Special Commentary: The Compound Security Dilemma
Isaiah Wilson III and Scott A. Smitson

Geostrategic Net Estimate
John R. Deni
Nathan P. Freier and John H. Schaus

Geostrategic Forecasting
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Leadership and Innovation
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Applied Strategic Art
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This issue of *Parameters* features talent from across the US Army War College. It is arranged thematically based on four major research areas critical to US security: geostrategic net estimate, geostrategic forecasting, leadership and innovation, and applied strategic art. Opening this issue, though, is a Special Commentary by Isaiah Wilson III and Scott Smitson entitled “The Compound Security Dilemma: Threats at the Nexus of War and Peace.” The authors argue the nature of today’s threats poses a compound security dilemma that demands nothing less than compound security solutions capable of embracing the contemporary multipolar ecosystem and its competitive dynamics.

The first research area, *Geostrategic Net Estimate*, showcases two contributions. John Deni’s “The United States and the Transatlantic Relationship” analyzes the major political and economic variables that will affect America’s relationship with Europe over the next two to four years. Looking at the Indo-Pacific region, “INDOPACOM through 2030” by Nathan Freier and John Schaus outlines the role the US Army can play in addressing the strategic changes underway in Asia and the Pacific region. The US Army, the authors believe, can have a transformational effect on the Joint Force approach to military capacities of key strategic partners within the region.

Our second forum, *Geostrategic Forecasting*, offers three essays. In “Future Warfare: Weaponizing Critical Infrastructure,” Carol Evans alerts us to the fact that hybrid warfare now includes ways in which America’s adversaries are weaponizing critical infrastructure—particularly energy, transportation, information, communications, and the industrial base—to undermine the defense postures of NATO and the United States. In “The Politics of Oath-Taking,” Marybeth Ulrich seeks to raise the awareness of the responsibility oath-takers, both political and professional, have in upholding the Constitution. In “Designing Military Strategies under Uncertainty,” G. K. Cunningham offers suggestions for crafting curriculum for professional military education that considers the wicked problems of contemporary international security when establishing contextual frameworks for strategy.

The third research area, *Leadership and Innovation*, includes three articles. Steven Metz’s “The Future of Strategic Leadership” suggests contemporary strategic leaders have yet to transcend twentieth-century, industrial-age leadership models to develop the entrepreneurial-leadership skills necessary to meet twenty-first century challenges. Anthony Pfaff’s “Military Ethics below the Threshold of War” describes a novel ethic for the use of military power that will introduce new norms associated with escalation, reprisal, and risk, increasing permissible uses of force while limiting their scope. Michael Lynch’s “Army Modernization in the 21st Century” maintains the US Army is learning important lessons from the failure of its future combat system a decade ago.
Our final forum, *Applied Strategic Art*, also consists of three contributions. In “Winning the Narrative War,” Samantha Taylor and Amanda Cronkhite examine policy narratives of Presidents George H. W. Bush and William J. (Bill) Clinton to reveal the fragility of messaging and how consistency in framing foreign policy initiatives is crucial to maintaining public support. In “Integrated Campaigning in the Pacific, 1918–1948,” Earl Catagnus Jr. and Jonathan Klug reveal the historical underpinnings of two critical Joint Staff documents, the *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* and *Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum*. Finally, in “Origins of US Army Strategic Landpower,” John Bonin argues the core competencies the US Army demonstrated in World War II remain vital in today’s national security environment. —AJE
ABSTRACT: The United States faces compound security threats today reflecting a paradigm shift in the character of global geopolitical competition. Arraying these threats against liabilities in strategic and policy frameworks poses a significant, unacknowledged challenge: a new compound security dilemma. This compound security dilemma demands compound solutions that recognize, adapt, and embrace the multipolar ecosystem and its global political, cultural, economic, health, and competitive dynamics.

Today’s tumultuous global security environment is best characterized as one of contagious, disruptive change—converging, transregional, compound security threats, a pathological weakening of nation-states, and arguably a breakdown of the Western liberal order itself. A variety of security threats driven by cultural, political, and historical forces have combined in ways that have fundamentally altered the character of threat and the environment of global geopolitical competition, confronting US policymakers with a compound security dilemma heretofore unacknowledged. Traditional security concerns have now merged with human health and security issues due to the interconnected nature of our twenty-first century world, as painfully exemplified by the current pandemic. Foreign policy concerns have acquired a keen domestic focus while domestic policy concerns have received global attention.

The policies of a revanchist Russia, continuing conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and instability in Venezuela all provide compelling, geographically diverse, and comprehensive examples of the compound security threats faced by the United States today. Accordingly, US strategists need a theory and analytics-informed network model that can highlight the nexes between drivers of instability, horizontally and vertically and between ecosystems. By describing compound security threats, the underlying compound security dilemma that generates these threats, the resulting policy puzzles, and by providing several examples, we offer the requisite foundations for a theory with significant utility for military strategy and force planning today and tomorrow. This special commentary is prerequisite and preamble to a larger, subsequent research theory-building project focused on further development and testing of the general governing dynamics of the compound security dilemma.
Compound Security Threats, Defined

The coronavirus provides a window into understanding the compound threats of today. At the time of this writing, the United States still confronts this deadly adversary, one that flouts accepted international laws and conventions regarding warfare and human security protections. This adversary has already achieved mass societal disruption at an alarming speed. Within three months this enemy inflicted over 152,000 casualties (confirmed cases) resulting in over 5,700 deaths globally. Worldwide economic market disruptions now threaten a global recession, and national publics now question the responsiveness of their governments’ capacity and even willingness to contain and mitigate the adversary. The second-, third-, and nth-order damage across all sectors—political, economic, societal, foreign and domestic—are as yet incalculable. The potential for a global paradigm shift in the way we perceive these threats is real.

Some readers may ask, why choose to speak of COVID-19 in terms more appropriate to traditional warfare—why speak of a global pandemic as a global, epoch-changing war? This moment is beyond the metaphorical: we are, in fact, at war against this virus, or at least we should be because COVID-19 is indicative of the changed nature of many of today’s threats.

Many contemporary threats have become compounded largely because their root causes and underlying conditions (or currents) have been allowed to persist unaddressed or under-addressed (see figure 1). These causes and conditions include economic imbalances; sectarian conflict; massive and sudden demographic shifts due to regional conflict, climate change, and insecurity; loss of trust in governing institutions; and border concerns inextricably tied to identity. The repercussions of these compound threats follow a multiplicative—or exponentially contagious—progression as opposed to an additive, linearly sequential one typical of traditional threats. Hence these repercussions dramatically alter the risk calculus, risk reward, and benefits-to-costs factors so critical to strategy planning and policy decision-making.

The combination—or more accurately compounding—of global dynamics such as wealth disparities, widening wealth and inequality gaps, instabilities and unpredictabilities in the global economic market, and global climate change (to varying degrees, artifacts of globalization) have resulted in what strategic forecasters have described as an environment of “constant tension between greater interdependence and intensifying competition” for increasingly scarce material and high-value resources.

In combination these environmental dynamics are the first, most fundamental and consequential of the major drivers of disruptive change shaping today’s global security environment and place new stresses on the long-standing liberal international system. Behavioral changes in international relations caused by these changes reflect an ongoing shift from a balance-of-power model of geopolitical competition to one of instability and unpredictability. In essence this shift marks a return to pre-World War I geo-mercantilism with “beggar-thy-neighbor” behaviors that foster go-it-alone and do-it-your-own-way approaches to solving security dilemmas.4

Veteran US National Security Council and State Department senior policy adviser Ambassador Richard Haass has dubbed this development a return to a “self-help” system of international competition.5 This system

makes forming and norming—holding together capable and willing coalitions for collective security and defense—more difficult while also making the formation of such coalitions more essential. As nation-states drift toward their own self-help solutions to solve security dilemmas, they are less likely to treat such dilemmas as collective problems.

This brings us to the issue of the threats themselves. In many respects these threats are more daunting than those of the Cold War. Historian Walter Russell Mead described the changed character of geopolitical competition in this way:

Sometime in 2013, we reached a new stage in world history. A coalition of great powers has long sought to overturn the post-Cold War Eurasian settlement that the United States and its allies imposed after 1990; in the second half of 2013 that coalition began to gain ground. . . . The big three challengers—Russia, China and Iran—all hate, fear and resent the current state of Eurasia. The balance of power it enshrines thwarts their ambitions; the norms and values it promotes pose deadly threats to their current regimes. . . . increasingly, they think they have found a way to challenge and ultimately to change the way global politics work.6

The major nation-state challengers (China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran) identified in the 2018 National Defense Strategy share common denominators as emerging threats: all represent illiberal states led by despots driven by anachronistic-world-order motives and hypernativist and statist philosophies and ideologies. The hard choices of the global system's leading power, the United States, regarding whether and, perhaps more importantly, how to intervene in world affairs will matter most. This behavioral driver of change, also known as American Interventionism, is the second major driver of disruptive change for the future global security environment. Since compound threats demand nothing less than compound solutions, only by developing an understanding of the compound security dilemma posed by compound security threats can we open the door to lasting, compound solutions.

Compound Security Threats under a “New” Compound Security Dilemma

The term compounded refers to the increased interaction—interconnectedness and collision—of otherwise once separate policy issues, reflecting a new, post–Cold War (and now post-9/11) international security environment.7 Where there was once a brighter line dividing policy issues of a limited domestic context and scope of impact and consequence from broader international policy concerns, the division between the national and the international is less relevant and less viable today.

The security dilemma of the twentieth century international environment—defined primarily by physical, material-based security threats of a military (martial) nature—has now given way to a new twenty-first century security dilemma, the compound security dilemma.\(^8\) Traditional security concerns over material resources are less and less divorceable from issues of human security. Matters of health and biological contagion, once easily and accurately recognized and not considered domestic security issues, today are merely parts of a larger and more complicated “global health security” whole in a compound security dilemma world. The novel coronavirus global pandemic could not be a more accurate example.

**Core Governing Dynamics**

A number of core dynamics govern this compound security dilemma. First, shocks in one traditionally distinct public policy sector such as economics have cascading effects on other sectors also related to human security. With little or no warning, a matter of oil supply and demand can turn into a regional or worldwide security concern, even predatory conflict. The competition for energy is a clear example of this compound security dilemma. Competition for energy supplies will continue to dominate the economic landscape during the next 30 years and growth in world energy demand is likely to rise annually by between 1.5 and 3.1 percent. This trend is likely to result in highly competitive pricing and the continued enrichment and economic progress, as well as predation, of producer countries including Russia and Iran.\(^9\) Concepts of domestic politics and policies such as energy policy and migration policy now take on a global context: we now must think of these policy issues and concerns in a security context.

The new compound security dilemma questions the foundational logic of the traditional security dilemma while also calling for an entirely new governing logic. It thus raises central questions of scale and legitimacy regarding preferred unilateral policy approaches over multilateral options (from an instrumental solvency as well as ideational sovereignty standpoint).

Another governing dynamic of the compound security dilemma is the tragedy of scales problem. In the past, policy treatment approaches to planning, decision-making, and implementation were designed and optimized toward efficiency metrics, calibrated around response-mitigate-recovery public policy standard operating processes and procedures. The contagion qualities of compound security threats, however, outgrow and outpace traditional policy prescriptions given their exponential growth characteristics.

An additional feature of the compound security dilemma is the interaction effect at play between simultaneous and overlapping

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\(^9\) DCDC, *Global Strategic Trends*. 
sources of instability. The manifestations of these threats derive their character from this interaction between variables; the effect is (at least) multiplicative not additive in nature (see table 1). This tendency of the compound security threat to outpace the capacity of policy response options is just as apt to the COVID-19 pandemic as it is to the rise of ISIS, the Afghanistan War, the crises in the Middle East, the compound threat in Venezuela, and numerous other nexes of conflict that manifest at geopolitical flashpoints.

Table 1. Comparison of security paradigms

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The compound security dilemma, similar to the paradox of the wicked problem, features poorly and undertimed treatments to threats that do not solve or mitigate but rather metastasize those threats at accelerative rates. This effect heightens the risks of miscalculation, mis-signaling, and runaway crisis escalation. Further, the actions of our adversaries generate and exploit compound security threats deliberately and strategically along the gaps and seams of traditional geographic combatant command boundaries. The geography of compound threats is an essential calculus in strategic planning, force planning, and risk management and mitigation.

The Russia Compound Security Threat

Russia now leads a systematic assault on Western democracies and the international system founded on Western liberal values. Putin’s Russia aims to subvert Western democracies internally, spread anti-NATO and anti-European Union sentiment, and undermine the rules-based liberal international order.

Russia’s revanchist tendencies and expansionism are most easily seen in its physical military presence along the traditional and historically vital nexus of its territorial and ethno-cultural near abroad. As the 1990s and 2000s witnessed a Western liberal states’ expansionism in various forms, including an expanded NATO eastward and southward, the 2010s and teens watched a precipitous spread of a Russian sphere of influence westward and southward. Russia’s recent involvement in the Syrian conflict can be seen as a continuance of this trajectory. The two geostrategic pathways are clearly moving in counterpoising directions leading to an inevitable, though not necessarily obvious, clash, possibly an epochal one.

For years, Russia has worked to gain influence in southeast Europe, first and foremost using Serbia, later Kosovo, and more recently Bosnia, as footholds to establish friendly pockets on a hostile continent at a historical geopolitical pivot that sits along a major civilizational fault line. Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and seeks to shatter
NATO and change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. The use of emerging technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes is concern enough but when this behavior is coupled with Russia’s expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal, the challenge is clear.10

At present, Russian activity is aggressive, focused, and directed. Russia is also engaging in expeditions far beyond its historic near abroad, bringing even broader geostrategic implications. Russian involvement in Syria should be viewed as expanding anti-access/area-denial posture in the eastern Mediterranean, greater Levant, and the Sinai Peninsula. Russian gray-zone warfare activities in Syria are complicating and strangling European attempts at pressure on Russia regarding the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Finally, Russia’s cybermanipulations of elections threaten the legitimacy and viability of electoral systems in democratic and democratizing countries, including the leading and guaranteeing power of the Western liberal community of democratic states, the United States.

The ISIL and “Syraq” Compound Security Threat

On June 9, 2014, the self-declared Islamic State breached and erased the international boundary separating Syria and Iraq, making the crises in Syria and in Iraq compound into one so-called Syraq. The vital national security interests of the United States did not necessarily fall within one or both nation-states, rather it fell across their nexus. Syraq as such is not simply a civil war. It is a compound war—a composite of at least three wars and possibly a fourth. The first is the Syrian Civil War in which Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, using primarily conventional forces, has brutally murdered hundreds of thousands of Syrian people.11 The second is the Syrian insurgency against the Assad regime. In this part of the conflict, insurgents have been trained and resourced by a multitude of different countries anxious to see Assad removed from power. The third is the international war against the Islamic State and other transregional terrorist organizations.

Arguably there is a fourth war in which the major combatants are weaponizing refugees by causing mass migration into southern Europe, metastasizing a threat to NATO member states in southern Europe and to the internal stability of the EU. This crisis is a form of war that many still fail to see as such; it is precisely a continuation of politics by other means with vectored, forced migrations aimed at overburdening and


eventually “breaking the nations” of Europe.\textsuperscript{12} And it is part of Russia’s deliberate strategy of disruption.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{The Venezuela Compound Security Threat}

Even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Venezuela experienced increased deterioration of the rule of law and an expansion of illicit activities, especially narcotics. Additionally, Venezuela continues to face a worsening humanitarian crisis, the continued collapse of its health sector, and greater food insecurity.

Venezuela is also faced with a worsening economic crisis beyond the effects being created by the current US sanctions regime. As the COVID-19 pandemic has taken hold bringing economic activity to a halt across the globe, an oil price war has unfolded—a byproduct of the failure by Saudi Arabia and Russia to come to a mutual collective agreement on supply cuts, resulting in an oversupplied market. The resulting drop in oil prices carries potentially dire implications for oil-exporting Latin American economies, several of which rely on oil revenues for substantial shares of their budgets.

The crisis in Venezuela is driving the largest exodus of refugees in recent history in Latin America—almost 4.5 million as accounted for by the United Nations in May.\textsuperscript{14} Additional projections estimate that by mid-2020, Venezuela will surpass Syria as the largest humanitarian crisis in the world.\textsuperscript{15} While numerous organizations like the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the US Agency for International Development are attempting to mitigate the effects of this crisis, neighbor states like Colombia and Brazil (two major US strategic partners) are at risk of exceeding their ability to absorb and support this mass exodus. This challenge will only be compounded as the effects of COVID-19 impact the region.

Finally, the instability of Venezuela also has geostrategic implications for the United States. Already a major platform of influence prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, Venezuela is the lens through which Russia and China continue to prioritize their efforts in Latin America.

While China continues to use its Belt and Road Initiative to gain access and influence throughout the region, China has also heavily invested in critical infrastructure, establishing “dual use” ports at key geostrategic

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choke points including Panama. These actions as well as the significant influence that China retains on the future of Venezuela is demonstrative of a broader pattern across the Western Hemisphere as stated by the US Southern Command Commander, Admiral Craig Faller, in a January 2020 testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Committee:

I look around the region and I see China working on multiple port deals, IT infrastructure, dams, mining, logging, fishing, including a significant illegal fishing, illegal mining and illegal logging. And I look at the port access that they're pursuing in El Salvador, Jamaica, Bahamas. I ask myself the question why would China want to buy an island and lock up a 99-year lease for most of the coast of El Salvador, right here within a two-hour flight of the continental United States. They are trying to achieve positional advantage right here in our neighborhood and that is alarming and concerning to me. It drives the sense of urgency with which I look at this competition.

Whereas as Chinese interests in Venezuela are a blend of geoeconomics-meets-geostrategy, Russia’s interests in Venezuela are weighted toward its increased role and visibility within the military dimension of its power.

Given Havana’s outsized role and influence in Caracas, Venezuela is a major fulcrum for Russia’s approach to Latin America. Venezuela and Cuba are two of Russia’s three key allies in the Western Hemisphere, and Venezuela accounts for 80 percent of Russia’s foreign military sales program. Venezuela has been a frequent end point for Russian long-range bomber sorties into and out of the Western Hemisphere; it hosts Russian navy port visits and exercises; and it serves as a major platform for Russia’s ongoing information warfare campaign across Latin America. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia has signaled its solidarity (in word and action) with President Nicolás Maduro and remains the external state actor most relevant to the trajectory of the Maduro regime.

Compound Security Threats and the Limits of American Unilateral Power

Our current systems and methods of calculating risks and force requirements do not fully nor adequately account for these “compounding” dynamics. As a result, our determinations of risk and force requirements are anemic, setting conditions for a “too little . . . too
late... and not enough for long enough” approach to global transregional threats to national and hegemonic interests. Cobertly the convergence of threats at key geographic locations presents the United States with additional challenges, but it also presents opportunities to sharpen our focus and apply our resources in more precise and economical ways, at decisive locations, through simultaneously executed named operations and enduring efforts, creating the possibility of achieving overmatching compound wins.

In short America can no longer go it alone, nor should it. As the cases discussed illustrate, the United States has a power problem consisting of three components: (1) insufficient power, type, and kind; (2) insufficient capacity to produce, maintain, and sustain the power required to meet contemporary missions; and (3) insufficient capability to convert power available (on hand or in production) into effective policies and strategies. Again, the anemic public policy handling of the COVID-19 pandemic is a sad testimonial to these facts. The United States has reached the limits of its fungible power, at least from a perspective of single-select instrumental or unilateral choice.

America remains an exceptional nation in terms of its relative capabilities and capacity to rival nation-states and in its ability to project power globally. But like a boxer replete with years of experience and a reach that outdistances younger, less-experienced competitors, the “tale of the tape” for the United States today might read: “great reach, but poor endurance in the latter rounds.” America retains the ability to reach anywhere and everywhere, but frequently with the wrong kind of instrument and too little of the right-fitting solution set. America often arrives too late to prevent, contain, or mitigate today’s compound security threats or does not sustain the longevity needed for effective regimens. All told, this is a worrisome combination. There is a point of diminishing returns that all great powers must face in relation to their ability to expand, manage, and govern imperial dominions. As historian Paul Kennedy noted:

Nations project their military power according to their economic resources and in defense of their broad economic interests. But, the cost of projecting that military power is more than even the largest economies can afford indefinitely, especially when new technologies and new centers of production shift economic power away from established Great Powers—hence the rise and fall of nations.20

We still live an international relations paradigm that privileges the sovereignty of individual nation-states, within which states retain the right to make their own policy choices. But exercising the sovereign right to determine one’s own art of the possible independently does not change the nature of threats nor the character of change in global geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic competition. If the policy

choice is unilateralism and self-help, the risk calculations of such choices must be measured against the changed and changing environment. In an era where that environment—foreign and domestic—is governed more by a new compound security dilemma, the risk of continuing to choose public policies of unilateral self-help will prove beyond the calculus of risks itself—more the stuff of a gamble.

So what might come of an “America First” foreign policy? History provides examples of the consequences of adopting purely transactional approaches: uncertainty, strategic mis-signals and misreads, and illiberal solutions and outcomes that while perhaps instrumentally beneficial and successful in achieving and securing short-range strategic goals, wind up being devoid of a moral footing of the kind needed to secure lasting, durable, legitimate peace and stability in the longer run.

Implications for Military Strategy and Force Planning

Compound security threats represent a change in the character, scope, and scale of challenges to our common defense and public welfare. While hybridity is certainly part of the equation, it is not all of it. The compounded nature of today’s and tomorrow’s threats dramatically alters our public policy and force planning, sizing, and shaping calculations and algorithms.

As former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, speaking to US troops in Kuwait in December 2004 said, “you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”21 Unfortunately, these remarks echo our reality today, a reality largely of our own making. At the same time, we too often hear this expression offered as an epiphenomenal excuse for failures of imagination, anticipation, forecasting, and planning, and for our underpreparedness for the fullness of contemporary public policy puzzles.

Addressing these failures will require our entire national security enterprise to come to grips with a recurring set of behaviors that cuts across our checkered performance against compound threats:

- The phenomenon and paradox within the social constructions of the meanings of war and peace, the issues of security and nonsecurity, and the tendency to win a war but to lose the intended peace, as evidenced by our decades-long anabasis in Iraq
- The false distinction between national security and human security issues, as demonstrated by US-led military-humanitarian interventions in the 1990s, which addressed only symptoms but not root causes (Somalia, Kosovo, Haiti)
- The persistence of chronic, civil-societal, government-society structural inequalities that go un- or under-addressed for many reasons yet remain the common denominator of rebellions,

insurrections, and insurgencies (Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, the Arab Spring)

- The tendency to declare false or premature victories while a conflict is evolving, not ending; the “mission accomplished” paradox results in undercounts in risk assessments and capability requirements calculations (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, COVID-19)

Furthermore, as Amitai Etzioni, author of From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations (2004), once reminded us, “Whether one is highly critical of the American global projection of power or celebrates that the United States has accepted that it is destined to bring order and liberty to the world. . . . [The question is:] Where do we go from here?” Indeed, we need to think and move in more comprehensive, multilateral, and communitarian ways and directions. If our power equation can neither muster nor sustain the type, quality, and quantities of force we need or dispatch it in ways and according to timelines necessary to achieve overmatch of compound threats as they form, or at least before they compound, then we need a whole new equation.

Our new equation will require novel frameworks and mental models by which the United States, as part of a global effort, can plan, lead, and organize solutions to compound security threats. A theory and an analytics-informed, multilayer, network model (see figure 2) capable of capturing the interactions of the drivers behind compound problems, both horizontally and vertically, between separate ecosystems, could have significant utility.

Figure 2. “Key concepts and dominant interpretations of power relevant to polycentric environmental governance” by T. H. Morrison et al., is licensed under CC BY 4.0.
Such an approach might just be the moment of paradigm shift that many within military, public policy, and public affairs circles have debated, even promoted, for at least the last three decades. The 2020 novel coronavirus pandemic may be its herald. If so, will we recognize it and heed its call for the whole-cloth change it requires?

Isaiah Wilson III
Dr. Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III, outgoing director of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, and fellow with New America, is a recognized expert in the areas of grand strategy and strategic planning, military and security studies, and civil-military affairs.

Scott A. Smitson
LTC Scott A. Smitson, strategy branch chief at US Southern Command, holds a joint PhD in public policy and political science from the O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University.
ABSTRACT: Europe remains as important as ever for US security but several factors contribute to a degree of unsteadiness in the 2020 European security environment. The outcome of conflict between forces of stasis and change over the next two to four years will be determined by several dynamics including Europe’s response to the COVID-19 economic crisis, Russia’s desire to shatter transatlantic relations, the American approach to NATO, the impact of Brexit, whether German leaders will lead, and French efforts to address long-term economic malaise.

In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of ongoing security challenges from Russia and elsewhere, how will the transatlantic security environment evolve in the next few years? This question is a critical one for American policymakers. The magnitude and scope of transatlantic trade in goods and services, the commitment to common values such as democracy and the rule of law, and shared geopolitical interests within and beyond the transatlantic region make America’s relationship with Europe of vital interest to the United States.

Continuing Russian military provocations in northeastern Europe, Moscow’s efforts to undermine democracy and intergovernmental institutions, foreign fighters from the Islamic State, China’s increasingly exploitative behavior in Europe, and waves of migrants from Africa and the Middle East, however, threaten Europe’s stability and security and hence American vital interests. Magnifying these challenges is the economic disaster generated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which is likely to be the worst global contraction since the Great Depression.

This brief article will unpack for policymakers what these challenges may mean for transatlantic security in the coming two to four years. To accomplish this, the article will first outline the current state of play in European security arguing a kind of equilibrium has been achieved over the last two years, in contrast with the mid-2010s when the European security environment was in great flux. Nonetheless, as the second section of this article points out, several ongoing and emerging challenges combined to create an unsteadiness in European security at the beginning of this new decade. Whether those challenges remain relatively manageable or erupt into crises will depend on the primary drivers of security in Europe, which are identified in the third section of this article. Finally, the article outlines potential alternative short-term futures in Europe, drawing out some prospective outcomes and implications.
Improved Security Situation

In some respects, Europe has entered a security stasis over the last two years particularly in contrast to the 2014–16 period and especially with regard to the most acute security threats confronting Europe—namely, Russian aggression and international terrorism. This security stasis was mostly the result of two key factors. First, most North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states implemented a series of budgetary, force posture, readiness, and modernization initiatives intended both to reverse years of steadily declining defense budgets, on average, and to begin correcting the deficit of territorial defense capability and capacity across Europe.¹

Second, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and others improved their homeland security postures. Since the mid-2010s, European states have significantly enhanced intelligence collection and sharing, tightened counterterrorism laws and border controls, strengthened community-based monitoring and reporting networks, and devoted more funding to domestic law enforcement and for other counterterrorism capabilities.²

Persistent Unsteadiness

Despite this progress, there remains a security unsteadiness in Europe today stemming from several threats and challenges. The first is continued destabilizing Russian provocations in, near, and over Europe.³ Most obviously, Russian military forces continue to support, enable, and fight alongside the separatists in eastern Ukraine, a conflict resulting in at least thirteen thousand deaths and two million refugees flowing into Poland and other neighboring countries.⁴

The second threat confronting European security is small-scale terrorist attacks, including those religiously inspired. Despite relative success in preventing large-scale attacks and a corresponding drop in

the number of deaths from terrorism across Europe, there remains a risk of lone-actor attacks.\(^5\)

Additionally, other less acute—but no less impactful—challenges to security in Europe have recently emerged. Chief among these is China. Europeans have become increasingly worried about Chinese tech companies acquiring or building telecommunications network infrastructure in Europe. A 2017 Chinese law requiring its organizations and citizens to support national security investigations means companies like Huawei can be compelled to function as arms of the Chinese government to the detriment of European security.\(^6\)

In addition, Europeans are increasingly concerned about China’s investment in other sensitive technologies and critical physical infrastructure. Chinese investments have been most dramatic in Southern Europe where several countries have privatized previously state-owned assets to reduce debt.\(^7\) Increasingly strict European Union investment screening regulations may curb new Chinese activity in the short run, but this remains a challenge for Europe.\(^8\)

European economists and other experts have expressed concern over China’s efforts to systematically steal trade secrets for economic advantage and for exploitation by China’s military.\(^9\) Chinese state-directed economic espionage and intellectual property theft are frequently funneled directly into military advancements.\(^10\)

Finally, migration is another enduring challenge to security and stability in Europe today. The numbers of conflict refugees and economic migrants seeking asylum in Europe have fallen dramatically since the mid-2010s. Nonetheless, emigration from regions adjacent

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to or near Europe is unlikely to end considering instability in Syria, Iraq, and Libya and across much of sub-Saharan Africa. Managing the socioeconomic impact and flow of migrants places significant strain on social welfare, security, intelligence, and other government institutions across Europe.

**Short-Run Drivers**

How these threats evolve will depend in large measure on several key drivers of security and stability in Europe, primarily the economic slowdown created by the COVID-19 pandemic. The contraction in global economic activity threatens to be the worst since the Great Depression. Recovery may have significant effects on fiscal health across Europe—and hence on defense budgets—and will deepen debt for many of the most financially vulnerable European states. Robust global growth could return in 2021, but much will depend on how governments respond and how quickly a vaccine can be developed to prevent a resurgence of the virus.

The second driver of security in Europe in the short run is Moscow’s strategy of undermining the transatlantic relationship, destabilizing European politics, and dominating Russia’s immediate neighbors, primarily rooted in Russia’s persistent conflation of territory with security. An unremitting sense of insecurity continues to incentivize zero-sum strategic approaches to foreign relations.

The third most important driver is the American relationship with Europe in terms of security and trade. President Trump has a mixed track record with NATO despite expressing support for the Alliance at the December 2019 leaders’ meeting in London and even though his own National Security Strategy embraces NATO as an invaluable advantage. Reportedly, the president expressed his desire for the United States to withdraw from NATO, but he was convinced not to do so. With regard to trade, the president has declared the EU a “foe” of the United States,

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overturning decades of bipartisan support for European integration, and he has threatened to impose tariffs on a wide array of European goods.\textsuperscript{16}

If President Trump is elected to a second term, given his foreign policy tendencies and his lame duck status, it is conceivable he would deepen the trade dispute with Europe and pull the United States out of NATO.\textsuperscript{17} Congress has grown so concerned over the latter that it voted in 2019 to prohibit the use of funds for withdrawal.\textsuperscript{18} The US Constitution is silent on treaty withdrawal, and it is unclear whether Congress’s actions are sufficient.\textsuperscript{19}

A full-scale trade war with Europe would undermine America’s most important economic relationship, undercut Europe’s precarious fiscal situation, and worsen the transatlantic burden-sharing imbalance. Leaving NATO would erode the credibility of the mutual defense commitment among remaining Alliance members. Given a deteriorated economic and security environment, some European states would likely pursue hedging strategies vis-à-vis both Russia and China, opening the door for Moscow and Beijing to wield far greater influence in Europe.\textsuperscript{20}

The fourth most important short-term driver is Brexit. The UK’s 2016 decision to leave the EU has already reduced British economic output and household purchasing power.\textsuperscript{21} These shifts will ultimately mean reduced government tax receipts, which will likely result in cuts to military spending as London attempts to protect social welfare programs just as it did in the wake of the Great Recession. The magnitude of Brexit’s damage will only unfold slowly as the UK and the EU negotiate a post-Brexit relationship. Regardless, history suggests diminished military


capacity and capability will precede an eventual reconceptualization of Britain’s strategic outlook and its willingness to wield force abroad.\footnote{Fareed Zakaria, “Brexit Will Mark the End of Britain’s Role as a Great Power,” \textit{Washington Post}, March 14, 2019, \url{https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/brexit-will-mark-the-end-of-britains-role-as-a-great-power/2019/03/14/5df139fa-468c-11e9-8aab-95b8d80a1e4f_story.html}.}

Meanwhile on the continent, the question of German leadership looms as the fifth most important short-term driver. Throughout Angela Merkel’s 15 years in power, she has shown a reluctance to lead Europe on foreign and security policy. Only when crises have fully erupted—for example, Syria’s civil war and the resulting migration crisis, Russia’s intimidation of and aggression toward its neighbors, or Libya’s increasingly fraught civil war—has Merkel engaged meaningfully. If she fulfills her term of office through late 2021, Germany will likely remain on the sidelines at least until then, unwilling to wield the influence and authority that comes with being Europe’s economic hegemon.

The sixth and final short-term driver of European security is France’s ongoing economic reform effort. Emmanuel Macron—a relative newcomer to politics—was elected to the presidency in mid-2017 on the promise of a dramatic shakeup of the French economy. Since then he has struggled to implement what outside experts and economists have long acknowledged are fundamental, structural flaws in the French economic model.\footnote{Andrew Walker, “What is the French Economic Problem?” BBC News, April 29, 2016; and Alice Baudry and Laurent Bigorgne, “Diagnosing the French Malaise,” Carnegie Europe, April 13, 2017, \url{https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/68661}.} Reforms are vitally necessary to expand the economy more aggressively, which will in turn improve government tax receipts and permit France to fulfill its own ambitious national security strategy even as it deploys ten thousand troops domestically for counterterrorism purposes.

### Forecasting Alternative European Futures

To safeguard its interests in Europe and beyond, the United States’ grand strategic objective regarding Europe has long been to prevent a single, protectionist power from dominating the continent. Secondarily, Washington also desires European partners capable of and willing to defend common interests and values at home and abroad. Pursuit of these goals could be frustrated in the next two to four years, depending on the various drivers identified in the preceding section and how they affect the ability of European allies to manage the challenges posed by Russia, terrorism, China, and migration.

The most positive scenario might include the following outcomes over the next two to four years:

1. Russia calculates that fiscal and political costs of regularly violating the sovereignty of its neighbors, maintaining its support for the separatist war in Ukraine, and pursuing sociopolitical instability in Europe and North America through media and cyber manipulation
outweigh the benefits. As a result, it gradually begins to reduce the level of antagonism toward the West, if only for fiscal reasons.

2. The United States remains a steadfast NATO ally, renouncing any thought of conditionality in its commitment to Article 5 of the treaty. Given what appears to be a ratcheting down of Russia’s aggressive behavior across Europe, the United States announces it will postpone plans to conduct division-level exercises in Europe. Washington also signals its intent to begin negotiations with the EU on eliminating remaining trade barriers.

3. The United Kingdom concludes a new trade agreement with the EU that amounts to what many call a “soft Brexit,” maintaining the strongest possible economic links to the continent short of EU membership. For this reason, there is no independence referendum in Scotland, and British tax receipts slowly stabilize as economic growth recovers.

4. Merkel steps down in late 2020 and “snap elections” are held. Merkel’s successor achieves a solid mandate with a clear majority, earning the political capital necessary for continued growth in the defense budget, and a decision to exclude predatory, state-subsidized Chinese telecom firms from German networks, as well as an increasing willingness on the part of Berlin to lead Europe more decisively.

5. Macron succeeds in pushing through structural reforms, bolstering economic growth in France. At the same time, he dramatically curtails the homeland security mission of the French Army, freeing more military capability and capacity.

6. Working collaboratively, American and German scientists develop a COVID-19 vaccine in time for the 2020–21 flu/cold season. North American and European economic growth rebounds strongly in 2021, allowing most members of the transatlantic community to avoid a lengthy recession and painful tradeoffs between social welfare and national security.

Worst-Case Outcomes

1. Russia expands its military presence in Kaliningrad and builds new, permanent bases in Belarus, even as its fiscal position worsens. Meanwhile, it continues to covertly manipulate media and cybernetworks to undermine and weaken mainstream political parties in Germany and France. It also solidifies client regime control in Syria and Libya that in turn push opposition groups, disfavored minorities, and others to migrate toward Europe.

2. The United States expands its trade war against the EU and announces its withdrawal from NATO, to become effective in one year per the terms of the Alliance treaty. At the same time, Washington begins a major downsizing of its military footprint in
Europe, withdrawing troops and equipment. It announces plans to maintain a rotational presence only at Ramstein Airbase.

3. Merkel remains in office through the end of her term in October 2021, after which a minority government comes to power. Lacking a strong mandate, this government maintains Merkel’s cautious international approach. Given the American withdrawal from NATO, Berlin looks to the UK and France for additional security guarantees yet is offered none for fiscal (UK) and political (France) reasons. As a result German leaders pursue an accommodation with Moscow. Amidst the profound changes in the political-military realm, German leaders remove nearly all restrictions on Chinese firms’ access to telecom networks in exchange for an end to Beijing’s threats to shut out German automotive and other manufacturers from the lucrative Chinese market.

4. The United Kingdom’s rough exit from the EU results in continued sluggishness in the British economy magnified by what is termed the Pandemic Depression. As a result, unemployment climbs significantly. To manage the fallout, the British government shifts funding from defense and national security accounts to the National Health Service and social welfare programs. Meanwhile, Scottish nationalists ramp up large-scale demonstrations—sometimes turning violent—in support of an independence referendum.

5. Protests in France succeed in causing the political defeat of Macron’s economic reform packages, further inhibiting France’s response to the Pandemic Depression. With a contracting economy and another rising tide of migrants from North Africa and the Levant on the horizon, far-right political leader Marine Le Pen wins election in 2022. Her policies undermine the EU as well as France’s special relationship with Germany, and she announces French withdrawal from NATO following the United States. Simultaneously, Le Pen forgives Moscow for its transgressions in Ukraine—in exchange, Moscow agrees to purchase advanced French defense equipment.

Obviously, the scenarios outlined above are speculative and any number of permutations between and beyond the two scenarios are possible. Nonetheless, it is clear events in Europe will have significant implications for US national security and defense policy. Policymakers in Washington cannot fully control the transatlantic security drivers but having an awareness of those drivers and their potential implications can help the United States to mitigate the worst-case outcomes.
ABSTRACT: INDOPACOM transformation faces two risks: the same kind of strategic distraction that derailed prior efforts to refocus on the Indo-Pacific and competing Joint and service concepts and priorities. Mitigating these risks and restoring a hypercompetitive US position in INDOPACOM relies on US senior leaders’ adopting bold change. The Army can lead the way by adopting four transformational roles in INDOPACOM—grid, enabler, multidomain warfighter, and capability and capacity generator.

China’s advantages in anti-access/area-denial will require novel US warfighting solutions going forward. A more credible, hypercompetitive United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) Joint Force will inevitably rely on the deliberate and innovative combination of service strengths. The Army’s substantial Joint enabling capability in mission command, protection, sustainment, movement, and intelligence (and information) make it an attractive foundation upon which to build a more agile, distributed, and lethal theater-level Joint Force approach.

Distraction

For nearly 20 years, the US military focused to a fault on irregular wars with nonstate actors in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more broadly the Global War on Terror. During that time, the Department of Defense prioritized counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and nation building in its strategy, concepts, plans, and readiness. The post-9/11 wars were perhaps the most disruptive for the US Army. The Army shouldered the wars’ principal burdens. Army forces grew accustomed to predictable mission sets and deployment cycles in familiar regions, and US soldiers became expert irregular warfighters. This all occurred, however, as profound change in the competitive environment emerged on the other side of the world.

As the United States fought insurgents and terrorists, China developed hypercompetitive approaches focused on outflanking US...


interests and, if necessary, defeating US forces in the Indo-Pacific region. To date, China’s hypercompetitive methods have confounded traditional US approaches to competition, deterrence, and warfighting. As a result, the US military and the Army specifically are out of position conceptually, physically, and with deployed and anticipated capabilities in this highly contested region.

**The Transformation Imperative**

The 2018 *National Defense Strategy* (NDS 18) recognizes an imperative for wholesale Joint transformation to meet the challenge of great power rivalry. United States INDOPACOM is a centerpiece in that anticipated transformation. Among the services, the Army may have the toughest challenge meeting essential transformational objectives.

The Army recently adopted the concept of multidomain operations as its contribution to great power rivalry. Consistent with its self-image as the nation’s war winner, its conception of multidomain operations frequently culminates in large-scale, multidomain ground combat. However, the multidomain and multifunctional demands on the Army in the Indo-Pacific will likely call for a different employment of Army forces. While multidomain ground combat may provide the platform for success in a future European or Middle Eastern war, INDOPACOM’s unique geography and threat profile do not bend as easily to Army preferences.

**China, China, China!**

While the military was away in the Middle East, a fundamental threat to American power emerged in the Indo-Pacific region. The strategic landscape there changed dramatically from the time of the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* to NDS 18. Over that time, US political, economic, and military advantage eroded. China emerged as a hypercompetitive regional juggernaut, and its explosive economic growth—combined with strategic vision—enabled rapid expansion of its diplomatic and economic influence, financial interests, military

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transformation, and gray-zone activism. Now all of these factors combine to position China as the most significant rival to American power, influence, and freedom of action since the Cold War.

The method, scope, and pace of China’s approach to countering the United States and the essential character of an American response is most accurately described as hypercompetition. China’s growing influence, reach, and raw potential means hypercompetitive military rivalry will be most acute for the United States in the INDOPACOM theater well through the next decade. Hypercompetition, the persistent struggle for transient advantage across highly contested domains and competitive spaces, is a business concept adapted by US Army War College researchers to describe contemporary great power rivalry. It presumes fortune favors the bold in an environment where no defense-relevant advantage is permanent. Instead, hypercompetition is acknowledgement that the persistent pursuit and exploitation of new or regained advantage will characterize future great power rivalry and conflict.

US adaptation to hypercompetitive great power rivalry started late and has only recently begun to take root. Most notably over the past three years, the 2017 National Security Strategy and NDS 18 offered clear guidance that the United States should prioritize great power rivalry in strategy, plans, acquisition, and employment of military capabilities and methods. A byproduct of the two Trump administration strategies is official identification of China as the United States’ pacing military threat. Ongoing efforts to refocus the Department of Defense and its Joint military forces on an aggressive hypercompetitive China are as appropriate as they are overdue.

Identifying the Problem

The commander of INDOPACOM succinctly described a key aspect of change in the Indo-Pacific military dynamic during a 2019 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing: “we speak frequently about the erosion of our advantage . . . which is really the case here. China has

seriously eroded that quantitative advantage—the number of assets that they have—but they’re also eroding that qualitative advantage.”

Aggregate military capability, however, is only one measure of relative advantage or disadvantage. If, consistent with NDS 18, the United States intends to reverse the erosion of military advantage and restore a favorable military balance in an increasingly volatile INDOPACOM theater, it needs to address key vulnerabilities in its current Joint Force theater design across more than aggregate or measurable military assets. A comprehensive view of theater design includes strategy and operational concepts; forces and capabilities; footprint and presence; authorities, permissions, and agreements; and mission command arrangements.

In this more comprehensive view, the United States is dangerously out of position conceptually and physically, and as a result also out of position with regard to deployed forces and capabilities for long-term hypercompetition with China. This reality exacerbates the theater-wide erosion of advantage. It limits military options available to Joint Force commanders. It also simplifies the decision-making calculus of Chinese political and military leadership.

Out of Position Conceptually

NDS 18 and institutional Army strategy both note the importance of developing and experimenting with innovative operating concepts. Though there is some progress, INDOPACOM and its assigned service components are not yet on a common Joint path that transfers greater risk to China and imposes costs while lowering US and partner risks. China, on the other hand, pursues its regional interests at US expense through sweeping military transformation and effective gray-zone campaigning. Absent effective US counteraction—starting with a coherent and unified Joint military approach—China’s aggressive military transformation and its deliberate gray-zone maneuvering will progressively increase US risk and limit realistic future US military options.

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At present there are two Joint warfighting concepts under development by separate US headquarters or staffs and at least six independent service-specific operational concepts in various stages of development. Army multidomain operations is among them. While all these efforts are potentially value-added, the effect of multiple uncoordinated and, at times, competing concept development efforts threatens Joint unity of effort. Further, without strong senior-leader oversight, new Joint concepts are vulnerable to suboptimal compromise favoring service interests over emerging Joint operational requirements.

Out of Position Physically

The regional posture of the United States is concentrated in northeast Asia, predicated on discredited assumptions of military advantage and positioned for the efficient prosecution of a second Korean war. It is not a forward posture conducive to effective hypercompetition or—in extremis—transition to conflict with a hostile China. Substantial advances in the number and quality of China’s precision-guided munitions—delivered from land, air, and sea—by themselves may nullify the deterrent effect of an American military heavily concentrated on large bases in Japan, Korea, Guam, and the Hawaiian Islands.

Likewise in the event of increased tensions or conflict, China enjoys strategic depth, internal or heavily protected lines of communication, and the ability to employ and maneuver critical assets with the benefit of relative sanctuary. But US and partner forces positioned in theater are within reach of China’s substantial precision weapons inventory and would be in immediate danger. Furthermore, US and allied surge and sustainment forces pushed from the United States and other regions would be under persistent threat as they attempted to reinforce forward-deployed forces.17 En route to a conflict in the Indo-Pacific theater, US and allied forces would have to navigate long, vulnerable lines of communication at the end of which entry into and maneuver within the theater would be heavily contested.

Out of Position in Capabilities

US Joint Forces currently lack the capability for the kind of large-scale, widely distributed “all-domain” operations essential to give China pause in escalating regional tensions or to defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in armed hostilities.18 In particular, power projection and access, Joint command and control (including secure data and communications), sustainment, protection, and intratheater movement and maneuver are challenged by the tyrannies of antiquated posture, distance, and an increasingly capable PLA.

For the Army specifically, delivery of lethal and nonlethal multidomain effects and ground combat are favored at the expense of

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Joint-enabling capabilities essential to an agile and distributed theater Joint Force. According to one observer, the US military is figuring out how to “shoot” without solving how it “moves” and “communicates.” Our research suggests adding protect and sustain to the deficits in movement and communication as well.

**From Strategy to Hypercompetition**

The operational demand for more distributed Joint operations within the INDOPACOM area of operations will expose the folly of a suboptimized Joint approach, uncoordinated service concepts, and persistent neglect of the enabling functions upon which successful Joint operations rely. Continued disadvantages in concepts, physical posture, and capabilities will increasingly constrain or deny the ability of US Joint Forces to hypercompete, especially when confronted with escalation from China.

A new hypercompetitive theater approach that is biased for action is the most appropriate way ahead. This approach implies transforming theater design across Joint functions and service components while actively hypercompeting for and exploiting transient advantages. US Joint Forces should pursue longer-lead, high-risk, high-reward technological advancements. They cannot, however, necessarily rely on them for decisive effect over the near- to midterm. Across the Joint Force, the earliest wins will likely emerge not from breakthrough technological change but from innovative and novel operational concepts, task organization, mission tailoring, and physical posture.

Consistent with NDS 18, a transformed INDOPACOM theater design should prioritize change to regain the strategic initiative. With initiative, the Joint Force can expand the competitive space to complicate rival decision-making and restore and maintain the favorable military balance. A favorable military balance does not connote restoration of permanent military advantage. Rather it implies the persistent ability to generate and exploit opportunity faster and with greater impact than can the pacing rival China.

Initiative, nurtured by deliberate choices in the application of resources and effort, allows the Joint Force to identify and exploit hypercompetitive opportunities as they emerge. This initiative starts in the persistent campaigning that should inevitably occur in the gray space short of armed conflict. As the Department of Defense works to develop and consolidate around a new Joint warfighting concept, an essential component of persistent campaigning is refocusing and repurposing Joint and service-level priorities to maximize operational and theater-strategic impact. We suggest the Army is central to such a change.

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Joint Transformation

Real Joint transformation in INDOPACOM can come when one service embraces the job of enabling Joint multi- or all-domain operations. This transformation is the Army’s greatest value proposition in the INDOPACOM theater over the next decade as it relates to the US-China rivalry. Toward this end, the Army can contribute most effectively to a transformed Joint theater design by adopting four transformational roles:

- the Army as the grid
- the Army as the enabler
- the Army as the multidomain warfighter
- the Army as the capability and capacity generator

The Army as the grid sees an Army-led establishment of a distributed, resilient, and mutually reinforcing theater network of expeditionary clusters, hubs, and nodes as the foundation for Joint multidomain operations. The core purpose of the grid is to expand the competitive space, creating options for Joint Force commanders, ultimately, enabling effective Joint multidomain maneuver.

The Army as the enabler calls for a Joint-focused Army transformation specific to INDOPACOM in mission command, sustainment, protection, movement, and intelligence (and information) to animate the grid. This transformation requires a persistent small-unit, multifunctional Army presence prepared to activate clusters, hubs, and nodes to meet Joint operational demands. It further requires mission-tailored Army forces to task organize and operate in distributed fashion well below the brigade level.

The Army as the multidomain warfighter sees the Army-led fielding of a land-based, multidomain warfighting capability with theater-wide presence and reach in concert with sister services and foreign partners. Army and sister service multidomain capabilities and concepts should be inspired by and integrated into a unified Joint multidomain theater concept.

The Army as the capability and capacity generator leverages a significant asymmetric US advantage—a strong network of regional allies and partners—to enhance traditional ground-force competencies and expand complementary multidomain capability. In this regard, Army forces—within a unified Joint concept—can be a catalyst for fielding a combined land-based, multidomain warfighting network that draws on the unique strengths and competencies of US partners.

The Army is currently focused on its roles of multidomain warfighter and capability and capacity generator in INDOPACOM. The roles of

22. Freier et al., An Army Transformed.

grid and enabler will be more difficult to adopt and socialize—though they are likely most important for the Army and the Joint Force in long-term hypercompetition with China. Only the Army can underwrite effective Joint Force operations theater-wide operating at the scale needed across the expanse of the Indo-Pacific region in the functions of mission command, protection, sustainment, movement, and intelligence (and information).

Conclusion

Thriving in hypercompetition first requires the United States to recognize and commit to engaging in it. A hypercompetitive US approach to INDOPACOM requires agile, disruptive, and mutually reinforcing Joint and Service theater designs. This point is not lost on China, but it remains conspicuously underdeveloped in US strategic calculations.

The Army is currently well positioned to take the first steps in inspiring essential Joint transformation by creating a flexible, scalable, and dynamic theater design biased first for distributed Joint theater enabling. This bias also implies commitment to establishing the physical grid essential to the enabling function. The grid and enabling functions combined will require innovative reconfiguration and employment of Army mission command, protection, sustainment, movement, and intelligence (and information) capabilities. As it becomes a reality, transformed Army theater design should help signal enduring US commitment to the region, expand options available to Joint Force commanders, and help them complicate rival planning and decision-making.

Success cannot be the result of good fortune or providence in INDOPACOM. Rather it must rely on transformational change in Joint and combined warfighting and the service concepts supporting them. The window of opportunity to make bold transformational change will not be open long and will be difficult to negotiate.

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ABSTRACT: Adversaries are actively targeting US and NATO critical infrastructure, particularly energy, transportation, information, communications, and the defense industrial base sectors to undermine military capability, readiness, and force projection. In some cases, adversaries are penetrating the critical infrastructure of the United States and our allies to identify vulnerabilities for later exploitation, and in others critical infrastructure is being weaponized by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as a form of hybrid warfare.

The West’s adversaries are using critical infrastructure (CI) as a weapon of choice in three domains. First, Russia has weaponized CI in Ukraine as a testing ground for the development of larger hybrid warfare capabilities against the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Second, Russia and other adversaries have penetrated the US energy sector, particularly the US electric grid, as a means to undermine future US warfighting capabilities. Third, China has conducted strategic penetration of key critical infrastructure segments of American and European defense industrial bases. The US military and NATO have redressed these threats by investing in infrastructure resiliency based on organizational and mission capacity-building and public-private sector cooperation.

Russian Hybrid Warfare against Ukraine

The linkage between critical infrastructure as an instrument of hybrid warfare has been on open display in Georgia and the Ukraine where a Russian cyberarmy, closely affiliated with the Kremlin, has systematically attacked almost every sector of Ukraine’s infrastructure for the past five years. The most notable attacks included one against Ukraine’s electric grid in December 2015, which left large parts of the capital city, Kiev, and the western region of Ivano-Frankivsk in the dark, and another, more technologically sophisticated attack in 2016 on one of Kiev’s transmission substations. These attacks were set against the
backdrop of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continued military clashes in the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions in Ukraine.

Governments and cyberexperts attribute these cyberattacks to a Russian group known as Sandworm, which deployed its BlackEnergy malware to penetrate specialized computer architectures used for remotely managing physical industrial equipment and control systems. What most worried these cyberexperts was Sandworm had already targeted NATO networks and had compromised the computers of American and European electric and water utility companies with the same Trojan malware. This malware provided hackers with enough control to induce blackouts on American soil. As one cyberforensic expert forewarned: “An adversary that had already targeted American energy utilities had crossed the line and taken down a power grid [in the Ukraine]. It was an imminent threat to the United States.”

The repeated cyberattacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure as part of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy serve Russian interests in several ways. This campaign is designed to keep Ukraine in Russia’s continued orbit by thwarting Kiev’s aims of integration with the European Union. Critical energy infrastructure as a tool of Russian coercion is certainly not lost on NATO and the EU. Since 2006, Russia’s Gazprom has repeatedly halted gas supplies in the midst of winter to Ukraine—a vital transshipment country with pipelines to Europe—over disputes on gas pricing.

The upshot is European countries, particularly Germany, and NATO writ large are attuned to the vulnerabilities associated with their dependency on Russian gas and oil supplies. Europe could not survive 30 days without Russian gas in the winter, and its vulnerabilities will only increase with Nord Stream coming online. Certain NATO countries such as Germany are more dependent on Russian energy supplies, leading President Trump at the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels to tweet, “What good is NATO if Germany is paying Russia billions of dollars for gas and energy?”

Another rationale for Russian CI attacks in Ukraine is to test, prove, and refine Moscow’s cyberwarfare capabilities against a country unable to retaliate—in essence, use Ukraine as a test bed for Russian hybrid warfare in future global conflicts, including with the United States. By turning the power off in Kiev, Moscow is both signaling and demonstrating to Washington its ability and willingness to weaponize critical infrastructure to challenge America’s military might at home and overseas.

Russian Penetration of the US Energy Sector

In March 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security confirmed Russian government hacker teams had actively “targeted government entities and multiple U.S. CI sectors, including the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors.” The Russian cyberattack teams included Sandworm, Dragonfly, and Palmetto Fusion, with some attributed with gaining remote access to actual industrial control systems and US energy sector networks including a Kansas nuclear power facility. Cyberattacks against the US power grid have continued. The group Triton or Xenotime has compromised electric facility safety systems in order to cause potential plant disruption and damage. According to a researcher at the US cybersecurity firm Dragos, surveillance of the US electric grid is “indicative of the preliminary actions required to set up for a future intrusion and potentially a future attack.”

Penetration of the US electric grid has sounded alarm bells in the Pentagon. Department of Defense (DoD) installations and associated infrastructure depend on continuous and assured power to support missions and operations at home and abroad, and any extended loss of power has been acknowledged as a glaring national security Achilles’ heel. America must expect our adversaries to disrupt the flow of power with cascading impacts on transportation, communications, and other critical infrastructure services upon which the US military depends. After all, for decades the former Soviet Union carefully studied the US homeland and its warfighting infrastructure for infiltration and targeting purposes.

The game changer for today, however, is that with cyberspace and the merging of CI with information and communications technologies, our adversaries no longer require kinetic solutions and direct military confrontation with the United States. Rather as one senior DoD official conceded, “the smart thing to do is to maneuver around those forces, attack the critical infrastructure, the facilities here in the United States on which we depend to deploy, operate and sustain our forces abroad.”

The willingness and ability of our adversaries to deploy destructive cyberweapons in future warfare with the United States has immense national security implications. Of immediate concern is the threat to deterrence and intrinsic force projection capabilities—“it does not matter how capable, how well trained or how advanced a nation’s forces

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are if they can’t get to the front in time.”10 The deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure has larger security and ethical implications which have yet to be addressed fully.11

**Chinese Investments in the United States and Europe**

“China, in particular, has made it a national goal to acquire foreign technologies to advance its economy and to modernize its military. . . . It is comprehensively targeting advanced US technologies and the people, the information, businesses and research institutions that underpin them.”12 To achieve this national goal, China has used an effective combination of industrial, trade, and investment policies.

Initiated in 2015, Beijing’s Made in China 2025 industrial policy directs Chinese technological development in important dual-use areas: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics, aerospace, autonomous and new energy vehicles, communications, and other emerging industries. China analysts have focused largely on the government’s illicit means to acquire these technologies through espionage, cyberoperations, evasion of US export control restrictions, and through coercive intellectual property sharing requirements for foreign companies investing in the Chinese market. Less attention has been paid to Beijing’s “Go Out” strategy of promoting Chinese state-owned and private sector champions to invest overseas, particularly in the United States and Europe, in key defense industrial base sectors. Outward foreign investments and acquisitions have been assisted by Beijing-backed investment vehicles, such as the China Investment Corporation and massive sovereign wealth funds.13

This inattention changed dramatically with the recent bid by Chinese tech giant Huawei to provide 5G information and communications technology networks in the United States and Europe. The case of Huawei poses a number of concerns for the security of the defense industry base in the United States and Europe. For example: Should the United States and Europe be dependent on China to provide a key, dual-use defense industry base infrastructure? Through its control of the world’s wireless and telecommunications backbone, will the Chinese government use 5G as a Trojan horse for commercial and military espionage and hybrid warfare purposes?

The response by the Trump administration to Huawei has been swift and decisive. It has banned Huawei from all federal contracts for telecommunications equipment and services, and US government contractors are prohibited from doing business with Huawei as well. The US Department of Justice filed formal charges of fraud, obstruction of justice, and theft of trade secrets against Huawei in January 2019. Additionally, the administration has exerted considerable pressure on its partners within the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to ban Huawei from their respective markets.

Concerned about the larger implications of Chinese investments and other adversarial activities involving the US defense industry base infrastructure, Congress passed the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 as part of the larger National Defense Authorization Act of 2019. This legislation expands the powers of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to prevent foreign adversaries from gaining control of defense industrial infrastructure assets. That same year, the Trump administration issued Executive Order 13806, which mandated an assessment of US defense industry base. This assessment concluded, “all facets of the manufacturing and defense industrial base are currently under threat, at a time when strategic competitors and revisionist powers appear to be growing in strength and capability.”

European countries have been slow to recognize the potential security vulnerabilities and dependencies created by Chinese investments in infrastructure. China has launched the 17+1 Initiative, a forum under Beijing’s larger Belt and Road Initiative, that includes 12 EU member states and five Balkan countries and provides major infrastructure loans for the construction of high-speed rail networks, port infrastructure, communications, bridges, and highways. Chinese companies have acquired shipping terminals in Spain, Italy, and Belgium. Major Chinese port infrastructure projects include the Italian ports of Trieste, Venice, and Ravenna, as well as the Greek port of Piraeus, Koper in Slovenia, and Fiume in Croatia. In October 2019, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel allowed Huawei and ZTE (also Chinese-owned) greater market access into this key NATO ally’s 5G networks. This decision has multiple international security implications—it threatens NATO security and

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the operations of the US military presence based in Germany, and it contravenes US intelligence warnings.\textsuperscript{17}

Chinese involvement in key infrastructure projects in Europe has garnered increasing concern by NATO regarding Beijing’s intentions and the need for a shared Allied policy on China. On the occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary meeting in London in December 2019, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned: “What we see is that the rising power of China is shifting the global balance of power. . . . We have to address the fact that China is coming closer to us, investing heavily in infrastructure. . . . So, of course, this has some consequences for NATO.”\textsuperscript{18}

A recent NATO report was more direct in identifying the potential consequences of the penetration of defense industry base infrastructure by adversaries on NATO security. “The degree and impact of foreign direct investment in strategic sectors—such as airports, sea ports, energy production and distribution, or telecoms—in some Allied nations raises questions about whether access and control over such infrastructure can be maintained, particularly in crisis when it would be required to support the military.”\textsuperscript{19}

As with issues of energy security, NATO is grappling with dependency on European host-country infrastructure and the vulnerabilities this poses for logistics, secure communications, and other requirements to enable mobilization, force projection, and sustainment.

Arguably, Chinese Belt and Road Initiative investments in Europe are part of a deliberate strategy by Beijing to target economically weaker NATO members to draw them into China’s orbit. Indeed, this strategy appears to be having some success. Hungary and Greece sought to block any direct reference to China in an EU statement regarding the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that struck down the People’s Republic of China’s legal claims in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{20}

Sounding the alarm over the long-term implications of European Belt and Road Initiative investments on EU unity, Germany’s foreign minister forewarned, “if we do not succeed for example in developing a single strategy towards China, then China will succeed in dividing Europe.”\textsuperscript{21} Incremental progress has been made recently with a new


EU regulation establishing a framework for screening foreign direct investments in critical infrastructure and technologies. This new regulation is due to come into full effect in November 2020.22

**Redressing CI Vulnerabilities**

Beginning in 2005, the DoD initiated an enterprise-wide Defense Critical Infrastructure Program which focused on identifying key defense infrastructure assets and developing guidelines and procedures for their protection.23 With the launch in 2012 of the Department’s Mission Assurance Strategy, the focus shifted from protecting defense critical assets toward strengthening the resiliency of DoD missions. Mission Assurance is “a process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets—including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains—critical to the performance of DoD MEFS [mission essential functions] in any operating environment or condition.”24

Recognizing over 90 percent of US infrastructure resides in the private sector, the Mission Assurance Strategy also called for strengthening DoD partnerships with those commercial infrastructure owners and operators. The strategy has been augmented by other policy directives that require and provide all services, departments, and agencies with guidelines for identifying, assessing, managing, and monitoring risks to strategic missions.25

In contrast to the deliberate process of the US military, NATO has taken a less structured approach to redress critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. Its initial efforts focused on building organizational capacity with the establishment of NATO Centres of Excellence (COE) to support CI protection: Defense Against Terrorism-COE (Turkey), Cooperative Cyber Defense-COE (Estonia), Energy Security-COE (Lithuania). These centers have been bolstered by the work of the European COE for Countering Hybrid Threats (Finland).

The targeting of civilian infrastructure as part of Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine further spurred NATO efforts, in cooperation with the EU, to enhance critical infrastructure resiliency through developing baseline requirements for measuring and improving civil preparedness.26 Additional mitigation measures include the deployment of cyber and hybrid warfare support teams, enhanced information-sharing with

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25. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Critical Infrastructure Program.

the EU and the private sector, and the integration of energy and cyberinfrastructure requirements within NATO exercises—Locked Shields 2018—and war games.

Conclusion

The use of critical infrastructure as a weapon by our adversaries has received little attention in international security circles. As discussed previously, CI can be used as an instrument of hybrid warfare among weaker states such as Ukraine and against superpowers such as the United States. Whether through the use of cyberattacks against a country’s infrastructure, or more covertly through surveillance and penetration, or via acquisitions and direct foreign investment, targeting of critical infrastructure enables our adversaries to shape and control vital defense industry base infrastructure upon which US and NATO militaries rely.
ABSTRACT: Political and professional oath-takers are obliged to abide by their oaths. But their understanding of this obligation and the associated civil-military relations norms is uneven. This article distinguishes between political and professional oath-takers and examines how each should fulfill its obligations to uphold the Constitution.

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, in his opening statement during the House impeachment hearings, said, “I am a patriot, and it is my sacred duty and honor to advance and defend OUR country, irrespective of party or politics.” While the military institution has been increasingly caught up in the political upheaval surrounding the Trump administration, civilian control of the military and the expectation that the military institution will remain apolitical are the principal democratic civil-military relations norms that have been prevalent in the literature. The question must be posed, however, Is participating in acts in support of democratic institutions and the constitutional process a violation of the nonpartisan professional military norm, or do such activities constitute patriotic behavior essential to upholding a military member’s obligation to support and defend the Constitution?

In response, this article maintains military officers who testify against the commander in chief in settings such as an impeachment hearing do not violate the apolitical professional norm even if the president explicitly prohibits such testimony. In fact, officers who appear on the basis of legal congressional subpoenas uphold their oaths to support and defend the Constitution and preserve the constitutional powers of their second and coequal civilian master, Congress. Such nonpartisan actions support the checks and balances fundamental to the American democratic process, essential to the preservation of democratic institutions.


Constitutional Foundations

America’s founders authored a blueprint for a political system Edward Corwin famously stated was “an invitation to struggle.” The distribution of power across the presidency, Congress, and the judiciary ensured the specific and separate powers of one branch could be deployed to curb the excesses of another. The Constitution established a process through which ideas and policy proposals would be vigorously examined and debated. Various actors in any given debate might disagree on the substance of policy proposals, but the democratic process within which the debates occurred was not to have become a matter of debate. It is this process to which military members and federal office holders take an oath to:

solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me God.  

Loyalty oaths were part of early American political culture. The colonists were accustomed to taking oaths pledging loyalty to the monarch. Consequently, it is not surprising the Founders incorporated oaths into the Constitution as an additional tool to safeguard democratic institutions. Article 2 of the Constitution requires the president to take an oath of office, and Article 6 requires members of Congress, the federal judiciary, and officers of state legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government to take oaths. With regard to the military, oaths had always been required at the time of enlistment in the Continental Army, but in 1789 the first Congress legislated specific text swearing to uphold the Constitution, swearing allegiance to the United States of America, and swearing to obey the orders of the president and the laws of Congress.

Supporting and defending the Constitution means members of the military have pledged to protect democratic institutions and the individual freedoms of their fellow citizens enshrined in the Constitution. The Founders laid out a civil-military order subjecting the military to two civilian masters—the president and Congress. Their loyalty is not to an

individual leader or even the state but to a particular form of democratic
government, or rules of the game, which the Constitution established.
Consequently, participating in any action that undermines constitutional
norms violates the oath of commissioning, the oath of federal office
holders, and the trust inherent in the civil-military bargain between the
military, the political leadership, and the people.

Loyalty oaths were the only normative tool inserted into the
Founders’ democratic playbook. They are an important component of
the civil-military norms derived from traditions and practices developed
over time to supplement and reinforce the constitutional rules explicitly
stated in the Constitution.8 The Founders’ emphasis on employing
tools like oaths to instill loyalty to democratic processes underlines
their understanding that constitutional rules may go unheeded without
socializing key actors to adhere to them.

**The Impeachment Inquiry**

In fall 2019, the United States House of Representatives investigated
allegations President Donald Trump made the provision of military
aid to Ukraine contingent on the Ukrainian government announcing
it was investigating his chief political rival, former vice president and
presidential candidate Joe Biden.9 Many members of the administration
complied with the president’s wishes to refrain from cooperating in the
impeachment inquiry, but several key actors obliged Congress’ request
citing their “duty” to appear.10 These impeachment proceedings are
an important case study when evaluating the responses of members of
the government in support of the inquiry, with a focus on the varied
understanding of professional obligation and democratic norms of
former and active military officers caught up in the inquiry. To facilitate
this comparison, it is necessary to distinguish between political and
professional oath-takers.

**Political vs. Professional Oath-Takers**

Political oath-takers are political actors elected to their offices or
appointed by elected officials to pursue a particular policy agenda. The
president, political appointees in the administration, and members of
Congress are examples of political oath-takers. Professional oath-takers
hold their positions regardless of the political party in power. In the
realm of policy development and implementation, military actors, as
professional oath-takers, provide nonpartisan subject matter expertise
and institutional know-how to political actors. Indeed, civil-military
relations theory argues military actors’ professional status stems from

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8. See also Ulrich, “Civil-Military Relations.”
9. See also The Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry Report, Report of the House Permanent Select
   Committee on Intelligence, Pursuant to H.Res. 660, in Consultation with the House Committee on Oversight and
political actors’ reliance on their uniquely acquired military expertise. Regardless of affiliation professional oath-takers are required to remain nonpartisan in the performance of their duties. This apolitical ethic serves as a sort of shield protecting the professional oath-takers from allegations their motives are self-serving, political, or in some way unpatriotic.

Military actors have a privileged voice in the national discourse because of their perceived unique expertise and the elevated status of the military institution in society.\textsuperscript{11} Polls in recent years have consistently placed the military atop American institutions in terms of public trust.\textsuperscript{12} The military’s status as the most trusted national institution stems at least in part from the public’s perception of its apolitical nature.\textsuperscript{13} Scholars have warned politicization and loss of institutional trust go hand in hand.\textsuperscript{14} The Ukraine scandal has also highlighted that the public notices when officials who leverage their military experience to gain political offices commit ethical lapses, indicating the public expects more of former professional oath-takers.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Professional Oath-Takers}

The Ukraine scandal revealed a political climate where political oath-takers were caught up in the polarization of the times, which limited the objective functioning of the checks and balances so fundamental to American democracy. The scandal also highlighted the role oaths played in motivating some participants to adhere to professional norms developed in their experience as national security professionals. The next section presents the examples of a former military officer and an active military officer who honored their oaths while participating in the impeachment inquiry.

\textit{Ambassador William Taylor}

William Taylor graduated from West Point in 1969 and went to war as an infantry officer in the 101st Airborne Division. He remained in government service for the next 50 years as a military officer, Department of Energy employee, Senate staffer, and Foreign Service Officer. A diplomat at the center of the Ukraine inquiry, his media profiles invariably include the term “patriot” and link his military service to his integrity.

\begin{itemize}
\item Risa A. Brooks, “Perils of Politics: Why Staying Apolitical Is Good for Both the U.S. Military & the Country,” \textit{Orbis} 57, no. 3 (Summer 2013).
\end{itemize}
and commitment to American ideals. Taylor retired from the Foreign Service and was working as executive vice president of the United States Institute of Peace when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tapped him to come out of retirement to take the top diplomatic post in Kiev, Ukraine, a position previously held by Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch. (He previously served as ambassador to Ukraine from 2006–9.) Both were political appointments making him a political oath-taker more recently, but a professional oath-taker formerly.

Taylor testified before the House impeachment inquiry despite White House orders not to cooperate. His opening statement made his motivation clear. Taylor was concerned the strategically important US-Ukraine relationship “was being fundamentally undermined by an irregular, informal channel of US policy-making and by the withholding of vital security assistance for domestic political reasons.” Timothy O’Brien of Bloomberg News opined that Taylor put his career on the line and defied White House orders not to cooperate because he thought members of the administration were undermining the national interest. O’Brien wrote Taylor’s testimony stood apart from others in the administration who were:

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Former Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns told the New York Times: “Ambassador Bill Taylor is a person of integrity with a strong, ethical base. I would also describe him as a true patriot. His entire professional life has been in service to the U.S.” Burns’ comments track with the sort of deference professional oath-takers earn from a career of staying true to their oaths. Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, US Army retired, a former ambassador to Afghanistan, added: “Ambassador Taylor represents the best of our Department of State. His integrity and courage are the true marks of patriotism, loyal to an oath of office and never to be corrupted or intimidated by those seeking personal gain at our Nation’s expense.”

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman

Commissioned in 1999 as an Army infantry officer, Vindman is a combat veteran who was wounded in Iraq in 2004. He subsequently became a Eurasian foreign area officer and was assigned to the National Security Council staff. Like Ambassador Taylor, his testimony focused on US interests and the impropriety he witnessed as the senior National Security Council Ukraine expert on the presidential call in question. “I was concerned by the call. . . . I did not think it was proper to demand that a foreign government investigate a U.S. citizen, and I was worried about the implications for the U.S. government’s support of Ukraine.”

His credentials as a professional oath-taker were evident in his opening statement.

I have a deep appreciation for American values and ideals and the power of freedom. I am a patriot, and it is my sacred duty and honor to advance and defend OUR country, irrespective of party or politics. For over twenty years as an active duty United States military officer and diplomat, I have served this country in a nonpartisan manner, and have done so with the utmost respect and professionalism for both Republican and Democratic administrations.

Vindman’s actions were particularly courageous because he is still an active duty Army officer. He came forward knowing he would implicate the president, his commander in chief, in wrongdoing.

Yet some questioned his patriotism and adherence to civil-military relations norms. An active duty officer stationed at the Pentagon likened Vindman’s appearance before the committee in uniform to “the Army pushing a coup.” A veteran who is a lawyer writing for the Federalist website characterized Vindman’s decision to testify in uniform as “partisan move” akin to attending a political rally in uniform in violation of civil-military relations principles. His testimony was also criticized as “open insubordination” for questioning the commander in chief. Some even challenged his loyalty to the United States due to his immigrant status.

23. Opening Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the House Committee on Oversight and Reform October 29, 2019, in “Statement on Trump and Ukraine.”
Such criticism failed to acknowledge Vindman’s accountability to Congress to respond to lawful subpoenas and to offer testimony as a fact witness. In addition, his advice as a professional military expert on national security processes and policies in question was also relevant. Indeed, as a military professional, he had a professional responsibility to share expert knowledge that would enable members of Congress to make political judgments that were theirs uniquely to make. Vindman also acted to preserve the office of the president by supporting Congress’ constitutional remedy to hold individuals who abuse the office accountable through the impeachment power.

Other observers lauded Vindman’s decision to testify before the House impeachment inquiry citing the unique professional ethic of military oath-takers. Former assistant secretary of defense Evelyn Farkas noted: “Military officers stress the duty to speak out and report up the chain if they see something awry. This is something that we don’t drill into civilians. But in the military they are not expected to resign but to speak up the chain.” Tiana Lowe of the Washington Examiner wrote, “it shouldn’t have to be said, but Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, the National Security Council officer testifying in the House impeachment proceeding, is a great American patriot.”

**Conclusion**

This article has has discussed the need for new norms in civil-military relations theory, obligating citizens entrusted with positions of national responsibility to uphold oaths they take to the Constitution of the United States. The case considered—the Ukraine scandal and the subsequent impeachment inquiry—simply asked, to what extent does the traditional apolitical civil-military relations norm require or forbid the involvement of military officers in such activities as testifying in an impeachment hearing?

Exploration of constitutional foundations and civil-military norms found that appearing before congressional committees carrying out their constitutional powers of impeachment does not violate civil-military relations norms. On the contrary, such acts are consistent with the primary civil-military norm of professional militaries to remain subordinate to civilian control, in this case the control of Congress using its constitutional power of impeachment to investigate the president. Such acts preserve the powers of Congress and protect the office of the president from office-holders who might abuse their power. Professional oath-takers commit themselves to putting America first in terms of preserving its democratic institutions. Political oath-takers take the same oath. But in the current political climate many value their partisan


identification over their oaths. Their fellow citizens are taking note; many are grateful, but others are critical due to a narrower understanding of democratic and civil-military relations norms.

Effective practices may include better socialization into the meaning of the oath similar to the military’s tradition of making the readministration of the oath the center of promotion ceremonies. More robust education in professional military education highlighting the fact that the executive and Congress are coequal branches would help to dispel the prevailing view that loyalty to the president trumps the professional responsibility to appear before Congress.

Benjamin Franklin, when asked what sort of government the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 had created, replied, “a republic, if you can keep it.”30 This theme is on the minds of citizens today. History may record that present-day professional oath-takers were the critical keepers of the republic. Commenting on the role that a range of oath-takers played in the impeachment inquiry, journalist Jonathan Alter predicted, “history will look back and call this the ‘patriotic surge’ when people did their constitutional duty.”31


ABSTRACT: The expanding complexity and variety of threats to national security will require Joint commanders and planners who champion innovative and comprehensive military campaigns. Thus to educate future pragmatic practitioners, academic faculty should devise curriculum which advances beyond formatting of plans and orders to establish contextual frameworks for strategy.

Uncertainty remains as inevitable today as it was when Carl von Clausewitz discussed “the fog of war” two centuries ago. Nonetheless, national leaders, whether autocrats or democrats, set strategic goals which military commanders and planners are obligated to attain. No matter how “wicked” the problems, the intent of Joint military planning is to generate practical solutions. The goal should be to develop leaders capable of “thriving at the speed of war.”

In the effort to swing the pendulum of possibility as close to the side of probability as possible, planners must analyze each contingent environment to generate military actions with speed, magnitude, and duration. This article explores how Joint commanders and planners should incorporate the principles of operational design to deal with the wicked, ill-structured problems they confront. It examines the uncertainties of international security and the potential for use of design methodology in the development of theater strategy. It considers problems and challenges inherent in applying military strategy and recommends Joint professional military education equip commanders and planners to meet these challenges as a specific outcome of Department of Defense war colleges and senior service schools.

Wonder and Warning

In the operating environment of the twenty-first century, social, political, economic, historical, and geographic factors constitute complex, ever-adapting open systems. In warfare, adversaries are simultaneously protagonists and antagonists engaged in violent, destructive actions spanning a continuum of activity from cooperation to coexistence to deadly conflict. Nation-states operate in a condition of enduring
competition across a shifting continuum of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.\(^5\)

In this state of affairs, framing the operational environment decades out is difficult and ultimately often inaccurate. Intelligence estimates, while recognizing the speculative nature of the work, remain a planning necessity. That said, they uniformly forecast a future operating environment as bleak as it is uncertain. Worldwide trends and key developments extracted from the National Intelligence Council (NIC) main report, *Global Trends 2035*, include rapid globalization of technological advancements; workforces shrinking in developed countries, Russia, and China but growing in poorer, developing countries; and reduced productivity as global economies contract.

As national interests among major powers diverge, an escalating terror threat, continued instability in fragile states, the wider availability of lethal, long-range weapons systems, and the stress of expanding environmental degradations will disrupt societies and increase the risk of conflict.\(^6\)

Accordingly, the accustomed post–World War II order may morph into more complex and far-reaching arrangements and violence may be perceived as a primary path to recognition, wealth, and power. Any victories so gained may be short-lived, however, as state and nonstate actors alike find it difficult to sustain control in the ever-shifting twenty-first century international environment.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s futures assessment, *Joint Operating Environment 2035*, is equally certain about uncertainty concluding, “these conditions illustrate *contested norms* and *persistent disorder* in the future security environment.” Nongovernment prognostications are often equally clouded. The World Economic Forum suggested US global dominance will fade as power rebalances itself across a small number of competitors. Most nation-states will endure in near-term decades but they will become increasingly strained by the rise of megacities, transnational oligarchs, and even online identities.\(^8\)

**Possibility from Paradox**

Despite the likelihood of imprecision if not complete blunder, strategic planners must consider and incorporate these prognostications in order to link military campaigning to national strategy effectively so strategy anticipates national policy outcomes. Clausewitz stated


firmly that primarily, “it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise, the entire history of war would contradict us.”9 Military strategy employs the threat or use of force to change the strategic environment to bring it into consonance with policy, “the positions of governments and others cooperating, competing, or waging war in a complex environment.”10

Joint planning generally follows a predetermined and heretofore effective methodology for analysis established in doctrine as operational design. The methodology can be visualized as a series of questions (see figure 1) that commanders and their planning staffs might address.

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The validity of any such assessments of future conditions is unlikely to be easily measurable. Moreover, the spectrum of challenges faced by military commanders and planners includes contingencies where military power, traditionally applied in large-scale combat, may be of little value. The extensive logistical capabilities required by modern armed forces in warfare are equally suitable for humanitarian relief, disaster response, and crisis alleviation in peacetime. In earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, and wildfires, military forces are often the organizations of choice for immediate mitigation of danger and suffering due to the logistical resources they can bring to bear.

Often the soldier’s favored means of local transportation, the heavy-lift helicopter, is the only means available to deliver aid and supplies to the sites of large-scale natural disasters where great swaths of infrastructure and utilities no longer exist. These contingencies, too, must be anticipated and planned for with as much energy and precision as combat operations.

A Dangerous Enticement

Often strategic thinking is viewed as abstract reflection on strategic-level products or actions. Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Jomini, Mao Zedong, and others have their advocates. But, excessive focus on grand strategy, as enticing as this may seem theoretically and philosophically, may present a dangerous diversion to Joint commanders and planners. Grand strategy as an overarching concept for focusing whole-of-nation resources to realize enduring national interests, in addition to being hard to define or articulate, may be neither useful nor achievable.

Moreover, as a practical matter, US doctrine does not mention grand strategy as a functioning concept for national security and military campaigning. National strategy is the highest conceptualization of enduring, long-term national interests and values, including those associated with social and cultural issues. National strategy, then, acts as the “strategy of strategies” reflecting the nation’s predominant, broad, and comprehensive vision of the role of the United States.

The president’s National Security Strategy is the commonly accepted promulgation of policy guidance as national strategy. Yet the difficulty comes when trying to apply national strategy to action. The background canvas is too broad, and the possible mixes of color and texture too

plentiful. It is a relatively facile thing to identify likely major adversaries; it is quite another to develop practical plans and orders for countering their influence and deterring or defeating their aggression.

The National Security Strategy of 2017, for example, presents 99 priority actions across the whole of government. But these priority actions are not compared against each other or associated with resource constraints or operational feasibility. The National Security Strategy addresses outcomes and strategic goals but offers little with regard to resource allocations, fiscal constraints, or military effort, forces, or processes to be set against potential threats. It is aspirational in nature and relates little specific planning guidance.

Pragmatism in Planning

While grand strategy is academically appealing, in practice military commanders and planners cannot luxuriate in theories and lofty strategic concepts. The contemplation of operational design as described earlier is a useful methodology to employ to this pragmatic end, but the requisite framing is often a troublesome enterprise. Strategic guidance is quite often difficult to obtain, much less understand. Further, William E. Rapp argues persuasively that it is psychologically, culturally, and even structurally difficult to communicate across the civilian and military divide that characterizes strategy formulation at national strategic levels.\(^{16}\) Framing the operational environment is a complex and nuance-prone venture, demanding multicultural understanding in almost every instance. This context is culturally ambiguous, situationally convoluted and unclear, and subject to rapid change.

Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s model of military strategy as national security supported by a three-legged stool provides a time-tested heuristic that has become a basic paradigm within current planning. While it has its detractors, the ends, ways, and means model is ingrained in US doctrine.\(^{17}\) Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (2017) begins with a description of Lykke’s model: “Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated risks.”\(^{18}\) To the degree these three legs might be misaligned (tilt), the military strategist would likely encounter risk to assigned missions and tasks (see figure 2).\(^{19}\)

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Unfortunately, national-level policy and guidance often misses elements of the Lykke model integral to its utility, such as the ways in which a strategy may be implemented or the means by which a strategy may be accomplished. Unfortunately, national strategy as a primary vehicle for carrying out policy determinations and achieving political outcomes and end states, tends to focus on the element of “ends” to the exclusion of other factors. Military strategy requires both coherency and acceptance of risk. Coherency between national or grand strategy and military strategy becomes hard to maintain when corresponding national-level guidance or direction is not part of the planning paradigm, a condition that impedes the assessment of risk.

Exacerbating the challenges of understanding national strategy as strategic direction are the difficulties associated with the constraints of limited forces and capabilities. Approaches which rigidly follow predetermined, assigned geographic theaters or which consolidate globe-spanning functions will be inadequate to confront, deter, or defeat adversaries who adroitly integrate and employ military and nonmilitary power at times of their own choosing. To meet this contemporary challenge, the concept of global integration was introduced in the 2016 National Military Strategy and further elaborated two years later as a planning principle in the chairman’s instruction on the Joint Strategic Planning System:

Global integration is the arrangement of cohesive Joint Force actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional,
multi-functional challenges across all domains. It is a top-down, iterative process that integrates planning, prioritizes resources, and assesses progress toward strategic objectives. Global integration ends include enhanced senior leader decision making, strategically integrated worldwide operations, and a balanced and lethal future Joint Force.22

A Way Ahead

Operational design methodology provides a conceptual approach to problem solving well-suited to connecting national strategic policy guidance with theater strategy policy. The design process begins with understanding the strategic direction. Yet this step has typically been very difficult to do given the difference between national or grand strategy and military strategy as a framework for operational art. But the linkage is essential if military design is to produce ends that accomplish the policy objectives mandated by the need to sustain national interests in the face of dedicated opposition from sophisticated adversaries.23 To attain this goal, commanders and planners should be well positioned to employ operational design in formulating military strategy.

Specifically with regard to strategy comprehension and formulation, the chairman’s Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) aligns national- and theater-level strategy to senior-level education for Joint officers—predominantly in grades O-5 and O-6—and equivalent international officers and US civilians for service at strategic levels, with an emphasis on Joint operations.24 The OPMEP specifies, as a professional military education outcome, that war colleges must prepare graduates who are “strategically-minded warfighters or applied strategists who can execute and adapt strategy through campaigns and operations.”25 A few pertinent recommendations for inclusion or application of operational design as a key topic within program curriculums follow.

First, institutions for Joint professional military education should give themselves a frank azimuth check to determine they are in fact accomplishing the objectives set forth by the chairman for these top-level schools. The tendency appears to be drifting from meeting those requirements to familiarization with theorists and national policy as grand strategy. The OPMEP clearly states these requirements are matters of federal law, not preference, and include not only national security strategy but “planning at all levels of war . . . [including] theater strategy and campaigning, joint planning processes and systems . . . [and] joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and the integration of those capabilities.”26

Second, Joint professional military education must both capitalize on and foster relationships based on existing alliances and coalitions. The OPMEP points out that international officers are intended recipients of US Joint professional military education at senior levels, a policy in keeping with Tami Davis Biddle’s recommendation: “military students in particular ought to have every opportunity to learn to see their world through lenses other than their own. Cultural awareness and cultural literacy are essential to politics and to strategy.” Such broadening multinational perspectives support the framing of an operational environment.

Third, curriculum relating to Joint planning must embrace global integration with enthusiasm and incorporate interagency and multinational partners as a matter of routine. Technological innovations, economic globalization, and worldwide social changes have altered the geostrategic landscape such that purely regionally focused planning will not support decision-making and problem-solving global in scope. Joint planning across all theaters and functions must apply a holistic perspective incorporating all elements of power in plans and orders that inherently reflect a Joint, interagency, and multinational character.

Fourth, the aperture through which senior service colleges view the Joint planning process needs to widen considerably. Joint Publication 5-0 includes principles of Joint planning, but makes only cursory mention of the principles of Joint operations, foregoing a discussion of how to integrate these important operational considerations with Joint planning in favor of a mere passing reference and a few examples. In fact, principles of Joint operations are mentioned five times in the context of validating Joint plans, but never completely listed.

Rather than setting forth correct principles and concepts and allowing latitude in applying critical thinking and seeking creative solutions, planning doctrine has become heavily laden with process-bound conceptual rigidity. Operational design was conceived as a strategic thinking model, an intellectual framework intended to allow commanders and planners to quickly synthesize information and intelligence in chaotic, time-constrained conditions, collaboratively visualize how a Joint operation would unfold, and forge consensus around the commander’s intent. The extensive conceptual coverage of the four major components of operational design has now been reduced to a single graphic and a nine-step checklist of actions. Top-level war college curriculum needs to compensate for this flawed doctrine and urge its correction.

Embracing Risk

The United States should embrace innovative and comprehensive military theater and functional strategies. These should reflect widely conceived, thoroughly coordinated campaign planning that capitalizes on existing alliances and coalitions, builds partnership capacity, and enthusiastically embraces global integration.

In a pervasive atmosphere of uncertainty, a professional military will need to change to accept complexity and risk, rely on adaptability, and embrace innovation. Educators, especially those responsible for the development of courses and curricula, should respond to this need by taking an approach to teaching that itself is less structured and more holistic.

If Joint professional military education is to seriously concentrate on the development of adaptive, innovative, chaos-tolerant leaders “capable of thriving at the speed of war,” then course design and curricular development must model the creativity and analysis we expect to produce.32 To educate such practitioners, academic faculty should not simply address formatting of plans and orders but establish contextual frameworks for both the strategic planning process and the international strategic circumstances of each actual crisis or contingency. Such a perspective should impel top-level war colleges and schools, which are mandated to focus on strategy and campaigning.

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32. Dunford, “Character of War,” 3.
ABSTRACT: In the coming years a number of factors will expand and accelerate changes to the character of strategic leadership—shifts in the nature of armed conflict, the weaponization of everything, the development and utilization of new technologies, the decline of authority structures, political hyperpartisanship, and the coalescence of new ethical structures. Strategic military leaders must, therefore, transcend the twentieth-century industrial-style leadership model and embrace a model based on entrepreneurship.

Clausewitz famously noted that war has an enduring nature and a changing character. The same holds for strategic military leadership—it intermixes both consistency and change. The changing character of strategic leadership implies traditional methods for developing strategic leaders and exercising strategic leadership may no longer be adequate. Like their forebears, tomorrow’s strategic leaders must assure their organizations are effective at core warfighting functions, whether defeating enemies, maintaining security, or supporting other organizations. They must create and sustain effective, ethical organizational cultures. And they must think horizontally—integrating diverse activities and organizations—and vertically—planning for the long-term future and considering second- and third-order effects—while addressing near-term issues and challenges. These are the components of the enduring nature of strategic leadership.

But much is changing. The evolutionary forces shaping strategic leadership are powerful, intense, and complex, suggesting traditional methods for developing strategic leaders and exercising strategic leadership may no longer be adequate. It is impossible to predict precisely what attributes and capabilities will be most important in the coming decades but it is possible—and important—to identify likely ones. One way to do this is to take the major trends underway in the strategic environment and assess how they might require changes to the character of strategic leadership, conceptualizing this in the three interconnected realms of sustinment of security (strategic leadership’s outward-looking function), organizational design, and organizational culture and ethic.

Entrepreneurship and the Changing Character of Security

Imagine the commander of a future combatant command—or whatever integrated, multinational, dispersed, networked, public/private security organization replaces today’s combatant commands. She or he must deal with conventional enemies and the need to deter or defeat...
them in combat but also face nonstate adversaries exploiting what is called the “weaponization of everything.”

“Modern technology,” as Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum write, “enables individuals to wield the destructive power of states.” Multidimensional attacks and disruption are increasingly easy; creating and maintaining security, difficult. According to strategic futurist Sean McFate: “in the coming decades . . . wars will be fought mostly in the shadows by covert means, and plausible deniability will prove more effective than firepower in the information age. If there are traditional battles, they will not prove decisive. Winning will change, and victory will be achieved not on the battlefield but elsewhere.”

As the essence of security changes, so too must strategy. The architects of strategy—strategic leaders—must think in multiple dimensions involving a diverse range of adversaries or potential adversaries. Being able to defeat enemies will be necessary but not sufficient; security will be holistic. And once security is created, it will immediately erode as the forces of instability innovate and proliferate. Sustaining it will truly be a Sisyphean task.

This future commander will be surrounded by and part of revolutionary advancements in biology and bioengineering, neurologic enhancement, nanotechnology, advanced material sciences, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, and additive manufacturing. Artificial intelligence in particular is likely to fuel extensive change in armed conflict particularly in the realm of decision-making. As Thomas Adams put it, “the military systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will be too fast, too small, too numerous, and will create an environment too complex for humans to direct.”

Judgment alone will no longer be adequate for effective decision-making, particularly against adversaries using artificial intelligence and technology-enhanced decision systems. While this will be most stark at the tactical level, it will also play out at the strategic level, forcing future leaders to identify the optimal blend of human judgment and artificial intelligence.


5. TRADOC, Changing Character of Warfare, 18.

intelligence then constantly reassessing and revising it. The skill to do this will be vital, perhaps even decisive.

Dynamic narrative shaping will be critically important for future strategic leaders. Since war is waged for political objectives, it is ultimately psychological; what matters most is not how many of the enemy are killed or how many targets destroyed but how audiences understand and react to military actions. In a strategic environment characterized by a profusion of information, highly fluid ideas and beliefs, intricate connectivity, and intense, global transparency, the psychological component of military action will be even more important than in the past. “The only outcome of military action that ultimately matters,” Brad Dewees wrote, “occurs at the cognitive level—at the level where adversaries perceive and give meaning to actions taken against them.” Or as P. W. Singer and Emerson Brookings put it: “What determines the outcome is not mastery of the facts, but rather a back-and-forth battle of psychological, political and (increasingly) algorithmic manipulation. Everything is now transparent, yet the truth can be easily obscured.” Thus future conflicts and future strategy will largely be a “clash of narratives.”

Traditional methods of narrative shaping that rely on the transmission of information through formal media will no longer be sufficient. “These are not the kinds of battles that a plodding, uninventive bureaucracy can win,” as Singer and Brookings note. Having public affairs officers pass information to traditional media—being the stewards of information—will be woefully inadequate. Dynamic narrative shaping will require strategic leaders who are psychologically astute and understand how beliefs and ideas form, spread, merge, mutate, die, and are reborn across national, subnational, and organizational cultures. And they must communicate in an information environment where it is difficult to distinguish truth from deepfakes or “fake news,” where the authoritativeness of information no longer determines its impact. But however difficult, dynamic narrative shaping to create desired psychological effects may be the sine qua non of future strategic leadership—cross-cultural communication to attain desired psychological effects may be more important than enterprise management.

Entrepreneurship and Organizational Design

In the past most strategic military leaders—at least American ones—were the stewards of the organizations they commanded rather than their

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10. Singer and Brookings, LikeWar, 161.
creators. They might make some incremental changes or improvements but in most cases did not have to create new organizations from scratch or totally rebuild an existing organization. The pace and extent of change suggests those days are past: future strategic leaders will need to be the creators and revolutionizers of organizations, entrepreneurs rather than simply stewards. As with many aspects of life, technology will be the locomotive, defining the possible.

For instance, strategic military leaders have long relied on staff work and their own judgment to make decisions. But as information expands, leaders of all kinds increasingly will use data-based, technologically enhanced analytics. Effective strategic leaders cannot simply depend on staff to tell them what they need to know but must have a working knowledge of the analytical processes and the information that feeds decisions. While strategic leaders may not themselves be experts on the design of artificial intelligence, they must be “aware of the significance, capabilities, and risks associated with algorithms.”12 Put differently, strategic leaders must understand the gestalt of artificial intelligence and analytics-based decision-making even if not its architecture.

Future strategic leaders will no longer face a shortage of vital information but will struggle with its profusion. As James Mancillas writes: “One of the principal challenges of today’s military leader is managing the ever-increasing flow of information available to them. The ease and low cost of collecting, storing, and communicating has resulted in a supply of data that exceeds the cognitive capacity of most humans.”13 Accordingly, strategic leaders must help develop and learn to use a constantly shifting and evolving array of analytical tools so they can identify what is important in an ocean of information. They must adapt analytical tools to their organization’s needs instead of automatically taking what is readily available or provided to them. Analytical and decision tools will not only be tailored to an organization, but will change over time. Rather than simply making decisions, future strategic leaders must understand and shape the process of decision-making.

“Nothing breeds complacency like success,” writes Charles O’Reilly of the Stanford Graduate School of Business, “the point for maximum strategic paranoia is when you are at the top of your game.”14 Effectiveness has a definitive lifespan, and in the future it will become shorter and shorter. Future strategic leaders must be constant disrupters and innovators.15 In an environment of deep, rapid, and expansive

change, incremental adaptation and improvement will be necessary but not sufficient.

There is a saying that in war “speed kills.” Soon this dictum will apply not only to the maneuver of forces but also to organizational adaptation. Admittedly, innovation has long been a component of strategic leadership from the redesign of tactical formations by Alexander the Great, Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus and Napoleon, to the nineteenth-century development of general staffs and professional military education, through the twentieth century’s combined arms warfare on both land and sea. But most often innovation was a response to failure or defeat or to a fear of failure or defeat. In the future, disruption, innovation, and entrepreneurship must be constant and preemptive rather than reactive. As soon as an organization is functioning at a high level, strategic leaders must begin redesign.

**Entrepreneurship and Organizational Ethics**

Traditionally, strategic leaders in the US military also approached culture and ethics from the perspective of stewardship rather than entrepreneurship. Rarely were organizations completely broken, so strategic leaders focused on sustaining what worked and fixing what was not. As with organizational design, future strategic leaders will need to be disrupters of culture and ethics, innovators and entrepreneurs, “empathetic crafter[s] of culture” as General Stanley McChrystal, US Army retired put it.16 This disruption must happen even when organizations are not yet broken: future strategic leaders will know that every highly functioning organization is on the precipice of decline, even failure.

It is impossible to know exactly what ethical challenges will be most pressing in the coming decades, but it is possible to identify candidates. Take, for instance, the political and informational context of strategy. In previous decades there were only a few authoritative sources of information for the public—three television networks, a few major news magazines, a handful of major newspapers, and an array of influential journals of opinion. Reliance on a limited number of carefully edited information sources pushed political discourse and ideas toward the middle; this allowed compromise and consensus building.

Now the information environment is very different. There are thousands, perhaps millions, of sources but few indicators of reliability. Young people in particular do not rely on traditional media sources for information so the traditional media, with its emphasis on balance, fact-checking, and careful editorial control, does not reach them.17 Everyone can tailor information to their own biases and proclivities. And it is hard to attract attention in this environment. The result is a

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kluge of political discourse and entertainment. How an idea is packaged matters as much, sometimes more, than its content. Infotainers shape the national narrative as much as professional journalists, policy experts, or elected officials.

The profusion of information also contributes to the fracturing of consensus and hyperpartisanship, pushing political positions away from the middle and toward the ideological poles. It increases hostility toward people and organizations on a different end of the partisan spectrum, creating a climate of intense political tribalism. Politics today is treated less like a process for reconciling diverse positions and reaching consensus than war by other means. Compromise is treated as a loss and no one wants to lose.

Hyperpartisanship and the politicization of security policy already create intense ethical dilemmas for military strategic leaders and are shaking the foundation of American civil-military relations. This situation is likely to escalate. Will it be incumbent on future military strategic leaders to tailor their advice to the ideological biases and proclivities of the political leader they are presenting it to? Must strategic advice be shaped by political tribalism? Can military strategic leaders be above or outside of this tribalism? Will uniformed leaders have to propose military options they know can be completed in one presidential administration since the next one is likely to reverse it? Must future strategic advice be entertaining so political leaders will remember it?

Future strategic leaders will also face immense ethical challenges deciding how to use new technology like artificial intelligence and the human-technology interface. Even now movements to limit or ban things like “killer robots” are gaining strength. Linking brains to technology and adapting neurotechnology will raise difficult and complex ethical issues for the military. Could a technologically enhanced super soldier (or sailor, airman, marine, or space warrior) easily integrate back into civilian society once their service is complete? These challenges will affect the use of technology by the military, particularly the integration of humans and technology. And the more human-enhancement technology proliferates and matures, the greater the political resistance to it will become. Strategic leaders will have to navigate this complex ethical terrain. And every balance they reach will be precarious and temporary.


Conclusion

In the twentieth century, successful strategic leaders were like the titans of industry, managing increasingly large enterprises and increasingly complex endeavors. Winning often meant bringing the most resources to bear at the appropriate time and place. Particularly in the American way of war, logistics were decisive. Henry Ford or John D. Rockefeller probably would have been good strategic leaders while George Catlett Marshall or Dwight D. Eisenhower could have founded or led massive corporations. But future strategic leaders will need to be more like cutting-edge entrepreneurs, out-innovating and out-adapting adversaries.

Defeating the armed forces of enemies may be necessary but not sufficient as future strategic leaders struggle to sustain security in an interconnected environment with the weaponization of everything, where destroying and destabilizing are easy but sustaining security, hard. Building an organizational culture that is both effective and ethical will be challenging; success, short-lived. The process of reinvention and innovation will be constant. What works today, whether an organization, an ethic, a process, or a concept, may not work tomorrow.

To prepare for this future, the US military must institutionalize disruption, innovation, and entrepreneurship, creating organizational cultures based on rapid, persistent adaptation. It must develop campaigns of learning to identify both best practices and potential pitfalls in organizational disruption, innovation, and entrepreneurship. The military must integrate disruption, innovation, and entrepreneurship deep into its educational systems, teaching and testing for them, failing those who cannot thrive. It must constantly experiment with new strategic concepts and organizational forms.

As the military develops and promotes strategic leaders, it must test and select for skill at dynamic narrative-shaping. And the military must undertake even more robust partnerships and exchanges with the private sector, possibly even making such exchanges a requirement for leadership positions much like joint assignments. The US military’s method for identifying, developing, and empowering strategic leaders has not adjusted to the onrushing change in the strategic, political, and informational environment, nor has it focused on the skill sets strategic leaders will need in coming decades. Now it must—time is short.
ABSTRACT: The future of military ethics will be profoundly affected by competition below the level of war. Such competition de-emphasizes military force while expanding permissions on the ways and means militaries employ to shape enemy interests. This resulting new ethic will introduce norms associated with escalation, reprisal, and risk that will increase permissible uses of force while limiting their scope.

The ongoing violent exchanges between Iran, its proxies, and the United States bring into stark relief the legal and ethical challenges associated with the use of force below the threshold of war. Driven by developments in technology and doctrine, state and nonstate actors are finding more space to compete, often using military force but avoiding an all-out war. But as the inconclusive debate regarding the moral and legal legitimacy of the ongoing tit-for-tat exchange between the United States and Iran continues—including the strike in Iraq that killed dozens of Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) members, KH leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani—much regarding the character of this competition is not clearly covered by the current norms of warfare.

What stands out in the competition between the United States and Iran is the role proxies, reprisals, and escalation management play in the evolution of new norms. I do not mean to settle the legality of any specific act or means. Given the paucity of law coupled with increasing pressure to adopt nontraditional means, not enough shared norms exist to settle such questions. I do not, therefore, offer new norms as much as argue for a method to establish them. Of course, these means are not new. The problem for current norms of war, however, is they either say too little or too much. Proxies are under-regulated, allowing actors to avoid cost and accountability. Where actors avoid accountability, aggrieved parties have little choice but to engage in reprisals, which are illegal in peacetime, to discourage and deter future aggressions. Reprisals, of course, set conditions for escalation risking wider conflict for otherwise limited ends. Avoiding the resulting lawlessness will require proactive efforts to regulate the new environment these trends describe. What is needed to regulate this environment is a robust account of jus ad vim and jus in vi—much like what exists for jus ad bellum.

and *jus in bello*—to address when actors are permitted to resort to force and what limits on such force there should be.

**Jus ad Vim and the Future of Competition**

Sean McFate, in *The New Rules of War*, writes, “conventional war is dead.” In its place, he argues: “Future wars will not begin and end; instead, they will hibernate and smolder. Occasionally, they will explode.” More to the point, rather than relying on battlefield victory to achieve their objectives, adversaries will move into the “shadows,” where “anonymity is the weapon of choice.”

Just war theory and the law of armed conflict have little to say about such anonymous means, and even where they do, international institutions are often incapable of enforcing relevant norms. As McFate argues, “the laws of war will fade from memory, as will the United Nations, which will prove useless in the face of conflict.” He is optimistic to believe the laws of war will fade into memory because, if for no other reason, “lawfare” is such a critical aspect of competition—a point he recognizes. What he gets right, however, is the future normative environment will be characterized both by uncertainty on what the rules are as well as a lack of accountability, as international institutions—not just the United Nations—will find little leverage to regulate the behavior of state and nonstate actors.

Determining the evolution of these norms is the purpose of *jus ad vim*, a term Michael Walzer coined in 2006 when he raised the concern that without such norms governing force below the threshold of war, war itself would be more likely as limited attacks could set off a wider escalation. Determining what those norms should be requires balancing the norms of law enforcement, which emphasize limited force and human rights, and warfighting, which enables wider latitude regarding the use of force, but denies due process and places innocents at risk.

While the law enforcement model is obviously preferable, it requires effective governance and a monopoly on the use of force. Where those conditions do not exist, one may be permitted to loosen restrictions on force but must at the same time avoid depressing the peacetime standard for human rights to the war time standard. Thus *jus ad vim* will be more permissive than *jus ad bellum* in permitting the use of force. Maintaining

the peacetime standard for rights, however, means establishing a clear link between a proposed use of force and its effect, while tolerating little in the way of collateral harm. These requirements further entail that discrimination and proportionality in *jus in vi* will have to meet a higher standards than its *jus in bello* counterparts. Thus, shaping the evolution of these norms does not require a reimagining of the international order but it will require new practices and precedents to address the challenge that proxies, reprisals, and escalation represent.

**Proxies**

If anonymity is the weapon of choice then proxies are one way of achieving it. Even when anonymity is not possible, proxies, as Iranian reliance on them suggests, are an effective means of transferring risk and lowering one’s costs while imposing them on others. From the perspective of international law, moreover, it is difficult to hold state actors responsible when they do employ proxies. For a state to be accountable for a proxy’s actions, it must have “effective control” over a proxy’s operations. The standard for effective control, however, appears high. In one precedent, the International Court of Justice found the United States had provided the contras in Nicaragua not only with weapons but also a manual that advised them to “shoot civilians attempting to leave a town, neutralize local judges and officials, hire professional criminals to carry out ‘jobs,’ and provoke violence at mass demonstrations to create ‘martyrs.’” The International Court of Justice however, did not find the United States accountable for the crimes the contras subsequently committed because no one directly associated with an organ of the United States government directed them to commit these crimes.

A second precedent establishing standards for effective control arises from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s findings regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Army’s use of proxies against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here they found the FRY was responsible for the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) because the FRY had transferred officers to serve in the VRS, paid their salaries, had the same military objectives, provided financial and logistical support, and “directed and supervised the activities and operations of the VRS,” effectively giving them “overall control.”

It is not hard to see the difficulty here. Soleimani may have provided KH with weapons, funding, and even encouragement to attack US forces. But given either precedent those actions do not establish

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accountability. As long as he avoided giving specific instructions tied to particular operations and maintained some organizational distance between the Quds Force and KH, he was not legally accountable for the actions of KH. If he was not legally accountable for their actions then killing him was illegal, if not also unethical. The problem here is not whether these facts regarding the relationship between the Quds Force and KH are true; rather, the legal standard for establishing them establishes a “perverse incentive” encouraging proxy employment while discouraging any effort to moderate proxy behavior, since doing so could imply effective control. Future norms should address this incentive.

Reprisals

Whatever one thinks about the legality of the US air strikes targeting Soleimani and KH leadership, attacks by Iranian proxies that provoked them clearly broke international law. While the administration’s maximum pressure policy has dramatically impacted the Iranian economy, it does not justify an armed response. When faced with such a violation by an adversary (Iran) and in light of unsuccessful attempts for redress or accountability, the only resort for an aggrieved party (United States) was to reciprocate in the form of a reprisal. In this case—the strikes against KH and Soleimani—the United States claimed self-defense. This claim remains very much in dispute, however, so it is still worth exploring reprisals as an alternative justification.

In general, reprisals permit an otherwise illegal act to compel an adversary to conform to the law. Thus reprisals are not justified because someone did something wrong first, but rather as a means of law enforcement. Such uses of force must be proportionate and directed only at those involved in the violations it is supposed to address. The problem for competition is while reprisals are permitted in war time, they are generally regarded as illegal in peacetime. This does not mean one cannot use force to encourage conformity to a norm, but such use still has to meet the standards of self-defense. Simply attacking back when it is not clear any future attack is forthcoming would not meet this standard. Absent imminence, actors are obligated to seek alternatives before using force.

The difficulty here is these alternatives are often ineffective. The United States could have taken Iran to court for its role in the December 27 attack, but as the discussion regarding proxies indicates, it is not likely Iran would have been held responsible. The United States could also have tried nonviolent means to impose greater costs on Tehran, but given the already stringent sanctions Iran is under, it is not clear this course of action would be any more effective. This point suggests as adversaries increasingly engage in illegal behavior, there may be room for limited peacetime reprisals. As Walzer argues: “Reprisal is a practice carried over from the war convention to the world of ‘peacetime,’ because it provides an appropriately limited form of military action. It is better to defend the limits than to try to abolish the practice.”

_Escalation_

Of course, a primary reason peacetime reprisals are illegal is the risk of escalation. Managing escalation requires having a plan for escalation dominance prior to initiating any competitive act, violent or nonviolent. As Herman Kahn notes, escalation dominance goes to the side that “fears eruption the least,” or at least is the side best able to bear the cost should the conflict escalate. Effective escalation management thus requires at least three things: (1) a demonstrated willingness and capability to strike; (2) an off-ramp that gives an adversary a less costly but acceptable option other than continued escalation; and (3) a consensus among key allies and partners regarding the legitimacy of one’s response.

The operative word in the first condition is “demonstrated.” It is not sufficient that one is able to bear the cost of further violence better than the adversary. The adversary also has to believe this to be the case. Military capability, of course, is important to demonstrating such capability. But it is just as important one demonstrate resolve as well. While there are numerous ways to do this, broad international support for one’s cause can help to underscore the strength of the commitment. Thus, it makes sense to cultivate such support on an ongoing basis.

A good off-ramp is a clear policy statement giving the adversary something it can do that will avoid further retaliation—an alternative representing a lower cost than continued escalation. If conditions for escalation termination represent existential costs to an adversary then it has no reason not to continue the violence. Accordingly, off-ramps that undermine an actor’s ability to govern or essentially disarm it will not likely be effective, which is why Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s twelve demands for Iran, including abandoning its nuclear program, ending its development of ballistic missiles, and ceasing its use of proxies, are not an effective off-ramp. It is not that the United States should not pursue these goals relative to Iran. It is just that those conditions are, at least in Tehran’s perspective, equivalent to surrender and would make then vulnerable to regional adversaries such as Saudi Arabia.

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Consequently, when in an escalatory cycle, actors have to offer something else. In this case, it seems Iran was the one who found the off-ramp for the United States, temporarily at least. By striking back in a way that avoided fatalities it appeared, at least, to acknowledge the United States’ redline regarding fatal attacks on US personnel while avoiding the appearance of backing down, which would have likely undermined the regime’s domestic credibility. As Iran’s renewed attacks have demonstrated, however, escalation termination is not the same as conflict termination. In competition, sometimes the practical if not ethical thing to do is limit violence, especially when that violence risks harms to civilians.

Both conditions suggest the importance of ensuring international support for one’s actions. To the extent escalation entails political isolation, one increases one’s costs to oneself while at the same limiting the resources available to find alternatives to continued escalation. The former is more a practical concern but the latter is ethical. The strike that killed Soleimani received widespread condemnation, even from European partners. Given those partners’ utility in shaping Iranian behavior, alienating them simply strengthens the Iranian position and is thus self-defeating. The point here is not whether those partners should have condemned the attack on Soleimani. Rather the point is, given the uncertainty regarding how actors should respond in such circumstances, it is worthwhile to establish in advance a set of shared expectations regarding appropriate responses.

The Impact of Technology

Technologies such as cyber, artificial intelligence, robotics, and additive manufacturing among others are also going to impact the character of competition. In general, military innovation provides advantage by either reducing one’s own risk or increasing it for the enemy, preferably in ways the enemy would not expect. In reducing this risk, technology raises a number of ethical concerns. First, as Christian Enemark points out, the prospect of avoiding “deaths, injuries, and grieving families,” encourages political leaders to resort to force. Instead of fewer lethal individual engagements, the result may be more of them, thus creating greater risk for escalation.

Second, the proliferation of these technologies risks destabilizing the international order. As Margaret Kosal points out, “new technological
developments have become accessible and relatively inexpensive to a larger number of nations and within the grasp of nonstate actors: advanced technology is no longer the domain of the few.26 As a result, these technologies enable smaller actors, including nonstate actors such as proxies Iran employs, to pursue political objectives effectively, despite relative weakness. It also enables nonviolent coercive measures state actors can employ as reprisals thus raising the question whether nonlethal but indiscriminate cyberoperations, like disrupting a power grid, be permitted when the alternative is lethal, but discriminate force. These points suggests a moral, if not practical, obligation to regulate the availability of these technologies.

Third, while risk of physical harm may be reduced to near zero, the risk of psychological harms may increase and in unexpected ways. While studies have observed mental trauma associated with autonomous technologies, this can range unpredictably from desensitization and moral disengagement to trauma and moral injury.27 Making matters even more complex, a 2019 study of British drone operators suggested environmental factors such as work hours and shift patterns were as important, if not more so, to the experience of mental injury as visually traumatic events associated with the strikes themselves.28 These effects will require rethinking what counts as fulfilling ethical obligations to one’s own soldiers and veterans.

Conclusion

It should now be apparent what the broad contours of the resulting normative environment for competition would look like. From a practical perspective, low-cost measures that transfer risk and avoid attribution will proliferate, expanding targets to include those normally proscribed by international law. From a moral perspective, employing such measures will still be subject to conditions such as just cause, proportionality, reasonable chance for success, and last resort.

In doing so, any resulting ethic will make coercive measures, including the use of force, more permissive while limiting its scope. This ethic will prioritize nonlethal over lethal alternatives, and where lethal force is used, demand a higher standard for success and a much lower tolerance for civilian harm. These measures represent an alternative to war; therefore, actors will be morally required to take measures to avoid escalation.29

There is no bright line between competition and armed conflict. So while the military, political, and economic tools available to actors yield utility in either setting, the differences in ends competition and armed conflict represent differences in how these tools should be used both from a practical and ethical perspective. This last point is important. While the ethical does not follow the practical, the practical certainly shapes, in conjunction with a society’s values and ideals, how the ethical gets put into practice.
ABSTRACT: Harsh lessons from the failure of the US Army's future combat system a decade ago continue to haunt Army modernization efforts today. The advent of Army Futures Command and changes to the modernization and acquisitions process signal progress toward exorcising these ghosts of the past, enabling the Army to work with rather than against industry as it formulates its future combat systems requirements.

The failure of the US Army’s future combat systems (FCS) program destroyed the public’s confidence in the Army’s modernization processes. The Army’s latest modernization strategy, however, reflects a unity of purpose and structure unseen since World War II. The creation of Army Futures Command in 2018 provided an opportunity to reform and improve modernization processes that had been plaguing Army combat developments for decades. Inculcating hard lessons from the failure of FCS to sufficiently reform modernization and acquisition processes, Futures Command has labored to improve these modernization programs. But as it looks to the future, as its name demands, it should examine the causes of previous failures with an eye toward preventing them. An examination of the recent request for proposals for the optionally manned fighting vehicle (OMFV) in 2019 and again in early 2020 provides compelling lessons learned that can promulgate future success.¹

Ghost of Systems Past and Concepts Future

The ghost of FCS haunts Army modernization and provides a cautionary tale for innovators and futurists. The FCS program, the largest planned modernization program in Army history, planned 18 separate systems integrated by a wireless network in a brigade structure and operating under emerging doctrine. The program aimed to provide weapons, individual computer systems, manned and unmanned vehicles, and a sensor suite. All vehicles would be transportable by C-130 and would be “more lethal, survivable, deployable, and sustainable than existing heavy combat systems.”² After nine years and $87 billion, the Department of Defense canceled the FCS program in 2009.³

The FCS was haunted by the ghost of systems past—the so-called Big 5: M1 Abrams, M2/3 Bradley, UH-60 Black Hawk, AH-64 Apache, and...
and the Patriot. Modernization enthusiasts often incorrectly assume the Big 5 were developed together. Though the systems were called the Big 5 as early as 1972 for acquisition purposes, they remained five separate modernization programs, four of which began as product improvements to systems being replaced. Each spent an average of 17 years in development, and the changes they brought were evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The final products fielded in the 1980s were all tremendous improvements over the original designs in the 1960s, and the improved versions that have seen combat from Desert Storm to the present were orders of magnitude better than their predecessors. The AirLand Battle Doctrine, developed as a result of the Yom Kippur War and using the capabilities of these new systems, really made them successful as the Big 5.

The FCS program was also haunted by the ghost of concept future, the Army After Next, which envisioned development of systems over a period of decades using technologies as yet unknown. The program hoped to marry the idea of simultaneous acquisition with modernization using leap-ahead technology. But an ambitious yet unfeasible operational concept, immature technology, and an overly aggressive timeline doomed the program to failure. Current modernization programs must avoid these ghosts within the machine in order to succeed where other programs failed.

Unfeasible Operational Concepts

General Eric Shinseki’s vision of the Army unveiled in October 1999, required the capability to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours with a full division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. This flawed operational concept required a C-130 sortie for each of the two-to-three-hundred light armored vehicles in an FCS brigade combat team. Large operations would require hundreds of C-130s, likely making the plan unfeasible. The C-130 requirement came from a notional vertical takeoff and landing aircraft designed to support futuristic forces during Army After Next war games. This theoretical aircraft used the internal cube of the C-130, so the mission needs statement defined C-130 deployability as critical to achieving both “rapid tactical and strategic air deployment” and therefore “the only non-tradable requirement.”

The FCS concept supposedly eliminated the need for heavily armored vehicles by replacing mass with superior information allowing the soldier to see and hit the enemy first. The FCS brigade combat team would have the capability to “see first, understand first, act first, and to

5. Trybula, Big 5, 11, 26, 41, 51, 58.
finish decisively.”9 The system survivability depended upon “its ability to detect and kill the enemy beyond direct combat range,” while avoiding detection itself and surviving the enemy’s first shot.10

The challenge with ground vehicles has always been the balance between weight and armor. Initial planning for C-130 transportability imposed a 20-ton limit on the vehicle assuming perfect conditions operating at sea level, while the add-on armor and reserve fuel for the C-130 (normal for combat missions) further reduced the maximum payload to 17 tons. Additionally, assault landings enabling the operational scheme overly stressed the airframes, which resulted in the requirement for an even lower payload. To reduce the vehicle weight, developers repeatedly decreased mandatory deployment configurations, but these conflicted with the operational concept requiring the FCS to be combat ready upon deployment. The military’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, moreover, proved no amount of tactical intelligence could replace physical force protection from improvised explosive devices, refuting the operational concept’s reliance on intelligence to overcome the need for protective armor. This fact drove an operational need for more heavily armored vehicles such as mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles.

**Immature Technology**

As the pace of technological change has accelerated, the Army has sought to take advantage of new, emergent, and possible technology, always looking for the “leap ahead.” The FCS project manager identified 31 critical technology elements whose readiness determined the system’s effectiveness. A technology readiness assessment in 2003 found significant problems, neither new nor unexpected.11 A 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report warned, “many critical technologies will not be mature at Milestone B [acquisition program start], thus technology development and product development will occur concurrently.”12 Congress ordered an investigation of the FCS program in 2009 and determined few things had changed with the program in the intervening six years.13 These warnings went unheeded.

A RAND Corporation study of FCS in 2012 determined, “technical development must be rooted in exploratory basic science and advanced development programs validated by early and realistic field experimentation with real products, and not in SDD [Systems Development and Demonstration] phases of major acquisition programs.”14 The FCS program proved the danger of attempting to leap too far ahead.

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12. GAO, Future Combat Systems Program, 41.
13. GAO, Defense Acquisitions, 10.
Rush to Failure

An artificially accelerated timeline driven by the desire to jump-start transformation became a primary cause of the FCS system failure. In 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pressured the Army to modernize and adapt to emerging threats, reduce the logistics infrastructure, increase lethality, and speed deployment time. The term revolution in military affairs distinguished the effort from previous evolutionary changes of the 1990s.15 Despite the immature technology, Army senior leaders accelerated the timeline for Milestone B from 2006 to 2003, effectively dooming the program by eliminating time to correct deficiencies as they appeared.16

Army Modernization Strategy

The Army seems to be in a golden period now with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan winding down and no new near-term threats. The 2018 National Defense Strategy articulates, “long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities . . . because of the magnitude of the threats” and the potential for them to increase in the future.17 While the United States competes below the level of armed conflict, the Army is using the time to modernize decades-old equipment quickly to avoid facing the next war with inferior weapons. The 2019 Army Modernization Strategy is based on four key assumptions:

- The US Army’s budget remains flat with reduced spending power over time.
- Demand for Army forces remains relatively constant.
- Research and development matures in time to make significant improvements in Army capabilities by 2035.
- Adversary modernization programs stay on their currently estimated trajectories in terms of capability levels and timelines.18

The strategy also outlines a 15-year plan to build an Army for a new doctrine, multidomain operations (MDO).

Period of rapid change:

- Fiscal year (FY)2020 to FY2022: Begin initial fielding of the cross-functional teams’ signature efforts.
- FY2023 to FY2025: Adapt formations and organizational designs to incorporate the modernized equipment required for MDO.

Period of fundamental change:
• FY2026 to FY2028: Certify first MDO force package and begin building the second. Field optionally manned fighting vehicle and future attack reconnaissance aircraft.
• FY2029 to FY2035: Finish certifying next force package while continuing to innovate.19

Deus Ex Machina—Army Futures Command

The role of Army Futures Command as a modernization headquarters allows the Army to consolidate and focus modernization and acquisition efforts; its initial development has proceeded with an eye toward correcting past failures, merging all technological research, modernization, and capability development processes into one command to better focus those efforts. Six priorities drive the Army’s equipment modernization strategy: long-range precision fires, next-generation combat vehicles, future vertical lift, networks, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality.20

Eight new cross-functional teams (all the above, plus assured positioning and timing, and synthetic training environment) focus modernization programs. Each cross-functional team is led by a senior military or civilian leader and includes specialists in acquisition, requirements, science and technology, test and evaluation, resourcing, contracting, cost analysis, sustainment, and military operations. These cross-functional teams develop capabilities, leveraging industry, academia, and soldiers in an iterative process to inform materiel solutions, ensuring appropriate stakeholders are represented, empowered, and connected.21

Lack of coordination in the research and development area has plagued the modernization system, leading to fragmented efforts. Future Command’s new Combat Capabilities Development Command aligned each of the Research, Development, and Engineering Centers as lead support to one or more of the cross-functional teams and as supporting efforts to others (see table 1).

With the failure of FCS still fresh in the Army’s consciousness, Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy challenged the modernization community to “fail early, fail cheap.”22 The January 2020 cancellation of the OMFV request for proposals provides an example of this dictum. The Army realized the project was on the wrong track and needed a course correction: “the most prudent means of ensuring long-term programmatic success is to get this multibillion-dollar effort correct.”23

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19. HQDA, Army Modernization Strategy, 10–11.
This cancellation also set off alarm bells throughout the defense media and Congress, both questioning whether this was not just the latest in a long string of Army modernization and acquisition failures—a valid question given the Army’s recent history.

Table 1. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Centers’ assignments to cross-functional teams

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Priorities</th>
<th>Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC) Components</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armaments Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 LRPF</td>
<td>LEAD</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 NGCV</td>
<td>support</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 FVL</td>
<td>support</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Network</td>
<td>support</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 AMD</td>
<td>support</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 SL</td>
<td>support</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

Air & Missile Defense (AMD):
- Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC)
- Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center (AMERDEC)
- Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C5ISR)
- Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC)
- Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command (ECBC)
- Future Vertical Lift (FVL)
- Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF)
- Natick Soldier Systems Center (NSSC)
- Network (Network)
- Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV)
- Soldier Lethality (SL)
- Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC)

Despite the Army claiming to have learned from failures such as the FCS, the initial OMFV request for proposals in March 2019 began with some of the same traits as FCS—unreasonable expectations and an impossible timeline. The Army intended to issue an ambitious draft requirement in order to push industry to provide the best solutions then get industry feedback and adjust as required.

In addition to the age-old vehicle weight problem, height became a challenge. Recent combat experience shows ground clearance enhances land mine survivability. Industry leaders warned the Army that some requirements

were unattainable and requested modifications. The Army subsequently removed the requirement to transport a full nine-soldier infantry squad—the original purpose of the vehicle. The objective requirement called for a 50mm cannon with a 30mm acceptable as an interim. With an added Modular Active Protection System, the vehicle was required to defeat rocket-propelled grenades, missiles, and long-rod penetrators.26

Army leaders argued soldier survivability was paramount yet sacrificed armor to remove weight. The Army remained just as focused on air transport as it had been during the FCS development, distorting OMFV development. The required protection was reduced making the vehicles light enough for two to fly on a C-17 as the Bradley does today.

Soldier survivability and vehicle reliability were compromised in order to achieve impossible standards. Part of this survivability lies in the potential to take soldiers out of it completely, hence optionally manned, but the vehicle would still be remotely controlled by soldiers. Bidders had roughly six months to produce a working prototype for testing.27

Although Congress and the press criticized the Army’s cancellation of the OMFV request for proposals in January 2020 to start over again, the restart was actually good news and indicates the Army’s willingness and ability to learn from its own mistakes.28 It is also visible evidence of the ability of Futures Command to change the landscape.

In April 2020, the Army unveiled a new and innovative approach to designing the OMFV. It began by soliciting ideas from industry, first on what vendors found difficult about the initial request for proposals, and then requested recommendations for how to revise OMFV development.29 The Army released an Industry Day Narrative listing broad characteristics rather than specific requirements for the OMFV (see table 2).30 It ranked survivability first among nine desired characteristics and also relaxed air transportability as a firm requirement for the first time since the FCS period, almost 10 years ago.

Table 2. Nine desired characteristics

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Survivability</th>
<th>Lethality</th>
<th>Transportability</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>Manning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
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27. Freedberg Jr., “NGCV: Hard Choices.”
The timeline for the OMFV, with five specific phases, is much more realistic:

- Phase 1 (FY2020 to FY2021): Develop and refine OMFV acquisition and contracting strategies
- Phase 2 (FY2022 to FY2023): Preliminary design
- Phase 3 (FY2023 to FY2024): Detailed design
- Phase 4 (FY2024 to FY2027): Prototype build and test
- Phase 5 (FY2027 to FY2030): Production and fielding  

Finally, the Army seemed to recognize the impossibility of transporting large numbers of armored vehicles by air. The Industry Day Narrative acknowledges units will still primarily deploy by water with the option to deploy by air. Not limiting deployability to one specific airframe allows more flexibility to continue to deploy primarily by water. The narrative also acknowledges the continued requirement for protective armor, but those requirements are more realistic—the OMFV must protect its crew from other infantry fighting vehicles, not from tanks. Elimination of tank main gun survivability makes the armor problem much easier.

Perhaps the most important part about the narrative, however, is the new approach to design. One sentence indicates the Army’s final rejection of the old FCS-type process—“the Army recognizes the importance of accurately defining the capabilities without over constraining the design.” This approach encourages industry to use virtual reality and modeling and simulation in providing initial digital designs rather than demanding a prototype within six months, demonstrating the Army’s willingness to be much more open and sensible, listening to expert opinions from industry. This approach is an improvement—during the FCS program some contractors complained overzealous Army combat developers had vision but no practical knowledge. They reported that when they told developers certain things were impossible with existing technology, the developers replied, “work the problems harder.”

Trouble Ahead?

Despite evidence of good news, the original request for proposals process revealed a potential problem between the modernization and acquisition communities. GAO had previously identified a lack of formal coordination procedures between Futures Command and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), despite early attempts at aligning the processes. In October 2019, defense

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32. NAMC, Industry Day Narrative, 3, 9.
33. NAMC, Industry Day Narrative, 4.
34. Perin, Future Combat Systems, 58n, 102.
media outlets reported that after Bradley manufacturer BAE Systems Land & Armaments dropped out of the OMFV competition, the Army disqualified Raytheon Rheinmetall Land Systems for not shipping the prototype shipped from Germany in time. Army Futures Command had insisted at the time that the process must stick to the schedule, but the acquisition community favored an extension. Restarting the process has reset the clock to zero but the Army needs better coordination between the modernization and acquisition communities.36

Conclusion

Failure is the ghost in the Army modernization machine but one that can be exorcised. The new modernization strategy has changed the nature of the machine, and Army Futures Command is the deus ex machina, providing a unified infrastructure with which to conduct a new, coherent, reasonable modernization strategy. The Army frequently uses the phrase “lessons learned,” but very often the lessons are only gathered rather than learned. The recent restart of the OMFV indicates the Army might finally be learning the harsh lessons taught by the FCS experience. If those lessons truly have been learned and the experiences passed on to the rest of the modernization enterprise, the Army need no longer fear the ghosts in the machine.

ABSTRACT: A president’s ability to control the policy narrative during a military intervention is crucial to maintaining public support, especially when American blood might be shed. An examination of policy narratives couching the military interventions in the Gulf War and in Haiti reveal both the fragility of these narratives and the importance of framing.

Be it Roosevelt and infamy, Kennedy and Pax Americana, or Reagan and a wall that needed tearing down, framing a policy narrative with the right words can be critical to the legacy of a president. Studies of successful framing of presidential messages find repetition begets message penetration which begets impact. But examples of failed presidential narratives are difficult to uncover for one obvious reason: they failed to dominate. Nonetheless, studies of unsuccessful framings and the policy implications thereof are important for understanding the presidency, especially now in a fragmented media environment when gauging the success of a narrative is more difficult. Even today, the president makes no more compelling decision than the one to risk the lives of American servicepeople. Consequently, studying successful and unsuccessful presidential wartime message framing can illuminate the importance of controlling narratives under the highest of pressures.

This article explores two cases of presidents framing messages addressing military interventions. Specifically, it examines George H. W. Bush’s messaging regarding the Persian Gulf War and William J. (Bill) Clinton’s messaging surrounding the invasion of Haiti following that country’s 1991 coup. The authors contend an executive’s ability to keep terminology dominant and forestall any counternarratives is a measure of rhetorical success. Being on the defensive or constantly having to reframe one’s message is a measure of failure. Not all successful presidential framings will sway public support but maintaining a consistent narrative about a crisis is itself a measure of any administration’s efficacy.

Background

Frames are subtle changes in language that can have dramatic impacts on public opinion by focusing attention on certain, select aspects

of an event or issue. Historically, elites set news frames since their word choices and perspectives are critical for journalists in the initial stages of reporting any story. Well-known examples of framing in news coverage include presenting a rally or protest as a matter of free speech versus a public safety risk or using terminology like welfare instead of the more sympathetic framing of assistance to the poor.

Cognitive science has shown such linguistic choices impact how information “encodes” in the brain and what becomes associated with the topic. Specifically, the brain associates terminology and issues because of recency or frequency: we associate B with A because we have recently heard about B or because we think about B often.

Creating a frame that will be adopted by the media in order that a particular policy will be embraced by the public is highly beneficial to a politician’s success. Competition between the press and politicians over frames on domestic issues is common, but the press tends to more readily accept politicians’ discourse on foreign policy. Cases of successful counterframing of foreign policy should, therefore, be relatively rare—on foreign policy especially, the framing game is the executive’s to lose.

The Persian Gulf War

When the Gulf War began in August 1990, Bush condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait calling it a “blatant use of military aggression
and violation of the UN [United Nations] Charter.” Bush repeatedly described the invasion as “naked aggression,” a “brutal act of aggression,” and an “unprovoked invasion.” His word choices signaled to the public how to understand what was occurring in the Persian Gulf—specifically, Iraq had brutally attacked Kuwait without reason. Bush also established that the United States was not responding to the crisis alone, but had dispatched envoys to work with the UN and allies around the world to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. This narrative would prove important moving forward when Saddam Hussein later attempted to introduce a counterframe that the conflict was a bilateral fight between him and America.

Early in the conflict, Bush spoke frequently about diplomatic efforts to achieve his objectives for the conflict: Iraq’s complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government, the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and the protection of US citizens abroad. Throughout the first months of the Gulf War, Bush focused his language on these objectives, successfully establishing a dominant initial frame for the crisis and leaving little room for critics to introduce counternarratives.

Public opinion polls in August 1990 reveal Bush’s narrative and rhetoric was successful: 60–75 percent of Americans were keeping abreast of events and supported Bush’s policy. There were complications though, as a majority also believed the United States was involved to protect American economic interests in the Persian Gulf and a minority believed the involvement was to deter Iraqi aggression. From August 1990 through January 1991, even when Bush was unable to convince a majority of Americans about the justifications for US involvement in the Persian Gulf, he was able to maintain a majority of support for US military presence in Saudi Arabia. These polls suggest Bush’s framing was working.

In November, Bush adjusted his narrative to gain support for military intervention, building upon the existing framing to justify the use of force. Bush emphasized lessons learned from World War II, repeatedly drawing analogies between Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler and emphasizing the world could not appease aggressors. Bush continued to express his desire for a nonmilitary resolution to the crisis, but now added that UN Security Council resolutions had to be implemented.

15. Gallup and Newport, “Persian Gulf Crisis.”
Bush and his allies had a large hurdle to overcome before using force: the concern over another Vietnam-like quagmire, which, in August 1990, 48 percent of Americans admitted to fearing. Polls indicate Bush overcame these fears by stressing American forces had sufficient resources to overwhelm Iraqi forces and the administration had every intention to depart the region quickly.

As months passed, as a result of the framing of this narrative, Bush succeeded in convincing a majority of Americans to support his policy choices. By January 1991, almost two-thirds of Americans said they had given a “great deal” of thought to whether the United States should invade to retake Kuwait from Iraq, and over half reported supporting military intervention.

In addition, Bush’s many statements, news conferences, and exchanges with reporters ensured three-fourths of Americans said they understood why the United States was involved in the Persian Gulf. Polls show Bush’s statements brought public understanding in line with his own reasons for US involvement: peace, security, and stability in the region over access to oil supplies. Despite Saddam Hussein’s counterframing efforts, public concerns that oil was the real reason for the conflict, and worries about a second Vietnam, Bush successfully controlled the narrative about the Gulf War until the invasion in 1991 and the commencement of Operation Desert Storm.

**The 1991 Haiti Coup**

In addition to establishing the policy narrative for the Gulf War, Bush also established the narrative for the Haitian coup that ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in September 1991. From the beginning Bush stated the United States was “worried about Haiti” and supported the “restoration of the democratically elected government to Haiti.” He also stated he was “wary of using US forces in the hemisphere” and he hoped a resolution could be “done without any kind of force,” publicly supporting efforts by the Organization of American States to resolve the

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22. Data from polls in *Gallup Poll Monthly* from August 1990 to January 1991.
croscope. Bush’s narrative constrained US support in this crisis to diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions against the illegal government.

Throughout 1992, Bush narrowed his rhetoric, advocating for Aristide’s return, continuing economic sanctions, and the repatriation of refugees. Further, Bush’s statements made clear the United States would not use force or send troops to restore democracy to Haiti or Aristide to power. This policy position would change with Clinton. At first, Clinton continued Bush’s narrative with little adjustment. But as the crisis continued, Clinton tried to change the narrative to fit with his own emerging policy.

Similar to Bush, Clinton’s policy narrative discussed the US preference for restoring democracy in Haiti and returning Aristide to power, as well as US efforts to support international negotiations toward these ends. Clinton’s narrative however, referred to the US “commitment” and “determination” to restore democracy to Haiti, whereas Bush only said “worried” or “supported,” without committing the country to any solution to the Haitian crisis.

While seemingly minor, this variation in terminology, when applied to policy decisions, makes a significant difference in public messaging. Commitment and determination imply significantly different degrees of willingness to work toward a policy goal than worried does. This was the first of several differences between the two presidents’ framings of the Haitian crisis. Other significant divergences included Clinton’s decreased focus on the Haitian refugee policy, increased attention to human rights, and stating Aristide had been elected by “two-thirds of Haitian voters.” This messaging foreshadowed a policy shift and an attempt to change how the public understood the crisis.

In overcoming Bush’s hands-off narrative to gain public support for his own more interventionist policy, Clinton faced an uphill battle after seeming to (at first) accept Bush’s more laissez-faire policy. Establishing a foreign policy narrative is hard; changing one is even harder. Further, Clinton did not deliver his Haiti narrative frequently or consistently, mentioning Haiti on average three days per month throughout 1993.
The consequence in terms of public opinion was clear: October 1993 polling indicated more Americans disapproved of Clinton’s handling of Haiti than approved of it.29

In early May 1994, Clinton revealed a more forceful policy toward Haiti by introducing two new phrases: “not ruling out any option[s]” and “time for a new initiative.”30 He began emphasizing the length of the coup—almost three years—and stated, “maybe we’ve let it run on a bit too long.”31 He also harkened back to earlier narratives that two-thirds of Haitian voters had elected Aristide and the US mission was to restore democracy.32 Additionally, Clinton more frequently referred to the fact that following the coup, Haiti was one of just two nondemocratic countries in the hemisphere and therefore of significant strategic interest to the United States.33 In fact, between May and August 1994, Clinton began to include “defending democracy” as a specific US interest in his increasingly hawkish narrative.

Nonetheless, he failed to outline specifically what US interests or mission objectives were. For example, Clinton first talked about Haiti being in the United States’ backyard, then walked back this messaging.34 He talked about Haiti sending drugs and that it, like Cuba, was a nondemocracy.35 During this period of a lack of specificity and contradiction in the policy narrative, in July 1994, 50 percent of survey respondents opposed the military intervention desired by the Clinton administration.36

In an attempt to gain public support, Clinton made a flurry of public statements in mid-September to update Americans on developments and explain his policy decision. After Clinton addressed the nation on September 15, 1994, support for an intervention increased somewhat, possibly due to a rally-around-the-flag effect: Gallup reported 66 percent of Americans were convinced by Clinton’s arguments, but 43 percent disapproved of the way Clinton had handled the situation in Haiti.37 These gains were temporary: by October, approval of Clinton’s handling of the crisis fell to 54 percent.38 By February 1995, while 47

percent said they had approved of his handling of the crisis, 47 percent also reported disapproval. Our analysis of Clinton’s framing of the military intervention in Haiti concludes he failed to establish a policy narrative convincing Americans that the seriousness of the Haitian crisis warranted armed intervention.

Implications for Future Executives

A successful presidential policy narrative rallies domestic and international support behind a policy decision. A strong narrative successfully framed helps coalesce support for a policy and quiets potential counternarratives. But such narratives and frames must remain agile—media and communications theory reveal a presidential narrative cannot be presented and then left alone. A successful narrative and frame, repeated with some frequency, keeps the event relevant for the public.

These two case studies provide the following three insights:

• Whenever possible, a president should establish a narrative early. This timing is important for new initiatives or events and for efforts to redirect an existing policy narrative—the sooner an administration publicizes its version of events or policy position, the better chance a message has of gaining traction.

• The success of the narrative depends on how well an administration conveys the relevancy of the issue in question. Presidents employing consistent, sustained phraseology are more likely to beget success than presidents using inconsistent, contradictory, or confusing language.

• A successful frame evolves with the situation but has consistent foundations, and allows a president to establish national interests and objectives. During the Gulf War, Bush established US interests early and did not change them. Clinton did not do this—the administration’s narrative regarding US strategic interest in Haiti morphed multiple times.

Every administration faces messaging and optics problems. While no one case can provide comprehensive instructions for all occasions, executives would be well-served to study the messaging strategies of Bush and Clinton in the examples above, one of successful control of a presidential policy narrative and the other, a mishandling of the same.

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ABSTRACT: Russia, China, and other nations operate in a perpetual state of competition with the United States. Recognizing this reality, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently published the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning and Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, *Competition Continuum*. This article places these documents within the historical context of World War II in the Pacific and argues they are a return to a traditional American approach to the employment of military force.

The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) and the Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19, *Competition Continuum*, are a return to a more traditional American strategic approach where, in times of peace, military power was applied mostly to advance economic interests. Often, promoting US economic interests required the application of military force within the so-called gray zone between war and peace, a place in which American military leaders were quite adept at operating. The Pacific region from 1918–48 provides an excellent example of this strategic environment. Military force was applied along the competition continuum within integrated campaigns. All stages of the continuum—cooperation, competition below the level of armed conflict, and armed conflict—were present, sometimes occurring simultaneously. The region was hotly contested and never fully at peace, requiring leaders to employ all elements of national power to secure American interests. Playing out across vast distances, this great-power rivalry ranged from the relatively benign to the waging of a total war and featured both the first-ever international arms reduction action and the only uses of atomic weapons.

A wide range of national security challenges face the United States—confronting near-peer adversaries, containing rogue states, and defeating nonstate, transnational terrorist and criminal organizations, posing a significant dilemma for American national security leaders. The JCIC called for Joint Force commanders and their staffs to think, plan, and execute integrated campaigns where the Joint Force works in concert with the interagency, partners, and allies rather than as an independent entity only employed in direct military conflict. Building on previous assessments of the current and future operating environments, JDN 1-19 began the process to codify *Competition Continuum*, a construct...
embracing the spectrum of challenges within an era of enduring global competition.

Compared to other agencies and organizations, the sheer size of the Department of Defense has the potential to make it the lead agency for most national security endeavors. Unilateral leadership, however, is not the objective of integrated campaigns. Although Joint Force capabilities are unparalleled in size and scope, the JCIC calls for Joint Force commanders to “identify physical and cognitive campaign objectives and then align resources and actions—across the range of partners—to ensure the accomplishment of these objectives.” They are not to exercise command or attempt to control those outside their legal jurisdictions. Instead, while campaigning through the competition continuum to secure national interests—not all military in nature—Joint Force commanders are to collaborate with civilian agencies, allies, and partners to create unity of effort.

Prior to Pearl Harbor

The historical antecedents for integrated campaigning are much older than the relatively recent Cold War period. Prior to World War II, gray zone conflict was a natural part of the operating environment, ambiguous strategic guidance and shifting policies were the norm, interagency collaboration was expected, officers routinely performed diplomatic functions to include negotiating treaties, and it was understood that economic progress was usually the underlying motive behind most foreign policy.

Securing the industrial base, particularly its labor force, technological innovations, and manufacturing capacity, was essential for maintaining American hegemony. At its core, this approach was conceptually Hamiltonian and reflective of Edward Meade Earle’s influential essay, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power.” Hamilton viewed military power as both a byproduct and an adjunct to economic power. The pursuit of military power was not an end unto itself, but rather a means to an economic end resulting in national independence and individual freedom. Although Hamilton’s system was not adopted wholesale, the assumption that military capacity was drawn from and supported the economic needs of the people has become part of the collective American mind. This was assumption especially true when military force was applied outside the confines of war in periods of contested peace.5

3. JCS, Joint Operating Environment, 11.
Throughout the middle to late 1800s, Americans sought new trading partners and relatively untouched markets. Since European empires like Britain, France, and Spain dominated trade in Africa and Central and South America, only Asia was open for economic expansion. Diplomats secured trade treaties across the Pacific and established consuls in many fledgling island nations. By the 1870s, the United States had a foothold in the Chinese market and had opened trade with Japan. The Spanish-American War made the United States a global power with colonial possessions of Guam and the Philippines to administer and defend.

Adding these new territories to other Pacific territories such as Hawaii and Wake Island provided the bases that naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan so adamantly argued the US Navy required to project power. In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt declared the “Mediterranean era died with the discovery of America,” and “the Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all, is just at its dawn.” Shortly afterward, the Russo-Japanese War broke out. It ended with Japan’s stunning victory, which established it as a regional power and set the conditions for a future war.

Following the Boxer Rebellion in 1901 in China, the US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps maintained garrisons and ships at strategic locations along critical waterways, rail lines, and internationally controlled sections of cities. Their tactical mission was to protect American lives and property, but their strategic objective was to maintain the Open Door policy in China and enhance American influence throughout the region. American commanders worked closely with and sometimes under the direct control of State Department officials.

American naval officers became naturally at ease operating within this complex environment. In a 1922 Naval War College lecture, Rear Admiral H. S. Sharp explained, “the life experience of a naval officer is a broadening one,” specifically in the “practical matter of international affairs and foreign people” where their duties, and, more importantly, individual professional responsibility, often called upon them to act as diplomats, negotiators, law and treaty enforcers, and peacekeepers.

During the interwar years as their commitments abroad expanded, Army officers demonstrated equal competence in such affairs. Both naval and military officers coordinated with Christian missionary organizations to ensure the safety and, at times, the safe evacuation of far-flung missions. Freedom of navigation patrols, field maneuvers, and even the routines of military courtesy and protocol were used to

demonstrate power and exert influence over an array of international navies and militaries.  

**World War II**

For the United States, the interwar years ended abruptly with the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, which shocked and incensed the American people. The next day, President Roosevelt made his iconic “Day of Infamy” speech, to which Congress responded by declaring war on Imperial Japan. The next four years consisted of bloody warfare, but there was much more to American activities in the Pacific than just armed conflict. From a national perspective, the United States used the military instrument of national power exercised through integrated campaigning in conjunction with diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power aimed at both punishing Imperial Japan and achieving a better peace. From a military perspective, fighting the Pacific War required cooperation amongst the services and with Allies, armed conflict with Imperial Japan, and even competition with Allies.

Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 includes specific definitions of three forms of cooperation: engage selectively, maintain, and advance. World War II was global in nature and so was US cooperation with its Allies Great Britain and the Soviet Union. When the Germans touched off World War II with the invasion of Poland, a neutral United States sought to engage selectively with Great Britain through loans. The relationship was transactional in nature, as American legislation required other nations to purchase US war goods, and the United States still sought competitive advantage over the United Kingdom. Thus, the United States sought to help Britain against Nazi aggression while improving its own strategic position.

As the fortunes of Europe and the United Kingdom waned, however, the United States sought to maintain Great Britain as a bulwark against the Axis powers, creating the lend-lease program and then system, which increasingly helped Britain while reducing competition with Britain. After Pearl Harbor, American cooperation with its erstwhile competitors now potential Allies increased dramatically, and the United States advanced its relationship, becoming allied with

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Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Nationalist China, and the Soviet Union.\(^\text{14}\)

The Allies’ war with Japan was total in nature, and JDN 1-19 defines four activities conducted in armed conflict useful to help understand this war: \textit{defeat}, \textit{deny}, \textit{degrade}, and \textit{disrupt}.\(^\text{15}\) After Pearl Harbor, the United States made several efforts to deny the Japanese from achieving their strategic objectives. First, American and Philippine forces defended the Philippine Islands as long as they could, denying the Japanese a quick victory and the ability to use those forces elsewhere. Similarly, the United States and other Allies used naval forces in an effort to deny the Japanese a quick victory in the Java Sea, which while it failed, it nonetheless served to slow the Japanese. Meanwhile, the United States increased its efforts to support the Nationalist Chinese against Japan, denying the Japanese victory in China and thereby tying up a large part of the Japanese Army fighting the Nationalist Chinese and Communist Chinese.\(^\text{16}\)

Almost immediately after Pearl Harbor, the US military also began efforts to disrupt the Japanese. The Doolittle Raid was one of the first and most important of these efforts. This small raid had negligible tactical impact but had strategic-level disruptive effects. The Japanese military felt dishonored by the attack on the Japanese home islands—a demonstration of the military’s potential vulnerability. Furthermore, there was a perception of a threat to the Japanese emperor, however remote in reality. The Japanese military reacted to the raid with the attack on the Aleutian Islands and Midway Island, which was ultimately disastrous. Carrier strikes, Marine Raider Battalion operations, and some submarine efforts were other examples of operational-level disruption efforts.\(^\text{17}\)

The United States used three key efforts to degrade Imperial Japan’s ability and will to wage war. The first two—a submarine campaign that quietly eviscerated the Japanese merchant marine and an extensive mining effort, which reached a crescendo in 1945 with the introduction of B-29 Superfortress bombers—resulted in shortages of raw materials that led to cascading effects upon Japanese industry and military operations. Additionally, the mining effort limited and degraded both operations and training programs, especially for aircraft pilots. The third effort, a strategic bombing campaign, devastated the Japanese ability to wage war in terms of war industry, infrastructure, and military capabilities. But the will of the Japanese remained strong enough to fight on until the deployment by the United States of two atomic bombs and the Soviet entry in the Pacific War.\(^\text{18}\)


\(^{15}\) JCS, \textit{Competition Continuum}, 5.


The Allies had three theaters of war in which to defeat Imperial Japan. In a sense, the oldest was the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) where Imperial Japan fought for years before Pearl Harbor. The Allied command structure in this theater was complicated on paper and even more so in reality—Chiang Kai-shek was in command in China and American General Joseph W. Stillwell served as his deputy. The British also had major subordinate commanders, most notably Admiral Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten, the nominal CBI theater commander. The two newer theaters were the Southwest Pacific Area, under the command of US Army General Douglas MacArthur and the Pacific Ocean Areas under the command of US Navy Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.

The two American theater commanders worked to defeat Imperial Japan by forcing its unconditional surrender and changing its militaristic nature while CBI remained a supporting theater.19 In 1942, MacArthur’s forces stemmed the Japanese tide on New Guinea and then went on the offensive, which picked up speed and momentum as he fought to retake the Philippines in 1944 and 1945. Meanwhile, Nimitz’s forces took and held Guadalcanal and later began the Central Pacific drive in 1943 that would, like MacArthur’s forces, increase the pace of its offensive in 1944 and 1945.

Just as US cooperation with its Allies changed over the course of the war, so did US competition with its Allies. The JDN 1-19 includes specific definitions of three activities in competition below armed conflict: enhance, manage, and delay. For example, America enhanced its position at Britain’s expense as Great Britain took wartime loans and gave up influence and bases in the Western Hemisphere.20 In the immediate aftermath of the Japanese 1941 attacks, the Allies fought desperately to stem the Japanese onslaught, which involved all Allies stepping up their cooperation.

Despite this need for short-term cooperation to defeat the common foe of Imperial Japan, some competition remained, and the United States changed its competitive activities to focus on managing Great Britain. As the Pacific War continued and the prospects of victory increased, America and her Allies increased their competition for postwar political and strategic advantage, especially as the war neared its conclusion. Given the growing signs of war weariness in the American people, the United States attempted to delay the Soviet Union over eastern Europe and China.21

Beyond World War II

The unexpected speed of the Japanese surrender after the atomic bombs were dropped in August 1945 caused immediate and massive

21. Costello, Pacific War, 536–38; Murray and Millet, War to Be Won, 521–22; and Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 324–79.
redeployments of troops to occupation duties throughout Asia. Overnight, senior leaders made a conscious, deliberate, yet ultimately swift strategic shift from fighting an unlimited global war to competing against the ideology of communism and the state and nonstate actors who embraced it. Although unsuccessful for many reasons, Operation Beleaguer, the occupation of North China until 1947, combined force deployments and Nationalist Chinese training programs in support of diplomatic efforts to stem the onslaught of Chinese communism.

The 40 years of Japanese occupation left Korea in a vacuum, and the US Army filled this void. The Korean Military Advisory Group was hugely successful in South Korea, building partner capacity and creating space for Syngman Rhee’s government to wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign. The famed historian Allan R. Millett, an expert on the Korean War, went so far as proclaiming this success was what led to Kim Il-Sung’s decision to invade the south in June 1950.22

Conclusion

American cooperation, competition, and conflict in the twentieth century in the Pacific demonstrate the JCIC and JDN 1-19 have deep historical roots. Traditionally, the underlying reason America exercised its military strength short of war was to bolster the other elements of national power, chiefly economic power. Military force was adjunct and even subordinated to diplomatic and economic action. Naval and military commanders inherently understood this and waged integrated campaigns to secure national interests in concert with other government agencies, Allies, and partners.

Before 1941, naval and military commanders simultaneously executed campaigns of cooperation and competition throughout the contested Pacific region. They did this all while working for, with, and through various agencies like the State Department as well as communicating and coordinating with private entities such as news reporters and Christian missionaries. During World War II, they created campaign plans that were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval, integrated into a global strategy, and executed across three different theaters of operations. After the war, these same commanders confronted great power adversaries, administered occupied governments, and competed throughout the region below the level of armed conflict.

As a result of its growth and prestige as the Cold War progressed, the US military became overly focused on purely military matters. Senior military and political leaders perceived effective strategy was the ability to enhance capabilities to deter war. If war did come, then a successful strategy was winning enough battles to win that war. When the Soviet Union fell, this condition only worsened. The current National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy make this strategic focus anathema.

The JCIC and JDN 1-19 provide a blueprint for military leaders to return to a more traditional American strategic approach to employing military force in times of peace.

Earl J. Catagnus Jr.

Jonathan P. Klug
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ABSTRACT: During World War II, the Army demonstrated the core competencies outlined in Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army, in its application of strategic landpower. The Army of today must retain its capability to perform these core competencies—the requirement for the Army to provide true strategic landpower in conjunction with other services, partners, and allies is as critical today as it was then.

Seventy-five years ago, the US Army completed the destruction of its World War II enemies on land. While it received tremendous support from the air, sea, and Allies, I agree with Professor Russell Weigley’s assertion: “At the close of World War II, the United States Army was the mightiest in the world. . . . In every theater the American Army had faced enemies long trained in war and had speedily overcame them.”1 While the Nazi German and Soviet armies fielded more combat divisions, only the US Army participated in both theaters of war and all six principal land theaters of operations at the same time.

While the Army has long used the term landpower to describe the capabilities it provides the nation, it only officially defined landpower in 2005.2 The current definition in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 is “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”3 In 2012 the Army, in conjunction with the US Marine Corps and US Special Operations Command, established a Strategic Landpower Task Force to better inform Congress and American public about landpower.4 More recently, the Army published its core competencies in ADP 1, The Army, on July 31, 2019.

Core competencies are intended to express clearly how the Army contributes to national defense and joint operations. These competencies are: prompt and sustained land combat; combined arms operations including combined arms maneuver, wide area security, armored and mechanized operations, and airborne and air assault operations; special operations; set and sustain the theater for the Joint Force; and integrate

national, multinational and joint power on land.\(^5\) However, not only are these competencies not new, but they were observable during World War II when the US Army demonstrated the origins of strategic landpower in its ability to conduct simultaneous global operations to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, people, and resources.

**US Army in World War II**

The National Defense Act of 1920 specifically charged the War Department and the Army General Staff with overall mobilization planning and preparation in the event of war and remained unchanged until 1947.\(^6\) In early 1942, then Chief of Staff General George Catlett Marshall organized the Army into three major administrative commands—Army Ground Forces (AGF), Army Service Forces (ASF), and Army Air Force (AAF). In 1945, 70 percent of AGF and ASF (some six million personnel) were deployed overseas, of which only 20 percent could be found in the 89 combat divisions, all overseas.\(^7\) Was some 80 percent of the Army unnecessary overhead or tail to the divisional tooth? No! This arrangement was the complete force structure required for the Army to perform its core competencies including providing prompt strategic landpower and simultaneously sustaining global campaigns in two theaters of war—Europe and Pacific—and six separate theaters of operations.

**Organization for Combat**

The Army followed doctrine in Field Manual (FM) 100-15, *Field Service Regulations: Larger Units*, which called for Army theater commanders to be directly responsible for both administration and combat within their assigned theaters.\(^8\) By late 1944, the Army had six principal theater armies: the European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETO), North African and later Mediterranean Theater of Operations, US Army (MTO), Persian Gulf Command (PGC), US Army Forces in the Far East (FE), US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), and US Army Forces, China-Burma-India (CBI).\(^9\) Each had a senior Army officer as commander who reported directly to the Army chief of staff for internal Army matters, and who, if not dual-hatted, also reported to a joint or combined commander for operational matters.

Under Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur, ETO and FE were extremely large and concerned with *sequel* planning.

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including the occupation of Axis countries.\textsuperscript{10} Under theater armies with significant combat requirements, the Army formed Army groups and field armies. Based on World War I experience, field armies became the fundamental unit of strategic maneuver capable of independent operation, with a flexible structure, and expected to serve both as senior operational and logistical headquarters. In World War II, corps headquarters were flexible extensions of the field Army in tactical command of divisions but without support structure and consequently much smaller. Divisions were the largest unit with a completely organic structure capable of limited duration operations.\textsuperscript{11} In addition to divisions, the Army organized most AGF and ASF combat and support units into groups, battalions, or companies which could be organized at echelons above division and provided to streamlined divisions only when required.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{World War II Army Core Competencies}

\textit{Prompt and Sustained Land Combat}

While the Victory Plan of 1941 envisioned an Army requiring some 6 million ground and service personnel with 215 ground combat divisions, the Army never fielded that many divisions because of the nondivisional support required.\textsuperscript{13} The Army provided joint and combined theater commanders 9 field armies, 23 corps, and 89 combat divisions (16 armored, 66 infantry, 1 dismounted cavalry, 5 airborne, and 1 mountain) totaling over 2 million in deployed AGF units by May 1945.\textsuperscript{14} At that date, 61 of the Army’s 89 fielded divisions were in Eisenhower’s ETO alone.\textsuperscript{15} Charles B. MacDonald argues in \textit{The Last Offensive}:

The efficacy of the American tank-infantry-artillery team, of methods of air-ground co-operation, of the regimental combat team and combat command concepts, and of the “lean” division with attachments provided as needed . . . the general excellence of American arms and equipment, the ability to motorize infantry divisions on short notice—all these had been demonstrated and proved long before.\textsuperscript{16}

The Army withstood the Japanese first strikes in 1941–42 in Hawaii and especially the Philippines. From Operation Torch in November 1942, the US Army conducted all American amphibious operations in the MTO and ETO. Once ashore, sustained land combat was exemplified by the operations of General George Patton’s II Corps in Tunisia and
Seventh Army in Sicily, General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army, 15th Army Group in Italy for the North African and MTO, and General Omar Nelson Bradley’s 12th and General Jacob L. Devers’s 6th Army Groups in the ETO. In the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur’s Sixth and Eighth Armies conducted major amphibious operations in New Guinea and in the liberation of the Philippines. In the Central Pacific, Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson’s Army forces also conducted amphibious operations in conjunction with the Marines.17

**Combined Arms Operations**

Combined arms maneuvers conducted by US Army forces grew in tactical excellence as the war continued and provided the winning margin in applying landpower to defeat the Axis powers in four major theaters of operations. After overcoming initial inexperience in North Africa, II Corps demonstrated combined arms armored and mechanized excellence as it defeated the Germans and Italians in Tunisia.18 At Normandy and the breakout at Saint-Lô, Bradley’s First Army and 12th Army Group demonstrated combined arms excellence in amphibious and mobile warfare. Patton’s Third Army exemplified this combined arms armored and mechanized excellence with its accomplishments, especially in the 4th Armored Division’s relief of Bastogne in late 1944.19

Similarly during the Battle of the Bulge, the 7th Armored Division exemplified this excellence with its defense and later liberation of Saint-Vith, and the 2nd Armored Division with its destruction of the 2nd Panzer division.20 The US Army also developed forcible entry by airborne and air assault capability (gliders at the time) with the First Allied Airborne Army, XVIII Airborne Corps, and five airborne divisions and several smaller units. These units conducted four division-sized or larger airborne and glider operations: the 82nd and 101st at both Normandy and Market Garden, the First Allied Airborne Army in south France, the 17th during Operation Varsity, and numerous regimental-sized airborne operations in Sicily, Italy, and the Southwest Pacific.21

**Wide-Area Security**

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave the US Army the lead conducting military government in 1942. In the ETO and MTO, the Army conducted wide-area security by providing the occupation and military government forces to secure the peace in North Africa, Italy, France, and Germany after maneuver units had defeated the Axis forces. The 12th Army Group established the Fifteenth Army after June 1944

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in ETO to relieve other units of mopping-up duties and to conduct occupation and other operations in conjunction with French forces against bypassed German units.\(^\text{22}\) In Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s POA, Richardson employed Army base commands to secure, occupy, and provide administration for most of the islands, including Okinawa, in Nimitz’s Central Pacific whether assaulted by marine or army forces.\(^\text{23}\) In addition, the Army provided the liberating forces and initial military government in MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific for numerous Japanese-occupied islands as well as the Philippines. Postwar, the Army provided all of the US occupation forces for West Germany, West Berlin, Austria, Trieste, Okinawa, South Korea, and Japan.\(^\text{24}\)

**Setting and Sustaining the Theater**

The US Army set and maintained multiple theaters of operations through the theater armies and their Services of Supply branch. Under General Brehon B. Somervell, the ASF totaled over two million soldiers and civilians by 1945. It provided logistical support and procured most of the supplies and equipment for the AGF, AAF, and substantial numbers of Allied and Marine divisions.\(^\text{25}\) Even theaters without significant ground combat forces—the PGC and CBI—had large numbers of ASF: “the relatively high support strengths for the Central Pacific Base Command are explained in part by the Army support rendered to 6 Marine divisions also present in the theater.”\(^\text{26}\)

In addition, the Army remained responsible for most major domestic or overseas infrastructure/base and road construction.\(^\text{27}\) As the war continued, the Army also took responsibility for the evacuation and detention of over 400,000 Axis soldiers at over 600 facilities and for the evacuation and hospitalization of some 231,000 American casualties in the United States.\(^\text{28}\)

**Special Operations**

As the war progressed, the Army created numerous new units to meet particular operational requirements. Army special operations forces for World War II included six Ranger battalions for special assault missions; the joint US-Canadian, First Special Service Force for operations in Italy; the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) for long-range penetrations in Burma; and other special reconnaissance units such as Alaskan and Alamo Scouts. Although the Office of Strategic Services formed in 1942 was an independent government agency growing to over

\(^{22}\) Weigley, *Eisenhower’s Lieutenants*, 668.  
^{23}\) Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy*, 448; and Robert C. Richardson Papers, Museum and Archives, US Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.  
^{27}\) Stewart, *American Military History*, 90.  
thirteen thousand personnel, its larger military units were recruited from, manned by, and under the command of Army personnel.29

In Europe, the Army created Jedburgh teams specifically to liaise with the French resistance and operational groups. These groups, composed of foreign-language qualified soldiers who were skilled in sabotage and guerilla warfare, were designed to be employed in small teams in enemy territory. In the Pacific, Office of Strategic Services personnel played a major role in training thousands of Nationalist Chinese troops as well as over ten thousand Kachin and other indigenous irregular forces in Southeast Asia fighting the Japanese. In Axis-occupied Europe, regionally aligned operational groups conducted strategic intelligence and unconventional warfare operations.30

Integrating National, Multinational, and Joint Power

National. On September 1, 1939, the Regular Army consisted of only 190,000 in 11 understrength divisions. The Army also had divided the nation into field Army areas responsible for all bases, stationing and training on a geographic basis. Using the above framework, between July 1940 and June 1941, the Army mobilized over 215,000 members and 18 infantry divisions of the Army National Guard and over 100,000 officers of the Organized Reserve Corps. Later under the ASF, the Army remained responsible for acquiring and building the necessary bases for expansion and mobilization for millions of new draftees.31 Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers provided oversight of the $2 billion Manhattan Project building the atomic bomb.32

During World War II, the Army conducted support to domestic civil authorities and provided for the active defense of the US homeland. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the Army established several defense commands to coordinate military responses to potential foreign attack. In the continental states, Second Army (Eastern Defense Command) and Fourth Army (Western Defense Command) never deployed and remained in place until war’s end. The forces assigned to continental defense peaked at 379,000 in July 1943, including 140,000 in antiaircraft and coast artillery units.33 The Army established the Caribbean Defense Command to protect US interests in South America and the Alaska Defense Command to defend Alaska and conduct operations to repel the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands.34

32. Stewart, American Military History, 123.
34. Cline, Washington Command Post, 381.
Multinational. Besides fielding 89 divisions, the US Army supported security cooperation for Allies. The Army provided equipment and supplies, mostly under the Lend-Lease Act, for 60 Russian divisions (PGC), 36 Nationalist Chinese divisions (CBI), 12 French divisions (MTO/ETO), and 1 Brazilian division (MTO). In addition, the Army provided significant numbers of combat advisers, down to the battalion level, to the Nationalist Chinese, and advisers to the regimental level to the French and Brazilian divisions. In this manner, the Army more than doubled its own number of fielded divisions.

Joint. Since AAF remained part of the US Army, ASF provided an estimated 167,257 personnel in direct support of AAF. In addition to Army tactical headquarters, under provisions of the prewar Joint Action of the Army and Navy, the Army provided the joint theater commander—dual-hatted as the theater Army commander—and the core joint headquarters for four theaters: ETO, PGC, FE, and CBI. The Army also provided separate service component staffs for MTO and POA of the combined or joint commander. The Army also provided additional headquarters when required. In 1944, the Army established the 1st Airborne Task Force (Allied) as a provisional airborne division for the invasion of southern France, and later the First Allied Airborne Army with command over both airborne units and their airlift as Eisenhower’s theater reserve. When a large ground headquarters was required in late 1944 with both an Army and a Marine amphibious corps for Nimitz’s Central Pacific drive, the Army activated Tenth Army under General Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. The Army also provided hundreds of battalions of coast and antiaircraft units to defend joint forces.

Conclusion

The US Army of World War II demonstrated the value of strategic landpower on a global scale. After the fall of the Philippines, the US Army never failed a strategic mission during the war. These missions included protecting the homeland; mobilizing, training, and equipping over ten million soldiers; setting, maintaining, and then dismantling six major theaters of operations; maneuvering on land to defeat three major enemies; building the atomic bomb; occupying, governing, and returning defeated countries to the community of nations; and humanely conducting detention operations for our captured enemies. Consequently, the Army demonstrated all current core competencies in its application of strategic landpower during World War II. Today the
Army must retain its capability to perform these same core competencies as the global nature and requirement for the Army to provide true strategic landpower in conjunction with other services and allies still remains.
The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Nuclear Catastrophe

By George Beebe

Reviewed by James P. Farwell, associate fellow in the Centre for Strategic Communication, Department of War Studies, Kings College, University of London, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington

George S. Beebe served as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Russia analysis and was Vice President Dick Cheney’s adviser on Russia. Savvy and insightful, he contravenes the conventional wisdom calling for increased pressure on Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin for its disruptive activities in US elections, Europe, and other places. In an excellent new book, *The Russia Trap*, he lays out a clear history of modern Russian relations with the West, explaining how tensions escalated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where we are headed, and the grave risks the current trajectory poses.

He begins with a proposal: The United States and Russia are fighting an undeclared virtual war. It is not a cold war between two ideological adversaries but a shadow war in which the two nations are competing for strategic advantage without direct use of military force. While the United States pioneered the use of soft power, Moscow has learned fast.

The weapons include cybersabotage, cyberespionage, and cyberinfluence. These confluent tactics, he argues, create escalating spirals of aggression and suspicion. In a networked, globalized world in which digital networks, national economies, media systems, and nuclear command and control systems are all linked together in some way, it is difficult to limit damage inflicted from any of these cyber weapons. The potential consequences of these attacks could range from armed hostilities to nuclear war.

Beebe’s strength has always been as an analyst and grand strategist. One of his keenest skills lies in his ability to see how the other side thinks and acts. He recognizes America’s agenda looks different in the eyes of Moscow. The Russian government “sees ‘instability and destabilization’ as the defining characteristic of US foreign policy” (27). In this view, Russia is a victim, not a perpetrator, of disruption and the United States has brought disorder, not prosperity.

He traces the history of US-Russia relations over the last three decades, from Kosovo to the Arab Spring—Libya and Syria. As relations have evolved—perhaps more accurately, devolved—the United States and Russia each views itself as engaged in legitimate, defensive, and benign actions, while the other engages in the opposite. These attitudes reinforce one another, deepening mistrust and eliminating important brakes on escalatory spirals.
Americans dismiss Russian objections to an eastward expansion of NATO or efforts to foster democracy in Russia. Russia, Beebe argues, feels threatened by NATO and sees activities like the National Endowment for Democracy as fostering sentiment in Russia intended to ignite regime change. Beebe feels the nations are experiencing brake failure. The Cold War was fought over a set of rules that imposed vital restraint. Today’s shadow war lacks them. The US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has intensified suspicions, and the Kremlin rejects as implausible the explanation that the US focus is Iran, rather than exploiting a perceived Russian vulnerability. Problems with other strategic arms control agreements deepen the challenge.

Russian meddling in the 2016 US election raised emotions to a new high. Washington responded with tough sanctions aimed at squeezing Russia into submission. In Beebe’s view, that strategy is doomed and more likely to make the Kremlin more aggressive.

He discusses a scenario that could trigger all-out war, closely tied to a plausible rendering of current events; it is a nightmare scenario. Beebe also offers a series of initiatives to absorb shocks wrought by security tensions. He defines these as surprise developments that diverge suddenly and sharply from the trends preceding them. As examples, he cites the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 2008 financial crisis, and the Arab Spring. The challenges are not linear. We must recognize this and build resilience into the system to achieve stability.

Solutions Beebe proposes include resilience through more frequent and open personal communication between officials. Critical infrastructure requires technical resilience. Informal understandings such as those following the Cuban missile crisis are vital. He argues we need to look beyond our relations with Russia, incorporating them into mutually beneficial strategies, such as checkmating Chinese expansion.

Beebe knows his subject. He has thought long and hard about the challenges US-Russia tensions pose. He understands the escalatory risks and argues cogently for practical approaches that lower tensions and reduce the risk of accident or strategic miscalculation leading to war. The Russia Trap is a must read. It is well written, informing, enlightening, and provides a needed perspective that lights the road ahead to strength and stability.
On Absolute War: Terrorism and the Logic of Armed Conflict

By Eric Fleury

Reviewed by LTC Nathan K. Finney, US Army

Wrestling with the underlying elements of theory—picking it apart and refashioning it to describe the issues we face today—can be a challenge for military members engaged in the day-to-day rigors of a career in the armed forces.

Fortunately, Eric Fleury’s *On Absolute War* provides a compelling example of how to think deeply about the underlying logic of military theory and its application to contemporary problems. Initially, based on the title and the table of contents, I was expecting to find terrorism explained with well-known Clausewitz quotes. I could not have been more mistaken. Fleury digs thoroughly into theory—specifically the basic logic of Clausewitz’s *On War*, including its purpose and application—and then uses it to fashion his own concept which he then applies to the underlying drivers and dynamics of terrorism as a method of warfare, creating a general theory of terrorism. I was exceedingly skeptical at first but by the end, *On Absolute War* convinced me of the merits of Fleury’s approach.

Using the structure of *On War* as a model, *On Absolute War* begins with a dialectical comparison of terrorism and conventional warfare, which includes a more nuanced look at the former through the assessment of terrorism as practiced by both state and nonstate actors. Through case studies he explains the dynamics of terrorism and its inherent goal of perpetual escalation, militarizing all sides to a conflict in a manner that approaches absolute war as described by Clausewitz. Finally, Fleury grafts the Clausewitzian concept of battle onto terrorism demonstrating how a theory of terrorism can describe the relationship between the state and its citizens under this form of warfare.

What is so impressive about *On Absolute War* is its nuance and understated breakthroughs. Fleury undoubtedly understands *On War* better than most, going beyond the surface of Clausewitz’s work into what drove the development of his theory and the logic behind it. He recognizes and uses techniques that make *On War* a relevant to military art and science to this day. In addition to adopting a dialectic approach, Fleury focuses on key elements of the Clausewitzian theory such as the permanent interplay of human nature and historical evolution. By understanding these elements, Fleury is able to progress beyond simply applying Clausewitzian phrases or surface-level ideas to his own work, and instead engages the underlying theory as it relates to terrorism in order to ascertain something wholly new. In the process, he advances beyond the analysis of the last few decades, which “have precluded a more fundamental examination of how to understand the nature of war between such dissimilar combatants”—terrorist and conventional
forces (2). Fleury determines that we “must reevaluate the nature of the conflict itself, not just revise its tactics” (5).

The most innovative and thought-provoking concept in Fleury’s work is the idea that “terrorism is an attempt to approximate a condition of absolute war in reality as much as possible” that strives to bypass “traditional limits of warfare, especially friction and reciprocity,” to coerce all actors to escalate their actions, and thereby create ever more militarized communities on all sides, ultimately aiming to “reorient . . . loyalties around the architects of the campaign” (5). Contrary to traditional military perspectives on absolute war—that it includes nuclear weapons and threatens the end of humankind—the nuanced and analytical approach Fleury uses to make such a case for terrorism is quite masterful.

Despite its many strengths, On Absolute War is not perfect. While Fleury’s overall assessment of the motivations behind the Global War on Terror, and his descriptions of approaches taken in its prosecution are well summarized, he somewhat mischaracterizes the counter-and anti-terrorism policy continuum from the Bush to the Obama administrations. While the former certainly viewed a campaign against terrorism as global, and the commitment as total, the latter fundamentally changed its focus and approach, attempting to back away from and solve challenges created by the former. Small details like these are almost inconsequential, however, given the intellectual innovation and insight gained throughout the rest of the book.

On Absolute War is my top recommendation for 2019. On Absolute War presents a strong theoretical and intellectual framework for planners, strategists, and decision makers in the national security realm. Thinkers, planners, and strategists—even those not interested in terrorism—stand to gain valuable insight into how to dissect, reformulate, create, and write about military theory. Fleury has provided not only an insightful general theory for terrorism, but guidance on engaging with theory in general.
Kara Dixon Vuic’s second book, *The Girls Next Door: Bringing the Home Front to the Front Lines*, should have been written ages ago, yet it is well-timed to make a meaningful impact on the field today. Both academic and analytical, this serious yet accessible and expertly written book centers on the physical and emotional experiences of the women who volunteered to work in wartime troop support programs and whose service as historical agents and important actors in a broader story might have been marginalized or absent from other accounts.

Vuic captures and preserves the unique voices and stories of these women and presents a straightforward and compelling case for the careful study of people who move in and around military circles in wartime. She offers critical analysis, avoids jargon and theory-laden discursive passages, and makes it clear through her construction and analysis that she is well attuned to more academic concerns.

While war accounts often center on male combat experiences, *The Girls Next Door* focuses on women and their service to the nation during war. The book rounds out the reader’s understanding of women’s wartime work when accounts of these official recreation and entertainment responsibilities are considered alongside studies of women laboring in wartime industrial jobs and serving in uniform. Vuic connects conceptual ideas about the home front and the battlefront—these women were employed in programs specifically designed to “domesticate the military environment,” and these “recreation programs variously sought to combat prostitution, remind soldiers of their mothers or sweethearts, and symbolize a supportive American home front” (1).

Take a moment to reread the program goals: it is a whiplash-inducing set of expectations for young women to navigate. Their tensions are palpable throughout the book: be wholesome and pretty, but not *too* pretty. Be friendly and available, but not *too* available. Remind them (simultaneously?) of their mother and their sweetheart at home. Make friends but do not become too attached—some of them are going to die. Work, travel abroad, and be independent, but move and live under strict constraints to protect your safety. Boost soldier morale and bear the burden of men’s emotions and experiences of war, but do not let your vulnerabilities show.

Vuic expertly walks readers through these complexities, bringing challenges to the forefront and embedding them within her deeper
analysis of social and cultural changes in the United States—especially regarding race, gender roles, and sexuality—that affected both the institutional role of these women and their recreation and entertainment work experiences. She also clearly recognizes that these women, while working within structural and institutional constraints, sometimes changed and subverted the instrumental institutional aims and exercised agency to shape and interpret their experiences.

Vuic moves chronologically through the twentieth century, beginning roughly with the First World War and culminating with an examination of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The Second World War merits two chapters, one of which examines the unique challenges of race, colonialism, and exoticism in the Pacific and China-Burma-India theaters. In the epilogue, Vuic offers a brief speculative commentary on how women as entertainers and morale/recreation workers factor into twenty-first-century American military engagements.

Vuic’s choice to organize each chapter with a different format and thrust, depending on the most relevant analytical categories and sources, is refreshing. The chapters stand well on their own and do not feel forced into an artificial structure, although I did find myself occasionally wishing for a deeper dive on the institutional side: How were women selected, trained, equipped, funded, supervised, and evaluated? How did differences in these patterns affect experiences and expectations?

By the end of the book, one point is crystal clear: women are not peripheral to military history or to the history of war more broadly. Gender and sexuality are central to these fields. Further, historians of women and of gender should also make the careful study of military and wartime contexts central to their work. By focusing on women who were employed in official entertainment and recreation work, Vuic clearly proves military history, the history of war and society, women’s history, and the history of gender and sexuality are intertwined. Her spot-on epilogue highlights the challenges arising as women have become fully integrated members of the military profession: “Organizations that held up women as symbols of both wholesome and sexualized ideals placed them in untenable and often dangerous situations. And, recreation and entertainment programs that offered women as antidotes to the military suggested that they had no place in it” (271).

Contemporary military leaders of gender-integrated units who want to understand more clearly how complex ideas about gender roles, sexuality, masculinity, femininity, and domesticity have operated within the military sphere should add The Girls Next Door to their reading lists. It is more important than ever for members of the twenty-first-century US armed forces to understand the military’s historical pattern of reinforcing binary and traditionally conservative gender roles and create a new organizational culture that welcomes and includes women as full members.
Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam
By Ingo Trauschweizer

Reviewed by Frank Jones, professor of security studies, US Army War College

Nearly thirty years have passed since Douglas Kinnard published The Certain Trumpet: Maxwell Taylor and the American Experience in Vietnam. Kinnard, a retired Army brigadier general and later professor of political science, was no stranger to Taylor. He served on Taylor’s personal staff when Taylor was Army chief of staff, and spent hours interviewing him. Now Ingo Trauschweizer, an Ohio University history professor, offers a different portrait of Taylor—one long overdue.

In this well-researched book, Trauschweizer provides a balanced and meticulous appraisal of Taylor’s career from 1945 until the general’s death in 1987. This perspective advances our understanding of Taylor through the author’s adroit use of archives, high-quality secondary sources published since the 1990s and, most notably, declassified information Kinnard did not have access to in the 1980s.

As Trauschweizer highlights in the introduction, Taylor’s detractors are legion. They viewed him as a ruthless, mendacious, manipulative micromanager or worse. Yet when he died, obituary writers and politicians lionized him, citing his long service to the nation and brilliant career. He remains an extraordinary example of an American leader in the twentieth century—soldier, presidential adviser, diplomat, business executive, and public intellectual. Trauschweizer brings each of these roles into view with clarity, using speeches, articles, and Taylor’s books to flesh out this accomplished officer’s strategic thinking and judgment.

These last two points are unmistakable in the chapters on Taylor’s stint as West Point superintendent, and, even more impressively, as Commanding General of the Eighth Army in South Korea and Commanding General, US Forces Far East. As superintendent, Taylor brought a different emphasis to the US Military Academy’s curriculum, one that contemporary officers, regardless of rank, should heed: the ability to think critically, communicate clearly, and employ military history for leadership development. These strategic leader competencies are visible in Taylor himself. His ability to use popular magazines and elite journals such as Foreign Affairs to discuss world events and the Army’s missions is an important element of Trauschweizer’s intellectual biography. Taylor understood the military instrument of power encompassed more than the use of force. His 1948 Kermit Roosevelt Lecture, delivered two years before NSC-68, is a testament to his prescience and comprehension of the military strategy needed for the Atomic Age. His command of US forces in West Berlin (1949–51), an island in a sea of Soviet power during a period of intense hostility on America’s Cold War front lines, was masterful. Trauschweizer underscores how Taylor used the instruments of national power in this assignment and the economic instrument in particular, working with his chief economist to make the Marshall
Plan a reality, rebuilding war-torn Berlin. Trauschweizer’s discussion of Taylor’s guiding hand to implement the Korean War armistice and postwar activities buttresses the argument that Taylor was a strategist of high order who understood the criticality of aligning ends, ways, and means.

Equally important, Trauschweizer underscores Taylor’s assessment of World War II—it was not simply the attainment of victory. More broadly, Taylor recognized the war as an imperative for mobilizing the American public in support of national interests, policy objectives, and the US military. He grasped that the role of the military leader is to improve relations with civilians, both political leaders and American society, especially in a military dependent on conscription.

Taylor’s faith in the indispensable role of the infantryman was never far from his mind as he attempted to organize the Army for the atomic battlefield as chief of staff. The disagreements between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Taylor resulted from differing strategic visions, but as the author points out neither Eisenhower nor Army Secretary Robert Stevens had Taylor as their first pick for chief. Despite this fraught association, and the friction it created, Taylor’s wise stewardship at a time of major transition in strategy, coupled with budget battles with a president determined to cut defense spending and service turf fights, should not be dismissed. Taylor’s thinking about deterrence and operations below the nuclear threshold is valuable and relevant, worthy of study by today’s strategists.

Yet Taylor is recalled as the Kennedy administration’s doyen. His book *The Uncertain Trumpet* transfixed the president—here was a general with new thinking. Taylor’s first assignment for JFK was a bureaucratic labor—assessing what went wrong with the Bay of Pigs invasion of Castro’s Cuba, a catastrophic failure and political embarrassment. Taylor’s advice and the trust he engendered with Kennedy led to his appointment as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962, a position he held into the Lyndon Johnson presidency. Johnson found Taylor’s counsel similarly valuable and made him ambassador to South Vietnam as America’s entry into the war was in play.

Like so many among the “Best and Brightest,” Taylor’s legacy is tainted by Vietnam. He bears responsibility for that fiasco, which he acknowledged publicly years later. Perhaps his optimism about achieving US policy objectives was unrealistic, but he had an affliction common among those who fought in World War II—they had difficulty understanding their North Vietnamese adversary, perhaps out of hubris and cultural insensitivity. Likewise, Taylor’s ignorance of the workings of the North Vietnamese Central Committee, vital to assessing strategic risk, was endemic in the US government. But even more fundamental, US leaders could not reframe the environment. Here Taylor’s critical thinking skills, the unerring judgment Eisenhower lauded him for in *Crusade in Europe*, failed him abysmally.
Kinnard ends his book by contending Taylor is a transitional figure, the link between “heroic generals” of World War II and “managerial generals” of the postwar period. Trauschweizer’s book presents sufficient evidence to suggest a third group. Taylor was ahead of his time, a forerunner of a new school, the politico-military general, fulfilled in such figures as Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft and General Colin Powell—generals endowed with the expertise and aptitude to move proficiently between the civilian and military realms as presidential agents and policy entrepreneurs. This conclusion may be Trauschweizer’s most significant contribution to the study of civil-military relations in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era.

My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness

By Howard Jones

Reviewed by Dr. Ron Milam, executive director, Institute for Peace & Conflict, Texas Tech University

Many books have been written about the My Lai Massacre during the Vietnam War—most notably Michael Bilton and Keven Sims’ Four Hours in My Lai (1992). The latest and most complete book, and certainly the most thoroughly documented of the very tragic story, is Howard Jones’ My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness. Jones’s book illuminates new issues associated with the tragedy that occurred on March 16, 1968, in the village of Sơn Mỹ in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. Telling this story is difficult for authors, and Professor Jones has done it well.

To summarize the military operation that took place that day, soldiers from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade of the 23rd Infantry Division—known as the Americal Division—were ordered to enter several hamlets and eliminate, destroy, kill, or any one of several verbs soldiers understood to mean destroying everything that lived in the village. An artillery barrage would precede the operation since it was supposedly market day, and the soldiers were told there would be no noncombatants in the area, and anyone there would be either Viet Cong (VC) or VC sympathizers. The 48th National Liberation Front battalion was known to be operating in the area, and while soldiers differed in subsequent interviews as to what they were ordered to do, there was unanimity in the understanding that all persons and livestock were to be destroyed, and that they would probably receive resistance from the VC in the area. They encountered none. After four hours, over 500 elderly men, women, and children lay dead.

Jones documents not only the actions of March 16, 1968, but also how Charlie Company engaged the enemy in previous weeks without ever seeing them. In particular, members of 1st Platoon knew VC soldiers had skinned alive an American soldier, and many members
of the platoon had heard the soldier’s agonizing cries throughout the night. Lieutenant William Calley of 1st Platoon had reportedly noted his men’s response was, “you had to kill” (29). The extent to which revenge was the motivating factor is part of the mystery associated with the My Lai massacre.

Jones examined the depositions of many soldiers involved in the operation and writes of rampant sexual assault and the horrific murder of women and children. His words create a difficult narrative to read, especially for combat veterans of any war. Perhaps the most revolting picture of the more than forty-two presented in the book is one captioned “Lunch break a few feet from a pile of bodies.” The picture shows no apparent security cordon, just five soldiers relaxing after killing hundreds of noncombatants.

Jones discusses the heroes of My Lai, particularly helicopter pilot Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson and door gunner Specialist Lawrence Colburn who confronted Calley and threatened to shoot American soldiers if the killing did not stop. These men provided the most details of the massacre prior to the formal investigation. The Army cover-up and lengthy trials are major parts of the book, with the author providing a very balanced look at the way the evidence linked the failures of leadership to those connected, including Calley, and those acquitted, including Captain Ernest Medina.

My Lai is the most complete and well-documented published account of the massacre, one highly applicable to military leaders who may be confronted with decisions about ordering men and women into combat situations or in handling such information after war crimes are alleged. My Lai should be read by active duty military personnel who may have to engage enemy soldiers and make decisions about who are noncombatants—at My Lai every person the soldiers encountered was a noncombatant. Jones has done a great service to the field of military history and Vietnam War scholarship with this very fine book.

Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War

By Thomas E. Hanson

Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, director, Plans and Policy, G2, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

In this history of the training of select US Army units in Japan on the eve of the Korean War, author Thomas Hanson challenges a widely embraced assessment of US Army units deployed in the immediate aftermath of North Korea’s invasion of South Korea: their failure to defeat those forces was attributable to occupation soldiers’ soft living. Hanson effectively argues that such was not the case, at least not for the quartet of infantry regiments that are his focus. The first three chapters are the most valuable—indispensable context and a synthesis of what is
to follow. Four central chapters, each covering a regiment representing one of four infantry divisions in Eighth Army at the time, are impressive in depth and detail. The conclusion reinforces points previously made and offers several innovative and interesting thoughts on what might have been, despite the author allowing himself a bit of subjectivity that unfortunately detracts somewhat from the whole of his offering.

Hanson convincingly counters the allegation of “soft soldiers” by demonstrating that commanders worked hard to train their units in the months prior to the June 1950 incursion. He frequently cites—and substantiates—factors impeding their efforts: undermanning, personnel turnover, frequent commander rotation, lack of noncommissioned officers, deficient equipment, and ineffective training areas. Division strengths were limited to 12,500 of 18,900 authorized for financial reasons. Infantry regiments were short one battalion of three authorized, and their artillery battalions were likewise deficient in one of three batteries.

Army units in Japan remained an occupying force until early spring of 1949, then transitioned to a defense of Japan mission, the primary threat being the Soviet Union lurking not too distantly to the north of Hokkaido. The mission should have been fair preparation for repelling a North Korean attack a little over a year later, but volatility in the ranks meant any training done other than at the individual level had a short half-life. Attempts at collective training, by necessity, had to await individual preparation as seventeen weeks of pre-deployment basic training during World War II had been cut by more than half to eight weeks by the late 1940s. And some soldiers arrived with less. Little wonder that Eighth Army established its own basic training programs while subordinate units were responsible for instilling branch-specific skills as, Hanson relates, none of the latter training was provided stateside prior to a new soldier’s arrival in Japan. It was a shortcoming redressed only in July 1950, the month following North Korea’s invasion.

Hanson is particularly critical of post–World War II officer assignment policies in which leaders were assigned to command positions with little if any attention given to previous experience. He condemns “the assignment of patently unqualified officers to maneuver unit command billets for their retirement tours . . . as one of the most damaging policies implemented by the U.S. Army between 1945 and 1950” (37). The judgment may have value, but limiting his observation to maneuver commands alone—a constraint that generally characterizes the book as a whole—undervalues branch and combined arms expertise so fundamental to the success of the US Army in World War II.

Recent veterans of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will find some of Hanson’s insights all too familiar. Relying on civilians for vehicle maintenance in Japan due to manpower shortages meant those skills were later lacking on the Korean peninsula, particularly given the 24/7 requirements of combat. Those involved in more recent conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia likely felt a similar sting when contractors
who provided maintenance for key systems could not or would not deploy forward. Veterans whose careers include Vietnam will likewise shake their heads at Hanson’s observation that “punching command tickets” was behind the overly rapid turnover among battalion and regimental leaders. The 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division had three commanders within eleven months when a new colonel assumed command in the opening days of February 1950. Hanson regrettably again allows objectivity to slip here, concluding—without citing a justification—that “The assignment of non-infantry officers to command infantry battalions . . . can only be described as the exacting of revenge by bureaucratic agents uncomfortable with their own contributions to national defense during World War II” (113).

Hanson’s work would have benefited from more strategic context. Hanson does take “Lightning Joe” Collins and General Omar Bradley to task for not demanding more in the way of support from the administration and Congress. But he underestimates the impact of ongoing fiscal wrestling among DoD Joint Chiefs facing a never-before-seen era of atomic weapons.

Ultimately, this analysis of how four infantry regiments struggled to overcome severe handicaps to prepare themselves for war provides insights otherwise unavailable in other histories. Hanson’s point, that despite very significant initial setbacks these units were fundamental to slowing and eventually halting the North Korean advance is well taken. The first units to cross the Sea of Japan fought and failed to stop South Korea’s invaders in the war’s opening weeks. Yet in the weeks to follow, these units would be part of the tide that washed northward once again to regain the territory lost, and then some. This book puts the challenges faced by these men in context showing that the months leading up to those initial setbacks included tough training and too little support from the command structure. Hanson’s work does much to set the record straight in terms of the real reason those opening weeks progressed as they did, while reminding US political and senior military leaders how decisions made in illusionary periods of peace come home to roost when the illusion dissipates.
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Submissions to the US Army War College Press must address strategic issues regarding US defense policy or the theory and practice of land warfare while exhibiting the highest standards of research and scholarship. Actionable strategic, policy, or instructional recommendations must be included. For more information, visit https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/.

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| • Monographs. 20,000 words (15,000-word main text, 5,000 words in the foreword and executive summary) |
| • Articles. 6,000 words or less |
| • Commentaries. 2,500–3,000 words |
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**File Type**  
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