being able to develop a clear statement of need, and making that need known to the appropriate schoolhouse, can be a challenge for the AFRICOM staff and USARAF planners if their knowledge of the U.S. and African PME systems is insufficient. Thus, this lack of knowledge affects both AFRICOM’s and USARAF’s ability to obtain the required resources to support the partner nation.

Process issues are not the only problem regarding PME support to partners. As noted earlier, another critical issue is the inability of the schoolhouses to provide requisite support due to a lack of personnel. The Army acknowledges that “the requirement to support activities aimed at developing partner country institutional capabilities may exceed the Army’s capacity,” and that PME is an area of risk. The reason is readily explainable: the PME support requirement competes with the Army’s own support requirements. Further, while there are planning and resourcing processes in place, as DA PAM 11-31 indicates:

These processes and their associated timelines vary among theaters, complicating Army efforts to synchronize across ASCCs, ACOMs [Army Commands], and DRUs [Direct Reporting Units].

In short, generating force institutions are not staffed or resourced to support PME-related engagements in any theater, let alone Africa, on the recurrent basis required for building the necessary relationships to advise and assist partner nation PME institutions. Thus, support for PME events by the Army schoolhouses is
accomplished on an ad hoc basis through personal networks, individual willingness, and individual availability.\textsuperscript{46}

This resourcing issue influences BPC planning, and AFRICOM BPC planners recognize it explicitly.\textsuperscript{47} Granted, some personnel involved in BPC activities dispute that a resource gap exists, such as those involved in the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI).\textsuperscript{48} However, DIRI is aimed at the ministerial level; that is, the strategic or executive direction function in terms of BPC.\textsuperscript{49} Even when DIRI is combined with other Defense Security Cooperation Agency programs, which are all focused at building ministerial-level competency,\textsuperscript{50} there is still a resource gap at the generating force level. This gap is reflected in the absence of generating force activities within the various country plans for the AFRICOM region. Likewise, the inability to access PME expertise at the generating force level has an effect on PME-related events, such as establishing a schoolhouse or writing a PME curriculum. Consequently, the likelihood of having a lasting effect is diminished because the upstream activities that need to be taken at the generating force level to institutionalize the PME capability are either not identified or not implemented in time to ensure their integration into the partner nation’s DOTMLPF system. This process problem may be a significant hidden driver that could explain why the bulk of AFRICOM engagement is all at the operating force level, which results in the generation of tactical capability instead of generating partner capacity.

The Army’s recent establishment of Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) will not alleviate the aforementioned problems. SFABs are an excellent means to produce specific capabilities within partner forces.
However, unless reach-back mechanisms are established to ensure the integration of generating functions with operating functions, then the SFAB will also be limited in its ability to build sustained capacity, as indicated in Army doctrine. Limited resourcing at the generating-force level, PME schoolhouses will affect the SFAB support needs as well. The more sophisticated the DOTMLPF requirements are within the partner nation, the greater the need for specific subject matter expertise. The SFABs lack the ability to perform high-end PME tasks and they will confront the same reach-back limitations that the GCC currently experiences.

In summary, the Army lacks the generating force capability that is required for the long-term cultural change that PME is designed to foster in partner nations’ militaries, one of the essential outcomes of BPC. This finding mirrors the judgments of a 2009 USAWC study, which concluded that GCC staffs do not have the expertise or resources to develop comprehensive, cross-functional engagement plans because of an inability to tap into a trained and ready pool of subject matter experts. Unfortunately, the result is the same after nearly a decade: without the generating force support for PME integration, there will be little enduring capability to build partner capacity above the tactical level.

African legacy PME systems offer different approaches to engaging in PME-related BPC and, in many cases, provide a foundation for institutionalizing capacity if they can be linked to effective internal assessment and executive direction. BPC engagement with African PME institutions is a complex endeavor. As this study began as an effort to gauge the level of understanding of African PME systems within the U.S.
BPC community, it was necessary to develop baseline data to conduct a comparative analysis. Using four baseline questions (Figure 2-1), modified from the U.S. Process for Accreditation for Joint Education, the author conducted site visits in four countries specifically focusing on their highest level of PME. The baseline questions assessed both curriculum and internal PME systems to determine how education is delivered, how the partner nation’s national policy objectives and the various levels of PME are synchronized, and how education is institutionalized within the various nations.
1. **What is their internal guidance on PME for their respective militaries; what kind of product (graduate) are they trying to produce as an outcome of their PME institutions?**
   a. What subjects do they teach?
   b. How do the various Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) own or shape the education process, or is PME treated as a training issue and thus rests entirely within the operations directors (G3)?
   c. Does written guidance to the institutions on desired outcomes exist (what the graduates are supposed to be able to do)?

2. **What is the internal system to fashion PME into a coherent whole?**
   a. What is the synchronization mechanism used to provide learning outcome guidance to the various institutions, from Initial entry through Senior Service College (SSC)?
   b. How do they ensure their PME system is designed to develop personnel from initial entry through SSC?
   c. Do they have a regional or internal national Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) process?

3. **What is their assessment system for PME, internally for students and externally from their customer?**
   a. How do they obtain feedback from the field about their graduates and incorporate this feedback into the curriculum?

4. **How do they develop curriculum?**
   a. How do they ensure PME is linked to their DOTMLPF process (and do they have a formal DOTMLPF process)?
   b. What is the origin of their PME system, and what model do they follow (e.g., United States, United Kingdom, French, Russian, or Chinese)?

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**Figure 2-1. PME Study Questions for Partner Nations.**

Based on these questions, several observations are relevant. First, the colonial legacy influences the way African states approach PME because colonialism influenced the structure of their educational enterprises.
There are significant differences between the structures of British and French PME legacy systems; these differences affect how PME is taught, and how the curriculum is fashioned for teaching. (Because of the different legacy systems, a direct comparison between African and U.S. PME institutions cannot be made.) Second, when one examines the African education systems using a DOTMLPF analysis, commonalities between both the British and French legacy systems are apparent in terms of how they relate to the generating force and executive direction functions. These factors highlight two separate and noteworthy issues affecting BPC with African PME systems; the first involves educational capability generation, the other relates to educational capacity development. **Both of these issues are affected by the lack of understanding of partner nation PME systems on the part of U.S. military members and a lack of capacity to support BPC at the U.S. generating force PME institutional level.**

Educational capability generation affects the ways the U.S. military can engage African PME institutions. Successful educational capability generation begins by ensuring that the relevant U.S. PME institution experts engage with their counterparts at the African institutions. This connection ensures that the correct subject matter experts engage with the educational institutions based on the educational level of the specific PME School. It clearly makes sense for military academies to engage with military academics, staff colleges to engage with staff colleges, and so forth, as there is a common understanding of the educational goals sought based on curricula and outcomes.

However, the differing developmental approaches between the U.S. and African systems are important.
U.S. schools teach to different levels than the African schools, even if they have the same titles as those in the U.S. PME system. This complicates capability development with the partner schools when assisting with curriculum development. One cannot assume that because the U.S. and African institutions have the same title, that the similarly named U.S. educational institution is the appropriate one from which to seek help.

The lack of understanding of PME systems within AFRICOM, the ASCC, and the SCOs means this distinction is missed when determining engagement options. To illustrate this point, Figure 2-2 maps the various PME systems in relation to the U.S. PME system and the levels of war taught at these schools.

Figure 2-2. Mapping African PME Schools According to U.S. PME Equivalents (Army) and Levels of War.\textsuperscript{54}
As the figure shows, there are significant differences among the various PME pathways because of the legacy systems developed under the colonial regimes. Having an understanding of these differences is crucial to ensuring the appropriate U.S. experts are engaged in curricula transfer and development activities on which to build the foundations for establishing educational capability. Legacy system advisors and partners also influence how U.S. engagement takes place.

The French-based system is a bottom-up system, in part, because of the close relationship of the French with their former colonies. The French approach to PME in the partner nation mirrors the system in France, which results in close linkages between the African and French PME schools in terms of curricula development and pedagogical techniques (Country 1 and Country 2).\textsuperscript{55} Coopérants (specially selected French officers assigned to assist a partner nation) continue to serve within some of France’s partner nation institutions (Country 2).\textsuperscript{56}

The main point to note though is that France follows a building block approach to PME in these nations; a methodology similar to the U.S. Army’s “Building Blocks of Security Force Assistance.”\textsuperscript{57} France concentrates on the basic skill levels in its early PME system assistance with respect to curriculum and faculty development within the partner nation schools. Education begins at the tactical level and expands to the operational level over time. The highest level of education in the French-based system is the Higher War Studies Course (senior staff college level), which is an operational level school, though this school’s curriculum does contain some elements bearing on the strategic level. This is a reflection of the fact that French-based
systems in Africa lack the SSC level of PME found in the British legacy system and the U.S. system.

Depending on the educational sophistication of the host nation system, the French coopérants can vary their approach from a “do it for them/with them” to an exclusively advisory role. Pedagogical techniques are primarily passive learning and include lectures, but small group dialogue and other active, adult leaning techniques are growing in importance, if not in practice. Formal curricula products, such as course directives and lesson materials, are well developed in terms of the products provided to students and in terms of learning objectives. All of these points were evident during field research in both Country 1 and Country 2.

There is no interagency presence within either the student body or the faculty of these partner schools. In fact, despite the high demand for a place in Country 2’s Higher War Studies Course, the General Staff turns many of these interagency students away. In Country 1, the course curriculum is too militarily focused to merit interagency presence. With respect to the Higher War Studies Course in Country 2, it uses learning outcomes to guide its educational approach rather than learning objectives, which implies a measurement of student performance and success for the course. However, learning objectives are also found within some of the course material.

In Country 2, coopérants are in an advisory role at the staff college level. However, the French officers use the “do it for them and with them” method at the Higher War Studies course level and they occupy the key instructional billets within the school with partner officers serving as deputies. Curriculum development and execution reflects this same distinction. In Country 2’s
staff college courses, the partner nation develops and executes its own curriculum in coordination with the coopérant and the French military’s L’Ecole d’Etat-Major (EEM/the senior war and staff college school). However, the French effectively maintain complete control over the curriculum at the Higher War Studies course level. They develop the curriculum; that is, they determine the subjects, and then the program is suitably modified for African institutions before being sent to Country 2 for review and acceptance.\textsuperscript{63} Essentially, this process means that Country 2’s review is a formality rather than a substantive review. In all the time Country 2 has conducted the course, it has not made a single change to the curriculum received from Paris.\textsuperscript{64}

Country 1 differs from Country 2 in the level of direct French influence because of the state of the relationship. There are no coopérants present within the Country 1 school system. In this instance, the French assistance follows a “do it with them,” and “advise” pathway. Country 1 made the decision to develop its own staff college and curriculum. However, given historic ties between it and France, initially, the Country 1 curriculum developers chose to mirror the French EEM curriculum closely when the French course was located at Compiègne (EEM moved to Saumur in 2012).\textsuperscript{65} Based on long-term engagement with other partners, Country 1 has since reestablished a relationship with the French EEM at Saumur and closely mirrors its course design and curriculum.\textsuperscript{66} Nonetheless, changes to the curriculum are clearly under Country 1’s control; it decides which elements of the French system it will accept based on the professional judgment of the Country 1 Staff College Commandant.\textsuperscript{67}

The major significance of the French bottom-up approach is in how the overall PME system is
developing in the African partner nations. The French partner nations are learning as they proceed in terms of what they need in a PME system, at least in terms of the levels of education. Both Country 1 and Country 2 determined on their own that the staff college level is insufficient as they endeavor to professionalize their armed forces. This shortcoming became especially apparent when they had to face actual threats and discovered that a staff college-based education was inadequate for military participation in the development of national defense policy and strategy.

As a result, both Country 1 and Country 2 are in the process of developing higher levels of PME. Country 1 has moved to developing a School of Higher War Studies, and Country 2 has determined it will establish an SSC using the French Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defense (IHEDN) as the model. The reason for this development in Country 2 was the realization that graduates of the School of Higher War Studies were incapable of actively and effectively aiding in the development of national security policy and strategy. To quote a senior staff officer:

Graduates of foreign war colleges can do policy and strategy but they can’t plan to the same level as our local graduates. Our local graduates can plan, but they can’t do policy and strategy. Our problem is we get most of our General Staff locally (these are graduates of the Higher War Studies Course).

Given the evolutionary pathway of the French legacy systems, it will not be surprising if Country 1 makes the same determination that it too needs an IHEDN after it gains experience with the Higher War Studies course.
The British (United Kingdom) legacy system does not appear to have the same depth of partner involvement that one sees in French legacy systems.\textsuperscript{71} Nonetheless, all levels of PME are present in Country 3 and Country 4 (See Figure 2-2). Thus, there is more direct equivalency between the British and U.S. PME systems in terms of schools, but not necessarily in terms of curriculum, which can lead to gaps in learning between the various levels of PME. Pedagogical techniques are primarily passive learning and lectures, but small group dialogue and other adult leaning techniques are also growing in importance, if not in practice.\textsuperscript{72} Formal curricula products for students in both Country 3 and Country 4, such as course directives and lesson materials, are often not well developed and syllabi tend to follow a training schedule format.\textsuperscript{73} There is an inter-agency presence on both the student body and faculty of the British legacy system SSCs in both Country 3 and Country 4.\textsuperscript{74} Both British legacy system SSCs offer an accredited post-baccalaureate degree from the local university system. However, in terms of curricula, as in the French based legacy system, there is a clear dual track distinction between the civilian degree and the military diploma.\textsuperscript{75}

The British do not necessarily follow the same advisory framework as the French. In Country 3 and Country 4, current British assistance is more means focused in terms of providing specific curriculum, furnishing lecturers, or supplying instructors for specific topics vice focusing on programs designed to develop partner faculty ability to deliver the same material.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, the British follow more of a “do it for them,” and “advise” approach at the individual institutional level. This demand-based approach results in British assistance concentrating on capability development instead
of capacity development because of a minimal focus on creating PME systems.

While one can readily distinguish the differences between the British and French legacy systems in terms of educational capability, there are striking similarities at the PME systemic level that seriously affect the United States’ ability to build sustainable partner capacity. **In both the French and British legacy systems there is a lack of in-depth Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) level attention to PME and a lack of holistic assessment standards that marginalize the effectiveness of existing African PME systems.**

Many of the previously mentioned observations concerning curricula development and pedagogical techniques are easily manageable, but there are two significant obstacles. Both the French and British legacy systems are highly compartmentalized; they are not connected to effective executive direction and generating force functional capacity. This lack of connection is a serious weakness as institutional capacity building is the most vital element in ensuring a lasting capability. Additionally, lack of CDS ownership of the system complicates DoD’s ability to build partner capacity in PME with African nations that use these legacy systems.

Sufficient executive direction in terms of an overarching systemic guidance on subject matter and an assessment system designed to measure the effectiveness of graduates in relation to this guidance does not exist. Overall, there is minimal to no **systemic** ownership of PME by the military leadership at the CDS level and no culture of assessment exists that would enable African PME systems to gauge their own effectiveness and adapt accordingly to a changing strategic environment. The result is one where PME is either irrelevant
or has difficulty adapting to meet strategic challenges as they emerge.

The first common critical issue is a general lack of quality systemic level PME guidance in Africa. In all four countries, Chief of Defense (CHOD) and CDS ownership of PME varied widely. Representatives in each country mentioned that there is guidance for PME, but this guidance is given verbally directly to school commandants, is very school specific, and does not include mechanisms to tie the educational enterprise into a holistic system. In many cases, the observations and guidance focused on general topics for inclusion in the curriculum, were not linked to educational outcomes or objectives, and were tactical in nature. CDS education and curriculum guidance was uniformly intuition—judgment based vice evidence based—and was generally not written or captured by the wider educational enterprise. The comment “guidance is more along the lines of the current graduating class seemed to be lacking in topic x,” or “we need to teach more of topic y,” were common themes when discussing the quality of guidance received with staff and faculty in all four countries.

Each country did report that the General Staff provided some oversight to the PME schools, but the quality of the interaction varied widely between the schools and was not necessarily dependent on whether they were a British or French-based legacy system. This curriculum or resourcing dialogue followed the same generic topical format as the verbal CDS guidance. Again, minimal to no direction is captured in writing with the exception of Country 2, where the General Staff guidance is in writing but only focuses on “competencies to be covered” at the Staff College level. However, while this level of oversight varied
between simply focusing on resourcing to engaging in generic curriculum dialogue, the key commonality is that the oversight only dealt with the PME schools on an individual basis.

It is this cumulative emphasis on the individual PME School, in terms of guidance, oversight, and outside engagement, that leads to the biggest common shortcoming within African PME enterprises regardless of their foundational legacy system. At the risk of mirror imaging, there are no Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)-like processes or other system-wide mechanisms, such as the U.S. Army’s The U.S. Army Learning Concept for Training and Education (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC] PAM 525-8-2), designed to tie together the disparate parts of African PME into a whole.86

The OPMEP, TRADOC PAM 525-8-2, and other documents of this sort provide the clear executive direction functions of strategic planning, assessment of readiness, and review and analysis in terms of required human capabilities needed to achieve current and future mission requirements.87 These types of documents are critical to the systemization of PME in that they provide the CHOD and CDS an enterprise-level blueprint for how the various levels of PME work in conjunction with each other to provide a required body of knowledge, in terms of both curriculum and pedagogy, needed to meet operational requirements for the force from initial entry into the future.88

Given the incomplete nature of the guidance received and the distinct lack of formal guidance documents, school commandants in both legacy systems have wide latitude to interpret what to teach and how much to teach to their students.89 This latitude becomes a problem in that it exacerbates the
compartmentalization of African PME systems. Representatives at all levels were unsure of how their school linked to the other schools of their respective PME enterprises.\textsuperscript{90} Thus, significant assumptions are made about what is being taught where and to what extent. This level of uncertainty carries through to knowledge about curriculum changes at the various schools and how these changes may affect education throughout the respective African PME enterprises.\textsuperscript{91} For example, Country 3’s SSC had no knowledge of the 100% curriculum review that was taking place at the staff college, which prevented an analysis of how this change would affect their assumptions concerning baseline knowledge of future students.\textsuperscript{92}

These factors underscore that systemization is the missing element in African PME. Systemization is critical to effective capacity building in that it provides for the sustainability required to turn an operational capability into an operational capacity as differentiated by Army doctrine and other key practitioners.\textsuperscript{93} This absence of systemic guidance means that African PME lacks both the vision and means to create the self-sustaining and adaptive education foundation required to effectively sustain operational capabilities over-time. In short, African PME institutions have difficulty performing their generating force function of supporting the operating function, through the personnel it educates for the operating force, with the integrated generation of the knowledge needed to conduct the range of tasks associated with current and future missions.\textsuperscript{94} This lack of systemization interacts with, and is related closely to, the absence of a culture of holistic assessment in all four case studies.

One of the key functions of the OPMEP in U.S. PME is it sets standards for military accreditation in order
to ensure PME is providing the requisite knowledge needed for the force.\textsuperscript{95} Military accreditation places the military component of the curriculum on an equal footing with the civilian requirements for higher degree accreditation. Accreditation is based on the in-depth review of the standards set for faculty, curriculum, and assessment of student learning outcomes, and course and program performance through the institution level as certified by outside inspection of the schools in question. This holistic assessment acts as a validation mechanism to ensure the curriculum and teaching methodologies are current and effective in developing the students for performance in the field. Accreditation also provides a signal to the CHOD when the other aspects of the total force are not supporting the education system with the appropriate resources to meet the mission. In short, accreditation through assessment is the tool that lets the CHOD and CDS know that the generating force functions of training and education are actually providing the operating force with the requisite knowledge required to conduct the range of tasks associated with present and future missions.

Without the setting of standards and military accreditation, as is done in a U.S. system through the OPMEP, there is no mechanism to drive assessment beyond the individual student performance level at each school. None of the institutions in any of the four countries conducts assessments beyond the individual student level, which are conducted solely for the purpose of creating graduate order of merit lists.\textsuperscript{96} Neither are there formal ways to seek out and incorporate lessons learned from field operations into tactical, operational, and strategic level education and curricula in any of the legacy based PME systems in this study.\textsuperscript{97} When combined with the use of program learning
objectives, instead of outcomes, and no direct, formal feedback loops from the field to monitor graduate performance, schools have no way of knowing whether their curriculum is practical.

The low level of CHOD and CDS involvement in PME as an educational endeavor vice a training endeavor further serves to hamper wider assessment as it is too easily viewed by the PME institution leadership as someone else’s responsibility. Given the low level of CHOD and CDS ownership of PME that comes from military accreditation through an OPMEP-like process, the African leadership has no way of knowing whether the PME system is providing the right products, in the right quantities, at the right time because of incomplete metrics for measuring success. The overall result is one where curriculum too easily stagnates and loses relevancy.

This stagnation is especially the case with the British legacy-based systems due to their more independent and hierarchically functioning bureaucracy. Interestingly, the French-based systems are more open to change as a robust French lessons-learned system permeates changes to the Higher War Studies Course and French partnerships with African PME institutions and defense enterprises. This exposes French system schools to changes in curriculum and educational approaches even if they are developed through the lens of French needs and not specifically the partner nation experiences. Furthermore, the bottom-up development of the French legacy system leaves more space for learning within the participants. For example, Country 2, in addition to realizing the need for its own IHEDN, is also incorporating PME and PME guidance into its Defense White Paper currently under development.
In terms of BPC, the U.S. focus on tactical capability, even at the educational institution level, does not result in institutionalized change. The shortcomings in resourcing for the generating force and lack of expertise in the SCOs, GCC, and ASCC inhibits AFRICOM and the ASCC from effectively conducting holistic BPC across the executive direction, and the generating force and operating force functions. Because the United States cannot effectively engage holistically, institutionalizing capacity, especially through African PME systems, will be difficult to achieve.

Change is difficult even when systematization, accreditation standards, and holistic assessment exist. The U.S. experience in curriculum changes and the debates following the events of September 11, 2001, leading up to the Iraq surge in 2007, serve to illustrate the slowness of change even when impetus and mechanisms exist. Without change mechanisms, systematized coordination between schools and searching out and incorporating lessons learned creates a bottom-up approach to PME improvement that can be easily road blocked by a bureaucracy that may not have the capacity to understand the improvements that need to be made in the system, or fear the accountability that an OPMEP and standards bring. This situation results in African military education enterprises that are locked at the tactical or operating force level, are viewed as training, and are not especially capable of institutionalizing knowledge and doctrine brought about by exposure to U.S. engagement activities.

IMPLICATIONS

Given the proceeding observations and findings, there are important implications regarding how U.S.
BPC doctrine, the U.S. approach to BPC, and the structure and character of African legacy PME systems affect U.S. BPC policy and strategy. Two major implications present themselves. The first deals with the effect that the difference between the two legacy systems has on U.S. efforts. The second, and more important implication, deals with the wider strategy of BPC in relation to overall U.S. defense policy and strategy.

Implication 1

The character of the Host Nation PME system influences the operational approach to PME capacity building. As has been already identified, the bureaucratic and intellectual structures inherited from the legacy system of an African PME institution significantly influences how PME is conducted from an enterprise standpoint. This means that this structure needs to be taken into account as the United States develops PME assistance and other BPC efforts targeting that partner nation. Education is expensive and represents a significant investment in partner nation and U.S. BPC resources. Currently, given Africa’s global priority level, the United States seeks to affect change and build capacity on a regional basis. PME legacy systems have a significant influence on the viability of using a regional approach.

Working with the British-based systems is going to be more problematic and transactional in character due to their more independent and hierarchical bureaucracy. The British-based systems are much more institutionalized within the potential partner nations without any embedded outside assistance, such as the French coopérants inside their legacy systems. This means that African bureaucracies that use the British system will
need to be convinced of the need for change in order to generate the will to change and improve. In short, they have to realize there is a problem in the first place. If that outcome does not occur, there is no will to make changes at the systemic level.

This obstacle is evident in engagements within Country 3 and Country 4. Country 3 participants, following detailed discussion and dialogue, realize where change needs to take place in order to build a holistic PME system, but they are faced with the need to create the sense of urgency required within the higher levels of the bureaucracy first. While this opens space for building holistic PME systems, U.S. efforts also need to focus on assisting the partner nation with realizing the need for change. Country 4 is in a similar, but more entrenched position. The hierarchy inside Country 4 is locked into tradition and does not see the need for change despite operational setbacks in the field and parliamentary opinion otherwise. Under these circumstances, the use of learning objectives instead of outcomes and the British assistance approach of "doing it for them," in the form of lectures and instruction, can serve to exacerbate the sense that everything is fine within these PME systems.

Under these circumstances, taking a regional approach to PME capacity building is inhibited by host nation attitudes and lack of will to change. Regional approaches are seductive on the outside in that the partner will see this approach as validation of the effectiveness of its PME system. This validation will drive the bureaucracy to want to use U.S. assistance as a means to bolster and otherwise continue the status quo. This result is not conducive to the regional generation of capacity in the form required for the integrated generation of the knowledge needed to conduct the
range of tasks associated with current and future missions. As a result, U.S. efforts in this environment need to focus on generating the realization of the need for change in order to start working systemically within their PME systems. Until then, engagements will likely be transactional in nature and focus on providing specific blocks of knowledge that are useful at the operating force level with the realization that knowledge transfer will be transitional.

These circumstances do not completely rule out a regional approach to issues and BPC. Instead, they change the timeline and shape of U.S. efforts in the form of having to use two distinct, but integrated lines of effort to achieve capacity over time. First, U.S. BPC planners and SCOs will need to foster within the partner nations a realization that there is a valid need for change within their PME systems. This step is required to establish the baseline conditions for institutionalization of knowledge over time that will promote and ultimately result in a regional educational approach. As for engagement on specific topics or subject matter, U.S. efforts to work on a regional basis will have to be taken through multiple independent bilateral programs. It is the U.S. security cooperation planners and SCOs who will have to ensure that the cumulative effect of these bilateral engagements move toward the institutionalization of U.S. desired knowledge and procedures over time. The integration of both lines of effort requires a heavy reliance on measures of effectiveness in order to keep the United States from becoming a means to an end for the African nations in question.

The United States may stand a better chance of affecting regional level change in a French-based legacy system provided it targets its efforts appropriately. This increased probability exists because of how
the French approach partnership shaped institutional and bureaucratic development. France’s bottom-up approach to building capability, combined with its embedding of expertise in the form of the coopérants, has created an environment where there is a common basis of doctrine and staff procedures inside Francophone Africa. This common base enables French-based systems to cross-fertilize one another in terms of educational objectives and outcomes.

As such, France, in cooperation with select African partners, is pioneering regional PME schools such as the Higher War Studies Course in Country 2, which has an increasing demand regionally and currently involves 21 other nations. Furthermore, the experience gained in Country 2 forms the basis for the Higher War Studies Course under development in Country 1. It is these regional schools that provide the window of opportunity for achieving U.S. regional BPC goals in terms of PME curriculum improvement and teaching techniques in addition to and in coordination with currently ongoing bilateral efforts. Partnering with the African states sponsoring the regional schools provides a central injection point for assistance and knowledge.

More importantly, the commonalities created by the French approach means the United States may be able to build systems that institutionalize knowledge and doctrine more quickly in a French-based system. The need for strategic-level advice and assistance in terms of policy and strategy development and strategic education exists inside the French-based system as exemplified by Country 1 and Country 2’s efforts to improve policy and strategy development as well as raise the level of PME. There is no need to convince the potential partners on the need for change. They already desire it themselves.
This belief in the importance of change is important as it means changes in PME structure, in terms of accreditation and pedagogical techniques, become ways to achieve already desired outcomes and makes PME a resource generator to assist them in meeting their goals of developing effective policy and strategy. This self-realization of need means there is greater will on behalf of the potential African partner for appropriately targeted U.S. assistance. Already habituated to the French approach of “doing it with them” means that there is greater probability of the partner nation internalizing U.S. executive direction and generating function level assistance that can effectively combine ongoing U.S. tactical-level efforts into a holistic system. In short, there is greater space to turn capability into capacity, provided U.S. engagement activities are enduring and seen as adding value based on commonality of interest.

Implication 2

U.S. structural issues inhibit certification of BPC activities under Section 333 of the FY 2017 NDAA. The observations and implications related to the character of the African PME system are environmental in terms of U.S. BPC activities. That is, these issues fit firmly within the environmental and problem frames of the operational design process for theater security cooperation engagement and can be dealt with in the security cooperation planning process. A better understanding of the environment, including the DOTMLPF framework of the potential partner, means a more complete reframing of the problem for the United States that should lead to adjustments in the operational approach to achieve the United States’ desired effects.
However, issues relating to incomplete application of doctrine due to insufficient resourcing of the generating function in the U.S. system are structural issues within the U.S. BPC system that, if not dealt with, will continue to have a significant impact on the United States’ ability to conduct BPC activities effectively in terms that relate to the NDAA requirements.

The U.S. Congress favors BPC, but it is equally interested in outcomes, meaning the effectiveness of security cooperation programs in relation to U.S. strategic objectives. As previously identified, U.S. BPC doctrine clearly differentiates between what it means to build capability and what it means to build capacity. Furthermore, doctrine promotes an integrated approach to BPC that brings all executive direction, generating force, and operating force functions together into a holistic system designed to institutionalize capacity within a partner nation. It is this systemic approach, utilizing the entirety of the U.S. force, which adds sustainability to BPC efforts through the institutionalization of the partner’s capability.

Further, the U.S. Congress is looking to DoD for the systems and processes needed to create sustained effects from U.S. security cooperation investments. Section 1205 of the Act, and more importantly, Section 333, clearly support the approach described above. Not only does the NDAA demand the security cooperation enterprise focus on the effectiveness of BPC efforts, it further requires the Secretary of Defense to certify to Congress and report that U.S. programs, down to the specific country level, contain institutional capacity building and also the specific measures for the sustainment of security assistance programs and the specific strategic objectives that these programs support.
It was clear to many participants at the AFRICOM STRWG that the purpose of Section 333 is to press DoD to show how its activities fit together in a systemic fashion that result in a long-term positive outcome for U.S. investment in security cooperation programs. This congressional intent means that DoD has to be able to explain how it makes deliberate **choices** concerning when and where to conduct simple capability generation events, which are periodic and have ephemeral effects, versus long-term capacity building which institutionalizes the effects of U.S. engagement activities across the force. Given current circumstances, U.S. security cooperation is tactical in nature and cannot promote a holistic capacity-building approach utilizing the entirety of the strategic (executive direction), operational (generating force), and tactical (operating force) forces.

This current approach to security cooperation is not an ends-driven strategic approach but is a means-driven strategic approach, which is inconsistent with the intent and requirements of the FY 2017 NDAA. As identified, the bulk of U.S. theater engagement focuses on generating tactical capability for immediate problems. Furthermore, insufficient resourcing of the generating force, especially in the Army schoolhouses, combined with knowledge shortfalls among the SCOs and security cooperation planners serve to lock the GCC in at the tactical level of engagement by necessity. Without the ability to incorporate the generating force into security cooperation, a holistic approach utilizing systemic measures of effectiveness is not possible. Hence, AFRICOM and USARAF, and therefore the DoD, cannot meet the reporting requirements of the 2017 NDAA. Thus, without addressing the structural issues inhibiting the U.S. approach to BPC, the DoD
enterprise, including GCC, ASCC, and the U.S. Army, will have great difficulty in justifying BPC activities to Congress. The result could have serious consequences for ongoing and future U.S. BPC efforts from a Congress that is clearly looking for effects-based, not performance-based, metrics.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Successful implementation of BPC requires a balance between discrete, capability-generating events and longer-term integrating events focused on institutionalizing capacity over time. Achieving this balance takes an integrated approach to BPC that brings all executive direction, generating force, and operating force functions together into a holistic system designed to institutionalize capacity within a partner nation over time. The following three recommendations serve to address the current shortcomings in U.S. efforts that inhibit the GCC from effectively following an integrated approach to BPC in Africa.

Recommendation 1

Doctrine is solid; the challenge is to implement it fully and reinforce the use of doctrine in the conduct of building partner capability and BPC in the GCC and ASCC. Building partner capability or partner capacity is a strategic choice that requires the integration of the entirety of the SFA model in planning and execution of engagement activities. Planners need to ensure that the entirety of the model is addressed in developing country engagement plans by deliberately looking at the upstream and downstream activities required at the institutional (generating force)
and strategic (executive direction) levels of the force needed to institutionalize capacity over time.

Following the planning timelines and guidance contained in the section “country objectives” contained in FM 3-22, Army, specifically linked to each level of the SFA model, will assist in determining the demand signal and specific support requirements from the generating and executive direction functions of the force to help build sustainability of the U.S. investment over time. Following doctrine will also provide the needed information to show the linkage of U.S. engagement efforts to U.S. interests and highlight how the GCC and ASCC are institutionalizing capability of time—both issues that are critical data points for meeting congressional certification requirements contained in the NDAA.

Building capability over capacity needs to be based on deliberate choice, not by lack of knowledge. Events targeting immediate capabilities need to be addressed specifically as such and be deliberately differentiated from areas where the GCC and ASCC intend to develop capacity. Short-term engagements for building presence or relationships need to be further factored into the SFA model across the levels of the force. This is a commander’s call, but short-term relationship and tactical unit building are not sustainable over time without specific linkages to concrete strategic outcomes as demanded by Congress through the NDAA. Granted, immediate and emergent problems demand capability generation, but planners also need to approach these situations from the perspective of what needs to happen to build capacity over an extended period as the situation clarifies itself in relation to a clear statement of U.S. interests and long-term policy objectives. Taking this approach, focusing on measures of effects
in relation to U.S. interests and objectives, will assist planners in differentiating between capability-based and capacity-building events to DoD and Congress.

Solely focusing on operational force activities without linkage to generating force and executive direction activities is a tactical approach that in many cases risks focusing on partner wants versus the requirement to institutionalize capability in order to gain strategic return on the U.S. investment. This aspect becomes especially critical when conducting PME-based activities, such as developing a branch specific school for a potential partner, which have significant future requirements to ensure the school is functional beyond its opening. Given that developing institutional capability is perhaps one of the more complex forms of engagement, especially when it comes to using PME to institutionalize capability, using measures of effects to inform planning is critical to recognize changes in the environment and execute appropriate branch plans according to doctrine. This perspective is critical as well to developing the demand signal to inform the Army, DoD, and Congress of the resources required to conduct BPC activities over time.

Failing to have a holistic BPC approach to these issues, as facilitated by doctrine, means the DoD will not be able to seize the opportunity to shift from building immediate capability to BPC when they arise. It is at the executive direction and generating force levels that is the best indication of a partner’s will to build and sustain systems and thereby indicates its true value as a partner. When the United States is viewed as nothing but a means by the engagement partner, then there will be little return on investment and the United States will not be able to meet the intent of the 2017 NDAA or DoD Directive 5205.82, Defense Institution Building.
DoD BPC guidance, Army BPC guidance, and Foreign Area Officer training should serve to reinforce the utility of doctrine. Revisiting doctrine to reinforce the difference between capability and capacity as well as emphasizing BPC in Foreign Area Officer and Army planners’ courses will assist in reinforcing its utility as a tool for developing and conducting holistic and integrated theater security cooperation strategies and country plans. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and Army-level guidance and oversight of GCC and ASCC security cooperation engagement plans and programs should specifically include information be reported in accordance with Army and Joint BPC doctrinal structures to show how engagement activities transition from discrete tactical events to the institutionalization of capacity. This means ensuring GCC and ASCC plans incorporate all levels of the force (operational, generating, and executive direction functions) in BPC planning in a synchronized and coherent manner. This step will further reinforce the use of doctrine and help the DoD develop U.S. systems and processes to assist the Secretary of Defense in certifying that security cooperation activities meet the mandate and intent of NDAA Section 333.

Recommendation 2

Make BPC a priority in senior leader engagements at the GCC and ASCC commander level; institutionalization of capacity requires greater direct commander-level involvement with partner nation counterparts. The lack of African CHOD and CDS ownership of African PME systems, especially in terms of accreditation and assessment, inhibits GCC and ASCC efforts to institutionalize knowledge generated
from security assistance engagements effectively. It is beyond the SCO to generate the sense of ownership needed to institutionalize the effects of U.S. engagement. Moreover, interest flows both ways. GCC and ASCC commanders and key staff officers are very good about asking potential partners about what capability they require, but fail to follow-up at the requisite level with the host nation to ensure that institutionalization of effects is a priority with the African partner. This lack of commander-level follow-up is a subtle form of mirror imaging on our part. Leaders fail to ask these questions because they are habituated to working with the robust generating force and executive direction functions present in the U.S. system. Institutionalization of effects from capability generation leading to capacity only begins if it is a priority with the partner nation’s CHOD and CDS. Given the hierarchical nature of African militaries, the lack of CDS interest can only be fixed with direct engagement by the equivalent level U.S. commander.

Direct questions from the AFRICOM and USARAF commanders dealing with the issue of how the partner nation will sustain U.S.-provided capability shows institutionalization is important, demonstrates commitment, and provides an opportunity to begin the detailed work within the African system to engage at the generating force level, which is needed to bridge strategic engagement with tactical engagement effectively. As such, PME and other institutional level requirements identified in doctrinally-planned security assistance engagement, even when discussing immediate capabilities requirements, must be included in the talking points for U.S. senior leaders. By showing the U.S. commander cares about institution building in
all of its details, especially in terms of PME standards, partner nation CHODs and staffs will take note.

This senior-level attention by the CHODs and their staffs provides two benefits to the United States in terms of BPC efforts. First, it provides the United States an indication of the partners’ will to engage in PME and put forth the effort to sustain their own systems and capabilities in conjunction with U.S. assistance. Second, if the will is present, it opens a window for the SCO and security cooperation planners to engage with the requisite elements of the partner nation staff to begin the process of institutionalizing U.S.-provided capability over time. In short, if it matters to the AFRICOM commander, it could matter to the CHOD. If it matters to the CHOD, then it does matter to the requisite institutions and staffs in the partner nation. The linkage and level of interest help overcome bureaucratic inertia that can prevent even a well-intentioned partner’s efforts to institutionalize capacity.

The commander’s ability to influence the CHOD and staffs will be especially important in getting OPMEP-like processes and procedures begun with respect to systematizing and accrediting PME. Given the hierarchical character of African militaries, generating the will to change from the top is a key element in addressing the missing **systemization** in African PME that prevents the institutionalization of knowledge generated by U.S. capability building events. Furthermore, these effects help establish the conditions for the effective use of the resources outlined in the third recommendation. All of these efforts combine to set the conditions for creating actual educational capacity in African partners that enhance the sustainability of current U.S. tactical capability generation efforts as required by the 2017 NDAA.
Recommendation 3

Generating force support for BPC, especially PME, requires adequate resources; therefore, there is a need to create Strategic Outreach offices (SOO) at key Army educational institutions to provide expertise and reach back for use by the GCC and ASCC. As noted earlier, PME can be an effective tool for transforming militaries and generating sustainable capacity because it provides a means of changing the way military personnel think about problems. Consequently, PME is a critical element of institutionalizing U.S. BPC efforts for the long-term as it embeds knowledge and procedures inside the partner nation’s DOTMLPF processes. However, due to lack of sufficient resourcing at the generating force level, the institutional Army schools are unable to support GCC and ASCC needs. This shortfall leads to an ad hoc approach to PME-related BPC that inhibits a holistic approach to institutional-level capacity building. For a small investment of resources, the Army can improve this situation by creating BPC capability in terms of PME engagements by developing SOOs at its key educational institutions.

Current resourcing shortfalls within the generating force contribute to the tactical character of AFRICOM BPC engagements. Army schools are regularly unable to support GCC and ASCC requests for assistance with host nation schools and are unable to participate in BPC planning activities that can assist in identifying the upstream activities required to institutionalize knowledge and doctrine across the partner force. Failure to include the generating force in the form of the higher Army schoolhouses in BPC, especially when it comes to PME-related activities such as the establishment of PME schools, produces increased risk for GCC
and ASCC BPC efforts by reinforcing the transactional and ephemeral character of U.S. security cooperation engagements. The United States has a reputation of promising much, assessing more, and delivering very little; thus the emphasis is on the tactical level of capability generation as partners concentrate on what they can obtain from the United States through short-term transactional engagements. This condition effectively minimizes the ability of the GCC to institutionalize capacity over time because the U.S. efforts become strategic means, vice ways, for our partners, thus affecting the overall DoD enterprise’s ability to meet the certification and reporting requirements specified in the 2017 NDAA.

PME is a complex, systems-oriented problem set that requires DRU subject matter expertise to assist BPC planners in integrating PME into theater campaign plans. Title V hiring authorities provide an excellent tool to ensure that the right expertise in the form of former military and civilian practitioner-educators staff the SOO. These offices will provide the specific subject matter expertise required to address the knowledge gaps identified in the GCC, ASCC, and SCO structures with respect to understanding, assessing, and engaging with partner nation PME systems and the wider generating force and executive direction level activities. These aspects are all long-term propositions that are currently beyond the capability and capacity of the GCCs, ASCCs, and SCOs.

Most importantly, creating an SOO at the Army’s flagship educational institutions (the U.S. Military Academy, Army University, and the USAWC) gives the Army a holistic BPC capability by providing appropriate expertise from the tactical, that is, the SFAB, through the strategic level (see Figure 2-3). It formalizes and
actualizes the doctrinal linkage of operational, generating force, and executive direction functions without seams or gaps. SOOs would directly support the institutionalization of the tactical capability generated by the SFABs, the potential institutional-level capability generated by the Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), and the potential strategic-level capability generated by the DoD’s Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) Program and the Defense Governance and Management Team’s (DGMT) activities. By conducting detailed curriculum mapping using the SOO, the GCC can engage selectively, in accordance with its theater objectives, to institutionalize knowledge generated from U.S. operational force and other engagements across the partner force. Additionally, given the focus on BPC in U.S. policy and strategy, the SOO would also provide a central point for the collection of lessons learned, the enhancement of doctrine, and the development of curriculum to support the wider Army educational enterprise.
Figure 2-3. Integrating Generating Force PME Assets with SFA Brigade Activities = Holistic Army BPC Capability.

Having a centralized resource simplifies coordination within the U.S. Government (USG) enterprise and enhances the Army’s ability to track the demand signal for PME-related BPC support for both mission and budget purposes that is available across the GCCs and ASCCs globally. It also provides a needed structure that can assist in eliminating the ad hoc nature of current PME-related support requests from across the DoD enterprise. Granted, given the joint nature of U.S. PME, other institutions can support BPC efforts in Africa. However, the Army should be the first choice for African PME-related BPC assistance, given African militaries are Army-centric, and the security problems originate on land.
Additionally, PME can be an effective tool for transforming militaries and generating sustainable capacity because it provides a means of changing the way military personnel think about problems. As such, PME is a critical element of institutionalizing U.S. BPC efforts for the long term, as it embeds knowledge and procedures inside the partner nation’s DOTMLPF processes. Thus, PME serves as the bridge that links discrete tactical level BPC events to the creation of strategic consciousness through executive direction assistance, thereby creating a complete system. Creating the SOO provides the institutional-level generating force support for BPC needed to engage with PME systems. It further provides the wider DoD with a pool of subject matter experts who can assist other DoD BPC programs across the generating force and executive direction functions. In short, it is this institutional-level capacity building that locks-in the benefit of U.S. engagement and provides a blueprint to show to Congress how U.S. efforts, especially Army efforts with the newly created SFABs, tie together to institutionalize capacity over time across the operational force, generating force, and executive direction functions as the 2017 NDAA requires.

CONCLUSION

The concept of BPC and its associated activities have been in the military lexicon for more than a decade. However, despite BPC’s long-term presence as a tool of U.S. national security policy and strategy, the United States has had difficulty building sustainable capacity amongst its partners. This difficulty in building capacity is because BPC efforts have overly focused on tactical capability generation based on
a “train and equip” mentality.112 This approach has especially been the case in Africa where the short-term capability focus has hampered the institutionalization of capacity.113 This is the character of the current problem facing U.S. BPC efforts in Africa.

The focus on immediate capability is understandable, especially when potential partners are dealing with immediate security threats. However, this loss of focus on long-term strategic gains means the effects of U.S. efforts are ephemeral and creates a dynamic where the United States potentially has to rebuild capability almost constantly. This is because the United States is not effectively addressing problems from an institutional perspective. Turning a capability, the ability to perform a mission or function at a discrete point in time, into a capacity, the ability to perform a mission or function over time, is dependent on institutionalization of knowledge and skills inside the partner defense systems. Systemization of outcomes means working at the generating force level to ensure knowledge, skills, and procedures are embedded throughout the DOTMLPF functions of the partner nation. U.S. military doctrine clearly makes these linkages between the operational and the generating force. This linkage is exactly what is missing from current U.S. BPC efforts in Africa.

There are multiple reasons for this situation in relation to Africa. First, institutional capacity building is neglected due to a distinct lack of means, physical and intellectual. This is a structural issue inherent within the U.S. system. Operationally, a distinct lack of knowledge about partner nation generating force systems and a lack of resourcing of the United States generating the force expertise required to support BPC by the GCCs means the upstream activities that have
to happen with the partner to institutionalize outcomes are either not identified or happen too late in the process to have an effect.\textsuperscript{114} This is especially the case when dealing with complex systems and topics, such as PME.

Second, this lack of intellectual and physical means at the GCC and ASCC is influenced by issues inside African partner systems. Education is a key component of the transformation and generation of sustainable capacity. However, AFRICOM cannot effectively leverage PME as a tool for change. From an actual conduct of BPC activities standpoint, the character of the partner nation PME legacy system influences how the United States needs to engage. There are significant differences in how a British-based legacy system and a French-based legacy system operate.\textsuperscript{115} These differences need to be clearly understood in order to match the correct U.S. BPC tools with the partner system so that institutionalization occurs.

In addition, AFRICOM faces a significant common \underline{systemic} issue between the various systems. PME in Africa is generally treated as training. There is a distinct lack of CHOD and CDS ownership of PME. African PME systems lack effective executive direction and are not supported by cultures of assessment that influence the continued relevance of African PME educational outcomes in the face of a rapidly changing strategic environment.\textsuperscript{116} Systemization is the missing component in African PME that prevents the institutionalization of knowledge.

These factors combine to create a dynamic where, given current circumstances, U.S. security cooperation is tactical in nature and cannot promote a holistic capacity-building approach utilizing the entirety of the strategic (executive direction), operational (generating
force), and tactical (operating force) force. This is not an ends-driven strategic approach; but is a means-driven strategic approach, which is inconsistent with the intent and requirements of the 2017 NDAA. The result could have serious consequences for ongoing and future U.S. BPC efforts because Congress is not convinced that U.S. interests and objectives are being met and that a suitable return on investment is achieved.

Dealing with these issues is critical to ensure the success of BPC as a method to achieve U.S. strategic goals in Africa. The solutions to these issues lie easily within doctrinal and resourcing aspects of the U.S. DOTMLPF system, especially with how the United States conducts BPC and how the Army resources BPC. By fully implementing doctrine, with GCC and ASCC commanders making institutional BPC a priority, and creating SOOs at flagship Army educational institutions the probability of achieving defense institution building is increased.

Fully implementing and reinforcing doctrine, particularly the planning guidance contained in FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, develops the resourcing demand signal to inform the Army, DoD, and Congress of the resources required to conduct BPC. More importantly, it forces the linkage of U.S. engagement efforts to U.S. interests and highlights how the GCC and ASCC are institutionalizing capability of time—both issues that are critical data points for meeting congressional certification requirements contained in the 2017 NDAA. The Army and the OSD’s specifically demanding BPC information that is reported in accordance with Army and Joint BPC doctrinal structures, such as the SFA model, will help develop U.S. systems and processes to assist the Secretary of Defense in certifying that security cooperation
activities meet the mandate of NDAA Section 333 by ensuring GCC and ASCC plans incorporate all levels of the force (operational, generating, and executive direction functions) in BPC planning in a synchronized and coherent manner. PME is a critical tool in showing how the GCC is institutionalizing capacity.

Having the GCC and ASCC commanders making institutionalization a key area of emphasis in their engagement with counterparts addresses the lack of CHOD and CDS ownership of PME. Asking specifics about how tactical capability is being institutionalized shows that it matters. Generating the will to change from the top is a key element to addressing the missing systemization in African PME that prevents the institutionalization of knowledge generated by U.S. capability building events. Making progress in engendering cultures of assessment, which benefits the entirety of the force and not just PME, will not happen without CHOD ownership. Direct GCC and ASCC commander focus on institutionalization further opens the space for the SCO to work with the partner generating and executive direction functions and helps gauge the level of partner will to sustain the effects of U.S. BPC activities. These data points are critical to assisting the GCC in ensuring they have a holistic approach to BPC that incorporates all levels of the force (operational, generating, and executive direction functions) in BPC planning and execution in a synchronized and coherent manner, again feeding into the Defense Department’s ability to certify BPC activities in accordance with the law.

The positive gains of implementing these previous recommendations can come to naught if the Army does not address the resourcing issue for the generating force. Creating the SOOs at the Army educational
Institutions is critical to dealing with the lack of knowledge and establishing reach-back assistance at the generating function level. Establishment of the SFABs does not address the generating force functions required to institutionalize capacity. This can only be done by using the right expertise over the long-term. Creating the SOOs provides this sorely lacking expertise, provides a structure that can assist in eliminating the ad hoc nature of PME-related support requests from across the DoD enterprise, and enhances the Army’s ability to track the demand signal for PME-related BPC support. More importantly, the SFAB and SOO in combination give the Army a holistic BPC capability that formalizes and actualizes the doctrinal linkage of operational, generating force, and executive direction functions in BPC without seems or gaps. It is this type of capability that will enable the GCCs and ASCCs to meet the intent of NDAA Section 333.

Institutional capacity building is the key to locking-in the benefits of U.S. capability generation activities in Africa. PME is a critical element of partner institutional capacity. However, as this chapter indicates, institutional level capacity building is neglected due to a distinct lack of means. Thus, current U.S. efforts, for all intents and purposes, follow on an operationally based means driven approach in terms of BPC. As was previously noted: “we do the tactical very well.” However, this is also a liability; it is a nonstrategic approach that places future BPC activities at risk because it cannot answer the requirements demanded by the 2017 NDAA. By making some relatively small changes in procedure at the GCC and ASCC in terms of how they plan for BPC and how they socialize BPC with partners, combined with a small Army investment in resources, enables a shift to ends-driven BPC
approaches at little cost. These changes are critical in dealing with the partner generating force, particularly in terms of PME capacity generation. These are low cost, low risk options to put BPC back on the strategic track and meet the intent of the 2017 NDAA.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2


6. Army and Joint doctrine defines security force assistance (SFA) as Department of Defense (DoD) activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government (USG) to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. These activities are
conducted to assist the partner nations in building the capacity to defend against internal, external, and transnational threat actors. Joint doctrine further defines the goal of SFA as the creation, maintenance, or enhancement of a sustainable capability or capacity to achieve a desired end state. See Headquarters, DA, Operations, p. 3-6; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 29, 2013, p. I-5; Headquarters, DA, Army Support to Security Cooperation, p. 1-24.


12. Ross, p. 27.

13. Ibid., pp. 28-29; McFate; Ilan Goldenberg, Alice Hunt Friend, Stephen Tankel, and Nicholas Heras, Remodeling Partner Capacity: Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Counterterrorism


15. Ross, p. 27.


26. Ibid., p. IV-11; Headquarters, DA, Army Support to Security Cooperation, pp. 1-14–1-15, 4-2, 4-5.


29. AFRICOM STRWG, briefings, Germany, February 27-28, 2017.


31. Strategic Leader interview conducted at AFRICOM STRWG, Garmisch, Germany, February 27, 2017, hereafter, Strategic Leader, AFRICOM STRWG, Germany, February 27, 2017.


33. *Ibid*.

34. *Ibid*.


38. Multiple interviews conducted at AFRICOM STRWG, Garmisch, Germany, February 27-28, 2017, and site visits to African professional military education (PME) institutions and engagement events from September 2016 to March 2017, hereafter, Multiple interviews, AFRICOM STRWG, Germany, February 27-28, 2017, and site visits and events, September 2016-March 2017.


42. According to participants at the AFRICOM STRWG, requests for forces to the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) require a 180-day lead-time for the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) and 270 days for reserve forces—this clearly has an effect on training, especially for emergent requirements. However, when you combine this lead-time for forces with the habitual perceived refusal by Army schoolhouses to support emergent PME-related or subject matter expert request then you may get planners to shy away from following doctrine.


44. Ibid., p. 6.

45. Ibid.


47. Strategic Leader, AFRICOM STRWG, Germany, February 27-28, 2017.


51. See the definition of Capacity as defined in Headquarters, DA, Army Security Cooperation Handbook, p. 84.


53. Ibid., p. 9.

54. Mapping conducted based on field research and specific school site visits, September 2016-March 2017.

55. Field interviews and site visits, April 2014 through February 2017.

56. Coopérants are specially selected French Officers assigned to assist a specific partner nation. They wear the partner nation uniform during the duty and fill positions within the partner nation military. These positions can be at the tactical through the ministerial level. These officers focus on SFA in accordance with French objectives and are managed by and assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while posted overseas. See Jean-Philippe Peltier, “Perspectives: A French idea worth stealing,” Armed Forces Journal, December 1, 2011, available from www.armedforcesjournal.com/perspectives-a-french-idea-worth-stealing/, for a further discussion of coopérants and how they may relate to the U.S. system.

57. Headquarters, DA, Army Support to Security Cooperation, p. 4-4. These building blocks follow a simple methodology of “Do it for them,” “Do it together,” and “They do it” where the SFA element transitions to an advisory role. The final stage is an excellent way to gain a true understanding of whether you have been successful at developing capacity instead of ephemeral capability.
58. There is a generational and cultural tension inside both the British and French legacy PME systems. Both tend to be somewhat hierarchical in character, where dialogue tends to be centered more on agreeing with the critique of the more senior directing staff and visiting professors. Dialogue amongst the students themselves, however, can be quite robust. The younger generation sees the value in a more critical thinking approach to engaging with course material and the need for greater use of active teaching and learning techniques in the classroom, but this is going to take a cultural shift. Field interviews and PME-related theater security cooperation engagements, July 2014 through March 2017.

59. Field interviews and site visits, April 2014 through February 2017.

60. Field interview with senior Country 2 Staff Officer, February 2017.

61. Multiple site visits to Country 1, April 2014 through April 2016.


63. Field interview and site visit, February 2017.

64. Field interview, February 2017.

65. The French Staff College has now moved to Saumur.

66. Field interviews and site visits, April 2014 through September 2016.

67. Field interviews and site visits, April 2014 through September 2016.

68. Author’s translation of school name currently in existence in Country 2. This school is the Senior Staff College level and is the equivalent of the French *Ecole de Guerre* in Paris.

69. Field interviews with Country 1 and Country 2 Defense Headquarters Staff Officers and site visits, April 2014 through February 2017.
70. Field interview with senior Country 2 Staff Officer, February 2017.

71. The British legacy system also includes assistance provided by India. Granted, the Indian PME system has evolved over time, in terms, into a distinctly Indian endeavor. However, the skeletal structure of the system remains what was planted by the United Kingdom. Thus, assistance in forming schools, curriculum, and pedagogical approaches provided by India can be traced back to British roots.


73. Field interview and site visit, February 2017.

74. Author PME-related theater security cooperation engagements and site visits, July 2014 through March 2017.

75. Ibid.

76. Field interview and site visits, July 2016 through February 2017.

77. Author PME-related theater security cooperation engagements and site visits, July 2014 through March 2017.

78. Ross, p. 32.

79. Field interviews and site visits, July 2016 through March 2017.

80. Ibid.

81. Site visits, author PME-related theater security cooperation engagements, and field interviews, April 2014 through March 2017; Country 3 senior leader interview, Washington, DC, September 2016.

82. This lack of formal capture of guidance was most persistent in Country 3. A general comment by several individuals involved in the PME enterprise was “We learned from the British, we don’t write things down.” Site visits, July 2016 through February 2017.

84. Ibid.

85. Site visits and field interviews, February 2017 through March 2017.

86. Site visits, field interviews, and author PME-related theater security cooperation engagements, July 2014 through March 2017.

87. CJCS, Security Force Assistance, p. IV-10; Headquarters, DA, Army Support to Security Cooperation, p. 4-2; Ross, p. 28.


89. Author PME-related theater security cooperation engagements, and field interviews, April 2014 through March 2017.


91. Field interviews, July 2016 through February 2017.

92. Site visit, July 2016.


95. Enclosure B, “Policies for Intermediate and Senior Level Colleges,” and Enclosure E, “Joint Professional Military Education,” of the CJCS, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, serve to set curriculum requirements and standards for the various schools inside the U.S. system and show the curricular linkages between staff college and Senior Service College (SSC) level education. Enclosure F, “Process for Accreditation of Joint
Education,” lays out the process of periodic institutional and enterprise level evaluation required to ensure PME meets military related educational requirements. The U.S. Army’s TRADOC also conducts its own assessments and accreditation of military curriculum at Army PME schools and the Army University.


97. The general comment concerning lessons learned was that the students bring lessons to the schoolhouses and exchange them between themselves. This passive approach is too dependent of the quality of the student and does nothing to incorporate new ideas into doctrine, which can then drive formal curriculum development. Site visits and field interviews, February 2017 through March 2017.


100. Field interviews, site visits and author PME-related theater security cooperation engagements, July 2016 through February 2017.


102. The key difference between learning objectives and learning outcomes deals with student ability and performance. A learning objective places to onus on the student to be able to demonstrate their mastery of the subject. A learning outcome places the onus on the school to demonstrate its effectiveness at teaching the material. In an objectives-based approach, order of merit lists etc., reflect the student’s ability to learn, while in an outcomes-based approach the student’s ability to apply the knowledge in the field is the critical measure of success.

103. Site visit, February 2017.

104. Strategic Leader, AFRICOM STRWG, Germany, February 27, 2017.

105. Ross, p. 27; Headquarters, DA, Army Support to Security Cooperation, pp. 1-8, 1-13–1-15, 4-2, 4-5.

107. Ibid., pp. 506-507.


112. McFate; Ross, p. 26.


115. Field interviews with Country 1, 2, 3, and 4 Defense Headquarters staff officers, military educators, and site visits, April 2014 through March 2017.

116. Ibid.; Author PME-related security assistance visits, Country 1, 2, 3, and 4, April 2014 through March 2017.

117. Strategic Leader, AFRICOM STRWG, Germany, February 27, 2017.
CHAPTER 3

STRENGTHENING AFRICAN PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS: THE STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY PARTNERSHIP

Catherine Hill-Herndon

INTRODUCTION

In his 2007 testimony announcing the establishment of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said the new command would “oversee security cooperation, building partnership capacity, defense support to nonmilitary missions and, if directed, military operations on the African continent.”1 The first of these missions is critical for the attainment of U.S. defense aims and the success of the U.S. Army’s global mission, as security cooperation provides strategic access to partner nations, enhances the Army’s readiness, training and leader development activities, and improves situational awareness and expertise in the area of operations through engagement.2 While public health is not usually thought of as an element of security cooperation, it is a major component of building partner capacity in that it contributes to U.S. partners’ abilities to function effectively in the areas of governance, essential services, and economic development. It is an indisputable truth that virtually every nation that wants to thrive socially, politically, and economically cares about the health of its population. Therefore, working with partner militaries and governments on challenges in which the U.S. Government (USG) has a
clear, shared interest, such as public health, especially pandemic and disaster preparedness, is a sound basis for establishing trust and building solid relations with partners in the AFRICOM area of responsibility.

Now in its 2nd decade, with the changing security environment on the continent, AFRICOM has had to address the rising threat of violent extremism. Although there is no irrefutable evidence as to the direct cause of violent extremism, it tends to take root in impoverished countries and when societies are under extreme stress. Public health can make an important contribution in efforts against violent extremism, given the impact that investments in health systems can have on economic growth and development in partner countries, and in alleviating the societal stress that allows it to take root. These connections are not lost on U.S. policymakers, who consider these factors critical in the attainment of U.S. national security objectives, by protecting our citizens from disease, as well as promoting global economic wellbeing and a stable international order. As first noted as far back as the 2000 *National Security Strategy*, “Besides reducing the direct threat to Americans from disease, healthy populations internationally provide an essential underpinning for economic development, democratization and political stability.” A World Health Organization (WHO)-sponsored study observed that health sector investments have significant economic returns in addition to their contribution to general economic development.” This study points out several reasons why public health activities have broader effects in societies. For example, investors are more likely to put their money in countries where workers are healthy and productive. Economists who have studied the issue consider improved health outcomes a major factor in
East Asia’s rapid economic development through the second half of the 20th century.\textsuperscript{7}

While there are important benefits gained by paying attention to public health issues, there is enormous risk in ignoring them. Infectious disease outbreaks, in recent history, have cost millions of lives. The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) alone have claimed the lives of more than 35 million people. An estimated 50 million people died of influenza in 1918.\textsuperscript{8} More recently, the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa demonstrated unambiguously that the United States and other nations face the challenge of infectious disease as a global community. The potential for economic and social disruption from a major disease pandemic is enormous. Yet investments in preparedness and planning for pandemics are inadequate.\textsuperscript{9}

In his February 2017 remarks at the National Press Club, Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases, noted that every U.S. president since Ronald Reagan has addressed one or more pandemic outbreaks. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush faced HIV/AIDS, while President George W. Bush had the additional challenge of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak. Administrations have also dealt with the emergence of West Nile Virus in the United States, in addition to other contagious diseases such as Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, Swine Flu, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, Anthrax, Chikungunya, Ebola, and Zika. As Fauci asserted in his remarks, future epidemics and pandemics of these diseases, and ones we do not yet know, will occur in the future.\textsuperscript{10} No nation is immune from this possibility and all must be prepared.
The ability of U.S. partners and allies to respond effectively to a disease outbreak has political, economic, and social implications for their populations. HIV/AIDS is an example of a pandemic with consequences far beyond its immediate health impact. In the 1990s, HIV/AIDS’ effect on African militaries brought health and security concerns together at the highest levels of the USG. In 2000, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Resolution 1308, asking member states to consider voluntary HIV/AIDS testing for peacekeeping troops, the first ever UN resolution on a health topic. In the early years of President George W. Bush’s administration, concern about how HIV/AIDS was undermining the effectiveness of African militaries led to the inclusion of the Department of Defense (DoD) as one of the implementing agencies for the U.S. President’s Emergency Relief Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Yet, it is not only U.S. presidents and international organizations that have paid attention to the impact of disease outbreaks.

The U.S. DoD policy and military doctrine address the need for U.S. military readiness in the public health sector. As specified in the DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6000.16, “Military Health Support for Stability Operations,” medical stability operations (MSOs), are a “core U.S. military mission.” The policy states the DoD Military Health System should be:

prepared to perform any task assigned to establish, reconstitute, and maintain health sector capacity and capability for the indigenous population when indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals cannot do so.
The geographic combatant commands are specifically charged with the following tasks related to MSOs, including:

a. Identify MSO requirements.

b. Incorporate MSOs into campaign plans; theater security cooperation plans; military training, exercises, and planning, including intelligence campaign plans; and intelligence support plans.

c. Engage relevant U.S. Government departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, IOs [international organizations], NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and members of the Private Sector in MSO planning, training, and exercising, as appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], the USD(P) [Under Secretary of Defense for Policy], and the ASD(HA) [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs].

d. Submit MSO ideas and issues to the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), for further exploration as part of the joint experimentation program.

e. Ensure unity of command and unity of effort for health engagement activities within their command and subordinate theater of operations.\textsuperscript{14}

The above guidance focuses on health sector capacity and capability in a particular type of operation, but that may be changing. Specifically, WHO defines health systems as “all the activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore and/or maintain health” as well as “the people, institutions and resources, arranged together in accordance with established policies, to improve the health of the population they serve.”\textsuperscript{15} It appears the DoD is expanding its lens to take in more of the elements outlined in the WHO definition. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) experts writing recently in the \textit{Joint Force Quarterly} noted, “systems engagement is more aligned
with U.S. projection of soft power,” and that given budgetary challenges, “it is even more essential that Global Health Engagement not only meets the needs of partner nations but also produces maximum benefit to the broader policy objectives of the United States.” Nonetheless, historical traditions are not easily abandoned.

Traditionally, the U.S. Army’s involvement in public health activities has concentrated on preparedness (including research, development, and surveillance) and response. The rationale for Army involvement in each area differs, but sometimes they intersect. In the case of preparedness, which includes U.S. military preparedness and that of its partners, there are compelling reasons for the Army to work with African military counterparts. African countries are routinely challenged by major disease outbreaks. In 2016, there were several major disease outbreaks in Africa alone, affecting nine nations, including Nigeria (measles), Ghana (cholera), Central African Republic (cholera), South Sudan (cholera), Somalia (measles), Kenya (cholera), Burundi (cholera), and Angola/Democratic Republic of Congo (yellow fever).

Even more predictable health issues are a challenge for troop readiness. During the deployment of U.S. forces to Liberia in 2014-2015, a response mission, the Army recognized the biggest health threat to U.S. forces was not Ebola, but malaria.

THE EBOLA CRISIS (2014-2016): AN OVERVIEW

There are many accounts of the challenges that West African governments and the international community faced with the 2014 Ebola outbreak. The governments of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, recently emerged from decades of conflict, were severely
strained. Notably, in August 2014, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf declared a state of emergency, citing the need for “extraordinary measures for the very survival of our state and for the protection of the lives of our people.”

She faced a severe political crisis and fired several government ministers who refused to return to Liberia to address the outbreak. The Liberian economy was also hard hit. After seeing gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 8.7 percent in 2013, Liberia’s economy contracted by 0.7 percent in 2014, and showed zero GDP growth in 2015.

Before the 2014 outbreak, USG programming for infectious disease in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone was limited. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had bilateral PEPFAR programs in Liberia and Guinea, and Sierra Leone was part of a regional program. Guinea joined USAID’s President’s Malaria Initiative program in 2011. In 2014, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was providing limited technical support to Sierra Leone, but was not present in Guinea or Liberia. Additionally, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research’s U.S. Military HIV Research Program (MHRP) had worked in Nigeria to develop research capacity for more than 10 years.

AFRICOM had also engaged in global health activities on the continent, and long-term collaboration and capacity developed through a variety of programs was critical in the Ebola response. For example, AFRICOM’s Disaster Preparedness Program (DPP), implemented in part by the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, assisted “African PNs [partner nations] to prepare for, respond to and mitigate disasters, as well as to develop strategic partnerships on
the continent.” Several West African countries at risk from Ebola in 2014 had already engaged in the DPP, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo. Each of those countries had exercised their national disaster/pandemic preparedness and response plans by mid-2013. After the outbreak, Senegal specifically attributed their ability to contain the limited outbreak they experienced to work done in partnership with AFRICOM and CDHAM under the DPP program. When they discovered Ebola cases in Lagos, Nigerian officials activated the country’s DPP plan and brought the outbreak under control. Liberia became a DPP participant in 2013; unfortunately, it had not yet conducted its national exercise until after Ebola emerged. CDHAM also conducted programming under the West African Disaster Preparedness Initiative from March to December 2015 within the DPP framework, as a transition from Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE (OUA). The purpose was to apply lessons learned in the Ebola response to improve national disaster management capacities and foster regional collaboration, communication, and coordination, primarily within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Walter Reed’s MHRP platforms in several countries conducted Ebola testing. MHRP sites in Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Mozambique ran phase II Ebola vaccine trials. Lastly, AFRICOM continues to support periodic activities of the African Partner Outbreak Response Alliance (APORA). APORA partners include African nations, DoD agencies, AFRICOM, and USG civilian agencies, including USAID and the CDC.

Nigeria’s experience during its Ebola outbreak underscores the importance of long-term commitments to partner capacity. In addition to the work
done with Walter Reed and DPP, Nigeria’s effective response was facilitated by its experience in polio eradication, working with long-term partners such as the CDC, along with NGOs, including Rotary International and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, to enhance Nigeria’s disease surveillance system. These partnerships meant Nigeria had the trained personnel and resources to recognize and shut down the Ebola outbreak quickly, and a plan in place to deploy them for other infectious disease outbreaks.

Nonetheless, former President Barack Obama’s September 2014 announcement the U.S. military would join a USG surge in OUA, to fight the epidemic, was a turning point. The deployment of the 101st Airborne Division had several important benefits. Liberia badly needed the Ebola Treatment Units, and the announcement the U.S. Army would build such a unit for health care workers was a key factor in the ability of international NGOs (INGOs) and local health officials to recruit and retain medical personnel. The air bridge from Senegal was essential for bringing in personnel, equipment, and supplies, particularly given regional and commercial travel restrictions. Training for Liberian first responders was critical as well. Finally, the DoD’s research and development was the source of the most knowledge of, and virtually all countermeasures for, Ebola.

The psychological impact of the arrival of the 101st Airborne Division on the morale and the resolve of the Liberian government, medical community, and population cannot be overstated. One observer maintains:

Military engagement symbolized the commitment of international resources and a demonstration of goodwill, halted the exodus of INGOs from the region, encouraged a professional response with structured command
and control arrangements, and provided high-quality treatment facilities, which reassured international agencies that deployed professional staff to the region.33

Military forces from the United Kingdom, China, Canada, France, and Germany also responded to the 2014 Ebola outbreak. In 2016, The Lancet reported, “These forces were seen by many as a game changer in the Ebola response.” The study found “the deployment of foreign militaries was vital to convincing several non-governmental organisations to maintain or establish operations in the affected countries.”34

OUA was a watershed event for the Army and AFRICOM, but it followed decades of DoD activity in the health sector in Africa and other parts of the world. Globally, Army and Navy laboratories, including in Africa, play an important role in force protection, and contribute significantly to disease surveillance and detection more broadly. For example, in West Africa, the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3 (NAMRU-3) in Cairo, based in Egypt since 1946, has had activities throughout the region, including in West Africa.35 For over a decade, NAMRU-3 has maintained a detachment in Accra, Ghana where it works in close collaboration with the U.S. interagency, including the CDC. These organizations and their activities were the foundations on which the successful Ebola response was built.

OUTBREAK LESSONS LEARNED

Since 2015, the USG has exerted considerable effort to take the lessons of the Ebola outbreak into account, and to agree on new procedures and planning to avoid delays and confusion in the future. In this context, one important lesson is how an infectious disease outbreak
can turn into a situation requiring a broader response. The State Department’s *Foreign Affairs Manual*, which governs State’s operations, includes epidemics as a possible cause of a disaster in its policy guidance for USG provision of humanitarian assistance.\(^{36}\) In West Africa, however, recognition that the situation had turned into what WHO described as a “broader, multidimensional crisis” came very late, delaying an effective and timely response.\(^{37}\) An earlier decision to trigger traditional disaster/humanitarian mechanisms might have reduced the risk of a broader outbreak, and potentially saved many lives.

A University of Sydney study (2015) concluded:

> adverse health events must be recognized as equivalent to other disasters for their potential to cause or exacerbate humanitarian crises. Health actors must not preclude multisectoral collaboration with humanitarian, and if necessary, military actors even if an event is framed as a health crisis.\(^{38}\)

This was certainly true in the case of Ebola. Jeremy Konyndyk, then-director of USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), said recently that “no one in the USG had a monopoly on the capacities needed to stop the transmission.” In his view:

> calling it a disaster put it into an operational framework that pulls everything together: military, civilian, NGOs. It also brings in more flexible tools, including funding streams and authorities within the USG.

He continued, “We also must note the political significance and impact of the U.S. Government putting its credibility on the line to do something.”\(^{39}\)

The response to a complex health emergency, which is more likely to be a slow-onset crisis, requires
a different planning response than a natural disaster with a sudden onset. Policymakers and planners must recognize that in a health crisis, strategy and guidance need constant reevaluation. After a hurricane, or an earthquake, the event itself is over when relief efforts get underway. Responders will encounter a range of consequences, but the original nature of the disaster will not change. Disease is different. At the start of an outbreak, responders may not know the exact cause, source, or epidemiology of the disease. Policymakers and planners must continually reassess assumptions, based on the data, to ensure the response remains effective and appropriate. Former CDC Director Thomas Frieden emphasized this at a recent conference, noting that responders in a health emergency “must be adaptive.” Public understanding of the nature of an emerging infectious disease may not reflect the science, and decisionmakers, planners, and responders across the USG should lead in this regard.

The character of the U.S. military intervention occasioned significant interagency debate within the USG, leading the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis’ (JCOA) study of OUA to conclude, “debate about the nature and extent of the USG response consumed critical time while the crisis worsened.” Much of the debate was over the nature of military support. There were policy concerns about the exposure of troops to the disease and a debate over the potential role of military personnel in the provision of medical care. The weeks of debate over the DoD’s role concluded with decisions that were, in the end, largely consistent with the internationally agreed-upon Guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, also known as the Oslo Guidelines.
Forty-five UN member states, including the United States; the European Union; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the Western European Union; several UN agencies, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the WHO; and INGOs and universities, including the International Committee for the Red Cross, agreed to the Oslo Guidelines, negotiated in 1994 and revised in 2007. The Guidelines differentiate between direct and indirect assistance, defining direct assistance as “the face-to-face distribution of goods and services.” Indirect assistance is “at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.” According to the Guidelines:

Military and civil defence assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged “humanitarian gap” between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. Therefore, foreign military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military or civil defence asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.

Moreover, one of the key principles in deploying military and civil defense forces is that:

humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Insofar as military organizations have a role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should, to the extent possible, not encompass direct assistance, in order to retain a clear distinction between the normal
functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders.45

There is also an acknowledged role for infrastructure support.

Although USAID trains its staff based on the Oslo Guidelines, there appears to be limited interagency awareness of these agreed-upon principles.46 Broader understanding of, and interagency planning based on, these guidelines could speed the decisionmaking process in a future emergency. At the same time, the Army and AFRICOM should continue to consider when and if a U.S. military medical response is appropriate. The military has considerable capacity to respond medically. Virtually all the preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic medical countermeasures fielded in the Ebola epidemic were either directly or indirectly a product of the U.S. military’s acquisition process and its medical research and development activities.47 Some interviewees considered the inability of military researchers to lead vaccine trials, for example, a significant missed opportunity.

During OUA, AFRICOM recognized the need for a deeper understanding and expertise in their area of operations.48 AFRICOM faces several challenges in building and sustaining expertise, including the relative newness of the combatant command, the 5-year limit on civilian tenure, and the lack of African liaison officers outside of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in Djibouti.49 Moreover, particularly in smaller countries, the number of host government counterparts with the technical backgrounds and in some cases, English skills, to handle global health engagements may be limited. These individuals and their staffs can be overwhelmed by the multiplicity of
USG actors. At the country level, the country team, in this context, is an invaluable resource. The team is also an excellent mechanism for overseeing coordination; deconflicting planning, programs, and training; and ensuring policy coherence and sustainability. Regionally, AFRICOM’s approximate counterparts at the State Department, the Bureau of African Affairs, and at USAID, the Africa Bureau, are also important partners. Continued efforts to coordinate at the regional and country levels will ensure AFRICOM’s health engagement efforts fall within the broader USG policy framework and will help avoid program overlap and confusion.

Routine work with U.S. civilian agencies will also facilitate emergency response, as was the case with the Ebola outbreak. Several interlocutors identified the lack of civilian agency understanding of military response capabilities and limitations as a challenge. In recent years, the interagency has made considerable progress on civilian-military coordination. However, many civilian agency offices involved in the Ebola response, particularly at the action officer level, had not had significant contact with military counterparts. As the outbreak worsened, they did not include military options in their planning, and were not sure of the right questions to ask the DoD to determine what might be possible. Even once the USG began its internal debate over whether or not to deploy the U.S. Army in response to the epidemic, there was considerable discussion over what its role would be. Army and AFRICOM success in future deployments depends on planning and exercising what they can do to respond to future health emergencies. The converse is also true: the Army and AFRICOM need to understand the
authorities and capabilities of their USG partners in responding to a public health emergency.

The U.S. CDC has an emergency operation system that activates in response to disease outbreaks and other health crises. The State Department, through its Operations Center, also has established coordination mechanisms for natural disasters, disease outbreaks and other civilian emergencies. In 2016, USAID’s OFDA issued “USAID/OFDA Guidance on Indicators for Programming in Response to a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).” These guidelines govern a potential OFDA-led response to an isolated disease outbreak declared a PHEIC by WHO, in addition to OFDA responses to infectious disease outbreaks in the context of a natural disaster or other complex humanitarian emergency. Sustained collaboration, including policy coordination and exercises, across these functions will enhance the effectiveness of the entire interagency in future emergencies.

Outside the USG, there are several fora where the global health community has established shared global and regional goals and objectives, agreed to by countries, regional organizations, and international organizations, to strengthen health systems. Using these goals as a basis for Army and AFRICOM planning and programs will ensure those programs support broadly agreed-upon objectives, and facilitate collaboration with and commitment of other stakeholders and partner governments. The first and foremost of these shared goals are the International Health Regulations, which 196 UN member states, the United States included, have accepted and agreed to implement.

Another mechanism is the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), a partnership of almost 60 nations
and others, including international organizations and NGOs. Its purpose is:

facilitating collaborative, **capacity-building** efforts to achieve specific and measurable targets around biological threats, while accelerating achievement of the core capacities required by the International Health Regulations, the World Organization of Animal Health’s Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway, and other relevant global health security frameworks [emphasis added].

Sixteen of the members are African countries, of which 10 have posted their own national roadmaps for improving capacity on the GHSA website, making them readily accessible. African countries that have shared their roadmaps include Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. Additional GHSA members in Africa include Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. In coordination with the interagency, AFRICOM and the Army should steer health engagement activities to fit within the GHSA to ensure those activities are appropriately focused, sustainable, and support broader U.S. goals.

As Africa’s regional and subregional institutions expand their reach and capacity, AFRICOM should consider them as potential partners. For example, the African Union (AU) recently established its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (AU CDC), based in Addis Ababa. The United States contributed $10 million to establish this organization; other support has come from WHO, INGOs, and China, which built the AU CDC headquarters building. In 2016, the AU CDC issued its *Regional Strategy for Health Security and Emergencies: 2016-2020* to help African countries detect and
respond to priority diseases and public health events. Efforts to date include mapping laboratory diagnostic capacity across member states and identifying gaps. The organization has also established Africa-wide guidelines for standardizing and strengthening laboratory activities. The AU CDC is working closely with U.S. CDC, but there is plenty of work to do, and the Army and AFRICOM could usefully participate in these initiatives.

In future emergencies, African partners will look to the United States, and AFRICOM, for partnership and support. Within the USG, civilian agencies have the lead on global health engagement; close collaboration allows the DoD to play its important and appropriate role effectively. Efforts to improve interagency coordination remain a priority. The DoD’s key role in PEPFAR is an example of an effective, interagency approach. From its start in 2003, the DoD has been a partner in PEPFAR’s efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, with a focus on countries where the military is engaged on HIV/AIDS issues. According to PEPFAR:

Members of the defense forces in 13 PEPFAR focus countries have been the recipients of DoD military-specific HIV/AIDS prevention programs designed to address their unique risk factors. In these 13 countries alone, military programs have the potential to make an impact on more than 1.2 million people, including active-duty troops, their dependents, employees, and surrounding civilian communities.

The DoD will also continue to play a useful role through the Joint West Africa Research Group, established in 2015, which is a collaborative initiative to support surveillance and clinical capabilities to detect and respond to infectious disease. The DoD partners in this effort include the U.S. MHRP at the Walter
Reed Army Institute of Research, Walter Reed Program-Nigeria, the Austere Environment Consortium for Enhanced Sepsis Outcomes at the Naval Medical Research Center, NAMRU-3 (Ghana Detachment), and other military, government, and academic institutions, including the Sabeti Lab at the Broad Institute of Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Nigeria’s African Center of Excellence for Genomics of Infectious Diseases.

The debate over the military’s medical role in response to a pandemic continues within the DoD and in the interagency. Senior leadership must resolve outstanding force health protection policy issues. Important questions regarding quarantine, transport of patients, and disposal of remains are still under discussion. Substantive policy discussion and decisionmaking now would facilitate science-based policymaking in a crisis. Once established, policies should be well socialized with the DoD leadership, the U.S. interagency, and Congress. Public affairs planning, in terms of messaging, is also essential.

INITIATIVES FOR THE LONG-TERM

Sustained, routine engagement on health issues with partner military and government officials benefits AFRICOM, the Army, and broader U.S. national interests. For AFRICOM, health engagement is an excellent way to understand and support partner governments’ capacities and response capabilities. Such engagement contributes to AFRICOM’s depth of knowledge and experience in Africa, and gives soldiers experience in permissive environments. Planning, and consistently exercising plans with partners, including in Africa, contributes to a solid knowledge base,
clear policy guidance, effective interagency coordination mechanisms, and science-based decisionmaking and planning. Global cooperation in the health sector also provides opportunities for collaborative research and development in emerging infectious disease, and development of effective countermeasures. All of these activities enhance U.S. capacity to respond to a major global pandemic. Nonetheless, OUA was a single event for which, as previously described, the U.S. military and other organizations were able to respond effectively.

In the aftermath of the West Africa Ebola outbreak, AFRICOM, through a joint planning team established in 2015, developed a pandemic influenza and infectious disease contingency plan that took into account lessons learned during the OUA deployment. As part of this process, the planning team made several key recommendations for Phase 0/steady state activities to AFRICOM leadership that, if fully implemented, would significantly contribute to preparedness, both for the United States and for our partners. The recommendations are:

- Assessing partner health and medical capability/infrastructure.
- Security force assistance with key partners focused on force health protection, biosecurity, biosafety, biosurveillance, and crisis response.
- Disaster preparedness exercises with partners.
- Participation with the GHSA to ensure synchronization.

The following are specific suggestions for follow-up action by the Army and AFRICOM to address some of the issues and challenges raised above, and to support the key objectives stemming from the lessons learned exercise after OUA. Throughout the lessons
learned literature, and during interviews with officials both inside the DoD and in the interagency, it is clear that, despite AFRICOM’s interagency emphasis, coordination continues to be a challenge.

First, to provide an appropriate, overall framework, AFRICOM should develop a consolidated, shareable theater-wide health engagement strategy that sets objectives, priorities, and guidelines for appropriate, sustainable DoD activities supporting broader U.S. and global health policies and strategies. This strategy should be based on a discussion of command goals, objectives, and suitable activities and should be part of the Theater Campaign Plan. An emphasis on early and interactive interagency regional coordination, as is now the case with country teams, would clarify agency roles, promote civilian agency understanding of the DoD’s interests and objectives, ensure coordination of overlapping USG activities with country and regional partnerships, and facilitate development of individual country plans. AFRICOM may find it helpful to consider Pacific Command’s approach, based on its Health Theater Security Cooperation Plan, in which the command sets priorities for health programs and activities in the theater.

The JCOA study on Defense Institution Building recommends AFRICOM use its annual African Strategic Dialogue with deputy chiefs of mission, USAID mission directors, and defense attachés (DATTs) to “reduce geographic command-interagency bureaucratic friction.” The annual dialogue is a useful forum; however, it does take a very broad approach. Alternatively, the USUHS Center for Global Health Engagement (CGHE) could provide an excellent forum for a focused, detailed discussion of health systems strengthening. AFRICOM could consider a CGHE-led
discussion with interagency and other key international partners, the results of which would serve as a basis for drafting a theater-wide strategy. Such a conference would build on the Global Health Engagement training workshops that CGHE holds for AFRICOM planners and staff. Within the Army, an Army Medical Building Partner Capacity (BPC) conference to share and discuss best practices could be useful, possibly hosted by the Army Medical Command at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Participants could include U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) and the other five Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) supporting the regional combatant commands: U.S. Army South, U.S. Army North, U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Army Central, and U.S. Army Europe. Moreover, given the role of European-based INGOs in humanitarian assistance and disaster response in Africa, AFRICOM could also consider participating in ongoing preparedness planning with those stakeholders in Geneva, in cooperation with the U.S. Health Attache’s office at the U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva.

Second, AFRICOM should ensure planners systematically take into account interagency-approved strategy documents to provide a broader USG perspective on the bilateral relationship and direction of USG programming. AFRICOM policy is to tie activities to the Department of State’s country-level Integrated Country Strategies and the Bureau of African Affairs’ Joint Regional Strategy. These strategies reflect interagency agreement and the depth and breadth of USG expertise. Efforts in 2015 to ensure AFRICOM planners have ready access to these documents should facilitate this process. In countries with USAID programs, AFRICOM should routinely review USAID’s 5-year Country Development Cooperation Strategies,
which outline the “development context and overarching U.S. foreign policy and national security considerations.” USAID strategies are usually drafted jointly with the host government and include an assessment of the host government’s development strategy and priorities.

Third, AFRICOM military planners should prioritize efforts to cooperate more closely with significant international organizations and NGOs, perhaps through its existing APORA initiative. AFRICOM would have to agree with the interagency on the nature and direction of this cooperation, and incorporate the results into the regional strategies discussed above. One important potential partner is the AU and, specifically, the organization’s newly established AU CDC, in collaboration with the U.S. CDC. As noted earlier, the AU CDC has released its *Regional Strategy for Health Security and Emergencies: 2016-2020*. Further work with ECOWAS, already an AFRICOM partner, including through its West African Health Organisation, could also be very effective. Additionally, in coordination with the CDC, AFRICOM should consider participation in the African Society for Laboratory Medicine (ASLM), a virtual organization headquartered in Addis Ababa, with WHO and AU support. In 2015, more than 20 African health ministers issued the Freetown Declaration, calling for international stakeholders to “establish resilient tiered laboratory networks, regularly measure progress with a standardised score card, and effectively integrate these networks into disease surveillance and public health institutes.” The organization’s goals for 2020 are:

- Strengthening laboratory workforce by training and certifying laboratory professionals and clinicians through standardised frameworks;
• Transforming laboratory testing quality by enrolling laboratories in quality improvement programmes to achieve accreditation by international standards;
• Developing strong, harmonised regulatory systems for diagnostic products as defined by the Global Harmonization Taskforce; and,
• Building a network of national public health reference laboratories to improve early disease detection and collaborative research.67

This is another area where AFRICOM’s participation and engagement with African partners would be useful in its capacity-building activities.

Fourth, the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) can be an important contributor to public health engagement with African nations, and there is widespread interagency support for expansion of the SPP in Africa. There are 12 existing SPPs in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility.68 The recent AFRICOM offer to the National Guard Bureau to give State Partnerships the “first right of refusal” on security cooperation activities, and to continue to expand the program, is an excellent initiative.69 As the effort progresses, SPP health engagements should be systematically integrated into broader AFRICOM programming, and AFRICOM should submit a request for additional funding for SPP activities, to include additional training days for unit rotations, in support of these operations. The National Guard has long-established relationships with partner countries, which puts them in an excellent position to provide needed regional expertise. They are also responsible for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in their own states, making them a natural partner for African militaries that play that role in their respective countries. One senior State Department official noted
that host governments also appreciate the continuity that SPPs represent, and in some cases find it easier to work with the DoD through the smaller National Guard organizations. AFRICOM might leverage SPP partnerships elsewhere for additional access in Africa. Where there is an established SPP with a partner in Europe, or Asia, for example, and that country has a partnership of their own in Africa, cooperation on a trilateral basis might be possible.

There are DATT Offices and Offices of Development Cooperation in only 34 of AFRICOM’s 54 countries. Forward deployment of additional National Guard personnel would help bridge the gap between capacities in country and at AFRICOM and USARAF headquarters. These officers would improve coordination at the country team level; deepen existing relationships with African partners; and support and maintain the access afforded by training and other activities. Networking National Guard personnel with the planners in a systematic way could also help offset the gap in African liaison officers in AFRICOM headquarters.

Moreover, AFRICOM should also consider, under its broader theater health cooperation strategy, how to maximize the impact of the State Partnerships and ensure those programs support disaster preparedness goals. During OUA, INGOs called for deployments of personnel trained in biohazard containment. The United States has a robust Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) capacity within the National Guard. Through the SPP, this capacity could be leveraged in Phase 0 training and preparedness activities. In 2015, for example, Nigeria asked for support in establishing a Nigerian military bioresponse capability for high threat pathogens. Walter Reed Program-Nigeria is responding to
this request. The United States is engaged in Uganda along similar lines. Other African governments may be interested. National Guard CBRNE units could train and exercise African bioreponse teams, so that African militaries would have this capability, alleviating pressure on U.S. resources in an emergency. At the same time, the DoD should continue to develop policy to allow for possible deployment of National Guard CBRNE capacity in response to a future pandemic outbreak, if called upon. Finally, AFRICOM should ensure all SPP activities support a broader, sustainable theater-wide strategy.

Fifth, functioning Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) are critical to an effective emergency response, and AFRICOM could usefully support the establishment of additional emergency operations centers and training of personnel. The CDC is building health EOCs in several GHSA countries. AFRICOM should coordinate with CDC and other U.S. agencies to identify priority non-GHSA countries where whole-of-government EOCs, to include health ministries, would make a contribution to preparedness. Host governments would benefit from having the center themselves, and by the discussion and policy decisions they would make in determining where to locate and how to organize operations. These activities would also benefit AFRICOM, as they would establish relationships with counterparts in the U.S. interagency, and between the host government and other stakeholders. The SPP National Guard partners would be a good choice to take the lead on such a program, given their role in disaster response in their home states, as noted above.

Sixth, AFRICOM, through the SPP, could consider training on mobile health platforms using smart phones during exercises with EOCs. The
joint USAID-DoD-Department of State-Department of Health and Human Services Inspectors General September 2015 report to Congress on OUA pointed to delays in data collection. The findings attributed these delays to a lack of communications capacity in the three affected states, forcing health care workers to depend on paper files, which significantly slowed transmission of information. At the same time, the three ministries of health lacked sufficient capacity to collect, share, and analyze data from the field. During the epidemic, USAID supported development of an open source health data collection system in Guinea. The Nigerian government credited mobile health technology with significant reductions in reporting times. The U.S. Army Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center has developed the Global MedAid Engagement Toolkit, which was field-tested in West Africa during the Ebola epidemic. This application supports medical personnel in the field when connectivity is limited.

Seventh, with respect to logistics planning, it is worth considering how AFRICOM’s planned West Africa Logistics Network might support a U.S. or international response to a health or other disaster. The network, scheduled to start operations in late 2017, will consolidate existing transportation channels, creating a light logistics hub to support troops deployed in Africa. In a natural disaster, USAID’s Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance ordinarily calls on its established network of NGOs and commercial contractors to support distribution of commodities, equipment, and supplies. The Ebola outbreak, however, significantly disrupted commercial transportation services into and within West Africa. Therefore, as part of discussions with partner nations, AFRICOM should consider, in
coordination with the interagency, provisions in the agreements establishing the hub to allow for importation and intratheater transport of emergency personnel, equipment, and supplies. AFRICOM could work toward an interagency-supported agreement with relevant regional organizations, for example, ECOWAS. Such an agreement could include guidelines to trigger the use of the network in an emergency, to include easing customs requirements and tariffs, and other barriers to a rapid response. AFRICOM and ECOWAS could agree, for example, that needed drugs on the WHO Essential Medicines List and Formulary or drugs consistent with WHO Guidelines for medicine donations would be automatically eligible for duty free import.80 AFRICOM and its African partners could likewise agree to activate the network for this purpose based on a disaster declaration by one or more partner nations or the relevant regional organization, and the U.S. Ambassador.81

Eighth, the SPPs could also consider planning and training on safe burial practices with African military. USAID’s OFDA has no authorities to allow it to support safe burial practices in a disaster. Addressing burial practices was key to breaking the transmission cycle of Ebola, for example, and would be an important element in response to any major disaster or disease outbreak.

Ninth, where feasible, medical readiness training exercises and humanitarian assistance programs should be linked to broader health systems strengthening and public health goals. For example, one possible approach is the one Pacific Command took in its 2015 exercise Task Force Forager. In this exercise, several of its Subject Matter Expert Exchange activities were linked to WHO and USAID programs supporting
achievement of the UN-agreed Sustainable Development Goals. The proposed AFRICOM-wide health engagement strategy could identify medical readiness training exercises that also support broader public health goals.

Tenth, interagency and NGO participation in exercises focusing on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is essential, and exercises should test how AFRICOM is able to ensure adequate and timely information sharing among Army systems and those of the interagency, external partners and host governments. AFRICOM has committed to incorporating crisis response in its exercises, as a way of assessing security force assistance (SFA) in this area. With the participation of interagency action offices and international organizations, exercises could consider potential decision points and guidelines to inform DoD policymakers in a future event. Building on the unprecedented NGO request for military intervention in West Africa in 2015, AFRICOM could host tabletop exercises at Washington think tanks or other fora that included the participation of UN organizations, INGOs, and U.S. interagency partners. For exercises in theater, it would be valuable to encourage participation beyond that of civil-military liaison personnel, to include action offices. AFRICOM could invite officers from relevant civilian agencies present at post to participate in regularly scheduled exercises. These officials would provide a useful perspective and would benefit from contact with military counterparts. Inclusion of non-USG stakeholders is also consistent with AFRICOM’s approach.

Lastly, there are a number of DoD elements working in the global health area. The DoD’s new internal Global Health Engagement Council should improve
coordination, reduce overlap and redundancy, and help identify DoD health engagement priorities. Joint Staff represents the combatant commands at the Council. The Joint Staff Surgeon’s Office is responsible for representing the combatant commands; AFRICOM’s active involvement in this process should enhance coordination with other DoD elements. More than one interagency official noted that an apparent disconnect between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and AFRICOM hampered AFRICOM effectiveness during the Ebola outbreak, as it lacked timely information about Washington deliberations. In the case of health engagement, this coordination issue might be improved by active AFRICOM involvement in the Council. Additional coordination improvements could be gained through AFRICOM’s interagency Consolidated Health Engagement Working Group that is an AFRICOM-led forum in which the DoD and U.S. interagency partners coordinate medical engagement activities on the continent consistent with AFRICOM’s line of effort concerning humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.

There are important strategic benefits of supporting the strengthening of health systems. These include the access that joint, interagency, interorganizational and multinational work on health issues offers; the opportunity for AFRICOM to enhance relationships, expertise, and effectiveness that these partnerships provide; and the need to be ready to provide humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or respond to a disease outbreak. AFRICOM should continue to incorporate lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak into planning and programming, looking for ways to work with African partners and allies to build health system capacity in advance of an emergency, and to improving its
ability to respond in the event of one. AFRICOM and Army leadership should take an active role in global health engagements, consistent with AFRICOM’s unique structure and mission, and the challenges facing its partners. Recognition of its unique mission was reflected in the AFRICOM Commander’s recent testimony to Congress, in which General Thomas Waldhauser cited AFRICOM’s cooperation with State Department and USAID to “address the root causes of violent extremism, lack of accountable government systems, poor education opportunities, and social and economic deficiencies to achieve long-term, sustainable impact in Africa.”

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3


5. Harmonization for Health in Africa, Investing in health for Africa: The case for strengthening systems for better health outcomes, n.p.: Harmonization for Health in Africa and Partnership for

6. Ibid.


24. In December 2015, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) President Dr. Charles Rice formally established the Center for Global Health Engagement (CGHE) as
the successor organization to the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM).


27. Interview with a senior DoD official, December 15, 2016.

28. CDHAM, p. 20.


32. *Ibid*.


35. At the time of the Ebola outbreak, the Ghana detachment of the Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3 (NAMRU-3) was conducting military-to-military capacity building in hospitals and national influenza centers in Ghana, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. U.S. NAMRU-3, “Fact Sheet,” July 23,


41. Joint Staff, J-7, JCOA.


43. Ibid., p. 3.

44. Ibid., p. 4.

45. Ibid., p. 9.


48. This is a theme of the after action review put together by CALL. JCOA’s report noted, “The unique aspects of the mission, evolving DOD roles, and lack of understanding of the operational environment complicated crisis planning efforts.” See CALL, Operation United Assistance: Setting the Theater: Creating Conditions for Success in West Africa, Newsletter No. 15-09, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, June 2015, available from usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/15-09%20OUA%20Newsletter.pdf, accessed June 8, 2017. See also Joint Staff, J-7, JCOA.

49. Interview with a former National Security Council staff member, February 14, 2017.

50. See Koehlmoos et al., pp. 108-109, for a discussion of this point.

51. Interview with a senior USUHS official, December 15, 2016.


55. African countries participating in the GHSA partnership are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic


57. Interview with a State Department official, February 14, 2017.


60. Department of State, “The United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.”


62. According to the U.S. CDC:

Epidemic refers to an increase, often sudden, in the number of cases of a disease above what is normally expected in that population in that area. Outbreak carries the same definition
of epidemic, but is often used for a more limited geographic area. Cluster refers to an aggregation of cases grouped in place and time that are suspected to be greater than the number expected, even though the expected number may not be known. Pandemic refers to an epidemic that has spread over several countries or continents, usually affecting a large number of people.


63. Phase 0, or the shaping phase, refers to:

Joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.


64. J5 Plans Division, e-mail to author, February 2, 2017.


68. Existing partnerships between African countries and state National Guards in the U.S. AFRICOM area of operations are as


70. Interview with a State Department official, February 24, 2017.


72. Other partners are the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research/U.S. Military HIV Research Program (MHRP), the Austere Environments Consortium for Enhanced Sepsis Outcomes, and the National Strategic Research Institute/University of Nebraska Medical Center.

73. Ake and Lawler.


75. Ibid., p. 53.

76. Ibid., p. 116.
77. Kaplan and Easton-Calabria.


81. Under this scenario, AFRICOM would activate the logistics network within the existing internal U.S. Government (USG) response framework. USAID’s OFDA initiates an assessment in response to a U.S. Ambassador’s disaster declaration, combined with a host government request for assistance. For the DoD to participate in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief mission, OFDA would formally request DoD support. OFDA would make a request to activate the logistics network if, for example, normal logistics channels were overwhelmed or disrupted.


83. CALL, Operation United Assistance, p. 8.

84. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, e-mail to author, May 5, 2017.

CHAPTER 4

THE FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2017 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT (NDAA) AND U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA: CONFRONTING EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES

William M. Wyatt

A collection of well-intended programs and authorities nested under the umbrella term “security cooperation,” and meant to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa, suffer from a plethora of authorities and diverging interests, coupled with a tendency to rely on short-term goals, an undertrained and understrength workforce, the absence of reliable data to assess efforts, and conflicting guidance. Additionally, there appears to be an overwhelming propensity among those involved in security cooperation to assume outcomes are under U.S. control. This flawed assumption occurs in the absence of the recognition that regardless of what the U.S. Government (USG) does, far too often outcomes are in the hands of the partner or events beyond its control. Moreover, security cooperation is a long game. There will always be short-term needs and programs to address them. However, USG success in helping to improve security within Africa requires a unified, long-term, consistent effort on the part of all actors: the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). These actors must be willing to accept factors beyond their control and the reality that U.S. goals may diverge from those of our African partners.
Although the Department of State has primacy for foreign policy, the State Department and the DoD work together on many programs that fall within the realm of security cooperation; there are no clear plans or messages, let alone consistent goals across the entire USG security sector enterprise. Rather than a coherent national plan for security with partners, the USG deals with a multitude of programs and authorities spread across multiple USG organizations. With so many funds, authorities, and offices involved, few USG officials have a grasp of the numerous factors involved in managing security cooperation, to include timelines for planning and executing programs, the equities of the numerous individuals and agencies, or even how these factors affect one another.\(^1\) Nevertheless, one can easily find countless anecdotes of the DoD and U.S. Army successes in implementing security cooperation programs across Africa. The problem is that, given the challenges listed above, security cooperation success is often an end state reached through serendipitous means rather than because of a comprehensive, well-conceived, planned, resourced, and executed effort on behalf of U.S. foreign policy. Past successes and a radically new approach to security cooperation under the fiscal year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) signal the possibility of improved coordination and outcomes to achieve U.S. policy goals in the future.\(^2\)

There is a need for clarity in U.S. foreign policy, in part stemming from a dramatic shift in who controls resources for Africa in the security sector arena.\(^3\) Section 1206 of the FY 2007 NDAA (later called 2282 and now in the 2017 NDAA termed Section 333 programs) dramatically expanded security cooperation programs, specifically train and equip programs in Africa under
the label of building partner capacity (BPC). These Title 10 security cooperation programs focused heavily on counterterrorism and have greatly increased the DoD’s role in security cooperation across the globe. In financial terms, the Department of State directly administers just 40 percent of the security sector budget, with the DoD now controlling the remaining 60 percent vice the less than 20 percent it controlled in 2006.4

Another challenge in defining security cooperation and related concepts is that there is not a common lexicon or consistent definitions that the USG organizations understand or use.5 BPC, security force assistance (SFA), foreign internal defense, security assistance, and defense institution building are but a few of the applicable terms. For this discussion, however, the study will focus on security cooperation, which is an umbrella term that essentially indicates all the DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments.6 This includes both Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.), National Defense-funded activities and programs, as well as State Department Title 22, U.S.C., Foreign Assistance programs where defense department personnel serve as the executive agent. Therefore, the primary focus of this chapter is any activity over which the DoD personnel have some purview. These activities also include, but are not limited to, Section 333 Train and Equip, military-to-military exchanges, Defense Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Awareness and Prevention Program, foreign military sales, foreign military financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET), excess defense articles, military exercises, and several other programs.

Additionally, the Department of State and the DoD security cooperation and security assistance programs
play a major role in helping to attain U.S. foreign policy aims across Africa. These efforts contribute to professionalizing African security forces, combating terrorism, building U.S. diplomatic ties with African bilateral, regional, and continental partners, and increasing partner capacity. Given significant increases in activity, the number of programs available and the fiscal expenditures for security cooperation activities since 2006, a review of existing and recent historical efforts is worthwhile to document the impacts and, potentially, the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation in Africa.

The principal questions this chapter seeks to answer are as follows: How do security cooperation programs further U.S. national security interests? Do they aid partners in achieving their own goals? What happens when those goals diverge or a partner has its own designs on use of capabilities and defense-related equipment? Are security cooperation efforts effective? If a partner receives U.S. assistance and then does not participate in a mission or security efforts that Washington desires, is that a failure of security cooperation or of diplomacy? Alternatively, is it simply a national prerogative and the result of factors beyond the control or influence of the United States? The answers to these questions demand a substantive examination of many programs and, perhaps, even the entire approach to security sector activities in USG policy toward Africa.

Assessing the value and impact of a broad array of traditional security assistance and security cooperation programs is fraught with hazards; often considering a program a success or not depends on one’s perspective. Further, efforts to capture partner satisfaction with programs reliably or accurately are rare or haphazard at best. Consequently, the study will examine U.S. and partner expectations, experiences, points of
view, and results of security cooperation programs. Expectations are an ever-changing dynamic, which when overly ambitious on either side can result in perceptions of failure, regardless of the actual outcomes. Assessing U.S. security cooperation in Africa is not a simple metric or single measure, but rather it requires a specific evaluation of each relationship and its circumstances to determine where and when our efforts achieve the goals that the USG established for its partners and itself. As one recent U.S. Army assessment observed:

While the task may seem clear, it is anything but simple. The large number of activities and actors, authorities, funding sources, varied agencies, country team agendas, and regional politics all conspire to create a difficult environment in which to execute a meaningful plan.\(^9\)

**KEY CHALLENGES TO U.S. ARMY SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA**

Prior to the FY 2017 NDAA, despite concerted efforts on the part of the State and the DoD to link them, U.S. security cooperation and security assistance programs were, at best, frequently disjointed or loosely linked and bore little resemblance to any unity of effort.\(^10\) Additionally, prior to the aforementioned legislation, the limited authorities for security cooperation frequently hampered or at least limited the effectiveness of security cooperation programs and often prevented leveraging one program with another. The U.S. security cooperation community, specifically the Departments of State and the various DoD components focused on Africa (Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM],...
the regional service components and security cooperation offices [SCOs]), also tended to take very parochial points of view regarding design, implementation, execution, and evaluation of U.S. security cooperation programs. Despite the State and the DoD positions arguing to the contrary, many efforts were overwhelmingly focused on the near-term (3 to 5 years, at best), rather than long-term strategic goals and objectives in the interest of the nation.

While the United States will always have short-term foreign policy goals, especially in Africa, where the USG responds to unanticipated conflicts far too frequently, the security cooperation community within State, DoD, and USAID must also articulate, formulate, and advance long-term policy as well. If there is little focus on the future, the USG will be unable to escape the never ending crisis mode in its policy toward Africa. While some events abroad are clearly out of U.S. control, the security cooperation community can still set conditions or help shape outcomes to some degree with security cooperation engagement. Consequently, security cooperation is an essential component of U.S. foreign policy in Africa.

In spite of an overwhelming focus on the short-term, there has been recognition of the need to “play the long game” in security cooperation, particularly at the OSD level. The creation of the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI) is one example that there is attention on shaping the security environment long term. Other defense institutions such as the Center for Civil Military Relations (CCMR), the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), and the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies and their programs are clear indications of commitment to shaping over the long term. While this commitment is clear, it is far from
overwhelming. ACSS has faced dramatically declining operating budgets for several consecutive years, greatly constraining its ability to reach its target audience of defense and security professionals in Africa.

Planning and programs at the combatant command level are a different story. The U.S. AFRICOM does have staff working on programs that address long-term needs. However, while U.S. AFRICOM holds annual meetings with its security cooperation professionals from the staff and in our embassies across Africa, as well as an annual planning conference specifically focused on security cooperation programs, it devotes the preponderance of its effort to near-term concerns tied to countering terrorism. This is most evident in the Command’s 2017 Posture Statement and articulated in its Theater Campaign Plan, which has five lines of effort. One, neutralize al-Shabaab and transition African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the Federal Government of Somalia. Two, degrade violent extremist organizations in the Sahel/Maghreb and contain instability in Libya. Three, contain and degrade Boko Haram and the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS)-West Africa. Four, interdict illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa with willing and capable partners. Lastly, build peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response capacity of African partners. All, save the last line of effort (build peacekeeping capacity and humanitarian and demining assistance), are focused on either counterterrorism or countering criminality. None of these lines of effort focuses on institution building, professionalization, or collaborating with African militaries not involved in the counterterror campaign or contributing to the peacekeeping effort.
This is not a claim that U.S. AFRICOM entirely ignores partners who fall outside their lines of effort. Nor does it mean the command never integrates long-term considerations into its planning. This is not an indictment of the command for being shortsighted. Rather, this is a case of addressing the immediate at the expense of the future elsewhere. It is far easier to avoid conflict then it is to intervene and end it. Critics will note that these assertions challenge the focus of the lines of effort and point out that AFRICOM does employ ways and means to these lines of effort. This is a fair point, but it is not the issue. The concern is that while focused almost exclusively on these narrow lines of effort and those African partners who contribute to the fight, the command will neglect African partners not currently involved in those lines of effort. The obvious counterpoint to this complaint is that the USG lives in a world of limited resources and one cannot do everything. However, the command need not devote significant resources to an issue to demonstrate its importance.

In terms of how the DoD and the USG identify priorities, much of Africa, including long-established security cooperation relationships and close partnerships, will only become a priority or important when on the verge of crisis or a direct or proximate threat. This approach is risky. While countering terrorism, particularly in the Sahel region, for example, may be a priority today, the security environment in other parts of Africa is ever changing. Twenty years ago, the focus was in Central and East Africa on failed states and genocide. Thirty years ago, the liberation struggle was still in full bloom in Southern Africa. One could make a legitimate case that a different USG diplomatic and or security approach in both Mali and Nigeria a decade
ago could have led to far different and more peaceful outcomes than the bloody wars with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other groups in Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria. In both those cases, a newly emerging U.S. AFRICOM and disengaged Department of State missed or ignored the warning signs. France and neighboring West African states had to intervene to prevent AQIM from overrunning all of Mali. Restoring order today is a far more difficult challenge after Boko Haram spread its insurgency across borders and affected multiple Lake Chad Basin states.

The existing U.S. AFRICOM lines of effort largely ignore Phase 0 (shaping operations) across much of the continent in favor of an overwhelming focus on counterterrorism efforts. Some U.S. officials may argue that this is necessary, as terrorism has metastasized across large swaths of the continent, and occupies much of the national security debate and dominates foreign policy concerns. Further, on the issues where U.S. AFRICOM has a counterterrorism focus, it does plan to use all aspects of security cooperation to combat the problems. Unfortunately, the concentration on counterterrorism has already resulted in diminishing attention and resources for many countries with no direct link to the command’s combat-focused lines of effort.

Large parts of the continent that once garnered attention for security concerns are now secondary or tertiary interests. This includes South Africa, where reduced staffing levels hinder security cooperation; and Liberia and Ghana, where extensive U.S. diplomatic and security cooperation investments are at risk from a lack of attention. Additionally, other nontraditional security cooperation partners interested in greater cooperation like Zambia cannot get U.S. AFRICOM or U.S. Army Africa’s (USARAF’s) attention. With limited resources,
this is not difficult to understand. However, this orientation will lead to future problems resulting, in part, from neglect for Phase 0 in non-focus countries. Weak civil and governmental institutions, uneven economic growth, and unbalanced population pyramids with an emerging and massive youth bulge will challenge existing security and defense institutions within the coming decade. Not only will established security sectors like South Africa or Tanzania see problems emerge, but governments and security institutions where weak governance is already prevalent today will not be able to cope with the coming demographic, economic, and resource challenges.

Now is the time to engage countries such as Zambia, Benin, Liberia, Botswana, and Rwanda—not after they become problems. Many of our African partners continue to seek external mentors and partners, particularly those without colonial-era baggage. U.S. AFRICOM and the U.S. Army can remain engaged with non-line of effort countries in an effective way that does not require additional resources. However, withdrawing resources from SCOs and Title 10 and Title 22 programs sends signals to partners. Security and diplomacy require engagement and long-term commitment. The U.S. Army, U.S. AFRICOM, the Department of State, and the entire USG take risks whenever they assume relative peace and quiet in one country or region is everlasting. In the meantime, if the U.S. presence diminishes, Africans will find other partners to meet their needs. Will it be the U.S. Army or the People’s Liberation Army? While Beijing’s assistance is seldom the preferred option for Africans, in the absence of a U.S. presence, it is an option. China’s policy of non-interference in internal affairs can and will result in outcomes anathema to U.S. interests. Chinese interests
alone are not a valid reason to engage in security cooperation with African partners. However, shaping the security environment for long-term peace and security is a valid reason and one the USG has articulated in numerous policy and strategy documents.

DIVERGING INTERESTS

The Department of State tends to concentrate too heavily on a “what have you done for me lately” approach, in that it has a laser focus on troop contributing countries for peace operations across Africa, as if shaping operations in Phase 0 have little to no role in foreign policy. To be fair, phases of operations is a DoD concept, not a diplomatic planning concept. Additionally, the advent of the term Phase 0, the rationale for which first appeared in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review is also the manifestation of a clear conflict between existing Department of State primacy for foreign policy and a growing DoD role in diplomacy.14 “Shaping” activities at the theater level, which are “performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies,” certainly have the appearance of the DoD inserting itself into diplomacy.15 This tension, recognized or not, is nonetheless present regardless of how many times the combatant commander or other U.S. AFRICOM general officers tell diplomats that the command is a supporting effort, not the lead actor in Africa.

The Africa Bureau at the Department of State has limited staffing and a mission to get Africans into peacekeeping to keep American forces out of peacekeeping missions in Africa. This has resulted in an over concentration on training peacekeepers (even in countries not active in peacekeeping), supporting
existing peace operations (Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali, Darfur and others), and on other interventions in conflict zones, vice pre-conflict efforts. True, the IMET and African Military Education Program (AMEP) programs focus on pre-conflict. However, the amount of funding for these programs is a pittance when matched against what the State Department and the DoD spend annually on conflict interventions in Africa. This is not an entirely fair comparison as intervention in conflict zones is, by its very nature, exponentially more expensive than prevention. Nonetheless, after more than a decade of focus on interventions, funding levels for prevention efforts are flat.

The State Department is not alone with this short-term focus. The existence of Section 1206 (2282, 333) funding and authorities in the DoD budget since 2007 has led to another perversion with the DoD forced to spend these funds in annual appropriations. The program, intended to address immediate or emerging threats, has also become bogged down in bureaucratic processes within DoD and at the Department of State. When Congress first introduced the Section 1206 authority and funding, a security cooperation officer or a staff officer at the combatant command or service component command could review the single page of congressional guidance, consult the host nation, develop a proposal, and submit it to the combatant command. After State reviewed and concurred, provided congressional notification was not a consideration, the program could move forward in a matter of weeks, as Congress envisioned. However, as time has progressed, both the State and the DoD have introduced progressively more constraining requirements that have reduced the effectiveness of the program.
and, too often, effectively prevented security cooperation officers from even making proposal submissions within the combatant command’s prescriptive deadlines.

BUILDING A DEDICATED SECURITY COOPERATION WORKFORCE

Security cooperation encompasses full-spectrum support to allied and foreign partners and is a complex endeavor. Understanding the legal authorities, funding sources, needs of partners, U.S. foreign policy goals, the political environment in Washington, DC and within partner countries, the conduct of military operations, institution building, planning and assessing programs, and the countless other skills and knowledge necessary for successful security cooperation require professionalization of the security cooperation workforce. The absence of a professional security cooperation career field in both the Department of State and the DoD contributes to wildly divergent outcomes at the country level. Apart from a small number of military Foreign Area Officers, few Department of State or DoD personnel working on these programs are regional specialists with the requisite training or experience in security cooperation or security assistance. This is a problem present at all levels, from Washington, DC to Stuttgart to embassies in Africa. One should not infer that the entire workforce is inexperienced or untrained. Rather, the issue is that there are simply an insufficient number of security cooperation professionals with Africa experience. The FY 2017 NDAA requirement to develop a security cooperation profession within the armed forces may eventually improve this from a Title 10 perspective, but it will have no impact on increasing the
availability of security cooperation professionals in the State Department or USAID.\textsuperscript{17}

The shortage of trained and experienced security cooperation professionals working in embassies in Africa is more acute today than a decade ago when there were far fewer SCOs in Africa and far less funding in the security cooperation arena for Africa. A tangible example of this dilution of security cooperation capacity in general was U.S. AFRICOM’s expansion of SCOs across the continent. When U.S. AFRICOM first formed as a subunified command under the U.S. European Command in October 2007, there were less than 10 SCOs in sub-Saharan Africa. Today there are nearly 40 offices in embassies. This expansion was in response to demand from African partners, but it further spread a limited talent pool and by necessity, resulted in an influx of junior officers, including company grade officers (captains), filling security cooperation chief positions.

The deliberate, planned expansion of SCOs initially occurred at a time of increasing resources as U.S. AFRICOM evolved from a subunified command to a combatant command, added service component commands, and experienced a rapidly rising operating budget even as Section 1206 Train and Equip counter-terrorism funding and legal authority became available. U.S. AFRICOM struggled initially to develop a theater campaign plan that addressed the command’s role in Africa in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Early command guidance focused on steady state or a continuation of existing efforts, combined with the charge to engage with our partners. In the absence of clear guidance (a time span that arguably continued well past the Libyan intervention in 2011), service components, SCOs, and even the Combined
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in Djibouti all engaged and developed relationships with African partners. Nevertheless, the limited number of experienced security cooperation personnel led to varying outcomes during this expansion of activities.

SCOs across Africa are overwhelmingly composed of Foreign Area Officers in the rank of major or lieutenant colonel. Their staffs invariably include U.S. Army enlisted personnel specialists (not experienced Africanists) and local national staff who may or may not have completed rudimentary security cooperation training. The security cooperation chief in each of these offices must report to, and coordinate with, the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT), the overwhelming majority of whom are assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency, not U.S. AFRICOM. In addition, few embassies have a central security actor in the mission to coordinate defense, diplomatic, and development roles.

Another seldom-recognized development is the degradation in the role and importance of security cooperation professionals. Across Africa in diplomatic missions where security cooperation officers once had direct access to the chief of mission (COM) and or the deputy COM, many no longer have a direct influence. The DoD’s efforts to speak with a single voice under the SDO/DATT concept have not always resulted in improved security cooperation. No longer in charge of their own programs to a significant degree and often lacking access to the COM, doing the hard work of security cooperation is far less appealing for experienced officers who are now incentivized to seek SDO/DATT roles instead.

The establishment of the SDO/DATT position in 2007, intended to rationalize the DoD efforts
at diplomatic missions, had the perverse effect of diminishing the role and perception of SCOs at U.S. AFRICOM and with many ambassadors. In Africa, where arguably security cooperation meets U.S. foreign policy goals in a far greater manner than other DoD efforts, security cooperation is now something few experienced, talented officers aspire to do. With a couple of notable exceptions (Kenya being the most prominent), security cooperation officers are no longer an important or the most important DoD actor in an embassy. Given the vital importance of security cooperation in Africa and the increased emphasis in the FY 2017 NDAA, this is an incongruous outcome. What is more, a Defense Intelligence Agency officer (the SDO/DATT) writes the performance appraisals for the security cooperation chiefs, not their command. Additionally, in the Army’s case, the security cooperation chiefs are senior rated by a lower ranking officer (the J-5; a two-star general officer) than their peers in the same embassy (an SDO/DATT of the same pay grade is rated by the Combatant Commander, a four-star officer).

The FY 2017 NDAA offers potential progress for future security cooperation in Africa with creation of a security cooperation profession within the military. However, while it affects the DoD, it does not directly influence the Department of State and USAID personnel. Security cooperation is part of a larger security sector that requires Department of State and USAID participation. There is no profession for the security sector writ large (defense, law enforcement, intelligence and related activities) within either the State Department or USAID for career Foreign Service Officers. These officers may serve a tour at an embassy in which they handle these issues, but it is not a systematic practice, nor is it a career field. All three principal
security cooperation actors, Department of State, DoD, and USAID, need a common baseline of knowledge regarding the security sector, security assistance, and security cooperation. To, in part, achieve this common baseline of knowledge, Foreign Service officers at State and USAID should attend training at the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies.

ASSESSING SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

Assessing the value, efficacy, and impact of U.S. security cooperation efforts is a demanding exercise for a simple reason. There is a paucity of reliable data available to make cogent assessments of the efficacy of security cooperation programs. Consequently, far too often assessors must rely on anecdotal evidence or incomplete information to make determinations of outcomes. Worse still, both the Department of State and the DoD tend to determine progress or success based on what they can count, rather than the attainment of national and theater strategic objectives. To some degree, this is understandable. It is far easier to count and report that the Department of State Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program has trained hundreds of thousands of African peacekeepers. It is much more difficult to design metrics to answer the real question, “Have the ACOTA trained peacekeepers had a positive effect, improved security in country X?” Only in rare instances have the DoD and its components undertaken detailed assessments and certainly not with any measurable indicators.

As an example, aside from the Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP), an annual written
narrative assessment from the security cooperation officer in an embassy, there are little data to determine the success of the International Military Education Training Program (IMET). However, the assessment that one finds in a CETPP is very narrow. First, there is a listing of previous IMET students in positions of prominence. In other words, the Department of State tracks alumni that have risen to the top of their own militaries, but attendance in an IMET course may or may not have played a role in their success. Moreover, what does this metric really tell us other than the possibility that knowing a highly placed foreign military official may garner us access or might lead to common alignment of interests? It is useful information, but as nearly the only means to assess the strategic impact of IMET, it is lacking. The second element of analysis in the annual CETPP comes from the written narrative on the state of the training programs. The security cooperation chief is responsible for drafting this portion, though too frequently the local national staff member with historical knowledge writes it. These narratives are not consistent and vary wildly based on the efforts and experience of the security cooperation chief.

FACTORS BEYOND U.S. CONTROL

Regardless of the program, the Department of State and DoD officials rarely acknowledge that, no matter the activity, even the best planned, coordinated, resourced, and executed program can fail based entirely on factors over which Washington has no control or influence. U.S. security cooperation with Uganda (2009-2014) to professionalize the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and train its forces for the AMISOM played a vital role in improving the
security situation in Somalia, as the UPDF proved to be a critical component of AMISOM offensive operations. More specifically, public health programs, Section 1206 Train and Equip programs, IMET and the ACOTA program were critically important to the UPDF’s operational readiness, its training, and its ability to contribute to AMISOM. However, in February 2014, despite promises to the contrary, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni signed a draconian anti-homosexuality bill into law. The immediate response from the Obama administration and Museveni’s reactions led to a ratcheting up of political rhetoric and the USG threatening to suspend security cooperation programs. Consequently, a highly successful security cooperation and diplomatic partnership effort was at risk as Uganda’s internal domestic interests diverged from our own. Yet, all the while, U.S. and Ugandan security cooperation goals remained in alignment for issues in East Africa. President Museveni’s actions were beyond USG control, yet they nearly had severe negative consequences for the success of a long-standing security cooperation effort in East Africa with repercussions well beyond Uganda’s borders.

WHAT WORKS? WHAT DOES NOT WORK?

Regardless where they work, a conversation with U.S. diplomatic and military personnel will evoke near universal praise and approval for IMET. In Washington, DC, at U.S. AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany, and in U.S. embassies on the continent, nearly everyone will point to IMET as a success and worthy of our time and energy. Since its inception in 1976, IMET has indeed been an important program in helping our partners develop professional military personnel, exposing
foreign military and defense personnel to U.S. values and culture, inculcating desired norms for civil-military relations, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as well as garnering access for the United States.

While IMET is normally a highly valued program, it is not always the most desired or successful program from our partners perspective. In West Africa, counter-narcotic programs tend to be popular with some host nation militaries. In other places, the foreign military sales and or the foreign military financing program are the most valuable security cooperation program for our partners who rely on this funding for maintaining operational aircraft (South Africa, Kenya). Troop contributing countries to AMISOM highly value the Section 1206, 2282 or 333 program. Similarly, habitual peacekeeping participants highly value the ACOTA program. Even the relatively new (began in 2013) AMEP is important to our African partners. The point here is that what matters to partners are not the programs or authorities, but rather the capabilities that the USG can provide.

In theory, the USG consults African partners on any programs or funding it intends to offer to them. In practice, this is a rather hit or miss proposition and, frankly, it is far more often miss. This can be a situation as simple as selecting IMET courses for the partner, vice consulting them for their desires. On the other hand, it may be as complicated as developing a Section 1206 (now 333) program that provides fixed wing aircraft to an African partner with no consultation with that partner. At some point, USG help can become a burden to a partner, even a very unwelcome burden. There are numerous reasons why this occurs, but at the most fundamental level, the issue is that few personnel outside the embassy have any vested stake in what
the partner says or what it needs. Consequently, it too often falls to the inexperienced security cooperation officer to elicit host nation preferences without making promises or raising African expectations. There are many good reasons the host nation is not involved more deeply in this process; nonetheless, a successful program must and will at an appropriate point seek host nation input and buy-in for any security cooperation effort. It is true that many, if not most, African partners will seldom, if ever, turn away assistance from the USG. The more important question is simple: Are African partners best served with the options the USG develops without consulting them?

U.S. ARMY SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE (SFAB) AND THE REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES (RAF)

In 2012, then Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno, introduced the concept of Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). Prior to the establishment of the RAF concept, SCOs submitted a request for forces, which the combatant command would then use to draw troops from the joint personnel process from the most appropriate and available service (active and reserve components). However, General Odierno saw the Army’s future nested in the RAF concept. His plan was that Army units that would have long-term relationships with designated combatant commands. The RAF brigades were to receive substantial region-specific training for language and cultural awareness, the working theory being that this long-term alignment and targeted training would make them more effective in meeting demands across the range of military operations. While this concept may appear sound on paper,
in practice it leaves much to be desired. Shortly after the concept appeared, U.S. AFRICOM designated the RAF as the “force of choice” for all security cooperation activities in Africa.

The most obvious problem with this design is the limitations of a brigade-sized unit (between 1,500 to 3,000 soldiers, depending on unit type). The numbers and variety of security cooperation activities that are underway at any given moment across Africa is dizzying. Military-to-military exchanges alone can be twenty or more simultaneous activities with (normally) three to five or more soldiers as part of a Traveling Contact Team. When considering travel time, the troop numbers easily double with the next group on its way to Africa. This logic of course presumes that an Army brigade has the requisite experience, skill sets, and training necessary for full-spectrum security cooperation engagement. In many cases, this is true. However, under the RAF structure, when seeking to undertake this activity with a partner at anything beyond the tactical level, problems arise.

Few officers or soldiers assigned at brigade level have experience at the operational or strategic levels of warfare, let alone in the institutional Army. There may be a few former recruiters or drill sergeants in a unit, but the unit does not habitually undertake this type of activity nor will it have a sizable number of experienced senior non-commissioned officers with operational or strategic experience. In other words, an Army brigade may be well suited to conduct military-to-military exchanges or to train African soldiers at the tactical level, but it is not capable to addressing the complete breadth of security cooperation activities that support U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.
The FY 2017 NDAA directs the creation of a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) within the Army. The SFAB concept suffers from the same challenges that beset the RAF. Even if the SFAB structure is composed of experienced officers and senior non-commissioned officers with institutional knowledge and experience as well as operational and strategic experience, there is no guarantee that the structure will have the expertise necessary to meet broad security cooperation requirements in Africa. It cannot meet the requirements for defense institution building enumerated in DoD Directive 5205.82.

In fact, existing Army institutions are simply better able to understand and handle many of our African partners’ security cooperation requirement and requests, as outlined in the second and third chapters of this monograph. If a host nation wishes to develop doctrine for battlefield triage, the SFAB may well be able to provide this support through security cooperation. However, if an African partner desires U.S. assistance in designing career paths and education requirements for its officer corps, other U.S. Army commands (ACOMS) are better suited to help with this task. Similarly, the SFAB would not be well positioned to provide ministerial and intergovernmental security cooperation support to an African partner that wants to develop a national security strategy. An interagency U.S. team composed of Department of State, USAID, and DoD personnel is more appropriate. Security cooperation for the U.S. Army, let alone the rest of the DoD is far broader and requires more than any traditional Army brigade can deliver.

The SFAB concept can be a useful security cooperation asset if it has permanence, includes a hybrid staff with experienced security cooperation professionals,
and manages to leverage resources across the U.S. Army enterprise, and with other DoD components. Additionally, such an organization must have at least a two-star general officer with access to the Army Chief of Staff as its commander or director, and develop relationships with State, USAID, OSD, and U.S. AFRICOM. Given the importance of shaping activities for promoting regional stability and to prevent or mitigate conflict, the SFAB can be a useful actor, provided the Army tailors its structure, resources it adequately, and either rescinds the RAF concept or finds ways to avoid duplication.

SETTING CLEAR, ACHIEVABLE GOALS FOR ENDURING RESULTS

Ostensibly, all actors within the USG seek the same outcome: achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. As the lead agency for foreign policy, the Department of State must coordinate and synchronize USG efforts across the executive branch agencies. Since 2012, the chosen vehicle for achieving synchronization has been the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). However, the ICS is a country specific plan and not a bureau-level or department-level strategic plan. By contrast, U.S. AFRICOM has developed a theater campaign plan with lines of effort that span national boundaries and cover numerous functions and regions. Consequently, security cooperation officers must insert the combatant command’s priorities into each ICS, simultaneously giving deference to the ICS as it is the ambassador’s strategy for a specific country.

Given its single country focus, the ICS is not the panacea one might hope for in the security sector. Nonetheless, it is a solid concept which all actors
should embrace (U.S. AFRICOM did so at its inception back in 2012). The key is to move the ICS from what it is to what it can become. At present, the ICS is an exercise wherein agencies at post (in embassies) review existing or desired programs and projects, insert relevant information into the forthcoming ICS, and then an officer at the embassy cobbles together the product. In essence, at many diplomatic missions even today (5 years after its initial introduction in 2012), the ICS is less an integrated product that results from a collaborative strategic planning process and more an effort to make a coherent presentation of existing independent efforts. As time passes, the ICS is likely to become a more effective tool for strategic planning at the embassy level, but U.S. AFRICOM should consider working more closely with the Africa Bureau to build regional strategies that mesh with the theater campaign plan. Even more importantly, the FY 2017 NDAA, Section 1273, requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State to develop a strategy for U.S. defense interests in Africa. This document will help build unity of effort in security sector assistance and could advance a whole-of-government approach to security cooperation and defense institution building. Another valuable step would be the formation of a DoD-Department of State coordinating committee that can ensure consistent attention to security cooperation program execution. Offering Department of State and USAID an opportunity to be members of the Defense Institution Building Coordination Council that the DoD recently established might be a useful first step.

In addition, the Department of State, the DoD, and USAID should create a security-sector assistance implementation plan that establishes clear, achievable
goals and objectives for each security cooperation program and desired end states in each country, a concept recommended 2 years ago in a Joint Staff, J-7 study. Further, the plan should have defined schedules and milestones to be accomplished with in-progress reviews conducted on a periodic basis. This point, while self-evident to many casual observers, is vitally important, as far too often success is not something that actually achieves a foreign policy goal. Rather, the tendency is to declare success based on faulty metrics tied to equipment deliveries, training events held, or numbers of Africans who deploy on peace operations. This preference for the easy way is understandable, because in many cases success may be difficult to gather data, assess, or prove. Often an intangible or a decision by our African partner may alter outcomes in ways over which we exert little control or influence.

Security cooperation can and should address foreign and defense policy goals as appropriate for near (24 months or less), intermediate (2 to 10 years), and the long-term (beyond 10 years). For example, an immediate objective for a Section 333 Train and Equip program may be to prepare 500 African soldiers for deployment to Somalia, but with the clear goal of achieving the U.S. objective for African peacekeeping. Concurrently, this training can and should also address intermediate military goals with improving internal institutional capacity for host nation training (by developing this capacity at local training institutions) and for improving host nation defense capacity through preparation, training, deployment, and peace operations; all possible as a consequence of the Train and Equip program. Finally, this effort can address long-term objectives with a focus on inculcating democratic values, respect
for human rights, improved civil-military relations, and operational experience.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the success or failure of the new direction included in the FY 2017 NDAA directly relates to U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa. The DoD, and more specifically U.S. AFRICOM, its service components and SCOs, have achieved many successes in the realm of security cooperation over the past decade. However, success is too often the result of serendipity, not design. The FY 2017 NDAA introduces more rigor into security cooperation processes and programs, and requires thoughtful design of security cooperation activities in Africa to include budgeting, managing, and evaluating these activities.

The introduction of a security cooperation profession, streamlined authorities, and much clearer strategic guidance will likely improve security cooperation outcomes. Nonetheless, U.S. AFRICOM must improve the perception of the value of security cooperation work or risk failing to attract the top talent to this critical field of work. Further, Department of State should consider a different approach to foreign policy in Africa with an additional focus on the security sector, especially, the appointment of a security sector official in each diplomatic mission. The official would be responsible for drawing together all security sector actors, setting strategic objectives and goals, and would report directly to the ambassador. Similarly, the Africa Bureau at the State Department should do the same and that official should then include USAID and the DoD members on a panel to design security sector foreign policy. Lastly, the Department of State and USAID should strongly
consider at least additional training for security sector professionals to keep pace with the DoD.

Both the Department of State and the DoD must begin to take seriously the need for unified, long term, consistent security efforts in foreign policy by helping African partners develop and advance their security sector institutions through mechanisms associated with defense institution building. Necessarily, this entails engagement with non-priority partners, or those not currently contributing to today’s policy priorities of counterterrorism and peacekeeping. However, continued attention predominantly to crises is costly and inefficient in the end. Finally, all agencies need to develop data to assess security cooperation efforts. These elements will prove to be the most difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, both are vitally important to improving security sector outcomes and in evaluating the U.S. contribution to those outcomes.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 4


4. Jackson, p. 11.


8. Jackson, p. 15.


10. JCOA, p. 3.


16. For a discussion of this point, see CALL, pp. 11, 13, 16, 22; and JCOA, pp. 15-20.


CHAPTER 5

ACCOUNTABILITY: THE INTERAGENCY AND BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY (BPC) IN AFRICA

Genevieve Lester

The term building partner capacity (BPC) camouflages the enormity of the effort that the U.S. Government (USG) seeks to achieve under this concept. The 2011 version of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, defined BPC as:

the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.\(^1\)

This definition denotes that the enumerated actions require a whole-of-government approach and interagency effort. While this publication has been superseded, the definition is still relevant and useful.

BPC is a noteworthy security activity because—in theory—it creates opportunities for both the United States and African nations by advancing U.S. national security aims, and through training, guidance, and the provision of resources it aids African forces with counterterrorism operational capability and in a variety of other missions. As General Thomas Waldhauser, Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), stated before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Armed Services, “Africa, our allies, the U.S., and, indeed the world will benefit from our [U.S.] actions to promote stable and effective nation states and defense institutions in
Africa.” He continued by stating that to achieve this goal, the United States “must remain engaged on the continent, investing in the capability, legitimacy, and accountability of African defense institutions.” BPC, he remarked, is essential to attaining U.S. policy goals as well as “creating sustainable African solutions” through a “whole-of-government approach.”

The core questions here, however, are what are the U.S. national security policy objectives in Africa, and how could the attainment of these objectives be facilitated? Earlier chapters of this study considered BPC with respect to its meaning and use. This chapter considers the objective of partner capacity building and examines the question of what constitutes accountability, as this concept is ambiguous and requires delineation if it is to be put into practice. It concludes with recommendations that provide the building blocks for institutions, U.S. and African, to promote accountability.

The impetus of this chapter is the fiscal year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), in particular the sense of Congress articulated in Section 1205, that:

the Secretary of Defense should develop and maintain an assessment, monitoring and evaluation framework for security cooperation with foreign countries to ensure accountability and foster implementation of best practices [emphasis added].

This chapter introduces the interagency process that is intended to develop partner capacity in Africa. It describes, briefly, where the process falls short. It draws from the NDAA language quoted above to discuss the need for accountability in BPC processes, as an essential facet of assessment. Herein, accountability
is defined as “ensuring that partner legal, policy and financial commitments are achieved.” Finally, it makes recommendations on how to instill accountability in institutions in Africa that will contribute to the development and continuity of BPC in practice.

THE INTERAGENCY AND BPC IN AFRICA: WHAT PRACTITIONERS THINK

In order to understand the environment in which BPC activities occur, one analyst identifies the three core responsibilities of the executive branch in the policymaking process. The first level of responsibility is to set national security policy and ensure that all agencies adhere to it. The second level of responsibility involves the integration of various agency programs to “maximize achievement of national policy in a given country.” This is normally a State Department function carried out by an ambassador/country team, which is also responsible for making sure that the president’s goals are undertaken faithfully. The third level is program execution, which requires the involvement of a broad range of agencies to implement the BPC activities designed to achieve national policy. The analyst emphasizes, “It is in the area of program execution that most of the current confusion regarding roles and missions resides, as key functions such as police training are continually passed back and forth from one agency to another. This is the area where some rationalization would be most useful, ideally in the form of legislation laying out a more enduring division of labor among agencies.” Thus, agencies, both civilian and military, interact closely when it comes to the practice of BPC. This interagency engagement tends to be prone to friction as different policies are undertaken, with differing
authorities and expectations, as well as variation in the resources available.

Because of the range of stakeholders involved, the complications and complexities of engaging in BPC programming run the gamut. For example, the State Department, which collaborates on BPC efforts through its ambassador or chief of mission (COM), confronts challenges in managing these programs because of resource limitations or constraints. Because the ambassador does not control the entire budget for programming of BPC activities, he or she is not able to exert control over the other agency involved in program execution. This gap leads to a common problem:

Often the State Department is in a weak position to design and oversee implementation of a multiagency strategy for the achievement of national objectives in a given country because it lacks control over the funding.7

Additionally, the personality and priorities of the ambassador influence program execution in partner nations. There is an enormous variation in how these officials deal with BPC as well. This variation may be due to a number of factors. The embassies are physically distant from each other, with poor communication among them in terms of information sharing and the dissemination of best practices. Additionally, the small size of the embassy staff creates limits to observation, monitoring and assessment of activities, and in some cases, the country team staff become personally invested in their programs and not in evaluating how the totality of programs contribute to attaining U.S. national security policy objectives in a particular nation.8 In terms of the relationship between agencies as represented in these embassies, they are personality-driven and thus can vary tremendously in the
achievement of U.S. aims. These attributes only serve to underscore the diversity of factors that affect program execution.

These issues have been well documented. As a RAND Corporation report points out BPC is fragmented and thus, ad hoc and reactive.9 According to the same report, there is an absence of strategic rationale to the programs.10 Also contributing to this fragmentation is the length of time personnel are assigned to Africa. There is considerable turnover in personnel in positions involved in security cooperation and associated programs, making relationship building—the core to partnership—difficult to put into practice. Personnel are generally assigned to their programs on their own agencies’ assignment schedule adding to the impact that frequent turnover has.11

Other analysts and practitioners critique internal processes and point out the frustration of the constant turnover of personnel, who come and go in these roles as their careers take them elsewhere. Still others cite the impact of “turf battles” and “stovepipes,” present all through the various processes, from the policymaking levels to operations on the ground, most obviously represented by the U.S. embassies in country, which many have said are their own “fiefdoms.”12 On the other hand, the military is often blamed with having minimal dedication to the mission and a general unwillingness to engage helpfully. Military in the field are charged with not understanding the context or culture they are operating in, and not engaging long enough in African programs. All organizations are blamed for not having clearly identified their objectives as part of the BPC planning process. One official claimed that the entire process was like the “bureaucratic politics model,” ultimately the result of internal
bureaucratic tribes battling for resources against one another and not the result of a regularized process. At an extreme, the systems seems to be anarchical—that is, with no overall governing head or institution to which all parties are required to be accountable.

Timing and commitment are also issues of concern to those in charge of implementing BPC activities. Nonmilitary agencies critique the short duration of assistance on the part of the Department of Defense (DoD). The U.S. military, according to the sources of this criticism, has a culture of speed and mission accomplishment.

The military is all about making something happen right now—whether that means blowing something up, taking a hill or seizing a port. They focus single-mindedly on accomplishing the objective, so everyone else better get out of the way.

As one Foreign Service Officer observed, “Development does not work that way at all. It’s not about what ‘we’ do, but about strengthening the local government and setting up a cooperative process.” He adds:

Even those few who had arguably relevant backgrounds were too mired in the military culture of urgency to be able to give development goals much attention. They often did not realize that establishing the process for building a road was often more central to stabilizing an area than the actual construction.

Another often-heard concern is that access to partner and large-scale activities can be difficult because agencies may choose to exclude members of other organizations, which may undermine the monitoring of activities and assessment of outcomes. One example that interviewees noted is Exercise Flintlock, an
annual regional exercise among African, allied, and U.S. forces, which has taken place since 2005, directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and undertaken by U.S. AFRICOM. The purpose of the exercise is to bring together those forces to promote interoperability and information sharing, but in this particular instance, specific analytical teams from the DoD were not allowed to participate as observers.\textsuperscript{18} Beyond the selection of who could participate, there was no clear method of testing the exercise’s effectiveness. Whether there were assessors of the exercise present was ambiguous, and ultimately the outcome of an enormous expenditure of time and resources was considered successful because it simply occurred; it drew militaries together. There was no further outcome expected.\textsuperscript{19} While there are likely numerous benefits of conducting such exercises for building skills and relationships, the lack of formal assessment mechanisms is exactly the issue that the FY 2017 NDAA addresses with its emphasis on accountability and for the dissemination of best practices to achieve U.S. policy objectives in Africa, as well as its attention to measurable outcomes.

This single example underscores also the issue of the objectives of the various BPC activities. They are uneven and may not even exist for some programs. Again, there seem to be numerous programs occurring where there is an unclear objective and an inadequate assessment mechanism in place. This absence of a clear objective for the activity makes developing metrics and accountability extremely difficult. In one RAND Corporation study that the Joint Staff funded, the analysts developed their own set of metrics and applied them to a series of case studies in order to see whether the programs were effective or not.\textsuperscript{20} This need to develop
standards or criteria underscores the deficiency that exists and one that Congress seeks to rectify by the imperatives articulated in the FY 2017 NDAA.

The variation in U.S. and African stakeholders’ own capacities and commitment to long-term activities and investment hinders the growth of capacity building as well. Crucially, all stakeholders involved with the BPC mission must buy-in to this process. They must believe in the objective. Moreover, studies of accountability and administrative responsibility going back decades point out that values and policy objectives are intertwined with empirical analysis. The test of successful policy implementation becomes the measure of agreement among the stakeholders as to what has been achieved, realizing that analysis is itself unavoidably limited because of a variety of factors such as possessing too little information, limited time for observation and monitoring, and political constraints. Given these factors, program decisions are made incrementally so they can be closely related to current policy. Each party involved in policy implementation must have a clear understanding of the other’s position and anticipated movements, and adjust accordingly when they occur. By taking incremental steps, serious or long-lasting mistakes can be minimized.21 This approach is consistent with the U.S. policy on security sector assistance, which considers that the “up-front costs are relatively small when compared to the larger political, economic, and societal costs in the event that local institutions flounder and instability ensues.”22 This point is particularly apt for the conduct of BPC activities in Africa. Accountability within the context of BPC in Africa should be considered as small end states along the way; that is, as incremental steps, toward a shared objective. It also must be a venture that all join and consider
legitimate. This requires the USG to align its priorities and schedules to enable an integrated process. The turnover of personnel on assignments of varied length is an additional concern; however, in the end, conflicting or overlapping missions could end up increasing costs and diminishing the likelihood of meeting U.S. policy goals.

Finally, until relatively recently, Africa had little strategic value for the United States. With the advent of U.S. counterterrorism activities in the AFRICOM area of responsibility, this has changed, but it has also affected other BPC programming. While recent DoD Directives, such as those dealing with security cooperation and defense institution building, have been published, with respect to measurement and accountability, it has been the NDAA that has given the greatest impetus as Congress intended, as it characterized the new chapter on security cooperation as a “reform” measure. Nonetheless, USG officials involved in African affairs believe that national security issues involving the region are of low interest and priority among decision-makers.

PUTTING ACCOUNTABILITY IN PLACE

The section of the NDAA mentioned previously, coupled with other comments drawn from interviews with the DoD and Department of State officials, can be interpreted as an indictment—that up to this point in time, BPC programs in Africa have not been monitored very effectively, or put more strongly, there is no order to these programs and consequentially, no accountability. However, such an interpretation would be incorrect; there is order to these programs and accountability exists, but each agency has its own
procedures, authorities, and processes. What is lacking is an accountability mechanism that unites the stakeholders in a legitimate and credible fashion to achieve U.S. national security policy aims.

As pointed out in the introduction to a previously mentioned RAND study on the U.S. Army and BPC, without an analytical approach to the issue of BPC, decision-makers will be forced to rely on “anecdotal information and personal opinions.” This report is not alone in articulating such a position. Other external reports on mission objectives and metrics are helpful in this regard and generally argue that a more systematic approach to BPC should be used. A Congressional Research Service report noted:

While a variety of studies explore programmatic effectiveness, very few explore what the United States sought to achieve when engaging in a BPC effort, and whether or not doing so led to desirable outcomes.

In another study of BPC that the Defense Department sponsored, the author noted:

Capacity activities are intertwined with issues of legality, authority, responsibility, and legitimacy on every level, from the strategic to the tactical. All capacity-building activities have legal and legitimacy dimensions—one of laws and rules, and of perceptions—that must be considered in strategy, planning, and execution [emphasis added].

These quotes signal different issues, but they all return to the importance of legality and accountability.

To return to the language in the relevant provision of the FY 2017 NDAA quoted in the beginning of this chapter, “accountability” in the NDAA necessarily refers only to DoD activities. This narrowly written
language elicits interesting questions about what constitutes accountability and who, exactly, conducts it. Accountability is an ambiguous term in the legislation. Accountability as a term and as a concept can mean many things. It can be a goal or a constant process. It can be an individual responsibility as accountability for one’s behavior, or as broadly used as the concept “accountability to the public.” In fact, accountability is an institution requiring stakeholders to be linked together, that is, linked together through chains of accountability so that accountability ensures relational stability.28

Equally important, accountability can be both internal and external.29 From this dichotomy stems a broader framework for accountability. Internal accountability refers to adherence to bureaucratic rules within an agency or institution. Most institutions have a set of rules and regulations regarding appropriate behavior as well as administrative actions. These include, for example, how money is handled, how the organizational hierarchy works as well as its internal processes, legality, and recourse. Recourse includes, for example, methods for changing an employee’s behavior to meet standards or other requirements. Internal accountability is achieved through rules but also through norms of acceptability that employees adhere to as part of the contract of employment. Norms are inculcated beginning from the first day of employment and continue to guide behavior throughout. When an employee deviates, the agency has recourse and punishes the employee. This example is simplistic, but internal accountability has this straightforward effect. From time to time, institutions reorganize, but their rules and norms remain the same, thus insuring stability and internal accountability.
External accountability adheres to different criteria, and the mechanism itself is located outside of one particular agency or bureaucracy. External accountability requires that a mechanism be established that stands outside the originating agency. For example, there are many medications on the market. To move a product from research and development into the marketplace, however, it must receive U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. The FDA uses particular criteria to decide whether the new drug is acceptable. In order to preempt a negative response from the FDA, the pharmaceutical firm adheres to the regulations prior to any review by the external mechanism. Thus, having accountability criteria in place is crucial to attaining successful and measurable outcomes.

While internal accountability relies on processes and the benefits of bureaucracy, external accountability is dependent on trust and credibility. These two features must be developed through the assessment of a range of criteria. In order for this accountability mechanism to be considered legitimate and credible, it must include all partners as equal players from the beginning. This particular point is important when discussing BPC in Africa as the studies and interviews conducted made no significant mention of the African partners as a responsible and accountable agent in security cooperation planning and execution. This too is illuminating as criteria for external accountability could include knowledge of conditions and processes in the specific partner nation. For example, how much does this external accountability mechanism know in general about a topic and beneath that, how much does the mechanism provide detailed criteria for the activity or service provided to the partner? Knowledge in this context includes both institutional memory and the
expertise of the officials responsible for constructing and managing the accountability mechanism. Another criterion must be autonomy. The external mechanism must remain exactly that—external—and it must be free from influence in order to change behavior or alter the rules of accountability. This element suggests that separate assessment units must be established in the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) or in the institutional Army that can serve as evaluators of accountability, but it also means that similar units must exist in the partner nation’s government, to include the military.

Another factor that is necessary for external accountability is temporality—**when**, in fact, the mechanism is used. For example, a mechanism could review plans for BPC before the program starts, require updates in a particular ongoing period, or serve as an after action activity. Most mechanisms use all three elements with different weights assigned to each depending on the requirement for assessing outcomes. In terms of BPC activities, the concept of external accountability relates directly to defense institution building. The DoD policy on defense institution building states that the DoD will:

> promote principles vital to the establishment of defense institutions that are effective, accountable, transparent, and responsive to national political systems especially regarding good governance, oversight of security forces, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.\(^{30}\)

Given that policy, appropriately organized external mechanisms both imply and exercise longevity, commitment, and legitimacy, as well as a relationship between civilian and military authorities, and the advancement of civil society. As U.S. Army Major
General Charles Hooper remarked with respect to BPC in Africa:

Over time we [AFRICOM] have developed, along with our African partners, a deeper appreciation of the importance of focusing on institutional capacity. To support the building of institutional capacity, we focus on resource allocation, command and control, expanding combat multipliers such as intelligence and engineers, and developing recruiting, training, and sustainment programs and policies. These functions help to ensure the readiness and independent sustainability of our partners’ forces. An underlying premise of our institution capacity-building efforts is that military forces must be subordinate to civil authority and accepted as legitimate members of a civil society based on the rule of law.31

The reminder here is on the appropriateness of an activity and the importance of an external check on that activity. The relationship to an external mechanism is a different type of relationship than one that is strictly bureaucratic and hierarchical. It is crucial to understand internal accountability because it gives those involved in BPC an awareness of how accountability on each side works and creates expectations for how external accountability will function. External accountability will help improve partner capacity, as it will give all actors legitimacy. This is important in all matters of accountability, but it is even more so in Africa, where credibility in the international environment is hard won. Moreover, external accountability in the form of an institution will provide a symbolic stability in addition to an actual one. That is, it signals fairness and rule of law through an established institution that advances the point Major General Hooper made: the military is subordinate to civil authority and acts as a legitimate member of the broader society. A
solid accountability institution can be a cornerstone for the building of good governance and can reduce corruption, for example, concurrently.

However, the preceding also suggests that there is an organization (that is, an outside actor) responsible for the construction and maintenance of the accountability institution. This third way would include developing an organization in African militaries that can act as a boundary crosser, effectively crossing the boundary between internal and external entities in order to convey information, including operational practice, and can translate the expectations if there is variance between internal and external rules. In the United States, an Inspector General performs this role. Most USG agencies have this organization, which performs audits, conducts investigations, ensures compliance, and acts as an intermediary. Inspectors General are considered a neutral party, but one firmly ensconced within a bureaucratic structure. A statutory Inspector General arguably adds a further source of accountability by having the additional requirement of dual reporting. Dual reporting, for example, in the United States, requires the Inspector General to report to his agency head initially, but he must also report his findings to Congress.

The creation of such a mechanism in African militaries may serve the same purpose as it exists in several African police forces. An Inspector General could serve as a go-between with the stakeholders. This figure would have to have autonomy and legal protections from retaliation, both from inside superiors and external stakeholders. He or she would have to be privy to all necessary documents and information, and a sound reporting structure would have to be set up for him or her. Dual reporting requirements broaden the
audience of mechanism activities and further enhance the perception of stakeholders being good stewards of the process, but they can also run into friction within their home organizations if they seem insufficiently loyal.

CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING AN EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM

Africa is dealing with a range of issues, not all of them security related. While the U.S. military is focused principally on counterterrorism on the continent, local populations may also be working on economic development, education, public health, and institution building in other arenas. The United States is also dealing with budget cuts, political upheaval, and uncertain political priorities. What type of mechanism is feasible to establish and that will meet stakeholders’ needs?

To answer this question, the following guidelines are offered as suggested methods for constructing an external accountability mechanism for BPC in Africa in conjunction with the USG agencies involved in this mission. First, members of these organizations would have to be equals, and there would have to be an agreed upon set of both expectations and consequences of failing to adhere to the expectations. Second, buy-in by all U.S. and partner stakeholders is crucial to obtain and maintain. Third, both U.S. and African governments must establish a transparent process of assessment and explain to both stakeholders and observers why the decisions were made. Fourth, local knowledge and expertise is critical for both U.S. and African officials; members must be locally respected and as far from any political instability as possible. Fifth, the accountability mechanism requires a resilient structure that can
withstand both a changing threat environment and political instability. Sixth, program objectives must be clearly stated and criteria for evaluation must be established by the mutual agreement of the United States and the African partner. Seventh, the institution must be built around or with an already accepted cultural institution or an independent body (whichever institutions are chosen to house the mechanism, they would have to be regarded as above reproach). Eighth, all parties must ensure strict adherence to consistent principles of accountability with recourse to sanctions for violations. Lastly, with respect to the issue of temporality, joint accountability reviews would be conducted prior to, during, and after the conclusion of a program or activity; the emphasis would be based on the threat environment.

CONCLUSION

BPC has been a focus of USG policy for many years. This interest was reinforced through the Quadrennial Defense Review for 2006 and 2010, as well as, of course, to FY 2017 NDAA. The challenge in BPC results from the mix of stakeholders in this space—Department of State, DoD, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), their components and others—with different goals, funding sources and levels, authorities, and perspectives. In the words of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in its study of lessons learned and best practices with respect to security cooperation, “all [these elements] conspire to create a difficult environment in which to execute a meaningful plan,” which must result in “purposeful activity on the ground.” The practice at the operational level and below is fraught with complications and friction points
with other players, and other issues, such as infrastructure, and local and regional stakeholders, but it is also where BPC activities take place. Additionally, there are frequent organizational challenges, as mentioned above, including personnel turnover, which hinders accumulation of institutional knowledge as well as relationship building.\textsuperscript{35} Chief among these complaints is the perception that there is no accountability regarding implementation of BPC programs.

While this assertion is not correct, the focus has largely been on financial accountability. The form of accountability Congress seeks in the current legislation is far different and the scope of this undertaking is immense. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently identified 194 DoD security cooperation and Department of State security assistance programs that relate to building foreign partner capacity to deal with security-related threats. As the GAO noted in its report, “According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. Government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.”\textsuperscript{36} Given that statement, accountability for BPC activities will not occur immediately, but steps to improve it are certainly necessary to assure Congress that the DoD and other relevant departments and agencies share its concerns.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5


8. Interview with Department of Defense (DoD) staff, May 27, 2017.


12. Interviews with the DoD and Department of State policy staff, May 5, 2017; Interview with a DoD Africa expert, May 12 and May 27, 2017. This is a common theme; represented here is one of the more extreme examples.


14. This terminology is used in the neo-realist sense; that is, the neo-realist paradigm of international relations theory.


18. Interview with DoD staff, May 12, 2017.


29. For development of the internal/external dichotomy, see Lester, pp. 1-28.


32. Yarger, p. 63.

33. *Ibid*.


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