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From the Editor in Chief

Our Spring issue opens with a Special Commentary entitled “#FakeNews in #NatSec: Handling Misinformation,” by Amanda Cronkhite, Wenshuo Zhang, and Leslie Caughell. The authors use an agent-based modeling method to achieve a better understanding of how misinformation spreads in different types of networks. Policies that promote increased media literacy or other preemptive measures, they argue, are more effective than those that address misinformation after the fact, such as fact-checking or labeling fake news.

This issue’s first forum, Civil-Military Relations, features two articles. John Binkley’s “Revisiting the 2006 Revolt of the Generals” examines public criticism of the Bush Administration’s handling of the Iraq War in the summer of 2006 by retired general/flag officers. This criticism, Binkley claims, constitutes a new era in civil-military relations that permits active involvement in public debate by retired senior military officers. Zachary Griffiths’s “Are Retired Flag Officers Overparticipating in the Political Process?” contends the active participation of retired generals and admirals does little harm to US democratic institutions or to the nonpartisan reputation of the US military.

Our second forum, Adapting to Adaptive Adversaries, includes two contributions. In “Missiles, Drones, and the Houthis in Yemen” Jean-Loup Samaan describes how, during the war in Yemen in 2015, the Houthis transformed from a local insurgent group to a nonstate actor able to defy regional powers. The conflict offers important lessons regarding the growing accessibility and affordability of sophisticated weapons’ systems and their usefulness to violent extremist groups. In “Defense Institution Building in Africa,” Ashley Neese-Bybee, Paul Clarke, and Alexander Noyes discuss tools and processes for developing successful defense institutions in low-capacity, high-threat African states.

The final forum, Strategic Lieutenants (Part II), adds substantively to the debate regarding how strategically sensitive company-grade officers must be. If the need for strategic-minded officers has indeed increased since the end of the Cold War, it is worth asking how the West’s military academies have adjusted to the demand. Carsten Roennfeldt’s “Norway’s Strategic Lieutenants” maintains the Norwegian Military Academy has achieved success with a method of instruction that fuses the Lykke model of military strategy with the Toulmin model of argumentation. In “Denmark’s Strategic Lieutenants,” Dorthe Bach Nyemann and Jørgen Staun describe how the training curriculum of the Royal Danish Military Academy routinely produces lieutenants capable of bearing complex leadership responsibilities in fluid operating environments. ~AJE
ABSTRACT: Adapting an epidemiological model for studying the spread of viral infections, we use agent-based modeling (ABM) to simulate how misinformation spreads in different network types. Our results indicate policies that address misinformation after the fact, such as fact-checking or labeling fake news, will not be as useful as policies promoting increased media literacy or other preemptive measures.

Some people are more susceptible to misinformation than others, and some social environments are more conducive to the spread of misinformation than others. We tested how a so-called mind virus—the Russian term for misinformation—moves through different populations. Our simulations found the propagation of misinformation is facilitated by individuals who believe in and transmit false but appealing information, and who live in a social environment characterized by strong relationships with like-minded individuals. When these conditions are met, misinformation spreads widely and rapidly. In other words, neither the type of network nor the characteristics of the populace alone account for information spread; it is the combination of susceptible individuals and network structures that most facilitates the spread of falsehoods.

This finding suggests strategies for combating the spread of misinformation must account for network configuration as well as the strength of social ties between the individuals spreading misinformation, particularly the level of trust between a transmitter and recipient. Policies that fail to consider these two factors jointly will have, at best, very limited success. Nonetheless, most government proposals focus on stopping the circulation of existing misinformation. More surgical approaches may be necessary, including identifying and inoculating those most susceptible to misinformation by increasing their media literacy, and tailoring literacy campaigns to the network structure through which misinformation is spreading. Though this tactic is...
already being deployed in other parts of the world, it would represent a substantial change in domestic policy.  

This article first draws from democratic theory to explain why misinformation is more dangerous than mere ignorance of facts. Current discussion of the spread of misinformation often invokes a viral infection metaphor, and the article evaluates the comparability of information and contagious disease transmission. Given the similarities, the article discusses the application of epidemiological methods to simulate the transmission and virulence of misinformation with agent-based modeling (ABM). It then provides the findings of computer simulations that collected data on how misinformation moves through different types of communities. The article’s analysis demonstrates the difficulty of halting misinformation once it has begun to spread. The article concludes by addressing the normative implications of the findings and recommends policymakers rethink their approaches to combating misinformation.

**Misinformation and Fake News**

While misinformation is not a new phenomenon, discussions about misinformation have taken on greater urgency following Russian interference in American and European elections in 2016 and 2017. In a review of “97 elections and 31 referendums” between November 2016 and April 2019, researchers found “foreign interference” in the elections of “20 countries.” Ahead of the US elections in 2020, concerns about information warfare are widespread, with intelligence officials stating multiple foreign adversaries are already attempting to subvert US electoral protocols. The director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, even called the interference in the 2018 midterms a “dress rehearsal for the big show in 2020.”

Politicians, governments, and intergovernmental organizations now face a complicated technological challenge—stopping the spread of fake news generated by actors operating largely outside of their legal jurisdictions. Prominent proposals include changing regulations governing social media, imposing fines for intentionally spreading falsehoods, and implementing mass education initiatives to increase digital literacy.

In 2018, the European Union outlined a plan to counter misinformation, focusing on detecting misinformation, coordinating responses to misinformation campaigns, legally regulating social

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media platforms, and empowering citizens to recognize and reject false content.\(^7\) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, has also committed resources to teaching its members to fight misinformation campaigns.\(^8\) But these solutions are often developed without adequately considering the conditions under which misinformation spreads through a population, information vital to understanding how misinformation may be stopped.

**Do Facts Matter?**

Prominent democratic theorists suggest a well-functioning democracy rests on the existence of citizens who possess and use accurate information to form political preferences.\(^9\) For decades, political scientists have been assessing how the political knowledge of citizens affects their political preferences.\(^10\) They find many people lack basic political information, which distorts the policy preferences they express relative to what they say is their actual preferred policy.\(^11\)

Growing evidence suggests the use of inaccurate information may pose an even greater problem for democracy than the lack or uneven distribution of political information.\(^12\) Misinformation “can distort public debate, undermine trust in political leaders, and warp the process by which people form and update policy preferences.”\(^13\) In addition, citizens who use inaccurate information to make judgments behave in a systematically different manner than people who possess accurate information.\(^14\) To use a recent example, people who do not believe in the utility of vaccines—anti-vaxxers—not only put themselves at risk because of misinformed beliefs but have endangered the herd immunity of whole cities and even the assessment that the United

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12 Jennifer Hochschild and Katherine Levine Einstein, “‘It Isn’t What We Don’t Know that Gives Us Trouble, It’s What We Know that Ain’t So’: Misinformation and Democratic Politics,” *British Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 3 (2015): 467–75.


14 Hochschild and Einstein, “‘What We Don’t Know.’”
States has eliminated measles nationwide.\textsuperscript{15} The most pressing problem for advanced industrialized democracies may not be the ignorant and inactive citizen, but the ignorant and “active” citizen.\textsuperscript{16}

These findings give greater urgency to understanding how misinformation spreads and how it might be stopped. Methods used by epidemiologists to study viral transmission may provide a powerful tool in understanding the spread of misinformation by incorporating three factors: individual susceptibility, the likelihood of transmission, and network structure. Each plays a distinct role in facilitating a virus’s spread. The bulk of the social science literature on information transmission focuses on similar concepts.

Susceptibility: Transmission and Updating

Individual susceptibility, or inborn immunity, conditions human responses to pathogens be they microbes or viruses. Some individuals are extremely susceptible to sickness while others possess more resistance due to inoculation or prior exposure. Susceptibility to misinformation depends on a number of individual-level factors such as education, attention to news, and partisanship. Inherent or learned immunity, such as higher media literacy, may buffer against the spread of misinformation. Just as some people exposed to the chickenpox virus do not develop symptoms, some people exposed to misinformation will never believe it.

Pathogens are spread through either direct contact or via an intermediate host. Pathogen characteristics, such as its infectivity—the ability to enter, survive, and multiply in a biological host—and infectiousness—the ease with which pathogens can be transmitted between hosts—determine the rate at which a group falls sick. Diseases that sicken victims quickly but with high mortality rates like Ebola are generally limited in geographic scope or density. Diseases like the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) have lower mortality rates and sicken victims over years, often yielding much larger areas of infection. Increasingly, scholars are studying how interactions and social embeddedness facilitate the spread of disease.\textsuperscript{17}

Internalizing misinformation requires not just exposure but also belief. The incorporation of misinformation as fact is known as updating in social science.\textsuperscript{18} “Transmission requires that two agents interact with each other, with one conveying a belief to the other,” while updating occurs only when the receiver accepts the new information.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} Hochschild and Einstein, “What We Don’t Know.”
\textsuperscript{17} Leon Danon et al., “Networks and the Epidemiology of Infectious Disease,” Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases 2011, art. no. 284909 (2011).
Transmission can happen without updating, but the reverse is usually not true.20

Existing literature suggests updating is caused by a combination of individual-level and community factors such as partisanship and trust in the media, among others.21 This article focuses on the importance of interpersonal trust for misinformation transmission. Trust acts similarly to physical proximity to an infected person—the closer or more trusted one is, the greater the likelihood of contagion.

**Network Configuration**

In epidemiological research, network structure defines the pathways a pathogen must travel to reach different individuals, with physical proximity between two people determining the likelihood of infection. Similarly, social network structure defines the paths through which misinformation could possibly reach all of the individuals in a community, as well as how citizens receive and interpret political information and misinformation.22 Social network analysis has found real-world networks often share enough attributes to be grouped into ideal types.23 This article considers two types of networks—small-world and scale-free—as they represent how information most commonly moves.24

As figure 1 shows, small-world networks have high clustering coefficients—someone’s friends also tend to be friends with each other, and short average path-lengths—a person need only go through a few acquaintances of acquaintances before connecting with someone unknown.25 In real life, these connections are neighborhoods, churches, or clubs in which almost everyone knows each other and interacts regularly. The modern social media environment is much like this: barriers to connecting with others, like the costs of transmitting

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20 Not unless the person updating in isolation is the instigator of the rumor.
information, are low and most people’s social media friends are still relatively geographically proximate.26

Figure 1. A small-world network

Scale-free networks, as shown in figure 2, are characterized by a small number of hyperconnected individuals, a majority of which maintain very few links to fellow members.27 These links are based on preferential attachment in “which a small number of high-degree actors are responsible for connecting the network, which puts them in a uniquely powerful position for influencing” the rest of the network.28 The most commonly employed analogy for a scale-free network is the hub-and-spoke airport system: major airports such as O’Hare or Heathrow serve as essential transit points through which most passengers must travel in order to reach smaller airports. This network most resembles the traditional gatekeeper news model dominant in the broadcast age (approximately the 1950s through the 1990s) when people

received their news from a very limited number of news outlets, such as a daily newspaper and one of three major television networks.

An important difference between the two models is that members of small-world networks are most likely acquainted with each other through intermediaries whereas members of scale-free networks are much less likely to know each other. Put colloquially, friends of friends are likely friends in small-world networks, but friends of friends in scale-free networks are much less likely to be acquainted.

**Modeling Misinformation**

The similarities between virus transmission and information transmission offer researchers a powerful analogy for understanding the spreading of misinformation. But it is difficult to track the spread of misinformation through a population in real time. Studies of misinformation frequently use surveys, which provide only a snapshot in time and often fail to capture information on the role of social networks in transmission. Studies of Twitter are also becoming popular but there are three important limitations to such research: Twitter represents a skewed version of America; research is limited to cases where rumors
take off and fail to study instances in which they do not; and sampling via hashtags is limited to relevance samples that often do not capture the full universe of related tweets. From the perspective of information warfare, it is important to know the full range of possibilities of what might be effective in spreading misinformation, not just what happens to go viral.29

Epidemiologists use computational models that incorporate information about individuals and social networks to simulate the transmission of contagious diseases. The most commonly used contagion model is the modified susceptible, infected, and recovered (SIR) model.30 SIR stands for the three states a subject can take on as a disease moves through a population. “Susceptible” denotes vulnerable individuals who have not yet been exposed to the pathogen; the “infected” are actively sick individuals who can infect others; the “recovered” are individuals who have acquired immunity. The modified SIR model adds a “carrier” state for individuals who are infectious regardless of their own health.31

The central assumption of the SIR model is that individual characteristics condition human responses to infection, in turn determining whether that person will transmit the disease to others. With regard to misinformation, the categories overlay as follows:
• “susceptible” persons who have not yet been exposed to misinformation but may believe it if exposed;
• “infected” persons who have been exposed and believe the misinformation;
• “removed” persons who recognize misinformation as false or incorrect and refuse to pass on the misinformation for any combination of individually motivated reasons; and
• “carriers” who may be skeptical or reject the misinformation outright but nonetheless pass it on. One example would be a journalist who repeats a falsehood while providing a correction. (This passive misinformation transmission commonly occurs on social media. There is theoretically a subset of those who believe misinformation but opt not to pass it on. In that case, those agents in our model act as if removed.)32

Mind viruses, like other diseases, are nothing more than long strands of information seeking to reproduce to ensure survival. To stretch the metaphor, a rumor seeks to survive by infecting as many people as

possible with belief in its credibility. In this view, the SIR model seems appropriate to model rumor emergence.

Because belief in misinformation is not equally likely, we define the probability of belief as a function of a person’s trust in the source as well as the person’s trust in her political institutions. Trust in the source of a rumor incorporates cues about credibility into the model. People are more likely to believe a rumor when they believe the transmitter is a credible source of information, and they are more likely to trust people with whom they regularly or closely associate. In the age of social media, individuals can splice up their networks to control who sees what (for example, designating friends, close friends, and acquaintances on Facebook, or into a circle of friends for WeChat). Interpersonal trust becomes an important factor in determining to accept, use, and transmit misinformation.

The second component, trust in political institutions, considers the information environment in which a person resides. Institutional trust is highly correlated with a person’s propensity to adopt a conspiratorial orientation as well as with pessimism about politics and political processes. People who distrust institutions also tend to believe conspiracy theories. People with lower institutional trust are also more open to believing a rumor or information from unofficial channels in general, for example with samizdat during the Soviet era.

Though individuals can change their beliefs, this model does not incorporate a mechanism or timeline for recovery. Once a person believes a piece of misinformation, said person remains persuaded. This modeling choice reflects an important reality of information transmission, namely, most believers will have transmitted misinformation to others even if they change their minds later. Those who received the information may continue acting as agents of transmission.

The Model’s Parameters

The ABM used in this paper requires parameters to be set at the level of the network as well as the individual agent. Besides specifying the network type as discussed earlier, other network-level parameters include size, the average level of institutional trust, and average level of interpersonal trust. Possible network size parameter $N$ was derived from R. I. M. Dunbar’s work on sustainable social group size, with small group size set to 100 members (number of people most of us call friends),

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35 Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy.
37 We use the term “agents” because it is standard terminology in the ABM literature.
medium group size set to 500 (acquaintances), and large group size set to 1500 (upper limit for whom one person can put faces to names).  

As discussed in the previous section, people are differently susceptible to believing in misinformation. We adopt Adam Berinsky’s typology of rumor susceptibility for agent assignment and incorporate his experimental findings about the frequency of occurrence for each type of susceptibility.  

The typology, distribution, and our assumptions about the probability of misinformation transmission are as follows:

- “susceptible” agents are capable of believing a rumor and they will pass on a rumor if they believe it: 65 percent;
- “gullible” agents will always believe the rumor and they will always pass it on: 5 percent;
- “skeptics” reject the misinformation as being wrong and they will not tell anyone else: 5 percent; and
- “ambivalents” do not internalize the misinformation but will always pass it on: 25 percent.

The average level of institutional trust in the network can be set to low (widespread distrust in government), medium, or high. Though the average level of interpersonal trust might similarly be varied from negligible to significant, we held average interpersonal trust levels to be uniformly high in order to capture contemporary concerns about echo chambers, which suggest people tend to hear news from those they agree with and are unlikely to hear or want to hear information that challenges them.

We calculate an individual’s trust in political institutions as $T_{\text{institutions}} \sim N$ (average level of institutional trust, 10), $T_{\text{institutions}} [0, 100]$, with lower scores meaning lower trust. Agent i’s trust in agent j, $T_{\text{personal}}$, is calculated as the average of the strength of the connection with her general level of interpersonal trust $\sim N$ (average level of personal trust, 1), $T_{\text{personal}} [0, 100]$, with lower scores meaning lower trust.

During initial setup for each simulation run, the model generates agents and connections according to the parameters of the network type, either small-world or scale-free. Each agent is assigned membership according to Berinsky’s typology and the probability of membership discussed above. At every timestep $t$, “infected” (misinformed) agents

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40 Golbeck, “Computing and Applying Social Trust,” 76-77.
and skeptical “carrier” agents expose all connected acquaintances with misinformation:

- “removed” agents who receive the misinformation will reject it and will not pass it on at time t+1;
- “carrier” agents who receive the misinformation will reject it but will pass it on at time t+1; and
- “susceptible” agents who receive the misinformation have probability
  \[ P_{\text{infection}} = T_{\text{institutions}} + T_{\text{personal}} \]
  of becoming infected agents, with threshold infection \( A \) set at 0.50. If \( P_{\text{infection}} > A \), the agent transmits the misinformation at time t+1.

A simulation run ends when all agents have been exposed to the misinformation or when a prespecified time limit has been reached.\(^{41}\)

**Current Findings**

In all simulations, misinformation spread most quickly through small-world networks, characterized by high levels of trust and regular interactions between individuals. This suggests that in neighborhoods, schools, or friend groups where many people know each other, believability of misinformation and the susceptibility of individuals is less critical because its members are closely connected and are more likely to trust each other. This trust means misinformation tends to infect most of the community very quickly. Because of heavy interconnectedness between all individuals, almost everyone will be exposed to misinformation regardless of the number of rejectors.

In scale-free networks featuring weaker as well as fewer bonds between members, the structure plays a much more dominant role in determining the extent of penetration by misinformation than network size or how closely agents are connected. Individuals who occupy central hub positions are instrumental in the spread of misinformation. Political scientists might refer to these critical nodes as opinion leaders. On social media, these nodes would be known as influencers. As depicted in figure 3, just as cancelations at O’Hare International Airport will affect flight schedules at smaller airports all over the country, influential individuals who reject the misinformation and refuse to discuss it may affect whether their connections will ever hear it. Conversely, believers in hub positions are capable of quickly and efficiently infecting an entire network by getting misinformation out to their followers.

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\(^{41}\) The model run ends when all agents have heard the rumor. But this may not occur due to the randomized configurations of agents and connections. Thus, in repeated simulations, we specified the model would end regardless of its state after 500 ticks.
Our data suggest activating these influencers is the best way to stop the spread of misinformation. When persons occupying critical nodes hear a piece of misinformation early in its life cycle, recognize it as inaccurate, and fail to pass it on, the spread of misinformation halts. This contrasts with previous findings indicating the initial number of opinion leaders, not their location, explains how widely misinformation spreads.\(^{42}\)

People have “a strong tendency to connect and bond with people who are like” themselves (homophily).\(^{43}\) People also tend to live among those similar to themselves, and are less and less likely to interact with people with different viewpoints than their own.\(^{44}\) In other words, Americans


are becoming members of smaller and more densely connected small-world networks, and they are more rarely getting information from sources outside of those with whom they agree. We are hearing less discordant or challenging information than we did in the broadcast media age.  

Humans living in polarized, disconnected clusters constitute particularly conducive environments for the spread of misinformation. This means attempts to stop the spread of misinformation must focus on the conditions under which misinformation originates and begins to spread rather than tactics to halt that information once it gains traction.

**Political and Societal Prescriptions**

From a policy perspective, expecting influential persons not to repeat misinformation or creating legal restrictions that penalize them for doing so (rightly) raises concerns about encroaching on free speech. Expecting social media platforms to take down offending accounts, as happened in 2018, further inflames concerns about censorship without effectively stopping the spread of misinformation.  

Fact-checking or correcting efforts like those supported by Facebook and Google pervade research and policy recommendations but have shown limited effectiveness. Our results suggest why fact-checking may not prove a panacea—even the mere transmission of a rumor, for example by a journalist fact-checking it, further infects the community. And once misinformation begins to spread, it becomes incredibly difficult to stop. The key to combating misinformation likely rests on preventing misinformation from beginning to spread rather than halting it after the fact.

Given this finding, we next consider what may be effective in stopping the spread of misinformation. Extrapolating from our model and recent successful endeavors by other researchers, we recommend a two-pronged approach to making future policy. First, government should focus on developing digital literacy campaigns to prevent people from believing and subsequently sharing misinformation. Second, government and interested organizations should incorporate structural information into those digital literacy strategies, decreasing susceptibility to falsehoods by targeting education efforts at citizens who are most likely to spread misinformation (“carriers” or “ambivalents”).

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**Digital Literacy**

Digital literacy scholars have identified five generally successful approaches to improving people’s ability to detect falsehoods:

- teach individuals to check for fact-checking articles about a news story;
- trace the source of information;
- read laterally, that is, check other sources’ evaluations of the story’s source;
- recognize the emotions they feel in response to the story; and
- identify common structural characteristics of fake news stories.  

Lateral reading has even been shown to be effective among digital natives, which includes many millennials (born 1981–96) and all of Generation Z (1997–2015). As such, it has the largest chance of success among current students and newly enfranchised voters.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has declared digital literacy a basic right of children. Digital literacy training is most effective when taught to young children. Because US states are responsible for setting educational curriculum, campaigns for increasing digital literacy should focus their lobbying to encourage adoption at the level of the school district. Librarians and teachers have been especially entrepreneurial in brainstorming ways of raising awareness in their communities. This policy approach would not necessarily require many resources to implement and can draw on the work of nongovernmental organizations. If such endeavors prevent at least some people from believing and sharing misinformation, they may prove more successful in the long-term in fighting the reach of misinformation.

Many US allies and partners already utilize these proactive approaches. Finland, which borders Russia, launched a multisectoral initiative to combat misinformation and disinformation, especially on hot button issues such as immigration. Countries such as Italy and Germany have integrated digital literacy education into school curricula. Public education campaigns and wargaming against fake news have shown to be effective in recent small-n studies. Specifically, borrowing from inoculation theory, researchers found that educating students on the production of disinformation and having them practice creating disinformation raised awareness of and attention to on the

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50 Milanovic, “Digital Literacy.”
52 Mackintosh, “Finland is Winning.”
veracity of news stories in real life. All of this appears to be a specific effort to protect each country’s national security from the informational equivalent of yelling “fire” in a crowded theater.

The knowledge that some individuals are more susceptible to misinformation than others allows policymakers to target information literacy campaigns where they might be most effective. An analysis of consumption of fake news online during the 2016 presidential election showed that while a relatively small proportion of news was untrustworthy, a plurality (44.3 percent) of US adults was exposed to some disinformation in 2016, and those exposed were highly concentrated in certain subpopulations, such as those with the most conservative news diets. In fact, one study showed that 1 percent of the population may have been exposed to 80 percent of disinformation in the 2016 election. Research has also shown older Americans are much more likely to believe and to share fake news. Highly concentrated clusters of misinformation consumption presents an opportunity for policymakers to utilize resources more efficiently, such as by leveraging algorithms already being employed to train artificial intelligence in social networks. As Tim Hwang wrote recently, “Algorithms may also point the way to identifying specific individuals who will be most effective in helping to contain the spread of disinformation.”

The private sector can also encourage digital literacy. Just as social media outlets may push clickbait quizzes for attention, they can also promote digital literacy. In some countries, this has already been done as a tradeoff to forestall government regulation. Social media platforms can demonstrate their commitment to digital literacy by sharing the cost and targeting those individuals who share the most misinformation. After all, once misinformation is identified, Facebook, Twitter and other platforms can easily backtrack to see who has shared it and how widely it has gone.

### Fighting Misinformation

Military personnel engage with civilians on social networks frequently, often becoming trusted sources of information for their connections, and relationships between military individuals are often characterized by high degrees of trust. Thus, military personnel passing on misinformation or disinformation may be particularly powerful in infecting others. This makes it imperative for organizations, including

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55 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this analogy to us.


the US military, to become more proactive in educating their members to avoid passing on misinformation.

Large organizations such as the US military or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization already engage in some digital literacy training for new recruits. NATO recently focused on providing educational materials to raise cross-cultural competence for their members, ensuring troops were more effective when operating outside their own cultural milieu. A similar strategy could be used to disseminate strategies for combating misinformation.

In the US military, just as classes about terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have recently been integrated into basic training for enlistees born after the event or were too young to remember it, the Department of Defense can include digital literacy classes into its training.60 This recommendation goes back at least as far as 2011, when a commissioned study by Army Training and Doctrine Command found very low levels of digital literacy among soldiers, a situation that has likely not improved in the age of #FakeNews.61 Even then, the benefits from small investments in digital literacy had larger-than-expected payoffs, making them resource-efficient for the military and other organizations.

Incorporating network structure into this training should also be low cost. Social networks, for example, know which of their members self-declare as military. The Department of Defense could work with social networks to find out which among its ranks have spread the most misinformation. Identifying patterns in misinformation spread among soldiers (be they geographic, among specializations, or at certain ranks) would allow for better allocation of funding aimed at digital literacy efforts and would identify where the military might be vulnerable to disinformation campaigns ahead of the 2020 elections.

**Conclusion**

In the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, Internet and social media companies made changes aimed at reducing the prevalence of fake news on their platforms.62 Facebook implemented artificial intelligence to identify and prevent clickbait and fake news from gaining popularity or trending and contracted with journalists to combat fake news.63 Google launched its own tool that prioritized fact-checking articles in its results when a user searched for information about a fake news topic.64

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Nonetheless, since the 2016 election, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, WeChat, and other social networks remain “awash in fake news.”\textsuperscript{65} The problem has spread to other countries, clearly impacting recent elections in Mexico and Brazil.\textsuperscript{66} Our analysis shows a person may be individually susceptible and enmeshed in networks on social media that increase their likelihood of becoming infected by misinformation. Yet these realities have not guided our efforts to combat misinformation.

The odds of misinformation diminishing in quantity seem low. For example, deepfakes—videos produced or altered to present content that never occurred in real life—will make it even harder to identify real news, and the technology to produce videos has evolved so quickly that now it can be done from a single image. The cost of producing deepfakes has also dropped dramatically making them increasingly a reality in politics, and numerous technologists worry that deepfakes of political leaders will be used to sow discord and even incite revolution.\textsuperscript{67} A recent Pentagon-funded study by the RAND Corporation found misinformation could be an important factor in the possibility of conflict between NATO and Russia.\textsuperscript{68}

Perhaps the largest takeaway from our simulations of misinformation spread is that misinformation diffuses rapidly and widely in networks like those created on social media platforms.\textsuperscript{69} The increasing ease with which individuals or groups can create highly plausible online misinformation or disinformation likely exacerbates this problem.\textsuperscript{70} This proves particularly true if such misinformation is pushed out by a trusted and well-connected source.

Our findings do not prescribe what works to stop misinformation but rather what likely will not work. Our simulations suggest it is incredibly difficult to stop a piece of misinformation once it has begun to spread. We therefore suggest media literacy and civic education programs that educate citizens to recognize falsehoods and therefore not repeat or spread them are more likely to be effective against the dissemination of misinformation. Other countries are actively and publicly formulating strategies to combat misinformation. The insistence by the United States to rely on private efforts to counter misinformation leaves us vulnerable to foreign adversaries who want to disrupt our political system. As another presidential election cycle ramps up, our unwillingness to face the problem head-on poses an important threat to democratic stability.

\textsuperscript{67} Emily Zendt, \textit{Deepfake Videos Are Getting Terrifyingly Real}, PBS \textit{Nova}, television and online, April 4, 2019.
\textsuperscript{70} Christopher Elliot, “Here Are All the Real Fake News Sites,” \textit{Forbes}, February 21, 2019.
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ABSTRACT: This article examines the public criticism of the Bush Administration’s handling of the Iraq War in the summer of 2006 by recently retired general/flag officers. This criticism constitutes a new era in civil-military relations, which includes the active involvement in public debate by retired senior military officers.

The so-called revolt of the generals in the summer of 2006 is not an aberration but an example of the changing nature of the involvement of the military in public discourse. The military profession itself must confront the reality that the nature of military professionalism may be in a transitional period and, consequently, the expected role of the military might be changing. Thus, understanding the history and the possible future impact of the revolt is something military officers need to address, not merely as an historical footnote in the study of civil-military relations, but also as a possible model for the future of military professionalism.

Between March 19, 2006, and April 19, 2006, three recently retired Army and Marine general officers—Army Major General Paul Eaton, Marine Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, and Army Major General John Batiste—publicly criticized the Bush administration and, in particular, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, for mismanaging the war in Iraq. Within a short period of time, three additional retired generals—Marine Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, Army Major General John Riggs, and Army Major General Charles Swannack—were interviewed by the press and concurred with the criticisms levied by Eaton, Newbold, and Batiste. Collectively these public attacks became known as the “Revolt of the Generals.” Later that same year, the editorial board of the Military Times wrote:

Rumsfeld has lost credibility with the uniformed leadership, with the troops, with Congress and with the public at large. His strategy has failed, and his ability to lead is compromised. And although the blame for our failures in Iraq rests with the secretary, it will be the troops who bear its brunt. . . . Donald Rumsfeld must go.


Eaton was the first to assail the administration in a March 19, 2006 op-ed in the *New York Times*. In charge of training the Iraqi military until 2004, Eaton called for the resignation of Rumsfeld, labeling him “strategically, operationally, and tactically” incompetent and placing primary responsibility for the problems in Iraq on the secretary. Eaton’s opening shot was followed by an April 9, 2006 article in *Time* magazine by Newbold, entitled “Why Iraq Was a Mistake,” and an April 19, 2006 op-ed in the *Washington Post* entitled “A Case for Accountability,” by Batiste. Newbold, who retired in 2002, was the director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Batiste, who had commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, retired in 2005 after turning down promotion to three stars.

Retired and, in rare cases, active duty officers will sometimes enter a debate over a particular peacetime policy or budget issue. But for such a debate to occur during wartime is extremely rare. The goal of this article is to explain the scope of the revolt of the generals, illuminate its underlying causes, place the revolt within the main contours of American civil-military relations, and indicate how it may affect American civil-military relations in the future. This article will not offer an ethical proscriptive model as to when the military should enter into the public debate; George Clifford, a Naval War College researcher, and Don Snider, Leonard Wong, and Douglas Lovelace, Army War College researchers, have already written on that topic.

**Civil-Military Contours**

Within the contours of civil-military relations theory, the revolt raised two separate but related issues. The first was the quintessential debate regarding objective and subjective civilian control of the military articulated by Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal work *The Soldier and the State*. The second was how the military communicates in either an advisory capacity with the civilian leadership or by participating in public discourse. This communication is generally referred to as the military’s voice.

As many readers are aware, objective and subjective civilian control are not absolute typologies but are heuristic models reflecting two sets of general characteristics regarding the nature of civil-military relations. Most officers display characteristics of both models. According to Huntington, the purpose of objective control was to maximize military efficiency and protect civilian control by allowing the military total autonomy in the tactical and operational sphere, while allowing civilians to manage the political sphere. In order to effectuate this, the military

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was expected to be apolitical in its actions and exclude non-military factors from its considerations when fulfilling its advisory function.\(^6\)

Like objective control, subjective control is a normative model for civil-military relations. Huntington rejected subjective control because he feared it would degrade military efficiency and destroy the military’s political neutrality. Several years after Huntington published *The Soldier and the State*, University of Chicago sociologist Morris Janowitz utilized subjective control as his normative model in the publication of *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*.\(^7\) Janowitz argued, operating effectively within the ambiguous zone of limited war, required military officers to appreciate nonmilitary factors.

Both Huntington and Janowitz assumed civilian control meant the military should follow civilian direction. Nevertheless, the degree to which the military appreciates nonmilitary factors is a distinction with a profound impact on military advice, as well as the analysis of the revolt. As military officers became more conversant with political considerations, Janowitz believed they would be less reticent to speak openly on issues traditionally outside the professional military sphere.

In reality, military officers do not divide their advice between military and nonmilitary factors. Instead, officers recognize their advisory role required them to consider nonmilitary factors when offering advice. Incorporating nonmilitary factors, however, creates tension with the military’s professional ethos. In spite of the impossibility of having a binary approach to objective and subjective civilian control, this article employs the heuristic characteristics that differentiate objective and subjective civil-military relations as a starting point for the analysis.

With regard to military voice, there are two distinct types.\(^8\) The first is *advisory* voice in which the military officer, usually on active duty, participates in the decision process; the second is *public dialogue* voice (discussed later). The traditional American approach to advisory voice was articulated succinctly by former Army Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgway when he explained to his civilian superiors they could expect fearless and forthright expressions of honest, objective professional opinion up to the moment when they themselves, the civilian commanders, announced their decisions. Thereafter, they could expect completely loyal and diligent execution of those decisions.\(^9\)


Typically, when the military discusses the concept of “voice,” it is within the context of giving advice to civilian leadership in private. The military expects the advice will receive a respectful hearing, but understands it may be rejected. Advisory voice concerns the extent to which military professionals consider nonmilitary factors in the advisory process.

A different aspect of voice and the one most pertinent to our discussion of the revolt of the generals relates to what I call the public dialogue voice. The question in this case is to what extent the military should publicly participate in the discourse regarding policy. One of the first writers to confront this question was Sam Sarkesian in 1998:

> The military profession dare not withdraw into an ethical cocoon. . . . Instead it must make a prudent and positive response to the travails imposed on it and not shrink from articulating its views in the public square. . . . senior military officers must reshape the very notion of military professionalism by candidly admitting the impact of politics on the military’s ability to do its job and daring to practice constructive political engagement. This would appear to violate the sacred code of silence by which the U.S. military is strictly apolitical, offers technical advice only.\(^{11}\)

Inasmuch as Sarkesian believed professional officers should consider and discuss nonmilitary factors, his model was predicated on subjective control and the reality that military policy was inextricably tied to political policy. He carefully distinguishes his “constructive engagement,” or the public dialogue voice, from shrill partisan conversation. As Sarkesian noted, the “military must not remain passive and allow misjudgments and misguided policies and strategies to emerge from the political arena absent an airing of the military perspective,” nor should the military be “a silent order of monks isolated from the political realm.”\(^{12}\)

This position is the heart of the debate over the legitimacy of the revolt. While the military understands the theoretical possibility of utilizing its public dialogue voice, becoming involved in public discussion has negative consequences. Sarkesian does not differentiate between active duty officers and retired offices and, in point of fact, there is a question under the notions of military professionalism whether there is a distinction.\(^{13}\) As former Commandant of the US Army War College Major General William E. Rapp noted, the “most difficult question about fostering a culture of candor and voice involves the appropriateness of public expression of military voice.”\(^{14}\) From the perspective of the dissenting general officers, this was exactly what occurred.

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The revolt confirmed Janowitz’s belief that as the military became more cognizant of nonmilitary factors, its servicemembers were more willing to speak out and assert their voice. Subjective control and public dialogue voice were inextricably intertwined in this transitional process. The latter could not exist without the former, which is not to suggest the revolt precipitated this transition. Instead, Janowitz argued this transition has been slowly developing over the post-World War II era. But the military, for a number of reasons, saw the events leading to the Iraq War as an existential threat to the United States, which led to a large number of retired officers finding their public dialogue voice.

The actions of the six officers described at the outset of this article portray the broader and deeper nature of the revolt. The revolt began as the debate over whether to invade Iraq unfolded, and increased in tempo regarding the strategic direction of American involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and the Bush administration’s detention policies. The publication of the above-referenced editorial in the *Army Times*, *Air Force Times*, *Navy Times*, and *Marine Corps Times* on the eve of the 2006 midterm elections reflected the breadth of the revolt.

The difficulty in examining this particular event is determining whom to include in our analysis as a dissenting general. Retired General James Jones, for example, publicly distanced himself from the revolt even though his critical comments about the Bush administration were quoted by Bob Woodward in *State of Denial*. The large number of retired military officers acting as consultants to the various news networks only muddied the issue.

The form of public involvement also varied. The typical avenues of involvement were opinion pieces or media interviews. Congressional testimony was another major avenue of access. Some officers associated themselves with public interest groups while others signed open letters to Congress. A number of retired four-star officers joined “Diplomats and Military Commanders for Change,” which stated the administration had “failed in the primary responsibilities of preserving national security,” and failed to maintain America’s “responsibilities of world leadership.” In any event, the number of officers, the scope of their

public involvement, and the breadth of their complaints far exceeded the original six dissenters.

The difficulty in defining the precise scope of the revolt has also resulted in senior officers being included in the perception of dissenting officers even if dissent was not their intention. A case in point is the statement of then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2003, that the Army’s occupation force requirements for Iraq would be “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers.” After his opinion was widely repudiated by Pentagon officials, the story goes, Shinseki was forced from office and senior administration officials snubbed his retirement ceremony.

Another active duty officer dragged into the revolt was Admiral William “Fox” Fallon, Commander, US Central Command. Admiral Fallon resigned after the April 2008 publication of an interview in Esquire portraying him as holding the administration back from more aggressive action regarding Iran. The previous February, the admiral had also opposed increasing the number of carrier strike groups in the Persian Gulf and had vowed privately that war with Iran “will not happen on my watch.” The admiral also argued with General David Petraeus over the general’s requests for increased forces in Iraq. An unanticipated perceived consequence of the revolt was the belief that the Bush administration retaliated against both Shinseki and Fallon for speaking truth to power.

These public attacks upon the military’s civilian leadership, either real or imagined, for the apparent purpose of affecting public opinion and the direction of policy caused great consternation regarding the nature of American civil-military relations. These attacks triggered a scholarly debate regarding two of the basic premises of civilian control and the military’s advisory role: the civilian leadership’s right to be wrong and the military’s obligation simply to “salute and obey” after a decision is made even though they may disagree.

Because the revolt seems to violate the traditional Ridgway model, it has become the most visible example of what has been characterized as a crisis in American civil-military relations. The “crisis” school in the Persian Gulf context had its origin in a 1994 article written by Richard Kohn, an expert in US civil-military relations. Kohn’s article, entitled “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” was reinforced

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21 Lawrence Di Rita, “Gen. Shinseki’s Silence.”
23 Barnett, “The Man Between War and Peace.”
by his subsequent articles. Kohn observed a slow erosion in the relations between the military and its civilian leadership during the Cold War exacerbated during the Clinton administration by the administration’s antimilitary bias and policies such as “don’t ask, don’t tell.”

The relevant portion of analysis of crisis is the apparent increased intrusion of the military into what historically has been the civilian decision-making sphere, in particular, the decision to use military force. The tremendous influence of General Colin Powell, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in particular his New York Times op-ed opposing military intervention in Bosnia, epitomized reaction to this intrusion. Mackubin Thomas Owens, an expert in the field of civil-military relations, has argued an underlying assumption among the dissenting officers was that they had “a right to a voice regarding the use of the military instrument” and a “right to insist that their views be adopted.” From Owens’s viewpoint such an expectation clearly violates the American principle of civilian control. But Owens is conflating two issues, the military’s right to a voice and the expectation its advice had to be accepted. These are separate issues and need to be viewed as such.

Consequently, the revolt was seen as an illegitimate act of political interference on the part of the military, undermining the nature of civilian control and calling into question the very nature of the civil-military contract upon which America’s democracy rests. For scholars such as Kohn, Owens, and Snider, the revolt was an aberration from the traditional norm of American civil-military relations, and therefore a violation of the officers’ “professional ethic.” Charles Krauthammer, a Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist and television commentator, characterized the generals’ actions as “alien to America.” Damon Coletta, a professor of political science at the US Air Force Academy, roundly criticized Shinseki for violating the civil-military bargain by publicly opining on force levels that were “beyond his official purview” and in a public forum. The implication was that even by responding to Congress’s constitutional mandate for oversight, General Shinseki was...


“shirking” as defined by Peter Feaver, a professor of political science at Duke University.30

Owens laid out the case against the dissenting officers:

Uniformed officers have an obligation to stand up to civilian leaders if they think a policy is flawed. They convey their concerns to civilian policymakers forcefully and truthfully. If they believe the door is closed to them at the Pentagon or the White House, they have access to Congress. But the American tradition of civil-military relations requires that they not engage in public debate over matters of foreign policy, including the decision to go to war. . . . The idea that a general or admiral—including those on the retired list—should publicly attack government policy and its civilian authors, especially in time of war, is dangerous.31

Other scholars rejected this description of danger and saw the revolt as a long overdue opportunity to discuss the nature of American civil-military relations and reexamine the proper role of the military in the development of political/military policy.32

Once the revolt erupted in 2006, members of the officer corps and the academic community debated several questions. First, was the Ridgway model still the standard of professional conduct? Second, to what extent did the revolt constitute an aberration from the traditional professional ethic? If one assumes the traditional Ridgway model has always been and still is the standard, then the revolt must be, by definition, an aberration from that norm.

We do, however, have to consider whether the traditional model is being replaced by a new standard of conduct. Feaver believed we may be in the midst of a transition with the “emergence of a norm among American military officers that civilian control does not mean that civilians have the right to be wrong.”33 Finally, what exactly was the nature of the revolt and how did it fit within the contours of civil-relations theory?

**Nature of the Revolt**

The allegations levied as a result of the revolt by the generals fall into two categories, and each relate to a typology of civil-military relations. The first, and the one that has received the most attention and criticism


31 Owens, “Rumsfeld,” 79.


33 Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 300.
from commentators, claims the Defense Department’s civilian leaders substituted their own preferences for those of the military experts while ignoring “the advice of seasoned officers [and] denying [military] subordinates a chance for input.”

To accomplish this, senior military officers were so intimidated they acquiesced in the administration’s decisions. As Batiste wrote, the country “deserve[s] competent leaders who do not lead by intimidation, who understand that respect is a two-way street, and who do not dismiss sound military advice.” This first set of allegations arises out of objective civilian control. The second set of allegations addresses the administration’s failure to consider broader aspects of the war’s political/military environment and raises issues not normally considered military in nature.

The principal claim that the Bush administration rejected the advice of the military experts was related to the military perception that the civilians lacked experience or expertise in those areas. Former commander of US Central Command General Norman Schwartzkopf’s concern was decisions, contrary to professional military advice, were made by “somebody who doesn’t have any of that training [or experience].” A former US Central Command commander, Joseph P. Hoar, probably spoke for many of the dissenting officers when he described Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz as “a very bright guy, but he doesn’t know anything about war-fighting, and I suspect less about counterinsurgency operations.”

To gain agreement for their policy preferences, the civilians forced acquiescence on the military. This heavy handedness is not a new issue. Administrations since the end of World War II have attempted to impose policy preferences on the military, and the military has consistently resisted. From the military’s perspective, such forced acquiescence prevented its leaders from “generating independent military advice as they had a legal obligation to do.”

Implicitly, the retired general officers were responding to the administration’s acceptance of Eliot Cohen’s normative model of civilian intrusive management outlined in his 2002 book *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesman and Leadership in Wartime*. Cohen, a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), rejects Huntington’s argument for operational autonomy for the military on two grounds: it violates Clausewitz’s maxim that war is an extension of politics and it prevents political leadership from ensuring military actions are consistent with national objectives.

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34 Eaton, “Top-Down Review.”
35 Newbold, “Why Iraq Was a Mistake.”
of policy, and the military’s professionalism does not necessarily result in better policy decisions. Since wars are fought so rarely, Cohen argues, a military professional has had no more actual practice leading large armies in combat and making strategic decisions during wartime than the civilian leaders.

Moreover, civilian leaders access different types of information and have different views of the situation. Thus, civilian leadership should actively intervene in the military’s operational decisions to guarantee they are compatible with the state’s political aims and the civilian’s operational goals. While Cohen’s approach supplied a rationale for the administration’s involvement in military matters, the retired officers saw it differently.

The difficulty is when you have civilian leadership who are professionally unschooled. . . . [Secretaries such as McNamara and Rumsfeld are] ignorant of military operations, of strategy and policy. The effect is normally they’re disdainful of those they lead. And then, as they begin to increase their power, they become arrogant, and they’re unwilling to accept advice, even though they claim they are willing to accept the advice . . . at some point they reach where they think they’re above the law. . . . And I believe in the case of Mr. Rumsfeld, we’ve reached that.

A series of specific allegations flowed from the claim that the administration rejected professional military advice. The first was that the civilians micromanaged the war. Eaton figuratively referred to the “8,000-mile screwdriver” that allowed the Pentagon to intrude into a variety of decisional processes, especially prewar planning and decisions regarding resource allocation for postcombat stabilization operations.

Batiste stated the administration’s micromanagement “radically alter[ed] . . . 12 years of deliberate and continuous planning.” A number of retired general/flag officers, including Eaton and Newbold, refer to Shinseki’s testimony and his subsequent treatment. For them, the testimony not only epitomized Ridgway’s obligation to speak fearlessly and honestly but reflected the administration’s desire to stifle such discussion even though it was constitutionally required.

Micromanagement is also linked to a separate set of allegations—the Bush administration failed to understand the nature of the counterinsurgency in Iraq and intruded into the military’s operational decisions once the insurgency began. According to Eaton, Rumsfeld’s decisions and the Quadrennial Defense Review reflected a lack of

42 Paul Van Riper, Frontline, “Rumsfeld’s War;” the page for interviews; the page for military officers; the page for Paul Van Riper interview by Frontline, Frontline, PBS, July 8, 2004.
44 Batiste, “A Case for Accountability”; the website for NBC News, Meet the Press, “MTP Transcript for April 15, 2007,” interview of Tony Zinni by Tim Russert, MSNBC, April 15, 2007; and Van Riper, “Rumsfeld’s War.”
45 Eaton, “Top-Down Review”; and Newbold, “Why Iraq was a Mistake.”
understanding of “the nature of protracted counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and the demands it places on the ground forces.” Former commander of the Coalition Ground Forces Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez described in his memoir how political decisions intruded into operations in Fallujah to widespread dismay.

A final military-related set of allegations claimed the administration took its eye off the ball by going into Iraq and allowed the insurgency to break the United States military. A former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry “Hugh” Shelton reflected the concerns of many officers when he said “it will be hard to sustain the momentum in the war on terrorism” while simultaneously fighting in Iraq. As units redeployed again and again to Iraq or Afghanistan, the administration’s apparent disregard of the danger to military effectiveness became a focal point. One group of retired officers expressed concern in an open letter to Congress.

The situation in Iraq, grave and deteriorating, is troubling to us both as former military commanders and as American citizens. Top military officials have consistently acknowledged that the repeated and lengthy deployments are straining the [military] forces and are taking a heavy toll on critical warfighting equipment.

The claim of micromanagement echoes the military’s criticism of the McNamara Defense Department during the Vietnam War and the belief that civilian intrusion into the military’s operational arena during that conflict was a classic violation of Huntington’s normative model. For the officer corps, the error of the Vietnam War was more than micromanagement and civilian intrusion. Instead, the war also revealed a failure on the part of senior officers to stand up and deliver the “fearless and forthright expressions of honest, objective professional opinion” that Ridgway demanded. Colin Powell spoke for them when he recalled:

Our senior officers knew the war was going badly. Yet they bowed to groupthink pressure and kept up pretenses. . . . As a corporate entity, the military failed to talk straight to its political superiors or to itself. . . . Many in my generation . . . seasoned in that war, vowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons the American people could not understand.

Thus, Powell’s great regret was not McNamara’s graduated approach to the war, nor Washington’s micromanagement, but that the military

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46 Eaton, “Top-Down Review.”
50 Colin Powell and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine, 1995), 149.
did not stand up to the civilian leadership and articulate their concerns over whether the war was winnable, especially in the absence of clearly defined goals and public support.  

The problem for the dissenting officers was that once Rumsfeld had, in the words of Jones, “systematically emasculated” the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no institutional entity could supply those fearless and forthright professional opinions and halt the civilians’ intrusion.  

Newbold complained, “Never again, we thought, would our military’s senior leaders remain silent as American troops were marched off to an ill-considered engagement.” Historically, the key for any administration to impose its preferences on the military was the selection of compliant officers at the top of the organizational chart. According to Eaton, General Peter Pace, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave the “impression that our senior man in uniform is just as intimidated by Rumsfeld as was his predecessor, General Richard Meyers.”

Related to civilian intrusion into the area of military expertise and the military’s failure to speak truth to power was the administration’s tendency to use the military as political cover for its unilateral decisions. Retired Brigadier General John Johns complained that active duty officers were being used as “props to make it appear that the military is united behind [Rumsfeld’s] policy.”

This resentment that the military was silent during the Vietnam War in the face of perceived civilian intrusion and strategic incompetence was encapsulated in H. R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty. For many military readers, McMaster clearly suggested senior military officers were derelict in not articulating their concerns about the failing strategy in Vietnam more forcefully, and if necessary, making those arguments publicly.

During a 2003 ethics lecture at the United States Naval Academy, General Anthony Zinni recalled that in 1997 then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shelton required every service chief and combatant commander to read Dereliction of Duty so that they would never “forget what happened in Vietnam and the need to speak out.” Zinni went on to recall his own lessons from Vietnam in words that were almost identical to Powell’s.

The generals and admirals that I grew up with and I knew that went through Vietnam swore to themselves that we wouldn’t let it happen again, that we would question, that we would comment, that we would take positions above our own benefit and our own careers.
The scope of McMaster’s argument is central to understanding the revolt. Michael Desch believed the “implicit message [in Dereliction of Duty] is that unqualified allegiance to the commander in chief needs to be rethought.” For critics of the revolt, the retired officers’ reliance on McMaster’s book was based on a mistaken reading of the book as was the argument that military leaders had an obligation to voice their concerns. The issue, however, was not what McMaster wanted to teach the military but instead what the officer corps took from the book. According to then Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling in his “A Failure in Generalship” article, “if the general remains silent while the statesman commits the nation to a war with insufficient means, he shares culpability for the results.”

The officers involved in the revolt saw themselves as disregarded experts with catastrophic results for the nation. But unlike the ideal objective control model, the officers concluded, based on their own Vietnam experience and legitimized by McMaster’s research, they had an obligation to go to the next step and publicize their differences with the administration.

Subsequently, the retired general officers castigated the administration on a number of concerns that one would generally characterize as non-military in nature. One allegation was the failure of the administration to develop an overall strategy for the war and to articulate clearly defined political and military goals.

Retired General Jack Sheehan acknowledged he declined the White House’s offer to take the position of Implementation Manager for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because there was no overall strategy. As he put succinctly, “They don’t know where the hell they are going.” He saw no decision-making structure that linked “short-term operations and strategic objectives that represent long-term US and regional interests.” This view is indicative of the military’s belief that the civilians in the Bush administration did not understand the Clauswitzian relationship of the military instrument to foreign policy. Sheehan and other retired general officers felt comfortable critiquing the administration on this point.

In addition to failing to articulate a war strategy, the administration was also criticized for destroying the coalition. The destruction of a coalition that had worked so effectively during the first Gulf War was problematic to the general officers because, as Newbold noted, those disenchanted allies “could have helped in a more robust way to rebuild

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58 Desch, “Bush and the Generals.”
Iraq. But the destruction of the coalition also represented a moral failure in international leadership. In place of that moral leadership, the administration showed insensitivity “to the concerns of traditional friends and allies and [distain toward] the United Nations.” The administration’s policies on enhanced interrogation techniques, the existence of Guantanamo Bay, the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and the apparent manipulation of intelligence not only negatively affected the military operations but undermined America’s international position.

The third major allegation is the administration failed to understand the internal dynamics of Iraq and to utilize all the resources available to the US government. Sanchez, in an address before the Military Reporters and Editors Association in 2007, roundly criticized the administration failing to “employ and synchronize [the nation’s political power].” Instead of mobilizing US economic and political power, America relied solely upon the military alone to achieve victory. During Vietnam the military had identified the same problem—the inability of civilians to make the hard decisions to mobilize resources necessary to fight the war, with the primary example of not mobilizing the reserves. To avoid this problem in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporated the reserves into the total force concept. Again, a lesson from Vietnam is reflected in the concerns of the retired general officers.

Concluding Thoughts

As Janowitz wrote, as the military begins to consider nonmilitary factors, it will take a more robust role in policy formulation. Sarkesian built upon Janowitz’s model of subjective control to argue for a public voice. Both Janowitz and Sarkesian assumed that as the officer corps received more exposure to nonmilitary factors through education, graduate programs, and assignments requiring the internalization of such factors, it would be only natural for officers to want to participate in the public policy debate.

The revolt of the generals epitomized both Janowitz’s hypothetical transformation to subjective control and Sarkesian’s call for a more robust political discourse on the part of the military. The revolt reflected two primary concerns. The first focused on traditionally narrow military issues associated with civilian intrusion into the military sphere of interest. The second was the failure of the Bush administration to consider fully nonmilitary factors in its strategic decisions. In both cases,

63 Newbold, Why Iraq was a Mistake”; Batiste, A Case for Accountability”; Ricardo S. Sanchez, “Military Reporters and Editors Luncheon Address” (address to the Military Reporters and Editors Association, Washington, DC, October 12, 2007).
65 Van Riper, “Rumsfeld’s War”; letter to Senator McCain dated October 3, 2005, supporting his proposed amendment regarding torture which was signed by 26 retired generals and admirals; and Newbold, “Why Iraq was a Mistake.”
66 Sanchez, “Military Reporters and Editors Luncheon Address.”
68 Zinni, “Obligation.”
senior military members found voice in expressing their concern over the failure of the administration’s policies.

The dissenter of senior military members was triggered in 2006 by the convergence of historical factors. These factors included the senior officers’ confrontation with their perceived professional failure during the Vietnam War in light of the decision-making failures of the Bush administration. Collectively, these factors accelerated the transformation that Janowitz hypothesized. The result was a broad swath of military leaders, albeit retired, found their voice and demanded to be heard.

Questions left to consider include: to what extent was the revolt an aberration from the American model of civil-military relations? Does the dissent portend the future engagement of the military in the public decision-making arena? While Kohn and others saw the revolt in aberrational terms, Feaver is correct to suggest a new norm has emerged, one that replaces the traditional norm that civilians have the right to be wrong and the military, without commenting publicly, merely salutes and implements disastrous policies.

The dissenting officers did expect their voices to be heard. But that differed little from the traditional notion of advisory voice that Ridgway personified. The primary difference was the public nature of this voice. The dissenting officers did not expect their policy preferences would always be agreed to. During the revolt, a particular group of experts added its voice to the policy debate hoping its arguments would be persuasive.

The movement toward Janowitz’s transition has accelerated as a result of the military’s failure to find its voice during the Vietnam War and the military’s belief it needed to express its voice during the Iraq War. A fundamental change in the attitude of the military toward participating in public dialogue has taken place. The effect will be more constructive military criticism of civilian leadership, which will have the positive effect of making available to the public a clearer expression of military expertise. This result was what Sarkesian called for in 1998. Such a practice will improve America’s civil-military relations and the concomitant decision-making process.

Currently serving senior officers and senior officers of the future, whether active duty or retired, can learn from recent history and current events that constructive dissent can save lives. Revisiting past instances of active duty and retired military officers voicing constructive criticism of US foreign policy can help maintain healthy civil-military relations. Dissent does not have to be a revolt. Constructive criticism within the channels and contours of civilian control and military responsiveness can improve readiness without sacrificing diplomacy and peaceful human relations. Tragic wars can be shortened and better understood with engaged discourse.
ABSTRACT: Retired United States general and flag officers participate politically as individuals and in groups. Purportedly, participation damages civil-military relations. But this article argues these activities, including but not limited to endorsements of candidates, do little harm to US democratic institutions and to the nonpartisan reputation of the military institution.

With every presidential election, the public turns toward retired general and flag officers to see whom they will endorse. Senior leaders such as Retired General Martin E. Dempsey and Retired Admiral Michael G. Mullen have criticized these endorsements despite also participating in the political process themselves. This article presents the first holistic description of retired flag officer participation in politics. Drawing on the participation typology of Joakim Ekman and Erik Amnå, this research finds retired general officers participate politically in nearly every manner, individually and collectively. It also finds, in contrast with other scholarship, that current levels of political participation by retired general officers do not significantly harm civil-military relations.

In 2016, Dempsey penned an op-ed in USA TODAY, encouraging professional athletes to “stand and pay it forward for what you think America should do” instead of kneeling to protest police brutality. A month earlier, however, he wrote, “retired generals and admirals can but should not become part of the public political landscape.” Dempsey aimed his criticism solely at participation by retired flag officers in formal partisan politics, while he himself participates politically in many other ways.

Political participation is more than just voting. It includes a range of activities such as “voting, persuading, campaigning, giving, contacting, attending, and signing.” In one guide for servicemembers, the Department of Defense authorizes “voting and making a personal

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monetary donation” but prohibits partisan political activities.\(^5\) In the framework chosen for this article, even engagement in civic life and abstention from politics are characterized as political activities because of the resulting political impact.

In Dempsey’s case, his wide-ranging civic and political participation certainly has political consequences. Dempsey sits on boards of nonprofits and leads the youth participation program of the National Basketball Association (NBA), the Jr. NBA. The NBA pursues political interests—new basketball stadiums, favorable regulations, and tax breaks—by donating and meeting with politicians. During the same election cycle in which Dempsey criticized his peers, the NBA contributed $190,010 to candidates.\(^6\) Several authors agree “Dempsey's Twitter feed, which never mentions [Donald] Trump specifically, seems to be a continuing sub-tweet of the president, hashtagged under ‘#Leadership.’”\(^7\) Through his political participation, Dempsey seeks change.

Other retired general and flag officers participate politically as well. But does their political participation harm civil-military relations? Beyond just endorsing candidates for public office, the manifest political activities of general and flag officers, their participation in civil society, and even their disengagement from public affairs have some impact on government policy and civil-military relations. The first obligation of military professionals is “to do no harm to the state’s democratic institutions.”\(^8\) Such harm might take three forms. First, political leaders may lose trust in the advice of military leaders. Second, increased public expressions of partisan views may undermine trust by political leaders in the military. Finally, the public may lose trust in the military as a nonpartisan entity.

The impact of retired general officer political participation is inconsequential—neither negative nor significant—in our large and diverse republic. Dempsey and other writers on civil-military relations scarcely mention retired flag officer voting, donations, board memberships, or abstention from politics. But they do comment on their endorsements of presidential candidates every four years.\(^9\) Despite these criticisms of endorsement, current retired general officer political participation does not significantly harm civil-military relations.

Retired flag officers are exceptional and ambitious former military officers. They clear at least six promotion hurdles to reach the summit

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\(^9\) Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, “‘Cashing In’ Stars: Does the Professional Ethic Apply in Retirement?,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015).
of the Department of Defense’s “up-or-out” system. The military’s promotion process culls between 6 and 45 percent at each rank between O-4 and O-6.10 The services promote only about 3.4 percent of O-6s to O-7—the first general and flag officer rank.11 About 82 general and flag officers retire each year with 28 to 35 years of service. This body is small: in 2017, there were 7,428 living retired officers in the O-7 to O-10 pay grade compared to 109,920 officers who retired in the pay grade of O-6. Despite receiving a comfortable pension at an average of $91,432 per year, general officers often begin a second career in government, academia, or business.12

After leaving senior positions in the military, flag officers face frequent criticism for their employment and political decisions after retiring. Despite the variety of potential paths for retired officers, Retired Major General Paul D. Eaton suggested about “80 percent of his peers took ‘less honorable’ jobs in the military-industrial complex.”13 Some experts criticize this revolving door because of “conflicts of interests that may arise in such a second act.”14 Beyond defense-related conflicts of interest, retired general officers may influence the opinions of active duty personnel or the general public.15

The influence of retired flag officers on the military and general public concerns many commentators. Of the scholarly articles surveyed for this article, all but one criticized these endorsements.16 Arguments critical of candidate endorsements by retired general officers suggest a slippery slope from such endorsements to three outcomes.17 First, partisan activities such as endorsements may cause elected leaders to lose trust in the military’s advice.18 Second, they may increase the politicization of the active duty force.19 Finally, they may undermine popular perceptions of the military as nonpartisan.20 The next section explores how retired

11 MLDC, “Promotion.”
13 Paul Eaton (retired major general), interview by Zachary Griffiths, July 19, 2018.
20 Golby, Feaver, and Dropp, “Elite Military Cues,” 60.
flag officers participate politically and reviews recent political science research to see whether these concerns are legitimate.

**Political Participation**

Of all the ways retired flag officers participate in politics, only endorsing draws negative attention. For example, Dempsey participates broadly: voting, writing op-eds, leading for-profit and not-for-profit enterprises, and actively not endorsing. Other retired general officers participate differently, but they all participate. But, negative commentary focuses overwhelmingly on endorsement, despite the broad range of activities highlighted. Table 1 details retired flag officer political and civic participation using Ekman and Amnå’s participation typology.²¹

Table 1. General and flag officer participation in politics²²

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(X indicates some general and flag officers participate in a specific way)

Previous typographies of political participation focused primarily on formal and informal political participation. Ekman and Amnå recognize civil engagement and nonparticipation can be political acts, and they also recognize people participate as individuals and collectively. In total, their typology includes three forms of political engagement: nonparticipation, civic participation, and political participation (see table 1).

**Nonparticipation:** Some retired general officers choose not to engage in politics after retiring because they adhere to the military’s nonpartisan ethic. The *Army Profession* reflects this ethic when it states “senior Army leaders have a direct stewardship responsibility . . . to political nonpartisanship in the execution of their duty.”²⁴ Nonparticipation can be active or passive. Dempsey’s op-ed criticizing endorsement is an example of active nonparticipation—a public statement against political participation by retired military members. Passive nonparticipation takes place out of the public eye. “The overwhelming majority of

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²¹ Ekman and Amnå, “Political Participation.”
²² I coded retired general and flag officers as participating in a specific activity if I found any evidence of that form of participation. I coupled this research with eight interviews focused around general and flag officer decisions to endorse partisan presidential candidates.
²³ Ekman and Amnå describe this category as “extralegal” but “informal participation” better describes retired general and flag officer participation in this arena.
retired officers” refrain from politics to avoid politicizing the military.\textsuperscript{25} Others may leave the military and not participate out of indifference toward politics. But they still participate passively—even those who eschew voting are likely to engage in civil society activities, which have political effects.

\textit{Civil engagement:} Civil engagement takes two forms. The first form is social participation. As individuals, retired general and flag officers bring attention to issues important to them in their interactions with others. For example, Retired Major General John Batiste hosted a fundraiser to raise awareness about veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.\textsuperscript{26} Others participate socially by joining advocacy groups or identifying with a political party. According to the \textit{Boston Globe}, 3 of 39 flag officers retiring in 2007 joined the boards of directors for nonprofit organizations.\textsuperscript{27} The other form, civic participation, requires more personal effort than social participation. Civic-minded retired general officers attempt to persuade others of their views. Retired General Stanley McChrystal drew on his status as a “34-year combat veteran” when he argued in support of the Public Broadcasting Service as a “small public investment that pays huge dividends for Americans.”\textsuperscript{28} Collectively, civic-minded individuals volunteer their time with social, faith-based, or other organizations.

\textit{Political participation:} In the final category, political participation, individual retired flag officers engage formally and informally. In their formal participation, retired general officers individually vote, donate money to candidates, and lobby. Retired General Colin Powell first donated money to candidates in 1994, only one year after he retired, and has since donated 55 times (as of January 2020).\textsuperscript{29} Research reveals nearly 80 percent of officers with greater than 21 years of service voted.\textsuperscript{30} Likewise, 18 percent of officers reported donating money to political campaigns.\textsuperscript{31} Beyond voting and donating, at least seven retired admirals registered as lobbyists between 2000 and 2014 and lobbied on defense and transportation-related issues.\textsuperscript{32}

Retired flag officers also participate collectively through organizations. The Flag and General Officer’s Network, established in 1995 as a social club, is now a 501.C.19 organization “authorized

\textsuperscript{31} Dempsey, \textit{Our Army}, 133.
to engage in active participation with the U.S. Congress and federal government" on military issues. Other retired general officers lead or join the boards of directors for large nonprofit organizations that lobby the government. After Retired Admiral Patrick M. Walsh left the Navy in 2012, he joined the board of the Veterans of Foreign Wars Foundation. That foundation employs a full-time lobbyist and donated an average of $85,000 a year between 2014 and 2018. Historically, the predecessors of veterans' organizations, like the Society of the Cincinnati in the post-Revolutionary War period, have drawn negative attention. But today, veterans organizations are broadly accepted as part of the political process.

Informal participation, the next category of political participation, includes legal efforts to persuade political leaders. When retired flag officers endorse as individuals, they fall into this category. An individual endorser in the 2014 elections, McChrystal spoke carefully for only himself when he endorsed Representative Seth Moulton of Massachusetts and Retired Major General Irving L. Halter Jr. of Colorado. Other retired general and flag officers endorse collectively.

Following a political endorsement by Retired General Paul X. Kelley in 1988, collective endorsements exploded, reaching their peak when 501 retired flag officers endorsed Governor Mitt Romney in 2012. By matching endorsements with campaign contribution data, researchers found retired general officers endorse largely because of their social connections, suggesting interpersonal connections play a more important role in endorsements than political preferences or desire for material advancement. This work built on a 2012 survey that found a significant though small impact of retired flag officer endorsements on low-information and independent voters. Beyond presidential candidates, retired general officers collectively endorse around issues, such as higher physical education standards, support for the State Department, gun control, and nuclear missile defense.

The final category of political participation is illegal participation including political violence or terrorism. There were no examples of retired flag officer participation in these behaviors.

36 Campaigns recruit retired general and flag officers from all ranks to support their candidates. Between 2004 and 2016, 110 O-10, 278 O-9, and 952 O-8 and O-7 retired officers made endorsements. Author's calculations.
Retired general officers are citizens with interests. No one should be surprised when such officers engage in politics across the entire typography, both individually and collectively. Of the 11 forms of participation retired flag officers engage in, only collective endorsements garner significant criticism from military professionals and scholars of civil-military relations (see table 2). This criticism may occur because it is hard to distinguish retired flag officer private political action from political positions taken based on military expertise. The collective nature of these endorsements, with headlines focused on the number of retired general officers involved, make differentiation even harder and at least partly explains the negative reception.

Table 2. Criticism for retired general and flag officer endorsements of presidential candidates by military professionals and scholars of civil-military relations

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(X indicates some general and flag officers participate in a specific way; C indicates the activity is widely criticized)

Endorsement is distasteful to those familiar with Samuel P. Huntington’s theory of objective control, which expresses concern about the state of civil-military relations. In his op-ed criticizing retired flag officer endorsements, Dempsey argued endorsing a candidate is different than running for office because elected officials are accountable to the voter.40 Also, individual endorsements from retired general officers open each individual to public criticism as their names appear in the media. This critique of political stances weighs on some retired flag officers. In an interview, Retired Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman expressed concerns his endorsements might undermine his position at the US Chamber of Commerce.41

Unfortunately, the media rarely highlights individual retired general or flag officer endorsements because these officers are not well known.42 Retired officers from the reserve component may be known in their state, but active duty officers move frequently, removing their familiarity with hometown issues. Without connection to specific places, such endorsements are most valuable on national security issues. But these individuals are not well enough known to be picked up by the media as influential individuals. (Even Dempsey, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, leveraged his title in his op-ed on kneeling professional athletes.)

40 Dempsey, “Keep Your Politics Private.”
42 For a rare exception, see McChrystal, “Save PBS.”
Impact on Civil-Military Relations

Notwithstanding the relatively rare cases of political endorsements by individual retired general officers, concerns have been raised about the effects of these individual and collective endorsements. This article will now evaluate three theorized harms to civil-military relations resulting from endorsements. First, elected leaders may lose trust in military advice if retired flag officers endorse candidates.43 Second, endorsements may lead the active duty force to assert increasingly political views.44 Finally, endorsements may undermine the confidence in the military that is rooted in the view of the military as nonpartisan.45

The concern that a president may lose trust in his military advisors is reasonable. Presidents nominate the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from a small pool of existing senior military officers. Some evidence exists indicating presidents nominate politically sympathetic officers for senior posts when their copartisans control Congress, making it less likely a president will distrust the chairman.46 However, if the president loses trust in the chairman, the National Security Council might make worse decisions or miss important military considerations.

Unfortunately for this theory, case-based research presents limited evidence that retired general officer endorsements undermine relationships between senior active duty military members and political leaders. In a study on the impact of high-profile individual endorsements on civil-military relations, of six cases considered, only Admiral William Crowe’s endorsement of then Governor Bill Clinton undermined trust between the military and then President George H. W. Bush.47 Crowe retired as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Bush in 1989 and joined Clinton’s campaign in 1992. After Crowe’s endorsement of Clinton, Bush said, “I was pretty disappointed in Bill Crowe.”48 The study concluded that personal relationships between the president and senior military officers exacerbate or reduce trust concerns, but broader impacts on civil-military relations by endorsements are limited by the public’s ability to “distinguish between the individual and the organization.”49

With the increasing number of endorsements since Kelley’s groundbreaking first endorsement, military members may have taken a cue from retired flag officers to participate more. As previously mentioned, political activity of active-duty servicemembers is restricted by the Department of Defense.50 After retiring, however, the political activities of flag officers may set an example of increased partisanship

45 Golby, Feaver, and Dropp, “Elite Military Cues,” 60.
or participation for those still in the ranks. As more retired general officers endorse political candidates, some would expect active duty servicemembers also to participate more.

In surveys of military members’ political participation in 2004 and 2009, some scholars found limited evidence that participation changed during the period when endorsing became more common. These years align closely with the 2004 and 2008 presidential election cycles where 343 and 311 retired flag officers endorsed presidential candidates, the second- and third-largest number of endorsing general officers.

Despite the increasingly prominent role of retired flag officers in presidential politics, however, officer corps’ political activities remained remarkably stable over time. On the subject of donations and public partisan displays, 2010 survey results “closely mirror [Jason] Dempsey’s findings” from 2005. These findings indicate “Army officers’ political views remained intact and largely unaffected by combat deployments” and their active duty service in general.

Although the negative effects of political participation by retired flag officers are limited with regard to high-level civil-military relations or as this participation influences active-duty servicemembers, such activities by prominent military experts might still undermine public trust in the military as a nonpartisan institution. Researchers proposed and tested a similar idea: cues from military endorsers about the use of force could influence a public with low interest in foreign affairs. Based on a series of surveys of 12,000 respondents, some research concludes endorsements can move public opinion, especially if an individual is Republican or the military recommends against the use of force.

A similar mechanism could work with public confidence in the military overall. Visibly increased political participation by retired general and flag officers might reduce public confidence in a nonpartisan military for those who disagree with these officers’ positions. Fortunately, national polls have collected data on confidence in the military since retired general officers started endorsing presidential candidates in 1988. Surprisingly, the rise of retired general and flag officer endorsements corresponded with increased confidence in the military as an institution. Between 1988 and 2016, Gallup surveys report a 15 percent increase in the public reporting a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the military.

Over the same period, the total retired flag officer endorsements in presidential election cycles increased from 1 to 180, with a peak of 506 endorsements in 2012. Increased general officer endorsements are

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52 Griffiths and Simon, “Retired Flag Officers,” 2.
54 Urben, “Civil-Military Relations,” 152.
55 Golby, Feaver, and Dropp, “Elite Military Cues,” 54.
57 Griffiths and Simons, “Retired Flag Officers,” 2.
strongly correlated with confidence in the military. Though oversimplified and omitting other possible explanatory variables, a linear model with the count of retired flag officer endorsements on public opinion finds that each endorsement is associated with a 2.67 percent increase in public opinion. While a causal relationship between retired general and flag officer political endorsements and public confidence in the military is unlikely, this provides evidence increased participation by these officers has not significantly undermined public trust.

In short, the impacts of political participation by retired general officers appears very limited and perhaps is constrained to cases where participation undermined trust in personal relationships between politicians and flag officers. As previously discussed, in only one of six cases did endorsement undermine trust with politicians. Active duty officers maintained a constant level of political participation throughout the period of increased participation by retired general officers. Finally, increased participation by flag officers did not undermine confidence in the military but is associated with a period of increased trust.

Conclusion

Like other people, retired general officers participate in politics in a variety of ways for many reasons. Some of these officers retire and then abstain from high-profile political participation. The nonpartisan ethic inculcated through several decades of service pushes many in this direction. Others choose to participate in civic life, either individually or collectively. Leaning on their military experience, many retired flag officers write op-eds to influence policy debates or on behalf of organizations they support. Politically, general officers participate in nearly every way. A few run for office while most vote and others chose to endorse candidates either as individuals or collectively. A select few register as lobbyists. None engage in violent or illegal protest. In short, retired flag officers participate in political life like other civilians.

While the increase in political endorsements by general officers has been a cause for concern, recent political science research indicates the nature of current retired general and flag officer political participation does limited harm to civil-military relations. Flag officers are high-profile individuals who capture the attention of researchers of civil-military relations and the general public when they participate in collective political endorsements. Yet despite this participation, none of the theorized harms to civil-military relations has occurred.

Relationships between serving general officers and politicians remain firm. As of December 2019, the US Senate continues to confirm general and flag officers by voice vote—hardly an indication of mistrust.

58 Using r statistical software, the author calculated this linear regression coefficient with the dependent variable being Gallup’s confidence in the military (great deal / quite a lot) from Note 57 and the number of endorsements as gathered by Griffiths and Simon between 1988 and 2019.
in military officers by national political leaders. Likewise, the active military is less partisan today than when party politics were pushed out of the military “by ending the practice of electing officers.”

Today’s troops vote in elections and abide by policies limiting political expression. Finally, confidence in the military remains high, perhaps because of its culture of selflessness, absence from domestic politics, or its distance from the average citizen. Increased participation by retired flag officers has not impacted this confidence. General officer political participation has not undermined civil-military relations in at least these three areas.

Although available evidence indicates few challenges to civil-military relations, researchers must continue to investigate why civil-military relations in the United States remain stable while other nations suffer from military coups. Where Clifford M. Bayne focused on individual endorsements, future research should consider how senior government officials, the media, and the voters interpret endorsements and other political participation. Comparative analyses involving other countries could be especially illuminating.

Researchers could also consider why political participation is different for these retired senior officers. As private citizens, they are free to participate politically. However, discerning private political sentiments from those expressed based on military expertise is challenging, and retired general officers cannot escape their military credentials. Deeper understanding of this tension could help us better understand this participation.

Quantitative methods could also generate answers. As noted earlier, confidence in the military increased from 1988 to 2016, suggesting the public’s view of the military is not swayed by endorsements. But there may be measurable changes in civil-military relations at lower levels. Textual analysis of Congressional hearings could indicate whether collective endorsements impact the policymaking or nomination processes. Finally, surveys could unpack assumptions about the interpretations of collective endorsements by the public.

Flag officers maintain high profiles after retiring, which may lead civil-military researchers to overly focus on their behavior. In other countries, retired general officers can wreak havoc. Fortunately for the United States, retired flag officers participate in politics like other citizens. This participation does not significantly harm civil-military relations. Barring major shifts in American politics, political activities of retired general officers are unlikely to significantly undermine political and public trust or politicize active duty troops.

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ABSTRACT: In response to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015, the Houthis transformed quickly from a local insurgent group to a nonstate actor able to defy regional powers. The Houthis’ ability to lay the foundation for a nascent strategy of compellence provides important lessons on the growing accessibility and affordability of sophisticated weapons’ systems and the likelihood future violent extremist groups will opt for this military posture as well.

Since the beginning of the war in Yemen in March 2015, Ansar Allah (commonly known as the Houthis) have been using missiles and drones against military targets belonging to the Saudi-led coalition. The Houthis have also attacked civilian targets deep inside Saudi Arabia and possibly inside the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The frequency of these attacks has become a common feature of the conflict—in 2018, the Houthis reportedly launched one missile attack nearly every week.\(^1\) In this context, this article considers the evolution of the Houthi way of war from its first insurgency campaigns in 2004–11 to the ongoing conflict. It then assesses how the Houthis have built an effective strategy of compellence against conventional armed forces using missiles and drones, one explicitly inspired by Hezbollah’s strategy in south Lebanon during the 1992–2000 period. This article concludes with some implications of this emerging pattern of nonstate actor warfare.

Missile attacks are obviously not the only tactics employed by the Houthis. Since the war started in 2015, the group has launched numerous ground offensives and, in particular, raids at the Saudi Arabia border that sometimes led to spectacular results.\(^2\) Moreover, it can be argued the use of missiles and drones is nothing new and neither is its strategic significance, especially in the Middle East.\(^3\) During the Second Lebanon War (July 2006) Hezbollah in Lebanon was able to fire missiles at Israel for 34 days despite a massive air campaign conducted by the Israeli Air Force.\(^4\) Likewise, Hamas and other Palestinian groups have, over the

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past decade, moved away from suicide bombings and now use rockets as their primary means of attacking southern Israeli cities.

At the same time, the damages suffered by Saudi forces and some of the country’s critical infrastructures (airports, oil fields) highlight the difficulties of defending civilian and military targets against these systematic attacks, leading to the question of the ability of missile defense systems to secure troops on the battlefield as well as civilians and infrastructures far away from the conflict.

The Yemeni case provides striking lessons for military planners. The evolution of the conflict reflects a fast-paced escalation of missile and drone attacks, underlining the gradual centrality of missile warfare for the Houthis. Compared to Hezbollah or Hamas, the ability of the Houthis to store a robust inventory of weapons and train their combatants to use them effectively suggests significant acceleration in the strategic and operational learning process of nonstate actors. Therefore, it is very likely other groups will be tempted to emulate this strategy in the future.

While partly the creation of the Houthis, this nascent strategy was made possible through the support of ex-officers from the Saleh regime and the deployment of advisers and capabilities from Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). But these factors do not render irrelevant the Houthis’ demonstrated ability to adapt.

A strategy of compellence is more than mere harassment and differs from deterrence. In the words of Thomas Schelling, “There is typically a difference between a threat intended to make an adversary do something (or cease doing something) and a threat intended to keep him from starting something.” Schelling adds, “The threat that compels rather than deters, therefore, often takes the form of administering the punishment until the other acts, rather than if he acts.” In this context, the Houthis use missiles to hold their power and to force the Saudi coalition into accepting the territorial status quo. As of this writing, it remains to be seen if this strategy will be successful. Nonetheless, the ability of the movement to prolong the war and deny the coalition any breakthrough has been significant enough to consider its implications for future warfare.

**Houthi Military Education**

The Houthis are not a new phenomenon in Yemen: the group emerged in 1992, only two years after the unification of Yemen, in Sa'dah governorate, one of the poorest northern areas of the country. A Zaydi Shiite revivalist political movement under the leadership of the Houthis family, the Houthis were part of the parliamentary system in the country from 1993 to 1997.

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between the Houthi leadership and the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh steadily deteriorated. Saleh proved unable to administer much-needed governance for the Sa’adah region in terms of infrastructure, social welfare, education, and security. This lack of governance exacerbated local feelings of marginalization and fueled the rising anti-regime rhetoric of the Houthis that paved the way for open confrontation.8

Between 2004 and 2010, the Houthis fought no less than six wars against the regime of Saleh. These conflicts were short—usually a few months—and ended with inconclusive military wins by the government that temporarily ceased hostilities.9 At the outset, the Houthi mobilization looked like a mere revolt designed to challenge the local authorities in Sa’adah. The Saleh regime dismissed giving any social legitimacy to insurgent demands, portraying the insurgents as mere proxies of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. But the movement was able to gather forces rapidly and expand to adjacent regions: by 2008, the revolt was already getting close to the capital, Sanaa.

Throughout these conflicts, the Houthis morphed into an insurgency that launched surprise attacks, used hit-and-run tactics, and conducted ambushes against the Yemeni army. They used local connections and illicit trafficking to wage a protracted war against state authorities.10 The first rounds of the conflict involved demonstrations and close fighting between Houthi combatants and government forces in the Marran Mountains. Overall, the early Houthi way of war was rudimentary. A RAND report published in 2010 described the Houthis as a loose organization that relied on “unconnected fighting groups.”11

In response, the armed forces of the Saleh regime conducted indiscriminate air strikes and shelling in the Sa’adah region, especially at rebel camps and villages supporting the movement, and tried to change local power plays by supporting its own proxies against the Houthis.12 Author Uzi Rabi described the evolution of the rebellion as one moving from a “consistent nuisance” to an “existential threat” for the regime.13

The conflict between Saleh and the Houthis quickly became part of the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. From 2004 onward, Saudi Arabia supported the Yemeni state apparatus against the Houthi insurgency.14 By 2009, as the latter started extending its operations into southern Saudi Arabia, Saudi air and ground forces were deployed to the

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11 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 238.
12 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 9–10; Brandt, Tribes and Politics, 154.
border, threatening to “clean out” the rebel camps. Meanwhile, despite persistent claims from Saleh and his Saudi allies, the relations between the Houthis and Iran were rather limited despite several visits to Tehran between 1994 and 2011 by Badr al Din al Houthi, the founder of the group, and his son Hussein. Likewise, Hezbollah military operatives such as Khalil Yusif Harb and Abu Ali Tabatabai reportedly traveled inside Yemen to meet Houthi leaders before the 2015 conflict started.

The strategic environment changed dramatically after the Arab Spring of 2011. Saleh left power in February 2012, replaced by his vice president Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi who was backed by Saudi Arabia. It is believed protests leading to the fall of Saleh triggered Iran’s provision of military and financial assistance to the Houthis, and the shipping of small arms grew in earnest. Meanwhile Saleh, no longer Saudi Arabia’s partner inside Yemen, soon found common cause with the Houthis—despite the fact the two fought six wars against each other—against the Hadi government. This odd alliance would prove decisive in September 2014, enabling the Houthi takeover of Sanaa.

In retrospect, the fall of Sanaa can be read as the culmination of this decade-long series of conflicts. It highlighted the disintegration of the Yemeni state, both under Saleh and his successor Hadi, as well as the growing ability of the Houthis to conquer and seize control of territories beyond the initial stronghold in Sa’dah.

From 2004 to 2015, there was no record of the Houthis using missiles against their opponents. In previous conflicts, Houthi combatants fought in the mountains (in the Haydan district) or in urban areas (Sa’dah, Kitaf). They used small-to-medium arms such as hand grenades and usually ambushed or openly attacked government forces.

The date of the first use of a missile by the Houthis in the conflict is disputed. According to official Saudi sources, a Scud missile was intercepted on June 6, 2015, on its way to Abha. But UN experts mention another strike on June 29, 2015. In either case, the missile attack occurred between two and three months after Saudi Arabia’s decision to set up a military coalition to restore the Hadi government. In the following weeks, Houthi attacks inside Saudi Arabia steadily increased and focused on border areas. Cities including Jizan, Najran, and Khamis Mushayt were repeatedly targeted.

The focus on border areas occurred simultaneously with the evolving battle inside Yemen. After the initial conquest of Sanaa in 2014, the Houthis expanded southward to Aden and westward to Al

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15 Hill, Yemen Endures, 194.
16 Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah’s Pivot toward the Gulf,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 8 (August 2016).
17 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East, Strategic Dossier, (London: IISS, 2019), 162.
18 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 137–39.
Hudaydah. But by the summer of 2015, this momentum was curbed by the intervention of the coalition and its local partners. A war of static positions unfolded and coincided with the Houthis increasing reliance on missile attacks targeting Saudi territory.

In 2016, the Houthis increased the frequency and extended the range of missile attacks. The attacks in 2015 were conducted using Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. Starting in February 2016, the Burkan-1 and Burkan-2H were reportedly introduced on the Yemeni battleground allowing the Houthis to reach more distant targets. Moreover, the missiles did not just target the forces of the coalition; they were also aimed at Saudi territory and at ships crossing the Red Sea. By mid-October 2016, the Houthis started engaging targets further north in Saudi Arabia: a ballistic missile was fired at the Taif military base and later that month, the Saudi forces reported the interception of a missile near Mecca. During that same period, the group also used an anti-ship missile in the Red Sea to strike a UAE vessel.

The series of attacks in late 2016 clearly signaled the Houthis’ improvement in employment of missiles. Saudi military sites were the initial priorities. But civilian infrastructures were soon in the line of sight: in July 2017, oil facilities near the city of Yanbu were targeted. In November of that same year, King Khaled International Airport in Riyadh came under attack. Noticeably in this last case, the missile had to travel about 900 km to reach the Saudi capital—a range clearly beyond that of the missiles stored by the Saleh regime.

Soon the UAE, Saudi Arabia’s closest ally and biggest contributor to the war, also became a target. In December 2017, the Houthis declared they had launched a cruise missile at the Barakah nuclear reactor in the emirate of Abu Dhabi. But no signs of destruction were visible or reported, and Emirati authorities subsequently denied the claim. On July 26, 2018, the Houthis announced they had attacked Abu Dhabi International Airport with a drone named the Samad-3. The Emirati government again denied the attack. It acknowledged an incident had occurred at the airport but said there was no evidence the facilities had suffered any damage. Moreover, air traffic management was operating at a normal pace after the supposed attack. A month later, a similar claim was made regarding a drone attack against the Dubai International Airport, the third busiest airport in the world. But once again, no sign of any destruction was visible.

In addition to firing ballistic missiles, the Houthis have recently employed other tactics. In January 2017, the Saudi frigate Al Madinah was attacked by “suicide boats” near the Al Hudaydah port in the Red

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Sea. In June 2019, a cruise missile was launched against Abha Airport in southern Saudi Arabia. And in early 2019, the Houthis began to employ drones more frequently as part of their military strategy.

In the fall of 2016, the UAE Presidential Guard reportedly intercepted unmanned aerial vehicles in the area of Aden International Airport. A few months later, on February 26, 2017, the Houthis claimed to have manufactured their own system, the Qasef-1, although independent researchers strongly suspected the drone was in fact Iranian in origin, given the similarities with the Iranian Ababil-2 drone. But in January 2019, Houthi fighters used a bomb-laden drone to attack Yemeni military officials during a military parade at the Al Anad Air Base, near Aden. The attack killed at least six people, including the head of military intelligence, Major General Mohammad Saleh Tamah. In May, two oil pumping stations in the province of Riyadh were damaged by a drone attack. In the following weeks, drones were sent against airports in Najran and Jizan and against urban areas in Khamis Mushait and Asir.

Most recently on September 14, 2019, Houthis claimed responsibility for a drone attack on oil fields in Abqaiq. The effectiveness of the strike and the distance between the target and Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen would have made such an attack a major technological leap forward. The US government expressed doubts, however, about the Houthi claim and instead blamed the Iranian regime for the strike.

**A Strategy of Compellence**

Although it may be tempting to dismiss Houthi tactics as mere harassment, several interrelated indicators (selection of targets, organizational changes, use of attacks in propaganda) suggest a strategy of compellence. The timeline presented above reveals specifically how missiles and drones have taken center stage in the conflict in Yemen. It confirms these arsenals were integrated to the Houthi military posture in a remarkably short period of time. This impressive pace of learning has nurtured suspicions regarding external support the group has received. Indeed, if the Houthis had no track record of previous use of such arsenals, how could one explain the sudden extensive employment of such weaponry?

Prior to the conflict, Saleh’s regime had no indigenous program of missiles. It did, however, store a small amount of Scud-B missiles and Hwasong-6 missiles purchased in the eighties and nineties from the


Soviet Union and North Korea. It appears the first wave of missile attacks in the summer of 2015 relied on this specific inventory. Given the alliance between the Houthis and Saleh at that time, it is likely the Houthis drew from the know-how of loyalist officers from the Saleh regime to launch these missiles. Still, these first attacks were perceived as ineffective by the Houthi leadership.

The Burkan-1 and Burkan-2H missiles that appeared later—in early 2016 and 2017 respectively—were not stored by the former regime and were in all likelihood obtained in the first months of the conflict. The Burkan-1 may have been Scud missiles modified with external technical support. But the similarity of the design of the Burkan-2H with Iranian Qiam-1 missiles quickly led the international community to accuse Iran of supplying them to the Houthis. Suspicions grew in earnest for most of 2016 and 2017. Noticeably, experts determined the missile that targeted the UAE ship in October 2016 was a Chinese-made C-802 supplied by Iran. It was the same type of missile Hezbollah used against the Israeli Navy during the 2006 conflict.

As the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen noted, by May 2017, the Houthis were firing extended-range ballistic missiles, demonstrating both Iran’s decision to deepen its support of the Houthis and the maturation of Houthi training. Hence, a few months later in December 2017, the US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, issued a strong statement condemning Iran for transferring these weapons to the Houthis. This statement was followed by several public assessments from US intelligence agencies supporting the claim.

In January 2018, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen recognized that Iran, “failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer” of such technology to the Houthi-Saleh forces. The UN Panel of Experts also confirmed the drones the Houthis had been using, such as the Qasef-1 UAVs, were similar “in design, dimensions and capability” to the Iranian-made Ababil-T.

But the most important component of the military evolution of the Houthis was not Iran’s supply of weapons systems—overall very modest in comparison to support provided by Tehran to Iraqi and Lebanese partners. Rather, guidance provided by Iranian and Hezbollah

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33 UN Security Council, 2140 Sanctions Committee Yemen, Final Report (January 26, 2018), 32.
advisers on the use of this technology played a key role in the Houthis’
military strategy designed to compel the Saudi-led coalition to accept the
territorial status quo.

In short, Iran helped the Houthis reinforce the arsenal they took
from the Yemeni government. More importantly, Iran may have helped
the Houthis make systematic use of it in order to move from a local
insurgency to a nonstate actor able to defy regional powers. The size of
that inventory matters less than the ways in which the Houthis have been
using it. This resonates with the classic debate on the role of technology
in warfare: as Michael Horowitz emphasizes, “it is the employment of
technologies by organizations, rather than the technologies themselves,
that most often makes the difference.”

The strategic influence of Iran and Hezbollah is evident in the
evolving military structure of the Houthis. A key challenge seems to
have been organizational change required by the deployment of this
arsenal. During the 2004–14 conflicts, the Houthis largely remained a
militia based on tribal ties. But there are indications the movement is
developing into a more organized force. It now commands three missile
brigades under the leadership of Major-General Muhammad Nasser
Ahmed al-Atifi, the former commander of the missile brigades of the
Hadi regime who defected and joined the Houthis to become their
defense minister. The group also took control of the Yemeni military’s
Missile Research and Development Center, which the Houthis claimed
was developing missiles such as the Burkan.

In the past five years, missiles and drones have been used by the
Houthis on the battlefield and in propaganda campaigns, with the media
outlets linked to the group issuing numerous threats against targets in
Saudi or Emirati territories and releasing video footage of past attacks.
In January 2018, the Houthis publicly declared their goal to block Red Sea
shipping lanes by using anti-ship cruise missiles. In May 2019, Yemen
News Agency, the official news agency of the Yemeni government seized
by the Houthis in January 2015, quoted a rebel military source saying
they planned to strike 300 Saudi and UAE targets, including military
headquarters and bases in both countries and their bases in Yemen.

Following the attack on the Saudi Aramco oil fields on September
14, 2019, missile threats were even more frequent. On September 26,
Houthi-affiliated Lieutenant-General Abed Al-Thour asserted on

35 Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International
36 IISS, Iran's Networks of Influence, 165.
37 Tom Cooper, “How Did the Houthis Manage to Lob a Ballistic Missile at Mecca?,” War is
Boring, January 2, 2017.
38 For detailed coverage of the Houthi media campaign, see the clips made available by the
Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project.
39 UN Security Council, 2140 Sanctions Committee Yemen, Final Report of the Panel of
40 “Yemen's Houthi Group Says Will Target UAE, Saudi Vital Military Facilities,” Reuters, May
19, 2019.
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Al-Masirah television that “with its aerial strikes and missile force, Yemen will send the UAE back to a time before its foundation.”

An examination of this media rhetoric shows how the arsenal became an instrument of pride for the Houthis. It also illustrates how it is conceived as a means to compel the coalition, and in particular Saudi Arabia, to remove their forces from disputed territories in Yemen. For instance during an interview with the media website Al-Monitor, Abdul Ghani al-Zubeidi, the editor in chief of the Houthi-affiliated Al-Jaish magazine asserted: “the [Houthi] army command is adopting a strategy of crippling movement in Jizan and Abha airports. . . . If strikes in Yemen persist, we will move to the next stage, which is targeting more distant airports in Riyadh and Jeddah.

This statement is striking as it shares rhetorical similarities with a major speech given in 2010 by Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Lebanese Hezbollah. This famous speech of Nasrallah, called “Khitaab al radaa” (Speech of deterrence) posited: “You destroy a Dahiya building and we will destroy buildings in Tel Aviv. . . . If you target Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport, we will strike Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport. If you target our electricity stations, we will target yours. If you target our plants, we will target yours.

The two quotes have a similar reasoning and show that, overall, the Houthi message resonates with the Hezbollah posture against Israel. The difference is that al-Zubeidi calls for the cessation of coalition strikes on Yemen while Nasrallah threatens the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) not to attack Lebanon. Using Schelling’s definition, the former is a case of compellence while the latter is one of deterrence. This distinction between compellence and deterrence explains why most comparisons of the Houthis with Hezbollah are misleading: arguably, the Houthi way of war mirrors the strategy of Hezbollah not as it is known today, but rather as it was between 1992 and 2000.

In 1992, Hezbollah first used Katyusha rockets against the IDF in south Lebanon and by June 2000, the last Israeli soldiers departed the occupied area. During this period, Hezbollah revised its military strategy toward the IDF by decreasing its reliance on suicide attacks and training its combatants to employ rockets on the battlefield in a systematic way. Following his nomination as secretary-general of the Lebanese movement in February 1992, Nasrallah explained to the

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41 “Houthi Military Expert Lieutenant-General Abed Al-Thour: UAE Like a Cave Full of Bats; We Can Destroy It; UAE Soldiers Will Have No Place to Return to,” Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project, clip no. 7524, September 26, 2019, accessed 30 November 2019.
42 For a discussion of compellence as a type of coercion, see Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 70–71.
newspaper As Safir that rockets were helping Hezbollah “work toward creating a situation in which the enemy is subject to our conditions.”

For Nasrallah, the architect of that revision, the logic was to compel Israel to remove its forces from occupied Lebanon. While the causal link between Hezbollah’s strategy and the IDF withdrawal of 2000 has been contested, it definitely fueled Hezbollah’s narrative in the aftermath. This also explains why the Houthis have followed the same objective in their current missile campaign against Saudi Arabia.

Concretely, the influence of Hezbollah has taken the form of training of Yemeni fighters even before the takeover of Sanaa in 2014. Since then, there have also been reports of Hezbollah operatives on the ground. (In September 2018, the Saudi coalition claimed it killed Tariq Haydrah, a Hezbollah commander, in an airstrike.) An analysis of Houthi practices, such as concealing launchers, targeting locations in Saudi Arabia, planning anti-shipping attacks, and designing influence strategies through the use of media campaigns, suggests Hezbollah cadres in Yemen have shared the lessons of their missile campaigns against Israel. The Houthis have thus compelled the Saudi-led coalition into withdrawing its forces from its controlled territories.

Today this posture aims to consolidate the Houthi foothold inside northern Yemen and force countries belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council into accepting the status quo. The similarities between the military postures of the Houthis and Hezbollah are noteworthy: both nonstate actors defend an enclave with a vast arsenal of missiles and drones, posing a direct threat to neighboring countries—in the case of Hezbollah, the security predicament Israeli military commanders have been facing since their withdrawal from southern Lebanon two decades ago.

The difference, however, is the distinctly compressed timeframe in which the Houthis achieved this position. This fact underlines not only the accelerating diffusion of military technology to nonstate actors but also, and more importantly, the ability of these groups to rapidly reorganize and train their combatants. If this evolution is a prologue to future conflicts involving nonstate actors, the Houthi military strategy throughout the war in Yemen presents challenges worth exploring.

**Future Houthi-Type Campaigns**

From the outset, the Houthi missile campaign against Saudi Arabia posed a fundamental conundrum—how to protect troops and civilians in the midst of a military intervention. The gradual ability of the Houthis to reach targets deep inside Saudi territory is a cautionary

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48 IISS, *Iran’s Networks of Influence*, 171.
49 IISS, *Iran’s Networks of Influence*.
50 IISS, *Iran’s Networks of Influence*; and Knights, “Houthi War Machine.”
tale on what missile defense can do and cannot do, given the fact Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among the biggest purchasers of missile defense systems in the world. Both countries operate Patriot missile batteries. The UAE also bought two terminal high altitude area defense missile (THAAD) systems in 2012. Saudi Arabia is in the process of acquiring the THAAD system as well. Both nations benefit from the deployment of US capabilities under the umbrella of US Central Command.

According to authorities in Riyadh, since 2015 Saudi Arabia has intercepted a large number of Houthi missiles, preventing heavy casualties. The public domain lacks precise information regarding the interception rate making it hard to assess the operational effectiveness of the systems. But Saudi official statements have sometimes been questioned by independent experts. When examining the missile attacks of November and December 2017 against King Khaled Airport and Al Yamamah Palace—both in the Riyadh area—Jeffrey Lewis, a research director at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said it was “very unlikely the missiles were shot down, despite officials’ statements to the contrary. . . . There is no evidence Saudi Arabia has intercepted any Houthi missiles during the Yemen conflict.”

Lewis’s suspicions follow a long list of critical studies challenging the effectiveness of missile defense, and of Patriot missile batteries in particular, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War (1990–91). In substance, the discussion over the Patriots’ performance against Houthi attacks is similar to traditional controversies over missile defense: it emphasizes limitations regarding the territorial coverage, the difficulties of early warning systems to detect incoming projectiles—particularly cruise missiles and drones—and finally, the interception rate of batteries deemed too low to truly rely on missile defense.

The Israeli experience may inform current predicaments of Saudi Arabia and possibly other countries in the future. Like Saudi Arabia, Israel faces a similar challenge with Hezbollah on its northern front and has heavily invested in missile defense through weapon systems such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow. In fact, Israeli military officials have long warned against the illusion of considering missile defense systems as a comprehensive shield against any foreign threat.

In 2010, then Major General Gadi Eisenkot, head of the IDF Northern Command, stated: “the residents of Israel shouldn’t be under the illusion that someone will open an umbrella over their heads. . . . The systems are designed to protect military bases, even if this means that citizens suffer discomfort during the first days of battle.” Eisenkot’s statement remains valid today. Even in the case of Israel, approximately 98 times smaller than Saudi Arabia, the effectiveness of missile defense

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is admittedly limited. That fact calls for modest expectations regarding territorial coverage of these systems.

Additionally, the proliferation of advanced military technologies to nonstate actors means ballistic missiles and drones are increasingly accessible and affordable. On the other side, missile defense systems still demand substantial funding and advanced training for their operators. The comparative investment costs between missiles and missile defense still favors the former over the latter, and is likely to do so even more in the future. Such a trend obviously reduces the deterrent value of missile defense, though it does not eliminate it entirely.54

These issues do not call for a complete dismissal of missile defense systems but rather a more balanced military strategy. In 2011, the IDF created a new special military unit named the Depth Corps Force to coordinate and conduct clandestine operations in enemy territory against missile and rocket launcher sites. Tellingly, despite the deployment of Iron Dome batteries across Israel during that period, the IDF retained the option of preemptive strikes.55

The activities of Depth Corps Force also echoed efforts of US and British Special Forces to locate Scud missiles inside western Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991—a mission with only modest successes.56 The Israeli experience vis-à-vis Hezbollah or the American experience with the regime of Saddam Hussein may provide important lessons for Persian Gulf countries, such as strengthening intelligence collection on rocket, drone, and missile locations and preparing forces for preemptive operations.

At the same time, as the case of the Houthis demonstrates, nonstate actors still rely heavily on the support of external powers to achieve significant results in missile warfare and in compelling conventional armed forces. In short, without the Iranian supply of missiles and drones and without the training provided either by the IRGC or Hezbollah, the Houthis would very likely have been unable to adapt the way they did. At the regional level, preventing state sponsorship is essential to curbing ongoing proliferation of these technologies to militias.

Unfortunately, arms control mechanisms in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf have traditionally failed: no country in the region is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime and only three—Iraq, Jordan, and Libya—adhere to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Moreover, the Missile Technology Control Regime was originally designed to prevent the proliferation of

nuclear-capable missiles and therefore it only covers systems traveling at least 300 kilometers.

Consequently, even if regional actors were to comply with the current regime, they could technically still transfer to nonstate actors a large portion of the low-range inventories similar to those the Houthis use in Yemen. Given the limitations of diplomatic initiatives, the definition of a tailored code of conduct calling on all Middle Eastern states to refrain from transferring missiles and drones to nonstate actors is a modest but critical step to mitigate risks associated with this new pattern of warfare.

**Implications for Policymakers**

Revising existing international frameworks to prevent further missile and drone proliferation to nonstate actors may degrade the firepower of groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis. But it will not entirely destroy them. Given long-term trends in the diffusion of military power—such as the exponential progress in missile technologies, the expansion of proliferation networks, and the capacity of armed groups to assemble indigenous arsenals—these movements will eventually find ways to acquire weapons systems, enabling them to maintain their grip of conquered territories and heightening the risks of external interventions.

Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia may well have to cope with a Houthi threat on its southern flank for the time being, accepting a certain amount of vulnerability at its borders in the same way Israel persistently contends with the Hezbollah threat from the north.

This trend—nonstate actors emulating the posture of Hezbollah and the Houthis—may adversely affect the ability of US forces to intervene in regional crises. Conventional armed forces such as the United States military may increasingly face entities using missiles and drones as a rudimentary and low-cost means of an emerging anti-access strategy. Practically, it may increase casualties and could constitute a kind of insurance policy for those terrorist organizations.

For US partners in the region, this phenomenon may call for a redefinition of military options vis-à-vis nonstate actors. If the complete destruction of these organizations becomes an unrealistic end state, designing a posture of conventional deterrence against nonstate actors like the Houthis may need to be considered.

Such a discussion is unlikely to please decisionmakers in the Middle East who might read it as a show of weakness. But given the evolving security environment, it may be necessary to rethink strategies. In particular, it may be necessary to question the relevance of counterinsurgency campaigns toward groups seeking, through this process of fait accompli, to secure a new status quo. All in all, the case study of the Houthis allows us to comprehend brewing trends in nonstate actors’ tactics. In the future, a broader examination comparing different trajectories (such as that of Hezbollah or Hamas) and identifying key parameters would allow us to deepen our understanding and contemplate
future military scenarios that may unfold for the United States and its allies.57

Defense Institution Building in Africa

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ABSTRACT: This article discusses tools and processes for developing successful defense institution building efforts in low-capacity, high-threat African states. The authors recommend activities for increasing engagement with interior security or police forces in addition to partner militaries.

Defense institution building (DIB) is a practical discipline aimed at building or reorienting a nation’s defense sector to be more effective, affordable, and accountable. Originally focused on Eastern Europe, DIB programs are now being implemented in regions far less developed, in countries with significantly less capacity, and where partners are either actively combating an adversary or are highly vulnerable to looming threats. Africa, for example, has seen a surge in DIB programs over the last five years. African states differ from those in Eastern Europe: they face a relatively higher threat, have significantly less capacity, and have a unique colonial legacy. Further, the United States has a growing constellation of security interests on the African continent.

In an effort to reduce regional instability and to build partner capacity for mitigating regional threats, the American government spends billions of dollars each year on security assistance to Africa. America’s 2017 National Security Strategy directed the US government to “continue to work with partners to improve the ability of their security services to counter terrorism” and other threats in Africa. According to this guidance, US forces are not a kinetic solution in Africa; rather, they provide security assistance to enhance the ability of African security sectors to defeat their adversaries. The 2018 National Defense Strategy likewise stated:

We will bolster existing bilateral and multilateral partnerships and develop new relationships to address significant terrorist threats that threaten U.S. interests and contribute to challenges in Europe and the Middle East. We will focus on working by, with, and through local partners and the European Union to degrade terrorists; build the capability required to counter violent extremism, human trafficking, trans-national criminal activity, and illegal arms trade with limited outside assistance; and limit the malign influence of non-African powers.

From an operational perspective, General Thomas D. Waldhauser, former commander of the US Africa Command, noted in his posture statement before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services on February 7, 2019 that enhancing partner capability is one aspect of the command’s approach on the continent, and DIB is an important tool applied to achieve this. Together these foundational documents demonstrate the importance the Department of Defense (DoD) places on the effort as a means to enhance partner capabilities to respond effectively to threats on the African continent.

Until quite recently, US security assistance globally, including in Africa, consisted mainly of tactical-level training and equipping of partner security forces. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act noted: “Security cooperation activities over the last 15 years have emphasized building the capacity of partner forces at the tactical and operational level. However . . . insufficient attention and resources have been provided for building institutional capacity at higher echelons.” Indeed, the traditional train and equip (T&E) approach has proven insufficient to enhance the effectiveness of some African militaries or to help partners build effective, responsible, and sustainable defense sectors. Mali is a prime example of the shortcomings of this traditional approach. In 2012, despite tens of millions of dollars and years of American intervention, Tuareg rebels with tenuous and temporary but real links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib overran the Malian military in the northern part of the country.

In the southern capital of Bamako, soldiers displeased with the government’s management of the rebellion cited institutional deficiencies within the army as the reason for the military’s loss. Specifically, the effort lacked a viable logistics system to deliver weapons, food, and other necessary supplies to soldiers fighting on the front line. These events eventually led to a mutiny-turned-coup in Bamako and a protracted conflict in Mali’s north.

Other examples illustrating the deficiencies of the traditional T&E approach abound in Africa, including anecdotes of US-supplied equipment rusting on runways due to neglect, investments being swallowed by corruption, and militaries being used for government repression. Such examples have led to the growing realization T&E programs must be accompanied by institutional reforms that improve partners’ ability to responsibly manage their security forces, including

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the equipment, people, and fundamental management functions a military must have to execute its missions.\(^9\)

**Defense Institution Building**

The US Defense Department defines DIB as follows:

Security cooperation activities that empower partner nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsive to civilian control. DIB improves defense governance, increases the sustainability of other DoD security cooperation programs, and is carried out in cooperation with partner nations pursuant to appropriate and available legal authority. It is typically conducted at the ministerial, general, joint staff, military service headquarters, and related defense agency level, and when appropriate, with other supporting defense entities.\(^10\)

The notion that the United States provides foreign assistance to enhance its partners’ ability to manage their external and internal security has been part of America’s strategy for international development since the Foreign Assistance Act was enacted in 1961. In 2010, former Secretary of Defense M. Robert Gates advocated for more attention to be paid to building the institutional capacity of partners’ defense ministries.\(^11\) This view led to the creation of the Defense Institution and Reform Initiative and Ministry of Defense Advisors programs, which are currently housed within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.\(^12\)

In 2016, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation Thomas Ross wrote, “Institutional capacity-building is the most often neglected element of capability generation, yet it is the element most vital to ensuring enduring capability.”\(^13\) Since then, the emphasis on DIB as an essential component of security cooperation has increased so significantly that the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act mandated all T&E programming implemented by the Defense Department include an institutional capacity-building component.\(^14\)

Thus, DIB has emerged as an important means to help build more effective, affordable, and accountable defense institutions while concurrently ensuring the long-term maintenance and sustainment of training, equipment, and other investments provided by the United States. For its relatively modest cost, the program has the potential

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\(^14\) NDAA, 2017.
to have a transformational impact on partners’ security sectors, if properly applied.\textsuperscript{15}

The poor practices associated with African defense institutions that create challenges for DIB practitioners are well documented.\textsuperscript{16} Among them are poor human resource management practices, which result in suboptimal job performance and career development. Inadequate planning results in inappropriate and unaffordable procurement decisions. Likewise, overinvesting in new equipment at the expense of readiness and an appropriate force structure results in capabilities that cannot be sustained. This situation is exacerbated by the complex donor environment, where well-meaning partners donate equipment that may not be best suited to the country’s requirements, saddling recipients with expensive assets while undermining efforts to plan for capabilities within the country’s own means.

Lack of transparency regarding personnel and equipment is a result of both antiquated or absent tools and processes for tracking as well as deliberate efforts by senior officials to obfuscate information, allowing them opportunities for personal enrichment. Notorious bureaucracies that impede efficient decision-making and the relative weakness of ministries of defense compared with the militaries presents another challenge. Finally, institutional reform, which is difficult in all contexts, is particularly thorny in highly factionalized militaries beset with ethnic, regional, and religious differences and where endemic corruption offers few appealing alternatives for senior officials who benefit from the status quo.

There is an emerging field of literature on how to implement DIB programs, mainly in relatively high-capacity regions and countries. But DIB implementation in low-capacity, high-threat African states is not well-documented.\textsuperscript{17} This article contributes to this literature by articulating lessons learned from the authors’ experience working on such projects in Africa, specifically Niger. Niger is a useful case to examine because it is representative of many countries that receive substantial security assistance from the United States. Moreover, through its participation in the US Security Governance Initiative, Niger is experimenting


with a new comprehensive model that has shown some initial, if still unproven, successes.

**Low-Capacity, High-Threat African States**

Every country’s context is unique. This fact must be the foundation of any program design. This article asserts that certain contextual commonalities, however, may lend themselves to a particular approach. In Africa, the threat posed by violent extremism and the low capacity of states to respond are common challenges among many countries. Although there is not one internationally accepted definition of terrorism, this model includes in its definition of terrorism any intentional act of violence by a nonstate actor, regardless of the source of the perpetrator’s grievance. We therefore define the level of threat and capacity to respond using the following criteria:

- High-threat states are those in the upper quartile of states threatened by terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index.\(^{18}\)

- Low-threat states are those in the bottom two quartiles of states threatened by terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index.\(^{19}\) We further dissect the definition of low threat to differentiate between postconflict countries that have emerged from conflict in the last five years and are therefore fragile, and countries with an otherwise low threat.

- High-capacity states are those valued as having medium to high human development in the Human Development Index.\(^{20}\)

- Low-capacity states are those valued as having low human development in the Human Development Index.\(^{21}\)

Most of sub-Saharan Africa falls in the category of low capacity, but a much smaller number are both low capacity and high threat. Low-capacity, high-threat countries are the most challenging to DIB practitioners since they have the highest risk of state failure and lack the means to respond to threats. This article asserts the most appropriate

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\(^{18}\) Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), *Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism* (Sydney, IEP, 2018). According to this index, the following African states are in the upper quartile of states threatened by terrorism: Nigeria, Somalia, Libya, Egypt, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sudan, Central African Republic, Niger, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, Burundi, Chad, and Mozambique.

\(^{19}\) IEP, *Global Terrorism Index 2018*. According to this index, the following African states are in the bottom two quartiles of states threatened by terrorism: Zambia, Togo, Eswatini, Namibia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Gabon, Eritrea, Botswana, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, Liberia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Djibouti, Senegal, and Rwanda.

\(^{20}\) United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Summary: Human Development Indices and Indicators, 2018 Statistical Update* (New York: UNDP, 2018). According to this index, the following African States are in the medium to very high levels of human development: Kenya, São Tomé and Príncipe, Zambia, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Namibia, Morocco, Cape Verde, Republic of South Africa, Egypt, Gabon, Botswana, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritius, and Seychelles.

\(^{21}\) “Table 1. Human Development Index and its components,” UNDP, 2018. According to this index, the following African States have low human development: Eswatini, Angola, Tanzania, Nigeria, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Mauritania, Madagascar, Rwanda, Comoros, Lesotho, Senegal, Uganda, Sudan, Togo, Benin, Malawi, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, the Gambia, Ethiopia, Mali, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, South Sudan, Guinea, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Central African Republic, and Somalia.
application of DIB practices for low-capacity African states will differ according to the threat level.

Low-capacity, low-threat countries can generally undertake traditional DIB approaches since they have the freedom to reform in peace, while states in this category that are in a postconflict state have proven to benefit most from full-scale security sector reform. Low-capacity, high-threat African states, the focus of this article, require adaptations of traditional DIB approaches that simultaneously address the urgent need for quick results and implement more long-term institutional reforms. An in-depth research study to test this hypothesis could determine whether this assertion applies throughout the range of African states or if Niger represents an isolated case.

The low-capacity, high-threat African states environment today. The current security environment in low-capacity, high-threat African states can be characterized by transnational threats, a preference for regional approaches, shared missions by military and police forces, an urgency to conduct operations, and a rich but complex donor environment.

Transnational nature of threats. Defense planning begins with identification of the threat. In the case of low-capacity, high-threat African states, the emerging and most potent threats are transnational. But many African militaries carry a legacy of their Cold War supporters and are thus structured for now irrelevant peer-to-peer missions. Transnational threats are now the norm and can easily be defined as “wicked problems,” since causes and solutions are often outside the ability of the state to influence directly. Such threats are also embedded with the population, requiring long-term, sophisticated strategies.

Preference for regional approaches. Particularly in West Africa, the preferred solution of low-capacity, high-threat African states to counter transnational threats is often a regional one, which is logical because transnational threats cross borders. Moreover, synergies can be gained by sharing intelligence, allowing cross-border pursuit, and filling in each other’s gaps in capacity. In West Africa, countries have joined forces numerous times as part of the Economic Community of West African States. This model has been pursued to address state collapse in Mali, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, as well as political unrest in Côte d’Ivoire with mixed results.

More recently, regional action has been sponsored and supported by donors, particularly those in Europe, who have been responsive to organizing and assisting these efforts. The most recent regional responses have been the Multinational Joint Task Force, a coalition of military and security forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria with the current mission to combat Boko Haram, and the Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel, a coalition of Sahelian military and security forces from
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger with the current mission to fight terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking.\(^{23}\)

These regional organizations are important for addressing transnational threats and creating a rudimentary common strategy or approach. But regional approaches are not a panacea, and significant challenges remain. Over time, for example, the Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel may develop some level of interoperability. But enduring challenges for these defense and security forces persist in areas of basic skills, such as conducting intelligence-driven operations. With or without regional groups, foreign assistance still remains essential in both sustaining the current fight and building capacity in local defense and security forces.

Regional efforts are useful for generating foreign support and demonstrating political will, but ultimately the forces must be generated by the same defense institutions that currently exist. Too many regional approaches may also complicate strategic decision-making. Niger, for example, engages in the Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel, the Multinational Joint Task Force, and numerous peacekeeping operations, in addition to its own domestic operations. Without improved decision-making tools and processes, Niger will be hard-pressed to determine how best to allocate resources among these competing policy options.

**Shared missions by military and police forces.** African nations commonly enable defense and security forces to share missions and operate together. This practice is often out of the necessity of scarce resources, but it also reflects the nature of the threats in play—transnational nonstate actors as opposed to the traditional threat posed by neighboring militaries. Military and police force collaboration can be both appropriate and wise. But this approach can be challenging for US agencies to support, since laws and customs restrict how US agencies can support different ministries.

The United States has historical concerns over the domestic use of the military that are not universally shared even though many states are concerned security forces not become overly militarized. And while flowing DoD resources to internal security forces has become easier in recent years, the practice remains the anomaly for the US government. In the same vein, while the US government is a proponent of interagency cooperation, it is often not exemplary in practice. Ultimately, the United States faces hurdles in synchronizing its many programs, even within a large organization such as the Department of Defense.

**Urgency to conduct operations.** Low-capacity, low-threat African states generally fall into one of two categories: postconflict and active conflict. Postconflict states, such as Liberia following its civil war, require wholesale reconstruction of their security sector. Defense institution building can be used to create new defense capabilities. But this approach is not optimal since rebuilding a defense establishment requires broad

domestic political support, the lack of which often led to the conflict in question. In cases such as Guinea, DIB is best used following or in conjunction with a broad security sector reform program.

Under these conditions, countries are fragile but not generally under direct external threat, and they have the time and the space to rebuild in relative peace. But DIB has become the tool of choice for low-capacity, high-threat African states actively fighting terrorist groups and insurgencies. Providing frontline defense in West Africa, countries such as Mali, Niger, and Chad receive considerable foreign assistance. Thus, their collapse would be detrimental to the region and to US interests.

Defense institution building programs offer significant promise for these hard-pressed states. But one important challenge exists—ensuring such militaries are able to conduct operations while learning new operational concepts and integrating new equipment requirements without pausing operations. Therefore, DIB programs must design and implement potentially disruptive institutional reforms while causing minimal disruption to kinetic operations. This requirement impacts the scope of the work and the objectives. The march toward the higher capability cannot degrade the utility of the existing, lesser capability if the whole enterprise is to survive the current urgent threat. Urgency thus overtakes some of the reform impulse since change increases risk, which could become so disruptive it hinders current operations.

Rich donor environment. In the Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel case, donors made pledges toward the military force of approximately $500 million by February 2018. But as history demonstrates, states with a crowded donor environment often receive a great deal of new equipment and training without much coordination among benefactors and without much thought given to sustainment. While training and equipment are provided, little to no support is given to help the partner integrate, maintain, or sustain long-term capabilities.

Moreover, a mechanism rarely exists for vetting donated capabilities against a clearly stated definition of the recipient’s defense needs. As a result, recipients may be unable to sustain unnecessary or expensive capabilities. Indeed, donor assistance often takes the place of strategic decision-making or takes up so many resources in out years that it crowds out other commitments and funding.

**Recommending a New DIB Model**

Given the distinctive history and contextual commonalities of low-capacity, high-threat African states, approaches should be tailored to these country’s unique environments and international best practices, not the donor’s norms. The four main principles of such an approach are presented here with examples from Niger.

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Support Operational Improvements with Institutional Reforms

The aforementioned definition of DIB places repeated emphasis on strengthening defense institutions that are effective, accountable, transparent, and subordinate to civilian control; that respect human rights and the rule of law; and that conform with principles of good governance. This description suggests the types of activities that fall under DIB are often lofty institutional reforms, which is consistent with the historical intent of DIB. The reality of low-capacity, high-threat African states, however, is that they must conceptualize, initiate, and implement such reforms while facing existential crises or engaging in active combat. Furthermore, since rapid improvement in operational capability is important, security cooperation planners within the US government must recognize the necessity of sustaining T&E efforts until the broader DIB effort creates the partner’s capacity to plan and to manage that support.

Niger conducts operations on all its borders and hosts DIB teams concurrently. It must build future capacity while participating in active combat operations. Focusing solely on institutional reforms that do not improve operational effectiveness in the short term may be viewed as a distraction from current operations for a force with little capacity to spare. Identifying opportunities to apply DIB principles to current operations, however, is a sweet spot where partners’ operational effectiveness can be enhanced while applying international best practices to create the force of the future. Such an approach provides the partner nation with proof of the value of the process, aids in building institutional tools, and provides a bridge to long-term efforts such as a new force structure design, an improved supply chain system, and human resource lifecycle management.

One possible way to apply the principle described above is to consider a new partner capability for which employment, maintenance, manning, or sustainment has not been well thought out. Starting with a specific capability or system and growing the institutional support a partner needs to sustain and to manage that capability, rather than undertaking a wide range of reforms across a number of domains, not only enhances the partner’s operational effectiveness but also demonstrates how best to apply institutional reform principles.

In Niger, a DIB team was tasked with mentoring the Nigerien defense and security forces (FDS) through the capability-based planning process. Traditionally, capability-based planning uses carefully crafted scenarios to test the adequacy of a military’s existing capabilities to perform its missions in light of the country’s most likely future threats. It then identifies affordable solutions a force can adopt to ensure sufficient capability to execute missions. As DIB practitioners do, the team assured operational relevance by adjusting the capability-based planning methodology in several fundamental ways.

First, since the Nigerien forces operate in a joint manner, the methodology was used to assess capabilities required by the army, air
force, gendarmerie, national guard, and national police to execute shared missions. Second, since Niger is engaged in numerous active operations and faces a threat unlikely to change significantly in the near future, planners found value in using current operations to identify capability gaps rather than expending valuable time developing scenarios that test the same mission areas.

Third, an abbreviated version of capability-based planning for the most critical mission areas can be applied in low-capacity, high-threat African states where, by definition, severe capacity shortages exist. Many African militaries, for example, view economic development as an important mission area but resource constraints prevent meaningful engagements in this area. Thus, scenarios to test this mission area did not need to be developed.

**Engage Military and Police Forces Equally**

In many African security sectors, military and police forces are inextricably linked in operational terms. The US government must therefore overcome remaining structural impediments that prevent the Department of Defense from imparting expertise to appropriate nondefense forces in partner nations. Authorities granted through section 333 of chapter 16 of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act authorize the US military to provide training and equipment to foreign security forces. Engaging military and police forces is broader than traditional DIB, and there is an ongoing effort within the Defense Department to tackle these issues through the lens of institutional capacity building.²⁵ Institutional capacity building goes beyond DIB, but does not broach full-scale security sector reform, which is better suited for countries whose security sectors have already collapsed as a result of internal conflict.

The Security Governance Initiative is another way the United States encourages the delivery of critical subject matter expertise where authorities associated with funding sources have traditionally precluded such activity. In Niger, the Security Governance Initiative identified the need for improved planning and resource management capabilities across the military and the police forces. While the Defense Department has honed the expertise of DIB practitioners to perform this function for its military partners, there has been relatively little US government capacity to provide the same expertise to police partners.

Through authorities granted under Title 22 of the United States Code, the Security Governance Initiative sponsored a team of planning and resource management professionals with experience in both the defense and law enforcement domains to provide expertise to the military and police services of Niger.²⁶ This activity would have not

been possible heretofore given legal restrictions barring DoD-funded DIB teams from engaging with police forces of partner nations.

An important way the DIB team in Niger operationalized the principle of interministerial engagement was by supporting the Nigerien government’s desire to institutionalize the FDS concept. A legal decree created the force out of military and internal security forces that operated under the authority of the ministers of defense and security, respectively. The law did not, however, actually provide for an accompanying structure, bureaucracy, or resources to create the FDS.

Consequently, the force, remained a concept and an institution in name only. Through the support of the DIB team, Niger identified the lack of an interministerial institution that could perform inherently joint functions, such as capability planning, as a key capability gap. Assisting in the creation of a structure to formalize the institutional concept is an important way in which the US government engages defense and internal security forces with equal emphasis.

Embrace the Trend toward Regional Forces

The proliferation of transnational threats requiring cross-border operations, intelligence sharing, and integrated command and control structures has prompted many low-capacity, high-threat African states to move toward regional joint forces over unilateral operations. This new concept has the potential to change the fundamental way in which the forces of member countries operate and are managed. Defense institution building assistance to these countries ought to embrace this trend, which is likely to continue.

In countries that are members of regional forces such as the Multinational Joint Task Force or Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel, traditional DIB areas that could be adjusted to accommodate this change include joint logistics or supply chains, the development of joint operational concepts, joint training for cross-border operations, or the implementation of intelligence-sharing mechanisms. In the long term, assisting with a force structure analysis that identifies requirements and allocates resources for units operating in national missions and multinational missions will be a valuable task.

Enable the New Model

Certain practices serve as key enablers for low-capacity, high-threat African states to overcome pervasive challenges. In Niger, the following practices have proven to be critical for the success of the DIB team. First, a local project coordinator, either a US hire or foreign national with excellent access to and working relationship with a partners’ senior leaders, can be a significant force multiplier when local human capital is limited. This coordinator ensures momentum is maintained between DIB team visits, facilitating progress. This coordinator also supports the DIB team by developing a nuanced understanding of the institutional
structures and greater insights into the political dynamics of the host nation.

This information is essential for DIB teams to understand how host nation bureaucracies make decisions and how reforms can be implemented and institutionalized. Notably, fostering relationships to acquire such knowledge can be difficult, requiring trust to be built over time and, therefore, may not be achievable by US-based personnel.

Second, a means to engage the political class is essential to ensuring a DIB program’s reforms transcend participating institutions and reach the highest levels of government. Identifying or cultivating change agents among the political class with the will to support potentially disruptive reforms is key to ensuring gains are sustained. This effort can be done through an official memorandum of understanding between the partners or collaboration with a government-sponsored think tank or other entity with direct access to the political class. These practices may not be unique in all countries where DIB teams operate, but they are key enablers to a successful DIB program in a low-capacity, high-threat African state.

Conclusion

In aiming to make US partner nation defense sectors more effective, affordable, and accountable, DIB plays an important role in the US government’s security assistance toolkit. Originally focused on Eastern Europe, American DIB programming now has a large footprint in Africa, which faces a different set of conditions and challenges than high-capacity and low-threat regions. Indeed, many African countries where DIB is being implemented have long histories of coups and military misuse, extremely limited capacity, and are either actively combating an adversary or are highly vulnerable to looming threats.

Based on observations and experiences in Niger, the authors of this article recommend DIB efforts in low-capacity, high-threat African states consider the following criteria to ensure the best chance for success. First, DIB objectives should be designed to support immediate operational improvements concurrently with institutional reforms. Second, DIB programs should engage military and police forces with equal emphasis. Third, DIB programs should support partners’ desires to develop regional joint forces. Finally, key enablers, such as a full-time coordinator at the embassy and a high-level memorandum of understanding, should be utilized to help garner the political will needed to implement DIB efforts successfully.

Through the Security Governance Initiative, the United States and Niger have agreed to a program incorporating many of the recommendations highlighted above. But an in-depth research study to assess the utility of this approach across a range of low- to high-capacity and low- to high-threat African states could determine whether this assertion is accurate or an isolated case. Likewise, ongoing research to assess the outcomes of this long-term process in Niger or their utility for
high-threat countries in other regions would be useful. But the country’s security and defense sector leadership seem genuinely interested in reforms that will improve their performance in ongoing and future operations.

Better managed and more accountable security sectors in Africa will help mitigate threats emanating from the continent and make American T&E efforts more sustainable and effective. While certainly not a panacea, the recommendations highlighted here would help current and future DIB efforts turn these goals into reality.

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ABSTRACT: This article argues for the efficacy of a recently implemented method for teaching strategic mindedness to cadets at the Norwegian Military Academy. The method fuses the Lykke model of military strategy with the Toulmin model of argumentation, consumes less time than other teaching methods in the field of strategic thinking, and could be used to educate military officers in other nations.

In 2013, when General Martin E. Dempsey, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stipulated “the application of force rarely produces and, in fact, maybe never produces the outcome we seek,” he captured a widely shared concern that the West no longer wins wars. This critique is often attributed, at least partly, to the inability of military officers from Western nations to understand the ways military means can be applied to achieve ends of policy. According to General Rupert Smith, we fail to make the fundamental distinction between “what it is we expect the use of force or forces to achieve as opposed to do.” As a contribution to this debate, this article offers one of several ways this challenge is being addressed at the Norwegian Military Academy (NMA), which is tasked to cultivate junior officers who can think strategically.

While the term “strategic-minded lieutenants” calls to mind General Charles C. Krulak’s “strategic corporal,” it is different. Krulak refers to military professionals who, by focusing on the immediate effects of their actions, create undesired strategic outcomes. In contrast, before taking action, a strategic-minded lieutenant asks: What am I to achieve? After evaluating and balancing the ends, alternative ways, available means, and potential risks, the officer takes appropriate action to achieve a desired strategic outcome. This competence is relevant for many junior


4 Col. Erlend Bekkestad (commandant, Norwegian Military Academy), presentation of the 2018 educational program, NMA, Oslo, Norway, September 13, 2018.

officers, including those in Norwegian expeditionary missions in which, increasingly, captains or majors hold the position of commanding officer.

The article begins by conceptualizing two distinct forms—one technical and one value-based—of strategic mindedness. These are based on Norwegian doctrine and on Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s definition of military strategy, and refined further by broader insights from the sociology of professions. Second, this article shows how Stephen E. Toulmin’s widely recognized rhetorical model of argumentation can be adapted and used as an educational method to develop strategic mindedness among future military leaders. Finally, the scope and utility of this approach is discussed in the context of research and debate in the United States on the broader concept of strategic thinking.

Strategic Mindedness

As conceptualized here, the term strategic mindedness is based on the guidance of Norway’s former chief of defense, General Sverre Diesen:

Military operations require commanders and staff officers to be: capable of approaching operational problems in an intellectual and analytical manner, able to judge the utility of military force and its effects with regard to political ends, and a leader who can distinguish primary from secondary matters, and balance short and long-term concerns. Advantages and disadvantages of alternative courses of actions must be evaluated and weighed before decisions can be made and transformed into orders.7

The term is further anchored in Lykke’s conception of military strategy consisting of three components—ends, ways, and means—that must be balanced in a reasoned manner.8 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization adds risks as a fourth component.9 Henceforth, all four elements are included when I refer to Lykke’s understanding of strategy.

Strategic mindedness refers to the cognitive capability of coherently linking the four components in Lykke’s notion of strategy. This construct makes the educational task manageable in precommissioning professional military education (PME) and the competence relevant for the problems officers will be tasked to solve throughout their careers as they reach higher levels of command in increasingly complex environments. As such, strategic mindedness is related to the term strategic thinking. Although no generally accepted definition of the

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latter term exists, it covers a broader scope of themes we shall revisit. Within this conceptual context, strategic mindedness is proposed as a subfield. While the notion of strategic thinking supports NATO’s understanding of operational art, strategic mindedness is equally useful to platoon commanders.

From an educational perspective, the simplicity of Lykke’s conception is valuable. Yet, it must be elaborated upon to account for the professional judgments Diesen calls for above, including the ability to balance long and short-term concerns and evaluate alternative courses of actions. To this end, scholarship in the sociology of professions is informative.

Talcott Parsons and Donald A. Schön argue a defining feature of professions is their responsibility to serve society in politically and ethically contested domains such as security, health, and education. In these critically important fields, society has entrusted, respectively, military and public safety officers, medical doctors, and teachers with the exclusive mandate to further its common interests.

To live up to this trust, professions continuously improve their respective field of knowledge, and professionals—individuals commissioned to act on behalf of the professions—apply this expertise in practice adapted to the particularities of specific cases, such as a firefight or an emergency room. If such cases could be addressed through standard solutions, society would not need professionals—cases could be solved by anyone with a bit of training in prescribed procedures.

Yet, medical and military situations, for example, often have case-specific elements of uncertainty and problems that make standard solutions inappropriate or inapplicable. Hence, a central characteristic of professional expertise is the ability to draw from different fields of knowledge in order to solve problems where the way to do so is not provided by standard solutions. This requires judgment that takes political and ethical concerns, among others, into account.

Aristotle offered the term “practical wisdom” to define such judgment as a particular form of competence, distinct from the universal truths of science and the knowledge and application of a technical skill. A commander can use science, for instance, to calculate the ballistic

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trajectory of his weapon system. Some scholars adapt similar scientific methods in an effort to apply generally valid social science knowledge to military operations, such as the 3:1 rule in which one needs three times as much combat power as the enemy possesses to break through defensive positions. Technical skills are necessary to know how to carry out decisions, for instance, to ensure military planning proceeds along established procedural lines and to maneuver troops according to an operational plan.

In contrast to these two competencies, practical wisdom is necessary to determine how to achieve a common good in situations when there are several, often conflicting, objectives. In the context of military operations, common good should ultimately be understood in terms of national interest. Practical wisdom is a form of judgment expressed in actions encompassing political and ethical concerns.

This competency is essential for officers who routinely deal with what are sometimes referred to as “wicked problems.” Moreover, it seems particularly important for contemporary warfare where military activities, according to Emile Simpson, “even down to the tactical level, are required to have effect in highly politicized, kaleidoscopic conflict environments.” In such contexts, combat must achieve political rather than purely military outcomes. This requires decisions based on values, as opposed to technical skills driven by a technical rationality.

This conceptualization of professional judgment provides for two forms of strategic mindedness relevant for practices that characterize the military profession. One may be called technical strategic mindedness, which is driven by a technical rationality and aims to achieve ends in ways largely informed by the profession’s procedures and established practices. The other, value-based strategic mindedness, is designed to achieve a common good in a way that balances potential conflicts between risks and interests in a reasonable manner.

**Strategic-Minded Junior Officers**

The NMA, a department of the Norwegian Defence University College that provides the Norwegian Army’s precommissioning PME, develops these two forms of strategic mindedness in a variety of ways. These include informal computer games as *Wargame* and *Hearts of Iron*, everyday chess competitions in the lounge, and more formal classes with tactical decision games and software-based tactical simulations like *Steel Beasts*. Similar cognitive capabilities are also cultivated during exercises and when cadets learn to plan operations following procedures spelled out in the Norwegian army’s manual for planning and decision-making.

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In addition to such educational approaches, the NMA has developed a method that draws from the academic field of rhetoric. This may come across as abstract and irrelevant for a practical profession such as the military. It is not. This method clarifies how ends, ways, means, and risks may be coherently connected in a well-reasoned strategy. As Anders Molander points out, “To reason means to construct arguments,” and he proposes Toulmin’s rhetorical model for such use. Adapting it at NMA, we have found his model useful as a pedagogical tool to cultivate strategic mindedness in our future officers because it visualizes the structure of a strategic argument and spurs cadets to make their reasoning explicit.

While other rhetorical approaches could have been relevant, after reviewing introductory textbooks on the topic, we chose Toulmin’s model. It is widely recognized, more practical, and more accommodating of shared beliefs than ancient rhetorical theories, which largely aim to formulate strictly logical arguments based on premises that are true in the sense they are based on empirical data. In contrast, Toulmin offers an analytical framework to scrutinize the way people construct well-reasoned arguments in areas where few, if any, scientifically true premises exist. This is particularly useful for officers whose professional reasoning relies more on experiences and doctrines than on universal scientific truths.

An equally influential alternative rhetorical approach with a similar purpose is that of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, which focuses on how arguments are constructed differently depending on the audience. But for officers tasked to reason in a variety of national and international contexts, Toulmin’s model is more suitable since it is applicable in a general sense. From an educational perspective, the major weakness with his model is it takes some time to master, although most cadets grasp it within a week.

Toulmin suggests a reasonable argument consists of a few basic components and offers this example. Presumably, Harry is a British subject, since he was born in Bermuda. Unless both his parents were aliens, a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject on account of established statutes and legal provisions. Toulmin breaks this argument down in six components, structured in the following model in figure 1.

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20 Toulmin, Uses of Argument, 102.
Toulmin clarifies the claim “Harry is a British subject” is convincing because it is sustained with the evidence (datum) “Harry was born in Bermuda.” This information can sustain the claim because of the generally shared understanding (warrant) “a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject.” To persuade, one must be able to substantiate such warrants with backings, referenced here as “the following statutes and other legal provisions.” The rebuttal highlights counterarguments, noted here as the possibility “both his parents were aliens.” By moderating the claim with the qualifier “presumably,” the argument still comes across as convincing.

The NMA has combined this rhetorical model with Lykke’s notion of strategy as an educational tool to develop cadets’ strategic mindedness. It replaces Toulmin’s datum component with “end” and his claim component with “way.” Cadets use this adapted rhetorical model to scrutinize historical cases in order to clarify how the commanders in question may have reasoned to achieve military and political ends with available means. Drawing from the references included in a syllabus on the Falkland Islands War (1982), for example, cadets are tasked to write a paragraph clarifying a British commander’s tactical problem and solution.\(^{21}\) Findings are then presented in a brief paragraph that might read as follows:

On 28 May in the early hours of the battle of Goose Green the battalion commander is killed, and Major Keeble finds himself in command. His mission objective is to take Goose Green, which eventually comes down to taking the fortified local village Darwin. Yet his troops are cold, hungry and exhausted after little sleep, two days of marching and 15 hours of battle. Instead of using them, he initially envisages to achieve his objective by bombarding the village.

Next, cadets use the adapted Toulmin model to structure such historical accounts as a strategic idea. To establish coherence cadets are free to add information on the way commanders’ may have reasoned where this is not available. The above-mentioned finding of a tactical problem and solution was presented as follows in figure 2.

Figure 2. The structure of a technical strategic idea as elaborated by cadets in class.

The rhetorical model connects the military end (here, take Goose Green) with a way (here, bombardment). This comes across as a reasonable strategic idea for those who share the underlying assumption that bombardment is an efficient way to take an area. To support this warrant, cadets refer to the historical example of Nazi forces’ breakthrough of French defensive lines at Sedan in 1940. Adding other relevant cases and academic references may further strengthen the strategic idea.

The credibility of the warrant relative to the rebuttal decides whether the proposed course of action seems reasonable. Although it is rare, if at all possible, to find historical sources establishing how a commander actually reasoned to solve tactical problems, this is of little importance in an educational context where the purpose is to develop cadets’ ability to connect the strategic components in a manner that makes sense.

To some, this use of Toulmin’s model may seem pedantic. Yet, clarifying the nuts and bolts in a well-reasoned strategic idea helps cadets gain strategic mindedness. As they fill in text in the model’s components, cadets make their reasoning explicit for themselves and for those who give them feedback. It is precisely this visualization that facilitates learning.

The strategic idea presented in figure 2 above is technical in the sense that the tactical problem and subsequent solutions do not encompass risks and values beyond winning the firefight. Yet using the same method, cadets also identify strategic ideas that include broader concerns and represent a value-based strategic mindset.

To return to the Falklands example, a few hours later Major Chris Keeble has second thoughts about bombarding Goose Green. Pursuing humane ends, his strategic reasoning includes the fate of more than a hundred civilians in the local village. He decides to try to save them and sends a courier to give the local Argentine commander the ultimatum “surrender your forces” or “take the inevitable consequences,” simultaneously informing him, “you shall be held responsible for the fate of any civilians” in Darwin and Goose Green.

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22 Hastings and Jenkins, *Battle for the Falklands*, 249.
In an elaborated version of the rhetorical model, this can be spelled out as a value-based strategic idea. Major Keeble finds a way to combine two parallel lines of reasoning, which, for simplicity, are only partly presented in figure 3 with three of Toulmin’s modified components, end, warrant, and way.

Figure 3. The structure of a value-based strategic idea

In this model, the strategic idea of the ultimatum (Way 2) met the objective of taking Goose Green as well as the broader end of being humane. Although Way 2 may illustrate the benefit of a value-based decision in solving a tactical problem that achieves a specific military objective without compromising matters of high value, we found no relevant historical cases to support the model.

This educational method aims to improve the quality of military leaders’ future decision-making but is clearly no guarantee the decisions will produce the expected outcomes. As Antulio J. Echevarria II laconically observes, “A successful military strategy is simply one that works,” and as any officer knows, friction and chance influence the outcome of military plans no less than pure reasoning. Still, a coherent plan, backed by well-reasoned judgment, is more likely to achieve its objectives than one which is incoherent, and it will lend itself to a better defense in the event of failure.

In addition, Toulmin’s model can support the way Michael Howard recommends the military profession uses history, not as an arsenal of successful historical tactical solutions that can be reproduced but as a way to prepare junior officers for making decisions in the fog of war. Once adapted as a mindset, the model sensitizes them to the ways

officers of the past reasoned to achieve their ends and to factors that influenced their decisions. As such, it can provide junior officers with a more profound understanding of their profession’s expertise.

Moreover, Toulmin’s model may also help cadets come to terms with the character of their profession’s field of knowledge. While both are professionals in politically and ethically contested domains, why is it military officers are less capable of predicting the outcome of a course of action than medical doctors?

With reference to the model Harald Grim and Anders Molander suggest, it is because some professions’ expertise is based on weak warrants. Often, medical doctors can reason with warrants based in the natural sciences since they are solving problems related to the human body. But officers who ultimately aim to influence human behavior must reason with warrants derived from the human and social sciences. Here few, if any, universal truths exist. Hence, military strategy is necessarily based upon weak warrants since it must be anticipatory about future human behavior and about options for influencing such behavior by means of the threat or use of military force.

Consequently, Dempsey’s observation with which the article opens reiterates the fact that compared to outcomes of decision-making in many other professions, the judgments of a military officer are fundamentally less likely to result in desired outcomes. Appreciating they are to become experts in a field with weak warrants may help cadets to gain the courage necessary to make decisions with uncertain outcomes and the mental robustness to live with the consequences.

**US Debates on Strategic Mindedness**

Lykke’s conception of military strategy, upon which the previously mentioned educational method rests, has been criticized for inspiring military strategists to understand “strategy [as] an exercise in means-based planning.” This use of the concept misplaces focus on what military forces can do. But the approach is useful when one starts by asking: What is the end? The answer then guides further considerations with regard to strategy’s three additional components.

In addition, Lykke’s conception forms a minor, although essential part of the broader term strategic thinking. While contested, few theoretical propositions for what constitutes strategic thinking are in contradiction with Lykke’s ends-ways-means-risk logic. A US Army report exploring how to develop strategic thinkers concluded “strategic thinking in the military context is a complex and multifaceted construct that encompasses a wide range of skills, activities, and goals.” The report adds that the term, strategic thinking, is confused by the fact it is used interchangeably

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with related concepts such as critical thinking, creativity, and conceptual planning.

Moreover, discussions about strategic thinking are often interwoven with appeals to contextual understanding. For instance, the report recommends strategic thinkers maintain a systemic and holistic approach and agrees with Paul K. Van Riper that this requires a solid education in, among others, system theory, strategic theory, and geopolitics. Before retiring, Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster proposed an alternative bottom-up perspective: “We need to educate our soldiers about the nature of the microconflicts they are part of and ensure they understand the social, cultural, and political dynamics at work within the populations where these wars are fought.”

In comparison with such wide themes, the scope of the method offered in this article is limited, but not contradictory. Strategic mindedness is essential to connect the ends, ways, means, and risks that, among others, NATO considers of central importance when operations are designed. And while the contexts will change and become more complex throughout a commander’s career, this cognitive capability may still be useful to achieve mission objectives.

Although senior defense officials increasingly acknowledge junior officers must be capable of thinking strategically, this is not reflected in American PME nor necessarily supported within the rank and file. As Scott A. Silverstone and Renee Ramsey at West Point hold, “It is not hard to find Battalion Commanders who bluntly assert they do not want their junior leaders thinking strategically; they simply want them to execute their operational tasks with skill and determination.”

Former US secretary of defense, Robert M. Gates, took a different view when he argued “officers of lower and lower rank were put in the position of making decisions of higher and higher degrees of consequence and complexity.” By suggesting contemporary wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan should be understood as “captains’ wars,” he implicitly recognized junior officers must be able think strategically. In the same vein, the US Department of Defense Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stipulates, “It’s imperative that we encourage commanders at all levels to find innovative ways to accomplish the mission.” This is also reflected in a US House of Representatives’ initiative to “sponsor a number of

31 AJP 5, 3-1–3-2.
junior/company grade officers for PhDs in strategic studies including history, political science, international relations, and economics at top-tier civilian institutions.\footnote{Quoted in Van Riper, “Identification and Education,” 22.}


Nor do the calls seem to be reflected in the curricula of American PME before its final level. The West Point lecturers observe, “Education on strategy is first treated deliberately if an officer attends a Senior Service College (SSC) in later years of a full career, but a relatively small number of officers in each year group is given this opportunity.”\footnote{Silverstone and Ramsey, “Who Are We Teaching.”}

Strategic thinking tends to be wrapped in an aura of elitism. Celestino Perez Jr. takes issue with this military mindset. Along the lines of McMaster above, Perez advocates officers learn early in their career how to understand and engage with the microdynamics of local conflicts and any bottom-up effects on the broader conflict.\footnote{Perez, “Errors in Strategic Thinking.”}

Engaging with the microdynamics of local conflicts as well as with bottom-up effects are clearly relevant to PME but take time to learn. Unfortunately, for that reason alone they may be left out at the precommissioning level to allocate otherwise limited time to the broad array of other proficiencies cadets are tasked to gain. In that case, the educational method suggested in this article can be useful. Although no substitute for strategic thinking in the broad sense of the term, strategic mindedness will be useful and only takes a few days to grasp.

\section*{Conclusion}

Senior officials of defense establishments desire junior military officers to learn to think strategically. As a contribution to this challenge, this article has presented one of the NMA’s educational methods to teach precommissioned officers to approach tasks guided by what they shall achieve (ends) within the framework of Lykke’s conception of military strategy. Inspired by insights from the sociology of professions, a technical and a value-based form of strategic mindedness is proposed. The former draws from established procedures and practices to find ways to achieve ends, while the latter requires professional judgment that identifies ways to achieve ends by balancing these with related risks and concerns. An adapted version of Toulmin’s rhetorical model serves to develop such cognitive capabilities. By visualizing the four essential components of a military strategy (Lykke), the model helps cadets given
a task focus on the end and find a reasonable way to achieve it, taking into consideration available means and risks involved.

The educational approach presented here does not purport to cover the broad field of strategic thinking but is offered as one of several methods to learn to think strategically. It is compatible with many other treatments of the topic in the literature and can be learned relatively quickly. Hence, Toulmin’s adapted model could be useful if US precommissioning officer education endeavors to develop strategic-minded junior officers.

An increased focus on cultivating strategic-minded junior officers may improve the chances officers make expedient decisions, but it cannot prevent fatal decisions. What such a focus can do, however, is establish a better understanding that unfortunate outcomes are not necessarily the result of incompetence or carelessness but may reside in weak warrants that characterize the military field of expertise. Even the most informed and conscientious military decision offers no guarantee for success. Understanding this may help officers carry the burden of their professional responsibility more easily.

Moreover, the ability to reason convincingly may help an officer whose judgments are being questioned. This is particularly critical in public debates where the outcome will have implications not only for the officer’s reputation but also for the armed forces. Thus when unwanted military incidents make breaking news, a reasonable explanation from the commanding officer may well be the armed forces’ strongest line of defense of its most vital asset: society’s trust.
ABSTRACT: Since the Cold War, the Royal Danish Military Academy has proven highly adaptable. The officer training curriculum has responded to significant changes in Denmark’s strategic culture and today produces lieutenants capable of bearing complex leadership responsibilities in fluid operating environments.

The ideal Danish officer during the Cold War was modeled along the lines of a citizen soldier—a democratic-minded officer who, under the threat of nuclear war, was the so-called “insurance policy not to be used.”¹ But today’s first lieutenants are seen as future strategic enablers, sent abroad to fight wherever and whenever the United States or United Kingdom calls. Accordingly, the skills and mindset of the young officers need to be radically different from what they were during the Cold War—during training, they must develop a sense of strategic mindedness. The Royal Danish Military Academy located at Frederiksberg Palace in Copenhagen has educated Danish army officers since 1869. And while the physical place remains the same, the training has changed noticeably since the end of the Cold War.

In this article, we argue that changes in how a small state like Denmark views the role of its military—and implicitly, the role of the officer corps—reflect changes in the country’s strategic environment and strategic culture. These shifts can be seen in the teaching of young officer cadets. There is no straight line, however. Rather, intervening factors at the organizational level as well as a certain time lag between changes in the strategic environment and changes in the educational system affect what cadets are taught.

The article proceeds in three sections exploring how changes in the strategic environment and the strategic culture have affected the role of the military and thus the ideals behind the training of junior officers. First, after briefly presenting our theoretical framework, we discuss the design of Danish officer training during the Cold War with its focus on securing a democratic mind-set in the young officer corps, following the post-Second World War ideal of a democratic citizen soldier. Second, the article presents marked changes made to Danish officer training during the late 1990s and early 2000s, due to Denmark’s increased focus on expeditionary forces and the perceived need for a strategic lieutenant

¹ Unless otherwise noted, all translations are provided by the authors.
capable of acting efficiently in a multinational environment far away from home.

Third, as a result of changes in the strategic environment after 2014, Denmark is in a situation where it is difficult for Danish politicians to choose between staying committed to the concept of expeditionary forces or returning to territorial defense. They seem to have ended up with a compromise between the two overall strategic outlooks—doing both with only a modest increase in defense spending. We conclude with a short discussion on how this has affected officer training and what possible tensions could arise as a small state like Denmark adapts to changes in the strategic environment.

Changes in Junior Officer Education

In order to answer how (or if) changes in the strategic environment have affected the training of junior officers, we must consider the strategic environment—the context within which foreign and security policy decisionmakers operate. These decisionmakers find themselves under constraints from changes in the structure of the international system and at the regional level, as well as under pressures from different intervening domestic variables, which may constrain or divert foreign policy in unexpected ways. Changes (or perceptions of change) in the relative distribution of power in the international system or at the regional level—the shift from the bipolar order of the Cold War to the unipolar order of the post-Cold War period to the beginning multipolar order of post-2014—affect the outlook of states, perhaps especially small states, and the way foreign policy decisionmakers view the utility of the use of force.

Policy adaptations may not take effect overnight; in the case of Denmark, there seems to be a time lag between the mental realization of change and subsequent shifts in policy. What comes to the fore in our analysis, however, is an apparent small-state adaptability. This is perhaps due to the small size of Danish strategic culture, as well as a fair amount of organizational flexibility within the Danish armed forces, which went within a short time span from wholesale territorial defense (and in reality nonuse of armed force) to expeditionary forces involved in missions far away from the homeland.

Domestic variables also affect foreign and security policy elites’ view on the utility (and legitimacy) of the use of force. Traditions play a part, and intervening variables such as values, threat perceptions, national identity, and history all form the strategic culture of a given state. Accordingly, we focus on how strategic culture affects the choices of decisionmakers trying to adapt to changes in the strategic environment. Perceptions and choices of decisionmakers seep down the bureaucracy

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and eventually form military doctrine, training, and overall education—in our case, officer training. So in a sense, officer training is variable: it depends on changes in the strategic environment and how these changes are perceived in the strategic culture.

Changes in officer education happen through direct intervention by the ministry of defense, the ministry of education, or other government agencies dealing with defense. Changes also occur through internalization of the strategic culture mind-set in the officer corps, in part stemming from public discourse, but also from courses at officer training institutions and by experiences of officers returning from deployment. A third path is the influence of teachers and staff on the chosen curriculum and teaching methods at the military academies.

Taking a closer look at officer training in Denmark, we can detect changes related to overall shifts in perceptions of the strategic environment, albeit with a certain time lag. Despite this delay, Denmark has shown substantial adaptability to changes in the strategic environment both in the role of the military as an instrument of foreign policy and in the training of the ideal officer. Surprisingly, Denmark’s shift from being a foot-dragging member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the 1980s to being one of the most eager participants among the smaller NATO members, happened almost without any tension or constraints.

The Cold War and Its Aftermath

During the Cold War, Denmark found an international position by adapting to the bipolar condition with realist pragmatism. Issues closely related to security policy were guided by our NATO membership and a policy of non-offensive behavior toward the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). On other less security-oriented issues, Denmark pursued an activist policy of international détente, strengthening the United Nations and international regulations and working for liberal egalitarian values derived from its perception of itself as a northern small state with a unique mix of a capitalist economy and social security for all citizens.4

The overall threat perception and the Danish way of handling Cold War confrontations had numerous effects on defense policy and officer education from the 1960s onward. Military forces were critical in UN peacekeeping missions throughout the period. But in all other respects, the military instrument was for nonuse only and did not play a huge part in Danish foreign policy. It was the insurance policy you hope not to use. The strategic culture at that time affected the education of young officers greatly by institutionalizing distinct ideals—the ideal of citizen soldiers combined with the ideal of antiauthoritarian leadership and democratic culture also in the military.

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Even the role of the armed forces as a deterrent toward the USSR was only fully supported by parties belonging to the center-right wing in parliament and parts of the Social Democratic Party. The rest of the parties and a large part of the public believed deterrence was adding to the tensions between the two superpowers and wanted Denmark instead to enhance dialogue and détente and adopt moralistic stands. These negative views on power politics had an effect on Denmark’s relationship to NATO. Thus, the minority governments of the conservative Prime Minister Poul Schlüter from 1982 to 1993 were forced by the left-leaning majority to insist upon adding footnotes with minority views in central NATO papers on the so-called Double-Track Decision. This strongly irritated the United States, which concluded that Denmark probably would continue to be one of the softer members of NATO. This continued until the mid-1980s.

The citizen-soldier ideal, the central ethos of the Danish conscription-based army after the Second World War, was also strongly inspired by the postwar German version of Bürger in Uniform (citizen in uniform). Ideas echoing both the citizen soldier and the Bürger in Uniform were almost tailored to the small state anxiety toward power. This was further enhanced by an understanding that Danish political values regarding international justice and equality were better served through international cooperation than through military buildup.

This small state identity and the dislike and unease concerning power were given a new dimension during the Cold War, where fear of outside threats was supplemented with threats from within society. One of these concerns was the potential nondemocratic mind-set of the military leadership. Another was the concern that citizens, inspired by communist thinking, would take up arms against the state. This threat perception had a direct impact on officer training, primarily on the need to internalize civic virtues in the officer corps. It also affected the whole approach to officer-subordinate interactions and how future officers themselves should be treated at the academy.

Civilian norms—the strengthening of topics such as psychology and pedagogy—can be seen as illustrations of the enhancement of civilian control. Social sciences teaching and the introduction of norms from society together would shape a less authoritarian culture in the Army under explicit democratic control all the way into the classroom. The introduction of the social sciences served no instrumental function

5 NATO, “Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The ‘Double-Track’ Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces),” December 12, 1979, Official texts, NATO, last updated November 9, 2010.
7 Hans Branner, Danmark i en større verden: Udenrigspolitik efter 1945 [Denmark in a greater world: Foreign policy after 1945] (Copenhagen: Columbus, 1995); Henning Duus (former teacher, Royal Danish Army Academy), interview by authors (transcript in Danish), March 7, 2017; and Wivel, “Shadow of 1864?” 118–22.
8 Ellen Jans (former teacher, Royal Danish Naval Academy), interview by authors (transcript in Danish), 2017, 1.
at the time, just as there was no call for tasks requiring a political or strategic mind-set. It all came down to shaping and securing liberal democratic values from top to bottom in the military.

Looking at changes in Danish strategic culture from the Cold War until 2001, it is surprising to see how views from the Cold War period still had a significant influence on officer training and perceptions regarding tasks they might have been required to solve in the 1990s. It was still essential that future officers were democratic citizens first, diplomats (with arms) second. However, they were never seen as strategic actors.

**Instruction in the Social Sciences: 1980–2001**

Social science was first introduced at the academy in 1967. It consisted of modern history with a focus on economic, social, and political development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The idea was to introduce the cadets to the overall lines of the political and legal systems in Denmark and provide them with a basic understanding of sociology and macroeconomics. The very wide range of topics is rather illustrative of the perception at the time—officers build their character through general insights into the foundations of the state and the liberal democratic system.

Little in the way of teaching plans, reading lists, and so on has survived from this period. But in interviews with former teachers, the following examples of topics and texts are mentioned. In the late 1980s, the focus on the *Bürger in Uniform* inspired teaching gleaned from Samuel P. Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957). Samuel E. Finer’s *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (1962) addressed issues such as the optimal degree of separation between a civilian government and its army. Other subjects included questions on whether the military should be entirely subordinate to the polity and the dangers of military dictatorship.

In the early 1990s, topics under the heading of political science included the Danish political system, political ideologies, comparative political studies, foreign policy, defense policy, and international relations, thus still highly focused on securing the democratic mind-set of officers. Following the changing environment for Danish foreign policy, knowledge about international relations and international political theories began to play a more significant role combined with an understanding of public international law. These insights would build character and enable the officer to engage in conversations at all levels of society without losing face, thus giving him or her the confidence to act as a civil servant.

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10 Duus, interview, 5.
11 Duus, interview, 5.
The values and choices that stem from the strategic culture of the small-state narrative did not change substantially before 2001. What did change after the Cold War was the possibility that a small state, such as Denmark, could use military means as an essential resource in foreign policy. Changes in the strategic environment created a rather exceptional situation. First, the Danish Defence Commission of 1997 stated: “It is the assessment of the commission that Denmark is currently enjoying a security-geographic location which implies peace of an almost unprecedented kind. It is also the commission’s assessment that there will not be a direct conventional military threat to Denmark’s security over the next ten years.”

For the left-wing parties, benevolent international developments in the 1990s meant less skepticism toward the defense forces as such and a more optimistic view of the military as an instrument for state policy. As a consequence, officers in the Danish Army were given an additional role. They were going to be “diplomats in uniform.” Secondly, the Baltic States came to play a very important part in understanding how the military could play an important role in nation building as opposed to warfighting. Tasks for the Danish military in the newly independent democratic Baltic States had a large influence in how the idea of diplomats in uniform materialized.

One of the main foreign policy priorities for Denmark during this period was the integration of the new Baltic States into the European societies’ mix of market economy and liberal democracy. The Danish armed forces played a central part in this endeavor by helping to ensure the Baltic defense agencies came under strict civilian control and incorporated a democratic non-nationalistic and nonauthoritarian mindset. The example of the Danish citizen soldier here is obvious—these officers in the mid-1990s were the essential medium of delivery for the export of Danish core values.

Denmark took the lead in establishing a joint Baltic defense college in Tartu, Estonia, and led the training and preparation for the joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion that was to be deployed under the UN flag in the former Yugoslavia. The transition of the role of the military from an insurance policy not to be used to a valuable asset or tool for foreign policy happened almost without any tensions or constraints. This can be attributed to the aforementioned external and internal conditions that facilitated a very positive interplay between the strategic environment and the strategic culture.

By the end of the 1990s, the growing focus on the officer as diplomat and the many deployments of officers in the Yugoslav conflict

14 Jans, interview, 1–2.
meant international relations became the most important topic of social sciences teaching. The building of character, the development of civic virtues, and teaching that focused on civilized behavior and being a well-spoken, well-informed member of society slowly, but inevitably lost space in the curriculum. In many respects, these values were now more or less taken for granted. Instead, the attention was on how Danish core values, which made Danish society stable, prosperous, and secure, could be exported to other states. Although developing diplomats in uniform could be seen as a more instrumental approach to the social sciences teaching compared to the development of the Bürger in Uniform, it was still radically different from what was to come.

**After 9/11: Junior Officers as Strategic Enablers**

The pro-US line in Danish foreign policy, developed throughout the 1990s, was markedly enhanced after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and energetically promoted by then Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen who later became NATO secretary general. Thus, the somewhat foot-dragging Danish response to the use of military force, which had characterized Danish foreign policy thinking since the end of the Second World War, was replaced by what some have labeled “super Atlanticism.” Relations with Washington went from warm in the 1990s to persistently good after 2001.

Following the 9/11 attacks, Denmark followed the path of the United Kingdom and played the part of the loyal ally staunchly supporting the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The driving actor here was Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. In a series of speeches and newspaper comments, he successfully argued, that the need to act decisively alongside the United States after 9/11 underlined a clear stand against the former small state mentality from the past—most importantly the Danish government’s initial cooperation with Nazi Germany during the occupation in the Second World War and the Danish footnote policy in NATO in the 1980s. “The cooperation with the USA is not a policy of adaptation. It is a natural cooperation with a like-minded friend, partner and ally, which celebrates the same principles and values, as we

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16 Jans, interview, 2.
do: Democracy, freedom of speech, market economy and respect for human rights.”

A further enabling factor of this change was the absence of a direct military threat to Danish territory. A report from the Danish Defence Commission of 2003 argued the “direct conventional threat toward Danish territory has disappeared in the foreseeable future.”

After having lived on the frontline of a possible nuclear war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces during the Cold War, the very absence of the threat of nuclear destruction enhanced the public’s acceptance of the use of military force.

From the early 2000s, the Danish armed forces acting as an expeditionary force used as a foreign policy tool of the Danish state in order to underpin the special relationship with the one power that could guarantee Danish national security (through NATO)—the United States. Furthermore, it supported the hope for a liberal world order of democracies and human rights. Danish participation in the US-led intervention in Iraq, the result of a very small majority in parliament, briefly looked like a constraint to the Danish policy of military activism. But, in the end the liberal values behind the military missions in both Afghanistan and Iraq helped pave the way for a broad political consensus and public support for the utility of military force and implicitly, a more strategic role for officers.

**Instruction in the Social Sciences: 2001–2014**

The change from territorial defense toward an expeditionary force had a marked effect on officer training, albeit with a certain time lag. Thus, even though the need for changes in the syllabus was mounting due to changes in the strategic environment, it was not until the shock of 9/11 that the Royal Danish Defence College launched an overall revision of officer training on account of the “changed basic conditions.”

Major General Karsten J. Møller, then Commandant of the Royal Danish Defence College, outlined three overall developments that in his perception had changed the nature of war in the twenty-first century and, therefore, the basic conditions of officer training: 1) the end of the Cold War and the end of bipolarity; 2) the change of the nature of war from interstate wars toward intrastate wars (new wars); and 3) globalization, which meant “no states or regions can allow themselves to ignore basic problems and conflicts in remote parts of the world.”

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22 Forsvarskommissionen, *De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår for dansk forsvars politik* (Copenhagen: Danish Defence Commission, August 2003), 10.


24 Møller, 3.
At the 175th birthday of the Royal Danish Defence College in 2005, Møller described the role of the Danish officer as “warrior, diplomat and business leader.” With this revision of the overall education, the role of Danish officers changed from the notion of “citizens in uniform”—that it was hoped would never have to be used in war but who had special responsibilities as guardians of the democratic state—to a new, more instrumental role with specific skills and with a practical and immediate use—Danish officers were to lead troops at war.

The international combat mission that arguably had the most substantial effect in changing the outlook of the Danish military (army) was the deployment to Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Denmark first sent special forces in late 2001, and in 2002, deployed around 200 regular soldiers alongside German, Dutch, and Austrian forces in the German-led battlegroup in Kabul, Feyzabad, and Mazar-e-Sharif in the northern, more peaceful part of Afghanistan. When NATO took over ISAF in 2003, and in 2005 decided to widen the area of operations to the southern and less peaceful parts of Afghanistan, Denmark took on new responsibilities.

First, at the beginning of 2006 Denmark increased its deployed forces to 360, then to 640 (2007), and finally to 750 (2008) as part of a British-led battlegroup deployed to the Helmand province in the southern part of Afghanistan. Here the mission went from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and included some of the roughest fighting Danish forces had participated in since the war in 1864 against Prussia and Austria. This fighting resulted in a casualty figure of 44 dead and 214 wounded (from 2002 on). Considering the size of the Danish population, this was the highest casualty rate among the participating NATO countries.

To justify this, the Danish government argued NATO’s mission was progressing and things were getting better in Afghanistan. “The buildup of democracy has been forwarded. Women’s rights and possibilities are greatly improved, and equal rights are inscribed in the constitution.”

Also, the Danish government assigned great weight to education, another important issue among Danish voters. Essentially, the Danish Army was on a mission to do good in the world. The increased focus on democracy, education, and women’s rights affected the demands on the military. To translate these political goals into results on the ground, Danish officers had to focus on nation building, capacity building in weak states, and human rights, and they had to have a more advanced understanding of international law, culture, and Islam, while at the same time fighting (or learning to fight) a counterinsurgency.

When then Lieutenant Colonel Mads Rahbek took over the post as head of the officers’ primary training (chief of basic training) at the

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25 Møller, 3.
Royal Danish Military Academy in 2008, after having been deployed to the Helmand province in Afghanistan in the second half of 2007 on Danish ISAF team 4, he had a clear idea of what was expected of future young officers and why. One of the changes Rahbek made was to introduce scenarios with staff operations synthesizing most of the courses that were taught at the academy, to make the scenarios as real as possible.

One of the scenarios, a five-week integrated course at the end of the curriculum and taught for several years was a “deployment” to the Helmand province. Here the cadets were faced with constantly changing problems and tasks, requiring them to understand the area’s history and hone the ability to collect knowledge of different conflicts in the deployment area and on its borders. Cadets had to plan patrols, incorporating knowledge of physical resilience and training, tactics, leadership, and cultural studies as well as taking into account the mental strain these patrols would have on their men. As Mads Rahbek argues, “The basic training in tactics at platoon leader level was the prerequisite for solving problems at staff operations, but now there were also so unbelievably many more stakeholders involved as well as available assets at the platoon leader level which he had to be able to handle.”

Essentially, the task was to train strategically minded officers. As Major Thomas Munch, commanding officer for class Storrud from 2009 to 2012, argued, “everything became more serious. It was absolutely clear a large percentage [of the cadets] would join high-risk missions. We experienced a marked rise in professionalism.”

The new officer training at the academy included cultural studies. The importance of culture studies for officers gradually became obvious after the first missions in Iraq, but more so after the missions to Helmand. Battle assessment reports from the Helmand province led the Army Command to press for changes in officer education. At the Royal Danish Military Academy, leadership concluded that a lack of cultural sensitivity in the Danish officer corps could hamper missions in the future. Therefore cultural studies were included in the syllabus as an integral part of understanding international society, the way other states function, and as part of political science classes on weak states.

It was also seen as a necessary precondition for establishing contact with the local population in a mission area. As Rahbek argues, the rationale for teaching cadets cultural studies and political science was for them “to understand the context within which the international operation’s tasks were to be solved.” This signaled a marked shift in Danish officers’ training. During the 1980s and 1990s a subject such as cultural studies or religion would have been taught for the purpose of building character so young officers would be educated and polite; now
it was on the syllabus due to its instrumental function—cultural studies was deemed necessary because it could help win wars.\textsuperscript{30}

Changes in officer training were further reinforced by domestic reforms in the overall Danish education system, which required new academic abilities in officer education. The pressure for reform resulted from an enquiry from the Danish Evaluation Institute, commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Defence in 2002–3 to evaluate Danish officer training. As part of the process, all of the institutes and officer academies were asked to conduct a guided self-evaluation of the purpose and methods of the training in question. The description provided by the Royal Danish Military Academy of officer training was that it should produce a junior officer capable of being “a military leader (\textit{fører}) of a tactical unit” as well as “a business leader of a military workplace” and “act in an international environment.”\textsuperscript{31} Gone, or at least significantly reduced, was the influence of the idea of citizens in uniform.

\textbf{New Strategic Outlooks}

Five years after the annexation of Crimea, with continuous tensions between Russia and its neighbors, growing public awareness of Russian influence campaigns in Europe and the United States, and in a situation where NATO is reinventing deterrence measures on its eastern borders close to Denmark, the training of first lieutenants is once again in a process of reform. Consequently, we have seen changes at the Royal Danish Military Academy, proving once more its ability to readily adapt to the strategic environment.

In tactics, focus has shifted from stabilization operations to preparations for conventional warfare. In leadership, discussions on how to change the mind-set of officers to make them more risk-taking and less sensitive to losses fill the hallways. Cultural awareness classes have been removed from the curriculum. Teachers are asking themselves, What are the core competencies required by officers in the near future?

Danish strategic culture is not on the verge of returning to a time of pacifism or power evasiveness, shying away from using military forces as a political instrument as in the 1970s and 1980s. Nor are we seeing a return to more simple tasks for officers—being exclusively devoted to territorial defense and international peacekeeping missions where the conflicting parties are duly separated. There is a general agreement that complex conflicts are here to stay, globalization has seriously challenged the sovereign state, and the ongoing struggles are taking place among the people.

Even the “deployable deterrence” of Russia will call for strategically minded officers who can mitigate false information, apply digital assets with care, interface with strategic partners—military and civilian alike, and who are sensitive to the political as well as strategic consequences

\textsuperscript{30} Rahbek, interview.

\textsuperscript{31} Danmarks Evalueringssnititut (EVA), \textit{Forsvarets liniofficersuddannelsen}, Selvevalueringssrapport, Bilag 4 (Copenhagen: EVA, 2003), 4:2. Also see p. 32.
of their own behavior and that of their men and women in the local community. Today’s missions may not have the same close connection to liberal values or so clearly reflect Danish core values as was the case in both the Baltic States in the 1990s or the mission in Afghanistan. But they still have broad support in the public as well as in parliament. The positive perception of the utility of force and of officers as a tool for a more secure and safe world is well established in Danish strategic culture after many years of an activist international foreign policy.

Conclusion

Officer training is not a timeless and unchangeable effort. Rather, it shifts over time according to changes in the strategic environment and in the strategic culture—at least in the Danish case. Thus, the very idea of an officer’s role (the ideal officer) is dependent upon how the armed forces view what type of threats and missions, it should prepare for. This is dependent on how foreign and security policymakers view the strategic environment and the utility of force—an assessment which is formed within the country’s strategic culture.

During the Cold War, the Danish armed forces were seen as the “insurance policy you hoped not to use,” and their role was mainly as a deterrent of the Warsaw Pact, together with other NATO forces. The officer’s role was modeled along the lines of the citizen soldier, a soldier one hoped never to use in actual combat. The secondary role of the officers was to serve as guardians against internal antidemocratic forces, be they right or left wing. After the Cold War, the Danish officer’s role changed slowly through the 1990s, when the Danish armed forces helped establish and form new defense forces in the newly independent Baltic States. The mission there was essentially a nation-building project, and the role of the Danish officer was broadened to also encompass the role as a diplomat in uniform. However, the citizen soldier ideal was still intact, and the involvement in the Baltic States was primarily the export of core national values.

After the shock of 9/11 when Denmark chose to support the US-led war on terror, the Danish officer’s role changed again. Gone was the idea of the officer as a guardian of democracy (a citizen soldier). Instead, a new, more instrumental officer’s role with specific skills and with practical and immediate use in mind emerged. From 2001 on, Danish officers were to be trained to serve as warriors, diplomats, and business leaders (organizational leaders). The first role—leading soldiers in battle—was clearly the one that received the most focus. The combat missions in Afghanistan rapidly changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

Alongside the warfighting role, the Danish officers also had to use their diplomatic skills among the ISAF partners, as well as use their knowledge from the newly implemented cultural awareness classes to

32 Jakobsen and Ringsmose, “Size and Reputation.”
conduct outreach programs and civil-military cooperation projects to benefit the local population. Danish officers became strategic enablers.

For more than a decade, the Royal Danish Military Academy had clear goals and missions. The hard missions in Afghanistan and Iraq meant education and related activities served a direct and necessary purpose—building nations, strengthening institutions, and providing security—thus enabling local populations to build better lives. Clear goals and an almost existential demand for education and development of needed competencies for the young officers is gone, replaced by uncertainty and unpredictability. To prepare the strategic-minded lieutenant for an uncertain world, it seems essential to develop cadets who can make sound judgments and who are sensitive to values and perceptions across a range of stakeholders. These skills require a solid understanding of international relations as well as diplomatic skills and the ability to behave correctly among people with other values and manners.

Moreover, good judgment must derive from knowledge of and commitment to fundamental values and ideas that our liberal societies are built on. Thus, some requirements at the Royal Danish Military Academy from the Cold War period focused on developing citizen soldiers may find their way back into the curricula. As Western liberal values are contested in a more multipolar world, it becomes highly important to ensure officer’s values and judgments rest on these principles. To sum up, the tasks of the strategically minded lieutenant in the (near) future could look like this—military leader, diplomat, and democrat, ready for an uncertain world.

Dorthe Bach Nyemann

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Jørgen Staun

Commentary and Reply

On “Civil-Military Relations and Today’s Policy Environment”

George J. Fust

This commentary responds to Thomas N. Garner’s article “Civil-Military Relations and Today’s Policy Environment” published in the Winter 2018–19 issue of Parameters (vol. 48, no. 4).

Thomas Garner, my peer and former United States Military Academy Department of Social Science alumnus, offers commentary suggesting it is the military’s responsibility to bridge the civil-military divide. He also places the blame for this divide squarely on the military. This is an unfair assertion and a one-sided argument replete with faulty logic and fallacies. The author leverages select readings from the syllabus for an American politics course taught to all cadets at the United States Military Academy. Several key readings are missing from his approach. More importantly, he fails to address the contemporary literature that offers a holistic framework for assessing who is really at fault for the civil-military divide.

The material he failed to highlight also offers alternative perspectives on how to resolve this friction point. The civil-military divide is not an existential threat as Garner suggests. The beauty of the western civil-military relations system he describes is its stability. Scholars and pundits offer commentary on the fringes of civil-military relations theory and often portray unhealthy civil-military interactions to be direr than they really are. Garner’s article is one such example.

To begin, Garner asserts: “The problem is that civilian trust in the military institution is becoming meaningless because of the public’s lack of understanding of the military and the military’s acceptance of that trust as confirmation of its efforts. Therefore, the onus is on the military to be far more critical of itself than the public.” No evidence for this assertion is given. It also does not take into account the current oversight from the media and Congress. One only needs to watch the latest congressional committee grilling of academy superintendents over sexual assault reform to understand.

Another possibility not taken into consideration is the military could be doing the right thing. The military services have been transparent in recent years regarding senior leader misconduct. This effort has continued despite trends suggesting no change in behavioral trends.

Should the services highlight failures simply to highlight them? The public has a tendency to weigh in when reform is required. Retired senior leaders also demonstrate their willingness to police other leaders or criticize them when required. Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Retired General Martin E. Dempsey, is well-known for calling out the negative behaviors of other general officers. In short, Garner's premise that the military does not have adequate self-criticism is unfounded.

The second main argument Garner makes is the military has not earned the trust bestowed on it but merely receives it as a result of a lack of “meaningful connection” between the military and society. Civil-military relations theory does not make a distinction about types of trust or how it is generated. A 1962 classic work by Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, explains the foundation of healthy civil-military relations require society to trust and respect the military. Is it possible to have unearned trust? If perception is what Garner meant, he is still off base. Eric Nordlinger theorizes in *Soldiers in Politics*, when public perception of the military is high, good civil-military relations can occur. Again, he draws no distinction on the efficacy of the perception because perception is reality.

The counterargument to Garner’s "lack of meaningful connections" is an easy one. Connections between society and the military are constantly on display. Debates over flag burning or kneeling at football games are two contemporary examples that highlight ongoing debates involving society and the military. If anything, the military has become uncomfortable with the amount of connections being made to it. Politicians, notably the sitting president, routinely invoke the military and draw it into the political realm. There is no lack of conversation today surrounding the military and its role in society.

If one does not buy into this counterargument, another approach can be employed. Perhaps it is not the soldier who has lost touch, but society. Soldiers are reminded of their oath to serve. They are reminded of the cost when waving goodbye to family members on a tarmac. They know why they serve. It is society that needs the reminder. The “meaningful connection” is the social contract, otherwise known in our system as the Constitution. Montesquieu and the Federalist outline our representative democracy. The citizens elect someone to speak on their behalf and represent their interests. These representatives must maintain an understanding of the military. They provide the oversight required for healthy civil-military relations. As previously indicated, Congress is currently performing this function.

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Garner’s core argument is the “civil-military rift is the military’s to close because of the concept of the military profession’s responsibility to society enumerated by Huntington.”  

This misinterpretation of Huntington is only plausible because Garner does not offer any supporting evidence or consider any alternatives. The glaring mistake is the military has made the relationship with American society work. In 2019, it was the most trusted institution!  
The history of US civil-military relations began with a near coup. George Washington resolved this mutiny with his famous Newburgh Address and established our military’s culture of subservience to the civilian government.

Russell Weigley outlined the establishment of the military’s unique culture from its earliest beginnings, through the Civil War era, to modern day. He suggested America sent its military into the frontier so it would not be a threat to society. This fostered a unique culture “of discipline, virtue, responsibility” within the military but also contributed to its resentment of society. The military saw itself as the keeper of virtue and honor, which is often referred to as the starting point for the cause of the divide—resentment. A contemporary analysis by Mara Karlin argues, “The gap in civilian and military experiences . . . since 9/11 has led to persuasive, persistent, and unrealistic myths that have eroded faith in civilian leadership of defense policy.” Despite the evidence of a gap, the US military is not a threat to the society it protects. Nor is there any indication it will be anytime soon.

Garner criticizes the military for not “conducting outreach, discussing shared values, and engaging in public discussions.” His recommendations—to have military families leave their garrisons and move into civilian communities and to have military personnel write critically of the profession—are already a common occurrence. He fails to highlight any of the military’s current efforts to connect with society.

The military’s public affairs branch and most major commands have public engagement as a priority effort. Most units have partnerships with their local community. They host air shows, fun runs, Fourth of July celebrations, and vehicle demonstrations. The military funds hundreds of ROTC programs simply to have a presence in higher education, even if they are cost-prohibitive. National Football League commercials and pre-game shows are filled with military linkages. The Army and the Air Force fund and facilitate World Class Athlete Programs (for athletes training for the Olympics), which allows these athletes to serve as ambassadors for the military. A legislative liaison office for each branch exists in the Pentagon and at every combatant command. What more can be done?

Garner’s article along with this commentary serves as evidence that military officers engage in public debate. Garner criticizes servicemembers for not closing an apparent civil-military gap. He

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believes “the majority of the professional force cannot remain silent.”

If they did speak, what would they say? What more can be said beyond the weak critique offered by Garner? Few constraints prevent members of the military from criticizing their branch. Perhaps they are too busy upholding their end of the social contract to make time for corrections on the margin. Perhaps most of them adhere to the professional ethic espoused by Huntington. Perhaps they abide by the discipline required to maintain good order and the trust of society.

The military should have some degree of separation from society. This is the functional imperative of which Huntington spoke. It is what makes the western model of civil-military relations stronger over time. Garner suggests the degree of separation is too great. He suggests military families are too isolated on their posts. This is a convenient point often used to explain the gap but lacks merit. Military installations are an integral component of the ecosystem they belong to.

Look at the arguments anytime base realignment and closure is mentioned. No elected representative wants to lose the economic benefits military bases provide. They employ civilians both on and off the installation, which suggests daily interactions between military members and civilians. Military spouses enroll their children in swim lessons off post, they shop at local stores, they fill their gas tanks, they join civic groups, they meet people at local parks, and they join church groups. All these activities help close the civil-military gap. Military bases are necessary for the functioning of the military. The idea they are islands unattached to society is not supported by reality.

The US military has earned the trust of its citizens. It is not a threat to the society it protects. Under a Hobbesian notion, the social contract has been fulfilled. The people have given up some liberties in exchange for security. Under a Lockean concept, the military has secured the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and property, so much so that the country is the most sought-after place to immigrate to. Ask any citizen of any country with a history of coups if their military has earned their trust. The US military has protected this nation at great personal cost.

So who is ultimately at fault if a civil-military gap exists? Garner says it best in his closing thoughts, “The gap may well be a failure in civic responsibility on the part of the citizen.” Declining social capital is a possible cause for the civil-military divide. The average American doesn’t talk to her or his neighbor, what makes us think he or she cares what the military is doing? Even if the military were to implement Garner’s suggestions, the citizenry would be required to listen and digest the military’s transparency. Unless this transparency is splashed across social media, it is unlikely to be consumed but will invariably lower trust. The military cannot mobilize society to care.

can, however, continue to execute its duty and keep society safe enough to have these discussions.

The civil-military divide is not a growing existential threat to American democracy. A gap has existed since the nation's founding and is an inherent part of the US system. The strength and commitment of civilian control results “from the active and sustained commitment of both civilians and military professionals to an idea that had proven itself in good times and bad.” David Trask, “Democracy and Defense: Civilian Control of the Military in the United States,” Issues of Democracy 2, no. 3 (1997): 18.

The military has not forgotten this idea. The same cannot be said of civilians.

The Author Replies

Thomas N. Garner

I am happy my commentary on civil-military relations in Parameters is eliciting discourse. George Fust states my article is “an unfair assertion and a one-sided argument replete with faulty logic and fallacies.” I am happy to take criticism on any logical fallacies for which I am guilty. But he merely makes the statement without elaborating or providing evidence for any specific fallacies I may have committed. After correctly identifying my core argument—that it is the military’s responsibility to close the civil-military divide with society—Fust goes on to argue against positions I do not hold, the very definition of the straw-man fallacy. Since it is difficult for me to defend arguments I did not make, I will instead expand upon the points in my article for clarity and address some of the specific points Fust makes about my work.


Kohn’s sentiment is reflected in specific literature on the subject in the idea professions hold “authority.” Earnest Greenwood lays out that the relationship between a professional and a client is predominately based on that professional’s authority or extensive education in the “systematic theory of his discipline.”

Because clients lack the expertise or training of the professional, they are hindered in their ability to understand that profession, appraise the quality of service received, or question a professional’s judgment on his or her subject of expertise. The professional's authority is the

26  Greenwood, “Attributes of a Profession,” 47.
“principal source of the client’s faith” in the professional relationship.\(^\text{27}\) Even in Huntington’s work, the military’s “responsibility” suggests the ultimate client of every profession, including the military, is society; professions are understood to make meaningful contributions to society. Therefore, military officers have a responsibility to serve society to their fullest capacities without money being the sole motivation.\(^\text{28}\) I believe that in order to serve society in this way, military officers should not expect society to learn about the military profession and then blame the average citizen for their ignorance. Ultimately, this is why patients go to doctors, clients go to lawyers, and parishioners go to clergy—for their expertise. Why then is there a different expectation for the military profession, as Fust opines?

The common argument against this assertion is there is a difference in the social contract that applies to the military given the unique relationship of civilians and the military in America. The simple answer to this is society changed the terms of that contract with the all-volunteer force implemented in 1973 as a result of the Gate’s Commission. Bernard Boëne writes that the current all-volunteer military is “in danger of lacking legitimacy and support.”\(^\text{29}\) Neither I nor Boëne argue the military lacks legitimacy or support, but this is certainly a possibility in the all-volunteer era. Boëne states the American Cold War military was “an ‘institutional’ armed force which was functionally and, in part, structurally and culturally divergent from large-scale civil organizations, but enjoyed effective social and cultural links to society through the mechanism of selective conscription.”\(^\text{30}\)

Additionally, Boëne notes that before the 1950s one would find “an armed force of civilians in uniform” during World War II that is “highly representative, [and] highly legitimate.”\(^\text{31}\) We have done exactly what Michael Sandel argues: “Turning military service into a commodity—a task we hire people to perform—corrupts the civic ideals that should govern it.”\(^\text{32}\) To this end and again to address one of Fust’s points directly, the issue is not the military’s relationship to its civilian political superiors, it is more of an issue concerning the relationship of the military to the society at large, which it serves.

Fust states I suggest the civil-military divide my article discusses is an “existential threat” “on the fringes of theory.” This claim is a red herring. I never suggested the divide is a threat or existential. It is also not on the fringes of theory, as I very carefully used existing theory to argue my points: “there is reason to worry that Americans are proud of their military not because of involvement with it or reflection about what makes it good, but simply because it is theirs.”\(^\text{33}\) It should also be noted that I feel this most recent civil-military dilemma I highlight does

\(^{28}\) Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 9.
not replace Huntington’s, Feaver’s, or Janowitz’s conception; it merely
adds to it.

Fust also states I failed to address contemporary theory which offers
a “holistic framework,” but he fails to address what contemporary theory
or material I am excluding. A brief look at my cited sources in the article
shows I drew from scholars such as Richard Kohn, Peter Feaver, Morris
Janowitz, Samuel Huntington, Suzanne Nielsen, and Michael Sandel. I
also cited studies and commentaries by Bruce Drake, James Fallows, Mark
Thompson, the Pew Research Center, David Barno, and Nora Bensahel.
This set of authors covers a range of theoretical viewpoints and opinion.

Fust claims I offered no evidence to support my argument of the
disparity between the public’s trust and their lack of understanding
about the military. My footnotes citing the Pew Research Center, Mark
Thompson, and Bruce Drake clearly indicate “that American society (71
percent of the public) and the US military (84 percent of veterans) are
coming no closer to developing a shared understanding of each other or
the military’s problems.”

Nonetheless, Fust and I actually agree on a number of points. I agree
with the argument and assertion that “perhaps it is not the soldier who has
lost touch, but society.” Further, I agree with his points on the continued
success of civil-military relations as this relates to political leaders and the
military, as well as with his argument about the military not being a threat
to society. I address and move well past these arguments on page 6 of my
article because I agree with both points.

I agree with Fust’s question concerning the military’s silence about
key issues: “if they did speak, what would they say?” Unfortunately, recent
articles in major news publications including those he cited do not show
any indication to the public, or the military at large, that there is a coherent
strategic message anyone in military service can champion to further a
positive dialogue.

Finally, I agree military installations are “an integral component of the
ecosystem” to which they belong. I am a product of this ecosystem; I am a
child of military parents who enrolled me in swimming lessons off of the
military post. But Fust’s assertion and implication that I hold the “idea that
[military bases] are islands unattached to society [that] is not supported by
reality” is both hyperbole and borders on ad hominem. These community
ties often do not extend beyond the community where the base is situated.
These ties do not reach the American people at large—those not living
immediately outside a military base—and this fact is concerning to me.

To conclude, I appreciate the dialogue my article elicited. I do not
claim to have all the answers. But I am trying to learn, so I appreciate
Fust’s thoughts on the topic. In the end, I am endeavoring to live up to
the professional responsibility in Huntington’s work where officers are
custodians of expert knowledge and contribute to it through scholarship
and study.

34 “War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era: Executive Summary,” Pew Research Center, October
10, 2011; and Bruce Drake, “On Memorial Day, Public Pride in Veterans, But at a Distance,” Pew
Research Center, May 24, 2013.
35 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 8–10.
Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents
Edited by Eli Berman and David A. Lake

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Proxy Wars represents a deliverable study produced through the Department of Defense Minerva Research Initiative research project Deterrence with Proxies, funded through the Office of Naval Research (ix). As a result, the work is very structured, follows a scientific methodology, and is extremely well referenced. This represents both a blessing—specific policy implications and research findings are evident—and a curse—lack of ease of reading and an overly academic approach.

The work is edited by two professors from the University of California, San Diego—Eli Berman and David Lake, an economist and a political scientist, respectively—with eleven contributors participating in the work. Of these contributors, five are professors, four are post-doctoral researchers, and two are PhD candidates. The contributors are also primarily trained as economists and political scientists. As expected, given the backgrounds of the editors and the contributors, the work follows a rational-actor and cost-benefit approach. This is embodied in the use of a principal-agent framework: “Our framework for analyzing conditions and strategies for indirect control consists of two players” (11). This framework results in a theory-driven 2-player game approach with the principal having five options in its interactions with the agent. Various conditionals and contract options then modify this principal-agent framework of interaction. The intent of this modeling is to address the following goals:

One goal is to determine when it makes sense for a principal—a superior power—to engage in indirect control to deal with issues of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counternarcotics operations, three areas where private actors within fragile states threaten global order and the interests of other states. In that sense, we test the limits of this strategic approach to transnational threats. A second goal, when indirect control makes sense, is to investigate how to manage that relationship successfully, at a minimum cost to the principal. (3)

This edited work contains a list of tables and figures, acknowledgements, an introduction, ten chapters, a conclusion, references, contributor information, and an index. Individual chapter case studies focus on the following: chapter 1: South Korea, 1950–53 (by Julia Macdonald), chapter 2: Denmark, 1940–45 (by Brandon Merrell), chapter 3: Colombia, 1990–2010 (by Abigail Vaughn), chapter 4: Lebanon and Gaza, 1975–2017 (by Matthew Nanes), chapter 5: El Salvador, 1979–1992 (by Ryan Baker), chapter 6: Pakistan, 2001–11 (by...
Clara Suong), chapter 7: Israel-Palestinian Authority, 1993–2017 (by Alexei Abrahams), chapter 8: Yemen, 2001–11 (by Ben Brewer), and chapter 9: Iraq, 2003–11 (by David Lake), with a final chapter focusing on the case study policy implications for the United States (by Stephen Biddle). The latter contributor is well known to US Army War College audiences as he once held the Elihu Root chair of military studies at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI).

The reviewer found the front and back elements of the work—introduction, policy implications for the United States (Chapter 10), and the conclusion—to be the most interesting and useful components. Unless the reader has an interest in a specific country of interest, after a while, the case studies proved to be redundant. They utilized similar formats and functioned as a data set subjected to interpretative analysis by the individual contributors. These are termed “analytic narratives” tied to a single theory with cross-case and over-time comparisons utilized (23–24). As a result they were scientifically employed to validate or invalidate components of the model used in the work and its theoretical (basic, comparative static, and capacity-building) H1–H12 predictions (Table 0.1, 16).

The main findings of the work are summed up in the concluding two chapters. Stephen Biddle’s policy implications chapter provides best practice when relying on proxies—focus on incentives rather than punishments—and addresses doctrinal assumptions of interest alignment and various perceptions of conditionality. He then provides a listing of eleven policy implications derived from theory and case study analysis (284). These include: “structure civilian aid with options for increases if proxies comply with US preferences, and decreases if they do not” and “seek proxies, whose interests align as closely as possible with those of the United States” (284). The conclusion, provided by Eli Berman and David Lake, provides a master table that summarizes the case studies, highlights primary Hn changes over time, and offers conclusions (with descriptions of anomalous behavior) (table C.1, 290).

The overall project findings follow:

1. Proxy relationships work well in suppressing political violence when proxies are appropriately incentivized (six or seven of nine cases), but provide disappointing results when incentives are lacking, inconsistent, or absent (two or three of nine).

2. The United States is surprisingly inconsistent in applying incentives, which accounts for both of the unambiguous disappointments (Yemen and Iraq).

The analytical narrative method seems to provide enough discipline to yield conclusions, at least in the fortunate cases where the qualitative data are consistently predicted by theory (301). Additionally, a surprising and disturbing finding came out of this study, namely “local agents, when not appropriately incentivized, often use foreign military assistance to shore up the opposite of
inclusive governance: a patron security service that threatens political rivals” (302).

Contemporary works in this genre of study are Michael A. Innes’ *Making Sense of Proxy Wars* (2012), Andrew Mumford’s *Proxy Warfare* (2013), and Geraint Hughes’ *My Enemy’s Enemy* (2012), as well as the more recent works—Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli’s *Surrogate Warfare* (2019) and Tyrone L. Groh’s *Proxy War* (2019). While most of these books are more engaging reads than *Proxy Wars*, this work does have greater scientific rigor to it. It will have immediate interest to the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute community as well as those professionals interested in the activities of violent nonstate actors and transnational organized criminals. Still, for other audiences, focusing only on the front and back elements of the work, with some case study analysis for data grounding, likely represents the best approach to reading it.

**White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War**

*By John Gans*

Reviewed by Jesse B. Burnette, master of science candidate, US Naval Postgraduate School

Those who lead the many to guide the decision-making of a few now have a newly defined shoreline to follow. Dr. Jon Gans’s *White House Warriors* sheds new light on the White House’s often-unmentioned, yet steadfast neighbors in the executive office building—the National Security Council (NSC). Following Gans’s tribute to the men and women of the NSC, Gans concludes, the NSC’s history is replete with both successes and failures. The great insight this history offers is that the NSC best serves both the president and the nation with the rightsized job; that is to say, better national security policy and process is a function of smaller writs, not bigger staffs.

Gans is eminently qualified to write this authoritative account of the American premier coordinating and policy body. The author’s eclectic background as a public servant has brought him to the highest steps of government. His key career highlights include serving as chief speechwriter to Defense Secretary Ash Carter, assistant to Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and key postings with Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and US Senator Hillary Clinton. In what began as a doctoral dissertation at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Gans amassed numerous hours of personal interviews with senior NSC staffers—Morton H. Halperin, Philip A. Dur, Richard N. Haass, Alexander Vershbow, Meghan O’Sullivan, and Douglas Lute—to augment his considerable firsthand documents.
Gans’s succinct but thoroughly documented 72-year history of the NSC, written in the form of a political thriller, performs three functions for the reader. First, Gans charts the origins of the NSC from its beta form in the Second World War, to the opening of the Cold War, through subsequent changes, to the present. Second, through this comparative history, Gans reveals how each commander in chief—from Presidents Truman to Trump—tailored the NSC to fit preconceived predilections for running the country within the broad guidelines of the National Defense Act of 1947. In doing so, Gans captures the NSC’s coordinating role: responsible to the president and facilitating policy formulation, but without overseeing the execution of the policies it helps to create. Third, Gans tells the largely muted story of the leaders of the national security council staff from Sidney Souers, who served as executive secretary for the NSC (before the creation of the position of national security advisor in 1953) in the Truman Administration, to national security advisor John Bolton who served during the present administration.

*White House Warriors,* however, does not adequately describe the American pre-NSC foreign policy procedures and institutions—specifically those of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. More on this pre-NSC period would have provided the reader with an enhanced comparative sense of the genesis and utility of the NSC and thereby bolstered his conclusions.

*White House Warriors* provides an easily digestible and nonpartisan account of how some of NSC staffers fared better than others and how some national security advisors, many of whom were senior military officers, shaped enduring processes that guided the United States through its most perilous journeys. If the future mirrors the past, Gans’s *White House Warriors* will be a useful handbook prefacing any senior officer’s tour of duty at the NSC.

**The Fighters: Americans in Combat in Afghanistan and Iraq**

By C. J. Chivers

Reviewed by MAJ Nathan K. Finney, East and Southeast Asia planner for the US Army Pacific

While reading *The Fighters,* the overwhelming emotions I experienced were gut-wrenching frustration and anxiety. This reaction was not the result of a failure on the part of the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, C. J. Chivers, but rather, it reflects how well he captured his subject—the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as seen through the men and women who lived those conflicts. Notably Chivers recognized, “National failures and individual experiences, while inextricably linked, are distinct” (24).

My negative emotions stem from a place similar to that of the individuals covered by Chivers’ reporting in the book. Of course experiences vary, but it is clear many of those Chivers covers in *The Fighters* were disappointed in the approach taken by our country toward the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq and the utter failure of those conflicts—despite all the sacrifices and good intentions poured into both—to achieve any kind of positive result, whether for the United States, our coalition partners, or the local people themselves.

While such negative emotions might typically lead to a negative view of the book, this could not be further from the truth. No other book I have read so tangibly enables the reader to understand the broad scope of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, while also describing what those wars were like to the individuals who fought in them, covering the entirety of the conflicts to date, from the initial air-based attacks on the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001 to the effects the wars had on the Taliban mujahedin (the fighters) into late 2016.

As a veteran of both Afghanistan and Iraq, I find it difficult to read about these particular conflicts, let alone see movies depicting them. Part of this reluctance is a desire to avoid reliving tough times I had while deployed. In addition, my war is personal—another's depiction of the wars never matches my own, leading to my own frustration or nitpicking them.

Instead of trying to understand my experiences through the eyes of my contemporaries, I find it more useful to read accounts and stories written of previous conflicts. One author in particular, Karl Marlantes, has allowed me to live vicariously through his stories without having to relive my own. In both Matterhorn and What It Is Like to Go to War, Marlantes weaves his own experiences in Vietnam as an infantry officer into gritty detail educating those unfamiliar with war, while also allowing those all too familiar with it to safely compare their own experiences to his.

Admittedly, The Fighters and Marlantes’ books are extremely different. For instance, the former is written by a noncombatant and told through the eyes of others, while the latter provides essentially autobiographical accounts (or a fictional narrative based on personal experiences) of a participant in the war. However, the focus on war from the tactical perspective—on the individuals having fought and died, as well as on those at the home front supporting those men and women—and how they viewed their successes and failures within those conflicts is common to both Marlantes’ and Chivers’ books. This focus makes their audiences tangibly feel the subject at hand. It allows them to understand “truth” at the ground level, through which they have a better perspective to view and analyze the larger whole.

From my perspective, the lessons and implications are more important. This is especially true in The Fighters. First among these lessons is the professionalism of the men and women fighting for the American people. Whether the war was going well or poorly, Chivers ably covers the reactions by our men and women in uniform. They signed up to serve, and serve they did, to the best of their ability. As Marine Corps Lieutenant Jarrod Neff felt after all his trials and tribulations to take Marja, Afghanistan and its subsequent abandonment
by US forces, “they fought hard and looked out for each other. As he saw it that was all a grunt could do. Higher-ups had failed. They had not. He was proud” (340). And even though “there was no clear end to any of it, and few people had expectations otherwise,” the men and women Chivers covers—the men and women I served with—keep going back to Afghanistan and Iraq to serve their nation where they are needed (340).

In the epilogue to The Fighters, Chivers not only closes the loop on the men and women he covers in the rest of the book, allowing some closure to his readers, he also covers the implications of our endless wars and their effect on individuals. In the end, most of the men and women Chivers covered “wanted then, and still want now, to connect their battlefield service to something greater than a memory reel of gunfights, explosions, and grievous wounds” (19). Few of us have done so. And in the end, most of those who served in Afghanistan and Iraq are left to divorce our service from our country to prevent our disillusionment, because as sergeant first class Leo Kryszewski felt, “after all the violence and close calls, he had learned to separate his personal service from the larger march of American foreign policy” (344).

The Fighters is a tale of service, professionalism, and dedication. It is also a tale of frustration, disillusionment, and failure. And while you may feel gut-wrenching frustration and anxiety by reading this book, it should absolutely help guide your reflection and analysis of the endless wars of multiple American generations. Bravo to Chivers for covering the essence of recent wars in this book as well as in his numerous newspaper and magazine articles.

**Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity**

By Thomas-Durell Young

Reviewed by Pierre Jolicoeur, associate professor and director, Department of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada

To each generation its great project. For our grandparents and great-grandparents, it was the World Wars; for our parents, the Cold War and decolonization. Thomas-Durrell Young’s *Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions* describes the great test of our generation—the struggle to integrate nations formerly captive to communism within Euro-Atlantic security institutions.

The end of the Cold War has provided a wealth of opportunities for academics to bridge the gap between scholarly pursuits and Western governments’ programmatic objectives. Thus, scholars like Young
have also become technicians of security sector reform and defense institution building.

“This is the first time such a broad analysis of all these countries’ defense institutions has been assembled in one work in order to provide an analysis and to enable a comparative understanding and appreciation of the status of their development,” writes Young (11). Most practitioners of defense transition have, at some time or other, penned an article or two about our experiences in the field. But nowhere will one find a better structured and defended argument as to what went wrong in our Western support of transition democracies, and how to fix it.

The premise of Anatomy is that Western support methods and principles have failed—a generation since the Cold War came to an end—to support post-Communist states’ defense transition effectively. Consequently, we have new NATO allies whose political, structural, and operational reliability remain doubtful, even more so the further east one travels.

Anatomy begins with a description of the basic command and management philosophy that provides the overarching legacy of defense institutions in former Warsaw Pact, Soviet, and Yugoslav Republics. Chapter 2 proceeds with a critique of Western defense concepts and the pursuit of merely technical interoperability. Anatomy posits the Western model is the ideal to which every new NATO member aspires. This critique is then followed by an exploration of relationship management between Western countries’ advisors and their counterparts in recipient countries. The sobering conclusion of this section is that it is far better to speak plainly about shortcomings (whether the audience is the defense cooperation agency at home or the national representative of a transition country) than to “sugarcoat” partial achievements as great victories.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 discuss the situation in former Warsaw Pact countries, the former Soviet Republics, and former Yugoslavia, respectively. There, the arguments may appear anecdotal and repetitive. But the book’s audience is chiefly policymakers and students of defense diplomacy. Therefore, Young’s anecdotes are precious indicators that allow him to diagnose a “pathology” of legacy defense management behavior that perpetuates the old ways and makes institutions unchangeable (11).

If one only has time to read part of this important contribution, the reader should focus on chapters 7 and 8, which provide a vigorous critique of Western and NATO responses to central and eastern European defense management pathologies. Anatomy suggests “honest defense” as an antidote to lackluster defense institution and capacity building (203). In essence, it suggests speaking truth to power about the challenges and pitfalls of supporting transitioning defense institutions.
Built on a rigorous and logical structure and supported by expert analysis, Anatomy succeeds at giving a clear picture of the overall capability of our new allies at fulfilling their respective roles within the Alliance. This picture is clear but not pretty. The implications are extremely worrisome, and this is why Young’s Anatomy is such an important contribution to the field of defense studies.

Anatomy does not suffer from major faults, though it seems at times to act as a catharsis for the author. This is understandable. When one spends their best years supporting transition, one would be justified in expecting results. Frustration at the lack of progress would be even more justifiable. The incomplete transition has many causes, including the advisors’ Pyle-like naive enthusiasm that democracy and all that follows is genuinely desired. Current reporting on democratic retreat in Hungary, parlous minority rights in the Baltic states, and corruption in Ukraine are but a few indicators of the persisting malaise of transition. It remains to be seen whether honest defense is a sufficient remedy.

Honest defense should be supplemented by new subjects of instruction in our staff colleges. Anatomy would serve as the ideal textbook and keystone for a course on providing policy advice, defense and security cooperation program management, and defense diplomacy and institution-building management. Young’s Anatomy provides an invaluable contribution to the field of post-Soviet studies, public administration, and development studies. And after 25 years of only relative success in defense transition, it is not an exaggeration to say dedicated academic programs should be designed with Young’s experience in mind to prepare the next generation of advisors and security sector reform technicians.

The West won the Cold War by staying true to its principles while the chasm between deeds and words grew ever deeper in the Soviet camp. Anatomy suggests the post-Cold War is not over. The adversary is not Communist ideology, but rather the legacy of that ideology. We have taken too much time to recognize that the philosophy, psychology, and ethics of entire nations have been transformed by their totalitarian experience.
Landpower in the Long War, Projecting Force After 9/11
Edited by Jason W. Warren, foreword by Daniel P. Bolger


Drawn from papers presented at the United States Army War College during a symposium on landpower, editor Jason Warren has assembled diverse views of a broad topic. That said, Daniel Bolger's foreword and the editor's own introduction provide a general common denominator unifying the collection—landpower still matters. Seeking to do more than recount nearly two decades of campaigning in Afghanistan and Iraq, the essays deliver justification (some better than others) for reflection on the importance of landpower.

Following the foreword and his own introduction, Warren organized the eighteen essays under five broad subject headings: the strategic underpinnings of US landpower, the projection of US landpower, other purveyors of landpower, the US Army as a landpower institution, and landpower's influence on society. Even with undeniably entreating chapter titles such as James DiCrocco’s “Reading Manila, Thinking about Wiesbaden: Current Parallels to Pre-World War II Unpreparedness,” this review will be limited to samplings from each of the five broad subject headings.

Addressing the strategic underpinnings of landpower, Peter Mansoor builds on the first chapter’s recognition that many of the assumptions about the nature of war in Iraq in 2003 were wrong. His essay, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and Strategic Thought in the U.S. Military, 1991–2003,” demolishes the concept of “rapid, decisive operations” underpinning Secretary Rumsfeld’s vision of war versus its reality (32). This essay is important in the context of the Army’s current efforts to reorient on peer competitors. Joel Hillison’s compact essay with rich endnotes offers strong evidence that landpower must confront “deviant globalization” allowing nonstate actors to increase their relative strength through speed and mobility. Hillison’s prescription for moving beyond tactical and operational outcomes to “desired political outcomes” will resonate in the corridors of professional military education (PME) (44, 57).

The projecting landpower section begins with a strong acknowledgment by Frank Sobchak that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 may very well be “deemed the worst foreign policy decision in the history of the Republic” (86). Sobchak clinically moves through many subsequent decisions that have led to a seemingly unending commitment of US forces in Iraq. In the following chapter, Gregory Roberts reveals
a similar inability to balance ends, ways, and means in Afghanistan. A lack of strategic clarity about the very broad goal of “a state of perpetual prevention . . . to avert further attacks on the homeland” was compounded in the early days by an administration eschewing nation building and the United States outsourced the task to an international coalition (107). Eighteen years later, the United States still struggles to define a realistic end state for its campaign in Afghanistan.

In the third section related to other purveyors of landpower, William Waddell’s excellent essay on Airpower offers a concise explanation of effects-based operations. Iraq, just as in 1991, offered the perfect venue to demonstrate the concept until it didn’t. Low-tech insurgents “[were] an ‘effect’ for which no one had really planned” (163). The US Air Force supports but cannot really lead in the wars that have emerged, thus possibly explaining the attraction of a return to peer competition and space.

The real strength of Edward Gutiérrez’s essay on the interaction between the intelligence community and the military lies in its message about ethics and leadership. The application of hard power—landpower surely meets this threshold—must be done so with “justice and reason” by leaders with humility (172). Ibrahim Al-Marashi’s “ISIS’s Projection of landpower in Iraq” is not to be missed, offering a wonderful example of the extent of unintended consequences, as unemployed Iraqi officers sought a means of redress for US decisions in 2003.

Looking at the US Army as an institution in the fourth section, John Bonin’s “On Headquarters: Use and Abuse of Army Operational Headquarters (and Contracting) from 2001 to 2015” could be simplified further—penny-wise, pound-foolish. Sadly, despite instances in the recent past where a failure to resource command and control commensurate with the task at hand has had horrific results, headquarters remain less than sexy compared to other bright shiny initiatives. Fighting peer competitors will mean much more than advanced technology and new concepts. Someone will have to lead the fight, and more importantly, someone else should be trying to answer the critical question, “what next?” while the current fight is still unfolding.

The last two essays speak to how war influences societies for good and for bad. Jackie Whitt offers one of the few rays of hope from the last eighteen years. Anyone who has attended a naturalization ceremony in an active theater of war won’t be surprised to learn 110,000 noncitizens took the path of service to citizenship, even with the path narrowing dramatically in 2017 through policy change. The crucible of land combat offered women the right to choose combat arms. Lawrence Tritle’s “Post-Traumatic Stress (Disorder) in the Post-9/11 World” describes the human cost of applying landpower. His creative linkage between football and combat to propel advances in medical science is fascinating.

Despite the cost, the is a wonderful resource. The explanation of past events will offer new students of landpower foundational knowledge rather than tribal lore. Graduate students and officers at senior service
colleges can mine detailed endnotes to start their own research on related topics. Instructors can use succinct reading assignments to foster Socratic dialogue. At times the editing was uneven with too much “vice” and “leveraging” used in the military vernacular. And the shadow cast by Rumsfeld in many chapters begs for further exploration. Still, while few will need or want to read this book cover to cover, those who do will be rewarded with new perspectives.
James Barr offers an exquisitely researched account of the largely forgotten or misremembered history of the rivalry in the Middle East between a declining Great Britain and rising United States from 1942 until the British departure from the Persian Gulf in 1971.

This is James Barr’s third major book examining the history of Western Great Power engagement in the Middle East. Setting the Desert on Fire focuses on T. E. Lawrence and the British war effort in the Arabian Peninsula during World War I (2007). A Line in the Sand explores the competition between Britain and France in the Middle East during the interwar period and World War II (2011). This newest contribution to the historical literature is a natural progression of his earlier academic work.

Historians will relish the fresh insights offered into the detailed strategic and tactical machinations of the United States and Great Britain during this period. Barr takes full advantage of recently declassified archives in both London and Washington to knit together a compelling and engaging narrative of the behind-the-scenes diplomacy and spy craft reflecting the different strategic perspectives and diverging regional interests of these erstwhile allies.

These tales of outright competition and covert efforts to undermine one another’s interests will come as a shock to casual observers of today’s global politics who understandably (if unwisely) assume that the alliance between Britain and the United States is an enduring and permanent feature of the international security landscape.

Barr is undoubtedly a talented storyteller fully capable of painting events with vibrant color that will entertain the average reader, but the book also represents a genuine contribution to the scholarship examining the history of Western engagement in the modern Middle East. Beyond these freshly unearthed details contained in memoirs and diplomatic papers, Barr’s strongest contribution is his ability to narrate these details within a broader strategic context as seen from Washington and London.

In Barr’s assessment, the US-UK rivalry in the region was grounded in differing strategic traditions and rationales. British interests in the Middle East had long been driven by the need to secure commercial and military access to colonial possessions in India. In the post-World War II
era, British strategies came to be dominated more narrowly by the need for oil. “British companies’ domination of Middle Eastern oil production generated vital revenues for the Crown, improved Britain’s perennially poor balance of payments, and enabled the country to defend itself in the event of war with Soviet Russia” (3). British interests in the region were therefore considered enduring, vital, and not subject to negotiation or substantial compromise.

Barr suggests that American interests in the region had historically been quite minimal, were largely driven by commercial considerations, and were consequently “more realistic and flexible” (4). This allowed Washington to look upon the region with a distant and fresh set of eyes, enabling US policymakers to navigate more nimbly the political and economic transformations sweeping the region.

Barr’s wide-ranging account covers the most significant crises in the US-UK competition for influence in chronological order employing short, easily digestible chapters. This logical progression allows the reader to trace the evolution of American and British tensions throughout the region.

Barr’s narrative smartly covers the intense commercial and political competition for access to Saudi oil in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the founding of Israel in 1948, the 1953 coup in Iran, the Suez Crisis of 1956, as well various intra-Arab rivalries that animated multiple regime changes and conflict in Syria, Iraq, Oman, and Yemen into the 1960s.

Navigating the book for insights into particular issues or events might be problematic for readers not deeply familiar with the history of the region. While several of the chapters are clearly titled (for example, “The Jewish Problem,” “Fight for Palestine,” “Baghdad Pact” and “The Suez Miscalculation”), others are more opaquely named (for example, “Sheep’s Eyes,” “Eggs in One Basket,” “The Man in the Arena”).

Nonetheless, the book will certainly yield careful readers important insights, the most obvious a reinforcement of the nineteenth century British statesman Lord Palmerston’s admonition that “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

The breadth and strength of America’s global alliance structure created in the aftermath of World War II have been the envy of countries around the world. But the historical narrative of this book reminds us that even alliances forged in the crucible of war should not be taken for granted. Global and regional alliances require constant tending to overcome the tendency of narrow divergent interests to drive wedges between even the closest of partners.

Perhaps most saliently, Barr recounts an anecdote that poses the most fundamental question for contemporary US policymakers and military strategists. In 1953, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles completed a tour through the Middle East that included meetings with
national leaders in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan. At nearly every turn he encountered “an intense distrust and dislike for the British” and ultimately concluded that British troops based in the region had become “more a factor of instability . . . than stability” (215).

It has now been nearly 20 years since the US military intervened in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Yet the region today remains a primary source of global terrorism, continues to suffer broadly from authoritarian political repression, and is being ravaged by multiple ongoing civil wars and insurgencies. US policymakers should wonder whether leaders in Arab capitals, Europe, or elsewhere might now be drawing a similar conclusion regarding the presence of US forces in the region.

Fighting Means Killing: Civil War Soldiers and the Nature of Combat

By Jonathan M. Steplyk

Reviewed by Phillip Cuccia, former academic engagement director, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, current volunteer adjunct professor, US Army War College

Jonathan M. Steplyk’s book Fighting Means Killing: Civil War Soldiers and the Nature of Combat, a historical analysis, is truly a tour de force regarding individual soldiers’ thoughts, reflections, and attitudes toward killing another human being during the American Civil War (1861–65). Steplyk thoroughly analyzes what the soldiers in blue and gray wrote on this topic during and after the war in their diaries, letters home, and reflections.

Steplyk’s abundant sources are mostly firsthand primary accounts from Civil War soldiers who killed—or chose not to kill—and authoritative secondary sources. He compares and contrasts his findings about the nature of killing in the Civil War with what other researchers discovered while studying the same topic in other wars. The impressive, thorough analysis makes the book quite engaging for the reader attracted to detail.

Although many Civil War works address the subject of killing in combat, not one makes that topic the focal point of the study; hence, Steplyk’s book is unique. It offers much insight to the Civil War historical community and to those studying the psychology of killing in battle. Steplyk did not dive deeply into the aspect of what today would be termed post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of killing in combat. The omission may not only be from scarce documentation on the topic during the Civil War but also because it falls outside of the scope of this important work regarding cultural and military history.

The book opens with the reactions of the North and South to the first reported bloodshed of the war: the killing of Colonel Elmer E.
Ellsworth when he took down a large Confederate flag atop the Marshall House hotel in Alexandria, Virginia. The insightful and profound analysis continues in the remaining chapters.

Steplyk methodically walks the reader through a gamut of feelings, attitudes, and emotions toward killing by looking at the recruits’ backgrounds before the war in relation to guns, marksmanship, and hunting; by analyzing how a soldier felt during his first battle; and by relating how soldiers described killing in letters home and in their diaries with such expressions as “good execution,” “deliberate aim,” and “murderous fire” (89).

Steplyk’s insightful analysis of the phraseology in soldiers’ accounts of battle is aided by his use of contemporary dictionaries, which clarify word usage of the time. The author also discusses hand-to-hand combat and why Civil War soldiers engaged in this type of fighting so infrequently. He concludes that bayonet instruction, when given, was meant to keep soldiers busy as much as it was to improve their fighting skills.

Some historians claim a unique characteristic of this brother-against-brother conflict was the soldier’s preference to use clubbed muskets rather than bayonets in close combat. Steplyk, however, states that his research did not uncover any examples of Union or Confederate soldiers explicitly stating that they preferred fighting with clubbed muskets or that it was more bearable than bayonet fighting.

Steplyk next addresses the topic of sharpshooters as hunters of men and the common soldiers’ attitudes toward these marksmen. He debunks the notion that most soldiers expressed hatred toward sharpshooters, an idea that was perpetuated by relying on Robert Stiles and Frank Wilkeson’s battle accounts used in Earl Hess’s *The Union Soldier in Battle* (1997) and Bruce Catton’s *A Stillness at Appomattox* (1953). Steplyk concludes that antipathy toward sharpshooters was not the norm. He supports that conclusion with the observation that there was a lack of atrocities committed against sharpshooters during the Civil War compared with numerous twentieth-century conflicts, especially World War II, after which many combat troops acknowledged that snipers were not taken prisoner but killed outright.

The author then addresses murder and mercy with an in-depth study spanning the spectrum between these two extremes. He differentiates between murder and killing both within the context of the Civil War and with the religious mores of that time. Most readers would agree with his description of unlawful killing on the battlefield as murder and normal battlefield killing as morally permissible. His treatment of the topic is profound and could prove to be therapeutic for one who has been in a situation where they were faced with killing in battle.

Even when Steplyk is dissecting, scrutinizing, and evaluating the soldiers’ accounts of their actions on the battlefield, he does it objectively, without moralizing or lecturing. He shows that mercy on the battlefield
was inextricably tied to providing comfort to wounded enemy soldiers and to the complexities involved with the act of surrender during the heat of battle. His descriptions of soldiers surrendering immediately after discharging their weapons present an example of moral dilemmas soldiers were faced with during the Civil War which are timeless on the battlefield as soldiers today face similar situations.

Steplyk disagrees with modern historians who suggest soldiers declining to shoot at one another on the picket line were evading or compromising a duty to kill the enemy. He provides sound contemporary military reasoning for his rationale. He takes an academic look at how and why soldiers were able to set up unofficial truces to trade and fraternize with their enemy, and moments later, after returning to their respective sides, try to kill each other.

The concluding chapter deals with the influence of race and hate in the context of combat. Steplyk recounts how Confederate policies toward slavery led to the dehumanizing of black soldiers, consequently, a lack of mercy toward them. The book ends with the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln and an examination of that murder’s effects on the nation and its attitudes toward reconciliation.

Steplyk’s research and writing in Fighting Means Killing contribute greatly to our collective understanding of the Civil War. His judicious use of philosophy, psychology, and religion, in addition to a thorough historical approach on both the social and military side, make for a well-rounded treatment of the subject. Junior as well as senior leaders of the defense community will find the analysis in this book helpful in understanding the psychology of killing in combat. Those that have engaged in combat will perhaps find reading this book therapeutic and thought-provoking. Steplyk’s work fills a big gap with this thorough analysis of the attitudes of Civil War soldiers toward killing in combat. It will likely be the authoritative source on this subject for decades to come.

**How to Think about War: An Ancient Guide to Foreign Policy**

By Thucydides, edited by Johanna Hanink

Reviewed by MAJ Kerney M. Perlik, US Army aviation officer and assistant professor of international relations and international security studies at the US Military Academy at West Point

Casually citing Thucydides’s *History of the Peloponnesian War* in discussions of modern political and military strategy has become an intellectual status symbol among foreign policy and military elites. Interpretations of Thucydides’s benchmark historic account have become almost biblical: debates about strict versus loose interpretation follow each major translation of the text or the argument that invokes one of Thucydides’s self-purported timeless lessons.
The challenge with choosing the context in which to apply Thucydides’s lessons is that devotees simplify and warp the lessons of the Peloponnesian War to suit their specific purposes. Many draw limited conclusions like fear, honor, and interest as enduring motives for war or the classical realist conclusion that “might makes right” in foreign policy. Authors across disciplines, including political scientists like David A. Welch and Richard Ned Lebow, have even criticized this tendency to abridge or misinterpret Thucydides’s complex History as a disservice to the ancient historian and modern political scientist.

Entering into this apparent zero-sum intellectual battlefield is Johanna Hanink’s innovative translation of selected speeches from Thucydides. She states her approach of providing the full text, an introduction, and a direct translation for 6 speeches, out of more than 140, makes the key speeches and dialogue “fresh and approachable” (xviii). She also believes the concise version of Thucydides allows readers to bypass political bias and determine for themselves whether the lessons of Athens and Sparta apply to contemporary cases in foreign policy.

Without the luxury of spending much time on a single work, faculty in survey courses often choose one of two ways to teach Thucydides: leave it out entirely or offer up the “Melian Dialogue” or “Pericles’ Funeral Oration” as the sole representation of a far richer, more complicated history. The latter approach is like teaching a history of World War II by presenting Pearl Harbor as the only worthwhile historical lesson. With How to Think about War, students at least see key speeches set chronologically and in contrast to one another, avoiding an entirely one-dimensional takeaway: The “Mytilenean Debate” versus the “Melian Dialogue,” Pericles’s cautionary but idealistic “First War Speech” compared to “The Sicilian Debate” that marks the beginning of the end for the Athenian empire.

The author’s commitment to linguistic authenticity serves students and teachers of the classics and students in survey courses on international relations or foreign policy also benefit. Military leaders, foreign policy advisors, and policymakers who do not have time to delve into a full translation can use this book to assess the intrigue and the enduring appeal of Thucydides. Such self-taught students may miss the richness of lessons gleaned from the whole book but gain more than the oft-quoted realist refrain: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Readers come away with Hanink’s slightly different translation of the famed excerpt from the “Melian Dialogue”—“Those in positions of power do what their power permits, while the weak have no choice but to accept it.” The irony of that ode to power politics in direct contrast to the subsequent debate on the Sicilian expedition, in which Athens’ bloated sense of power and status is deflated in a crushing defeat precipitated by strategic overreach, is also recognized (xlviii).
Hanink’s contribution fills a few gaps in our collective understanding of Thucydides, but not without shortcomings. First, the subtitle *An Ancient Guide to Foreign Policy* is a bit of a misnomer. In the conversation surrounding Thucydides, scholars often hesitate to frame *History of the Peloponnesian War* as having any singular purpose, leaving that conclusion instead to the interaction between reader and ancient author.

Although one of the author’s expressed motives is to highlight the roles of individual leaders by translating speeches and not Thucydides’s commentary, she omits speeches from key characters whom she introduces, like the Athenian General Nicias who is represented only in the Sicilian expedition debate. But without Nicias’s letter to Athens from Sicily in 414 BC or his final speeches to his beleaguered troops on the eve of their imminent defeat in Syracuse, the reader misses the tragedy of a military leader who cannot detach himself and his men from a hopeless battle he initially opposed. Another example of a missed opportunity is not including any of the speeches or debates from book one, where the peripheral conflict between Corcyra and Corinth sets in motion the direct great-power conflict between Athens and Sparta.

Still, Hanink’s translation provides a worthwhile addition to the ongoing dialogue inspired by Thucydides. There is plenty of room to criticize the choices for this abridged version of an ancient classic, but the truth is Hanink provides a much more skilled “fresh and approachable” presentation of Thucydides than many of us would accomplish (xviii).

She also offers a critical piece of advice for those who proselytize the virtues of Athenian power and democracy as the model of a great power in wartime: “The reader who turns to these speeches in search of practical ancient wisdom is strongly encouraged to do so with the ultimate fate of Thucydides’s Athens in mind” (liv). For any student of war, it is prudent to know how the story ends before sharing its lessons.

**Major General George H. Sharpe and the Creation of American Military Intelligence in the Civil War**

By Peter G. Tsouras

Reviewed by Rev. Wylie W. Johnson, DMin, Pastor, the Springfield Baptist Church and Law Enforcement Chaplain in Delaware County, PA

Peter Tsouras’ well researched volume is an excellent development of the largely untold story of America’s first intelligence service—the Bureau of Military Information (BMI) and its unsung genius, Major General George H. Sharpe. It is an important follow-on companion to Fishel’s *The Secret War for the Union* (1996).

This volume follows the life of Sharpe from birth through his final years. Wrapped around the man, the bulk of the book is the incredible story of inventing an intelligence service in stride while fully engaged in the eastern campaign of the Civil War. This concept and creation of a
Union Army intelligence service was at the direction of Major General Joseph Hooker, who found himself as the Commander of the Army of the Potomac when Lincoln relieved Major General George B. McClellan in January 1863.

Joe Hooker was the godfather of modern American Military intelligence. Although he faded from center stage after Chancellorsville, the military intelligence structure he created soldiered on to tip the scales of victory in the Union’s favor at the decisive battle of Gettysburg that followed days after his relief. That structure went on to play a vital role in the subsequent victory of the Army of the Potomac. (36, 37)

Hooker’s prescient choice for his new intelligence service was Colonel George H. Sharpe, a Kingston, New York lawyer who had raised the 120th New York Regiment and brought it to the conflict. Hooker’s transformational innovation was to develop a staff section for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and reporting on enemy strength and potential intent, logistics, morale, weaponry, depots, as well as the intervening terrain.

Upon Hooker’s direction to begin shaping an intelligence staff section, Sharpe immediately began to gather key individuals as he developed the first all-source military intelligence unit in the US Army. Sharpe carefully and consistently developed principles of action and understanding, directing competent persons to gather raw information, analyze and test the data, and develop true military intelligence estimates.

There was nothing comparable in the southern force. And despite many institutional barriers, Sharpe’s BMI gathered reports from spies, cavalry scouts, signal stations reading Confederate wigwag messages, the (short-lived) Balloon Corps, interrogations of deserters and prisoners, southern newspapers, and freed or runaway slaves.

By careful, all-source analysis and record keeping, Sharpe was able to discard or verify information and develop very precise Confederate order of battle reports. Unlike the wild and imaginary estimates of McClellan, Sharpe’s estimates were rarely off by more than seven or eight percent. And crucially, Sharpe was usually able to pinpoint the location and strength of key opponents on the battlefield.

Almost immediately, Sharpe was able to provide Hooker with decisive intelligence—regarded as the best intelligence effort crafted during the Civil War—for a battle plan, which featured a double envelopment of Lee’s Army (the battle of Chancellorsville), accompanied by an end-run cavalry operation, with the goal of cutting off the Confederate logistics source, leaving the southern army without supply.

Unfortunately for Union forces, the incompetent cavalry commander, Brigadier General George Stoneman, failed to carry out his assignment; Confederate Lieutenant General Robert E. Lee reacted immediately to the crisis situation; and Hooker lost his nerve against lesser forces. But Sharpe’s BMI provided intelligence leading Hooker (soon to be relieved by Major General George G. Meade) to move the Union Forces north in response to Lee’s aggressive northern march.
The Union Army, greatly troubled by senior jealousies over rank and privilege, regarded Sharpe’s innovation as meddlesome and unimportant. Meade was usually of the mind to disregard Sharpe’s reports and return to a more familiar way of processing intelligence, even resorting to interrogating prisoners and deserters himself.

When Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant arrived in the Eastern theater, he retained Meade as the Commander of the Army of the Potomac. Later, Grant brought the BMI and Sharpe into his personal staff. The two eventually became close associates, and their friendship continued long after the war years.

The closing chapters detail personal and political events in Sharpe’s life after he returned to Kingston, New York. While of some interest, the real value of this book is the unveiling of the Union’s secrets. Unfortunately, Sharpe never wrote an autobiography or a history of the BMI, and much is lost to history as the national archives are incomplete. Sharpe was a true spymaster, taking most of his secrets to the grave (important for the wellbeing of his spies and scouts still living in the south).

Tragically, the BMI was quickly disbanded following the end of the war. The Army established the Military Intelligence Division (MID) much later in 1883. Although the Army reorganized the MID into the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) during World War II, military intelligence continued to be a bit player in the grand scheme of things until the MIS itself was reorganized in 1962 as the Army Intelligence and Security Branch.

This biography names individuals, long lost to history, who made significant achievements—key innovations and decisions—in the gathering and development of military intelligence, highlighting that no commander works in isolation. The book contains extensive appendices, clear photographs, helpful maps, and is fairly readable. While there are a few annoying typos (including a misspelling of Sharpe’s name), the book is an important resource in understanding the second half of the eastern campaign of the Civil War and will likely appeal to those currently involved in intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination efforts.

The Hall of Mirrors: War and Warfare in the Twentieth Century
By Jim Storr

Reviewed by David Ulbrich, associate professor and program director of the Master of Arts in the history and military history programs at Norwich University

Jim Storr’s Hall of Mirrors makes for a fascinating, yet frustrating, read. He analyzes warfare during the twentieth century to glean lessons from “the largely human processes by which war is waged” (vii). He uses British military history as the focal point because he is a retired British Army officer and because British forces were engaged in conflicts for most of the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries.
Storr surveys the “course and conduct” of these conflicts, with the former being “largely a result of the strategy,” and the latter being “largely a matter of campaigns and tactics, [which were] informed in places by strategic decisions” (xii). The title points to why reflections among wars are distorted by context, bias, culture, and other factors. Storr’s arguments are refreshingly opinionated, though not without some content flaws and research gaps.

Chapter 1 starts in the early 1900s with brief overviews of the Boer War and the Philippine-American War. Storr then devotes three chapters to the First World War, where he finds imbalances in every belligerent nation’s activities between grand strategy and strategy on one hand and operations and tactics on the other. This unevenness resulted in the bloodbaths of trench warfare. The evolution of maneuver warfare forms the pivot point between the bloodbath during the first three years and the more successful advances in 1918, as evinced by British Field Marshal Douglas Haig’s experiments with tactical and operational remedies for the problems of trench warfare.

Chapter 5 on the interwar years serves as an interlude when nations struggled to develop new weapons systems and doctrines that could reduce the defensive monopoly on firepower in the First World War and increase the mobility of assault forces in future conflicts. Summarized best by Storr, the three chapters on the Second World War provide the most attention to strategic bombing and ground campaigns in Eastern Europe, mentioning the Pacific War intermittently:

The Second World War was won strategically because America entered the war. Operationally, the war against Germany was won when Germany was overrun. That happened because of the destruction of Army Group Centre and Overload, both in 1944. It was not, nor appreciably shortened, by bombing. Japan was not defeated by atomic bombs. They merely hastened its end. Operationally, Japan was largely defeated by a highly effective series of amphibious campaigns. (140)

In chapters 9 and 10 on the Cold War, Storr astutely points to the conundrums of fighting limited wars in an era when dominant ideologies and the ever-present threat of nuclear weapons made the dangers of total wars very real. He argues winning wars was not possible in a traditional, conventional sense because nations could not align grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics. These chapters on the Cold War stand as the most valuable in the book.

The last five chapters shift from a chronological to a thematic approach. Storr examines the changes in military technology, again focusing primarily on ground and air operations. He correctly asserts, “The strongest logical and statistical correlations between battlefield phenomena are not those between weapons effect and damage . . . but between movement and changing behavior” (192; emphasis added).
Later, he explains why “good” and “bad” counterinsurgency practices hinge on the quality of communications, political systems, infrastructure, security, and stability, as well as on the proportionality of military force relative to collateral damage. Storr then takes a hard look at the morality and utility of strategic bombing, neither of which, he believes, justify the expense in resources or lives. Instead, he makes the useful suggestion that reconnaissance, raiding, and surveillance represent the ideal roles for aircraft. He concludes the book by applying theories of probability, agency, anthropology, and sociology to warfare.

*Hall of Mirrors* is not a monograph that includes scholarly conventions like endnotes and annotations, but rather a thought piece with minimal citations. This is not a judgment of the book’s value in and of itself, but rather a statement of fact. Authors need not pass academic litmus tests for their books to be valuable to readers. Nevertheless, such a structure, where arguments cannot be quickly corroborated in the text or endnotes, leaves Storr open to questions and criticisms. His acknowledged Anglocentric focus and preponderance of British sources prove frustrating because he did not incorporate some important British and American scholarship into his book.

The abovementioned quote about the outcome of the Second World War illustrates some of Storr’s historical oversights and historiographical omissions. His coverage of strategic bombing does not adequately address the nuanced debates about the efficacy of the bombing campaign. His analysis could have been enriched by consulting works by Robin Higham, Alfred Mierzejewski, Tami Davis Biddle, Gian Gentile, John Buckley, and Robert Pape.

Elsewhere, neither Robert Doughty nor Eugenia Kiesling appears in Storr’s bibliography despite their influential interpretations of France’s military in the interwar period and the 1940 defeat. In sections on the same period in the Pacific, Storr does not reference Edward Miller, David Evans, Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and Alvin Coox.

Turning to cultural factors affecting warfare, Storr’s examination of the Eastern Front does not integrate books by Omer Bartov, Wolfram Wette, Christopher Browning, or Geoffrey Megargee that reveal why racial ideology so profoundly affected German decisions and actions at all levels of warfare.

Similar prejudiced worldviews affected the course and conduct of the Pacific War in horrific ways, but the works of Gerald Horne, Yuki Tanaka, and John Dower are missing from the bibliography. The dearth of cultural studies of warfare is especially marked in light of Storr’s recurring connections of warfare with the human condition and human agency.

These caveats notwithstanding, *Hall of Mirrors* stands as a useful study because of the patterns of conflicts illuminated by Jim Storr. This synthetic survey will provide fodder for discussions among uniformed personnel and civilian academics alike.
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