From the Editor in Chief

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From the Editor in Chief

This issue of *Parameters* features talent from across the US Army War College. It is arranged thematically based on four major research areas critical to US security: geostrategic net estimate, geostrategic forecasting, leadership and innovation, and applied strategic art. Opening this issue, though, is a *Special Commentary* by Isaiah Wilson III and Scott Smitsón entitled “The Compound Security Dilemma: Threats at the Nexus of War and Peace.” The authors argue the nature of today’s threats poses a compound security dilemma that demands nothing less than compound security solutions capable of embracing the contemporary multipolar ecosystem and its competitive dynamics.

The first research area, *Geostrategic Net Estimate*, showcases two contributions. John Deni’s “The United States and the Transatlantic Relationship” analyzes the major political and economic variables that will affect America’s relationship with Europe over the next two to four years. Looking at the Indo-Pacific region, “INDOPACOM through 2030” by Nathan Freier and John Schaus outlines the role the US Army can play in addressing the strategic changes underway in Asia and the Pacific region. The US Army, the authors believe, can have a transformational effect on the Joint Force approach to military capacities of key strategic partners within the region.

Our second forum, *Geostrategic Forecasting*, offers three essays. In “Future Warfare: Weaponizing Critical Infrastructure,” Carol Evans alerts us to the fact that hybrid warfare now includes ways in which America’s adversaries are weaponizing critical infrastructure—particularly energy, transportation, information, communications, and the industrial base—to undermine the defense postures of NATO and the United States. In “The Politics of Oath-Taking,” Marybeth Ulrich seeks to raise the awareness of the responsibility oath-takers, both political and professional, have in upholding the Constitution. In “Designing Military Strategies under Uncertainty,” G. K. Cunningham offers suggestions for crafting curriculum for professional military education that considers the wicked problems of contemporary international security when establishing contextual frameworks for strategy.

The third research area, *Leadership and Innovation*, includes three articles. Steven Metz’s “The Future of Strategic Leadership” suggests contemporary strategic leaders have yet to transcend twentieth-century, industrial-age leadership models to develop the entrepreneurial-leadership skills necessary to meet twenty-first century challenges. Anthony Pfaff’s “Military Ethics below the Threshold of War” describes a novel ethic for the use of military power that will introduce new norms associated with escalation, reprisal, and risk, increasing permissible uses of force while limiting their scope. Michael Lynch’s “Army Modernization in the 21st Century” maintains the US Army is learning important lessons from the failure of its future combat system a decade ago.
Our final forum, *Applied Strategic Art*, also consists of three contributions. In “Winning the Narrative War,” Samantha Taylor and Amanda Cronkhite examine policy narratives of Presidents George H. W. Bush and William J. (Bill) Clinton to reveal the fragility of messaging and how consistency in framing foreign policy initiatives is crucial to maintaining public support. In “Integrated Campaigning in the Pacific, 1918–1948,” Earl Catagnus Jr. and Jonathan Klug reveal the historical underpinnings of two critical Joint Staff documents, the *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* and Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, *Competition Continuum*. Finally, in “Origins of US Army Strategic Landpower,” John Bonin argues the core competencies the US Army demonstrated in World War II remain vital in today’s national security environment. ~AJE