

US Army War College
USAWC Press

Monographs

2-1-2008

Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century

Jeffrey D. McCausland Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs>

Recommended Citation

McCausland, Jeffrey D. Dr., "Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century" (2008). *Monographs*. 17.
<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/17>

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Monographs by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

**DEVELOPING STRATEGIC LEADERS
FOR THE 21st CENTURY**

Jeffrey D. McCausland

February 2008

Visit our website for other free publication downloads
<http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>

[To rate this publication click here.](#)

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College External Research Associates Program. Information on this program is available on our website, *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil*, at the Publishing button.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI's homepage address is: *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil*.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/*.

ISBN 1-58487-340-X

FOREWORD


Secretary of Defense Robert Gates delivered a remarkable speech at Kansas State University on November 26, 2007. In his address, the Secretary underscored the pressing need to greatly expand the nation's "soft power" capabilities. Secretary Gates did not speak at length about current Department of Defense programs or the need to increase the defense budget dramatically. Rather, he called for significant increases in the capacity of other government agencies to work with the military in the rebuilding of societies in Iraq and Afghanistan and be prepared to counter the appeal of international terrorism globally.

Clearly the attack on the World Trade Center and subsequent conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan changed forever how Americans think about "national security." These events expanded not only the number and scope of issues, but also the overall complexity of the process. Consequently, the requirement for interagency decisionmaking accelerated, demands for greater policy flexibility increased, and an interagency process that was largely confined to a few departments of the Federal Government now involves a multitude of new players and allied states.

Emerging analysis of the American interagency and intergovernmental processes has underscored the nation's inability to respond effectively and coherently to contemporary national security demands. The 9/11 Commission and other studies have all recommended modifications to various organizations and the overall interagency process. These are clearly required, but there has not been sufficient attention focused on the nonmilitary human capital required to meet

the challenges of the 21st century. Specifically, the Federal Government lacks a comprehensive process to ensure the recruitment, development, and retention of civilian leaders capable of effectively integrating the contributions of specialized government agencies on behalf of larger national security interests. This new security environment requires people who are not only substantively qualified and knowledgeable regarding policy issues, but who also possess the leadership abilities to direct large complex organizations.

This monograph, by Dr. Jeffrey McCausland, focuses on the human capital required to succeed in the contemporary national security environment. It begins with an examination of the multitude of studies by both government and private agencies concerning this problem over the past 2 decades. It reviews the current development programs in three departments of the Federal Government – the Department of Defense, Department of State, and Central Intelligence Agency. Finally, the author outlines a proposal for a National Security Professional Program to meet this pressing need.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

JEFFREY D. MCCAUSLAND was appointed Visiting Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at the Penn State Dickinson School of Law in January 2007. He had previously served as Director of the Leadership in Conflict Initiative at Dickinson College since January 2004. He completed his active duty service in the United States Army in 2002, culminating his career with service as Dean of Academics, U.S. Army War College. Upon retirement, Dr. McCausland accepted the Class of 1961 Chair of Leadership at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland and served there from January 2002 to July 2004. He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1972 and was commissioned in field artillery. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He holds both a Masters and Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. During his military career, Dr. McCausland served in a variety of command and staff positions both in the United States and Europe. This included Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National Security Council Staff during the Kosovo crisis. He also worked on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a member of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army Staff, the Pentagon. Following this assignment he assumed command of a field artillery battalion stationed in Europe and deployed his unit to Saudi Arabia for Operations Desert Shield and Storm in 1990 and 1991.

Dr. McCausland has both published and lectured broadly on military affairs, European security issues, the Gulf War, and leadership throughout the United States and over twelve countries. He has been a visiting

fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany; George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, Garmisch, Germany; and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. He has served as a member of the Chief of Staff Army's Blue Ribbon Panel on Training and Leader Development; the Character Review Panel for the Superintendent, U.S. Air Force Academy; and has provided advice and assistance to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's Aerospace Leader Development Panel.

Dr. McCausland is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs based in New York. He is an adjunct fellow at both the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the RAND Corporation in Washington. He serves on the Board of Advisers to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New York and the Global Strategy Institute at CSIS. He has been a frequent commentator on the war in Iraq and Afghanistan for CBS since early 2003. Dr. McCausland has appeared on MSNBC, CSPAN, CNN, Al Jazeera, the CBS Morning Show, and the CBS Evening News. He has been frequently interviewed by the *New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Boston Globe*.

SUMMARY

Future historians will undoubtedly conclude that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), were a watershed in American history. The scope and focus of American national security policy changed forever in a few hours. America fought major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of this historic day. The nation remains engaged in the daunting challenges of post-conflict stability operations and the creation of effective governance in both countries. These efforts will likely continue for many years, and similar challenges may arise. America in the 21st century is more threatened by failing states that are a breeding ground for terrorist movements than by the imminent attack by a hostile peer competitor.

Some important lessons have emerged about this new security environment even as the “war on terrorism” continues both in America and around the globe. First, policymakers must remain engaged with challenges that predate the 2001 terrorist attacks such as globalization, international trade, the spread of AIDS, etc. They must, however, view these problems through a new lens and confront other emerging challenges. Furthermore, this condition is not temporary. The nation must expect that the threat of multiple crises will continue indefinitely. Finally, the challenge of international terrorism cannot be effectively confronted solely by the use of military force. It is fundamentally important that American national security strategy emphasizes the effective integration of all elements of national power – political, diplomatic, and economic, as well as military.

These events of the first decade of the 21st century have changed how Americans must think about

“national security.” They have dramatically expanded not only the number and scope of issues, but also the overall complexity of the process. Americans who felt safe at home and viewed security threats as distant from our shores no longer feel this way. Consequently, the requirement for interagency decisionmaking has accelerated, demands for greater policy flexibility have increased, and a process that was largely confined to a few agencies of the Federal Government now involves a multitude of new players and allied states. Clearly, the sad and apparently unexpected aftermath of the Iraq War underscores the critical need for significant changes in the planning of military operations, preparation for post-conflict requirements, and oversight of their execution.

As the nation embarked on this new era, the 2002 National Security Strategy noted that we must “transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.” The Bush administration responded initially with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, representing the largest change in the structure of the Federal Government since the National Security Act of 1947. But we must also transform existing institutions, the policy process, and how we “think” about the defense of the nation. Furthermore, as General Richard Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed, this transformation cannot wait—“it must take place as we wage the war on terrorism.”

Yogi Berra was once asked by a sportswriter while he was serving as the manager of the New York Yankees what was the most important thing in developing a world championship team. Berra replied instantly, “Hire world championship players.” While

this is true in sports and private enterprise, it is equally important in government. If America is to meet the multiple challenges of the 21st century, it is crucial that we develop a system that places the *right* people in the *right* places in government at the *right* moment. The nation critically needs civilian policymakers who can manage change and deal with the here and now. This monograph examines the development of career civilian leaders for strategic decisionmaking in the national security policy process. Such development must include the recruitment of quality personnel, experiential learning through a series of positions of increasing responsibility, training for specific tasks or missions, and continuous education that considers both policy and process. Consequently, it requires people who are not only substantively qualified and knowledgeable regarding policy issues but also possess the leadership abilities to direct large complex organizations.

This analysis considers existing efforts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and provides appropriate recommendations for each. It also outlines the changes required to existing personnel management systems and development programs to create an effective cadre of civilian national security professionals for the policy process. Clearly, these recommendations may be applicable for other executive agencies as well. These three departments were selected because they have traditionally had the primary (if not exclusive) role in the development of foreign and defense policy. There are also obviously growing requirements for those with technical expertise, human resource management, finance/comptroller skills, etc. The development of personnel with these talents for these three agencies is not the subject of this monograph.

Certain assumptions are crucial to this analysis. First, it is critical to understand that the words “training” and “education” are different when considering human capital development. Training is concerned with teaching *what* to think and what the *answers* ought to be. Education is focused on teaching *how* to think and what the *questions* ought to be. Training is most frequently used when the goal is to prepare an individual or an organization to execute specified tasks. It often includes task repetition, not unlike an athletic team learning to execute plays, and normally is the preferred method of learning when the goal is to perform operations in which success, failure, and completion can be clearly measured. Education has more to do with how to think about problems and how to deal with challenges that may not lend themselves to outright solutions. It is a matter of intellect, thought, indirect leadership, advice, and consensus building.

Second, we must also differentiate between “leadership” and “management.” *Management is about coping with complexity.* It is a response to a significant development of the 20th century, namely the emergence of large, complex organizations. Good management brings order to what would otherwise be chaos. *Leadership, by contrast, is about coping with change.* *Management* remains important for the day-to-day success of any organization and focuses on such issues as planning/budgeting, organizing/staffing, and controlling/problem solving. By contrast, *leadership* begins with setting direction and aligning people, as well as motivating them to success. The successful development of government policy for the war on terrorism wholly depends upon developing leaders of substance at all levels of executive agencies. They must be able to balance the pressing requirements of

management with the critical need to provide their organizations, and the collective effort, leadership.

Problems with the recruitment, retention, and development of individuals for the national security process are not new. The last 20 years are replete with studies led by leading American policymakers or think tanks, U.S. Government Accounting Office Reports, congressionally directed studies, and even presidential directives. They have focused on a single government agency, the interagency process, or government service in general. These studies demonstrate that problems associated with the recruiting, retention, and development of the “best and the brightest” for a career as a civilian in the national security process are not new. Furthermore, they demonstrate that this problem has taken on increased saliency in the last decade and in particular in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. It is also interesting to note that many of their recommendations are remarkably similar. Many stress the growing need for greater developmental opportunities, lateral entry, required rotational assignments to other agencies, etc. Finally, this litany of reports is a sad testimony to the Federal Government’s inability to adequately confront this issue despite its growing importance.

Still, some critics will argue that the nation is at war and can ill-afford reorganizations or changes at this critical moment. The sad tragedy that has been the Iraq War would suggest otherwise. It became clear almost immediately following the invasion in 2003 that fundamental errors had been made in intelligence and policy analysis. From the very onset, the United States not only required additional troops for the occupation of Iraq, but also enhanced civilian leadership and capacity to reconstruct Iraqi society. Without both these components, efforts to forestall

the ensuing chaos, as well as the resultant insurgency, were doomed to failure. The historical record since 2001 is replete with studies and analyses that clearly show the pressing need for a better synergy of efforts by the various agencies of the Federal Government to confront challenges of establishing effective regimes in both Baghdad and Kabul.

As American patience wears thin over the failure to achieve clear success in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the argument might be presented that this has been a tragic aberration. Once the United States withdraws, it can avoid future efforts to rebuild societies torn apart by conflict. Unfortunately, this global conflict will not allow us that luxury. We are confronted by an enemy who would replace secular governments with theocratic regimes hostile to our national interests and values. Their strategy amounts to “a global series of insurgencies, competing for the right to govern” in many predominantly Muslim nations around the globe. State collapse will continue to challenge the national interests of the United States and its allies for decades to come. If we are to prevail, we must mobilize and synchronize all elements of our national power—diplomatic, military, economic, social, and informational—to confront these new and extremely dangerous adversaries. The key actions required in a counterinsurgency involve “work we associate with civilian skill sets and even agencies—but the uniformed military is often placed in the position of having to undertake such activities.” Consequently, a rebalancing of roles between military and civilian leaders is required. Regardless of what the final outcome is in Iraq, it may not be our past so much as our future. This new security environment requires better qualified career civilian leaders to think in different patterns in order to accomplish these daunting tasks.

DEVELOPING STRATEGIC LEADERS FOR THE 21st CENTURY

INTRODUCTION

It is remarkable how the scope and focus of American national security policy have changed since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The United States has fought two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and is engaged in the daunting challenges of post-conflict stability operations in both countries. The “war on terrorism” continues both here in America as well as throughout the globe. Policymakers remain engaged with the challenges of globalization, international trade, the spread of AIDS, etc., that predate the 2001 terrorist attacks. Now, however, they must view these problems through a new lens and confront emerging challenges with Iran and North Korea. Finally, these conditions are not transitory – the nation must expect that the threat of multiple crises having an immediate effect on American security will continue indefinitely. The old adage that Washington is “a one crisis town” can no longer apply.

These events have changed how we think about “national security.” They have dramatically expanded not only the number and scope of issues, but also the overall complexity of the process. Americans who felt safe at home and viewed security threats as distant from our shores no longer feel this way. The government that is supposed to protect us has also felt the winds of change. The requirement for interagency decisionmaking has accelerated, demands for greater policy flexibility have increased, and a process that was largely confined to a few agencies of the Federal

government now involves a multitude of new players and allied states. Clearly, the sad and apparently unexpected aftermath of the Iraq War underscores the critical need for significant changes in the planning of military operations, preparation for post-conflict requirements, *and* oversight of their execution.

As the nation embarked on this new era at the turn of the century, the *2002 National Security Strategy* noted that we must “transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.”¹ The Bush administration responded initially with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the largest change in the structure of the Federal government since the National Security Act of 1947. But we must also transform existing institutions, the policy process, and how we “think” about the defense of the nation. Furthermore, as General Richard Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed, this transformation cannot wait — “It must take place as we wage the war on terrorism.”²

Crucial to this effort is developing a system that places the right people in the right places in government at the right moment.³ The nation critically needs civilian policymakers who can manage change and deal with the here and now. This monograph will examine the development of career civilian leaders for strategic decisionmaking in the national security policy process. Such development must include the recruitment of high-quality personnel, experiential learning through a series of positions of increasing responsibility, training for specific tasks or missions, and continuous education that considers both policy and process. Consequently, it requires people who are not only substantively qualified and knowledgeable of policy issues, but also possessed of the leadership abilities to direct large complex organizations.

This monograph will first consider existing efforts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and then make appropriate recommendations for each. It will further consider what changes must be made to existing personnel management systems and development programs to encourage the creation of an effective cadre of civilian “national security” professionals for the policy process. Such recommendations may be applicable to other executive agencies as well. These three departments were selected since they are in many ways those with a clear traditional role in the development of foreign and defense policy. Clearly, there are additional considerations with respect to current and growing requirements for those with technical expertise, human resource management, finance/comptroller skills, etc. The development of personnel with such talents for these three agencies will not be the subject of this monograph.

Some critics might observe from the outset that the nation is at war and can ill-afford reorganizations or changes at this critical moment. The sad tragedy that has been the Iraq War would suggest otherwise. It became clear almost immediately following the invasion in 2003 that fundamental errors had been made in intelligence and policy analysis. From the very beginning the United States not only required additional troops for the occupation of Iraq but also enhanced civilian leadership and capacity to reconstruct Iraqi society. Without both these components, efforts to forestall the ensuing chaos as well as the resultant insurgency were doomed to failure.⁴

Poor civilian leadership and mismanagement have been clearly documented in numerous studies, books, reports, and articles.⁵ Official reports provided

by Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), are particularly critical of American efforts in Iraq. In early 2007, SIGIR reported that despite nearly \$108 billion budgeted for the reconstruction of Iraq since 2003, the country's electricity output and oil production were still below prewar levels. Stocks of gasoline and kerosene had actually plummeted to their lowest levels in at least 2 years.⁶ Consequently, Mr. Bowen testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in March 2007 that his office planned to "aggressively pursue" the suspension and prosecution of contractors who are determined to have engaged in fraudulent contracting activities in Iraq.⁷ He further observed that the failure of the American-financed reconstruction program in Iraq threatened to be repeated elsewhere unless structural changes were made in the U.S. Government. Mr. Bowen compared his recommendations to the Congress as not dissimilar to proposals made in the 1980s that resulted in legislation strengthening the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁸

Prior to this, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) noted in its comprehensive report in late 2006 that "civilian agencies also have little experience with complex overseas interventions to restore and maintain order—stability operations—outside of the normal embassy setting."⁹ The ISG described the mission in Iraq as "unfamiliar and dangerous." As a result, the report observed that the United States had great difficulty filling civilian assignments in Iraq with sufficient qualified personnel. The ISG recommended that the constituent agencies (State, Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], Treasury, Justice, Intelligence community, etc.) train for and conduct joint operations across agency boundaries. It further suggested that the State Department expand its efforts to train personnel

to carry out civilian tasks associated with such complex stability operations, concluding that a Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity for such operations be established. This effort should provide a model for other civilian agencies to include Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture. Such ideas, however, were hardly new. They had been recommended a year or more prior to the release of the ISG report by leading government experts and officials.¹⁰

As American patience wears thin over the failure to achieve progress in Iraq the argument might be presented that this venture has been a tragic aberration. Once the United States withdraws from Iraq, it can simply avoid future efforts to rebuild societies torn apart by conflict. Unfortunately, this global conflict will not allow us that luxury. We are confronted by an enemy who would replace secular governments with theocratic regimes hostile to our national interests and values. Their strategy amounts to “a global series of insurgencies, competing for the right to govern” in many predominantly Muslim nations around the globe.¹¹ State collapse will continue to challenge the national interests of the United States and its allies for decades to come. If we are to prevail, we must mobilize and synchronize all elements of our national power—diplomatic, military, economic, social, and informational—to confront these new and extremely dangerous adversaries. The key actions required in a counterinsurgency involve “work we associate with civilian skill sets and even agencies—but the uniformed military is often placed in the position of having to undertake such activities.”¹² Consequently, a rebalancing of roles between military and civilian leaders is required. Regardless of what the final outcome is in Iraq, that outcome may not be our past so

much as our future. This new security environment requires better qualified civilian leaders to think in different patterns in order to accomplish these daunting tasks.

TERMS

Understanding certain assumptions is crucial to this analysis. First, some observers may take exception to the distinction between the words “training” and “education.” They may argue that they are synonymous, as we frequently use them interchangeably. They are *not* the same, there being a significant denotative difference. While training is more concerned with teaching *what* to think and what the *answers* ought to be, education is all about teaching *how* to think and what the *questions* ought to be: “Training is focused on the development and performance of specific tasks or skills, and education is oriented toward more generalized and abstract knowledge that may or may not be tied to specific tasks or action.”¹³ Training is most frequently used when the goal is to prepare an individual or an organization to execute specified tasks. It often includes repetition of tasks, not unlike an athletic team learning to execute plays. Finally, it is normally the preferred method of learning when the goal is to perform operations in which success, failure, and completion can be clearly measured. Education has more to do with how to think about problems and how to deal with those things that may not lend themselves to categorical solutions. It becomes a matter of intellect, thought, indirect leadership, advice, and consensus building.

Second, we must also differentiate between “leadership” and “management.” *Management is about*

coping with complexity. It is a response to a significant development of the 20th century, namely, the emergence of large, complex organizations. Good management brings order to what would otherwise be chaos. *Leadership, by contrast, is about coping with change*. An expert in human development once wisely observed, "If you don't like change, you will like irrelevancy even less." American business recognized this phenomenon as competition in the market and volatility in business cycles became more intensive and jarring. Doing the same thing only slightly better was no longer good enough. *Management* remains important for the day-to-day success of any organization, focusing as it does on such issues as planning/budgeting, organizing/staffing, and controlling/problem solving. By contrast, *leadership* begins with setting directions, aligning people, and motivating them to achieve success.¹⁴ The successful development of government policy for the war on terrorism is wholly dependent upon developing leaders of substance at all levels of executive agencies. They must be able balance the pressing requirements of management with the critical need to provide leadership for their organizations and the collective effort.

These expanding requirements for improved leadership and management preceded 9/11, and remain an integral part of dealing with the rapid pace of change. In his widely acclaimed book, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Thomas Friedman described the importance of change in the international system along with the corresponding demands placed on both organizations and individuals. He argued that "Globalization" had replaced the Cold War as the new defining international system.¹⁵ But "the globalization system, unlike the Cold War system, is not frozen, but

a dynamic ongoing process.”¹⁶ Friedman observed that “if the Cold War were a sport, it would be sumo wrestling.” Quoting Professor Michael Mandelbaum, he continued: “It would be two big fat guys in a ring, with all sorts of posturing and rituals and stomping of feet, but actually very little contact, until the end of the match, when there is a brief moment of shoving and the loser gets pushed out of the ring, but nobody gets killed.” Globalization, by contrast, “would be the 100-meter dash, over and over and over. And no matter how many times you win, you have to race again the next day. And if you lose by just one-hundredth of a second, it can be as if you lost by an hour.”¹⁷

In this new environment, any program that places “the right people, in the right place, at the right time” must acknowledge that it seeks to develop policy substance as well as management and leadership in its workforce to confront the changes engendered by globalization and the new security environment. If the policy process is to be improved, it must have well-qualified policymakers who understand the issues. Many must also develop into leaders as they move through their careers. These future leaders must be able to set goals, inspire performance, and monitor progress for the success of their organizations and the overall process.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Problems with the recruitment, retention, and development of individuals for the national security process are not new. The last 20 years are replete with studies conducted by leading American policymakers, think tanks, U.S. Government Accounting Office (USGAO) Reports, Congressionally-directed studies

(such as *The 9/11 Commission Report*), and even presidential directives that focused either on a single government agency (the most studied appears to be the Department of Defense [DoD]), the interagency process, and government service in general. For example, the National Commission on the Public Service was formed in 1987 following a symposium entitled, “A National Public Service for the Year 2000.” The symposium concluded that a “quiet crisis” existed in government. Too many of the nation’s best senior executives were prepared to leave government, and not enough of its most talented young people were prepared to join.¹⁸

The commission, headed by former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker, included 36 distinguished Americans including former presidents, senators, congressmen, cabinet-level officials, corporate executives, university presidents, and leaders of major nonprofit organizations. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld served as a member of this commission. The commission uncovered wide dissatisfaction among those in senior and mid-level positions of government. For example, only 13 percent of the senior executives interviewed by USGAO as part of the effort said they would recommend that young people start their careers in government. The report embraced three themes that shaped its findings— leadership, talent, and performance. It recommended making more room at senior levels of departments for career executives, enhancing efforts to recruit quality young people, and more effective executive development. In this last area the report observed,

. . . the education of public servants must not end upon appointment to the civil service. Government must invest more in its executive

development programs and develop stronger partnerships with America's colleges and universities.¹⁹

It further recommended increases in compensation and a reduction in presidential political appointees by 1,000 in order to create room for more career civilians to advance.

In May 1997, the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56. The directive acknowledged that the federal government requires the capacity to prepare agency officials for the responsibilities they will be expected to assume in planning and managing agency efforts for complex contingency operations. It further noted the need to create a "cadre of professionals" familiar with this integrated planning process to improve the government's ability to manage future such operations. It was issued at a time when the Dayton peace enforcement mission in Bosnia that had been predicted to last 1 year had become an open-ended operation with no end in sight, and when many in the Clinton administration were still feeling the effects of the bitter lessons from the Somalia.

PDD 56 directed the State Department, Defense Department, and the National Security Council to work with the "appropriate U.S. government educational institutions—including the National Defense University, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, and the U.S. Army War College—to develop and conduct an interagency training program."²⁰ It further directed that this training effort be held at least annually and focus on the development of mid-level managers (Deputy Assistant Secretary level) in the preparation and implementation of political/

military plans for complex contingency operations.²¹ A. B. Technologies reported in a study prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “the spirit and intent of PDD 56 directed training is not being followed” and that as a whole the directive was not implemented.²²

The need for a cadre of professionals to deal with the emerging security environment was reiterated in December 1997 with the issuance of the National Defense Panel Report. This report recommended the creation of “an interagency cadre of professionals, including civilian and military officers, whose purpose would be to staff key positions in the national security structures.”²³ The panel argued that this cadre should be similar in spirit to the “joint” products envisioned by the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Act. Their report made the following specific recommendations:

- create personnel management systems to provide greater attention to the education, development, and career development of these personnel,
- identify “interagency” slots within the national security community including domestic agencies that have foreign affairs responsibilities (e.g., Justice, Commerce, and Energy) which are staffed by this interagency cadre, and
- establish a national security curriculum, combining course work at the National Defense University and National Foreign Affairs Training Center.²⁴

In 1999 the Clinton administration convened the Panel on Civic Trust and Responsibility. This group prepared a report entitled “A Government to Trust and Respect” that, sad to say, identified many of the same problems that had been highlighted 10 years before.

The panel reported that in 1960 20 percent of law school graduates nationwide worked for the Federal Government at some point during their first 10 years of employment, with 35-40 percent of those having received a Masters in Public Administration (MPA). At roughly the same time, between 1,200 and 1,500 young Americans applied for the 39 positions available as part of the White House Fellows Program. By 1999, however, there were only 300 applicants for White House fellowships. Schools of Public Administration were sending percentages of their graduates in the low teens to Washington, and the law schools were sending only about 13 percent.²⁵

The report found that Americans remained proud of their country, but they were deeply concerned and distrustful of their government. Furthermore, the public was not willing to invest significantly higher levels of trust and confidence in the government until they perceived improvements in the way decisions were made. The study urged improvements in the quality of public officials to be achieved through greater leadership appeals in behalf of public service with the hope of attracting the "best and the brightest." It further recommended higher standards for government performance, improvements in the technological tools provided government civilians, and formation of public-private partnerships for enhancing government performance.

At nearly the same moment, Paul Light, Director of the Brookings Governmental Studies program, presented his report entitled, "The New Public Service" (1999). The Light Study argued that a flexible range of government, private, and non-profit opportunities had begun to replace traditional government-centered public service. In 1974, for example, 76 percent of the

graduates of major public administration or public policy graduates schools took their first jobs in the government sector; 11 percent took private sector jobs; and 12 percent went to nonprofit organizations. In 1993, 49 percent went to government positions; 23 percent went to the private sector; and 24 percent to non-profits. These numbers continued to drop between 1993 and 1999. While there is a multitude of reasons for this phenomenon, Light concluded that three were paramount: (1) recent graduates believed they had a better chance to help people in the private sector or working in non-profit organizations; (2) they also believed the private and non-profit sectors managed money more wisely than government; and (3) these graduates believed their opportunities for professional advancement and personal growth and skill development were far better in the non-public sector work place.²⁶

Light observed that the public servant of the 21st century wants and expects to change jobs and sectors frequently. Young people are not solely focused on job security and salary but rather on getting a job with a tangible impact. Overall, he concluded that the government system falls short in recruiting, training, and management. The study recommended that the government:

- *Declare a human capital crisis, recognizing it is in a talent war with the other sectors;*
- *Be more aggressive in recruiting mid- and upper-level positions from the outside;*
- *Recognize that recruitment must be followed with challenging work and the opportunity for growth.*

This effort also uncovered two interesting demographic phenomena in the civilian government

workforce. First, Light concluded that the career civil service faced the potential for a steady stream of retirements at a rapid rate through 2014. A managing partner of the Andersen Consulting firm quoted by Light described this situation as a “human-capital time-bomb ticking.” For example, approximately 40 percent of the career Senior Executive Service (SES) force became eligible for early or regular retirement by 2003, and almost 70 percent qualified by 2006. In DoD the figures were 64 percent already eligible, and 74 percent eligible in 2005. Second, the federal hierarchy was shifting from a traditional bureaucratic pyramid into an ellipse or diamond. The year 1998 marked the first time in history that the number of middle-level federal employees outnumbered the lower-level employees. A decade ago there were 1.2 lower-level employees (General Schedule 1-10) for each middle-level employee (General Schedule 11-15). Only a year later, the lower-level number had dropped to 0.93 for every middle-level position. If this trend continues, the federal government’s last front-line employee will retire sometime in 2030, with his or her job having been contracted out or downsized forever.²⁷ Obviously, these changes will have serious impacts on the education and development of both senior policymakers and civilian agencies in the future.

In 2000 two reports focused solely on this issue in DoD. The first was the Defense Science Board report on the Task Force on Human Resources Strategy of that year. It noted a “growing shortage of managers in place to fill career positions that . . . become available as more than half of the civilian workforce becomes eligible to retire in the next 5 years.” The report concluded with the following critical issues for the civilian workforce in the DoD:

- *Insufficient number of properly trained candidates in the pipeline, an aging workforce with little turnover, limited professional development opportunities, and weak compensation and incentive systems for SES and career civil service.*
- *Lack of a continuing professional development program for most career civilian employees.*
- *Need for an integrated personnel management plan that includes planning for an increased use of personnel from the private sector.*
- *Continuing problems with the confirmation cycle, inadequate compensation, financial disclosure rules, and post-employment restrictions, all tending to create a limited, less qualified applicant pool.*

The second report in 2000 was that of the USGAO titled “Human Capital: Strategic Approach Should Guide DoD Civilian Workforce Management.” This report noted that strategic human capital planning has been a weak link in the management of federal departments and agencies. It further concluded that:

High performance organizations in the public and private sector have come to recognize that people are an organization’s key assets. It is through the talents and dedicated work of staff that missions get accomplished.²⁸

The USGAO report further observed that DoD was like other federal departments and agencies that are required to deal with the myriad social, economic, and technological changes that have become *de rigueur* in 21st century America. This report was particularly relevant in that it encompassed over 700,000 civilians or 37 percent of all nonpostal civilian federal workers.

Furthermore, DoD had also largely been the “bill payer” for government-wide civilian reductions since 1989. Between 1989 and 1999, DoD reduced its civilian workforce by about 400,000 positions, from approximately 1,117,000 to 714,000, a 36 percent reduction.²⁹ Reductions continued until early 2005, totaling 41 percent. As a result, the DoD civilian workforce aged from 41.6 to 45.8 years, leaving fewer employees today in their 20s and 30s. This raises serious questions about the department’s ability to replace retirees in the future of whom (as previously mentioned) 74 percent had reached retirement eligibility by 2005. For example, employment in the youngest age groups, under-31 and 31-to-40, declined 76 percent and 51 percent, respectively, during the period 1989 to 1999. Still, the largest reductions occurred in clerical positions and blue-collar wage grades while the smallest reductions (8 percent) were in the professional grades GS-9 through SES. As a result, the professional force encompasses a higher percentage of the workforce and in general is better educated. In many ways, the civilian workforce in executive departments of the federal government has evolved over the past several decades from one qualified by early “training” to one needing “educational development” today.

Finally, this report pointed out serious issues with the actual conduct of personnel reductions. First, it discovered that civilian force reductions (unlike those on the military side) were less oriented toward shaping the makeup of the workforce in the future. Little attention was paid to maintaining a balance of skills needed to maintain in-house capabilities as part of the defense industrial base. Second, little concern was paid to the fact that the resulting workforce would be significantly older and thus more retirement eligible.

Third, many senior officials voiced concerns that the reductions had adverse effects upon the morale of the residual workforce. They observed that in many cases these changes resulted in limited career development opportunities, reduced chances for promotion, job insecurity, and longer working hours.³⁰

The USGAO report concluded that a five-part framework is essential if DoD is to create an effective human capital management process. The five parts are as follows:

- *Strategic planning*—Establish the agency's mission, vision for the future, core values, goals, and strategies.
- *Organizational alignment*—Integrate human capital strategies with the agency's core business practices.
- *Leadership*—Foster a committed leadership team and provide reasonable continuity through succession planning.
- *Talent*—Recruit, hire, develop, and retain employees with the skills needed for mission accomplishment.
- *Performance culture*—Enable and motivate performance while ensuring accountability and fairness for all employees.

The USGAO report further concluded that a strategy for human management must include “an effective approach to ‘growing leaders’—identifying employees with leadership promise and providing them with a variety of professional development and learning opportunities designed to pass along the values and competencies that the agency has identified as important to its leaders.”³¹

Since 1990 the USGAO has also periodically reported to Congress on operations across the entire

federal government that it identified as being at “high risk.” This effort is supported by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform.³² It has brought a much needed focus to problems that were perceived as impeding effective government and wasting money. In responses to recommendations from these reports, Congress has enacted a series of government-wide reforms to strengthen financial management, improve information technology practices, and instill a more results-oriented government.

The “high risk” report that was issued in January 2001 at the start of the new Bush administration included a section entitled “Strategic Human Capital Management: A Government-wide High Risk Area.” This report noted that “the federal government has often acted as if people were costs to be cut rather than assets to be valued,”³³ arguing that the federal government’s human capital strategies were not adequate to meet the emerging needs of the nation. As a result, the USGAO warned that the inattention to human management strategies had created a government-wide risk that was fundamental to the federal government’s ability to function effectively. This risk had arisen for a number of reasons. First, the dramatic downsizing of the federal government that had occurred during the 1990s was set in motion without sufficient planning for the overall effect on individual agencies’ performance capacity. Second, during this time agencies attempted to save on workforce-related costs by reducing investments in other human capital investments such as training and professional development. This occurred despite the fact that these programs were critical if their smaller workforces were to compensate for institutional losses in skills and experience.³⁴

The 2001 “high risk” update further argued that the inadequate human capital strategies would have serious future implications in a number of ways. Personnel turnover at top management positions would complicate efforts to transition to modern performance management techniques. The report observed that 45 percent of career SES members across all agencies and departments of the federal government were projected to retire by fiscal year 2005. An additional 26 percent would become retirement-eligible by that time but were expected to remain in their existing positions. This would obstruct attempts to invest in training and development of younger rising personnel to meet the specific needs of individual agencies.

This report highlighted as a particularly critical need that of focusing better on training personnel in contract management. It argued that agencies must have more personnel properly trained in contract management particularly “where agencies must . . . oversee the quality, cost, and timeliness of products and services delivered by third parties.”³⁵ This point was all too prescient in view of the revelations concerning problems that have bedeviled the American use of contractors during recovery/reconstruction operations in Iraq.

The Commission on National Security for the 21st Century – more commonly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its two chairs, former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman – was created in 1998 to conduct a comprehensive review of national security for the newly emerging era. Enjoying the support of the Congress and White House, it was originally chartered by the Secretary of Defense to conduct what was called “the most comprehensive review of American security since the National Security Act of 1947.”³⁶ This

endeavor resulted in three reports by the spring of 2001. The first, *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century*, focused on the emerging global security environment for the first 25 years of the new century. The second, *Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom*, outlined a new national security strategy that reflected emerging challenges. The final report, *Roadmap for National Security: Imperatives for Change*, offered a prescription for a significant overhaul of the structure and processes of the American national security establishment.

This final report by the Hart-Rudman Commission noted a critical need for reform within the government personnel system, echoing many of the findings of the studies previously mentioned. For example, the Hart-Rudman commission observed that the United States was “on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence in government.”³⁷ This was due in large measure to problems that had been identified by the National Commission on the Public Service in 1987, i.e., recruiting, developing, and retaining America’s most promising talent. While specific recommendations with respect to the State Department, OSD, and the CIA will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections, it is important to note here the commission’s emphatic conclusion:

If we allow the human resources of government to continue to decay, none of the reforms proposed by this or any other national security commission will produce their intended results.³⁸

The Hart-Rudman Commission report was significant for several reasons. First, it remains the most recent comprehensive review of the federal government, long-term threats, and strategy. Second, the report

was amazingly prescient in many important respects. The findings of this report and its recommendations thus remain salient despite the fact that the report was completed before the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

Also at the time of the arrival of the Bush administration in January 2001, Dr. Robert Moffit of the Heritage Foundation produced a study entitled "Taking Charge of Federal Personnel," which examined the balance between federal employees, political appointees, and contractors.³⁹ Many regard this study as the blueprint for the approach to personnel management adopted by the newly arrived administration of President Bush. Moffit argued that those who seek to reform government "have little appreciation for the immense power and political sophistication of the federal employee network and its allies and the intensity of its resistance to serious change."⁴⁰ Moffit argued that his analysis of past efforts to improve the federal bureaucracy demonstrated that a President must (1) make liberal use of his power of appointments and do so in a timely fashion; (2) use only political appointees for implementing the President's policies and for making all key management decisions; (3) provide a clear rationale for any reductions in the size of the federal work force and work to reform the benefits program provided to federal employees; (4) use the Civil Service Reform Act to improve accountability; and (5) make every effort to use good management and contract out government services to save money.⁴¹

Critics have argued that the report viewed the government bureaucracy as an obstacle to the administration's new agenda. The report makes no recommendations with respect to improving the career civilian workforce for executive positions. It clearly argues for "smaller government" and use of

the private sector to provide many of the services and expertise that had traditionally been part of the career civil service in the federal government. Moffit further recommended that party loyalty should take precedence over expertise when selecting officials.

Clearly many of the ideas argued in the report were adopted by the Bush administration such as reform of the civilian personnel system in DoD (to be discussed later). There is no doubt this study served to encourage the new administration to adopt a dramatic increase in outsourcing and contracting to reduce costs while providing the government with outside expertise.⁴² These measures were accomplished in many cases while reducing the overall number of civil servants. As a result, government contracts have soared during the Bush administration to about \$400 billion in 2006 from \$207 billion in 2000. An analysis prepared by the *New York Times* suggests that fewer than half of all contract actions are now subject to full and open competition. In 2005, 48 percent were competitive, down from 79 percent in 2001. Executive agencies, according to the *Times*, are unable to seek low prices, supervise contractors, and intervene when work goes off course because the number of government workers overseeing contracts has remained constant or been reduced, while contract spending has skyrocketed.

These problems were illustrated in October 2007 by a special audit of State Department contracts with DynCorps for private security guards conducted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR). The audit reported that until early 2007 the State Department had only two government contracting officers to oversee contracted work by as many as 700 DynCorps employees. The SIGIR report stated that this shortage resulted in “an environment vulnerable to waste and

fraud.”⁴³ Stuart Bowen, Chief of SIGIR, observed during an interview that “when you put two people on the ground to manage a billion dollars, that’s pretty weak.”⁴⁴

Some observers believe that the trend towards increased use of contractors has resulted in their having too great a voice in the actual determination of policy. The Acquisition Advisory Panel appointed by the Congress and White House in late 2006 reported that this trend “poses a threat to the government’s long-term ability to perform its mission” and could over time “undermine the integrity of the government’s decisionmaking.” This conclusion was echoed by David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States. He observed that the problem ultimately was a matter of loyalty – “the duty of loyalty to the greater good – the duty of loyalty to the collective best interest of all rather than the interests of a few. [Contracting] companies have duties of loyalty to their shareholders, not the country.”⁴⁵

Interest in government human capital adjustments became more apparent in the aftermath of 9/11. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (often referred to as *The 9/11 Commission Report*) observed that the federal government’s interagency process was unable to adapt how it manages problems to the new challenges of the 21st century, explaining that:

The agencies are like a set of specialists in a hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms, and prescribing medications. What is missing is the attending physician who makes sure they work as a team.⁴⁶

The report charged that a missing element contributing to the 9/11 disaster was effective management of transnational operations.⁴⁷

Even prior to the final release of *The 9/11 Commission Report*, the Center for Public Service at the Brookings Institution established its National Commission on the Public Service. The Commission was composed of Chairman Paul A. Volcker and 10 distinguished Commissioners. They included former Comptroller General of the United States Charles Bowsher; former U.S. Senator Bill Bradley; former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci; former White House Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein; former Office of Personnel Management Director Connie Horner; former Office of Management and Budget Director Franklin Raines; former head of the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority Richard Ravitch; former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin; former Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala; and former Congressman Vin Weber. Their report, *Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century*, was issued in January 2003. The Commission underscored the urgent warnings contained in the Hart-Rudman Commission Report, calling for immediate action in a number of areas. These included improvements in federal personnel management practices and a concerted effort to recruit and retain employees for the federal government.⁴⁸ It further called for (1) reform of the presidential appointment process to include a reduction in the overall number of Executive Branch political appointees; and (2) careful examination of competitive outsourcing practices to ensure they did not undermine core competencies of the government.⁴⁹

That same year USGAO conducted a study of how and whether agencies in four countries—Canada,

Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—are adopting a strategic approach to managing the succession of career civilian senior executives and other public servants who have critical skills. This study, entitled *Human Capital: Insights from Other Countries Succession Planning and Management Initiatives*, was delivered to Congress in September 2003.⁵⁰ The study observed that:

leading public organizations here and abroad recognize that a more strategic approach to managing human capital should be the centerpiece of any serious change management initiative to transform the cultures of government agencies.⁵¹

It concluded that several key practices were used by agencies in these nations to deal with succession issues and overall human capital management. They included (1) ensuring that the top leadership of the agency or department actively participates in planning for succession and other management initiatives; (2) linking this effort to the organization's overall strategic planning; (3) identifying talent (particularly with critical skills) at multiple levels in the organization and early in employees' careers; and (4) emphasizing developmental assignments in addition to formal training.⁵² Obviously, these efforts in democratic nations outside the United States are consistent with many of the recommendations contained in the various studies and analyses commented upon above, all of which are focused on the goal of protecting and enhancing organizational capacity.

In the summer of 2004, the RAND Corporation published a broad examination of the career development strategies of three U.S. employment

sectors—government, private corporations, and not-for-profit organizations. It concluded that “America’s ability to shape the world this century will depend on the quality of its leaders,” but that the nation was producing too few future leaders with sufficient depth and broad international experience.⁵³ The two authors, Gregory Treverton and Tora Bikson, conducted over 135 interviews of leaders in all three sectors. They observed that while all three sectors had major problems, the federal government was the most striking in its failure to address practices that were contrary to attracting and developing future leaders. The report did find, however, that a new sense of urgency had emerged in the aftermath of 9/11, and that young people were attracted by the opportunity to serve.

Treverton and Bikson concluded their study with several recommendations, many of which echo those made by previous such studies and reports. They include (1) making the hiring process quicker and more transparent; (2) requiring individuals to serve rotational assignments in other government agencies as a requirement for promotion; (3) facilitating temporary movement of officials from one department to another as required; (4) developing mechanisms for the lateral entry from other sectors (business or nonprofits) to fill mid-career positions; (5) expand targeted fellowship programs particularly at the graduate level to nurture talent; and (6) reserve some number of senior positions (particularly at the deputy assistant secretary level) for career civil servants to encourage retention.⁵⁴

In late 2005 the federal government launched “Project Horizon,” designed to bring together U.S. Government senior executives from agencies with global responsibility and the National Security Council (NSC) staff to explore ways to enhance interagency

coordination. This effort, which embraced nearly every department and agency of the federal government, was funded/managed by the participants with active involvement from the NSC. The Executive Summary of its initial progress report, released in the summer of 2006, states that the department participants identified the building of “a more flexible and deployable corps of U.S. Government professionals with deep interagency experience and global affairs expertise” as critical to the government’s ability to deal effectively with the current operational environment.⁵⁵ The report concludes with 10 discrete interagency capabilities needed to deal with anticipated challenges and opportunities. Two are particularly relevant to this monograph. First, a revised set of human resource policies, procedures, and incentive structures was needed to facilitate the rapid assembly of capable, experienced, and integrated personnel. These changes were essential to create a “global affairs career path” that would include required interagency rotations/training, formal education, and provisions for flexible assignments and deployments. Second, a network of global affairs training institutions was needed, one that mutually leveraged member curricular offerings to create an enhanced curriculum for the development of global affairs professionals.⁵⁶ Project Horizon is now exploring possibilities for institutionalizing appropriate curricular offerings as found through quarterly meetings of an interagency strategic planning group (ISPG).⁵⁷

Obviously, this brief review of studies, reports, directives, etc. with respect to recruiting, retention, and development of career civil servants for the national security process over the past 20 years is not comprehensive. There are many other studies that focus on an individual agency or department, or on an

aspect of the problem.⁵⁸ Still the 15 documents treated here have many points in common. First, they show that problems associated with the recruiting, retention, and development of the “best and the brightest” for a career as a civilian in the national security process are not new. Second, they demonstrate that this problem has taken on an increasing urgency in the last decade and in particular in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. Third, many of the recommendations converge, e.g., greater opportunities for development, lateral entry, required rotational assignments, etc. Finally, this litany of negative reports is sad testimony to the federal government’s refusal or inability to adequately confront these issues despite their growing importance.

A TALE OF THREE AGENCIES

The following three subsections examine how three agencies—State, OSD, and CIA—currently develop career civilian leaders for participation in the national security decisionmaking process and then makes specific recommendations that apply to each, respectively. As previously suggested, such development must include the recruitment of quality personnel, experiential learning through a series of positions of increasing responsibility, training for specific tasks or missions, and continuous education that considers both policy and process. But if change characterizes the environment that descended upon America after 9/11, do the cultures of these three organizations facilitate or retard change and growth? To answer this question, in the sections that follow we shall undertake a compact review of each of their cultures with respect to the professional development of its members.

“Organizational culture” is a powerful force within any organization or group. It is concerned with group norms or traditional ways of behaving that any set of people develops over time. Organizations, like people, have a past as well as a future. Such group norms are not solely recurring behavior patterns that can be observed by outsiders, but are those actions, attitudes, and assumptions that are unconsciously reinforced by everybody in the organization.⁵⁹ Frequently these accepted actions might even be counter to what is printed as organizational policy. Something is “cultural” when, if a member does not behave in the normal manner, the others (or the organization itself) automatically nudge him or her back towards the accepted ways of doing things. As a result, “culture” will triumph over “planning” every time. Any effort focused on organizational growth that fails to consider culture is doomed from the outset. Clearly, the CIA, OSD, and State reflect this phenomenon; consequently, any improvement must include appropriate alteration of their respective culture, or what we might think of as group norms.

Indicative of these group norms was a survey of members of the SES conducted in August 1999 at roughly the same time as the Hart-Rudman Commission deliberations. This survey was sent to all Senior Executive Servants throughout the federal government, numbering over 6,500. Approximately 2,500 (40 percent) responded. Among the significant findings:⁶⁰

- Over 75 percent oversaw a budget in excess of \$1 million.
- Two out of three reported rewarding teamwork, creativity, and innovation.
- Most believed creativity and innovation were rewarded though subordinates did not share this belief.

- The most important core qualifications for them were leadership, communications, focus on results, leading change, and technical competence.
- Many believed that recruiting more leaders outside the Federal Government for career SES positions would improve the SES.
- Over half believed a rotation assignment to another agency would be a positive developmental experience, but only 9 percent had been afforded the opportunity.
- Most had to do any personal development on their own time as it was not offered as part of their formal development.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have placed new requirements on executive agencies to play a role in post-conflict resolution that many were ill-prepared for. In many ways, these conflicts have forced the leaders in these agencies to confront fundamental aspects of their organizational culture. In the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, many senior officials have pointed to the difficulty of getting executive agencies to adopt a war mentality, an indication of both the problem and power of organizational culture. Former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was repeatedly quoted as believing that the majority of the federal government was not at war. He also took the view that the demands placed upon these agencies were frequently beyond what they had been trained, organized, and equipped to accomplish.⁶¹

Department of State.

It is a badge of honor among Foreign Service Officers to avoid any education once they join the department.

– A Senior Foreign Service Officer

The Department of State has perhaps the most unique culture of the three agencies in several ways. First, Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) normally enter the organization with a graduate degree and frequently with some familiarity in foreign language. Most are nearly 30 years of age and frequently have already had a previous career. Consequently, they are normally somewhat older than their colleagues entering OSD and CIA. Second, the values of the institution reveal much about its culture. The State Department's core values include loyalty to the United States, character that exhibits the highest ethical standards, and excellence in service. All of these underscore the State Department's representational function abroad and requirement to provide assistance to Americans and businesses abroad.

This representative function leaves little time for development of a core competency for the organization. FSOs view themselves as focused on performing the various functions required at an embassy or developing policy. The majority of FSOs serve a significant portion of their career in a core area such as political officer, economics, consular services, information management, etc. Unlike the military that "trains" and "prepares for operations," FSOs view themselves as continually conducting generic diplomatic functions week after week. Consequently, long-term planning is rarely put forth as a core competency of the organization.

Finally, the remaining organizational values emphasize accountability/individual responsibility and a sense of community that includes teamwork and the customer-service perspective, both of which are essential to the functioning of an embassy. As a result, the State Department has largely eschewed the tendency to focus the development of its officers on a particular regional background but rather sought “generalists” who are fungible and thus deployable worldwide. Most FSOs measure the ultimate success of their respective career by whether they are ultimately selected for an ambassadorial position. This perspective has traditionally discouraged specialization in a particular region or culture since the pool of prospective ambassadorial positions remains worldwide in scope.

A strong difference exists, however, between the denizens of “Foggy Bottom” in Washington and those serving in overseas assignments. The fact that the latter venue is the clear preference of the majority of FSOs reflects in many ways the historical ethos of the organization. Moreover, promotions in the organization seem to favor those who achieve their success overseas. Consequently, most FSOs seek to stay in regional bureaus or abroad and avoid functional agencies (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, arms control, legislative affairs, etc.) despite the fact that these organizations are not only critical to the success of the institution but also provide valuable experiential learning opportunities. This status difference may also result in bifurcation within the organization. For example, the economics section of State may be more closely aligned with Treasury or the Office of the Trade Representative on a particular issue than with the regional bureaus. This organizational tendency often results in poor integration of goals between

regional and functional policies, and a lack of sound management, accountability, and leadership.⁶²

Another essential value of the culture is that individual performance trumps group effort by a division or directorate. Recognition is often the derivative of having your “name on the byline” of an important cable to Washington. Consequently, rotation assignments outside State are acceptable but *not* truly encouraged, particularly as an individual becomes more senior in rank. Most believe such assignments are ill-advised as it rarely affords them sufficient recognition within State to undergird subsequent promotions. This belief is also due in part to the long narrative format for State Department evaluations and a corresponding fear that few outside the culture will fully understand it. The department has begun an effort to coordinate many of its personnel policies with USAID, a major component of State, and encourage rotations between the two, but it remains to be seen whether this move will be truly embraced by the organization.

Finally, the FSO community has been the most successful of the three organizations in ensuring that a number of its career diplomats are placed in Assistant Secretary or even Undersecretary positions as new administrations arrive. There was even a grievance leveled by the FSO association against an administration when a particular position that had been traditionally held by an FSO was given to a political appointee. Ultimately, the decision was reversed. State has also occasionally been successful in placing career FSOs in senior positions in OSD that had normally been held by political appointees, but there have been few, if any, examples of a career OSD person being offered a senior position at State.

From the overall standpoint of recruiting, retention, and culture, the Hart-Rudman Commission observed in 2001 that the State Department, “in particular, is a crippled institution, starved for resources by Congress because of inadequacies, and thereby weakened further.”⁶³ The commission went on to state that only if these internal weaknesses were cured, would State become an effective leader in the formulation and conduct of policy. Such cures were critical to securing necessary funding from Congress. This was highlighted in the summer of 2000 when 1,400 Foreign Service personnel (roughly a quarter of the entire FSO corps) attached their names to an Internet protest of their working conditions.⁶⁴

The challenges to the State Department brought about by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were perhaps greater than to any other organization in the federal government. The Hart-Rudman Commission had suggested even prior to 9/11 that the capacity of the department to support post-conflict resolution efforts had deteriorated and was insufficient to meet an explosion of requirements. One need only consider that in 1950 the budget of the Department of State was roughly half that of DoD. By 2001 it was only 1/20th. During the Vietnam War, USAID had nearly 15,000 employees. By 2001, this number had been reduced to roughly 3,000. As a result, Secretary of Defense Gates has described USAID as essentially an “outsourcing and contracting agency.”⁶⁵ The total number of FSOs was only 5,000 in 2000. Even prior to 9/11, the number had not increased significantly despite the fact that the number of countries and international institutions requiring diplomatic representation had grown significantly in the years following the end of the Cold War.

This record is particularly stunning if one compares State to DoD. In 2007 the U.S. defense budget accounted for approximately half of total global defense spending, and American armed forces had over 1.5 million uniformed personnel. By comparison, the State Department employed 6,000 FSOs (a 1,000 increase from 2000), while USAID employed 3,000. In other words, by 2007 DoD was about 167 times the size of the State Department (including USAID). As one observer noted, "There are substantially more people employed as musicians in Defense bands than in the entire U.S. Foreign Service."⁶⁶ President Bush himself seemed to underscore the pressing need for a greater civilian effort in post-conflict recovery efforts during his State of the Union Address in January 2007. The President expressed his desire to "design and establish a volunteer Civilian Reserve Corps." This corps would function much like military reserves and ease the burden on the military by allowing the government to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad.⁶⁷ So far, at least, this effort is at best in the embryonic stage, and a full-scale effort is unlikely prior to the end of the Bush administration.

The challenge posed by Iraq for the State Department was underscored in President Bush's "Surge Speech" on January 10, 2007. In his remarks to the nation, the President outlined a new strategy for Iraq that included a 30,000-soldier increase in military forces deployed to Iraq as well as a doubling of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the better integration of their efforts with brigade combat teams.⁶⁸ This PRT increase was proposed despite the fact that maintaining staffing even in existing PRTs in Iraq had been a significant challenge, with frequent turnovers and lengthy vacancies. The results of PRTs have been neither surprising nor

impressive. The Initial Benchmark Assessment Report released on July 12, 2007, noted that while the military had been able to achieve the targeted increase in troop deployments by early June, the expansion of the PRT program was still not complete with only about half of the approximately 300 additional PRT personnel having been deployed by that date. The report noted that “the full complement of *civilian surge* personnel will be completed by December 2007” (emphasis added).⁶⁹ Some might plausibly argue that taking nearly 1 full year to increase civilian deployments by 300 is hardly a *surge*. In fact, a very senior Pentagon official remarked that he had greater confidence that the Iraqi government would deliver on its promise to provide additional military forces for security in Baghdad than that the State Department would be able to deliver on its planned PRT increase to meet the expanded requirements as outlined in the President’s surge strategy.⁷⁰

For a number of years the State Department had been unable to recruit sufficient new FSOs to replace those departing owing to normal attrition. This was due in part to budgetary restrictions. Consequently, by 2002 there were 25 percent fewer people taking the entrance examination than in the mid-1980s. The opportunity to live abroad, learn a foreign language, and develop negotiating skills which had traditionally attracted young people to the Foreign Service were now available in the private sector and many nongovernment organizations (NGOs). These competitor organizations offered higher salaries, lacked the level of austerity or danger often faced by State Department employees, and imposed fewer constraints on two-career families.⁷¹ There was also some indication that attrition itself might be a growing

problem. While most Foreign Service entering classes have suffered an attrition rate of 12 to 17 percent by the eighth year of service, two classes in 2000 and 2001 had sustained 23 and 32 percent, respectively, by the same point in their careers. While these results were not conclusive, they were supported by two major studies on departmental talent by McKinsey and Company as well as the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel.

The department's own policies had also been a detriment to attracting and retaining the best personnel. The recruiting process was slow, and candidates frequently waited 2 years from the date of their first written exam until the first day of work. The required oral exam also discouraged many qualified people from applying, particularly if they had a broad range of knowledge as opposed to specific skills. This distinction was compounded by the exam's antiquated "blindfolding" policy whereby the examiners (who determined which applicants were offered positions in the Foreign Service) often knew nothing about the individual's background. While this procedure had the admirable goal of ensuring a level playing field for all applicants, it ran completely counter to the need to recruit the most qualified individuals.⁷² As of March 2003, this process had been eliminated for the individual assessment portion of the exam.

Upon assuming his responsibilities as Secretary of State, Colin Powell quickly enunciated his desire to enhance recruitment and the development of FSOs. Secretary Powell observed:

For America . . . leadership begins and ends with having the best men and women in the Department of State. It is absolutely imperative that on the front lines of freedom, democracy, and open markets we have men and women who are excited about the possibilities and superbly

talented in orchestrating and managing the kaleidoscope of changes that colors our todays and brightens our tomorrows.⁷³

Consequently, the Department began the “Diplomatic Readiness Initiative” in FY2002. The initiative was a 3-year plan to hire 1,158 staff over and above attrition. It was hoped that this would ensure that the department could respond to crises and emerging priorities, cover gaps, and provide employees appropriate training/development. The program focused on entry-level positions, disallowing lateral entry at higher levels (for example, GS 12-14). An Alternative Examination Program was initiated, allowing applicants (limited to government employees) to advance to the oral examination on the basis of their professional experience.

By 2004 the department had redressed almost the entire personnel deficit of the 1990s and increased diversity and quality of FSOs and specialists.⁷⁴ The Department dramatically increased its investment in marketing, expanded outreach efforts, and student programs. As a result, applicants for the Foreign Service examination doubled from about 8,000 in FY 2000 to nearly 20,000 in FY2004. Candidate refusals of job offers from State plummeted from 25 percent in FY2000 to 2 percent in FY2004, while the quality of those hired in terms of academic background and critical skills improved significantly.⁷⁵ By 2007 State Department officials proudly announced that, for the second consecutive year, the department had been placed in the top five ideal employers in an annual poll of undergraduates reported by *Business Week*.⁷⁶ Still, despite these laudable successes the department was only able to stabilize its overall strength at a total of roughly 5,500 FSOs. It was unable to create a significant surge capability.

Efforts were also made to redress what had been a difficult relationship between the State Department and USAID, while at the same time expanding USAID's capacity to deal with complex international emergencies and post-conflict resolution issues. The administration established the President's Management Agenda to ensure that both organizations maintained well-qualified and well-trained workforces. This included a USAID Development Readiness Initiative to increase surge capability, joint training, and the establishment of formal Department-USAID cross assignments, etc.⁷⁷ Still, these remained largely voluntary programs and were never adequately resourced.

In February 2004, Senators Richard Lugar, Joseph Biden, and Chuck Hagel introduced the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act (commonly referred to as the Lugar-Biden Initiative). This legislation sought to establish a more robust civilian capacity to respond quickly and effectively to post-conflict situations as well as complex international emergencies. An Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created in the Department of State, but its work to improve planning and coordination was largely undermined by a lack of resources that drew criticism from a number of sources.⁷⁸ In response, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44, titled Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Stabilization and Reconstruction, in December 2005, but the NSC Deputies Committee did not approve the interagency management system to commence serious planning across the government until March 2007. Currently, the S/CRS consists of only 70 experts. After 3 years of effort, it has trained 11 active members for deployment and an additional 300 Standby Corps

volunteers.⁷⁹ The recurrent concern about the shortage of funds for S/CRS was reiterated by the Secretary of State in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 2007.⁸⁰

In January 2005, Dr. Condoleezza Rice assumed her new role as Secretary of State. She took control of the department as it was continuing to undergo rejuvenation based on the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative created by her predecessor, and she subsequently endorsed this effort. One year later, she outlined her vision for the department, which was described as “transformational diplomacy.”⁸¹ Dr. Rice argued that American diplomacy must now seek to “create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world.” To accomplish this grand task, she outlined three management objectives:

- Reposition personnel, particularly from the European epicenter of the Cold War, to dispersed and linguistically/culturally difficult posts that are home to emerging powers as well as problems.
- Shift the professional focus from a reporting role to managing programs and building institutions with a special emphasis on public diplomacy.
- Expand training, especially in difficult languages, and require senior FSOs to maintain functional expertise in two languages and regions.⁸²

The Secretary also announced her commitment to expanding the capabilities of State’s S/CRS that had been created by former Secretary Powell and endorsed by the Biden-Lugar Initiative. Following the announcement of the new plan, legislation was enacted transferring \$100 million DoD funds for post-conflict operations to S/CRS to empower it for critical

situations.⁸³ Still, as previously noted, many experts argued that at least \$400 million or more annually was required if S/CRS was to be adequately resourced.⁸⁴ Finally, Secretary Rice used the word “transformational” to describe her belief that “like any great changes of the past, the new efforts we undertake today will not be completed tomorrow.” She described this effort as a “work of generations.”⁸⁵ Consequently, this endeavor was aimed at altering the organizational culture of the department as it had developed throughout the Cold War, obviously not an overnight task.

During the initial year of this effort, Secretary Rice also sought to overhaul the department’s hiring process. State Department Director General George Staples stated that under the plan announced in December 2006 the department would use a new “Total Candidate” approach.⁸⁶ The goal would be to improve the department’s ability to find and compete for the best candidates and improve the overall hiring process. The effort would weigh resumes and references in making hiring selections but would also consider intangibles such as “team-building skills.” The written examination for candidates would be retained but shortened and automated.

This effort occurred against the backdrop of expected personnel losses due to retirement and increased competition with the private sector and other government employers for top-quality personnel. The Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit organization based in Washington, estimated in 2007 that 60 percent of federal workers would reach retirement age in the next decade. In the State Department it is estimated that 90 percent of senior officers will be eligible for retirement in the next 5 years. Overall, State’s civil service cohort has aged from an average of 41 in the 1990s to 47 in FY

2006.⁸⁷ Streamlining of the department's recruiting and hiring process was thus timely.

Criticisms of changes in the hiring process were largely based on two arguments. First, many career FSOs openly expressed their concern that the changes would lead to a politicization of the selection process. Some pointed at the earlier expanded use of contractors as a clear attempt to introduce political correctness into the policy process, and they interpreted the latest changes as a complementary effort. Second, even proponents had to agree that the written examination had been a proven predictor of candidate success. Consequently, many viewed the change to automated format as a lowering of standards for entry.⁸⁸

Secretary Rice requested additional resources in her initial year in office for her transformation effort but remarkably did not request a significant increase in subsequent fiscal years. The 1,000-plus positions that were added as part of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative have now been absorbed by assignments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other difficult positions in Washington and around the globe. An independent assessment of the Secretary's "transformational diplomacy" effort suggested the department needs a minimum of 1,000 additional trained officers just to meet existing requirements.⁸⁹ This was further corroborated in the report, *The Embassy of the Future*, prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in October 2007. This study describes how the State Department by its own analysis has a shortage of 1,079 positions for transit, training, and temporary needs (these include language training, professional education, rotational assignments, etc.).⁹⁰ The report further outlines the need for joint agency training, rotational assignments to other departments,

educational opportunities at universities, and further leadership training as essential to accomplishment of the State Department mission in the future.⁹¹

The issue for the Department of State is not solely one of shortages in personnel and resources, as difficult as those challenges might be. Many experts have also argued that in addition to expanding overall strength, the Department of State must better protect its developmental resources, including leadership/management programs, from personnel “raids” to cover operational emergencies. One report suggested that “sending people abroad without the requisite training is like deploying soldiers without weapons.”⁹²

The department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) describes itself as the federal government’s primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the American foreign affairs community. It annually provides more than 450 courses, including instruction in 70 languages, to more than 50,000 employees from the State Department, over 40 other government agencies, and the U.S. military.

As part of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, some efforts were made to enhance developmental opportunities for FSOs offered at FSI and elsewhere. Mandatory courses in basic, intermediate, and advanced leadership for employees at the level of GS 13, 14, and 15 (Foreign Service grades 03, 02, and 01, respectively) were established, as well as the Senior Executive Threshold Seminar for those recently selected for senior Civil and Foreign Service.⁹³ Career candidates for Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) appointments have an advantage if they have demonstrated leadership qualities. Unfortunately, the four required courses total only 17 days, of which 2 are equal opportunity and diversity awareness. The Senior

Executive Seminar, 3 weeks in length, is somewhat more robust. Overall, training offered at FSI expanded by 25 percent from 1.9 million student classroom hours to 2.4 million from 2002 to 2004.⁹⁴

Still, many of these courses are primarily “training” as opposed to “education.” Furthermore, the FSI reports to the Undersecretary of State for Management, whose duties include security, human resources, building operations, and administration, rather than to those departmental leaders responsible for the future direction of the institution as well as overall policy. Consequently, many of the courses offered are focused primarily on preparing a diplomat or his/her family to be successful in a particular assignment abroad. They do not provide broad-based education on policy or problems that do not lend themselves to textbook solutions.

Consequently, the State Department offers little in the way of formal education and development for its officers during their career. Most current FSOs are forced to learn either experientially or by their own outside efforts. There are individual developmental opportunities to attend the military’s senior service colleges or participate in such programs as congressional fellowships. Unfortunately, these are not formalized development programs for the organization, not numerous, and not perceived as career enhancing due to the long period of separation. These impediments are compounded by manning shortages, which mean that there is frequently no officer available to fill a position for an educational or development experience for an extended period.

With these points in mind, several recommendations specific to the State Department seem appropriate. First, a successful Foreign Service requires

officers who are consistently building new knowledge and skills. The State Department requires a 10-15 percent increase in personnel to allow for that proportion of the overall service to be in training or education at any given moment. This number must be rigorously fenced off solely for these purposes to allow for adequate training and development. Failure to do so will result in personnel being simply absorbed into ongoing operational efforts. Second, expanding requirements and the pressing need to maintain a surge capacity require more flexibility for admission to the Foreign Service. Horizontal entry and exit should be considered whereby those with a particular background or linguistic skill could enter laterally at grades far above entry level. Furthermore, greater allowances should be made for career FSOs to take a leave of absence for personal reasons and subsequently return to duty. Third, any use of “blindfolding” for selection to the Foreign Service should be ended, and overall recruiting practices reviewed.

Fourth, the Alternative Examination Program should be broadened to include those in the military (both active and reserve) or who complete graduate degrees in areas of particular need. Fifth, control of the FSI should be passed from the Undersecretary of Management and placed directly under the Deputy Secretary. This shift would give FSI greater prominence, underscore the importance of FSO development, and allow the department leadership to better control course offerings and selection policies. Sixth, opportunities for development assignments at think tanks, congressional staffs, military war colleges, etc., should be actively sought as part the department’s overall development programs. Seventh, critical problems exist with respect to pay, allowances, and retirements. FSOs serving in

Iraq and Afghanistan pay taxes while serving abroad, unlike uniformed military, and effectively take a pay cut during these assignments. Foreign Service retirement is capped, and, unlike the military or other government agencies, State Department retirees cannot accept another government position without forfeiting a significant portion of their retirement pay. These compensation issues must be addressed.

Finally, the Hart-Rudman Commission made one final internal recommendation for the State Department in 2001 that still deserves consideration. The report recommended changing the Foreign Service's name to the United States Diplomatic Corps.⁹⁵ Some might argue that this is superficial rhetoric mongering, but it could have a significantly beneficial impact. It would serve as a reminder that this group of people do not serve foreign interests but are rather central to U.S. national security. Such a change would further rationalize the value of diverse assignments in regional bureaus, abroad in an embassy, and in the functional components of the organization. This change might help to better depict a career pattern for young people considering diplomatic service as a possible profession. Finally, it would also serve to emphasize that the traditional mission of the State Department to provide national representation abroad has dramatically changed, as revealed in the recent report *The Embassy of the Future*.⁹⁶ This report observes that diplomats of the future will need traits and skills that are different from those of diplomats a decade ago and even those hired today. A change in organizational culture is required, as the "new diplomat must be an active force in advancing U.S. interests, not just a gatherer and transmitter of information."⁹⁷

Office of the Secretary of Defense.

I have had 2 days of formal development in my 30 years as an OSD employee . . . 1 day of AIDS awareness and 1 day of sexual harassment training. . . .

—OSD Senior Executive Servant

As an organization, that portion of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that deals with policy differs significantly from State and CIA. First, it is a smaller group of professionals, numbering only about 400. In fact, they are outnumbered by others within OSD (human resource management, finance, comptroller, acquisition, research/development, etc.). Second, the State Department has a focused competency in diplomacy, and the CIA deals with intelligence gathering and analysis. OSD Policy shares its competency in defense planning with the military to a degree but is primarily focused on the security relationships between the United States and foreign powers. Obviously, this focus changed dramatically when, in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, DoD assumed responsibility for the initial efforts at post-conflict resolution instead of the Department of State. Third, development of an official within OSD primarily deals with his/her substantive background on a particular policy question as opposed to broad understanding of national security policy, the interagency process, or any effort to develop the skills necessary to manage a large and complex organization.

As previously discussed, the Defense Science Board Report of the Task Force on Human Resources and the USGAO report (“Human Capital: Strategic

Approach Should Guide DoD Civilian Workforce Management”) both pointed out many of the existing problems in DoD. They include insufficient numbers of properly trained candidates in the pipeline, limited professional development opportunities, weak incentives/compensation plans, an aging workforce, etc. The department overall suffered the largest force reductions in its history at the end of the Cold War, resulting in a professional staff that views itself as largely over-tasked. Fewer personnel have not resulted in fewer requirements, particularly in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. Despite this fact, reductions in personnel strength that were planned prior to these tragic events remained “on the books” to be implemented.

For the middle to upper grades, some believe that DoD recruiting has benefited markedly in the last few years by the change in the dual compensation laws that affected military officers upon retirement. These now allow military professionals upon retirement from active duty to accept government positions without any reduction in their retirement compensation. While this step has offered the department a source for recruiting mid-level management with significant policy experience, it may have masked or even contributed to the longer-term problem of an aging workforce. This problem could be exacerbated if coupled with the absence of a robust recruiting program. Over time, this might cause the OSD policy community additional problems due to the impending retirement of a significant portion of the staff. It may also, if not managed effectively, lead to a perception among younger employees that their opportunities for progression are inhibited by the lateral entry of a significant number of military retirees.

Still, the overall job satisfaction in OSD and Defense agencies is relatively high, similar to what is found in the private sector. Civilian job satisfaction is somewhat lower for those assigned to the service staffs (Army, Navy, and Air Force), but these still exceed 50 percent approvals.⁹⁸ While this is encouraging, these professionals give lower ratings to their supervisors and the quality of work produced than one finds in similar private sector analysis. This may indicate that a larger percentage will seek retirement at the earliest age possible under the existing personnel system.

Overall, DoD does not have an aggressive recruiting program. For many years, the department largely depended upon the Presidential Management Fellows Intern Program for entry-level positions in policy, but in the aftermath of the Cold War, these numbers shrank significantly. Proposals were made prior to 2001 to increase the number of selectees per year for the coming decade, but they were not acted upon.⁹⁹ In November 2003 President Bush announced the Presidential Management Fellows Program (PMF) to modernize this effort. The new program sought to increase standards, rigor, and prestige of the program, and it lifted the annual hiring cap for all Federal agencies.¹⁰⁰

The PMF program is a paid government fellowship sponsored by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for recent graduate students who seek a 2-year fellowship in a U.S. government agency. Selection begins with the nomination of the student by the Dean, Chairperson, or academic program director of their graduate program. This is followed by a rigorous assessment process. Agencies that hire PMFs include the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services,

Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Library of Congress, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and USAID. Following the conclusion of the 2-year fellowship, PMFs usually have the opportunity to convert their fellowship into a full-time permanent position. In 2007, over 3,900 applicants were screened, 790 were determined to be finalists, and 383 received appointments.¹⁰¹ Consequently, OSD has seen some increases in both the numbers and quality of applicants from the PMF program.

These facts, coupled with OSD's unwillingness to actively recruit new employees, could suggest a problem of organizational culture – a tendency to view career civilians as replaceable parts versus valuable professionals who need to be aggressively recruited, managed wisely, and retained. It appears, however, that the current generation of young Americans does see government service in agencies such as OSD as attractive. For example, since 1997 OSD has received between 100 and 140 applications each year for the six to eight open PMI positions.¹⁰²

Consequently, the federal government should attempt to eliminate recruitment hurdles and seek to expand the National Security Education Program (NSEP, also referred to as the David L. Boren National Security Education Act) that links educational benefits to government service requirements. This act directed the Secretary of Defense to create the program, provide oversight, and award scholarships. The NSEP was established in December 1991 with the following objectives:¹⁰³

- Provide resources, accountability, and flexibility to meet U.S. national security education needs, especially as such needs change over time.

- Increase the quantity, diversity, and quality of the teaching and learning of subjects in the fields of foreign languages, area studies, and other international fields critical to the Nation's interests.
- Produce an increased pool of applicants for work in the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government with national security responsibilities.
- Expand, in conjunction with other Federal programs, the international experience, knowledge base, and perspectives on which the U.S. citizenry, government employees, and leaders rely.
- Permit the federal government to promote the cause of international education.

Since 1994 the NSEP has awarded over 3,000 undergraduate and graduate scholarships for study abroad. Each recipient is required to spend 1 year working in the federal government in a position of national security responsibility. This is normally associated with DoD, Department of State, Homeland Security, or an element of the intelligence community.¹⁰⁴ This opportunity seems to be particularly attractive to those who have recently completed degrees at schools of public policy and seek entry-level positions/experience. Efforts might also be considered to create an ROTC-like program for particularly promising young undergraduates who are in relevant disciplines and seek a career in government service.

Experiential learning through rotation assignments to other government agencies, the National Security Council, or other outside developmental experiences are largely discouraged by the OSD culture and

leadership. Many quality OSD personnel have sought such assignments in the past and performed brilliantly, but this was largely due to their own initiative. They were rarely, if ever, rewarded upon their return with promotions or positions of increased responsibility. In the late 1990s, OSD policy created a number of other professional developmental opportunities at the various war colleges, State Department, Council on Foreign Relations, as well as sabbaticals at major universities for GS 15 or SES-level employees. These were all largely discontinued with the arrival of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and any future assignments outside of OSD policy could occur only if an assistant secretary was willing to give up the necessary body. Clearly these decisions were driven in part by the operational reality that every OSD employee who was sent to a developmental assignment outside of the organization meant that in theory his/her position would remain vacant until the incumbent returned.

Reluctance may be due to the fact that, in general, OSD senior positions have a higher percentage of political appointees than commensurate subcomponents of CIA and State. As a result, the organizational focus is on the immediate needs of policy as opposed to the professional health and development of career employees. The presence of Schedule C or political appointees in many (if not most) senior OSD policy positions further discourages career advancement. Many civilian professionals increasingly see their progress reaching a "glass ceiling" prior to any consideration for a deputy assistant secretary position. Furthermore, many see that they must not only compete with political appointees for senior positions but also with senior military officers and even FSOs who periodically have been offered senior DoD positions.

This tendency may contribute to earlier retirement or the loss of valuable employees to the private sector. Unfortunately, DoD does not conduct exit interviews for those departing the department as part of its overall recruitment/retention efforts. Consequently, it is difficult to assess the relative importance individuals ascribe to particular factors in deciding to depart service in the Department.

In the early 1990s, DoD attempted to establish a more formalized development program. Senior officials realized that the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act had begun to yield an officer corps that was more highly educated and equipped with a stronger joint perspective than in the past. There had not, however, been a similar investment on the civilian side. Civilian career professionals in OSD had very few opportunities for developmental assignments and little exposure to national security decisionmaking. Since 1997, OSD has initiated at least two new programs focused on enhancing leadership and management development among its civil servants and expanding their overall understanding of the policy process—the Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP) and Policy Career Development Program (PCDP).

DLAMP was established partially in response to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Force. It was designed as a systematic effort to prepare civilians for key leadership positions at GS 14-15 and SES levels for DoD. It had three components:

- A 1-year rotational assignment outside one's occupation or component.
- A minimum 3-month course in professional military education at the senior level that was established at the National Defense University.

- At least 10 advanced graduate courses in subjects important for Defense leaders (in essence a DoD-focused MBA program).¹⁰⁵

At one time DLAMP had 1,100 participants with 83 enrolled at 10-month professional military education courses (such as the war colleges).

While this program was endorsed by the Defense Science Board, it suffered from several difficulties over time. First, DLAMP was designed for all DoD civilian employees regardless of background. There was no distinction between those in technical fields versus those in policy positions. Those assigned to policy positions rarely were afforded the opportunity to attend, while many with a technical background found experiences such as the senior service college interesting but somewhat irrelevant to their career patterns. Second, DoD was unable to generate a personnel delta from which to fill positions left vacant when individuals were attending schooling. Consequently, managers were reluctant to send their best to schooling. As a result, GS 12s and 13s began being assigned to meet requirements. Third, selection for attendance was based on performance and not potential. Administrators claimed that existing personnel regulations precluded them for making development assignments based on future potential, arguing they were forced to focus solely on improving a person's background for their existing position. As a result, no clear link was established between DLAMP attendance, subsequent assignments to positions of greater responsibility, or promotions. Fourth, OSD Policy found DLAMP of less and less interest as it was more and more successful at attracting entry level applicants who already possessed a master's degree.¹⁰⁶ Finally, graduation criteria seemed

unclear to many based on the three tasks involved, and this made management of the program more difficult. This, coupled with rising costs for temporary assignments and overall mismanagement, resulted in the program being downsized solely to attendance at the senior service colleges. In 2007, roughly 50 DLAMP students are in attendance at the various war colleges. Significantly, none have been sent from DoD policy positions.

The PCDP was created specifically to deal with the development of OSD personnel in policy positions in the latter part of the Clinton administration. This effort's goal was "to develop career national security professionals of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy (OSD Policy) who are motivated, professionally developed and trained, and during the course of their careers, increasingly able to shape and affect the changing security environment."¹⁰⁷ In formulating PCDP, its authors observed that historically civilian employees in OSD Policy had very limited career development opportunities. Consequently, career advancement as reflected in more responsible, more senior, and varied assignments was at best episodic and difficult to predict or plan for. They also noted that this was not a new phenomenon. Senior Defense officials had noted an ever increasing need for enhanced career opportunities and options for professional OSD Policy personnel in studies completed in 1961, 1978, and 1994. This last study stimulated the PCDP effort, and it was formally inaugurated in 1995.¹⁰⁸

PCDP had four interlocking elements. These included: (1) a training/development program; (2) a rotation process that sought challenging assignments both inside and outside of OSD Policy; (3) an improved recruitment and hiring process; and (4) a career

advancement program.¹⁰⁹ The program included detailed guidance on when and how personnel could apply for development or rotation assignments as well as the creation of panels to review applications, monitor evaluations, and consider subsequent assignments. In many ways, this program seemed ideally designed not only to confront existing problems in OSD Policy, but also as a model that other agencies of the federal government might consider. Unfortunately, this group has not met in several years, and the program is largely moribund.

Secretary Rumsfeld made “transformation” a centerpiece of his efforts as the new secretary upon the arrival of the Bush administration in 2001. He observed in a *Washington Post* editorial that “transformation of our military capabilities depends on our ability to transform not just the armed forces and the way we fight. We must also transform DoD.”¹¹⁰ Consistent with this effort, Secretary Rumsfeld chartered a study to examine joint defense capabilities in March 2003. This report, *The Joint Defense Capabilities Study*, was completed in January 2004. While this was an exhaustive study of planning, resourcing, and execution, it largely ignored any changes to DoD personnel practices. The report provided only a single page on “workforce planning” and no detailed analysis of its recommendations. It did note that “workforce development is often reactive to decisions concerning joint capabilities, rather than being fully considered when those decisions are made.”¹¹¹ The report concluded that to support a revision in the planning process effectively, a more systematic effort had to be made to address human capital requirements. It recommended two additional efforts: (1) conduct a careful analysis of personnel requirements and training; and (2) increase the number of overall experts available to the department.

Perhaps in partial response to these recommendations the Bush administration also proposed the Defense Transformation Act in 2003 that was designed to assist the department in better managing its civilian personnel. Secretary Rumsfeld underscored the importance of this effort to the nation's security: "The DoD cannot meet the challenge of the future with an organization anchored in the past. We must be permitted to be as agile, flexible, and adaptable as the forces we field in battle around the world."¹¹² This effort sought to restructure how DoD hires, pays, promotes, and disciplines its more than 650,000 civilian employees. It proposed a new National Security Personnel System (NSPS) that would: (1) accelerate the hiring process that at the time took nearly 5 months, (2) introduce pay-for-performance bonuses; (3) streamline the promotion process; (4) provide greater flexibility for DoD senior managers to move personnel rapidly as required; and (5) facilitate the transfer of as many as 300,000 jobs then performed by military personnel to civilians.¹¹³ It also proposed new legislation that sought to reduce the number of labor unions that DoD had to negotiate with from as many as 1,300 to half a dozen. Finally, it proposed expediting the firing of DoD personnel when necessary.

Congress approved NSPS in November 2003. It required OSD to establish a program office to oversee the design and implementation of this new system in partnership with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). This effort began in early 2004 and included six design working groups encompassing over 100 participants from DoD and OPM. Implementation of the new system began in the summer of 2005 and was scheduled to be completed over the next 2 years.

Obviously this new system was controversial. Supporters emphasized improved hiring and firing, a \$500 million “performance fund” to provide federal executive incentive bonuses, enhanced collective bargaining arrangements, moving uniformed personnel out of positions that could be performed by civilians, and incentives for risk taking. They also argued that the NSPS would reduce the department’s need to turn to contractors for missions abroad. For example, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, over 80 percent of civilians deployed to the theater were contractors. This was due in part to the fact that DoD regulations at that time precluded the department from moving its employees quickly. The associated performance management system was described as the cornerstone for the program’s overall success. It required supervisors to establish performance goals and expectations in concert with their employees and provided personnel management training for supervisors and managers. Obviously, this requirement could over time enhance the managerial skills of at least the existing DoD leadership.

Critics noted that a pay-for-performance system had proven a failure in the 1970s and 1980s. They also complained that previous systems to improve the ability of DoD managers to assess their employees accurately had failed. Furthermore, assessments of this type are particularly difficult to conduct for policy-related positions in comparison to administrative, clerical, or technical jobs.¹¹⁴ Consequently, some believed that while the NSPS might be appropriate for many portions of DoD, it would be less useful to OSD Policy.

Detractors further argued that overall the new law provided the Secretary of Defense “sole and

unreviewable discretion” to implement change over the objections of OPM, labor unions, and Congress. Consequently, the Secretary could bypass federal personnel regulations to hire and promote any persons who are declared “essential to national security.”¹¹⁵ An official with the American Federation of Government Employees (a union representing 200,000 employees) said reducing OPM’s role would “open the door for every subsequent defense secretary to tailor the department’s personnel system to his or her political tastes.”¹¹⁶ As a result, a coalition of several federal labor unions has initiated a number of court cases that seek to halt or modify NSPS.

This new discretionary authority, coupled with the expanding number of political appointees in DoD Policy, could actually result in a significant increase in the use of contractors for policy analysis. If this were to occur, it is likely that Secretaries would utilize those “think tanks” that support administration policies and deprive the policy process of alternative views. Finally, NSPS does little to nothing to improve the development of career employees in OSD Policy. While the enhanced pay system is important particularly with respect to recruiting and retention, it ignores other incentives such as educational opportunities, variety of assignments, etc., that may be more appealing, particularly to those in policy positions. In response to these concerns, members of Congress approved an amendment to the defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2008 that would deny funding for key parts of NSPS. The White House responded that this effort was “in essence a total revocation” of the new system.¹¹⁷

Not unlike their colleagues in the Department of State, new policy professionals in DoD are engaged in interesting work on a vast variety of issues that in

many ways are more challenging than during the Cold War. It would be unfair not to note that efforts have been made to encourage the “best and the brightest” to seek a career with DoD, and the recent applicant pools have had outstanding credentials. Programs have been initiated to allow positions to be shared that include currently at least one SES billet. There has also been an attempt to create a few positions for DoD policy professionals with Regional Combatant Commands. The question remains whether or not these efforts will result in a dramatic improvement in overall development and serve as an incentive for the retention of the very best in a policy career.

Still, any DoD civilian joining the policy staff is confronted by a system that largely leaves career planning and individual development as a matter of personal responsibility and choice. They are joining a staff that has at best an ill-defined career pattern, particularly for those in policy positions. It places little value on educational development, training, outside experiential learning, or rotation assignments to broaden the knowledge of its personnel. This is despite the fact that most experts would agree that interagency experience is critical to the development of effective policy professionals in today’s and tomorrow’s defense climate.

In addition to the suggestions previously made, the following internal departmental improvements would seem appropriate. First, OSD, in concert with the Department of State, should expand the number of overseas postings for its personnel at American embassies and international organizations. Second, establish a clear rotational program for those working in regional bureaus at the GS 15 and SES level at the various regional centers established by OSD (e.g., the Marshall

Center in Europe, the Asia-Pacific Center in Honolulu, the Africa Center at the National Defense University, etc.) This would not only broaden the understanding of regional issues for these personnel but also improve the exchange of ideas on policy questions between the departments and the centers it oversees. Third, revise the DLAMP and place a career OSD civilian in charge. A new revitalized program must link the selection of an individual for training or educational development to his/her demonstrated performance and potential. It must further seek to align better attendance and completion with subsequent assignments to positions of increasing responsibility. Fourth, establish avenues for horizontal entry of highly qualified individuals with particular specialties into senior career positions.

Central Intelligence Agency.

Development in the Central Intelligence Agency is a Booker T. Washington self-help program. . . .

—Senior Intelligence Officer

At first glance the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would seem to have the fewest problems of the three agencies considered in this analysis. In reality, however, the CIA probably had the greatest requirement to change in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. At the conclusion of the Cold War, it had the most concentrated expertise of the three agencies on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and was still in the process of redefining its requirements. The so-called “War on Terrorism” required a dramatic shift in expertise as the agency sought a rapid increase in personnel with facility in the Middle East,

Afghanistan, etc. Furthermore, as one expert observed in the aftermath of 9/11, the number of “consumers” of CIA intelligence expanded dramatically. They now include everyone from policymakers to police chiefs to combat commanders at the unit level to FBI agents trying to get a search warrant.¹¹⁸ Finally, the expanded paramilitary requirements inherent in the “war on terrorism” require more intelligence officers, with a broader understanding of policy.

In light of the ongoing war on terrorism and the mystique perhaps that surrounds the CIA, it currently has fewer general recruitment problems. The agency has experienced periodic difficulties due to the time required to complete security clearance screening of applicants, not unlike other agencies in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The CIA does, however, appear to take a much more active role in recruiting than other agencies. It has established student work programs for undergraduate internships, co-ops, and graduate studies programs. Periodically, the CIA has also had difficulties in computer sciences and exotic language recruitment, but these are outside the scope of this monograph.

The agency has experienced some difficulties in retention. This may be due in part to the generational attitude of many of today’s applicants who expect to change careers several times during their working lives. This obviously is not a problem unique to the CIA. Modifications were also made to the federal retirement system in the aftermath of the Cold War that allowed an employee to depart the CIA early and take what he/she had invested towards their retirement. Some experts believe this may have encouraged the premature departure of experienced CIA professionals. In addition, the “downsizing” of the CIA that occurred

prior to 9/11 may have also had a longer-term adverse effect. Initially, this effort was based on attrition, but this did not yield sufficient reductions. Consequently, the agency was forced to offer pre-eligible buy-outs to many senior employees.

This may have had the unintended consequence of encouraging some of the best qualified to seek a second career in the private sector. For example, the practice of contracting retirees for subsequent agency work greatly expanded in the years following 9-11; some believe that nearly 30 percent of employees in the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) are retirees called back as contractors. A DO employee can retire, join a consulting firm that has an existing agency contract, and resume his/her old job within weeks with a 25 percent increase in salary.¹¹⁹

In many ways, the primary challenge in developing leaders at the CIA is dealing with its organizational culture, both externally and internally. The CIA itself has a unique organizational culture, but it must be understood that it is also only part of the overall "intelligence community" (IC) culture that includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, FBI, etc. Accordingly, those who have examined reform of the intelligence community in the aftermath of 9/11 have noted a need for greater "jointness" or better understanding by intelligence professionals of their sister organizations. Reports prepared by the congressional intelligence committees on the actions of the FBI and CIA before or in the immediate wake of the attacks noted that the Director of the CIA (D/CIA) was "either unable or unwilling to enforce consistent priorities and marshal resources across the community." Furthermore, the D/CIA "could not be assured that the entire intelligence community would focus on the war."¹²⁰

Some observers have suggested that the challenges posed by organizational culture have greatly complicated efforts to reform and reorganize the intelligence system that began in earnest with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. They note, for example, that any reform of the intelligence system is complicated by the existence of “three distinct, stubborn, and largely incompatible organizational cultures that are poorly balanced: military intelligence, civilian national security intelligence (mainly CIA), and criminal-investigation intelligence (mainly FBI).”¹²¹ During the Cold War, these cultures had been optimized for different threats. Military intelligence and the CIA had prepared to deal with the threats of nuclear war with the Soviet Union or conventional war in Europe. The FBI’s primary focus was (and will continue to be) on criminal investigations, and the agency has resisted blurring that focus by transforming itself even partially into a national security intelligence agency. Consequently, any effort to develop intelligence leaders for the 21st century must address the pressing need to ensure that future senior leaders are able to move beyond the traditions and requirements of their parent organization and achieve a broader understanding of the requirements and needs for overall intelligence collection and analysis.

This should not be interpreted, however, as suggesting that no efforts have been made to enhance greater “jointness” between the various agencies comprising the intelligence community or to establish development mechanisms to address this issue. The Intelligence Training and Education Board established a cross-agency team to define common standards for training, education, and career development. This group provided its report and recommendations in December

2005 that outlined common competencies spread over three levels applicable to the various agencies and their respective development activities.¹²²

In addition, Ambassador John Negroponte, the initial Director of National Intelligence (DNI), issued a directive in 2006 requiring all intelligence officers to serve tours of duty outside their home agencies prior to being selected for promotion to the government's senior ranks. This directive requires each officer to spend from 1 to 3 years in a different agency. Further, it established procedures to ensure that employees on rotational assignments are not treated differently than those remaining with their parent organizations for promotions or subsequent assignments. Ronald Sanders, the DNI's director for personnel, commented that "the objective is to develop a leadership cadre that can look across all intelligence disciplines, bring all that together, and try to make some sense out of it for policymakers."¹²³

This idea was further endorsed by Ambassador Negroponte's successor, retired Admiral Michael McConnell. McConnell issued his "100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration" upon assuming the position in February 2007. In this plan, McConnell designated creation of a culture of collaboration as focus area number one. He noted that "few transformation efforts have been successful when they did not address culture, attitudes, and day-to-day behavior." The plan's intent was to advance human resource programs modeled after DoD's efforts under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, integrating the intelligence community's workforce by promoting "jointness" through recruitment, training, exercises, education, retention, assignments, and career leadership development.¹²⁴ In his follow-up report issued in September 2007, McConnell noted the successful

implementation of the intelligence community's civilian joint duty program. The phased program requires civilians to complete at least one assignment outside their "home" agency as a prerequisite for senior rank. The report further suggested that the joint duty program will allow intelligence professionals to deepen their understanding of the inner workings of other IC agencies and the intelligence community at large. It also enables them to build and sustain collaborative, information-sharing networks across the IC.¹²⁵

Of course, these efforts remain largely in their infancy. Any authentic embedded change to organizational culture embracing the entire intelligence community will require continued emphatic action over a number of years to be ultimately successful. Furthermore, absent expanded authority for the DNI, success remains dependent to a large degree on the active volitional "buy in" of all intelligence agencies.

Internally, the CIA itself is in many ways three organizations in one—Directorate of Operations (DO), Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and Directorate of Science and Technology (S+T). Each directorate is headed by a deputy director of Central Intelligence; and the three are very distinct organizations in terms of mission, personnel development, and promotion policies. Historically, new intelligence officers are quickly "stovepiped" in a particular one of these organizations based on their background. The DO has a large demand for foreign language ability, the DI regional expertise, and S+T for engineering and scientific research specialties. Generally, CIA officers remain in their directorate for their entire career. Office directors within these three directorates retain primary jurisdiction over promotions through the rank of GS 14/GS 15, training, and developmental opportunities for their subordinates. Branch/Division Chiefs also become involved in these decisions. Senior intelligence

officers believe that career management is largely left to the individual, with frequently little assistance by supervisors or the organization. Interestingly, one authority close to the situation concluded that the agency is really not focused on developing “intelligence officers but rather analysts, engineers, and field agents.”

The CIA, like State and OSD, has traditionally discouraged experiential learning through rotational assignments outside the organization. All senior intelligence officers interviewed believed that the organization in past years had even discouraged officers from seeking an assignment within the CIA but outside their parent directorate (DO, DI, or S+T). This was considered detrimental to chances for promotion. Assignments to other agencies (such as OSD or State), fellowships, faculty positions at war colleges, etc., were never considered “career enhancing.” This was due to concerns about being “out of sight” and therefore “out of mind” within the parent directorate. Robert Gates (the current Secretary of Defense) attempted to make a rotation assignment a prerequisite for selection to Senior Intelligence Officer when he served as DCI, but this innovation was subsequently discontinued at the urging of the directorate heads as unworkable.

Several D/CIAs have attempted in the past to alter the organizational culture somewhat by the creation of specialized “centers” such as arms control, counterterrorism, crimes/narcotics, etc. This effort had the additional benefit of offering other organizations such as State, OSD, the military, and especially other members of the intelligence community (DIA, NSA, FBI, etc.) rotational positions in which their personnel could not only make appropriate contributions but also broaden their understanding of the role of intelligence in policy formulation. Moreover, these centers have

given the D/CIAs greater flexibility to influence the development of personnel in their own organization. Still, the “best and the brightest” in the CIA have normally been discouraged from seeking assignments to these outside organizations, since promotions, other development opportunities, etc., are controlled by the three deputy directors who tend to take care of those closest to their bosoms.

The CIA has an exceptionally robust educational system as an accompaniment to training opportunities, which, as previously noted, are controlled by the heads of the directorates. Newly accepted personnel attend an introductory training course that lasts about 16 weeks (11 weeks of initial training and a 5-week interim assignment), depending on their directorate of assignment. There is a mid-level course that personnel are encouraged to attend at roughly the 10th year of service. However, this course is voluntary and viewed as unnecessary for advancement by most personnel. Its student body numbers only about 30 per year, and each student must be nominated by his/her office director who has had to be willing to accept the temporary loss of those attending. The National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) is a fully accredited institution that offers a variety of courses and degrees for personnel assigned to the intelligence community. Many of the programs are structured to allow participation by personnel who continue to hold a full-time position in the organization. The NDIC is, however, primarily focused on students from the DIA, and some observers have suggested that in the past CIA students were an under-represented component of the overall IC student body.

In February 2002, the agency established the CIA University at the direction of the DCI. The Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis is part of the university and focused on the development of analysts

for the DI. It has both an Essential Skills Program and an Advanced Analyst Program. The latter includes five required courses that focus on a variety of skills and offers the opportunity for students to select from a variety of electives. It is designed to provide a nonmanagerial track for those in the DI seeking to reach senior intelligence service rank. While these programs are offered to others in the intelligence community, the vast majority of the participants are from the CIA.¹²⁶

CIA University also includes the CIA Leadership Academy, which offers educational development for agency professionals in three stages – emerging leaders, new leaders, and executive development. The initial stage provides nonmanagerial agency officers (usually through the rank of GS 12) with leadership knowledge and skills focused on the intelligence mission. The second stage is for new supervisors and managers who are in the first 6 to 12 months of their assignments. It seeks to sharpen skills that maximize their personal and unit effectiveness. Most courses are 1 to 5 days in length and voluntary. As usual, attendance at these courses is largely, if not exclusively, at the prerogative of the individual supervisor.

The executive development stage addresses leadership challenges in the framework of recent international, domestic, operational, and technical developments that affect the CIA and the intelligence community as a whole. Courses are designed for GS 15s and Senior Intelligence Service (SIS) professionals from all directorates and other representatives from the intelligence community. This stage includes the DCI leadership seminar, a year-long program with participants continuing to do their regular jobs. Participants in this program attend selected seminars throughout the year with senior U.S. government officials and private sector leaders.

These are important educational and training developments for the organization, as noted by Wilhelm Agrell: "If a modern profession is characterized by the transformation from improvisation and master-apprentice relations to formalized education and training programs, then intelligence analysis has come a long way."¹²⁷ Still, the CIA University and its corresponding programs are a relatively recent phenomenon, and it remains to be seen whether they will have a lasting impact on the development of intelligence officers. In the past, some CIA organizational improvements have momentarily resulted from earlier task force recommendations or consultations with outside experts who offered sound theoretical constructs for reform. Unfortunately, however, the conversion of theory to practice has tended to dissipate once the recommendations have been delivered and the task force disbanded. One expert concluded that the field of intelligence management has been for the most part ahistorical, with limited and noncumulative knowledge of how its theory should be put into practice.¹²⁸

The central weakness of the CIA's developmental program remains that it is largely voluntary in nature for courses below the executive development level, which are nominative. There is no formal correlation between course participation and enhanced opportunities for promotions. In fact, some observers have noted, for example, that never in a senior officer's entire career within the DO will he or she be evaluated on the basis of leadership ability.¹²⁹ Some officials believe, however, that the results of recent selection boards indicate at least anecdotally that a trend in this direction is beginning. If so, this will over time encourage more employees to take advantage of developmental programs, but such an awakening will not occur in the near term. Changing

existing policies in order to make completion of the mid-level course or course work at CIA University a prerequisite for promotions in grade or assignments of increasing responsibility has been considered and rejected. This rejection is due to the increased operational demand created by the war on terrorism. Such rigid prerequisites would require an expansion of the organization's manning in order to generate a delta of employees to be in full-time development or educational experiences.

Within the CIA, several changes could be adopted that would improve development. First, like DoD and the Department of State, the CIA leadership should seek additional personnel funding to ensure an adequate "bench strength" to allow personnel to receive advanced training and education. Second, the DNI should be given authority to establish practices throughout the intelligence community that clearly link training/education to advancement. This measure should also establish closer ties between training/education and advancement. Third, the human resource component needs to simplify security clearance procedures to speed recruitment. This step is important not only for the CIA and the entire intelligence community, but for almost all federal government recruitment. In 2004, a report by the Office of Management and Budget found that the average applicant for a new security clearance waited 446 days for action. In December of that year Congress directed that by December 2006 80 percent of all clearance actions be completed within 120 days. By February 2007, clearance actions had been reduced to 205 days, with 350,000 applications awaiting action.¹³⁰ Fourth, Congress must consider legislation not unlike that being promoted by DoD to improve compensation and align it more closely with the

private sector. Fifth, the established DNI requirement for rotational assignments should be expanded, with all agency members required to serve at least one 2-year assignment in another directorate besides their own prior to being considered for promotion to GS 15. Positions should also be established at regional combatant commands that would allow more CIA officers to apply their skills in post-conflict as part of military contingency planning. Finally, procedures for the lateral entry of those with particular language or other unique skills should be implemented.

THE WAY AHEAD – A NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICER CORPS

In the entry on the Spanish-American War, 1898-99, in the *Oxford Companion to American Military History*, the word most frequently chosen to describe the mobilization for and the conduct of this conflict is “chaotic.”¹³¹ While the United States was successful in its campaign against Spain, it was far from our nation’s finest hour. There was inefficiency, waste, and even scandal in the provisioning of troops. Little centralized planning existed, and there was no centralized command during the war, with the autonomous Army bureaus often acting at cross-purposes. As a result, President McKinley selected a young Wall Street lawyer, Elihu Root, as Secretary of War with the authority to reorganize and modernize the War Department. One of Root’s initiatives was to establish a rigorous system for the education and training of the armed forces.

This system was further improved upon by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.¹³² Goldwater-Nichols forced the military services to train, educate, and assign officers in a manner calculated to improve their ability

and willingness to operate jointly. It also established Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) with Joint Staff oversight that included periodic reviews at mid-level and senior service colleges to assess the quality of the effort and the inclusion of relevant joint material in the curriculum at each institution. Clearly American defenses today are vastly superior to what they were in 1898, but the need for similar radical change has arisen again. It is interesting to note that General Peter Pace, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral (Ret.) McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, have both recommended a “Goldwater-Nichols” type initiative for the federal government aimed at unification/integration of the interagency in counterinsurgency warfare and counterterrorism. Pace argued that such an effort would improve the interagency process and allow it to deal better with the challenges of the “war on terrorism.”¹³³ Several other studies have independently come to a similar conclusion.¹³⁴

Most of the security problems identified by several commissions and independent studies in the past 2 decades still exist. The only true change is that the threat to our security has grown in scale and complexity. Generally, America still has 20th-century institutions to counter 21st-century threats. While the recommendations provided for each of these three organizations are important, they are largely agency-specific, that is, directed at preparing a better Foreign Service officer, a defense policy expert, and an improved intelligence officer (albeit with an analytical, operational, or engineering focus). They will *not* develop people with the breadth of experience equipping them to oversee the policy process, assist in detailed planning, and provide necessary oversight

during execution. Dr. John Gaddis, the distinguished political scientist at Yale University, noted the need to stimulate thinking in terms of “grand strategy,” that is, the “calculated relationship between means to large ends.” This is a daunting requirement in many ways. Thomas Friedman, the respected columnist for the *New York Times*, has suggested that long-term strategizing is like trying to prepare someone now for the Olympic Games in 10 or 20 years when you do not know what the events will be.¹³⁵

The administration of President Bush has acknowledged this problem at various times over the past 2 years and has now begun to address it at this late stage. The *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) report was delivered in February 2006 as required by Congress to provide a complete review of where DoD believed it was and the direction deemed most appropriate in terms of American strategy and defense investments for the next 5 years. The QDR clearly proposed efforts to expand the capacity of agency partners, increase coordination between combatant commands and interagency partners, and undertake several initiatives to improve unity of effort for complex operations abroad.¹³⁶ It further supported providing increased funding for the Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS), the redirection of resources to other agencies as required, and expanded training programs for planners in other agencies of the federal government.

DoD subsequently began a dialogue with other agencies commencing with the establishment of a Task Force on National Security Officer Competencies. This group, which met at the National Defense University, included representatives from many executive agencies. The task force derived a set of prerequisite competencies in knowledge, qualities,

attributes, and skills applicable to mid-grade and senior leaders working in the interagency. It provided these to all executive agencies to be used for position descriptions and curriculum development, but the report acknowledged that each agency would apply these in addition to its own functional requirements and in different ways.

In May 2007 President Bush expanded on this effort with an executive order for “National Security Professional Development.” This order clearly states that it is the policy of the United States to “promote education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions in executive departments and agencies.”¹³⁷ This order was followed in July 2007 by issuance of the “National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals.” The document set forth draft curricula learning areas and draft specialty tracks, named a steering committee, and established a National Security Education Consortium (NSEC) that would “prepare civilians and military national security professionals to evaluate national security challenges through multidisciplinary education and research programs, professional exchanges, and outreach.”¹³⁸ The document also contained important proposals for the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to ensure that those participating in development activities are properly selected and rewarded in terms of promotion and subsequent assignment consideration.

Many observers argued that this “strategy” was “too little and too late.” Though it calls for coordination and cooperation among the various executive agencies, the Interim Director for NSEC has few position powers, and, at this writing, neither he nor any staff has been selected. Furthermore, the budget for the

NSEC remains uncertain. Falling in the final year of the Bush administration, its long-term future is extremely problematical and at best cannot begin before early 2008. Some agencies have privately complained that this document was an “unfunded mandate” calling for them to expand development opportunities for their workforce without additional funding.¹³⁹ Finally, even prior to release of the document, several leading figures in Congress expressed concerns about its approach. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, a longtime advocate of professional military education, sent a letter in April 2006 to then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld regarding this proposal. Congressman Skelton, after applauding the QDR’s call for expanding national security educational opportunities and affirming the benefits that would hopefully ensue from such interagency cooperation, cautioned that any move tending to drain dollars from military education should be avoided “at all costs.”¹⁴⁰

Furthermore, not unlike the military in the late 19th century and during the Cold War, the organizational culture of these agencies is such that dramatic internal reform is unlikely. Even if reform were to occur within the individual agencies, it would achieve uneven success among them and fail to advance the ultimate goal – better policy. What is needed is legislation that establishes within the Executive Branch of government a National Security Professional Corps (NSPC) of policy experts with broad-based experience throughout the policy process. It should seek to develop, through attractive, carefully tailored career paths, senior departmental managers and strategic leaders skilled at producing integrative, innovative solutions to national security policy problems.¹⁴¹

The present monograph has of course focused on State, OSD, and the CIA. The demands of our strategic environment, however, require that other agencies (i.e., Homeland Security, Treasury, Commerce, and Justice) be included in any interagency reform as they are all essential to interagency policymaking for this new era. The NSPC should be reserved expressly for those in policy career fields as opposed to those in such technical fields as human resource management, finance, etc. This latter group requires an important but different developmental pattern. Such an approach must also allow for the progression of those who are interested in focusing their career path on a narrower aspect of strategic policy, realizing that they will not be promoted to senior executive positions.

The career path for an individual in the NSPC will proceed through three developmental levels—entry, intermediate/management, and senior/leadership. Launching the NSPC successfully requires three initial steps. First, the President must clearly articulate (as have several previous studies) that the nation faces a crisis in attracting the very best in future generations of Americans to government service. This “call to arms” should be not unlike that of President John Kennedy in his much quoted inaugural address of 1961—“Ask not what. . . .” A change of this magnitude in the structure of the Executive Branch now and into the future cannot occur without robust presidential leadership. So far at least, President Bush has eschewed issuing such a clarion call despite the fact that many senior leaders in his administration have appeared to be advocates for such an undertaking. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, during a commencement address at the College of William and Mary, observed:

It is precisely during these trying times that America needs its best and brightest young people, from all walks of life, to step forward and commit to public service. Because while the obligations of citizenship in any democracy are considerable, they are even more profound, and more demanding, as citizens of a nation with America's global challenges and responsibilities – and America's values and aspirations.¹⁴²

Second, the presidential call to arms must be accompanied by more robust and energetic recruiting programs. These should include but not be limited to an increase of the Presidential Fellows Program that has historically capitalized on the desire of most young Americans to serve. They should also include additional incentives such as an expansion of the National Security Education Act (NSEA) that was previously discussed. NSEA would not only provide broad support in colleges and universities for social sciences, languages, and humanities in return for government service, but also encourage the expansion of many graduate schools of public policy that have atrophied in the aftermath of the Cold War. Third, the President must underscore his support for such an effort with a significant increase in the funds available to government agencies earmarked for personnel development. At a minimum, this measure must include a 10-15 percent increase in agency personnel strength at the GS 11 level and above that will allow a "float" in order for development courses/experiences to occur without leaving existing positions vacant. This measure must by design be directed solely at expanded professional development, barred from becoming a covert labor source for other purposes. It

should also include provision for a percentage of each agency's permanent staff to be offered opportunities for advanced civil schooling at government expense, not unlike what is done for military officers.

The President should further direct that OPM, in concert with an expanded personnel management section in the National Security Council (NSC), have oversight over agency developmental programs, to include setting down guidelines where appropriate and conducting periodic reviews for compliance. Each agency would retain primary control over the entry-level course for newly selected personnel. This course would still largely focus on the particular agency training program to accomplish the daily functional tasks inherent in its mission. It would, however, be appropriate for each new employee to complete a subcourse on the fundamentals of current U.S. national security policy and the interagency process. This subcourse could be presented in a distance education format to ensure consistency and reduce duplication in the faculty/staff. Guidelines for the subcourse curriculum would be provided by the NSC and OPM.

Prior to consideration for promotion to GS 14, or at approximately the 10-to-12-year mark, all personnel would undergo a mid-level developmental course. This course must be a fixed requirement across the organization and not confined to selected individuals, thus ensuring that each is given a fair opportunity to attend. This course would expand understanding of the parent agency, enhance skills as personnel assume supervisory responsibilities, and update understanding by personnel of current security policy and existing challenges. The Foreign Service Institute, Joint Intelligence College, CIA University, and the applicable faculty of the National Defense University

should form a curriculum committee that ensures that the mid-level course has the proper balance between an individual parent agency focus and the broader interagency focus. Each curricular unit should culminate with an interagency exercise involving the entire multi-agency student body.

At this point in their career, each attendee would elect whether to continue to focus their career path in their own agency or to volunteer for the National Security Professional Corps. Those who choose to stay within their parent agency need not be stigmatized, as it may offer them certain personal advantages. First, they would likely be able to complete their Federal service in the Washington, DC, area. Second, they could remain focused on a particular region or functional area that they find rewarding. Upon completion of the mid-level development course, a number could be offered advanced civil schooling in their area of expertise that further qualifies them for positions in their agency. The primary adverse effect of this choice is that they would likely advance no farther than GS 15 or equivalent. Some exceptions might be made for Foreign Service Officers who aspire to ambassador positions.

Those who choose to apply for the NSPC would be screened carefully, possibly to include an examination or interview, to ensure the selection of the best possible candidates. Selections will be made by a board consisting of representatives from the various agencies, OPM, and the NSC. Those chosen would undergo an expanded course on the interagency process, current threat, etc. Upon completion of this course, they would be placed in a 2-year rotation assignment with another government agency or on the National Security Council Staff. Following this rotation assignment, they would return to their parent agency and be placed in

a position requiring substantive as well as managerial responsibilities. These assignments would be made by the parent agency human resource office, OPM, and NSC personnel office working in collaboration. Another advantage of making the selection for NSPC at this point in an individual's career is that it could offer the opportunity for lateral entry by those from other careers but with appropriate expertise in a region, functional area, etc. This option may be critically important if the trend in government that requires more mid-level managers and fewer entry positions continues. Figure 1 portrays the NSPC program graphically.

Prior to consideration for SES, SIS, or equivalent, each NSPC member must also complete a senior leadership development experience. This can be attendance at one of the war colleges, Congressional Fellowship, etc. This should result in a larger number of NSPC personnel attending the war colleges than is found today from their respective agencies. This will have the ancillary advantage of improving the seminar dynamics and exercises at these institutions. Personnel rules must be established making it mandatory for an individual, once selected for GS 15, to be considered for senior leadership development. This is to ensure that the responsibility for personnel management remains with the organization and *not* the individual. Upon completion of the senior leadership development experience and promotion to SES, these individuals will be assigned to positions as Senior Officer Directors, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, or above for the remainder of their career. Initial consideration for assignment will be with their parent organization or the NSC, but final selections will be made by a board similar to that created for their selection to the NSPC. Each organization will present its recommendation for the individual's assignment during this process.




Figure 1. NSPC Career Progression.

Additional developmental experiences beyond this could include assignments as Political Adviser to a Regional Commander, war college faculty, sabbaticals, etc. These will serve not only to continue the development of rising members of the NSPC but also to ensure the retention of their valuable expertise.

Implementation of the NSPC program must attend to several important considerations. First, the program must be phased in over time. Still, the transition period, grandfatherings, and exceptions to policy cannot be so extensive as to dilute the effort. Second, as stipulated above, every effort must be made to ensure that the responsibility and oversight for career management decisions remain with the individual agency, OPM, and NSC. Individuals *must* be considered for development at the appropriate points identified in their career. Otherwise they cannot fulfill the prerequisites for promotion consideration and will be unfairly punished. Third, a reduction must be made in the number of Schedule C political appointees in the agencies affected to make room for the NSPC members being generated. This action must ensure that an NSPC member is assigned to most Deputy Assistant Secretary positions and some at the Assistant Secretary level. This will have the concomitant advantage of easing the change from one administration to another. Finally, implementation of this proposal will not only require strong Presidential leadership (as previously emphasized) but also congressional legislation. Clearly, the track record of implementing sound recommendations of previous studies demonstrates that the Executive Branch on its own is incapable of the type of reform required to overcome bureaucratic inertia and alter the organizational culture of federal departments and agencies.¹⁴³ It is essential that

Congress be as aggressive in this area of reform as it was in the adoption of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The other teams could make trouble for us if they win. . . .

—Yogi Berra

In the follow-on to the attacks of 9/11, the Commission on Post- Conflict reported that American security institutions required change to stay abreast of the current conditions. The report stated:

U.S. institutions and ways of doing business have not kept pace with the rapidly changing environment since the end of the Cold War. Despite over a decade of . . . experience in trying to address the challenges of failed states and rebuilding countries following conflicts, U.S. capacity for addressing these challenges remains woefully inadequate.¹⁴⁴

In many ways America in the 21st century is more threatened by the failure of states than it is by an imminent attack or invasion by a foreign power. Regardless of how conditions ultimately play out in Iraq, that trauma may be viewed in retrospect not as the end, but rather the beginning. Furthermore, failure to achieve our goals in Iraq would not be the worst possible outcome. The worst would be failing in the pursuit of our objectives in Iraq *plus* failing to learn the important lessons on how to alter our existing governmental structures and personnel development systems for the future. The sad fact is that the U.S. Government today does not have a deliberate development process

(beyond what is offered by individual agencies and departments) that provides a sufficient number of credible, competent civilian national security officers capable of conducting strategic planning, policy formulation, and operational oversight for complex contingencies.¹⁴⁵ Currently, the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch have neither the capacity nor capability to produce/obtain such officers, and there are few, if any, incentives for career civil servants to pursue the type of interagency development required to become such officers.

Consequently, the new security environment has changed the relationship between training and education in ways that must be considered when determining an effective way to develop and educate civilian policymakers for the future. First, today's junior official is much more likely to be confronted by decisions that may have operational or even strategic consequence than were his Cold War predecessors. Today's missions in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq and Afghanistan are more politically and culturally complex than Cold War missions. Second, while the students of policy in the 1980s could grasp the essence of American national security strategy with an understanding of deterrence and containment, the same is certainly not true today. No catchwords or pithy slogans can adequately convey the complex nature of the international environment we confront. Today's senior policymaker must have a much more sophisticated understanding of the integration of all of the elements of national power (military, diplomatic, economic, and informational) in the pursuit of national objectives. General John Abizaid, former commander of U.S. Central Command, noted this reality prior to his retirement from active duty. He commented in

the *New York Times* that American security structures for 21st-century defense challenges needed to adapt and perhaps deemphasize solely military solutions to many of the problems we face. He argued that America needed to “figure out how to get economic, diplomatic, political, and military elements of power synchronized and coordinated against specific problems wherever they exist.”¹⁴⁶

Accordingly, we must consider how we educate and develop senior leaders to deal with this level of complexity. In reality, by the time a person achieves a senior government position, he/she needs to have achieved some understanding of grand strategy and the full integration of the nation’s military, economic, and diplomatic/political instruments of power. This need requires us to look at the relationship between “training” and “education” in a different way.

Traditional issues associated with American culture may compound shortcomings in our current model for developing future leaders. For example, America as a nation has long had an “engineering approach” to problem solving. When Americans consider their great accomplishments as a nation, they typically reflect on the Wright brothers, building the transcontinental railroad, digging the Panama Canal, or landing the first man on the Moon. It is a traditional cultural assumption among Americans that the existence of a problem presupposes the existence of a solution, usually a scientific, engineering, or technological solution. Most Americans would find the story of Alexander the Great and his solution to cutting the Gordian knot quite satisfying. Gordius, the legendary founder of the capital of Phrygia in Asia Minor, dedicated a cart to Zeus. An oracle declared that whoever could untie the intricate knot on the yoke of the cart would be the ruler

of all Asia. Many attempted this feat and failed. After capturing the city, Alexander is said to have considered the problem, and with one swipe of his blade across the knot, solved the problem that had vexed so many. In a similar fashion, Americans tend to take a direct, quantitative, no-nonsense attitude toward problem solving. All it requires, in the American view, is a rational approach; measurement of the required amount of resources, people, and time; and the application of those resources as necessary. Then, *voilà!*

Otto von Bismarck, however, once remarked that there are two things that you never wish to observe being made—"sausage and diplomacy." One of the differences between strategic/diplomatic problems and tactical/operational problems is that the latter do have solutions, or at least finality. But diplomatic and strategic problems (like those we currently confront) frequently do not. Many budding American strategists and policymakers find this lack of closure extremely frustrating. They are further disturbed that their choices may be confined to the least bad of several bad options. Furthermore, rather than finding an actual "solution," they often must accept that though they can make the problem better or worse, a final solution is unlikely, at least on their watch.

As previously suggested, any possible "success" in a peace support operation, complex crisis such as Kosovo, or post-conflict resolution in Iraq requires an integrated approach that combines the military, economic, political, and social elements of power of the nation. Also as noted earlier, the military has frequently been put in charge of these operations by default and attempted to coordinate the efforts of numerous government and nongovernment organizations. Although the military may accomplish

its own tasks effectively, it often finds itself stuck in a complex and ambiguous situation in which it has little power or influence to accomplish other, oftentimes more complex, tasks that defy solutions based on the application of force or violence.¹⁴⁷ The military portion of the solution may in fact be the easiest to accomplish and must proceed apace if the political, economic, and social efforts are themselves to have any hope of success.

Not surprisingly, military leaders having wide experience with the Iraq and Afghanistan issues have been some of the most vocal in calling for change. This group has included General Peter Pace, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and now, Defense Secretary Gates. Some of these leaders have even opined that in the sequel to 9/11, 2001, the Department of State, DoD, and CIA went off to war while most of the remainder of the federal government and American public continued as if there had been no real change save for the inconvenience of added security measures during check-in at air terminals. It has further been reported that members of the JCS told President Bush and Defense Secretary Gates at one point that the surge strategy announced by the President in January 2007 could fail unless more civilian agencies stepped forward to carry out plans for reconstruction and political/economic development.¹⁴⁸ General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army and formerly commander of all American forces in Iraq, observed that "the question really is can we change the culture in the other departments so their folks can participate in areas like Iraq, or whether that's simply too hard and the mission should fall to the military."¹⁴⁹

If American strategy is to deal with challenges like Iraq and Afghanistan in the future, it must not

only alter existing culture in federal agencies but also carefully address the current mismatch between strategic objectives and resources. Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, former commander of the Multi-National Corps in Iraq, describes this “capabilities gap” as not being the fault of any military service or civilian agency but rather the result of “our government not having clearly defined expectations of what each instrument of national power should provide to our foreign policy solutions.”¹⁵⁰ The nation must decide on three alternatives: (1) ignore the problem of failed states in the future; (2) depend primarily on the military and DoD to resolve the problem of failed states; or (3) expand the capacity and capability of the Executive Branch agencies to shoulder their functional share of solutions. Clearly, ignoring the plight of failing states, particularly in areas that are vital to American national security such as the Middle East, is suicidal. Furthermore, our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that giving this mission solely to the military is problematical absent a radical expansion of the military’s nonmilitary roles and capabilities. It also places America at great risk if similar contingencies arise around the globe in the near time frame that further stress the capacities of our interagency.

For that reason, 21st-century civilian agencies and policymakers must be developed to deal with more shades of gray than the clearer black and white options of the Cold War. Our strategic challenges may be more like Rome’s of 2,000 years ago than like our own of just 20 years ago.

The Romans did not face a single enemy, or even a fixed group of enemies, whose ultimate defeat would ensure permanent security. Regardless of the amplitude of Roman victories, the frontiers of

the empire would always remain under attack, since they were barriers in the path of secular migration flows from north to south and from east to west. Hence Roman strategy could not usefully aim at total victory at any cost, for the threat was not temporary but endless. The only rational goal was the maintenance of a minimally adequate level of security at the lowest feasible cost to society.¹⁵¹

If the Roman experience serves as a foreshadowing of America's potential future—and the parallels are suggestive—than the time to undertake change is now. The proposals in this monograph call for organizational realignment that integrates human capital strategies into the core practices of the interagency and the federal government as a whole. The goal is not only better-run agencies but also better policy.

Large portions of American industry have already made parallel determinations in their own operations. Corporate America has realized that the “learning organization” requires organizational education in addition to traditional training. Learning is a set of processes and structures to help people create new knowledge, share their understanding, and continuously improve themselves and the results of their enterprises. It is not so much a program as it is an open-ended philosophy that the leadership of the organization institutionalizes permanently.¹⁵²

Great leaders have adopted such an approach intuitively throughout history. For example, General (and later Secretary of State) George Marshall once observed:

It became clear to me at age 58. I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the

military manuals or on the battlefield. In this position I am a political soldier and will have to put my training in rapping out orders and making snap decisions on the back burner, and have to learn the new arts of persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills.

Marshall clearly made the transition for himself and then effected change throughout the government. But he had the advantage of time and the less demanding environment of the interwar period. Our challenge today is to embed a true developmental system so that the next generation of policymakers is prepared for a future we can only see darkly. Furthermore, we must accomplish such preparation for the future even as we contend with successive crises du jour.

Such thoughts underscore the emerging reality that continuous learning by successful adults is difficult but essential to modern organizations and governments. Our current national security leadership must distinguish between two fundamental perspectives—both essential but very different. The first is the “Operating Perspective,” characterized by short time horizons, priority of action over reflection, high energy consumption, and high day-to-day operational efficiency. This perspective encompasses many of the internal recommendations made with respect to each organization in the present study. The second is the “Building Perspective.” Its time horizons are measured in months or decades. It requires analysis of the organization at the macro level instead of the workaday micro level. It seeks outcomes that may not be evident for years. But it is essential for sustaining the organization into the future.¹⁵³ It requires the development of people as well as ideas and policies. The American national security process must be able to

do both forms of development if we are to successfully manage the war on terrorism and manage the enormous change the evolving international security situation demands. We have little time to delay. America's failure to achieve its objectives in Iraq may not be the worst outcome that we potentially face. Failure in Iraq *and* our unwillingness or inability to learn from this experience and thereby adapt our government to future strategic challenges would be even worse.

ENDNOTES

1. President George Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2002, p. 2.

2. General Richard B. Myers, "Understanding Transformation," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 2003, pp. 38-41.

3. For a thorough discussion of this topic, see Jim Collins, *Good to Great*, New York: Harper Business, 2001.

4. John Hamre, Frederick Barton, Bathsheba Crocker, Johanna Mendelson-Forman, and Robert Orr, *Iraq's Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Field Review and Recommendations*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 17, 2003. See also Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2003; and *Defeating the Iraqi Insurgency*, Baghdad, Iraq: 1st Cavalry Division, May 2004.

5. See, for example, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2007; Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006; George Packer, *Assassins Gate*, New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2005; David Hendrickson and Robert Tucker, *Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2005; or Tom Ricks, *Fiasco*, New York: Penguin Books, 2006.

6. James Glanz, "U.S. Agency Finds New Waste and Fraud in Iraqi Rebuilding Projects," *New York Times*, February 1, 2007, sec. A, p. 8.

7. "SIGIR Aggressively Pursuing Debarments, Suspensions, Bowen Tells Senate Panel," *Daily Reports for Executives*, Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., March 21, 2007, p. A-36.

8. James Glanz, "Agency Says Rebuilding Failures in Iraq Show Need for Changes," *New York Times*, March 22, 2007, sec. A, p. 15.

9. James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, New York: Random House, 2006, pp. 92-93.

10. Joseph J. Collins, "Planning Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Vol. 41, 2nd Quarter 2006, pp. 10-14.

11. John Hillen, "Developing a National Counterinsurgency Capability for the War on Terror," *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXVII, January-February 2007, pp. 12-15.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 15. See also General Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, pp. 395-400.

13. D. E. McAllister, "Education/Training Discussion," TRADOC, January 29, 2001. See also Dianne Jordan, *Evaluation and Implementation of Distance Learning: Technologies, Tools, and Techniques*, Hershey, PA: Idea Group, 2000.

14. John P. Kotter, "What Leaders Really Do," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 68, No. 3, 1990, p. 2.

15. Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York: Anchor Books, 2000, p. 7.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

17. *Ibid.*, 12.

18. "Rebuilding the Public Service," *Report of the National Commission on the Public Service*, Washington, DC, 1989, p. 2.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
20. Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council 56, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, Washington, DC, May 1997, p. 5, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Rowan Scarborough, "Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Mission," *The Washington Times*, December 6, 1999, p. A1.
23. National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997, pp. 66-67.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Frederick P. Hitz, "Washington Rejected: The Declining Appeal of US Government Service," public lecture, April 4, 2000, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
26. Paul C. Light, *The New Public Service*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999, pp. 2-4.
27. Paul Light, *The Changing Shape of Government: Policy Brief*, No. 45, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, February 1999, p. 6.
28. Statement by Michael Brostek, Associate Director Federal Management and Workforce Issues, "Human Capital: Strategic Approach Should Guide DoD Civilian Workforce Management," Washington, DC: General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, March 9, 2000, p. 1.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

32. *High Risk Series: An Update*, GAO-01-263, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, January 2001, p. 3.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-75.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

36. Information on this effort is still available on the commission's website, *www.nssg.gov*.

37. *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*, Washington, DC: The United States Commission on National Security for the 21st Century, March 15, 2001, p. xx.

38. *Ibid.*

39. Robert E. Moffit, *Taking Charge of Federal Personnel*, Backgrounder No. 1404, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, January 10, 2001.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

42. Paul Krugman, "The Green-Zoning of America," *New York Times*, February 5, 2007, section A, p. 21.

43. Eric Schmitt and David Romide, "2 Reports Assail State Department Role on Iraq Security," *New York Times*, October 23, 2007, pp. A1 and A12.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Scott Shane and Ron Nixon, "In Washington, Contractors Take on Biggest Role Ever," *New York Times*, February 4, 2007, sec. 1, p. 1.

46. *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, referred to as *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004, p. 353, *www.9-11commission.gov/*.

47. *Ibid.*

48. The National Commission on the Public Service, *Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, January 2003, p. iii.

49. *Volcker Report Emphasizes Need for Immediate Action*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, January 2003, pp. 1-3, www.brookings.edu/media/NewsReleases/2003/20030107volcker.aspx.

50. *Human Capital: Insights from Other Countries' Succession Planning and Management Initiatives*, GAO-03-914, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, September 2003, p. i.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-5.

53. Gregory Treverton and Tora Bikson, *New Challenges for International Leadership: Positioning the United States for the 21st Century*, RAND Corporation Issue Paper, Washington, DC: RAND, July 13, 2004, p. 1.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

55. *Project Horizon Progress Report*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Summer 2006. See also Sid Kaplan, "Project Horizon-A New Approach to Interagency Planning," *Federal Times*, February 13, 2006, p. 4.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

58. See, for example, Christopher Jehn, *Report of the Intelligence Community Task Force on Personnel Reform*, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995, p. 4; *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000, p. v; Cheryl Y. Marcum, Lauren R. Sager Weinstein, Susan D. Hosek, and Harry J. Thie, *Department*

of Defense Political Appointments: Positions and Process, Washington, DC: RAND, 2001, p. 1; Chester A. Crocker, "Engaging Failing States," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 5, 2003, p. 8; Clark A. Murdock et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase I Report*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004, p. 52; *Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to the 9/11 Commission's Proposed Reforms*, GAO-04-1084T, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, September 2004, p. 2; Department of the Army, *Review of Education, Training, and Assignments for Leaders, (RETAL), Civilian Team Report*, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, May 2006; *Shaping and Utilizing the SES Corps Task Group*, Report to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC: Defense Business Board, May 2006.

59. John Kotter, "Cultures and Coalitions," *Rethinking the Future*, London: Nicholas Breatley Publishing Limited, 1997, pp. 164-178.

60. *Survey of the Senior Executive Service*, Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Personnel Management, August 1999.

61. Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, p. 380.

62. *Survey of the Senior Executive Service*, p. xv.

63. *Road Map*, p. xv.

64. *Secretary Colin Powell's State Department: An Independent Assessment*, Washington, DC: Foreign Affairs Council, Public Members Association of the Foreign Service, November 2004, p. v.

65. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Speech to the Marine Corps Association Annual Dinner, Arlington, VA, July 18, 2007.

66. David Kilcullen, "Plenty of Music, But Not to Soothe a Sensitive Breast," *New York Times*, July 22, 2007, sec. 4, p. 4.

67. President George Bush, *State of the Union Address*, Washington, DC, January 23, 2007, p. 11.

68. President George W. Bush, *Address to the Nation*, Office of the White House Press Secretary, January 10, 2007.

69. Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Initial Benchmark Assessment Report," www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070712.html.

70. Private conversation with senior Pentagon official, January 2006.

71. *Road Map*, p. 95.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

73. *Leadership and Management Training Curriculum*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, George P. Schultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, 2004, p. 140.

74. *Secretary Colin Powell's State Department: An Independent Assessment*, p. v.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

76. *Department of State Ranks High as an Ideal Employer for All Undergraduates in 2007*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, May 31, 2007, p. 1.

77. U.S. Department of State, "Strengthen Diplomatic and Program Capabilities," www.state.gov/m/rm/dosstrat/2004/23507pf.htm.

78. Clark A. Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005, pp. 59-64.

79. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, S/CRS, *Fact Sheet: A Whole of Government Approach to Prevent, Resolve, and Transform Conflict*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, September 2007.

80. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, "Opening Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the International Affairs Budget for FY2008," February 8, 2007.

81. Steve Donald Smith, "Better Jointness Needed Between Military and Diplomats, Rice Says," *Defense Link News*, January 18, 2006. See also Office of the Spokesman, *Transformational Diplomacy Fact Sheet*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, January 18, 2006.

82. *Ibid.*

83. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

84. Murdock and Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, p. 62.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

86. Elizabeth Williamson, "Foreign Service Hiring Gets a Re-Exam," *Washington Post*, December 12, 2006, section A, p. 13.

87. *Managing Secretary Rice's State Department: An Independent Assessment*, Washington, DC: Foreign Affairs Council, Public Members Association of the Foreign Service, June 2007, p. 2.

88. Williamson, "Foreign Service Hiring Gets a Re-Exam," sec. A, p. 13.

89. *Managing Secretary Rice's State Department*, p. 2.

90. Gregorgy Argyros, Marc Grossman, Felix Rohatyn, and Anne Witkowsky, *The Embassy of the Future*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2007, pp. 9-10.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

92. *Secretary Colin Powell's State Department*, p. vii.

93. *Leadership and Management Training Curriculum*, p. 15.

94. *Secretary Colin Powell's State Department*, p. 3.

95. *Ibid.*

96. Argyros *et al.*, *The Embassy of the Future*.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

98. "Human Capital: Strategic Approach Should Guide DoD Civilian Workforce Management," statement by Michael Brostek, p. 1.

99. Dr. John Foster and Larry D. Welch, *Final Report for Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics*, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2000, p. xiv.

100. *Presidential Management Fellows Program*, Washington, DC: Office of Personnel Management, www.pmf.opm.gov/.

101. *Ibid.*

102. *Road Map*, p. 98.

103. For information on the National Security Education Act and associated scholarships, see www.iie.org/programs/nsep/undergraduate/default.htm.

104. *Ibid.*

105. Testimony by Dr. Diane M. Disney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Civilian Personnel Policy, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, May 18, 2000, pp. 6-7.

106. Interview with William Lowry, Principal Director, OSD Policy, Enterprise Services, Washington, DC, February 5, 2007.

107. *Policy Career Development Program (PCDP) Procedures Document*, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, 2002, p. 2.

108. *Ibid.*

109. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
110. Donald Rumsfeld, "Why Defense Must Change," *Washington Post*, July 18, 2003, sec. A, p. 19.
111. Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team, *Improving DoD Strategic Planning, Resourcing, and Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2004, pp. 3-18.
112. Rumsfeld, "Why Defense Must Change," section A, p. 19.
113. Margaret Murphy, *DoD Talking Points: National Security Personnel System*, Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, July 7, 2003.
114. *Transformation for the 21st Century, Fact Sheet on Civilian Personnel Changes*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2003.
115. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004: The Civil Service and National Security Personnel Improvement Act*, Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, November 2003.
116. *Transformation for the 21st Century, Fact Sheet*.
117. "House Amendment Would Deny Funding for Personnel System," *AUSA News*, Vol. 30, No. 10, October 2007, p. 2.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
119. Garret Jones, *It's a Troubled Cultural Thing: Thoughts on a Troubled CIA*, Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 19, 2005, p. 4.
120. "Excerpts from Report on Intelligence Actions and Sept. 11 Attacks," *New York Times*, July 25, 2003, section A, p.12.
121. Richard A. Posner, "The Reorganized U.S. Intelligence System After One Year," *National Security Outlook*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, April 11, 2006, p. 4.

122. *Draft Standards Descriptions*, Washington, DC: IC Working Group on General Analysis Standards for Training, Education, and Career Development, December 20, 2005, p. 1.

123. Stephen Barr, "Negroponte to Apply Military's Joint-Duty Approach to Intelligence Agencies," *Washington Post*, June 19, 2006, sec. D, p. 4.

124. Director of National Intelligence, *United States Intelligence Community (IC) 100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration*, Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 11, 2007, www.dni.gov/100-day-plan/100-day-plan.htm.

125. *United States Intelligence Community (IC) 100 Day Plan: Integration and Collaboration-Follow-up Report*, Washington, DC: Office of the Director on National Intelligence, September 13, 2007, www.dni.gov.

126. Discussions with senior members of the analytical community and material provided by the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

127. Wilhelm Agrell, "When Everything Is Intelligence, Nothing is Intelligence," *The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers*, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2002.

128. Stephen Marrin, "The CIA's Kent School: A Step in the Right Direction," *Intelligencer*, Vol. 11, No. 2, Winter 2000, pp. 55-57.

129. Jones, *Troubled Cultural Thing*, p. 3.

130. Paul Leavitt, "US Shortens Time for Security Clearances," *USA Today*, February 16, 2007, sec. A, p. 12.

131. John W. Chambers, ed., *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 745.

132. For a thorough discussion of the development of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac*, College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Military History Series, 2002.

133. Jim Garamone, "Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act," *Defense Link News*, July 9, 2004, p. 1.

134. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004. See also Kevin B. Smith, Kenneth Dahl, Leah Fuller-Friel, and Chuck Harrison, *Teaching Colossus to Dance: Improving the Interagency*, Cambridge, MA: National Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 16, 2004.

135. John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War World," *Grand Strategy Project Review Project*, New Haven: Yale University, June 2000.

136. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 6, 2006, pp. 86-87.

137. President George Bush, *Executive Order 13434: National Security Professional Development*, Washington, DC: The White House, May 17, 2007.

138. "Educating National Security Officers," presentation prepared by the Steering Committee in accordance with the draft "National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals," March 22, 2007, pp. 6-7.

139. Private discussion with senior members of several executive agencies, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC, July 26, 2007.

140. "White House Planning Overhaul of National Security Education," *Inside Defense*, February 22, 2007, p. 3.

141. Similar proposals are contained in *Road Map*, pp. 102-103. More recent proposals include Jennifer L. Graham, *The Problem*

of *How to Create National Security Officers (NSOs), Human Capital and Cadre Development*, Washington, DC: National War College, Spring 2005; and Kenneth R. Dahl, *New Security for New Threats: The Case for Reforming the Interagency Process*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, June 2007.

142. Alan Finder, "With Iraq War as a Backdrop, Speakers Reflect on the Future," *New York Times*, June 10, 2007, sec. 1, p. 34.

143. For a thorough analysis of this part of the problem, see Kenneth R. Dahl, *New Security for New Threats: The Case for Reforming the Interagency Process*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, June 8, 2007.

144. Commission on Post-Conflict Resolution, *Play to Win*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, January 2003, p. 3.

145. For a thorough discussion of this issue and associated recommendations, see Jennifer L. Graham, "The Problem of How to Create National Security Officers (NSOs) Human Capital and Cadre Development," Washington, DC: National War College, June 2005, p. pp. 5-6.

146. Thom Shanker, "General Opposes Adding to U.S. Forces in Iraq, Emphasizing International Solutions to the Region," *New York Times*, December 20, 2006, sec. A, p. 12.

147. See Brad Knickerbocker, "How Iraq Will Change U.S. Military Doctrine," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 2, 2004.

148. Thom Shanker and David S. Cloud, "Military Wants More Civilians to Help in Iraq," *New York Times*, February 7, 2007, sec. A, p. 1.

149. Jim Garamone, "Top Officer Addresses Bonuses, Operations," *American Forces Information Service*, May 18, 2007.

150. Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, "Learning from Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future," *Military Review*, September/October 2007, pp. 3-15.

151. Edward Luttwak, *Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, p. 137.

152. For a good discussion of developments in industry, see Daniel Goleman, "Leadership that Gets Results," *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 2000, pp. 78-90.

153. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., *Thoughts on Strategic Leadership*, August 31, 1995.