

US Army War College
USAWC Press

Monographs

9-1-2006

Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism

Williamson Murray Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs>

Recommended Citation

Murray, Williamson Dr., "Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism" (2006). *Monographs*. 26.
<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/26>

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Monographs by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

**Edited by
Williamson Murray**

September 2006

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

Visit our website for other free publication downloads

<http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>

[To rate this publication click here.](#)

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI's homepage address is: *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil*.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/*.

ISBN 1-58487-247-0

CONTENTS


Foreword	v
1. Introduction: Professional Military Education and the 21st Century <i>Dr. Williamson Murray</i>	1
2. From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Countersurgency Operations <i>Lieutenant Colonel Ken Tovo</i>	17
3. Moral Power and a Hearts-and-Minds Strategy in Post-Conflict Operations <i>Lieutenant Colonel Andrew J. Cernicky</i>	43
4. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: The Long Road toward Successful U.S. Strategy in Iraq <i>Lieutenant Colonel Bjarne M. Iverson</i>	77
5. Chinese Oil Dependence: Opportunities and Challenges <i>Commander Jim Cooney</i>	103
6. Preemption and Nuclear Nonproliferation: Conflicting Means to an End <i>Lieutenant Colonel Mark Mills</i>	123
7. NATO: Still Relevant after All These Years? <i>Colonel Gregory C. Kraak</i>	139
8. Economic and Military Impact of China's Growth in the Asia-Pacific Region <i>Lieutenant Colonel Pierre E. Massar</i>	161
9. Transformation of the 36th Infantry Division, Texas Army National Guard <i>Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Lee Henry</i>	177
10. In the Aftermath of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: European Support for the Global War on Terrorism <i>Lieutenant Colonel John J. Hickey, Jr.</i>	197

11. The Dark Fruit of Globalization: Hostile Use of the Internet <i>Lieutenant Colonel Todd A. Megill</i>	215
12. A Strategic Analysis of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade <i>Colonel James D. Shumway</i>	231
13. Strategic Recommendations for Democratic Afghanistan <i>Lieutenant Colonel Dave Gerard</i>	259
14. Al-Qa'ida as Insurgency: The Quest for Islamic Revolution <i>Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris</i>	277
About the Authors	303

FOREWORD

In March 2006, President George W. Bush signed a new National Security Strategy that he refers to as a “wartime national security strategy.” He also states in the introduction that to follow the path the United States has chosen, we must “maintain and expand our national strength.” One way to do this is to study and propose solutions to the complex challenges the United States faces in the 21st century. At the U.S. Army War College, the students have embraced this challenge and spend a year developing their intellectual strength in areas that extend well beyond the familiar operational and tactical realm to which they are accustomed.

This collection of essays written by students enrolled in the U.S. Army War College Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) reflects the development of their strategic thought applied to a wide range of contemporary issues. The ASAP is a unique program that offers selected students a rigorous course of instruction in theater strategy. Solidly based in theory, doctrine, and history, the program provides these students a wide range of experts both in and out of the military, staff rides, and exercises to develop them as superb theater strategists. ASAP graduates continue to make their mark throughout the military to include in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands.



DAVID H. HUNTOON, JR.
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND THE 21ST CENTURY

Dr. Williamson Murray

It is a distinct honor once again to have the opportunity to introduce the chapters by the students from the Army War College's Advanced Strategic Art Program. The course, founded by Major General Robert Scales, commandant at the end of the last century, has consistently proven that there are extraordinary minds within the American military officer corps, who are more than eager to grasp the challenges and difficulties to be gained in pursuing a first-class, graduate-level education on the nature of war and strategy. Considering what Americans are beginning to understand about the strategic environment they confront at present and are likely to confront for much of the rest of this century, professional military education—at least in the opinion of this author—will represent a crucial player in the adaptation of U.S. military leaders to the strategic challenges that will confront this nation.

This author finds himself writing this introduction with some considerable poignancy because he is leaving the program after 6 extraordinary years of comradeship, learning and teaching with his fellow instructors as well as each year's group of exceptional students, who have participated in the challenges of the program both in the classroom and on the battlefield tours led by Professor Len Fullenkamp, one of the great teachers of military history in America. As with previous classes, this group of students in the Advanced Strategic Art Program for Academic Year 2004-05 garnered its share of honors and prizes at the June graduation. The chapter by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Morris, U.S. Marine Corps, won the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff award for the best essay by an officer attending a senior service college. It is the concluding chapter in this volume. The second chapter by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Tovo, U.S. Army, won the Army War College's military history award. Both reflect the contributions made by this group of students.

The events of the past 5 years have underlined that the United States and its Allies in the First World confront a very different strategic environment from the relatively peaceful and calm environment that so many predicted in the aftermath of the Cold War.¹ It appears now more likely that Samuel Huntington's darker view of where the world was going that he postulated in his article in *Foreign Affairs*—"The Clash of Civilizations"—captured the possibilities that already were emerging in the early 1990s.² This author would and has argued that the future and its implications are even darker than what Professor Huntington suggested. The confluence between the world's greatest reserves of petroleum and the extraordinary difficulties that the Islamic World is having, and will continue to have, in confronting a civilization that it has taken the West 900 years to develop will create challenges that strategists are only now beginning to grasp. Those challenges will require more than military expertise at the tactical and operational levels. It will require a grasp of culture and history—not just by generals, but by junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) at the sharp end of the spear. The experiences of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq already have underlined this in spades.

It is likely that the United States confronts troubles in the Middle East that could last into the next century and beyond—troubles which will inevitably draw its military forces into what Major General Robert Scales has accurately described as cultural wars.³ Such wars are going to require quite considerable changes in how the American military prepares itself for war. Inevitably technology will play its part, but it will only serve as an enabler of U.S. forces on the ground. War will remain a political act—whatever British and Israeli academics may believe.⁴ The wars of the future, however, will necessitate an understanding of the political and strategic implications at lower levels than has been the case in the past. Even now General Chuck Krulak's strategic, "three-block" corporal is coming into his or her own.

Above all, the silver bullet hopes and dreams of those like Admiral Bill Owens, that technology could remove the uncertainty and ambiguity from the battlefield and make war, at least for U.S. military forces, a relatively clean, surgical endeavor have disappeared in the

continuing difficulties that Coalition forces have encountered in the Middle East and Central Asia.⁵ In almost every situation envisioned, boots on the ground will determine the outcome of the wars that America fights, because for most of the world's peoples, it is control of the ground that matters.⁶ Only control of the ground, not air superiority, will translate into political success—the only reason to embark on war.

This chapter will begin with an examination of the potential strategic environment that the United States confronts at present. This, in turn, will lead to a discussion of the implications that the future has for professional military education. It is the belief of this author that whatever the focus of past professional military education, the 21st century and its challenges are going to demand changes not only in how officers are educated in the formal military education system, but more importantly in how they think about education throughout their careers. Moreover, it also will require changes in how the Services themselves think about and support professional military education through their personnel policies and in the opportunities they provide their officers to broaden themselves and their perspectives throughout what will undoubtedly continue to be busy careers. It is this tension between the military needs of the present in an officer's career and his or her intellectual preparation for the future that will present the greatest difficulty in developing future personnel systems that address the 21st century.

If Michael Howard could describe the military profession as not only the most demanding physically, but also the most demanding *intellectually* of all the professions in the 20th century, this is going to be even more true in the 21st century, because of the nature of the challenges that the United States will confront. To a considerable extent, the enemies that the nation faced in the 20th century provided caricatures of serious strategic threats in their general inability to frame a coherent and effective strategic framework to address the operational, economic, and political problems raised by the United States. The Germans and Japanese threw themselves into war with America in December 1941 with little consideration of America's strengths and weaknesses, and thus lost the war strategically before it had hardly begun.⁷ During the Cold War, the Soviets presented an

obvious and consistent threat over the course of the Cold War, but in their approach to the issues raised by that long-term competition, they displayed little ability to adapt to changing conditions.⁸

The problem for the United States in the coming century is that its opponents may not prove so unimaginative and incapable of adapting to an ambiguous and uncertain world as did America's opponents in the last century. The importance of strategic wisdom in guiding national policy over the first half of the 20th century has been suggested by this author and his colleague at Ohio State, Allan Millett:

[In reference to World War II] No amount of operational virtuosity . . . redeemed fundamental flaws in political judgment. Whether policy shaped strategy or strategic imperatives drove policy was irrelevant. Miscalculations in both led to defeat, and any combination of politico-strategic error had disastrous results, even for some nations that ended the war as members of the victorious coalition. Even the effective mobilization of national will, manpower, industrial might, national wealth, and technological know-how did not save the belligerents from reaping the bitter fruits of severe mistakes [at this level]. This is because it is more important to make correct decisions at the political and strategic level than it is at the operational and tactical level. Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but political and strategic mistakes live forever.⁹

Thus, if the United States is to prosper in this new century, its civilian *and* military leaders must display strategic wisdom. And if America's educational system, particularly its universities, have not provided its civilian leaders with the background to understand the strategic choices they will confront, then senior military leaders must have the intellectual background to elucidate the complexities of all strategic choices.¹⁰ It is the problem of how that strategic framework is to be provided that this chapter will discuss in its last section on professional military education.

The Future Strategic Environment.

It is unlikely that the most important challenge to American security over the coming century will be the rise of a peer competitor.¹¹ On the other side of the Atlantic, the culture and perspectives of the

Europeans, reinforced by the inclinations of an aging population, may present annoyances to American policymakers, but as the defeat of the European Union's constitution by French voters suggests, Europeans will, at worst, represent critics, not opponents, of American policies—particularly in regards to the Middle East, but undoubtedly elsewhere as well. In other words, unlike the 20th century, this century's strategic threats to the security of the United States will not come from Europe.

In Asia, the combination of demographics and the rise of China make it likely that Japan will remain a firm friend, if not a willing participant in military interventions even beyond East Asia. The continued existence of North Korea in its current bizarre form will push the Japanese further towards cooperation and alliance with the United States. And it is even possible that some considerable buildup of Japan's military forces will occur, which will ease some of the pressure on America's overstretched military forces.

In South Asia, India clearly is emerging as a great power with considerable clout. Its military, moreover, will dominate its regional neighbors in the area of the Indian Ocean. Connections based on the culture of democracy and the English language, as well as the absence of any major areas of competition, suggests that India will become an increasingly strong friend of the United States.¹² Just as with the case of Japan, India would move toward an even closer relationship with the United States if China were to become a threat to the balance in South Asia, India's position in the area, or the Middle East.

In terms of a possible peer competitor, the one great question on the horizon is China. What kind of China emerges from the economic explosion occurring at present on the Asian mainland will depend on how effective the diplomatic, economic, and social policies of the United States and its Asian allies are in persuading China's leaders that they have more to gain from cooperation than confrontation. The difficulty that confronts American policymakers is that it is impossible to predict the eventual impact of China's continuing economic expansion on that nation's leaders or how the growing tensions within China over the mal-distribution of wealth between the various regions will impact on that nation's political and strategic stability in coming decades. Despite the continuing rhetoric about

Taiwan, China's expenditures on its military forces have remained relatively limited. They certainly have not suggested a major buildup aimed at directly challenging the United States outside of China's immediate geographical interests.

Undoubtedly, American strategists, political leaders, and the military need to pay close attention to developments in China. The fact that the People's Liberation Army has more officers in American graduate schools than does the U.S. military suggests the extent to which the Chinese are paying attention to the United States. The number of American officers engaged in studying China or Chinese in graduate schools in the *United States*, on the other hand, is relatively small, while the number engaged in study on the Chinese mainland is almost nonexistent.¹³ This would appear to be a glaring intellectual weakness in preparing America's future military leaders to understand what may well be the most powerful nation in the world in economic and political terms by the end of the 21st century. Moreover, this state of affairs is, of course, reflective of the failure of education at all levels to push students to learn foreign languages, particularly the difficult ones.

Nevertheless, at worst even a hostile China would represent a return to the Cold War standoff between two great nuclear superpowers – a contest that would, for the most part, resemble the operational and strategic issues with which the American military has had long familiarity. In the largest sense, American strategy should aim at discouraging China from following the disastrous path that Imperial Germany pursued at the beginning of the 20th century. The United States can accomplish such an aim largely by political, economic, and diplomatic engagement, although there will be times where deterrence may be necessary.

The greatest challenge for both the First World and the United States – and for that matter China as well – in the 21st century will be that of an unstable and tumultuous Middle East, where the political ramifications of U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq are just being felt. Because oil will continue as the major engine of the First World, the Middle East will maintain its economic and political significance throughout the remainder of the century.¹⁴ Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, history has demanded that the Islamic World,

particularly its Arab lands, adapt to a world of globalization based on political and scientific developments that took the west over nine centuries to create – and that adaptation only began in the 1920s.

It is likely that those difficult processes of economic and political adaptation will continue well into the next century. The United Nations (UN) report of Summer 2004 suggested how little progress has been made over the course of the last century in tying the Arab polities to the dizzying pace of change in the rest of the world. For example, on average only 300 books are translated into Arabic each year; yet by comparison, the number translated into Spanish each year approaches 30,000. Part of the problem is that Americans have little understanding of how great a challenge their approach presents to an Islamic world. Without an understanding of the elements and history that have contributed to the making of their own polity, Americans have little hope of understanding the nature of other cultures and civilization.¹⁵

If that were not difficult enough, the Islamic World possesses deep tribal, religious, and political divisions. Imans, ideological modernizers such as the Ba'ath, tribes – with conflicts reaching back centuries – Sunni fanatics, Shi'a revolutionaries, and the Druze all contest for significant roles in the Arab world. None possess a coherent or consistent understanding of the factors that have influenced the decline of Islam's position in the world and the rise of the West. And without any real understanding of their own societies' ills, none possess the vision or knowledge required to execute the radical social, political, and intellectual changes required for their societies to adapt to the 21st century.

In the largest sense, the whole Middle East already is confronting burgeoning populations of young males, a dangerous recipe for both revolution and war.¹⁶ This unstable brew of contesting groups with rootless young males, many of even the best educated influenced by a ferocious and fanatic religion that reinforces their misreading of history and the nature of the world they live in, will not only impact on the Middle East in unpredictable ways, but will spill over into the external worlds that surround them. Again, the consequences are difficult to predict, but the auguries suggest extensive revolution, turmoil, and war throughout much of the Middle East.

The implications for the American military are clear: Military leaders in coming decades will require a far deeper understanding of the Islamic World and the Middle East than has been the case so far in Afghanistan and Iraq. This demand for understanding is complicated, given what has been happening in American schools and universities where politically correct courses, particularly in history, have replaced the serious examination of war, strategy, diplomacy, and politics. Thus, it is likely that America's political leaders increasingly may lack knowledge of the external world—a gap in their knowledge that military leaders must at least be in a position to fill in providing advice to the nation's leaders.¹⁷

These internal conflicts and the challenges of adapting will all help continue the political turmoil within the Middle East—most of which will be unpredictable and difficult to assess as to its possible impact on American interests. As Michael Vlahos has suggested, the First World will be able to exercise only partial and incomplete influence over the endemic civil wars within the Arab and Islamic worlds. Nevertheless, there will be times when intervention—military and otherwise—will be required, particularly where and when the world's greatest reserves of oil are threaten. Americans should have no illusions about how much influence they will be able to exercise over the radical changes which will inevitably take place in this part of the world. But not to include an understanding of the culture, language, and history of the Middle East in molding future military leaders is not only irresponsible—it represents a recipe for difficulties on a far greater scale than has presently proven to be the case in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The unfortunate reality is that turmoil within the Middle East will not only have considerable impact on the world's supply of oil, but it will continue to spill out into the First World. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon represent only the first installment of future troubles that will spill outside the Middle East. Like the period after September 11, 2001 (9/11), such spillovers will require, in most cases, a military response. As American experiences with the Taliban in Afghanistan underlined, there is no place in the world where the intervention of U.S. military power may not be necessary. Thus, the reasons for future American interventions in the region will be considerable, both because of the importance

of petroleum and because what happens in places like Somalia and Afghanistan could have impact on the world of the United States and its Allies, should regimes like the Taliban arise in the future. Failure to respond, as the United States did in the late 1990s, will have the most dangerous consequences, as the events of 9/11 underlined. In effect, the wars and operations in which the U.S. military will find itself involved will be “the cultural wars,” which Major General Robert Scales, U.S. Army (ret.) has aptly characterized.¹⁸

What the U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has underlined is that simple military intervention – pure military operations – will represent only the first step. Because for the past 350 years the west has fought wars *only* for political purposes, future conflicts inevitably will demand a closer tie to long-term political goals than has been the case in military thinking and preparation over the past several decades.¹⁹ It is well to remember that during World War II, the Anglo-American powers prepared extensively for the post-conflict phases in both Europe and the Pacific. In effect, the success of long-term post-conflict policies developed during the war and put in place over the period from the end of the war to the mid-1950s sealed the victory that their military forces had achieved from 1939 to 1945.

As the 2004 Defense Science Board Summer Study underlined, future interventions, particularly in the Middle East, will require careful articulation and planning for long-term efforts to establish more effective governance. Not to do so will be to throw the achievements of conventional victory away. Moreover, flawed stabilization operations similar to what has occurred in Iraq risk trying the patience of the American people to the point that they become unwilling to support any interventions, no matter how important and strategically worthwhile they may appear to policymakers. In this regard, the post-Vietnam trauma suffered by U.S. foreign and strategic policies throughout the 1970s is well worth remembering.

Thus, most of the wars and military interventions of the 21st century will be cultural conflicts, in which knowledge of the other and his cultural and religious drives will represent the essential element in the success or failure of American efforts. The kinds of conflicts and interventions that American armed forces will confront, will require even better trained and educated leaders at the junior officer and NCO levels.

The military leaders of U.S. forces will have to understand not only their own cultural framework, but that of others. They will have to be familiar and at ease with people who have very different attitudes and come from very different cultures. Above all, they will have to have the ability to develop a sixth sense – what the Germans call *Fingerspitzengefühl* – as to when things are right on the street and when they are wrong. They will have to entrust and empower their subordinates to make decisions in a world of uncertainty and ambiguity. Technology will be a major enabler, but it cannot, and will not, replace the crucial importance of the ability of Soldiers and Marines to make decisions based on a deep understanding and knowledge of local conditions. How, then, might the U.S. military think about professional military education in what is the most likely environment to confront military leaders over the course of the coming century?

The Implications for Professional Military Education.

In the early 1970s, then Rear Admiral Stansfield Turner carried out a radical restructuring of the Naval War College – a restructuring which placed serious, graduate level education at the forefront of that institution’s approach to professional military education. A quote that he provided this author in the mid-1980s encapsulates what Turner thought serious professional military education should involve in addressing the challenges of the Cold War:

War colleges are places to *educate* the senior officer corps in the larger military and strategic issues that confront America in the late 20th century. They should educate these officers by a demanding intellectual curriculum to think in wider terms than their busy operational careers have thus far demanded. Above all the war colleges should broaden the intellectual and military horizons of the officers who attend, so that they have a conception of the larger strategic and operational issues that confront our military and our nation.²⁰

Admiral Turner’s vision captures the fundamental issue involved in professional military education, except that now his premise about widening the vision and understanding of officers must extend to junior officers and NCOs as well. In the 21st century, it will not be enough for military leaders to remain superbly proficient

in their military skills. Admittedly, the latter must remain a critical determinant of promotion and selection for command positions. But future generals and admirals also must demonstrate knowledge and proficiency in areas beyond their warfighting specialties. In many ways, America's future military leaders are going to have to resemble the proconsuls of the Roman Empire, who were extraordinary in their ability to conduct campaigns, but who were also highly skilled diplomats and representatives of the Empire. Already America's combatant commanders are finding that, in some circumstances, they have to act not only as diplomats, but as governors as well.

How, then, will they be able to gain the political skills and savvy that they will require? In the end, only education in the widest sense can provide such skills. And here a fundamental rethinking and reform of the professional military educational system is necessary. Perhaps the crucial enabler to a reform of professional military education must be a larger reform of the personnel systems that govern so much of the current approach to the wider aspects of professional military education. It is significant that the officers before World War II enjoyed considerable latitude to pursue wider aspects of their careers. George Patton spent a substantial part of 1913 visiting the battlefields of Europe, including Normandy.

The current legal framework that emphasizes up-or-out was set in place in the late 1940s to address a particular set of problems applicable to that time and not ours. First, the 1947 reform of the personnel system aimed at preventing the stagnation of promotion that had characterized the interwar period, where seniority was the determining factor. Second, the health profiles of the majority of the officers in 1947—most of whom smoked and drank heavily—was such that a system that encouraged retirement between the ages of 40 and 45 made enormous sense. Finally, confronted with the Soviet threat, the system aimed at keeping the maximum number of officers on active duty, so that the United States could mobilize its military and economic potential as rapidly as possible.

The most obvious impact on the American military today is that each year the Services retire a number of exceptionally qualified officers at the O-5 and O-6 level. No business in the current era would possess a retirement system that actively encouraged many of its best people to retire well before they reached 50. The results

in terms of thinking about professional education are profound. Considering the complex requirements that any officer must master in his or her career, a 20-year career provides little flexibility or give. The present career paths rarely allow young officers the opportunity to gain wider perspectives beyond the immediate demands of their jobs. If the U.S. military is to develop a more flexible and adaptable officer corps,²¹ it is going to have to figure how to provide more time for serious study of languages, foreign cultures, and, above all, history. That can only come by stretching out the careers of officers well beyond the present pattern of 20 to 25-years.

In terms of thinking about wider education, one must understand that professional military education has been the step child of Service and Joint efforts to prepare senior military leaders for the positions of commanders and senior staff positions since World War II. There is some irony in this state of affairs, because professional military education played a *major* role the success of American military efforts in that conflict. Admittedly, there are some bright spots – such as the second-year programs at the Army, Marine, and Air Force staff colleges, the Naval War College, and the Advanced Strategic Art Program at the Army War College – where serious intellectual preparation of officers to address the operational and strategic issues confronting the United States and its military is occurring.

The problem today is even more direct and challenging than that which confronted the United States in the 1980s when Admiral Turner penned the above quotation to this author. Today, the United States confronts the cultural wars of coming decades, rather than the monolithic and inflexible Soviet Union. The nature of that security challenge demands a more intellectually demanding education of officers – a system of professional military education that should start at the beginning of an officer's career.

In the 1970s, the Army made a considerable effort to provide graduate educational opportunities as an incentive for its brightest officers to remain in the military. Such opportunities have slowly, but steadily decreased over the intervening decade. Greater flexibility in officer careers in terms of a reform of the personnel systems would allow the Services to broaden the horizons of their officers by providing them the educational background on which to build an historical and cultural perspective on other nations and people.

What the challenges of the 21st century demand are more thoroughly educated, culturally attuned officers *in command positions*. In some areas, the Department of Defense is making a start in the right direction with its demand the graduates of the military academies and those on ROTC scholarship attain higher levels of proficiency in foreign languages. Nevertheless, this represents only a first step. DoD and the Services need to reform the personnel systems so that fast track officers have the opportunity—like the current combatant commander of Central Command—to attend the most prestigious graduate schools in the world to obtain masters degrees and doctorates in subjects like military history, area studies, languages, and cultural studies.

Perhaps the most important step in improving the ability of future leaders to understand the broader issues lies in the provision of greater exposure to other cultures and other nations early in their careers. Additional opportunities for advisory tours, exchange tours, and foreign study, all would serve to provide future leaders with the skills to recognize the cultural gulfs and historical frameworks that they and their subordinates are confronting. None of this will be easy, and it will most probably demand a rethinking of the military career with an emphasis on more officers serving 30 years than is currently the case.

The DoD and Services also are going to have to think of professional military education as an integral part of an officer's career, as an enabler which begins when future officers are still in college and continues throughout every year of their career until they leave the military. There must be a distinct break with the traditional belief that professional military education only occurs at the staff and war colleges. If this is to occur, there needs to be a real emphasis on distance learning, on mentoring at all levels, and on reading lists dealing with military and cultural history that *all* officers are expected to master. Most revolutionary of all is the need for serious testing and evaluation for entrance to staff and war colleges to identify those officers who have seriously prepared themselves to meet the intellectual challenges warfare in the 21st century will demand of them.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. In this regard, see particularly Francis Fukiyama's book, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, 1993.

2. For the book length form of Professor Huntington's arguments, see Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, 1992.

3. See Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., *The Iraq War, A Military History*, Cambridge, 2003.

4. In this regard, see John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, New York, 1994; and Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, New York, 1991. For a reply to Keegan's astonishingly ahistorical attack on Clausewitz, see, among others, Colin Gray, "Clausewitz," in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, *The Importance of History for the Military Profession*, Cambridge, 2006. See also Barry D. Watts, *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War*, Washington, DC, 2002.

5. Admiral Bill Owens with Ed Offley, *Lifting the Fog of War*, New York, 2001.

6. The Iraqi Perspectives Project, in which this author has been identified, indicates that Coalition air attacks had virtually no impact on the thinking and policies of Saddam and his henchman, except to convince them that the United States and its Allies were not serious.

7. For a discussion of German strategy in the Second World War, see Williamson Murray, *German Military Effectiveness*, Baltimore, MD, 1992, chap. 1.

8. For the Cold War, see especially John Lewis Gaddis, *Now We Know, Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford, 1998.

9. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, "Lessons of War," *The National Interest*, Winter 1988.

10. The collapse of serious education in the humanities in major universities has made the situation with regards to diplomatic, military, and strategic history even worse. Virtually none of America's major universities, from which America's future political leaders will emerge, teach any courses in this area. And with the retirement of the major figures in this field, like James McPherson of Princeton, the situation will only get worse.

11. For another historian's view on the nature of the future strategic environment, see particularly MacGregor Knox.

12. India has more English language speakers than any other country in the world—including the United States.

13. I am indebted to Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., U.S. Army (retired), for this point.

14. The Chinese may well look to Central Asia in the long term rather than the Middle East for their supplies of petroleum, but there, too, as well as in their

Western provinces, they will run into the specter of Islamic terrorism and guerrilla movements.

15. How little even the brightest American students know of themselves and their history has been brought home graphically to this author by an honors course he teaches to junior and senior students of John Hopkins University. Of all 12 students, all selected with at least a 3.5 average, not a single one could name a battle in the Civil War other than Gettysburg or Antietam. Five years ago, 23 out of 23 students in a graduate course at George Washington had never read a Greek tragedy.

16. One of the clear drivers in revolution and war throughout history has been the existence of a young population of males.

17. As General Eric Shinseki discovered in 2003, sage strategic advice will not necessarily be taken by politicians with ideological blinders on, but at least the advice was tendered.

18. The author is indebted to Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., U.S. Army (retired), for this insight.

19. For a clear general examination of the history of war, particularly in the West, see Geoffrey Parker, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

20. Admiral Stansfield Turner, quoted in Williamson Murray, "Grading the War Colleges," *The National Interest*, Winter 1986/1987.

21. A number of blue-ribbon panels in Washington, especially the National Defense Panel in the late 1990s, have underlined that the Department will need more flexible and adaptable officers in the coming century.

CHAPTER 2

FROM THE ASHES OF THE PHOENIX: LESSONS FOR CONTEMPORARY COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel Ken Tovo

The Vietnam War was the most controversial conflict in America's history; it wreaked havoc on civil society, colored a generation's perception of its government, and devastated the American military, particularly the Army. Its specter continues to cast a shadow over every American political debate about the use of force abroad. As the first defeat in the military history of the United States, most soldiers would prefer to forget it completely; when studied at all, they usually do so in a negative sense—what to avoid, how not to operate. After the war, disgusted with the inherently messy nature of counterinsurgency, the Army turned its attention to the kind of wars it prefers to fight—conventional, symmetric conflict.¹

While a number of civilian scholars examined the war, the Army focused on how to defeat the Soviets on the plains of Europe.² While academic historians often deride the military for trying to refight the last war, in this instance no one can accuse the Army of that sin. Through its doctrine, scenarios at its officer education system and national training centers, and almost every other aspect of force development, the Army has remained singularly focused on fighting a conventional conflict. The result has been spectacular performance in both conventional wars with Iraq. Today, however, the Army finds itself once again in the middle of a major counterinsurgency effort—this time on a global scale against the insurgent threat of militant Islamic fundamentalism. The current counterinsurgency involves major combat operations, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, major advisory and training missions such as the Philippines, Georgia, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa, and numerous smaller missions around the world.

Unfortunately, such is the baggage still attending the Vietnam War nearly 3 decades after Saigon's fall, that senior military and

political leaders only speak the word “Vietnam” in sentences along the lines of “Iraq is not another Vietnam . . .” Yet the Vietnam conflict constitutes the longest and most intensive counterinsurgency effort in American history. For nearly 2 decades, the United States provided a spectrum of security assistance to South Vietnam in its battle against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese sponsors. The best and brightest civilian and military minds in the government developed strategies and concepts to defeat the communist insurgency in Southeast Asia as part of an overall strategy of containment. Today, the United States contends with a similar challenge. It faces active insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, both being fought within the context of a world-wide insurgency led by militant Islamic fundamentalists. As the United States seeks ways to defeat these new insurgencies, it is extraordinarily imprudent to ignore the lessons from the counterinsurgency efforts of the Vietnam War.

This chapter examines one major aspect of that conflict, the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure, the Phoenix Program. It will provide the historical context and an overview of the Phoenix Program, describe the contemporary insurgency threat, and analyze strategic lessons for application in contemporary counterinsurgency operations.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The strategic rationale for America’s involvement in Vietnam remains the subject of significant debate. However, even those who argue the war represented a necessary element of national strategy agree that South Vietnam was not a vital American interest in and of itself; its importance lay as a symbol of American commitment and will.³

U.S. involvement in Vietnam spanned more than 2 decades, from support for France’s attempts to reinstate its colonial government in the aftermath of World War II, through an advisory period that began in the late 1950s, to the introduction of conventional forces in 1965, “Vietnamization” beginning in 1968, withdrawal of conventional U.S. military forces in 1973, and the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975.⁴ When the U.S. military implemented the Phoenix Program in 1967, 12 years already had passed from the first official American

military death in the war.⁵ After years of providing military advisors and equipment to the South Vietnamese government, the United States introduced major American ground forces in early 1965 to prevent the imminent collapse of South Vietnam.⁶ By 1967, 2 years of conventional force operations and the commitment of nearly 450,000 U.S. troops had prevented a collapse, but had failed to defeat the insurgency.⁷

As early as 1966, President Lyndon Johnson met with senior U.S. and South Vietnamese civilian and military officials in Honolulu to discuss placing an increased emphasis on winning the political war in South Vietnam, since it seemed unlikely that conventional military operations alone could produce victory.⁸ In the President's view, "the other war," the war for the support of the South Vietnamese population, was as important as the military struggle with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force units.⁹ While the civilian agencies and some military units had put considerable effort into pacification and development programs, such efforts remained largely uncoordinated and ineffective.

An initial attempt to unify the civilian effort in Vietnam under the Office of Civil Operations began in November 1966. Headed by a deputy ambassador, it was a short-lived failure. Consequently, in May 1967, President Johnson decided to unify all military and civilian pacification operations under an organization called Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, a component of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).¹⁰

OVERVIEW OF THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

MACV Directive 381-41, July 9, 1967, officially inaugurated the "Phoenix Program" as the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for Attack on Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), with the short title of "ICEX."¹¹ By late 1967, MACV had replaced the innocuous name ICEX with the codeword "Phoenix," a translation of the South Vietnamese, "Phung Hoang."¹² Phoenix did not initiate the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure; instead, it centralized existing efforts and raised the level of attacks on the Viet Cong infrastructure to the mission of destroying the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong guerrilla forces. Phoenix embodied an understanding that an insurgency

principally represents a political struggle for primacy between competing political ideas. The insurgency first seeks legitimacy, and then supremacy for its political agenda in both the eyes of the populace and the outside world, while the counterinsurgency effort struggles to deny such legitimacy.

An assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) published in early 1969 aptly summarized the dynamic:

The struggle in Vietnam is in essence a struggle for political domination . . . The primary issue is control over people, not territory. Armed force . . . has long played a key role in the prosecution of this struggle; but our adversaries have seldom employed armed force, of any kind, for the classical military purpose of seizing and holding demarcatable plots of terrain . . . [O]ur adversaries have generally employed armed force . . . primarily as a political abrasive intended to cow the population into submission, collapse all political structures (from the local to the national level) they do not control, and erode the appetite for struggle of all who oppose [their] drive for political control . . . [T]he ultimate measure of success or failure will not be relative casualties inflicted, battles won or lost or even territory enterable with impunity but—instead—whose political writ runs (for whatever reason) over the population of South Vietnam.¹³

To pursue their struggle for political supremacy, the North Vietnamese had established a unconventional warfare force within South Vietnam. The nucleus of this force was a clandestine element of 3,000 political and 5,000 armed military cadre, who had remained in the south after the July 1954 Geneva settlement.¹⁴ The intent of these agents was to mobilize support for Ho Chi Minh and the Communists in the elections that were to occur in accordance with the Geneva Accords. Once it was clear that the South Vietnamese would not hold such elections, the North Vietnamese communists used this infrastructure to conduct an unconventional war against the Diem government.¹⁵

The Viet Cong insurgency, instituted, directed, and supported by the North Vietnamese, had two major components. The first consisted of armed Viet Cong guerrillas, augmented by soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), who had infiltrated into South Vietnam. The guerrillas and NVA units were the main focus of American counterinsurgency efforts, initially conducted by the

South Vietnamese and their U.S. advisors, and later by American military forces after the introduction of conventional units in 1965.

The second component included Viet Cong personnel and organizations which performed support roles, such as recruiting, political indoctrination, propaganda and psychological operations, intelligence collection, and logistical support. American intelligence labeled the latter component as the Viet Cong infrastructure. The CIA assumed initial responsibility for attacking this component of the insurgency for a variety of reasons. First, anti-infrastructure operations were a logical adjunct to the State Department's pacification and civil support programs. As a CIA report noted:

In addition to the "positive" task of providing the rural population with security and tangible benefits sufficient to induce it to identify its fortunes with those of the GVN [Government of Viet Nam], the pacification program also involves the "negative" task of identifying and eradicating the Communist politico-military control apparatus known as the Viet Cong Infrastructure (or VCI).¹⁶

Second, the targeted personnel in the infrastructure were primarily civilians; consequently, as noted in MACV Directive 381-41, "[t]he elimination of the VCI is fundamentally a Vietnamese responsibility employing essentially police type techniques and special resources."¹⁷

Consequently, the primary South Vietnamese organizations to prosecute operations against the infrastructure were intelligence organizations, the police, and paramilitary organizations such as the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation, the District and Provincial Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers, the Special Police, the Field Police, and the Provincial Reconnaissance Units. The CIA largely was responsible for the creation of such units and organizations.¹⁸ To some extent, the task fell to the CIA by default. Key CIA leaders recognized the importance of fighting the political component of the enemy's organization. Unfortunately, senior military leaders, particularly during General William Westmoreland's tenure as MACV Commander, considered the Viet Cong infrastructure a peripheral issue.¹⁹

First initiated in July 1967, Phoenix aimed at providing U.S. advisory assistance to ongoing operations that targeted the enemy's

infrastructure at the corps, province, and district levels.²⁰ It became a more coordinated effort when the South Vietnamese created the Phung Hoang program in December, 1967. But it took the Tet and May Offensives in 1968 to highlight the critical role of the infrastructure in facilitating the enemy's main force operations.²¹ As a result, South Vietnam's president issued a decree in July 1968 which committed the South Vietnamese to establishment of structures at every level of government to coordinate operations against the enemy's civil infrastructure.²²

The Phoenix Program established committees and coordination centers at the national, corps, province, and district levels. In addition, it directed the participation of key representatives from civil government, police, security services, and military organizations operating in the area.²³ At province level and above, these committees served largely to provide guidance and policy direction.²⁴ They also established quotas at the province and district levels for efforts to destroy the enemy's infrastructure.²⁵ The national level Phoenix committee established evidentiary rules and judicial procedures, specified categories and priorities of a variety of targets, and defined incarceration periods tied to target category.²⁶

At province and district level, Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCC/DIOCC) served as the foci of intelligence fusion on reports and operational planning to execute operations against the Viet Cong infrastructure.²⁷ The centers provided a mechanism to consolidate information from the numerous organizations operating on the battlefield, deconflict intelligence collection activities, and plan and coordinate anti-infrastructure operations. The United States primarily provided military advisors in the Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers. Advisory staffs at higher levels tended to have greater interagency representation. At the province level, the U.S. advisor received the tasking to:

. . . form and chair a Province PHOENIX Committee composed of all principal members of the U.S. official community capable of contributing effectively to the attack on the VCI [Viet Cong infrastructure] . . . [and] work in close conjunction with the counterpart GVN coordinating committee to bring together an effective GVN/U.S. team to optimize intelligence support and coordination of the dual effort against VC armed units and the VCI.²⁸

At the District level, which was the primary operational planning and execution element, the U.S. advisor was responsible for:

- providing timely military intelligence support to tactical units and security forces.
- achieving rapid, first-level collation, evaluation, and dissemination of VCI intelligence.
- generating police, military, or special exploitation operations to disrupt, harass, capture, eliminate, or neutralize [the] local VCI.²⁹

The understanding that the principal objective was to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the population led inevitably to the realization that large-scale combat operations were counterproductive to pacification goals.³⁰ According to MACV Directive 381-41, the intent of Phoenix was to attack the enemy's infrastructure with a "'rifle shot' rather than a shotgun approach to the central target—key political leaders, command/control elements and activists in the VCI."³¹ Heavy-handed operations, such as random cordon and searches, large-scale and lengthy detentions of innocent civilians, and excessive use of firepower had a negative effect on the civilian population. Government forces often appeared inept and unable to meet the security and stability needs of the people—in other words, they were, on occasion, the main threat to these goals. Unfocused, large-scale operations usually failed to kill or destroy the infrastructure, which controlled large sections of the population or critical support functions; rather, they were more likely to net easily replaceable guerrilla fighters. The Phoenix approach also acknowledged that capturing the enemy's political operatives was more important than killing them.³² The prime source of information to identify and locate future targets was the capture of current enemy operatives and leaders. Focused, police-like operations were much more likely to achieve this end than large-scale military ones.

Over time, the Phoenix program generated negative press coverage, accusations that it was a U.S. Government sponsored assassination program, and eventually a series of Congressional hearings. Consequently, MACV issued a directive that reiterated that it had based the anti-infrastructure campaign on South Vietnamese

law, that the program was in compliance with the laws of land warfare, and that U.S. personnel had the responsibility to report breaches of the law.³³ That directive described Phoenix operational activities as:

Operations to be conducted against the VCI [Viet Cong infrastructure] by the National Police and other assigned agencies of the GVN [Government of Viet Nam] include: the collection of intelligence identifying these members; inducing them to abandon their allegiance to the VC and rally to the government; capturing or arresting them in order to bring them before province security committees or military courts for lawful sentencing; and as a final resort, the use of reasonable force should they resist capture or arrest where failure to use such force would result in the escape of the suspected VCI member or would result in threat of serious bodily harm to a member or members of the capturing or arresting party.³⁴

Clearly, the intent of these operations was not indiscriminate killing and assassination; unfortunately, decentralized operations in an uncertain, ambiguous environment did lead to abuses.³⁵

Officially, Phoenix operations continued until December 1972, although certain aspects continued until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.³⁶ Like the Vietnam War that spawned it, the Phoenix Program was, and continues to be, a subject of controversy. To some, it was a U.S. Government-sponsored assassination program, carried out against innocents, and symbolic of the moral bankruptcy of the entire war.³⁷ For others, it was a benign coordination mechanism that offered “the best hope for victory” in the Vietnam War.³⁸ Like any controversial issue, the truth probably lies in between. Regardless, Phoenix was the largest and most systematic effort by the U.S. Government to destroy the insurgency’s political and support infrastructure—a critical element in a counterinsurgency campaign. Ultimately, the entire counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam was a failure for a variety of reasons; one critical factor was that the Viet Cong had established a large and effective support cadre throughout South Vietnam before the South Vietnamese and the Americans undertook a serious, coordinated effort to eradicate it.³⁹ While indications are that Phoenix achieved considerable success in damaging that infrastructure, it was too little and too late to change the war’s overall course.⁴⁰

TODAY'S INSURGENT THREAT

Vietnam was a classic example of a mass-oriented insurgency as defined in U.S. Army doctrine.⁴¹ The Viet Cong sought to discredit the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government in the eyes of the population through a protracted campaign of violence, while developing and offering its own parallel political structure as a viable alternative to the “illegitimate” government.⁴² The “battlefield” in a mass-oriented insurgency is the population—both the government and the insurgents fight for the support of the people.

As one author has suggested, both sides in this type of conflict have two tools in the struggle for control and support of the populace: “. . . popular perceptions of legitimacy and a credible power to coerce.”⁴³ He goes on to note that the target of coercion, the populace, defines the threat’s credibility, not the employer of the threat.⁴⁴ Consequently, conventional military power does not equate necessarily to credible coercive power. The conventional force may possess state of the art weaponry and overwhelming destructive power. Nevertheless, if the populace believes this conventional power will not, or cannot, be used against them, it has limited coercive value—particularly if the insurgent has demonstrated the ability to locate and punish noncompliant members of the populace and reward supporters.

Field Manual (FM) 3-05.201 states that mass-oriented “[i]nsurgents have a well-developed ideology and choose their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and guerrilla action.”⁴⁵ The militant Islamic movement, present throughout the Middle East and in many parts of Africa and Asia, is a mass-oriented insurgency that seeks to supplant existing regimes with its own religious-based political ideology. As espoused by al-Qa’ida, its ideology seeks reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate, removal of secular or “apostate” regimes, and removal of Western influence from the region.⁴⁶

The militant Islamic insurgency is inchoate; while nearly global in nature, it does not yet appear to be truly unified in a single insurgent movement, despite al-Qa’ida’s attempts to serve as a coalescing force. Rather, the current insurgency appears to be a loosely coordinated effort of multiple groups with nearly coincident goals and objectives,

who have not yet joined into a single unified front. Consequently, jihadist groups like Zarqawi's in Iraq may not respond directly to instructions from the al-Qa'ida leadership, but they share similar anti-Western, fundamentalist Islamic goals, and are likely receiving support from the same population base. Additionally, the level of development of the various Islamic insurgent movements varies from group to group, region to region.

Army doctrine establishes three general phases of development for an insurgent movement. It acknowledges that not every insurgency passes through each phase, and that success is not contingent upon linear progression through the three phases. In Phase I, the latent or incipient phase, the insurgent movement focuses on recruiting, organizing, and training key membership, as well as establishing inroads into legitimate organizations to facilitate support of its objectives. It establishes the clandestine cellular support structure that facilitates intelligence collection and operational actions, and infiltrates its supporters into critical positions within governmental and civilian organizations.⁴⁷ The insurgency normally avoids all but selected and limited violence during this phase in order to avoid provoking effective regime counterinsurgent operations before the insurgency can respond.⁴⁸

Once the insurgency has established its support infrastructure, it violently challenges the government. In Phase II, guerrilla warfare, the insurgent movement takes active measures to challenge the regime's legitimacy. This can include attacks, assassinations, sabotage, or subversive activities (such as information operations) to challenge governmental legitimacy.⁴⁹ In a rural-based insurgency, the insurgents often are able to establish relatively secure base camps to operate from, such as the Viet Cong did. In an urban-based insurgency, the members rely on the anonymity of urban areas to conceal their presence within the population.

In Phase III, mobile warfare or the war of movement, guerrilla forces transition to conventional warfare and directly confront government security forces. If properly timed, the government has been weakened sufficiently to succumb to assault by insurgent forces. This phase takes on the character of a civil war, in which the insurgents may control and administer significant portions of terrain by force of arms.⁵⁰

Due to its widespread nature, assessment of the developmental progress of the Islamic insurgency is dynamic and regionally dependent. For example, in Iraq, the Islamic insurgency (in loose coordination with other nationalist-based insurgent elements) is largely in Phase II, the conduct of active guerrilla warfare. In Saudi Arabia, recent attacks suggest the insurgency is transitioning from Phase I to Phase II. In Egypt, government control has kept the insurgency in Phase I, with Islamic dissident groups conducting propaganda operations, but rarely able to use violence. Based on the global nature of attacks initiated by militant Islamic organizations, the insurgency has already spent significant time and effort in Phase I; as a result it has developed insurgent infrastructure capable of supporting operations in selected locations throughout the world.

As in the early years of the Viet Cong insurgency, the violent component of the Islamic insurgency captures the majority of current attention, and has been the focus of regime counterinsurgency operations.⁵¹ Spectacular attacks such as September 11, 2001 (9/11), the embassy bombings in Africa, the attack on the *USS Cole*, and the Madrid subway bombings, or the now-routine daily guerrilla warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan focus attention on the paramilitary element of the insurgency. Yet, as with the Viet Cong, the armed Islamic elements cannot survive without a support infrastructure. In fact, many of the attacks are suicide operations. The perpetrators are expendable foot soldiers. Investigation of the high profile attacks indicates the presence of a widespread support network for intelligence collection, material support, finance, and movement of insurgents.⁵² However, these “direct support” cells represent only one component of the overall militant Islamic infrastructure.

The militant Islamic infrastructure also has a “general support” component. It includes religious/political infrastructure consisting of Islamic scholars and mullahs who “justify” violent actions by their interpretation of the Koran and Islamic law, and use the pulpit to recruit, solicit funds, and propagate the insurgency’s information campaign themes.⁵³ This component is critical to providing the insurgents with the stamp of religious legitimacy. Recently, the lead Islamic insurgent in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, issued an audiotape, castigating religious leaders for flagging allegiance to the

insurgents, thus underlining how seriously the insurgents view the importance of such support.⁵⁴

The general support component of the militant Islamic infrastructure also includes Islamic nongovernmental organizations that solicit money on behalf of al-Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations, as well as funding fundamentalist madrassas and mosques throughout the world. Such religious institutions serve as recruiting centers and platforms to spread their propaganda messages. This component also includes media organizations and web sites that provide fora for the insurgents' psychological operations and assist in the furtherance of their information campaign objectives.⁵⁵ The infrastructure directs, supports, and sustains the execution of violence against the regime and Western enemies; it constitutes the insurgency's center of gravity.

There are several disincentives to attacking this source of power; however, it must be neutralized to defeat the insurgency. The infrastructure component frequently is harder to find than the armed elements and is less susceptible to normal U.S. technology-focused intelligence collection methods. Rules of engagement are less clear-cut, as the targets frequently are noncombatants in the sense that they do not personally wield the tools of violence. Consequently, the risk of negative media attention and adverse public reaction is high. Moreover, infrastructure targets are likely to fall into interagency "seams." While armed elements in Iraq or Afghanistan clearly are a military responsibility, responsibility for infrastructure targets, particularly those outside a designated combat zone, can cut across multiple agency or departmental boundaries. Despite these obstacles, attacking the infrastructure represents a critical component of overall counterinsurgency efforts to defeat the militant Islamic insurgency. Consequently, lessons drawn from the Phoenix Program can offer important guidelines.

CONTEMPORARY INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACK

Five years of operational experience against the Viet Cong infrastructure yielded significant lessons at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The focus of the remainder of this chapter is on those strategic lessons most relevant to an attack against the militant

Islamic infrastructure. One can classify those lessons into three major categories: command and control, operations, and legal/ethical issues.

Command and Control.

Identification of Objectives. The most basic function of command is to define objectives for the organization. During the Vietnam War, the belated identification of the infrastructure as a center of gravity allowed the Viet Cong an insurmountable time advantage. For the current struggle, this has two implications. First, and foremost, U.S. strategic leadership must acknowledge the nature of the war which it confronts. A militant Islamic insurgency, not “terrorism,” is the enemy.⁵⁶ Second, the United States must wage a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign that includes neutralization of the insurgency’s infrastructure as a critical component of a holistic campaign. By focusing solely on the operational element of the insurgency (the terrorist or insurgent “operator”), the United States risks paying too little attention to the “other war” and thus, repeating the mistakes of Vietnam.

Unity of Command. One of the most significant successes of the Phoenix program lay in the establishment of unity of command among disparate civilian agencies and military organizations previously uncoordinated and often working at cross-purposes.⁵⁷ The Phoenix Program, led by a civilian deputy in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support department under the Commander, MACV, essentially created an interagency command element to unite civilian and military lines of command.⁵⁸ The intelligence and operations coordinating centers provided a mechanism to enable interagency cooperation and coordination in anti-infrastructure operations at the operational and tactical level. Unfortunately, there was no mechanism to enforce cooperation. Consequently, while senior leaders synchronized civilian and military policies and objectives at the highest level, organizations might still be working at cross-purposes at lower levels. This was particularly true in the intelligence arena, where organizational rivalries often resulted in a failure to share intelligence, as agencies treated their best sources and critical pieces of intelligence in a propriety manner.⁵⁹ Timely and accurate

intelligence is essential for counterinsurgency forces to execute focused operations that neutralize the insurgent and avoid negative consequences on the population. Compartmented or stove-piped intelligence processes impede development of a comprehensive picture of the insurgent's infrastructure—a picture that one only can "assemble" by compiling the various "pieces" collected by all the various participants in the regime's counterinsurgency effort.

The U.S. Government must unify today's counterinsurgency effort at every level. The United States should establish a single interagency organization or task force, empowered to promulgate policy, establish objectives, set priorities, and direct operations for the global counterinsurgency effort. The current decision to unify the nation's various intelligence agencies under a single director represents a useful first step in establishing unity of the intelligence effort; however, the United States must wield all the elements of national power in a coordinated fashion. Currently, the National Security Council is the only integrating point for the various departments; it does not possess the design or staff to plan and execute the detailed application of national power required to defeat a global insurgency.

Unity of command should extend down to the tactical level. Fora based on cooperation, such as the intelligence and operations coordinating centers in Vietnam, are largely personality dependent—they only work well when the participants "mesh;" they fail when personalities clash. Organizational structures, empowered to direct interagency counterinsurgency tasks, must exist at every level. While this might seem an usurpation of departmental responsibilities, the global counterinsurgency campaign needs singularly focused direction and supervision, by an organization empowered by the president to direct departmental cooperation at all levels.

Metrics. Evaluating operational effectiveness is another basic function of command. Commanders can use two types of metrics, measures of effectiveness and measures of performance, to assess their organization's effectiveness. Measures of performance evaluate how well an organization executes an action—it does not judge whether the action contributes to long term objectives; measures of effectiveness evaluate whether an organization's planned actions yield progress towards the objectives. For example, the Phoenix

Program levied infrastructure neutralization (killed, captured, or rallied) quotas on the intelligence and operations coordinating centers and used the total numbers of infrastructure personnel neutralized to determine if the campaign were successful.

There were two problems with such an approach; first, it confused measures of performance with measures of effectiveness. Numbers of neutralizations that a subordinate element executed might be a valid measure of performance; i.e., it demonstrated whether or not the organization actively was pursuing infrastructure personnel. However, neutralization numbers also confused actions with effectiveness. The objective of the Phoenix Program was to limit the infrastructure's ability to support operations and exercise control over the population. Neutralization numbers did not measure whether the overall campaign was making progress towards these objectives.⁶⁰

The second problem with the Phoenix quotas was that they caused dysfunctional organizational behavior. Driven to achieve neutralization quotas, police and military units often detained innocent civilians in imprecise cordon and sweep operations.⁶¹ The overburdened legal system then took weeks or months to process detainees; the jails and holding areas provided the Viet Cong with an excellent environment for recruiting and indoctrinating previously apolitical civilians.⁶² The quota system bred corruption, as families paid bribes to secure the release of their relatives while others settled personal scores by identifying their personal enemies as members of the Viet Cong infrastructure.⁶³

While reforms eventually corrected many of the deficiencies in the Phoenix Program, the lesson for current counterinsurgency operations is clear. Metrics designed to measure organizational effectiveness and performance can significantly influence the conduct of operations, both positively and negatively. It is critical to establish measures of effectiveness tied to operational objectives. Simple attritional numbers, while easily produced, more often than not are meaningless. For example, neutralizing 75 percent of al-Qa'ida's leadership might seem to indicate effective operations. However, without considering issues such as replacements, criticality of losses, or minimum required personnel levels to direct operations,

one cannot truly assess the effect of operations. Useful measures of effectiveness require a significant understanding of the enemy, the ability to collect detailed feedback on effects, and a major analytical effort. Consequently, the tendency may be to fall back on more easily collected, attrition-focused statistics. The experience of the Phoenix Program suggests that it may be better not to use metrics at all, rather than to use inappropriate ones.

Operations.

Combined Operations. Analysis of the Phoenix Program suggests that operations against the insurgent infrastructure are best done in a combined manner, with U.S. military and civilian organizations in a support or advisory role to host nation counterparts. In order to achieve its aim of a “rifle shot,” Phoenix operations more closely resembled police operations than military ones.⁶⁴ Such focused operations require a level of cultural understanding and local knowledge that only a native can achieve. Attempts to operate unilaterally without such expertise can result in indiscriminate use of force and firepower, lost opportunities, and a disenchanting, anti-American civil population.

Combined operations, but with clear American primacy, tend to send the message that indigenous organizations are inept or incapable. In the battle for legitimacy, it is critical that the regime not only is effective, but that the populace believes it to be effective. Overt U.S. presence often provides the insurgent with ammunition for his information campaign; insurgent groups in Iraq have leveraged charges of neo-colonialism against the United States to good effect in order to rally nationalists to their cause. The less a regime appears to have surrendered control of basic governmental functions to the United States, the better it can deflect the insurgent’s propaganda messages and gain or retain the allegiance of the populace.

The experience in Vietnam demonstrates that there is significant incentive to avoid or minimize combined operations with indigenous forces. The Viet Cong infiltrated the South Vietnamese government and security apparatus at every level, which decreased operational effectiveness.⁶⁵ This, coupled with the belief that U.S. forces were

more capable than the host nation forces, resulted in an American tendency to marginalize South Vietnamese operational participation, and inhibited a wider dissemination of intelligence, even between U.S. organizations.⁶⁶

Americans must avoid the temptation to do everything themselves; unilateralism or operational primacy hinders overall operational effectiveness by inhibiting the development of indigenous counterinsurgency expertise and undermining the legitimacy of the host nation regime. It also requires a greater commitment of limited U.S. resources, particularly personnel. U.S. military and civilian security organizations must establish and use common procedural safeguards, such as standards for vetting of indigenous personnel, to ensure operational security, while not incentivizing unilateral operations.⁶⁷

Advisors. One of the most significant limiting factors in the Phoenix Program was the competence of the U.S. advisors detailed to serve with the South Vietnamese military and civilian security organizations tasked with executing anti-infrastructure operations. For a wide variety of bureaucratic reasons, the Phoenix advisors were often young, inexperienced, and lacking in appropriate skills to advise their South Vietnamese counterparts properly.⁶⁸ This problem severely limited the Phoenix Program from reaching its full potential. As the program matured, efforts occurred to increase the quality and experience level of U.S. advisors through training programs and improved personnel selection policies.⁶⁹ Unfortunately, the U.S. effort lost valuable time before the implementation of changes, and the problem remained largely unresolved; however, the Phoenix advisory effort provides some key lessons for advisory efforts in support of an attack against the militant Islamic infrastructure.

Advisors must possess a basic level of regional expertise and language capability that they further develop once deployed. Advisors who understand their operating environment can assess the impact of operational techniques, avoid pitfalls that might alienate the population or provide the insurgent with ammunition for his propaganda campaign, and design operations that will target the insurgent infrastructure effectively, while enhancing the regime's reputation. A language capability often allows the advisor to verify

the accuracy of translators and host nation intelligence products, as well as judge the effectiveness and trustworthiness of host nation counterparts. In an environment where the population fears contact with host nation security forces due to corruption or insurgent infiltration, civilians may provide information directly to an advisor who speaks their language.⁷⁰

Advisors must be ready to operate under vague and uncertain circumstances and within broad procedural guidance. Advisors must be intellectually and professionally comfortable with the concept of applying police-like methods instead of normal military means to attack the militant Islamic infrastructure. Towards the end of the Phoenix Program, senior leaders recognized that not all military personnel met these requirements; MACV Directive 525-36 allowed personnel assigned as Phoenix advisors to opt out of the assignment without prejudice if they found the nature of the “. . . operations repugnant to them personally. . . .”⁷¹

The qualities necessary to be a counterinsurgency advisor are resident in the special operations community and the CIA's paramilitary organizations. While CIA operatives are generally more familiar with the interagency environment, their organization lacks sufficient personnel strength to operate on a global scale without significant augmentation. Additionally, advisory teams should include expertise from the law enforcement investigatory agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Regardless of the source of advisors, the Department of Defense should establish a specific training program to prepare advisors for the task of identifying, tracking, and attacking infrastructure targets.

Legal/Moral Considerations.

Legal and moral issues are of paramount concern in an attack on the militant Islamic infrastructure. These issues have the potential to wield considerable influence on the population's perception of legitimacy. Operations must stand the long-term scrutiny of world and U.S. popular opinion. Perceptions of the Phoenix Program as an immoral assassination operation drew intensive scrutiny from Congress and the media, and weakened the legitimacy of the governments of South Vietnam and the United States. The inability of

the South Vietnamese legal system to house, process, and adjudicate the large numbers of detainees generated by the Phoenix Program dramatically hampered its overall effectiveness.⁷² In many cases, the system became a revolving door, with hard-core members of the infrastructure being released prematurely. In other cases, lengthy detainment of innocents abetted the enemy's recruitment effort.⁷³ Interrogation of detainees provided the best source of information for future attacks; however, accusations of torture and inhumane treatment resulted in a considerable loss of legitimacy for the regime.

A fair, responsive, and firm judicial system must be available to deal with insurgents captured in a campaign against the infrastructure. The United States can influence this issue directly with those insurgents captured under its jurisdiction; it can influence indirectly the issue with those governments to which it provides aid and advice. To retain legitimacy, the United States must maintain the moral high ground. For example, while the unilateral and indefinite incarceration of al-Qa'ida detainees in Guantanamo may be legal, it may not be in the long-term best interest of the counterinsurgency effort. It has negatively impacted relations with coalition partners and contributed to a negative image of the United States in the world.⁷⁴ Agreements that return captives to their nation of origin for disposition, while still allowing U.S. intelligence agencies access for interrogation purposes ("rendition"), has been one method currently used to minimize U.S. exposure to continuing criticism.⁷⁵ However, this procedure invites accusations that the United States merely is using a surrogate to do its "dirty" work. In the long term, the United States must establish a process in cooperation with its coalition partners which yields intelligence for future operations and prevents detainees from rejoining the insurgency, while meeting basic legal and ethical standards that do not jeopardize popular perceptions of legitimacy of the counterinsurgency effort.

CONCLUSION

Twenty-six years after the fall of Saigon signaled the ultimate failure of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in South Vietnam, the United States found itself thrust into another major counterinsurgency

effort by the attacks of 9/11. The counterinsurgency against militant Islamic fundamentalism requires operations on a much broader scale than the U.S. effort in Southeast Asia, and the stakes are significantly higher. The communist insurgency in South Vietnam attacked a government of only symbolic importance to the United States. The current militant Islamic insurgency directly threatens vital U.S. national interests – potentially the most vital of its interests, national survival. The United States must recognize and identify this threat in order to engage and defeat it. Words matter; when the National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism identifies a technique, terrorism, as the enemy, it only can lead to strategic and operational confusion.⁷⁶

Once the United States acknowledges the threat posed by the militant Islamic insurgency, it must plan and conduct a holistic counterinsurgency campaign. This chapter has focused on only one component of such a campaign, the neutralization of the insurgency's infrastructure. This component is critical – the longer the United States delays effective infrastructure neutralization operations, the more difficult they will become, as militant Islamic movements further develop clandestine infrastructure throughout the world.

Neutralization of insurgents and their supporting infrastructure is only one line of operation in a counterinsurgency strategy. The United States and its coalition partners also must protect populations from the insurgent's coercive methods, pursue social and economic development to eliminate root causes, and mobilize populations to support counterinsurgency efforts. Each of these lines of operation can succeed. Yet the overall counterinsurgency effort can fail without an information campaign that both supports them and capitalizes on their success. The battleground of an insurgency lies in the minds of the populace. The United States and its coalition partners only can defeat the militant Islamic insurgency when they can convince the overwhelming majority of the people in the Muslim world that free, representative, and open societies that export goods and services instead of violence and terror best serve their interests – and that the United States stands ready to help them develop such societies. As it executes its counterinsurgency campaign, America must maintain moral ascendancy over its opponents and never lose sight of its democratic principles.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. William Colby and James McCargar, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam*, Chicago, 1989, p. 9.

2. Dale Andrade, *Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War*, Lexington, MA, 1990, p. xiii, asserts that the Viet Nam War is the best documented conflict in history, if one judges by sheer volume.

3. Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong*, Annapolis, 1997, p. 6. Moyar provides a succinct discussion of the U.S. interests weighed by the Johnson administration in its decision to intercede in the Vietnam conflict.

4. Arlington National Cemetery Website, "A. Peter Dewey, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army," available from www.arlingtoncemetery.net/apdewey.htm; internet; accessed November 17, 2004. The author indicates that an approximately 128-man MAAG began supervising equipment transfer to the French in Vietnam on September 17, 1950. Two U.S. airmen on contract to the CIA were KIA over Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The first U.S. advisors arrived in South Vietnam on February 12, 1955.

5. *Ibid.*, identifies Lieutenant Colonel A. Peter Dewey, U.S. Army, Office of Strategic Services, as the first American killed in Vietnam. Lieutenant Colonel Dewey was killed in action by the Communist Vietminh forces on September 26, 1945, near Hanoi. The Defense Department has set November 1, 1955, the date the MAAG was officially established, as the earliest qualifying date for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Air Force Tech Sergeant Richard B. Fitzgibbon, Jr., who was murdered in Vietnam by a fellow airman on June 8, 1956, is considered the first American officially to die in the Vietnam War under these criteria.

6. Colby and McCargar, p. 180; Moyar, p. 6; and "Named Campaigns—Vietnam," U.S. Army Center for Military History, available from www.army.mil/cmh-pg/reference/vncmp.htm; Internet; accessed November 17, 2004; hereafter cited as "Named Campaigns."

7. "Named Campaigns." By June 30, 1967, total U.S. forces in SVN had risen to 448,800.

8. Andrade, p. 53.

9. Colby and McCargar, p. 205.

10. Moyar, p. 48, discusses the brief-lived Office of Civil Operations and subsequent decision to establish the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS).

11. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Phung Hoang (Phoenix) Program, 1969 End of Year Report," February 28, 1970, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 1. Hereafter referred to as "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report."

12. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for Attack on VC Infrastructure. Directive 381-41," July 9, 1968, w/Change 1 Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 2. The document identifies "PHOENIX" as the short title for ICEX. Hereafter cited as "MACV Directive 381-41." Douglas Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, New York, 1990, p. 122. Valentine provides a detailed discussion of the program names. He states that, according to a Vietnamese myth, Phung Hoang was a legendary bird of conjugal love that only appeared in peacetime. He goes on to state that the Americans translated this "peaceful" program into the Phoenix, ". . . an omnipotent, predatory bird that selectively snatches its prey—a symbol of discord rather than harmony."

13. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Situation in Vietnam: Overview and Outlook," January 24, 1969, No. 0550/69, p. A-1. Hereafter cited as "The Situation in Vietnam."

14. Andrade, p. 5. Under the terms of the peace agreement, all Viet Minh forces were to withdraw to the northern half of a divided Vietnam.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

16. CIA, "The Situation in Vietnam," p. 7.

17. MACV Directive 381-41, p. 2.

18. See "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," p. A-4, for the official description of each of these organizations. See Valentine, for an in-depth analysis of each organization.

19. Andrade, pp. 12-13, 57.

20. William L. Knapp, "Phoenix/Phung Hoang and the Future: A Critical Analysis of the U.S./GVN Program to Neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure," Student paper, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, March 1971, p. 45. Hereafter cited as "Phoenix/Phung Hoang and the Future."

21. Valentine, p. 177. Valentine notes that:

. . . Tet proved to the world that the VCI shadow government not only existed, but was capable of mobilizing masses of people. . . Tet revealed . . . the intrinsically political nature of the Vietnam War. Even if the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments found it impossible to admit that the outlawed VCI was a legitimate political entity, they could not deny that it had, during Tet, dictacted the course of events in South Vietnam. And that fact pushed Phoenix into the limelight.

See also *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181.

22. "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," p. 1.

23. Knapp, pp. 51-52. Knapp identifies the 15 different organizations required to participate in the PIOCCs and DIOCCs.

24. "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," p. A-5.

25. "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," p. A-8, discusses GVN establishment of operational goals. It defines "neutralization" of Viet Cong infrastructure as "VCI who rally or are induced to rally, those who are captured and sentenced and those who are killed in the course of security operations. The desirability of capturing VCI is stressed, for the intelligence and other values they can offer." Note that detainees could not be counted until they were found guilty.

26. Knapp, pp. 55-56; and "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," p. A-4.

27. "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," p. A-7.

28. "MACV Directive 381-41," p. 7.

29. *Ibid.*

30. Andrade, pp. 100-101, provides an example of a typical firepower intensive sweep. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret, ed., Princeton, NJ, 1986, p. 856. Shy and Collier argue that the U.S. military never really came to this realization.

31. "MACV Directive 381-41," p. 3.

32. Andrade, p. 153; and Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," p. A-8.

33. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Military Operations, Phung Hoang Operations. Directive 525-36," November 5, 1971, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, pp. 1-2. Hereafter cited as "MACV Directive 525-36."

34. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

35. Valentine threads accusations of an assassination program throughout his book. See pp. 311-314 as an example. Many of the accusations of "assassination" were based on the idea that a "targeted kill" equaled assassination. Valentine, p. 319. As Andrade, p. x, notes, infrastructure attack involved ". . . shades of warfare that Americans would prefer not to think about. Most of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) were, strictly speaking, civilians." Moyar, pp. 224-232, addresses the issue of Phoenix as an assassination program in great detail and counters many of Valentine's primary sources. See Andrade, p. 123, in regards to charges of brutality and torture.

36. Moyar, p. 55.

37. See note 35.

38. Valentine, p. 126. Moyar, pp. 245-246, has some excellent reports from former Viet Cong on Phoenix effectiveness. Also see Andrade, p. 278.

39. Moyar, p. 11, highlights a 1967 CIA estimate of the VCI at 80,000 to 150,000 personnel. "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," p. 9, estimates the total of VCI at 74,000 personnel. Despite Phoenix's increasing effectiveness over time, the VC had been given too long to establish themselves nearly unmolested within South Vietnamese society.

40. See Valentine, p. 414. See also Andrade, pp. 263-4, 268-270, 278; and Moyar, p. 245, on the overall effectiveness of the Phoenix program.
41. Department of the Army, "Special Forces Unconventional Forces Operations", Initial Draft, Field Manual 3-05.201, Vol 1, Washington, DC, November 2001, p. 1-9. Hereafter referred to as Field Manual 3-05.201.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Dr. Larry Cable, "Reinventing The Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War," *Journal of Small Wars and Insurgency*, Vol. 4, Autumn 1993, p. 229. Hereafter cited as "Reinventing the Round Wheel."
44. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
45. Field Manual 3-05.201, p. 1-9.
46. Michael Vlahos, "Terror's Mask: Insurgency Within Islam," Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2002, p. 1. See also "Al Qaida Threat Brief: Executive Summary," Decision Support Systems, Inc. Reno, NV, 2001. Available from the internet at www.metatempo.com/AlQaidaThreatBrief.PDF, p. 2.
47. FM 3-05.201, pp. 1-7.
48. Shy and Collier, "Revolutionary War," p. 850.
49. FM 3-05.201, p 1-7.
50. *Ibid.*, p 1-8.
51. For the purposes of this chapter, the regime is defined as the coalition of governments working against the militant Islamic insurgency.
52. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, Washington, DC, 2004, pp. 365-366.
53. For example, prior to the attack on Fallujah, the Sunni clerical Association of Muslim Scholars declared that resisting the American and Iraqi government forces was a duty and issued a fatwa prohibiting followers from supporting the regime forces in any war. Fadel Al-Badrani, "Insurgents in Iraq Launch Deadly Attacks: Attacks Carried Out Across Central Iraq, Killing Over 30." *Reuters*, from [AOL ar.atwola.com/link/93197704/1096675187](http://AOL.ar.atwola.com/link/93197704/1096675187), accessed November 6, 2004.
54. "Al-Zarqawi Tape Criticizes Muslim Scholars," AP, Baghdad, Internet, available at www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-11-24-zarqawi-tape_x.htm?csp=34, accessed December 10, 2004.
55. Nick Wadhams, "Insurgents Step Up Violence," *Harrisburg Patriot*, January 4, 2005, sec A, p. 3, reported that a videotape found in Baghdad shows a former Al-Jazeera manager telling one of Saddam Hussein's sons, Uday, that "Al-Jazeera is your channel." The Qatar-based television station has been the recipient of al-Qa'ida's videotaped messages and consistently has served as an outlet for insurgent propaganda.

56. George W. Bush, "National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism," Washington, DC, February 2003, p. 1. The NSS states that "The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."

57. Moyar, p. 48; Andrade, p. 57.

58. Moyar, pp. 48-49.

59. Valentine, pp. 183, 204, 225, 325, 369-371; Moyar, p. 340.

60. Valentine, p. 274. See also Moyar, pp. 189-193, on the use of neutralization quotas.

61. Andrade, pp. 96-97.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

63. Valentine, p. 108. Valentine provides examples of U.S. advisors who stated that informants were manipulating the Phoenix Program for personal motives. *Ibid.*, p. 154, discusses how the judicial backlog caused corruption. Andrade, p. 123, discusses the downside of quotas; pp. 218-222 summarizes the problems and their effects of corruption and an inadequate legal system.

64. Valentine, pp. 206-207, provides an example of a typical "rifle-shot" operation.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 213 and 363. Valentine provides estimates of the extent of this infiltration.

66. *Ibid.*, *The Phoenix Program*, pp. 182-183, 213, 225, 300-301, 354. See also Andrade, p. 50.

67. See Moyar, pp. 154-155, reference operational security procedures. See *Ibid.*, p. 340, for his ideas on how to force intelligence sharing.

68. Valentine, pp. 225, 353, 364, on advisor problems and solutions. See also Andrade, pp. 138-140; and Knapp, p. 51.

69. Lieutenant Colonel Leo Kennedy and Lieutenant Colonel Marty Anderson, "An Examination of Vietnam War Senior Officer Debriefing Reports," Military Studies Paper, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, May 1986, pp. 26-27.

70. See Valentine, p. 229, for the difficulties that can arise when the advisor cannot speak the language. See also *Ibid.*, p. 108, for the idea that all counterinsurgent personnel must be intelligence collectors.

71. "MACV Directive 525-36," p. 2.

72. Andrade, pp. 219-222, argues that the inadequacy of the judicial system to meet the workload, lenient sentencing, and a generally inept legal system was the critical weakness of the Phoenix Program. See also Knapp, p. 56.

73. Andrade, pp. 206, 221.

74. Neil A. Lewis, "U.S. Sets Stricter Ban on Torture," *Harrisburg Patriot*, January 1, 2005, sec A, p. 9.

75. Dana Priest, "U.S. Seeks Long-Term Solution for Detainees," *Harrisburg Patriot*, January 3, 2005, sec A, p. 3.

76. Bush, "National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism," p. 1. See note 56.

CHAPTER 3

MORAL POWER AND A HEARTS-AND-MINDS STRATEGY IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew J. Cernicky

Human skills may change as technology and warfare demand greater versatility. No matter how much the tools of warfare improve, it is the Soldier who must exploit these tools to accomplish his mission. The Soldier will remain the ultimate combination of sensor and shooter.¹

U.S. Army Posture Statement, February 6, 2005

Boots on the ground matter during post-conflict operations.² However, the conduct of the individuals wearing those boots matters the most. Post-conflict operations in Japan, West Germany, South Korea, and elsewhere reveal a pattern: soldiers' thoughts and conduct directly relate to the positive progress (or deterioration) of the operation. The sources of thoughts and conduct of soldiers come predominantly from the values inculcated from and by society, culture, education, and training. Another important factor of positive progress lies in the degree of mutual social and cultural respect and rapport between soldiers and the local populace. There may be other socio-cultural dimensions that remain, but winning hearts and minds not only matters, but is the most critical factor for the successful outcome of post-conflict operations. The social-cultural dimension in post-conflict military operations represents a crucial element of national power, moral power, which the U.S. military should incorporate into its formulation of policy and strategy.

Moral Power.

Various scholars have viewed moral power as a significant contributor in military and political endeavors throughout history. Clausewitz expounded on the virtues of moral factors in *On War*. He noted that moral qualities of an army can influence the situation and objective in myriad ways.³ One must not underestimate the

potential of moral elements, including “the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit.”⁴ Nonphysical in nature, moral elements possess no numerical value, but they are crucial in any consideration of an army’s real strength.⁵ One recent commentator has underlined the importance of moral power in *Foreign Policy*. He argues that vital dimensions of power include not only material resources, but also faith and psychological factors.⁶ As material resources become more dispersed, they become less of a determinant of power.⁷ Highlighting the Pope’s influence to speed communism’s downfall, he argues that one should not underestimate the enduring power of ideology and religion. A political entity’s legitimacy, judged by its own individual members, and its credibility, determined by others, represent the most crucial elements of power.⁸ These elements determine the ability to project power.⁹

Moral factors give organizations stamina and influence morale.¹⁰ Believing in themselves, occupying forces can build their credibility with the occupied populace. By their behavior, forces to a large extent control and influence the degree that hearts and minds are won. Winning hearts and minds gives the occupiers credibility, even more strength, and eventually the achievement of their objectives.¹¹ “Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even more so in a global information age.”¹²

Moral power differs from soft power. Moral power is an active, or at least, a semi-active form of power. Moral power has more of an edge than soft power. An entity can choose the degree of moral power it wishes to apply in various situations. It can adjust this degree depending on current assessments. For instance, an occupation force, a strategizing entity, determines its power application processes. Soldiers, components of this force, actively pursue some end state. Contrasting with soft power, the entity does not maintain the same level of control. Soft power is a passive form of power, and its influence cannot be controlled easily. The United States cannot control the amount of goodwill generated overseas through proliferation of its commercial products, such as popular sodas, fast foods, clothing, and miniaturized entertainment accessories.¹³ Soft power co-opts rather than coerces people.¹⁴ Soft power finds its sources of strength

in institutions, values, cultures, and policies.¹⁵ An occupying force finds its sources in the conduct, behavior, and actions of its people. They coordinate efforts to harness good moral power. Otherwise, they fail to coordinate and lose the capability to apply moral power in a positive manner.

National power, strong or weak, derives its existence through many, if not limitless sources. Many commonly define the elements of national power through the use of the DIME model, representing diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements. Others have utilized the MIDLIFE model, delineating the elements as military, information, diplomatic, legal, intelligence, finance and economic. Although these elements encompass many facets of national power, they still limit the scope encompassing national power. One major element missing in both models is the moral element.

Soldiers Make the Difference.

In general, it is believed that the reasons for the change in the feeling of the inhabitants are to be found in the actions of the American troops of occupation. Many of the matters complained of are inseparable from an occupation, but many are entirely separable therefrom. It is the latter that must be corrected, not because of what the Germans may think of us but because of our own self respect and of the good name of our country.¹⁶

G-2 Conclusion on American Representation
for Occupied Germany, 1920-21

Soldiers' behavior, constantly scrutinized by an occupied populace, can influence either the success or failure of post-conflict operations. Representing the occupying power, troops comply with directives governing their mission and perform actions in accordance with civil-military leadership. The conduct of troops is important because, even though major operations are over, victory remains illusive without follow-up; tending to the defeated populace's state of being is vital.¹⁷ The occupiers must factor in the "fears, interests, and, not least, the honor of the defeated peoples."¹⁸ They must treat the defeated with respect.¹⁹ Although "decisive" combat power may win the fighting phase, it is usually not enough to secure the strategic objectives and win the peace.²⁰ Success depends on the transformation

from combat to peace and stability. To achieve this result, “. . . an occupying power must win the hearts and minds of the occupied population. It can win hearts and minds with coercive strategies, such as arresting citizens loyal to the preoccupied regime or cooperative strategies, such as promises of aid.”²¹ Troops are usually the first on the scene to carry out efforts related to economic and psychological recovery. Troops reassure, comfort, and persuade. They develop confidence, trust, deterrence, and overall regional stability.²² They are the military instrument that generates lasting change.²³

The people wearing the occupation forces’ boots make up a vital part of the army. “The army is people.”²⁴ Similar values, selfless service, sacrifices, and experiences bond the army and create a unique culture.²⁵ In this culture, soldiers are rigorously trained, disciplined, and empowered with vital responsibilities for lives.²⁶ Properly trained, soldiers develop strong loyalties, pride, and self-confidence.²⁷ They also gain a “sense of superiority” over civilians.²⁸ Fulfilling one of its core competencies, the army shapes the security environment through its presence.²⁹ Pertaining to occupation duty in Okinawa, Lieutenant General Ferdinand Unger praised American ambassador to Japan Alex Johnson, saying “He understood the important role that the military played in the conduct of our country’s international relations around the world. He understood power and the feelings of foreign peoples toward power.”³⁰ With other services, soldiers conducting post-conflict operations influence events both in theater and at the international level.³¹

One can define post-conflict operations best as actions derived from all elements of national power that resolve issues, support civil authorities, strengthen infrastructures, rebuild institutions, promote peace, and deter war.³² The range of military activities in these operations include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, shows of force, raids, strikes, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuation operations, nation assistance, counterinsurgency, freedom of navigation, counterdrug, humanitarian assistance, protection of shipping, and civil support.³³ Post-conflict activities transition dominant control back to civilians.³⁴ When post-conflict operations take the form of an occupation, they have several objectives. These objectives include stabilizing the occupied land.³⁵

An historical study of post-conflict operations can provide insight into factors fundamentally related to their success or failure. This chapter will review various historical post-conflict operations to discern the role moral power, as expressed through the thoughts and conduct of soldiers and the mutual respect and rapport that existed with the local populace, played in the success or failure of that operation. Identifying moral power's role, this chapter will suggest ways which ultimately could influence the course of events either positively or negatively. Elucidating the existence, the employment, and the role of moral power in the outcome of post-conflict operations also will suggest specific ways to mobilize moral power for current and future post-conflict operations.

Cases of Post-Conflict Operations.

Our policy here must for every reason of justice and righteousness be founded on scrupulously correct conduct towards all inhabitants of the Occupied Territory.³⁶

Commanding General's Policy
for Occupied Germany, 1920-21

Having studied 24 separate occupations, David M. Edelstein determined that the longer military occupations last, the less likely that they will be successful.³⁷ The longer an occupation lasts, the more probable "impatience" will set in and risk its success.³⁸ Reducing risk and elevating the likelihood of success is done by breaking down the resistance of the occupied people in three ways: ensure they understand the need for the occupation, ensure they realize that threats exist from which the occupying force can protect them, and offer credible assurances that the occupier will ultimately withdraw and hand back sovereignty.³⁹ Troops leverage a nation's strength in a powerful manner. Troop presence in an occupying role facilitates active control over the population's social, political, and economic structures more so than any other instrument of national power.⁴⁰ Positive first steps for troops are to behave in ways that establish law and order, supply basic requirements, and avoid abuses against the populace.⁴¹

The behavior of Americans occupying Germany in 1918 created both positive and negative impressions. American troops were disciplined in their behavior and dressed sharply to win curious Germans over to them.⁴² The Germans also liked the respectful way that American officers treated their enlisted troops.⁴³ Simply marching in formation, “clean-cut” troops impressed the occupied residents.⁴⁴ Germans appreciated newly arriving soldiers that extended a sign of friendship by distributing chocolate to children. Germans also admired the troops’ firm but fair policies.⁴⁵ Strictly enforcing regulations, Americans provided a secure environment which comforted the occupied people.⁴⁶ This civil stabilization improved relations by enhancing German feelings of friendship and respect.⁴⁷ Alternatively, American troops received adverse reactions when they acted immorally or drunkenly, requisitioned excessive billets, and failed to provide needed food in a timely manner.⁴⁸ Perceived to have been afforded overly comfortable billeting and entertainment arrangements, soldiers unintentionally drew resentment from the defeated and deprived Germans.⁴⁹ Many Germans felt overcrowded in the Rhineland and distressed in their daily affairs during the occupation.⁵⁰ Overall, American soldiers created more trust and cooperation when they behaved and meant well.

World War II-era occupations also indicate ways in which building rapport with the occupied people hinders or facilitates the soldiers’ mission. This rapport, coupled with soldiers’ conduct, relates to the success or failure of the post-conflict operation.

Occupation of Japan (August 28, 1945–April 28, 1952).

Post-conflict operations by American troops in Japan have been hailed as successful.⁵¹ The United States gained credibility and legitimacy during the occupation. Its troops and other agencies eliminated a resurgence of Japanese militarism and reconstructed political, economic and social structures.⁵² A “bitterly hostile foe” became a “polite and amazingly cooperative friend.”⁵³ Fear of the Americans turned into dependency, and dependency turned into admiration.⁵⁴ As a result, the United States secured Japan as an ally in the Cold War.⁵⁵ Troop behavior played an instrumental role in

these positive outcomes. Capably, willingly, and sincerely, troops built respect, mutual understanding, and cooperation among the Japanese.⁵⁶ Other factors also caused the success of the operations, including the nature of the Japanese people and the prior planning of the Americans.

Troop behavior influenced the respect that the Japanese had for the United States. Japanese citizens formed their opinion of their occupier based on their contact with American troops.⁵⁷ The behavior of American troops was the single most influential factor in building a pro-American sentiment.⁵⁸ Recognizing the strategic implications of troop behavior, the United States educated its soldiers on the importance of conduct. It supplied occupation forces with a pocket guide which specified "your actions, your conduct, both as a member of the Armed Forces, and as an individual, will be the yardstick by which they judge the U.S."⁵⁹ It further noted "your individual contacts will mean more in shaping their ideas about America and democracy than all the speeches of our statesmen or all the directives put out by the HQ. You are the salesman of democracy."⁶⁰ Troops acted with confidence, inculcated with a military culture devoid of defeat.⁶¹

Chivalrous, generous, and naturally friendly, American troops created favorable impressions⁶² and immediately dispelled the myth bred by Japanese leaders that Americans were "monsters"⁶³ and "savages."⁶⁴ Soldiers treated the "exhausted," "bewildered," and "suspicious" Japanese⁶⁵ more leniently than they had envisioned.⁶⁶ They facilitated communications between the occupied and occupiers, which mitigated "distrust, ignorance, and noncooperation."⁶⁷ Soldiers' friendliness brought the Japanese out from hiding.⁶⁸ Handing out candy and gum, they turned many youngsters into enthusiastic supporters.⁶⁹ Offering cigarettes to Japanese citizens, soldiers pleased their recipients.⁷⁰ Cheerful American soldiers comforted Japanese adults and children alike⁷¹ and gave them "warm feelings of affection and gratitude."⁷² Strikingly different than typical Japanese whose etiquette demanded courtesy to those of higher status, soldiers assisted citizens without prejudice. For example, soldiers helped them get on and off streetcars and gave up seats to women or elders.⁷³ These acts broke language, cultural, and social barriers. When bad conduct or invasion behavior occurred,

commanding officers brought troops under control by administering penalties to guilty soldiers.⁷⁴ Soldiers, providing security and food, helped create an uncharacteristic friendliness that the Japanese appreciated.⁷⁵ Women soldiers served as secretaries, drivers, wireless operators, intelligence operatives, engineers, nurses, doctors, hospital administrators, and logistics specialists.⁷⁶ Other women served in the civil education branch of local military government teams, teaching Japanese women about their rights under the new societal construct and encouraging them to use their democratic freedoms.⁷⁷

American occupation forces relieved internal aggression built up amongst the Japanese; their mere presence equated to essential security, stability, and authority.⁷⁸ Such aggression formed because the Japanese leadership could not provide sufficient food, and it failed to protect its people from either the constant threat of bombardment or actual aerial bombardment.⁷⁹ Vital rice imports had fallen by 50 percent in 1943, 70 percent in 1944, and 100 percent by 1945.⁸⁰ A black market provided food opportunities only a few rich could afford.⁸¹ A population increase of over 5,000,000; loss of former food source providers, including Korea, Formosa, and Manchuria; the loss of storage facilities; a lack of fertilizer; and transportation breakdowns compounded food shortages.⁸² Troops closed the sustenance gap between starvation and survival.⁸³ As America's relative strength during the war became apparent, the Japanese questioned their national leadership's "sincerity and sanity" for having gotten them involved in a war with such a powerful foe.⁸⁴ Failing to prepare their people for the possibility of defeat, Japan's military leaders caused widespread resentment among the population.⁸⁵ Once the occupiers took over, fear from bombardment vanished along with corresponding hatred.⁸⁶ Without troops to build a viable economy, violence and political collapse was imminent.⁸⁷ U.S. troops provided necessary political stability during the period when the Japanese underwent "complete mental reconstruction," "psychological demilitarization," and "psychological rehabilitation."⁸⁸ With substantial strength, the presence of troops negated coordinated drives by Japanese radicals or eminent revolutionaries.⁸⁹ Uniformly, the Japanese accepted the Americans.⁹⁰ In fact, 75 percent of the Japanese residents surveyed from November 1945 to December 1945 by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey felt satisfied with the American occupation.⁹¹

Leading the occupation, General Douglas MacArthur desired and usually received cooperation from Japanese officials. The Japanese respected him almost as much as they did the emperor, partly due to his tactful methods and humane treatment.⁹² Reform-minded Japanese welcomed new projects the military government began.⁹³ "Orderly" and "compliant" dispositions characterized the majority of Japanese.⁹⁴ Although the Japanese found rapid issuances of military government directives confusing and misaligned, they generally carried them out with a cooperative effort.⁹⁵ "Collaboration" became the norm during the occupation.⁹⁶ Military soldiers refrained from corrective action on their own accord if they discovered Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) policies being circumvented by the Japanese.⁹⁷

Nevertheless, Japanese officials did not appreciate the way reformers used mass media to broadcast important directives. They felt that occupation officials "were prone to ignore the feelings, history, and tradition that influenced equally well-intentioned Japanese officials."⁹⁸ Regardless, the Japanese enthusiastically received the democratization processes, such as demilitarization, freedom for women, land ownership reform, freedom of the press, liberalization of education, and encouragement of trade unions well.⁹⁹ Less well-received actions which the Japanese accepted with skepticism included "decentralization of political and economic controls" and elimination of ethics from school texts.¹⁰⁰ Americans aimed to defeat nationalist movements with these efforts.¹⁰¹

MacArthur kept the military instrument or "Yankee bayonets" always ready to enforce his demands.¹⁰² Military presence ensured progress even though "military government personnel in the field frequently exceeded their mandate, intervening directly in local affairs."¹⁰³ For instance, in October 1946 soldiers forcibly ensured that union workers and management at Toshiba Electric Corporation quickly resolved their differences. They "locked out all but a handful of negotiators until a settlement was reached."¹⁰⁴ In January 1947, U.S. soldiers displayed their machine guns at a labor rally to "dissuade local miners from striking" and preempt continuance of their grievances against management.¹⁰⁵ Issuance of the "MacArthur Letter," depriving Japanese government servants the right to strike, caused sympathetic university students to revolt against

“Americanization and colonization of Japanese education.”¹⁰⁶ The military government guarded against lengthy occupations, which by their nature “elicit nationalist reactions that impede success.”¹⁰⁷

The Japanese people reacted differently to others depending on the race, nationality, gender, and amount of money one had to spend. African-American soldiers experienced extreme morale problems and related better to the defeated Japanese than their white counterparts. Until General Matthew B. Ridgeway took over the occupation and implemented Presidential Directive Executive Order 998, which established equality for all troops without regards to race, color, religion, or national origin, commanders segregated them.¹⁰⁸ The Japanese even found the Indians, part of the British occupation force, more congenial than the Caucasians. The Indians exhibited more sympathetic behavior towards the Japanese, and friendships developed more readily.¹⁰⁹ “The Gurkhas proved popular with Japanese women.”¹¹⁰ The greater the custom or racial difference, the less enticing the relationship to the Japanese.¹¹¹ Japanese openly solicited soldiers who had money to spend.¹¹² Moreover, considerable attitude differences existed among four Japanese groups, namely peasant farmers and fishermen, organized labor, industrialists, and intellectuals.¹¹³ For instance, the intellectuals negatively reacted when “punishment of acts prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation” was not enforced by the Americans or when SCAP policy, perceived to be inconsistent or high-handed, was put into effect.¹¹⁴ Superior American troops created a “sense of oppression in minds of Japanese.”¹¹⁵ This sense was felt strongest in the intellectuals, scholars, and students and weakest among the farmers and small business owners.¹¹⁶ Interfering with Japanese traditions agitated the populace. Taking away land to expand the Tachikawa airfield for the military occupiers destroyed the ability for farmers to grow crops and hand down this land to future generations.¹¹⁷ However, expansion also made some Japanese happy, as it created new jobs.¹¹⁸

Other factors made post-conflict operations successful, including the nature of the Japanese. The Potsdam terms required the Japanese government to comply with the occupiers.¹¹⁹ Qualities such as “intelligent,” “industrious,”¹²⁰ “literate,” and “resilient” characterized the Japanese.¹²¹ They worked well in teams and lived in closely-knit families.¹²² They revered the Emperor, their spiritual

leader. Still in “power” under post-conflict rules, he ordered his people to cooperate.¹²³ He told them to “work to regain the trust and faith of the world; to contribute to world civilization through the establishment of a peaceful Japan.”¹²⁴

Another factor related to the success of post-conflict operations included advance planning conducted by the United States. The Territorial Subcommittee operated from 1942 to 1943 and an Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East functioned from 1943 to 1944.¹²⁵ The War Department and Navy Department established military government schools in May 1942 and January 1943, respectively. The Navy also organized the Office of Occupied Areas during this time.¹²⁶ In March 1943, the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) began planning for a military administration of occupied areas. By the summer of 1944, CAD had established Civil Affairs Training Schools for young officers at Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Stanford, Michigan, and Northwestern Universities. Leading authorities on Japan, like Harvard’s Serge Elisseff and Sir George Sansam, taught officers.¹²⁷ With the aim of benevolent occupation, other specialists on Japan assisted, such as Hugh Borton and Joseph C. Grew. They formed an “enlightened moderate approach” by the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee for the occupation of Japan.¹²⁸ Planning efforts made possible formulations of on-target guidance for soldiers’ conduct by way of subsequently written rules, regulations, and guides. Planning efforts resulted in a “detailed master plan for occupation tailored to Japanese precise conditions and requirements” which MacArthur just had to carry out.¹²⁹ Planning payoffs occurred throughout the occupation. One became evident in the first months of 1948 when the Japanese displayed more fortitude and a “take charge of their future” attitude concerning the reconstruction.¹³⁰ Amidst continuing food shortages and overpopulation, they sought loans to help themselves economically rather than relying on handouts.¹³¹ By April 28, 1952, Japan had matured into the role of a stable ally of the United States, and the occupation ended.

Occupation of Okinawa (September 7, 1945–May 15, 1972).

Passive popular resistance and large costs characterized the lengthy but overall successful post-conflict operations in Okinawa.¹³²

While controlling this territory for its geostrategic advantages and instituting a democracy, the United States developed a fragile relationship with the populace.¹³³ Favorable troop behavior led to mission accomplishment. However, some negative behavior created tension between Okinawans and the occupiers. Other factors such as the occupation forces' land acquisition program and slow progress to rebuild the infrastructure wrecked by the invasion affected Okinawan receptivity. Overall, trepid Okinawans appreciated their new freedoms secured by the Americans.

Troop conduct varied throughout post-conflict operations. Brigadier General William E. Crist, appointed Deputy Commander for the Military Government after the island's capture, set an unpopular tone, stating "we have no intention of playing Santa Claus for the residents of occupied territory."¹³⁴ To achieve military objectives at the least possible cost, he employed a harsh, but mission oriented attitude.¹³⁵ Using racially charged language degrading Japanese intelligence and dependability, he won no admiration from his Japanese translators.¹³⁶ As a selfish leader, micromanager, and souvenir hunter, he won little praise from his subordinates, either.¹³⁷ Regardless, troops initially had "good spirits" and importantly a "clear mission," which included securing rear areas, ensuring against Japanese uprising, and developing staging areas for operations against the Japanese mainland.¹³⁸ They disdained Okinawans, having just completed months of intense fighting,¹³⁹ but showed empathy toward noncombatant women and children killed in combat.¹⁴⁰ To minimize civilian interference and maximize their own safety, troops put civilians in crowded detention centers. On occasion, muddy roads choked the troops' movement of supplies and food, and strained relations.¹⁴¹ Troops, viewed as "overbearing," used brute force to prevent or terminate strikes.¹⁴² They acted with dignity, kindness, and rationality.¹⁴³ Atrocities occurred in Okinawa but some overstated soldier involvement.¹⁴⁴

With the passing of time, morale amongst American troops waned which affected their relationship with the Okinawans.¹⁴⁵ Americans delayed construction of permanent buildings, resulting in soldiers living in tents and huts unsuited to the typhoon prone climate.¹⁴⁶ Firm segregation policies between white and African-

American troops raised tensions; these tensions had a tendency to spill over onto the Okinawans.¹⁴⁷ Although American troops had an “amicable and generous nature,” some troops acted against the law, drastically undermining friendships.¹⁴⁸ The Okinawans wanted fair treatment and punishments to fit the crime. “Veneer thin” friendships developed not only because of criminal behavior, but because of the perception that subsequent punishments were light, considering the crimes.¹⁴⁹ In one case, a soldier found guilty for rape received such an insubstantial sentence that it enraged Okinawans. The judge in the case reasoned, ironically, that to give the American soldier a heavier sentence would strain or break the American-Okinawan friendship.¹⁵⁰ Four years after combat operations had ended in Okinawa, the populace lived in absolute poverty and burdened the American taxpayer.¹⁵¹ The conditions for the troops did not improve much, either. Occupation assignment became the worst of all duties for American soldiers. Okinawa became a “dumping ground for incompetents.”¹⁵² Lowered pride and professionalism degraded soldiers’ influence with the Okinawans and made mission accomplishment that much tougher.

Okinawans initially applauded American’s efforts to free them from oppression, but this optimism wore down over time “due to U.S. Military Government style of neocolonial rule.”¹⁵³ Okinawans used their new freedoms guardedly.¹⁵⁴ Poor and confined, Okinawans watched their society evaporate with the destruction of 90 percent of the island’s buildings.¹⁵⁵ Okinawans relied on Americans for everything from food to clothing.¹⁵⁶ Many blamed, not the Americans for their predicament, but the Japanese leadership for “allowing” foreign rule.¹⁵⁷ Americans strained their relationship with Okinawans because they took over a large percentage of prime land, while restricting actions on land they allowed Okinawans to keep. In the summer of 1945, the American military identified 85 percent of the island for base and airstrip development.¹⁵⁸ Land ownership, a primary Okinawan livelihood, comprised its identity and encompassed its ancestral values.¹⁵⁹ A deep hatred of the Americans evolved as they expanded their airfields and land possessions, and further restricted Okinawans from constructing buildings within a one-mile radius of military billeting or dependent housing projects with greater than

100 people.¹⁶⁰ The greatest threat to the Okinawans was when they tried to rid themselves of American rule by demanding reversion to Japan in 1948.¹⁶¹ Military professionalism persevered through this troubled time and others to stabilize operations until the occupation ended on May 15, 1972.

Occupation of West Germany (May 8, 1945–May 1952).

Success earmarked America's occupation of West Germany. The United States secured the Federal Republic of Germany as an ally against the Soviets. Troops helped reconstruct political, economic, and social institutions. Certain barriers to social reform and the abandonment of denazification constituted some failures of the occupation.¹⁶² In post-conflict activities, American troops found success acting professionally and diplomatically. Projecting a good image also mattered. Good relations became stressed under the pressures of economic and social issues as time progressed.

American troops showed their mettle from the start of post-conflict operations. As often as they patrolled towns with bayonets fixed,¹⁶³ they jogged through the same neighborhoods to get exercise.¹⁶⁴ Although many troops passionately loathed the Germans,¹⁶⁵ they behaved in a professional and reassuring manner. They judged Germans to be "thrifty", "workmanlike," "cooperative," "friendly," and "steady."¹⁶⁶ To uproot the enemy's government, troops engaged themselves with the public, especially with the youth.¹⁶⁷ Soldiers treated enemy prisoners with dignity. With guarded trust, they treated the populace fairly.¹⁶⁸ The typical American soldier acted in a "civil way."¹⁶⁹ Diplomatic soldiers generated goodwill. A soldier confidently responded to an accusation made by a young German girl that American bombs ruined her beautiful country. His remark that American planes attacked only military targets of importance enlightened the civilian and mitigated animosity.¹⁷⁰

Recognizing that soldiers' images played an important part in the potential success of post-conflict operations, the U.S. Army solicited individuals of the highest caliber for their newly established Constabulary, known as the Lightning Bolt.¹⁷¹ It sought 38,000 men functioning as soldiers and policemen to provide general military-

civil security.¹⁷² The unit's task was to serve a mission described as the "most delicately difficult any command has had since the war's end."¹⁷³ Furthermore, the task demanded "definite standards of physique, education, and background," and troopers trained "in a way that surpasses any previous military conditioning program."¹⁷⁴ Appearance became a major element of the Constabulary. Outfitted in a "Sam Browne Leather belt," "smooth surfaced combat boots," "olive drab blouse with matching trousers," and "golden scarf," the Constabulary force promised to be the "sharpest dressed" GIs in the Army.¹⁷⁵ Projecting such a positive image boosted the army's prestige and generated "an obedient or cooperative attitude" from the German populace.¹⁷⁶

During post-conflict operations, Germans had mixed thoughts. They guarded them carefully.¹⁷⁷ At times, they trusted the troops, as highlighted by the following story. An American company reoccupied the same town it had occupied a month earlier. Preparing for another displacement, a civilian family loaded wagons with their household goods. Upon recognizing the troops who were again going to inhabit their home, these family members "unloaded their possessions and returned them to the house. They were confident these guys would leave their house in decent condition as they had before."¹⁷⁸ Germans did not like Americans fraternizing with their population. When American troops' conduct deteriorated, German complaints and crime against troops escalated.¹⁷⁹

As the occupation lengthened, economic and social pressures coalesced into stressed relations. Failing to reduce food shortages and to raise the standard of living soon enough, troops faced constant resentment.¹⁸⁰ Likewise, when the military government segregated waiting rooms, hotels, shops, transportation, theaters and stages, resentment increased.¹⁸¹ Disrespect for American authority took the form of contemptuous sneering and open defiance to soldiers. The youth of the occupied population became the most arrogant and rebellious.¹⁸² Former good relations with indigenous persons employed with the military government began to fade.¹⁸³ Amidst a resentful populace, troop discipline and morale waned.¹⁸⁴ A soldier felt unsuited to his mission, writing "it's one big rat race," and "when they clear out the soldiers and start responsible civilians running

things (American civilians), things will shape up to pattern.”¹⁸⁵ He also wrote “the Army can fight a war but after that they just fool around and wait for another war.”¹⁸⁶ Occupation soldiers each had their own stories to tell. Many promoted the success of post-conflict operations with their good conduct and rapport with the Germans.

Occupation of South Korea (September 8, 1945-August 15, 1948).

American troops achieved a mixed outcome of both success and failure during their post-conflict operations in South Korea.¹⁸⁷ Many problems confronted the troops, including demobilizing Japanese military forces and establishing a civil government.¹⁸⁸ Massive migrations of people to and from Korea compounded these problems.¹⁸⁹ Unfavorable factors outweighed favorable factors.¹⁹⁰ After operations ended, the United States finally earned a reliable friendship with South Korea.¹⁹¹ The Korean War solidified this alliance.¹⁹² Failures included having to fight this war and having to counter the population’s strong resistance to post-conflict operations in the first place.¹⁹³

Due to the “primitive nature” of South Korea, troop behavior required toughness, ingenuity, and patience to succeed.¹⁹⁴ Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commander of the Headquarters U.S. Army Military Government in Korea, provided sympathetic leadership to oversee the challenging occupation.¹⁹⁵ The attitudes and actions of the Koreans and their leaders reflected an educationally deficient and organizationally unprepared society.¹⁹⁶ Although untrained in technology, Koreans had an “industrious,” “intelligent,” and “adaptable” character.¹⁹⁷ Many were “capable” and “energetic,” but most lacked experience caused by decades of Japanese occupation.¹⁹⁸ The language barrier and lack of interpreters caused intense strain between the Americans and Koreans.¹⁹⁹ Koreans considered the use of Japanese interpreters “extremely distasteful,” further increasing tensions.²⁰⁰ Morale issues resulted in an investigation into troop conditions in South Korea in early 1947.²⁰¹ A survey team conducted 169 visits to 84 different locations and attributed low morale to high turnover rates, inexperienced soldiers, flawed basic training, leadership failures, land conditions, and poor climate.²⁰² By March

1948, lengthy tours of duty caused some soldiers to consider the occupation as hopeless.²⁰³ These soldiers held the Koreans in contempt and stereotyped them as “stupid, lazy, dishonest, or completely disinterested.”²⁰⁴ By contrast, follow-on troops brought optimism to the occupation and felt that Koreans possessed helpful skills and were honest.²⁰⁵

Political, economic, social, and cultural factors strained behaviors of both the occupied people and the occupiers. Newly acquired freedoms of civil rights gave rise to political activism amongst the South Koreans. Their political directions diverged when “union of the mind and spirit were most needed.”²⁰⁶ By March 1948 the number of political parties totaled approximately 450.²⁰⁷ In contrast, Koreans neglected to prioritize economic programs to assist in their recovery.²⁰⁸ Persistent inflation and unemployment escalated the economic problems.²⁰⁹ The National Economic Board, an agency of the military government, stepped in and planned the national distribution of controlled commodities.²¹⁰ It provided fair allocations to the provinces and a centralized policy of distribution.²¹¹ Its actions prevented starvation. Social problems included continuous crime and homelessness.²¹² Soldiers executed “sincere” and “sound” efforts to keep law and order.²¹³ Sensitive to building goodwill with the Koreans, troops refrained from obtaining billets at their expense.²¹⁴ Also, they acted humanely, attending to the health and clothing needs of millions of displaced people.²¹⁵ Troops’ fair and equal treatment of Koreans elicited some cooperation and good relations. Regardless, some Koreans chose to take opportunistic directions for themselves, which opposed operational success.²¹⁶ After 40 years of Japanese repression, the Koreans suspiciously viewed American occupiers as tyrants.²¹⁷ Troops overcame this cultural barrier by establishing freedoms of speech and writing, as well as improving public health, sanitation, road, railroad, and educational infrastructures.²¹⁸

Other negative and positive factors affected troop success. An undefined American policy confused the occupiers and Koreans alike.²¹⁹ Under an uncertain American government, economic reform stagnated.²²⁰ The Russians, occupiers of Korea north of the 38th parallel, severed the flow of important goods to the south, including lumber, fertilizer, coal, and minerals.²²¹ Positive factors included having a large labor pool and a slightly modernized economy.²²²

Amidst austere conditions, American's "generosity and humanity" prevented the population from starving to death and enabled the creation of the Government of the Korean Republic on August 15, 1948.²²³

Recommendations.

Soldiers conducting post-conflict operations must not only possess suitable hardware, but they must also possess knowledge, excellent training, and outstanding leadership.²²⁴ Utilizing the most advanced weaponry, materials or supplies does not guarantee ultimate mission success. Technical proficiency with their equipment enables soldiers to wage war and get to post-conflict situations soonest. Proficiency, combined with knowledge of situational subtleties, provide the populace feelings that a secure climate exists. The security created protects both soldiers and the populace, limits radicals' ambitions, and stymies insurrection opportunities. Preparing soldiers with knowledge includes giving them training grounded in moral values. Soldiers must have the conviction to act with equity and humanity. Training regimens must not only focus on combat, but must concentrate on a curriculum entailing military operations other than war (MOOTW). In MOOTW, soldiers have the capability to deter adversary's action based on their physical presence or their potential employment. They "facilitate achieving strategic goals."²²⁵

Soldiers' training must include noncombat and nonlethal aspects. This complementary training enables soldiers to conduct themselves in line with national objectives. Author Max Boot says the United States has been slow to field nonlethal weapons. He says this may have the overall effect of costing lives.²²⁶ Prepared soldiers can prevent compromising situations. They can answer populations' questions responsively or explain snafus, thereby promoting goodwill. Training should equip soldiers with the capacity to perceive situational changes and to make logical decisions regarding the necessity to apply or not apply force. Based on current events, Boot suggests that the U.S. Government should institute the production of "high-quality general purpose forces that can shoot terrorists one minute and hand out candy to children the next."²²⁷ Providing protection in this fashion, soldiers begin to win the occupied people's favor.

Moreover, soldiers need a full appreciation of the cultural, economic, political, and societal scenery if they want to attain beneficial strategic results. Applying Sun Tzu, soldiers that know their former enemy and know themselves will never be in danger.²²⁸ Not knowing the enemy heightened the danger for British officers trying to keep order in Malaya. Unable to differentiate between Indian, Chinese or Malayan, they afforded the insurgents great advantage.²²⁹ Directives need to protect the occupying forces; however, they must not place at risk safe access for the soldiers to interact with the occupied populace. Understanding socio-cultural-moral forbearances²³⁰ can lead to successes, such as those found by the pathfinders of the U.S. Army. They succeeded against the Indians in the last part of the 19th century.²³¹ In addition, soldiers become more effective when armed with intimate knowledge of the occupied people. For example, American soldiers in Iraq feel empowered as difference makers, and they are determined to win the peace, shown in "their compassion for each other and for the Iraqi people."²³² With proper equipment, knowledge, and training, soldiers can win hearts, minds, and souls.²³³

Soldiers must demonstrate their capacity and willingness to assist occupied populaces in order to facilitate post-conflict operations success. Although "reluctance to put boots on the ground looks weak to friends and foe alike,"²³⁴ failing to put well-behaved people in boots on the ground is even more detrimental. Suspicious of occupying soldiers, an occupied populace first requires that the occupying force meets their needs. They guardedly watch the occupier's methods and behavior. Soldiers must employ sound human relations techniques.²³⁵ They must act considerately and put forth maximum effort. They must plan their actions carefully so as not to offend, and maintain constant contact with the people.²³⁶ This behavior facilitates communication, while eliminating distrust and ignorance.²³⁷ Hatred toward soldiers disintegrates as soldiers demonstrate their aims to be fair and beneficent for the good of the occupied people. Until the occupied populace has the capacity to protect, feed, and govern itself, the soldiers, along with any subsequent agencies assigned, must provide these services. In this way, soldiers rid themselves of the populace's negative preconceptions, build confidence, and

encourage cooperation. Soldiers' actions and presence disarm occupied populations of their hatreds. Once protected and nourished, occupied populations start to become a positive force for the rebuilding of the occupied society and its institutions. Good rapport with populations of varying abilities can overcome many barriers, such as rebellion, which may prevent progress.

The behavior of occupation soldiers can diminish the potential of occupied people to rebel. Soldiers, enchanting the Japanese by their generous, friendly, and humane nature, made friends out of disbelievers, not enemies. Entrenched for the long run, soldiers ward off deleterious uprisings of domestic, radical, and revolutionary nature in Japan. In Germany, soldiers appeased the populace through professional behavior, interaction, and dialog early on. Later, when Germans perceived soldiers getting unfair, special privileges, they became openly defiant and rebellious. Generous soldiers providing food, health, and clothing gradually helped create conditions for a strategic alliance between South Korea and the United States. Enforcing new rules and directives in association with the development of new institutions during any post-conflict operation inevitably will create tension. Giving the populace more freedoms, as in South Korea where political parties multiplied, also may tend to give rise to rebellion. However, soldiers' behavior can help keep a lid on potential unrest.

Soldiers must act with extreme professionalism or risk creating barriers for operational or strategic success. In Okinawa, the failure to project professionalism made the difficult task of taking over private land for military uses even tougher. Recently in Iraq, U.S. Marines, attempting to take Fallujah with a minimum of civilian casualties, took street by street, block by block, consciously choosing the right shot every step of the way.²³⁸ This tactic eased political pressures. Utmost professional conduct helps thwart insurgents. Unpredictable insurgents complicate the occupier's mission. They may realize the strength of the occupiers and lie dormant. They may realize the futility of creating any skirmishes or execute suicidal efforts to weaken the occupation. Regardless, soldiers need to build positive relationships, trust and respect with the occupied population who may know insurgents best. Goodwill between the forces and various

agencies or representatives of the population will generate crucial information about insurgents. Soldiers also should aim to team up with the local populace. An occupied-occupier alliance formed against the insurgents will mitigate their effect or eliminate them altogether. Acting professionally means soldiers carry through on projects promised. Otherwise they fracture the relationships and generate frustration detrimental to the post-conflict operations.²³⁹ The military's behavior becomes more restricted as societies become more liberated, such as those in the Middle East.²⁴⁰ The media of occupied territories send out to the world their own interpretations of troop action and conduct. These interpretations are formed by their own "prejudices, passions, and insecurities which emerge out of their own historical and geographical experience" and are transformed by the "hopes, dreams, and exaggerations of their respective societies."²⁴¹

Soldiers must educate occupied populaces to take over responsibilities associated with newly established security and governmental infrastructure. The occupied may lack experience, as in South Korea, but they desire employment, have the intellect and adaptability to assist security efforts, and eventually must take over to terminate the occupation. Effective ways soldiers can "embrace" the population include "train with them all day, watch videos with them at night, go out with them," and quarter with them.²⁴² Soldiers and populace must bond.²⁴³ Specialized forces can go into the villages to explore and discover the needs, desires and fears of the population. Offering humanitarian assistance and collecting intelligence all the while, they quickly dispel myths and appear to the population as caring individuals.²⁴⁴ Indigenous people providing security has advantages. Recently, a U.S. Marine-trained Iraqi soldier shot and killed an incognito insurgent attempting to enter a mosque for afternoon prayers. The Iraqi soldier recognized that the "worshipper" used an improper accent and intuitively shot the grenade-laden terrorist without asking further questions.²⁴⁵ The British and French prefer to operate indirectly, letting the indigenous people do the shooting for them.²⁴⁶ The British indirectly controlled the military government set up in their occupation zone in Germany at the end of World War II. German administrators put in place followed the British letter of the law. This "creatively functioning indigenous" organization demonstrated the British liberal approach.²⁴⁷ The

British did not shrink from public criticism and were guided firmly by their belief that democratic principles practiced over time would become second nature. The skeptical Germans could be conditioned and “educated” to adopt democracy.²⁴⁸ Also, the British military relies on thorough training instead of fear or coercion to affect good discipline and morale. They believe that “production of good morale is the most important object in military training.”²⁴⁹

A nation must not complicate its ability to utilize moral power in achieving its objectives by going it alone. To win hearts and minds, a nation must not be insensitive to building the strongest consensus and coalition possible to preserve its influence.²⁵⁰ For instance, the United States presently emphasizes a preemptive war strategy codified in the Bush doctrine. The administration’s decision to proceed into a war with Iraq, without United Nations support, has solidified a negative perspective. Some believe that the United States is an “arrogant superpower that is insensitive to the concerns of other countries in the world.”²⁵¹ Subsequently, the United States has diminished its capability to project influence, regardless of boots on the ground.²⁵² If viewed by others as a mistake to go it alone in this fashion, the United States has done much in its post-conflict operations to change the world’s attitude. The end state sought by the United States, a constituted democracy operating in Iraq, “brings moral clarity and cures deluded populaces of their false grievances and exaggerated hurts.”²⁵³ Democracies promote stability, demonstrated by Germany’s peaceful, nonexpansive nature and Japan’s contentment securing resources in the marketplace today.²⁵⁴

The value of moral power increases significantly with advance planning for post-conflict. Years of planning in preparation for the occupation of Japan gave the United States tremendous leverage. Reputable authorities participating on committees, in military government schools, and in civil affairs schools engineered an excellent plan to rebuild Japan. Their visions became reality. Planning maximized the probability of soldiers’ success in Japan and practically guaranteed for the United States a long-lasting strategic partnership. Inadequate planning will weaken any post-conflict security situation, as the recent Iraq example shows. Following the combat phase, the occupying power continues to lose many lives, time, and credibility.²⁵⁵

Occupying soldiers need a clear mission, and campaign plans need to have strategies that “[make] it easier for an occupying power to install a stable and sustainable government.”²⁵⁶ Policy must be known and understood by all soldiers. They then can represent their countries properly and discipline themselves accordingly. Performing tasks in coherence with policy, soldiers build and sustain good character. An unclear policy in Okinawa fostered the degradation of moral values which spilled over onto the Okinawan populace. Soldiers suffering from subsequent morale problems feel less inclined to be merciful, compassionate, sincere, or rational. This tends to delay the attainment of operational and strategic goals as it widens cultural, societal, political, and economic gaps.

Moral power, an element of national power, should be incorporated into United States military policy and strategy formulation. The education process should begin by including moral power as a distinct element in the DIME and MIDLIFE models. Introducing DIME-M and MIDLIFE-M type models into developmental education curriculums will stimulate thinking among future leaders and highlight the vital importance of this national element. Future military operations must be conducted only after thorough analysis of the ways moral power, as expressed through the thoughts and conduct of soldiers and their mutual respect and rapport with the populace, affects the success of the operations. Proper application of moral power could gain leaders efficiency, advantage, and ultimate victory. Consideration of the strategic effects that moral power application produces must become second nature to all military leaders.

Conclusion.

The most critical factor for the successful outcome of post-conflict operations consists of moral power, expressed through the thoughts and conduct of soldiers and a mutual respect and rapport with the populace. In Japan, the conduct of the soldiers transformed a formidable enemy into an accommodating ally. Soldiers’ behavior bridged the significant cultural gap leading to a strong strategic partnership. Okinawans’ receptivity of occupation soldiers varied in conjunction with the behavior of soldiers. Soldiers overcame

difficulties, their conduct facilitating success. The soldiers secured Okinawans' freedoms and established a democracy. Soldiers' conduct created a lasting friendship between the United States and Germany, valued to this day, and set in motion the reconstruction of political, economic, and social institutions. Troop conduct in South Korea overcame formidable conditions, including food shortages, language barriers, and massive migrations of people. Soldiers' humane conduct led to successful demobilization of the Japanese and establishment of a civil government.

Battles for occupied peoples' hearts and minds are the battles that Americans need to win during post-conflict operations. Within the constraints of dictated policy during post-conflict operations, soldiers should conduct themselves in ways endearing to the occupied populace. In direct contact with occupied populaces, they wield substantial strength through their conduct and rapport. Providing basic needs, showing respect, and instituting fairness into their activities, soldiers dispel suspicions, earn credibility, and attain their goals more readily. This leads to favorable strategic results. Limitless success awaits military leaders and nations who reassure and comfort occupied people in present and future post-conflict operations.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Peter J. Schoemaker and Francis J. Harvey, "United States Army Posture Statement 2005," February 6, 2005, available from www.army.mil/aps/05/training.html; Internet, accessed March 9, 2005.

2. David T. Zabecki, "Landpower in History," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Vol. 140, No. 1, August 2002, p. 40.

3. Carl Von Clausewitz; *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. and eds., Princeton, NJ, 1989, p. 184.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Niall Ferguson, "Power," *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2003, p. 22.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

11. David M. Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, p. 58.
12. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p. 1.
13. Ferguson, p. 21.
14. Nye, p. 6.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
16. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, American Forces in Germany, *American Representation in Occupied Germany, 1920-1921, Coblenz, 1922*, Vol. 2, p. 63.
17. Michael Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive?," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Spring 1999, p. 128.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
20. Clark A. Murdock, Michele A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt M. Campbell, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report," March 2004, p. 67, available from www.csis.org/isp/gn/phase1.pdf; Internet, accessed February 21, 2005.
21. Edelstein, p. 58.
22. Department of the Army, "The Army, Army FM-1," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 14, 2001, p. 22.
23. Zabecki, p. 40.
24. Department of the Army, "The Army," p. 22.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
26. Charles H. Donnelly, "Autobiography by Charles Howard Donnelly, Colonel U.S.A.R., retired," U.S. Army Military History Institute, U.S. copyright TXU 24-752, July 11, 1979, Washington DC, May 10, 1979, p. 911.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. Department of the Army, "The Army," p. 22.
30. Nicholas E. Sarantakes, *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*, College Station, TX, 2000, p. 147.
31. Zabecki, pp. 40-42.
32. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War," Joint Pub 3-07, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 16, 1995, pp. I-2, GL-4.
33. *Ibid.*, p. I-2.
34. *Ibid.*, p. IV-12.

35. Edelstein, p. 50.
36. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, *American Representation in Occupied Germany*, Vol. 2, p. 64.
37. Edelstein, pp. 50-51.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 59.
40. Zabecki, pp. 40-42.
41. Edelstein, p. 59.
42. General Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, "Candid Comment on the American Soldier of 1917-1918," personal interviews of Germans prepared by the Enemy Order of Battle Subsection of the Intelligence Section, Chaumont, France, 1919, p. 22.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 22.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
51. Edelstein, p. 87.
52. *Ibid.*
53. T. T. Brumbaugh, "Japan Believes in Us Now," *The Christian Century*, Vol. 63, November 27, 1946, p. 1434.
54. Earnest R. Hilgard, "The Enigma of Japanese Friendliness," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Autumn 1946, p. 346.
55. Edelstein, p. 87.
56. Wilford L. Harrelson, *The Occupation of Japan: A Case Study in Military Public Relations*, Thesis to Partially Fulfill Requirement of MA, University of Wisconsin, 1949, p. 177.
57. Jules Henry, "Initial Reactions to the Americans in Japan," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 2, August 1946, p. 24.
58. *Ibid.*
59. Armed Forces Information and Education Division Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Armed Forces Pocket Guide-Japan*, Vol. 25, Washington, DC: U.S. Armed Forces Information and Education Division Office of the Secretary of Defense, n.d., p. 1.

60. *Ibid.*
61. Henry, p. 19.
62. Hilgard, p. 347.
63. Henry, p. 22.
64. Brumbaugh, p. 1434.
65. Gordon T. Bowles, "Postwar Trends in Japanese Attitudes toward America," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 3, July/September 1956, pp. 278, 283.
66. Donnelly, p. 833.
67. Harrelson, p. 157.
68. Henry, p. 21.
69. Donnelly, p. 824.
70. Henry, p. 22.
71. Brumbaugh, p. 1434.
72. Kitani Tadashi, "Attitudes Towards America," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 3, January/March 1956, pp. 27, 32, 35.
73. Hilgard, p. 347.
74. Henry, p. 22.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
76. Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy*, Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann, trans., New York: Continuum, 2002, p. 127.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
78. "Japan's Stability Depends on Military Occupation," *Intelligence Review*, No. 84, September 25, 1947, p. 57.
79. Henry, p. 20.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*
82. U.S. War Department General Staff, G-2, "Food-The Major Problem in Japan's Occupation," *Intelligence Review*, No. 95, December 11, 1947, pp. 49-57.
83. "Japan's Stability Depends on Military Occupation," p. 57.
84. Brumbaugh, p. 1434.
85. Hilgard, p. 344.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 343.
87. "Japan's Stability Depends on Military Occupation," p. 57.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
89. Brumbaugh, p. 1434.

90. Hilgard, p. 344.
91. Henry, p. 19.
92. Donnelly, p. 896.
93. Eiji, p. 116.
94. Robert E. Ward and Frank J. Shulman, comps. and eds., *The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952*, Chicago: American Library Association, 1974, p. 716.
95. Bowles, p. 279.
96. Eiji, p. 115.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
99. Bowles, p. 278.
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Ibid.*
102. Eiji, p. 116.
103. *Ibid.*, pp. 116, 119.
104. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-129.
105. *Ibid.*
106. Bowles, p. 279.
107. Edelstein, pp. 50-51.
108. Eiji, pp. 129-130.
109. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.
110. *Ibid.*
111. Tadashi, p. 30.
112. *Ibid.*
113. Bowles, p. 278.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
115. Tadashi, p. 35.
116. *Ibid.*
117. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
119. Eiji, p. 116.
120. Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, *Economic and Political Conditions in the Far East: Japan, China, Korea; Report of William Montgomery McGovern*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948, p. 8.
121. Donnelly, p. 837.

122. *Ibid.*
123. Henry, p. 23.
124. Charles A. Willoughby, "Occupation of Japan and Japanese Reaction," *Military Review*, Vol. 26, No. 3, June 1946, p. 4.
125. Eiji, p. 202.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
127. *Ibid.*
128. D. Clayton James, "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret, ed., Princeton, NJ, 1986, p. 725.
129. Eiji, p. 210.
130. Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, pp. 2, 8.
131. *Ibid.*
132. Edelstein, p. 87.
133. *Ibid.*
134. Eiji, p. 443.
135. *Ibid.*
136. Sarantakes, p. 29.
137. *Ibid.*
138. *Ibid.*
139. Eiji, p. 441.
140. Sarantakes, p. 30.
141. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
142. Eiji, p. 442.
143. Sarantakes, p. 30.
144. *Ibid.*
145. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
146. *Ibid.*
147. Eiji, p. 442.
148. Sarantakes, p. 148.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
150. *Ibid.*
151. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
152. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

153. Eiji, p. 442.
154. Sarantakes, p. 149.
155. *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 148.
156. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
157. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
158. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
159. Eiji, p. 445.
160. *Ibid.*
161. *Ibid.*, p. 443.
162. Edelstein, p. 87.
163. Franklin L. Gurley, historian for the 100th ID Association, "Franklin L. Gurley Papers," U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1992, July 9, 1945.
164. *Ibid.*, July 2, 1945.
165. Keith Winston, private first class, Medical Detachment, 2nd Battalion, 398th Infantry Regiment, 100th ID, "A Soldier Named Keith," typescript and wartime letters, box titled: The 100th ID papers, Box 6, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, May 19, 1945, p. 277.
166. Gurley, March 20, 1946.
167. Joseph H. Hyde, Jr., "Army Services Experiences Questionnaire," Department of the Army, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, n.d., p. 14.
168. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
169. Winston, p. 262.
170. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
171. "Constabulary Forming," *Army and Navy Journal*, April 6, 1946, p. 970.
172. *Ibid.*
173. *Ibid.*
174. *Ibid.*
175. *Ibid.*, p. 971.
176. "German Attitudes Toward the Occupation," *Intelligence Review*, No. 74, July 17, 1947, p. 33.
177. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
178. Winston, pp. 261-262.
179. "German Attitudes Toward the Occupation," pp. 30-31.
180. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

181. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
182. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
183. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
184. Hyde, "Army Services Experiences Questionnaire," p. 15.
185. Gurley, December 10, 1945.
186. *Ibid.*
187. Edelstein, p. 88.
188. Duncan Sinclair, "The Occupation of Korea—Operations and Accomplishments," *Military Review*, Vol. 27, No. 5, August 1947, p. 54.
189. Robert T. Oliver, "The Rebirth of Korea," Essay found in the Charles Donnelly papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, box titled Japan and Korea, 1946-1948, folder marked Korea, 2, 1947-1948, chapter IV, pp. 2-3.
190. Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, p. 20.
191. Edelstein, p. 88.
192. *Ibid.*
193. *Ibid.*
194. Donnelly, p. 866.
195. "Long Live the Republic of Korea," *The Union Democrat*, August 15, 1948, p. 1.
196. William F. Centner, address, Columbus, OH, Junior Chamber of Commerce, July 7, 1949, U.S. Army Military History Institute, document, p. 4.
197. Oliver, p. 3.
198. Sinclair, pp. 55-56.
199. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
200. *Ibid.*
201. Donnelly, p. 869.
202. *Ibid.*, pp. 869-871.
203. Charles H. Donnelly, "Report of South Korean Occupation," Memorandum for Mr. Arthur A. Kimball of the State Department, Washington DC, March 10, 1948, U.S. Army Military History Institute, U.S. copyright TXU 24-752, July 11, 1979, Washington DC, May 10, 1979, p. 1.
204. *Ibid.*
205. *Ibid.*
206. Oliver, p. 3.
207. *Ibid.*

208. *Ibid.*
209. *Ibid.*, p. 4; and chapter III, p. 1.
210. Headquarters U.S. Army Military Government in Korea, *National Economic Board*, Regulation No. 1, Seoul, Korea: Headquarters U.S. Army Military Government in Korea, September 14, 1946, p. 1.
211. *Ibid.*
212. Oliver, p. 4, chapter III, p. 1.
213. Sinclair, p. 60.
214. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
215. Centner, p. 5.
216. Oliver, p. 3.
217. Centner, pp. 3, 5.
218. Sinclair, p. 60.
219. Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, p. 25.
220. *Ibid.*
221. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
222. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
223. "Long Live the Republic of Korea," p. 1.
224. Zabecki, pp. 40-42.
225. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September 2001, p. I-3.
226. Max Boot, "The Struggle to Transform the Military," March/April 2005, available from www.foreignaffairs.org/20050301faessay84210/max-boot/the-struggle-to-transform-the-military.html; internet, accessed February 14, 2005.
227. *Ibid.*
228. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., London: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 84.
229. Sir George Maxwell and committee comps., *The Civil Defence of Malaya*, London: Hutchinson and Company, 1944, p. 88.
230. Jiyul Kim, jiyul.kim@carlisle.army.mil, "FW: Robert Kaplan on The New Middle East," electronic mail message to Andrew Cernicky, andrew.cernicky@carlisle.army.mil, December 20, 2004.
231. Trudy Kuehner, "Robert Kaplan on the New Middle East," December 17, 2004, available from www.fpri.org/enotes/20041217.middleeast.kaplanr.newmiddleeast.html; internet, accessed December 20, 2004.

232. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004, p. 430.

233. Ling W. Lee, "War Against Global Terrorism: Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World," in *Essays 2004*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004, p. 57.

234. Zabecki, pp. 40-42.

235. Harrelson, p. iv.

236. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

237. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

238. Kuehner.

239. Henry, p. 25.

240. Kuehner.

241. *Ibid.*

242. *Ibid.*

243. *Ibid.*

244. *Ibid.*

245. Greg Jaffe, "A Marine Captain Trains Iraqi Colonel To Take Over Fight," February 24, 2005, available from www.pwcweb.com/vfwpost1503/hot_topics.html; Internet, accessed February 27, 2005.

246. Kuehner.

247. "The British Occupation Zone in Germany," *Intelligence Review*, No. 78, August 14, 1947, p. 48.

248. *Ibid.*

249. Anthony Kellett, *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*, Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982, p. 79.

250. Lee, p. 72.

251. *Ibid.*

252. *Ibid.*

253. Victor D. Hanson, "Why Democracy? Ten Reasons to Support Democracy in the Middle East," February 11, 2005, available from www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson021105.html; Internet, accessed February 11, 2005.

254. *Ibid.*

255. Murdock, p. 67.

256. Edelstein, p. 58.

CHAPTER 4

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: THE LONG ROAD TOWARD SUCCESSFUL U.S. STRATEGY IN IRAQ

Lieutenant Colonel Bjarne M. Iverson

Like an earlier generation, America is answering new dangers with firm resolve. No matter how long it takes, no matter how difficult the task, we will fight the enemy, and lift the shadow of fear, and lead free nations to victory.

U.S. President George W. Bush
March 8, 2005

INTRODUCTION

The United States finds itself deeply engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, as it was until only recently in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. As a nation, Americans have accepted and for the most part supported more than 50 years of engagement in Germany, Japan, and Korea, as well as more than 10 years in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It should not be surprising, therefore, that any effort on the scale of that which the nation undertook then, now, or in the future takes time, commitment, and resources to succeed. When the nation's goals include growing an enduring democratic form of government, progress can only be measured in decades. Bosnia-Herzegovina serves to emphasize the point. At this time, no one should harbor illusions that international disengagement would lead to anything other than a complete collapse of the fragile institutions established at considerable cost. For many reasons, present undertakings will be much more difficult in the Middle East.¹

The United States is at the start of its third year in Iraq. To be sure, arguments as to the wisdom of the decision to attack Saddam Hussein persist. Some argue that the United States already finds itself mired in a quagmire. Arguments persist that the Bush administration

committed serious errors by not adequately analyzing and planning for post-combat, or Phase IV, operations. This indictment has resonated across a broad spectrum of spectators and actors, national and international. In the recent election year it became difficult for the average American to separate fact from fiction, political rhetoric, or posturing. Some still wonder what the United States is doing, what are its policies and strategy, and what *should* it be doing, if anything, both in Iraq and in the global war on terror. In the meantime, the American military confronts the prospect of mounting casualties, American and Iraqi, and a less willing coalition. Hopefully, success of the recent Iraqi elections may reverse these prospects, at least temporarily.

There were, of course, compelling reasons for going into Iraq. There was evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed the infrastructure and raw materials with which to revive his programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass effects. Intelligence estimates from allies and friends, regionally and extra-regionally, confirmed American estimates and beliefs in late 2002 and early 2003.² In the meantime, Saddam made progress in his subversion of the international community, sought new means by which to destabilize the region, and further tightened his death grip on the Iraqi people, especially the Shi'a, Kurds, and Christians. For example, he created new forces, such as the Fedayeen Saddam, which looked and acted more like radical Islamic terrorists than conventional law enforcement forces. Moreover, as the United Nations (UN) Oil for Food program investigators are learning everyday, Saddam was manipulating that organization, while stealing millions at the expense of the Iraqi people. Concurrently, he was successfully courting the French, Germans, Russians, and others in an attempt to garner their support to end sanctions or at least render them less effective. Potentially worse, while filling his pockets and building extravagant monuments to himself, the dictator was setting up for the next generation of his dynasty, his sons Uday and Qusay, to assume power. From all reports, the two were the epitome of evil.³ One cannot understate the threat posed by their ascendancy.

There appeared to be no possibility of moderation on the part of Saddam. By all measures the opposite was occurring. Twelve years of sanctions had achieved little to mitigate the threats he posed,

while the international commitment to stay the course was waning. The expense to those who supported the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, the maintenance of armed forces in the region, and the enforcing of economic sanctions was growing. For example, Saudi Arabia, a supporter of UN sanctions against Iraq, had allowed the presence of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia in the Kingdom since 1992, and provided financial aid to that end. Yet, the Saudis were buckling under internal and external pressures to evict foreign forces from the birthplace of Islam.

At the same time, Saddam was playing a shell game with UN weapons inspectors. They achieved little success in the hunt for illegal weapons and programs except under the constant threat of U.S. military action. French, German, and Russian economic interests in Iraq were suffering, and their prospects of post-sanctions relations with Iraq, which they saw as close at hand, depended on their ability to chip away at sanctions. Mass media such as al-Jazeera television, based in Qatar, generated growing international sympathies for Iraq, as if Saddam were a victim. Finally, Saddam was communicating with terrorists, including al-Qaeda and Palestinian operatives, who were plotting against the United States. These and other factors played into Saddam's hands. Ironically, they also played into U.S. hands and opened the door for a second war in Iraq and the toppling of the Ba'ath regime.

On paper, the current strategy for Iraq is similar to that for Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Kosovo.⁴ A reformed Iraq has great potential to enhance Middle East stability and U.S. security. Yet many fail to understand the nature of this undertaking. Unexplained is a vision, growing or preconceived, that sees Iraq emerging as a key element in a framework for democratic reform in the broader Middle East, the long term implications of which fit into President Bush's world vision.⁵ Iraq, as the "cradle of reform" in the Middle East supported by the West, would, by its success, pressure existing regimes to change, check Syrian subversion and Iranian threats, enhance regional security, give greater voice and opportunity to indigenous peoples, and set the conditions to eliminate the nuclei of global terrorism. Ironically, Saddam Hussein, for all his torment of the Iraqi people, established some of the foundation blocks that

actually support U.S. efforts. He established a secular government and gave significant rights to women in terms of education, suffrage, and inclusion in the work force (although these gains declined considerably after the first Gulf War). Moreover, he allowed a modicum of religious freedom (again, however, subject to his whims).

Nor is the nature of the threat fully understood, although the American people, due to September 11, 2001 (9/11), appear to have a better grasp of the threat than do many among America's allies. The threat the United States confronts from radical elements and rogue states in the Middle East is grave. Of this there can be no doubt. America and the West must not be naïve about the religious radicalism and intent among their enemies, or the extent of their potential reach in their global war on Western ideologies and cultures. Radical Islamic terrorism consists of dimensions, some of which are evolving, which Americans have not even considered.⁶ And this is but one of many complexities in this emerging war.

Even more telling of the complexities the United States faces in Iraq are the diatribes of the terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In his 90-minute audio tape, released in mid-January 2005, Zarqawi openly condemned, insulted, and taunted the Shi'a. Americans would do well to understand that he is not alone in his belief that the Shi'a are a sub-class and that Shi'ism is not true Islam. There are deep prejudices in the Middle East. While the Sunni fighters in Iraq may appear small in number, they have the moral support of some regional Arab states and their populations, most of which are overwhelmingly Sunni.⁷ Regional Arab governments will find it hard to welcome any form of government in Iraq in which the leadership is Shi'a, no matter if it is a theocracy or a successful democracy. Both would be threatening. Success in a pluralistic system would pressure the old regimes openly to address democratic reform seriously. Moreover, an Iraqi government dominated in any way by Shi'a religious leaders would find open hostility among neighboring countries, especially Saudi Arabia.⁸

If America's intent is to accelerate the democratization of the Middle East, beginning with Iraq, the challenge is for these and other reasons formidable, though not insurmountable. The same is true, even if American intent remains limited to regional stability

and ending the international terrorist threat to the United States. No matter what the vision and intent of the United States, change on this scale will take a long time. In Iraq alone such efforts will take years. And they will be vulnerable to failure, if not attended by a broad engagement to address and correct Arab and Iraqi perceptions and grievances, and a major commitment on the part of the United States, the international community, and regional Arab leaders to stamp out terrorists wherever and whenever identified, as well as their acquiescence and support for democratic reform. The larger issues, however, revolve around hope for stability and reform in the Middle East that appeals to and obliges significant numbers of the disillusioned, who see their governments as failed, corrupt dictatorships and the United States as an oppressor and guarantor of an Israeli version of "Manifest Destiny."

In Iraq, that vision already appeals to the majority, even though a significant Sunni minority either sympathizes with or provides material support to the insurgents. However, the United States has not made much headway in the broader Arab Middle East, where hatred of Israel eclipses only that of America. The loud and profuse cheering in the streets of major Arab cities and towns in reaction to the attacks of 9/11 made this abundantly clear. Indeed, emotions represented a mixture of joy, sorrow, and anger, but the joy of some at the American catastrophe remains vivid. Americans rightly can curse the women, children, and men for their inhumane celebrations, but they would be wiser to understand why Arabs reacted in such a manner, and what this says about the state of affairs in the contemporary Middle East. Americans also should remember that this was not always the case. In fact, such a reaction among Arabs would have been the exception once upon a time. What went wrong, and how can Americans redress this situation? Do they and should they care?

BACKGROUND

Regardless of the view of how or why the United States invaded Iraq, the United States is there and will remain there for the foreseeable future. In the big picture, there is much to gain. Though imperative, success will not be easy in this complex environment.⁹ What is

required to execute U.S. strategy in Iraq successfully? No matter what the success in Iraq, can any strategy there be successful without a comprehensive strategy for the region, a strategy that realistically addresses Israel-Palestine and other monumental challenges? Is the United States willing to commit to an unsure prospect, the success of which one can only measure in decades?

America's long-term strategy for Iraq appears, unfortunately, to be evolving out of preconceived notions and poor advice on what a post-combat Iraq would look like. Some advice was discarded. Army Chief of Staff General Erik K. Shinseki, in answer to congressional inquiry, stated that the United States would require a troop strength of several hundred thousand to subdue Iraq for years in the aftermath of an invasion. Others, including Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator Paul Bremer, belatedly would draw similar conclusions after departing Iraq.¹⁰

The American military also made matters worse. Initially seen as liberators by all but the core of Saddam's followers and a small number of terrorists, many Iraqis now see Americans as occupiers. Many sit on the fence while U.S. forces confront a growing and increasingly sophisticated insurgency. Moreover, many Iraqis and others in the Middle East and beyond call into question U.S. intentions. If one believes the media and pundits, the United States finds itself mired in Iraq without a strategy to stabilize the country or to exit. In the meantime, the insurgency is evolving in much the same way that Colonel Roger Trinquier, a French expert on terrorism, described insurgencies and terrorism, or what he termed as modern war, some 40 years ago.¹¹

What could U.S. forces have done differently once the regime fell? Did the U.S. Government fail to plan for Phase IV operations? What are U.S. options at this stage? Without replaying the entire story, suffice to say that the U.S. military and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (later the Coalition Provisional Authority) made serious mistakes and miscalculations both in planning and then on the ground in the early days following the astounding success of major combat operations.¹² This was in large measure the result of misunderstandings of Iraqi culture and contemporary Iraq.

There are numerous examples. The United States could have ordered soldiers of the Iraqi armed forces to report to their bases,

with certain guarantees, under command of their officers. From that point, the United States could have identified and removed the officers in the highest tiers of the Ba'ath Party and those charged with crimes. U.S. and coalition forces could then have vetted each level of the armed forces, all the while paying salaries. Those found acceptable, the new Iraqi armed forces would have retrained. Others could have secured pensions. The occupying force could have done the same with other security forces, including the police and border control, as well as civilian bureaucracies. There were certain organizations such as the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Intelligence Service that U.S. authorities would have excluded altogether, but the risks of their exclusion would have been small. The occupying forces could have declared martial law and implemented shoot-to-kill rules against looters; it could have utilized the existing communications infrastructure to communicate with the people to assure them of U.S. intentions and expectations and inform them of their responsibilities; it could have implemented (a better word is imposed) Phase IV rules of engagement; and it could have done more to understand the complexities of Iraqi life including the practical "necessity" of being a Ba'athist in Iraq under Saddam.¹³ Finally, Americans could have encouraged Iraqi reconciliation. Two years later, deep traumas suffered by a number of groups have gone unpunished.

That the occupation force did none of the above exacerbated an already tense and volatile situation. Because the United States depended on the advice of Iraqi expatriates, some with suspect agendas, to develop and implement occupation plans and policies, it alienated large segments of the population who had suffered directly at Saddam's hands. Because Americans did not stop the looting they appeared soft on crime; Arab society demands order and deals harshly with civil crimes.

Disbanding the Iraqi armed forces represented a humiliation for many Iraqis. Ambassador Bremer, on poor advice, "dumped the baby out with the bathwater."¹⁴ He failed to account for the large numbers of soldiers who had served honorably. Because American policy disbanded the Iraqi armed forces and never made any attempt to recognize a significant Iraqi institution, it created a large number of unemployed armed young men who confronted a bleak future, a cadre of disaffected military leaders, and a population, which

reflected favorably on the pre-Saddam era armed forces. Moreover, failure to obtain surrender convinced many Sunnis that Iraq was as yet undefeated.

When the national police force literally collapsed, the Americans did little to bring it back. The solution to the lawlessness that reigned from April to June 2003 was to authorize an AK-47 assault rifle in every home. In effect, the United States disarmed Iraq's security forces and law enforcement apparatus, and at the same time armed everyone. The tragedies that accrued to coalition and Iraqi forces and civilians as a result of this decision are too numerous to recount. Because the occupation leaders failed to communicate expectations and intent to the population, the Iraqis remained in a state of fear and uncertainty, one that persists today.

U.S. forces continued to operate under Phase III rules of engagement, which often led soldiers to resort to the hammer as the tool of first choice, precisely the same option employed by Saddam's thugs. In some instances, U.S. forces harassed and attacked the innocent and humiliated them in various ways that called for revenge.¹⁵ And because coalition policymakers did not understand that not all Ba'athists had participated in the regime's crimes, the occupiers alienated entire professional classes of Iraqi society: the military, the bureaucrats and technocrats, teachers, and others.

In fairness, there have been American and coalition successes as well. Deposing Saddam's Ba'athist regime was morally and legally the right course of action, both from the standpoint of stabilizing the Middle East and enhancing U.S. security. While some have criticized U.S. authorities for not punishing the criminals of Saddam's regime in the immediate aftermath of the war, Saddam and many of his fellow criminals are in custody and will face Iraqi justice. Saddam's evil sons are dead, and their threat to future generations is no more. Much of the Iraqi population lives in relative security, although television often depicts a different picture. A greater percentage of the population enjoys acceptable and improving basic services, although Baghdadis, who are underwriting improvements countrywide, would not agree. U.S. efforts in the field of infrastructure, including electricity, water, irrigation, transportation, communications, and distribution systems will result in modern systems available to all segments of society within the next 5 to 10 years.

The United States has drawn terrorists to the battlefield of its choosing and is dealing continued heavy blows to known organizations. Moreover, the United States is discovering heretofore unknown linkages in terror networks that will allow interdiction on its terms. America is in a strong position in the heart of the Arab Middle East to influence the future direction of that region, while at the same time protecting its homeland. It can help maintain that position by staying the course in Iraq while encouraging and supporting moderation and reform in the region. Finally, no one can argue the success of recent elections or the hope they portend.

THE WAY FORWARD

What can America do now that it finds itself engaged in Iraq and recognizes some of the serious errors it has made over the past 2 years? Should it press on with the same strategy? What are the chances for long-term success? Have American leaders recognized their errors and are they addressing them? Or are they creating an environment that will breed new generations of recruits to fight America?

There are only two serious options. The United States can accelerate or eliminate major programs in order to extract itself sooner in hopes that things will turn out as it envisioned at the beginning. Or it can stay the course with minor and perhaps even major adjustments. Ironically, in either case, America runs the risk of watering down its goals. Staying the course represents a long and expensive proposition. A significant alteration in U.S. goals runs the risk that embryonic institutions will not mature. A premature exit leaves open the prospect that future generations of Americans will fight again in the Middle East.

America has embarked on a campaign, which will only succeed by convincing Iraqis to remain patient (currently succeeding); by understanding and helping Iraqis achieve security, stability, and representative government; by demonstrating tangible progress, in terms of security and quality of life; and by minimizing or eliminating the momentum its opponents now enjoy. Although America represents a "lightning rod" in the Middle East, ironically,

it also is the greatest hope for millions in the region. Despite oft-stated outrage against the United States, teahouse and academic discussions and even Arab journalists spoke of reform in the Middle East in the muted euphoria of Saddam's ouster and subsequent capture.¹⁶ The same is true in the aftermath of successful national elections in January 2005. There is a foundation on which to build.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Success in Iraq demands American presence. The stakes are too high for anything but complete success. Yet the United States may have to alter the ways and means of executing its strategy or even the *ideal* end state it envisions. Nonetheless, the United States must remain focused on the goal: a functional and growing form of representative government in the heart of the Arab Middle East. To do otherwise would be to hand radical Islamic terrorists a victory, add momentum to their drive for power and their goals in the region, and create greater threats to U.S. national security.

American presence cannot be one of overbearing arrogance. Nor can it be one of token presence. Rather, U.S. presence must be ubiquitous and at the same time inconspicuous. Its best and brightest must execute the strategy. Some believe that fewer troops on the ground would help, but any such reductions before the next elections could well create untenable vulnerabilities. Iraqi security forces at present are not prepared to assume their full security responsibilities. They would inevitably revert to the methods of Saddam's regime, with which they are all too familiar.

Because of the complexity of the Iraq environment, the United States cannot accelerate or eliminate major programs.¹⁷ The United States will have to weigh its decisions carefully to accelerate Iraqi security forces development and training programs. Where unavoidable, the United States must employ its leverage to mitigate risk. Though the Iraqi workforce is relatively well-educated, the government sectors require sustained U.S. support over the long term. The basic training and modernization of the armed forces and bureaucracies represents a fairly easy task, but that is only a first step. Subsequent steps provide the greatest challenge and will

take the longest time to implement. Such steps include inspiring professional cultures and ethics of service for the greater public good in the bureaucracy, while adhering to the primacy of the rule of law. The broad acceptance of such attitudes will take time, patience, commitment, and example.

Whether by design or coincidence the United States is making progress in developing the governmental structures at a faster pace than the armed and security forces. While the government stands up, builds infrastructures, gains confidence, and begins to make decisions that affect Iraqis on a daily basis, the security apparatus is growing more slowly. The security forces must mature over time into professional, ethical, and responsive entities, answerable to the people and subservient to civilian leaders. This appears simplistic, but is the foundation on which all else depends.

Iraqis want certain guarantees from a government. Their demands are neither excessive nor unreasonable. They desire a sense of security. They want security forces that are fair, responsive, and not abusive of powers. They demand guarantees of their civil rights. Since most Iraqis have lived in a cradle-to-grave welfare system, they demand social safety nets that provide for their needs during a period of unprecedented change. They want to know that basic services and support are available and equitable: electricity, consumable fuels, communications, food, and water. They demand a guarantee of access to education, quality health care, and opportunity. Their families should not have to resort to bailing putrid water from polluted canals for cooking and bathing. They demand an assurance that other Iraqis will not squander or pocket the nation's natural resources, and that the West will not manipulate them. In this respect, the United States is enjoying some success in its policies. Yet, most Iraqis would give up their basic rights, at least temporarily, to achieve genuine security and stability.

In the process, American policymakers cannot lose sight of the fact that Iraqis, those who have taken a public stand to lead or support change, are in grave danger. Many believe they and their families are marked for death, now or in an indeterminate future. Yet they have stepped forward. Unlike most of their coalition partners, their decisions to support U.S. designs are literally a matter of life and death. And memories are long in the Middle East.

Institutionalizing Security Structures.

Security, above all else, preys on the minds of the average Iraqi. If the United States cannot provide security, it will fail. If the United States does not develop professional Iraqi security forces trusted by the people, it will fail. The Anglo-American coalition is responsible for security and progress and therefore Iraq's success. One of the cornerstones of successful democratic reform is a security apparatus that is not threatening to the public, but which is able to protect it. There is no such foundation in Iraq at present. The security forces familiar to most Iraqis largely remain associated with violence against the people they were to protect, as well as rampant corruption.

Pressure is mounting to accelerate the formation and training of security forces. Any such acceleration will undoubtedly create trade-offs. One major trade-off will be the diminished quality of entry level training to meet the accelerated timeliness. To mitigate such a risk posed, the United States must take prudent measures. Yet there is no guarantee of success.

First, the United States must develop robust and focused intermediate, periodic, and remedial training programs. This is essential to make up for accelerated entry.

Second, it must develop programs by which mobile training teams live and train with Iraqi security forces.¹⁸

Third, to add rigor and ensure discipline, the United States must, with the cooperation of Iraqi military leaders, develop and implement a uniform code of military justice, a code of ethics, and set of values. For discipline problems, remedial and corrective training should be the focus rather than eliminating offenders (after all, this is a part of institution building).

Fourth, the United States needs to establish exchange programs for education and training in the United States and other coalition countries.

Fifth, the United States must equip the security forces with quality tools to enhance their confidence, capabilities, morale, and pride. The one major complaint of Iraqi soldiers and law enforcement organizations is that they possess substandard equipment, much of which the Coalition Provisional Authority and interim government

procured from other Middle Eastern states. They feel such equipment under-performs materiel previously produced by Iraq's state-owned military-industrial complex as well as that of their enemies. Iraqi security forces want American equipment, but will settle for European arms with which they are familiar and which are less costly.

Sixth, the United States and the Iraqi government must execute an information campaign, which publicizes the benefits, progress, and sacrifices of the Iraqi security forces and which emphasizes their commitment to serve and protect all Iraqis.

Obviously, each Iraqi security service will require programs tailored to its missions and relationship to the public. Progress will be directly proportional to Western commitments. Nevertheless, in dealing with Iraqi security forces Americans will inevitably try to instill their ideals and discipline. In a society that knows only the stick as the first choice for problem solving, Americans consistently must show by example that their way works better. If they fail to act in such a fashion, they will fail. As Americans become familiar with the new security forces, they may find they do not trust the Iraqis, do not approve of their work ethic, or remain segregated and grow distant from them. Commanders at all levels whose soldiers associate with Iraqi security forces must reinforce professional interactions that recognize Iraqis as the second largest and the most important coalition partner. Only the Iraqis can win this war; Americans cannot.

Basic Services.

Progress in building, renovating, and modernizing Iraq's infrastructure is slow but gaining momentum. In a state where the people depended on the government for everything from cradle-to-grave, the challenges are daunting. In the first year-and-a-half in Iraq, the United States scarcely achieved the levels of service provided by Saddam's regime. The average Iraqi could not understand or believe that the mighty United States was incapable of providing the same level of service that Americans enjoyed at home. They often concluded that the coalition was manipulating them to steal their resources, or punishing them for Saddam's crimes.

Not understanding the dilapidated state of Iraq's infrastructure, the Coalition Provisional Authority awarded mega-contracts for rebuilding the national level infrastructure to capable international firms such as Bechtel. Thousands of contractors then invaded the country. Most Iraqis believed that oil revenues were paying the foreigners. Concurrently, contractors and military engineers began countrywide infrastructure assessments, which quickly exposed the enormity of problems, local to national. The breadth and depth of the challenge overwhelmed an uninformed, unprepared, and undermanned Coalition Provisional Authority. To make matters worse, the deteriorating security situation slowed infrastructure efforts to a standstill. Iraqi businessmen and tribal leaders saw few benefits from the promised employment boom, save that which division commanders provided through their emergency relief funds that helped fix schools, water distribution systems, electrical grids, and communications.

If nothing else, Iraqis knew their rights and their benefits. The lack of services and jobs, exacerbated by increasing violence, sabotage, and summer heat, created unstable conditions. To their credit, most waited patiently. The coalition struggled through the summer of 2003 and provided the minimum needs in major cities. However, few areas outside the major cities saw any improvement at all. Almost 2 years later, Iraqis are finally seeing gradual improvement in most categories. Nevertheless, Baghdadis are quick to point out that they still are not receiving the same levels of services as before the war.

Though the coalition is making progress across a spectrum of services, much remains. American and international agencies and contractors are pressing forward with national level projects, including transportation and distribution systems; oil and agricultural production; and water, electrical, and communications infrastructures. The tangible benefits of these undertakings are not and will not be evident for some time. And the overhead costs for security remain unacceptably high.¹⁹

The planning and execution of projects to modernize Iraq's infrastructure continue. Unfortunately, American authorities all too often fail to get the good news of their plans and progress out and therefore fail to receive credit. Americans still are learning difficult lessons at the sub-national level. They continue to undermine their

efforts by not explaining clearly the benefits of long-term plans and programs. Unemployed Iraqi craftsmen and professionals sit idly by and watch as foreign labor, contractors, and militaries build everything from two-room schools to national power grids. When hired, Iraqis only receive mundane jobs and low pay. Moreover, Americans complicate their efforts by not understanding the hierarchies of Iraqi society, which include religious, tribal, familial, and municipal aspects, all intertwined. In the rush to provide basic services in the early days, they often undermined traditional and municipal leaders' authority. And, as was often the case, Americans believed they had the correct answers, and the Iraqis did not. On the personal level, always essential to success, Iraqis are willing to partner, but this fundamental often is neglected.

To be successful, Americans must address these and other cultural issues. Local through national level leaders increasingly will assume the decisionmaking role in a sovereign Iraq. In effect, the United States must assume the role of junior partner and follow through on decisions in support of the Iraqi government. These steps may often not fit American goals and objectives, but they are crucial to establishing a sense of participation, ownership, and commitment.

U.S. authorities must constantly advertise international contributions, now in the tens of billions of dollars, at every opportunity. They also must highlight the Iraqi partnership. But they cannot just say that they have allocated fifty or a hundred billion dollars to Iraq. They also must explain that such funds are contributions and not loans. Further, they must categorize expenditures already planned by province and lay out start dates for major projects and the types of contractors and labor required. Iraqis are entrepreneurs, and if they believe they can do business supplying or otherwise participating in these projects and programs, they will.

Insurgents and Terrorists.

The coalition was slow to realize the emergence of a number of distinct insurgencies in fall 2003. At times American military and political leaders denied the obvious, preferring to believe that the

violence was the work of small, independent cells and criminals. Yet the evidence to the contrary was undeniable.

One significant insurgency grew from decisions the Coalition Provisional Authority made with regard to the Iraqi armed forces in summer 2003. Faced with humiliation, unemployment, and bleak futures, former officers established cells that grew slowly, but steadily. Not only this but tacit, if not material, support among Iraqi civilians grew as well because of Coalition abuses, popular belief that America was subjugating the Iraqi nation, and the absence of security and jobs. U.S. blunders in the form of Phase III rules of engagement also served to disillusion much of the Sunni population.

A second major insurgency, consisting of radical Islamists, grew, as well. In addition to homegrown groups, jihadists infiltrated into Iraq in small numbers. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi became the headliner and inspirational leader of many of the radicals.²⁰ While he and his followers operated independently, they found refuge and support from homegrown groups such as Ansar al-Islam and Ba'athists, who were mostly Sunni. Their collusion with Iraqi insurgents, however, was a matter of convenience and common objectives, and not loyalty or brotherhood. Though analysts attribute the most horrific acts to foreign terrorists, criminal gangs and Sunni insurgents were all capable of the same atrocities.

How does the United States fight an enemy that it continuously misunderstands and misidentifies? That is a tough question. U.S. forces now carry a burden they partially created, or at least exacerbated. Yet, the United States does not have the option of inaction against insurgent targets and hot spots. Coalition forces must take down identified targets, but at the same time shift the focus of their presence increasingly toward training and equipping Iraqi security forces, including the police.

Iraqi culture respects strength. While the United States trains and mentors Iraqi security forces, it will have to allow operational Iraqi forces the latitude of dealing in their way with those who are terrorizing the country. The family whose immediate priority is security demands as much. This will be brutal in the short term, but given the tools and freedom of action to seek and destroy those who are committing terrorist acts, Iraqi methods will succeed in the long term. The ability to balance the necessity of extreme measures with

long-term development of professional security forces is crucial to the growth of democracy.

Many Iraqis have seen atrocities that Westerners hardly can imagine. They will only gain confidence in their government and security forces, if those forces provide security and stability. In Mosul in February 2005, the Iraqi police captured an Iraqi insurgent who they confirmed had beheaded a hostage. The police then filmed him begging for his life, and the Iraqi interim government televised the film throughout Iraq. The message was clear: not only will the terrorists be hunted down and brought to justice, but they are not as tough as they appear.

Focus on Youth.

One of the clearest opportunities to influence Iraq's future lies in influencing its young people. By and large, the youth of Iraq are malleable. Despite the U.S. occupation and some unfortunate situations, such as Abu Ghraib, they remain infatuated with U.S. soldiers and marines, perhaps through a prism of both fear and hope. America's continuing efforts to influence the young will pay dividends in the future.

American efforts should go a number of steps further, however. As U.S. and international organizations build schools and assist in the modernization of educational institutions, they can implant programs such as the study of the English language from elementary school through post-secondary levels. Every Iraqi understands that fluency in the English language is an important rung in the ladder of upward mobility. Today, satellite dishes are on the rooftops of Iraq and are capable of not only receiving al-Jazeera, but CNN and the BBC. The same tools should become standard in Iraqi schools, as well, to educate and inform this younger generation.

The education of the young is paramount to the success of a democratic Iraq. While programs of this nature formally lie outside the purview of the military, for all intents and purposes, it is the military that is influencing education at this time. Soldiers are building and renovating schools, donating school supplies, interacting with teachers and students daily, and providing medical services and other support. This aspect of the U.S. contribution to

Iraq is too critical to leave unattended, while experts and agencies await a secure and stable environment.

The Region.

The United States must approach the regional aspects of its Iraq endeavors with extreme care. In addition to kinetic options, the United States must revisit some initiatives and create movement that contributes to regional security. The United States must reengage in the Israel-Palestine crisis, seek to moderate Iran and eliminate its programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction or effects, influence Syria, and reassess the positioning of U.S. forces in the region.

Israel and Palestine. The Israel-Palestine question will not go away. Though recent developments are encouraging, all the parties have seen them before. It is all too easy, at the slightest provocation, for both sides to resort to intractable positions, which serve only the radical factions on both sides and promise a continued spiral of violence and hatred. Yasser Arafat failed to grasp the opportunity for Palestine that he helped create.²¹ His timely demise was a blessing that the international community must take advantage of.²² Successful Palestinian elections in January 2005 and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' emergence as the legitimate leader of the Palestinians offers opportunity. Though Israel wants immediate guarantees and action, Abbas must be given an opportunity to develop and present his agenda and vision, and take steps to reduce the violence emanating from Palestinian territory. His initial steps are strong indicators that he is serious about reducing the violence. America must welcome, if not embrace, Abbas. The Bush administration's recent movement in this direction is promising.

Neighboring states and the Arab League must become involved equally in the Palestine-Israel issue. Otherwise, it will fail. The Arabs and Israelis alike have used the Palestinians for their own purposes since 1949. Arab leaders have used Palestine as an excuse and a rallying point to draw the attention of their subjects away from their own failures and abuses. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal deserves consideration not only because it provides a thoughtful way forward, but more importantly, because it pushes other Arab leaders to the table and commits them to the peace process.²³

Iran. The United States has labeled Iran a member of the Axis of Evil, which is perhaps appropriate, considering its current leadership and record over the past 25 years. But the label misses the point on Iran. Though Iran's leadership supports terrorism and proceeds with plans to develop nuclear weapons, the regime is essentially weak and declining in power, based in part on the weight of its internal policies.²⁴ Dissent, though muted, is ever-present. Most Iranians do not support the repressive theocratic government. The theocracy has silenced the once influential and West-leaning Iranian middle class since 1979. Given a real opportunity to participate in the political process the middle class and other dissenters would present a viable challenge to the clerics. The United States must take steps to harness that discontent and compel the Iranian mullahs to moderate. Though the United States is making progress through allies such as Britain, it may achieve greater moderation in the regime in the long term through direct engagement. At a minimum, direct U.S. involvement would serve to buoy and perhaps encourage the muzzled majority.

From their perspective, the Iranian leadership understands that U.S. success in Iraq will lead to direct pressures. Moreover, they fear that America will conduct military operations against them at a time of its choosing. Their meddling in Iraqi Shi'a affairs and their tacit support of al-Qaeda operatives transiting or temporarily residing in Iran attest to their fears and reactions against the West, and the United States in particular. They have no assurances by which to draw any other conclusions. The Bush administration's stern public statements against them in the wake of Iraq's elections can only reinforce that perception. Currently, Iran has no incentive to moderate its policies or programs. In fact, the current situation elicits the opposite reaction. Tehran's rhetoric since the Iraqi elections indicates a clear intent to accelerate its nuclear programs.

Conclusion

The United States is in a race against time. Its "permit" to occupy Iraq will expire sooner rather than later. In order to extend that permit and enhance chances of long-term stability in Iraq and the Middle East, sustained diplomatic initiatives across a broad spectrum are necessary now and for the foreseeable future. If America arrives at

the point where it significantly reduces its presence in Iraq without having achieved tangible successes, it will have squandered a unique opportunity.

Recent U.S. progress in Iraq is welcome and long overdue. The United States is organizing, training, and equipping Iraq's future security forces; it is executing infrastructure construction projects utilizing Iraqi and international expertise and more importantly, employing a willing Iraqi labor force; it is setting the conditions for the development of an Iraqi Constitution and January 2006 elections, a daunting task; it is conducting a rolling offensive against insurgent and terrorist havens, a campaign in which Iraqis increasingly are taking the lead; and it is setting conditions for a successful economy.

This success is not an end; it is a beginning. As security and stability improve, the international community and Iraqis must roll up their sleeves and continue the hard work of creating a stabilized entity that acts as a catalyst for reform in the region. The coalition, which now includes a vested Iraqi leadership, is succeeding in Iraq. The list of successes is impressive: deposing and capturing Saddam Hussein, rebuilding the infrastructure he left in shambles, providing Iraqis with hope, and standing up systems that hopefully will lead to representative government that does not threaten its population or the region.

As the United States edges toward a new phase of its presence in Iraq, it must prepare to alter course. A nascent Iraqi government is assuming control. There will be setbacks, but as confidence among Iraqis improves, the elected government of Iraq will set its own course and return as a contributing member of the international community. However, the United States must accept that it cannot achieve instant change. Success will require presence, commitment, engagement, even idealism, and a willingness of the Iraqis to take the lead. As the United States helps to establish governmental structures, especially in the security line, it must remain thoroughly engaged for the foreseeable future in order to nurture representative government.

As the recent elections showed, most Iraqis are willing to take a chance with democracy. The United States is pushing against a partially open door. How it opens the door, and what it does once

the door is open, will influence Iraqis either to close it on America or to emulate and modify U.S. systems and institutions to fit their cultural and religious norms and traditions.

In the rush to turn over responsibility and authority to the Iraqis, Americans must take a hard look at how they define success. What conditions besides infrastructure, vetted leaders and government workforce, governmental systems in place, and sound economic practices must they set in order to give the new government a reasonable chance to survive? In such a context, how will Iraqis remember the United States once it has turned over responsibilities?

No doubt the United States will leave a legacy. The legacy it leaves will be governed by its attitude, commitment, ideals, and the end state it strives to achieve: a stable, peaceful government, mindful of civil rights, that represents the people. America must, therefore, remain engaged in Iraq for the foreseeable future. A host of reasons, not the least of which are economic benefits and stability in the greater Middle East, requires it. If Americans stay the course, Iraqis will not forget. And, yes, Americans must learn from Iraqis, too. Developing personal, professional, and official relationships based on mutual respect and a vision of a better future for Iraq will provide an opportunity to achieve broader change in the Middle East. However, if the United States proceeds too fast, opting for quick fixes, and fails to look beyond the short term, it will fail in the long term. In the end, Americans will have created a system that is as fragile to normal use as the Iraqi infrastructure it is struggling to rebuild. American impatience cannot work here. The United States and Iraq must remain wed until they achieve mutual goals.

Iraq and the coalition must envision the future together. This vision is especially important in the security structures. No other governmental structure touches the people so intimately. Therefore, the level of effort and the quality of commitment must reflect that importance. Most Iraqis are willing to learn and give U.S. institutions a chance, especially if they perceive Americans as committed partners. Americans must balance their approach to focus on solving problems and learning what works best in Iraqi culture. But again, setting the conditions for success requires presence, commitment, engagement, and idealism as well as the willingness of the Iraqi people.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Historically defined, the Middle East includes the entire United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), less East Africa and a portion of the United States European Command (USEUCOM) AOR. In the context of this paper the Middle East narrowly is defined as the modern Middle East and North Africa, which consists of the members of the Arab League.

2. Consultations with European, Asian, and Middle Eastern governments including Britain, Russia, Pakistan, Israel, and Egypt, as well as Iraqi defectors, all supported the U.S. contention that Saddam possessed WMD and WME. The weapons inspectors working in Iraq under the auspices of the UN failed to find such weapons, but neither could they unequivocally deny their existence, though they did find WME missiles that exceeded the ranges allowed by the UN. After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) uncovered numerous violations of UN sanctions during investigations from 2003 - 2004, but no WMD.

3. Con Coughlin, *Saddam: King of Terror*, New York, 2002, pp. 283-85, 299-304. Coughlin's work provides a glimpse of Saddam Hussein's development and control of his sons, Uday and Qusay, as well as their brutality and greed.

4. Elizabeth Cousens and Charles Cater, *Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Peace Accords*, Boulder, CO, 2001, pp. 33-49, 151-153.

5. B. Loveman, *Strategy for Empire: U.S. Regional Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*, Lanham, MD, 2003, p. 118.

6. Many of the radical Islamists that we conveniently, and perhaps incorrectly, lump under the umbrella of al-Qaeda see their jihad against the United States and the West as a holy war in which their eventual victory is assured. Not only this but theirs is a total war that does not recognize physical, political, or any other boundaries; does not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants; and seeks to achieve its ends by any and all ways and means available, including the widespread use of WMD and WME. They believe that their cause will gain traction among the world's more than one billion Muslims and that their sheer numbers and fanatical faith will carry them to victory over corrupt and decadent non-Muslims over a period measured in generations.

7. Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 2004*, Washington, DC, 2004. There are two exceptions in the Gulf region where Shi'a populations are large: Bahrain in which the Shi'a are 70 percent of the population; and Iran, which is not Arab, but whose population is 89 percent Shi'a.

8. Nadav Safran, *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security*, Ithaca, NY, 1988, pp. 10, 50, 354-357. Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud established the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1902 with the help his traditional fundamentalist allies, the Wahhabis. The Wahhabis, in alliance with the al-Saud, have targeted the Shi'a in the Arabian Peninsula since the 8th century. The modern Saudi government has looked with suspicion at the Saudi Shi'a and, in times of crisis such as the 1979 takeover of the

Grand Mosque in Mecca, has been quick to isolate the Shi'a, who are concentrated in al-Hasa and Qatif provinces.

9. L. Carl. Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game*, Princeton, NJ, 1984, pp. 78, 140. Complexities run the gamut in the Middle East, including the common perceptions that the Middle East has been victimized by the West to exploit its resources; the United States practices double standards to prop up its client state, Israel; the European colonial powers divided up the Middle East to ensure constant strife among the Arabs; and the West is attempting to corrupt the purity of Islam. Since before the fall of the Ottoman Empire, would-be leaders of the Arab world have tried to spark an Arab revival. However, pan-Arabism, Socialism, Palestine, and economic blocks have not had that effect. Over the past 20-plus years, Islam has had a unifying effect on many Muslims, and some see it as the one way to fend off the Western threat.

10. In a speech at Michigan State University on October 4, 2004, former U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority Ambassador Paul Bremer noted that from the beginning the United States did not have the number of forces necessary to execute the post-major combat operations mission in Iraq. In an Op-Ed piece in the New York Times on October 8, 2004, Ambassador Bremer tried to undo the damage to President Bush by defending the Bush Administration's decision to invade Iraq.

11. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, New York, 1964. Trinquier described the phases of insurgency and terrorism, or modern warfare as he termed it, based on his experiences against the Viet Minh in Viet Nam and Algerian terrorists (FLN) in the 1950s.

12. Though the U.S. Department of Defense carried most of the blame, all the major departments of the U.S. Government participated in planning Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other entities, American and international.

13. Ba'ath Party membership in Iraq was similar to Communist Party membership in the Soviet Union. Membership was a prerequisite for upward mobility in any number of bureaucracies and professions. Membership alone was not the sole criteria for judging individuals or groups in post-Communist Russia, nor should it have been in post-Saddam Iraq.

14. There is debate on who actually gave the order to formally disband the Iraqi armed forces. Ambassador Bremer was given broad authorities upon his arrival in Iraq, and he made the decision based on the advice of his coalition and American staff and Iraqi expatriates and his current understanding of the status of those forces. The Ambassador has not commented officially except to say that he was left with no other choice when the Iraqi armed forces disintegrated.

15. Abu Ghraib stands out as the most grievous of humiliations, but, in other cases, the coalition was duped by individuals or groups who used their access to coalition forces, especially Americans, to torment their own enemies.

16. Ralph Peters, *Beyond Baghdad: Postmodern War and Peace*, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2003, p. 326.
17. The slogans calling for withdrawal timelines that aired during the 2004 presidential campaign and since are dangerous to Iraqis who are in the trenches with America, U.S. and coalition soldiers, and to overall success. These slogans can become the self-inflicted wound from which there is no recovery. However, they resonate with elements of U.S. society, and, once stated, the expectation is that the promise will be kept. Finally, rather than steeling the determination of Iraqis to assume the fight against the insurgents, such pronouncements have the opposite affect in which the insurgents wait us out and surge as we depart. The Sunni insurgents believe that, once the coalition departs, they will win any fights with Kurds or Shi'as, whom they view as inferior. They would drag the country into civil war in the belief that they will resume their rule in the end.
18. The model of Oman is instructive. There, the British seconded NCOs and officers at the company level, and the result was probably the best-trained "leg" infantrymen in the Gulf. Though the British program ended in the early 1970s, they had founded a professional institution that proved itself in the mid-1970s when the Omani government successfully defeated an armed insurrection. The British model is worthy of emulation in Iraq.
19. The costs to the reconstruction efforts in terms of danger zone bonuses, insurance, transportation, and physical security variously are reported in the range of 30 to 50 percent of each contract. Such costs are prohibitive and cannot be sustained without unacceptable reductions in the scope of reconstruction or the infusion of additional billions of dollars.
20. Anthony Cordesman, *The Developing Iraqi Insurgency: Status at End-2004*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004, pp. 11, 15.
21. Fouad Ajami, *The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey*, New York, 1999, pp. 272, 284. Arafat's great success was that he had carried Palestinians from that "country of words" to some real political gains. When he landed in Palestine in 1994, Arafat returned to his homeland as a conquering hero, but he was unprepared for the task at hand.
22. Yasser Arafat was not a visionary leader. His great failure was in not handing over the reins to the cadre of educated and savvy Palestinians who were ready to take Arafat's success to its logical conclusion, a state. Instead, Arafat created an unwieldy, unimaginative, and corrupt autocracy that curbed rights and muzzled dissent. Had he knelt down and kissed the ground of his homeland upon his return, convened a national convention to achieve a consensus and vision for Palestine, and then bowed out to assume a position of prominence as an elder statesman, his legacy would have been one of truly great accomplishment and the Palestinian people would have been the beneficiaries.
23. At the League of Arab States summit in Beirut, Lebanon, in March 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah announced a wide ranging plan for Arab peace with Israel. In it, he proposed an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, borders, in

accordance with UN Resolution 242 and the establishment of a Palestinian state, in exchange for full Arab recognition of Israel and normalization of relations, including diplomatic, economic, and security. As the Crown Prince made his speech, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon launched an all out military assault on Palestinian refugee camps, which, in effect, killed the proposal.

24. Shahram Chubin, *Iran's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions, and Impact*, Washington, DC, 1994, p. 87.

CHAPTER 5

CHINESE OIL DEPENDENCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Commander Jim Cooney

China's dependence on foreign energy sources to fuel its economic growth represents a new influence on its national strategy. Prior to 1993, China was self-sufficient in oil production. By 2000 it was importing one million barrels of oil per day, which represented one-quarter of its petroleum needs. Economic experts project China to import eight million barrels per day by 2020; this will represent 75 percent of its oil requirement. Like Japan in the 1930s, China would view a disruption in its supply of oil, either through events unrelated to Chinese growth or contrived to slow the spread of its power in East Asia, as a threat to its national security. Such a disruption could precipitate a massive response, potentially involving armed conflict. Understanding why oil is so critical to China's national security and what China may do to secure sources of oil in the future is essential to any American strategy in the Western Pacific. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, the chapter will summarize China's current and future dependence on foreign oil, how oil relates to its economic development, and why prosperity is such an important national objective for the Chinese. It will then identify how oil dependence has led to recent changes in China's national security strategy, and recommend actions the United States should take in response to those changes.

China's consumption of oil has increased rapidly since 1990, far outpacing development of domestic sources.¹ Economic growth and increasing oil consumption generally follow parallel paths. China's gross domestic product grew by an average of 8 percent from 1999 to 2003,² while oil consumption grew an average of 7.5 percent during the same period.³ Projections suggest that China's oil consumption will grow to 11 million barrels per day by 2020, largely due to growth in the transportation sector.⁴ Proof of continued growth in this area




Figure 1. China's Oil Dependence.

manifests itself in the level of current and future road and auto construction. China ranks second in the world in auto expressway mileage and third in the world in total road mileage. They have laid down 1,800,000 kilometers of pavement. This trend is accelerating. The Chinese have accomplished 44 percent of this road and highway construction since 1990.⁵ Growth of the Chinese highway system will continue at a rapid pace for at least the next 3 years. The industrial and commercial bank of China announced in the summer of 2001 that it would finance 100 billion yuan (\$12 billion U.S.) in road construction projects over the next 5 years. This, according to the bank, will make "a great contribution to the state's economic development."⁶

China is filling these new roads and highways quickly with cars and trucks. Chinese citizens bought 4,400,000 automobiles in 2003. The Chinese Auto Association estimates sales will top five million this year, and growth could take off next year as China meets its world trade organization obligation to lift import quotas and cuts tariffs on automobile imports from 35 to 30 percent.⁷

There is no indication that domestic supplies can ever satisfy China's oil needs. China's proven reserves have declined over the past 10 years to the point where current Chinese production levels, which only cover two-thirds of its needs today, would exhaust its

domestic supply in 30 years.⁸ China's domestic production remains limited by oil field recovery capacity, not refinery capacity. China has shut down many of its smaller refineries due to over capacity in that sector.⁹ As a result, it is not possible for China physically to satisfy its oil needs domestically. Over one-third of China's oil imports come from the Middle East, another quarter come from South Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, etc.). The remaining imports largely come from Africa and the former Soviet Republics.¹⁰

Oil and China's National Security.

"The massacre in Tiananmen Square was an event full of great ironies. Deng Xiaoping, the chief target of the demonstrators' anger, had once been hailed as a pioneering reformer whose bold economic programs . . . improved the living standards of ordinary Chinese, and sparked a growing prosperity in the economy."¹¹ China's new found economic prosperity, and its resultant thirst for oil to fuel this economic engine, places the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a situation that Thomas Jefferson articulated 200 years ago: "We have the wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him nor safely let him go."¹² The population, particularly in the urban centers of China, has come to expect prosperity and will not tolerate a government viewed as responsible for an economic recession. As one popular Chinese magazine publisher put it: "These days, no one can persuade the Chinese people to trade their search for a better life with a political cause."¹³ Moreover, the regime did not find the crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protesters an easy task. The commander of the Thirty-Eighth Army Group initially received the order to put down the demonstration. He refused to lead his unit against the protesters despite threats of court martial.¹⁴ The CCP then went to great lengths to bring in People's Liberation Army (PLA) units from across the country to prevent any one unit receiving the responsibility and potentially refusing to act.¹⁵ Clearly the CCP does not wish to go through another wave of instability and has worked hard to prevent widespread discontent among its citizens. The issues that led to the unrest in 1989 largely were domestic problems involving poor monetary policy and government corruption.¹⁶ What has changed

from the issues that led to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations is that now there are external factors that could lead to an economic slowdown and, potentially, civil unrest. One of the most critical economic factors that could lead to civil unrest is the supply of oil.

Another issue that makes the CCP even more attuned to maintaining the current level of economic growth is the growing popular opinion throughout China that the government has an impact on citizens' daily lives. A Chinese government survey taken in 1990 and again in 2000 indicated that the number of people who felt the national government had an impact on their lives grew from 21 percent to 68 percent, and in urban centers that percentage has climbed to 75 percent.¹⁷ Given that the CCP emphasizes economic prosperity as a pillar of party policy, that the people recognize the government plays a significant role in their lives, and that the people have no institutional means of changing unpopular government actions, the CCP must be sensitive to any issue that could negatively affect economic growth.

Chinese Sources of Oil.

China's sources of foreign oil have evolved over time. Initially regional sources of oil from countries such as Indonesia and Brunei satisfied China's oil needs. However, China's percentage of the world oil demand has increased steadily. It grew from 2 to 6 percent from 1971 to 1997 and could reach 10 percent by 2020.¹⁸ To meet this growing demand, Chinese imports increasingly have come from the Middle East, and future growth in Chinese oil imports most probably will come from Middle Eastern sources.¹⁹ In addition to Middle Eastern oil, China remains interested in the largely undeveloped oil field beneath an island chain in the South China Sea known as the Spratly Islands.

Middle Eastern Oil.

There are no pipelines connecting China with Middle East oil sources. In order to reach China from the Middle East, tankers must transport oil, and the most direct route to China is through the Strait of Malacca.

This geographic chokepoint is the gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It roughly extends between the southern tip of Malaysia, where the city-state of Singapore is located, and the north coast of Australia, where there is a great archipelago, mostly controlled by Indonesia. South of Indonesia, the Torres Strait separates Australia from the Indonesian archipelago. The Torres Strait is an ecologically sensitive area that is too shallow and difficult to navigate for large ships such as super tankers. Therefore, the only practical route from the Indian Ocean to East Asia and the Pacific is the Strait of Malacca. A closure of the Strait would force any ship cruising at the standard speed of 15 knots to make a 2-week detour around Australia to get from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. The cost in fuel alone for a super tanker to make this detour is over \$1 million. The Strait of Malacca has been critical to global trade since Arab traders established routes with East Asia in the 8th century AD.

The building of the Suez Canal in the 19th century accentuated the importance of the Strait of Malacca because it allowed easy sea transport from markets in Asia directly to Europe. The Strait became indispensable in the 20th century with the establishment of oil as the energy source of choice by all industrialized societies around the globe. This was due initially to the large sources of oil in what was then the Dutch East Indies (modern day Indonesia) and later as a route between the Middle East and Asia and the Middle East and the western United States. By 1993, the Strait was handling over 8,800 vessels per year, a total which represented over one-third of the world's entire ocean going cargo ship fleet.²⁰ Included in that number were over 2,200 super tanker transits going to or from the Middle East.²¹

Strait of Malacca Security Environment.

The Strait of Malacca presents both challenges and opportunities for Sino/U.S. relations. This commerce route is unique in that it is a security concern for both China and the United States. Thus, any threat against the United States in this area necessarily will affect China. Similarly, any threat against Chinese interests in the region could impact the United States as well.

There are two major players in the area. Singapore is a well-developed nation in all respects, with a high regard for the rule of law and a government largely free of corruption. Moreover, it is the most stable power in the region. Due to its geographic location at the heart of the busiest waterway in the world, the security of the Strait of Malacca is of vital importance to Singapore. Indonesia, in contrast, has all the qualities that would allow extremist groups to flourish. It possesses a weak central government that does not administer the rule of law effectively and has a loosely regulated financial system that can covertly fund the activity of extremist groups.²² Indonesia also has ongoing ethnic tension that recently manifested itself during the East Timor crisis. The physical security of Indonesia is extremely challenging as well. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) fact book, Indonesia consists of 17,000 islands, only 6,000 of which are inhabited. These islands collectively present a 54,000 kilometer coastline. All of these factors represent underlying conditions that make Indonesia a fertile environment where terrorist groups can hide, train, and gain easy access to economic targets, especially one of the flagship issues for Middle East terrorism, the industrialized world's exploitation of oil. Current political and economic trends in Indonesia have resulted in an explosion of terrorist violence against Western targets. There have been nine terrorist bombings in Indonesia since 1999—most famously the October 2002 bombing in Bali that left 202 people dead (mostly Australian tourists).²³ Malaysia is similar to Indonesia in that it has a less centralized government and the rule of law is not as well defined as in Singapore. Like Indonesia, Malaysia has had to contend with various terrorist groups such as the *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* (KMM).

While there is no apparent conscious effort by terrorist groups to attack Chinese interests in the Strait of Malacca, actions by terrorists would cause serious economic problems for China. The unintended consequence of attacking U.S. and Western interests could have two differing effects. A threat could draw China into a closer relationship with the United States, if China were to recognize a common interest in regional security. On the other hand, it could create a conflict between the two countries, as each attempted to assert positive

control over the area's security environment. In particular, China could interpret increased security initiatives by the United States as an attempt to dominate the region. Additionally, given the long-standing animosity between China and the Southeast Asian countries, China could interpret an attack in the region as an attempt by one of the states in the Strait of Malacca to check China's growth as a regional hegemon. China could then carry out punitive actions against the alleged offending state that could only serve to worsen the security situation.

Recent activity by the United States in Southeast Asia has fueled China's suspicion that America aims to dominate the region's security environment. Specifically, there has been an increase in presence by the U.S. military in the region over recent years. The U.S. Department of Defense has increased its ties significantly with the defense organizations surrounding the Strait of Malacca, with U.S. Pacific Command now sponsoring and participating in two recurring naval exercises that involve Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The most significant, the mine countermeasures and diving exercise, held its inaugural event in June 2001. It focused on countering mine and undersea explosive threats to the Strait of Malacca.

One other exercise, Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training, is a semi-annual exercise held for decades. In the past, the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercise remained limited to one or two U.S. ships, and the exercise focused on humanitarian assistance and amphibious operations. This exercise has grown significantly in scope and security relevance over the past several years. American participation in the recently completed Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 2004 included an amphibious ship, a coast guard cutter, and two destroyers. The other participants (including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) conducted exercises relating to anti-terrorism, visit, board and search ship (VBSS) procedures, and small target gunnery practice.

Another structured military-to-military interaction in the region is the bi-annual Western Pacific Naval Symposium, last held in October 2002, and involving 17 other nations, including Indonesia and Malaysia. Although the security of the Strait of Malacca is not the specific reason for the conference, this issue mostly likely figured as a prominent topic. Finally, Singapore recently completed

its new Changi Naval Base with a deep draft pier, large enough to berth an American aircraft carrier. Significantly, Singapore publicly announced the pier would be available for use by the U.S. Navy.²⁴ In March of 2001 the USS *Kitty Hawk* was the first American carrier to visit the base.

China has attempted to counter perceived U.S. influence in the region since the late 1990s. A 1998 PLA whitepaper, *China's National Defense*, introduced a new policy known as the "New Concept of Security," which aimed at increasing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and at countering American military alliances around the globe.²⁵ The policy largely has been a failure for a number of reasons. Not surprisingly, China has not looked favorably on recent U.S. initiatives. A recent China News Service article noted that "the focus and emphasis of America's forces have shifted to East Asia."²⁶ China's current President Hu Jintao commented in 2004 that "the 'Malacca dilemma' is a key element to China's energy security" and "certain powers [the United States] have all along encroached on and tried to control the navigation through the Strait."²⁷

China's Middle East Security Strategy.

China is a relatively new arrival in the Middle East's diplomatic and security arena. Its recent dependence on foreign oil has forced the Chinese to reinterpret their political doctrine of self reliance. The reinterpretation argues that self reliance does not necessarily mean dependence on domestic production. Self reliance, as expressed by Mao Zedong, is the ability to "keep the initiative in one's own hands."²⁸ Despite that, China does not consider its current dependence on Middle East oil as fulfilling its rather loose definition of self reliance.

The Chinese see the Middle East as an environment dominated by the United States. There are large U.S. military commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, a strong naval presence in the Persian Gulf, and U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, along with substantial U.S. oil company investments throughout the region. China's view of the current Middle Eastern political and military environment has shaped its policy—one of opposition to U.S. policy in the region.²⁹ China is at a disadvantage in that it has

“neither strong historical ties nor long-standing strategic interests in the Middle East.”³⁰ This represents a difficulty when competing for influence in the region.

China’s present diplomatic strategy to gain influence in the region has aimed at nullifying American influence. The mechanism it has used is through support for regimes opposed to an American presence in the Middle East. The most visible example is Chinese support for Iran, specifically in the area of weapons technology sales. In the mid 1990s, China became the leading supplier of conventional arms to Iran.³¹ Additionally, China has provided assistance to Iran on developing dual use technology, easily converted to the development of nuclear weapons and systems designed to deliver such weapons.³² Issues about China providing nuclear weapons technology to Iran have been brewing for 15 years or more. In 1995 China succumbed to U.S. pressure and stopped the sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. Iran claims these reactors were exclusively for power generation. However, they are open to easy conversion to support a nuclear weapons program.³³ Since 2001, the Director of Central Intelligence has consistently reported that China has resumed nuclear weapons technology sales to Iran.³⁴

Moreover, China is helping Iran develop weapons delivery systems technology. Numerous reports from 1995 to 2002 have surfaced about China’s help with Iran’s *Shahab-3* and *Shahab-4* medium range ballistic missiles. These missiles have a range of 800 and 1,250 miles, respectively. Both are capable of hitting any state in the Middle East, while the *Shahab-4* could hit significant portions of Europe.³⁵ China’s delivery system support to Iran appears to be continuing. In January 2005, the United States imposed penalties on eight Chinese companies for exporting material that could improve Iran’s ballistic missile capability.³⁶

China’s Iranian strategy has precedent. It exported nuclear weapon’s technology to Pakistan for similar reasons. China wanted to prevent the United States and the Soviet Union from dominating the subcontinent located along China’s southern border.³⁷ Now Pakistan is a nuclear power, facing the nuclear-armed nation of India. Relations between India and Pakistan are relatively stable at present. This is due, in no small part, to the considerable interest of the United States in Pakistan and its assistance in fighting al-Qa’ida.

China's Middle East policy to oppose America's dominance in the region has had the effect of destabilizing the region; China will disrupt the relative balance of power among Middle East states if it provides Iran with nuclear weapon's technology. The potential for ethnic or religious conflict becomes more likely if Iran has strategic weapons that could support Islamic fundamentalism. Old hatreds between Iranian and Iraqi religious groups could flare up in the future. A nuclear armed Iran could allow it to act more aggressively towards a democratic Iraq or Afghanistan that do not share its fundamentalist beliefs. Another danger is that Israel could become an active participant in the situation. It appropriately could believe that a nuclear weapon in the hands of an Islamic state would be aimed at its territory. Selling weapons to Iran does not help China secure a reliable source of cheap oil. The policy inserts a destabilizing element into Middle East domestic affairs and encourages the United States to continue its extensive military presence there.

China and the Spratly Islands.

In addition to developing relationships in the Middle East, China also covets what potentially could be the largest oil reservoir in Asia, the Spratly Island oil field. Apart from the tension over the status of Taiwan, issues surrounding these islands present one of the greatest potential sources of conflict in the Western Pacific region.

The Spratly Islands are a group of small islands and reefs in the South China Sea. The islands are claimed by both China and Vietnam. The Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan also claim portions of the island chain.³⁸ There are 73 billion barrels of proven oil reserves under the islands. Most exploration companies expect the amount of proven reserves to continue to grow as exploration continues. The amount of proven reserves found to date under the islands is 10 times more than China's on-shore assets.³⁹

China recognizes the uniqueness of the Spratlys to its national interests. Its general foreign policy concerning countries along its borders has been that stability will promote security and economic growth. The one exception to that rule has been China's aggressive policy concerning the Spratlys.⁴⁰ In fact, China became more

confrontational in the region, especially with respect to Filipino claims to the islands, after the United States closed its last base in the Philippines.⁴¹ Without a U.S. military presence there, China openly has challenged the Filipino claim to the islands.

Chinese Military Doctrine Initiatives.

China's military is modernizing to support its foreign policy aims towards the Spratlys. Specifically, its military is modernizing in ways that support the securing of this source of oil. PLA doctrine rests on the writings of Mao Tse-Tung. Mao developed this doctrine during the 1927-49 Chinese civil war. Mao's principles and vernacular are still used by the PLA to develop doctrine.⁴² The PLA organizes its doctrine into two phases. They are the strategic defensive, followed by the strategic offensive. The strategic defensive breaks down into two smaller phases, the strategic retreat followed by the strategic counteroffensive.⁴³ Mao coined the terms "active defense" and "defense for the purpose of taking the offensive and counterattacking" to describe the strategic defensive.⁴⁴ Mao's doctrine made it difficult for the PLA to conduct military planning that fundamentally could be offensive and preemptive. As a result, all army operational plans were either defensive in nature, such as defending against an attack from the USSR or the United States, or focused on the retaking of Taiwan. The PLA argues that retaking Taiwan would be the final phase of the active defense strategy since Taiwan is a rebellious part of China proper. In all cases, PLA operational planning rested on two superpowers fighting each other.

The PLA began studying modern wars that were limited in scope, both in the force used and the geographic area, during the mid 1980s. It determined that limited wars have occurred routinely over things other than national survival. Nations have fought limited wars over ethnic, cultural, or religious issues, as well as borders and natural resources.⁴⁵ The case studies project caused the PLA to modify Mao's basic military doctrine. The new doctrine generally discounts an inevitable nuclear conflict between superpowers. A debate then began within the PLA over what other wars would look like and how they would be prosecuted. Chinese publications have referred

to these other types of conflict as a “local wars.” The study of local wars receives much more attention in current Chinese military journals than the traditional war between superpowers.⁴⁶ The local war concept gave PLA doctrine, military strategy, and operational concepts an offensive component, to include taking the initiative and striking first.⁴⁷

The PLA’s assessment of the future security environment speaks directly to the Spratly Island situation. It recognizes the shift from a bipolar Cold War division of the world to a new, multipolar world. One of the areas that Chinese military academics consider prime for conflict is the East Asian littoral.⁴⁸ PLA authors also see the fight for resources as being one of the most likely motivators for future conflict.⁴⁹

Along with the PLA’s new security assessment predictions, China has changed its definition of “strategic frontier.” In the past, the land boundaries and coastline have been China’s working definition of its frontiers, which supported the active defense strategy. Textbooks in Chinese schools now refer to three million square kilometers of ocean as sovereign territory.⁵⁰ PLA and civilian strategic thinkers also characterize the South China Sea, coincidentally the location of the Spratly Islands, as a “strategic frontier.”⁵¹ The PLA has taken these policy statements to mean that any issue in the South China Sea is an issue of sovereignty and a dispute over resources that necessarily must be Chinese.⁵² In China’s opinion, it has been restrained about asserting its authority over the area.⁵³

There is a direct link from policy to strategy in this case. China has established the South China Sea as an important interest. The Chinese military institution has changed its doctrine and military strategy to meet the stated national policy. Doctrinally, China has made the case to itself that control of the Spratly Islands is a viable national objective.

Chinese Military Modernization.

China is making substantive changes to its military in order to carry out this new military strategy. The military transformation is evident in the areas of resource allocation, equipment modernization, and the development of new capabilities.

China has been increasing its defense budget at a pace that is generally in line with its Gross Domestic Product growth for the past several years. The PLA budget grew 10 percent from 2002 to 2003. Projections put future budget growth at a similar rate.⁵⁴ Aggressively securing the Spratly Islands will involve the PLA Navy (PLAN). At present China's navy has limited offensive capability. There is only one noticeable naval construction program: China is dramatically expanding its underway replenishment ship capability. A robust at-sea replenishment capability will give China the capability to launch limited power projection operations. China has three replenishment ships capable of underway replenishment and astern refueling, and it plans to double this capability by building three more before the end of the decade.⁵⁵ The rest of the Chinese navy is small compared to its ground forces. The PLAN has a modest surface force of 62 destroyers and frigates, and is planning to build six more surface combatants in the next decade. China's submarine force consists of 55 conventional patrol submarines and a handful of ballistic missile, nuclear, and guided-missile submarines. The PLAN's amphibious force also is small. China has 30 ocean going amphibious landing vessels each capable of carrying approximately 200 troops or 10 armored vehicles, and possesses a dedicated marine force of three brigades that exercises with the amphibious ships. China's current naval capability and its new construction programs indicate it does not want to challenge the United States in a conventional, fleet-on-fleet, confrontation. However, China is making its existing navy, which has no peer in the South China Sea littoral, more expeditionary by building a capability to sustain it at sea in support of small scale sea control or sea denial operations, as well as relatively small (compared to the size of its army) amphibious operations.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is undergoing similar changes. Doctrinally the PLAAF is transforming from a purely defensive force to a more capable force, able to conduct both offensive and defensive operations. The offensive operations are geared specifically toward "winning a 'local war under high-tech conditions.'"⁵⁶ China's Air Force is modernizing by retiring large portions of its 1950s and 1960s air fleet; at the same time it is reinvesting the savings in less numerous, more capable, airframes composed of third generation

Russian made aircraft, such as the *Sokhoi Su-27* and *Su-30* fighters. China also is developing its own electronic warfare, warning and control systems, and aerial refueling capabilities to go along with its modern air fleet.⁵⁷ Operationally, the PLAAF has begun routine missions over international waters. Chinese military aircraft rarely flew missions beyond their coastline before the 1990s.⁵⁸

China's new military doctrine and modernization programs have been put to use in a series of naval exercises. China conducted six amphibious exercises, two naval and air force combined arms exercises, one naval logistics exercise and one exercise combining both sea and airborne forces, that it termed "offensive" in nature in the past decade.⁵⁹ China has the capability to control the Spratly Islands militarily. Its new doctrine and improved military capability give it that capability. However, the continued deterrent presence of the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Navy, prevents China from acting aggressively in the region. China cannot, and could not in the near future, given her ship construction program, confront the U.S. Navy directly.

U.S. Interests.

U.S. security interests offer opportunities for cooperation with China on the security of the global oil supply. U.S. security policy promotes the expansion of free markets, and economic development around the globe. The protection of free trade and free markets is most consistent with China's desires with regard to the Strait of Malacca. At the same time, U.S. security interests conflict with China's actions concerning its methods of achieving a secure source of oil. U.S. interests, such as the promotion of democracy and prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, are in conflict with China's attempts at gaining influence in the Middle East. Finally, the United States is ambivalent toward oil exploration and production development around the Spratly Islands. America wants the International Maritime Law of the Sea to govern conflicts over maritime resource rights. If the issue erupts into armed conflict, it could lead to considerable regional instability. This would affect economic prosperity by disrupting trade in the region. It could also affect global oil prices.

There are three issues involving Chinese dependence on foreign oil. The first is the security of the Strait of Malacca, the next is China's view of the U.S. role in the Middle East and how China is attempting to gain influence. Finally, there is the possibility that China could take unilateral action to secure more domestic oil for itself. All three issues require U.S. action.

The security of the Strait of Malacca is where Chinese and U.S. interests coincide. Were both parties to come to an agreement over the Strait of Malacca, such cooperation could help defuse the two issues that the United States and China disagree on. Both the United States and China benefit from the spread of a global system of free trade, and the safe transit of shipping through the Strait of Malacca is critical. The United States, partnering with Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, should invite Chinese participation in regional maritime security exercises. By demonstrating partnership, rather than a Cold War capitalism-against-communism framework, the Chinese will not feel threatened by an American military presence in the region. Chinese naval assets could then share the burden of security operations, leading to a greater understanding of security issues between the United States, China, and other South Asian countries.

There are, potentially, two second order effects to such military cooperation. Regional military-to-military cooperation could help defuse the Spratly Island issue by promoting closer relationships with the countries competing for the islands. Additionally, if the United States and China take steps towards cooperating on the security of global free trade, they could create a culture of military cooperation instead of competition. This spirit of cooperation could reduce tensions in other areas, such as the perceived U.S. dominance in the Middle East, and in the long term, the Taiwan issue.

China's interpretation of U.S. actions in the Middle East is leading to further destabilization of the region. This will necessarily result in more involvement and a longer and greater presence of U.S. military force in the region, precisely what China is trying to prevent. China's aid in the development of Iran's nuclear weapons program puts its policy in direct conflict with stated U.S. national security objectives. This fundamental misunderstanding is preventing cooperation on what should be a common interest, the continued supply of relatively

inexpensive oil to the world. Along with the indirect approach of cooperating on security in the Strait of Malacca, the United States must take up concerted and straightforward negotiations with the Chinese with respect to dual use technology provided to Iran and other Middle Eastern states. A Middle East that is roughly balanced in economic and military power between the various states in the region is the best way to remove the American presence. By empowering one Middle Eastern state with nuclear weapons, China is taking steps to destabilize the region and actually threatens the continued supply of cheap oil to the economy.

The forceful takeover of the Spratly Islands is the least probable scenario given the current world situation. However it has the greatest probability of destabilizing the entire South Asia region as well as the global oil economy. The best way to prevent an aggressive act by China is for the United States to maintain a credible deterrent force in the Western Pacific, even if the North Korean and Taiwan issues are resolved peacefully. A credible U.S. naval presence will maintain regional stability and forestall Chinese adventurism.

China's dependence on oil presents both challenges and opportunities. A secure source of oil is as important to China's national interests as it is to the United States and other industrialized nations. It would be hard to overstate oil's importance to the current regime in China. The shared interest in the security of global trade presents opportunities for increased cooperation and understanding. China's competition with the United States in gaining influence in the Middle East is actually counterproductive to its interests. Straightforward U.S. negotiations with China concerning the export of weapons technology to Iran are essential to prevent long term damage to Middle Eastern stability and Sino/U.S. relations. Finally, the United States must maintain a credible military presence in the Western Pacific to prevent any attempts at imposing a military solution on the Spratly Island issue. Oil dependence on the part of China brings its interests more in line with the global community of capitalist states. The challenge for the United States is to emphasize how this similarity presents opportunities for cooperation, while at the same time applying diplomatic pressure and maintaining deterrent forces to prevent conflict over the common need for oil.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Energy Information Agency, "China Country Analysis Brief," July 2004, available from www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html, Internet, accessed November 20, 2004.
2. World Bank, "China Data Profiles," August 2004, available from devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=CHN&CCODE=CHN&CNAME=China&PTYPE=CP;Internet, accessed November 20, 2004.
3. Energy Information Agency.
4. International Energy Agency, "World Energy Outlook 2000," Paris, OECD/IEA, 2000, p. 198.
5. "Total mileage of China's freeway ranks 2nd in the world," *People's Daily Online*, October 2004 [journal on-line], available from english.people.com.cn/200410/29/eng20041029_162122.html, Internet, accessed, November 20, 2004.
6. "Chinese Bank to Put 100 Billion Yuan into Road Construction," *People's Daily Online*, August 2001 [journal on-line], available from english.people.com.cn/english/200108/16/eng20010816_77416.html, Internet, accessed November 21, 2004.
7. "China's Auto Output, Sales Plunge in October," *People's Daily Online*, November 2004 [journal on-line], available from english.people.com.cn/200411/16/eng20041116_164044.html, Internet, accessed November 22, 2004.
8. British Petroleum, "Statistical Review of World Energy," June 2004, available from www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=2012411&contentId=2018340, Internet, accessed November 22, 2004.
9. Energy Information Agency.
10. British Petroleum, "Statistical Review of World Energy."
11. Chu-Yuan Cheng, *Behind the Tiananmen Massacre: Social Political, and Economic Ferment in China*, Boulder, CO, 1990, p. 13.
12. Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., *The Founders Constitution*, Vol. 1, Chicago, 1987, p. 575.
13. Stanley Rosen, "The Victory of Materialism: Aspirations to Join China's Urban Moneyed Classes and the Commercialization of Education," *The China Journal*, Vol. 51, August 2003, p. 34.
14. Timothy Brook, *Quelling The People*, New York, 1992, p. 40.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
16. Cheng, p. 33.
17. Yanli Wang, Nicholas Rees and Bernadette Andreosso-O'Callaghan, "Economic Change and Political Development in China: Findings From a Public Opinion Survey," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 13, No. 39, May 2004, p. 212.
18. International Energy Agency, "World Energy Outlook 2000," p. 189.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
20. John H. Noer and David Gregory, *Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia*, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 9.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
22. Colin L. Powell, "Patterns of Global Terrorism," April 2003, available from www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19983.htm, Internet, accessed October 6, 2004.
23. Associated Press, "Recent Terrorist Attacks in Indonesia," September 9, 2004, available from abcnews.go.com/wire/World/ap20040909_368.html, Internet, accessed September 24, 2004.
24. Michael Richardson, "Singapore Welcomes US Aircraft Carrier," *International Herald Tribune*, March 22, 2001, available from www.singapore-window.org/sw01/010322ih.htm, Internet, accessed February 5, 2005.
25. David M. Finkelstein, "China's New Concept of Security – Retrospectives & Prospects," October 30, 2001, available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/China_Center/PLA_Conf_Oct01/MFinkelstein.htm, Internet, accessed January 9, 2005.
26. Willy Lam, "Beijing's Reaction to East Asia's Changing Alliances," *China Brief*, Vol. IV, Issue 15, July 22, 2004, p. 2.
27. Mokhzani Zubir, "The Strategic Value of the Strait of Malacca," 2004, available from www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/mokhzani/strategic-value.pdf, Internet, accessed January 9, 2005.
28. Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China*, New York, 1995, p. 76.
29. Deng-ker Lee, "Peking's Middle East Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," *Issues & Studies: A Journal of Chinese Studies and International Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 8, August 1994, p. 87.
30. Barry Rubin, "China's Middle East Strategy," in *China and the Middle East*, P. R. Kumaraswamy, ed., New Delhi, 1999, p. 108.
31. Kenneth Kaztman, *Iran: Arms and Technology Acquisitions*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 97-474F, Washington, DC, The Library of Congress, 1998, p. 3.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
33. Shirley A Kan, *China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL31555, Washington, DC, The Library of Congress, 2003, p. 7.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
35. *Ibid.*
36. David E. Sanger, "U.S. Is Punishing 8 Chinese Firms For Aiding Iran," *New York Times*, sec. I, January 18, 2005, p. 1.

37. Ashok Kapur, "China and Proliferation: Implications for India," *China and the Middle East*, P. R. Kumaraswamy, ed., New Delhi, 1999, p. 175.
38. Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA World Fact Book: Spratly Islands," November 30, 2004, available from www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pg.html, internet, accessed December 14, 2004.
39. Haijiang Henry Wang, *China's Oil Industry and Market*, Amsterdam, 1999, p. 30.
40. H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong, "The Foreign Policy Outlook of China's 'Third Generation' Elite," in *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, David M. Lampton, ed., Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 141.
41. Wang, p. 29.
42. Paul H. B. Godwin, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine," *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949*, Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, ed., Armonk, NY, 2003, p. 25.
43. Mao Tse-Tung, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung*, Peking, 1967, p. 111.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
45. David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military; Progress, Problems and Prospects*, Berkeley, 2002, p. 64.
46. Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 262.
47. Shambaugh, p. 65.
48. Pillsbury, p. 259.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
50. Shambaugh, p. 67.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
53. Allen Carson, "Constructing the Dragon's Scales," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 12, No. 37, November 2003, p. 698.
54. International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance: 2004-2005," 2004, available from 3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/pdf/104318.pdf, Internet, accessed December 15, 2004.
55. Stephen Saunders, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002*, Coulsdon, United Kingdom, 2001, p. 112.
56. "PLA Air Force to Switch Its Defensive Posture," *People's Daily Online*, November 15, 2004, available from English.people.com.cn/200411/15/eng20041115_163994.html, Internet, accessed January 24, 2005.

57. "The PLA Air Force, PLAAF," *China Defense Today*, 2005, available from www.sinodefence.com/airforce/default.asp, Internet, accessed January 24, 2005.

58. Ken Allen, "PLA Air Force Organization," *The PLA as Organization: Reference volume 1.0*, James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., RAND Corporation, 2002, available from www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF182/, Internet, accessed January 24, 2005, p. 370.

59. Srikanth Kondapalli, "China's Naval Training Program," *Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA*, Vol. XXIII, No. 8, November 1999 [journal on-line], available from www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_99kos03.html#note*, Internet, accessed February 5, 2005.

CHAPTER 6

PREEMPTION AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: CONFLICTING MEANS TO AN END

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Mills

Much of the discussion about American foreign policy over the past several years has centered on whether or not the United States should have invaded Iraq preemptively. Regardless of political persuasion, or one's perception of the success or failure of current operations, the question persists. It strikes directly at the heart of the issue of whether the policy of preemption has supported or detracted from one of the highest priority national security objectives of the United States: "to prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)."¹ There are other policies or concepts intended to support this national security objective, such as the three pillars of the December 2002 "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction": counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management.² The currency and relevance of this discussion is evident in the ongoing national debate about how to deal effectively with the growing nuclear threat from Iran and North Korea. Moreover, the September 30, 2004, debate between President George Bush and Senator John Kerry highlighted proliferation of WMD as the gravest threat to U.S. national security. Both candidates emphasized the issue throughout their debate.

The aim of this chapter is to argue that the policy of nonproliferation and the newly elevated and explicitly articulated policy of preemption represent, in fact, conflicting objectives and that the friction caused by this policy mismatch hinders the strategic attainment of the stated national security objective of preventing enemies from threatening the United States and its allies with WMD. In so doing, the chapter will distinguish between hostile nation-states and nonstate actors (e.g., terrorist organizations and drug cartels), because, while both represent enemies or threats, the policies of preemption and nonproliferation ostensibly aim at nation-states.

Specifically, a preemptive attack against any terrorist organization will occur physically on the sovereign territory of some nation-state. The same logic applies to the policy of nonproliferation, which demands strict control and accountability of state-produced or state-controlled nuclear material to prevent it from falling into the hands of terrorists.

The scope of this chapter, however, will remain limited only to the policies of preemption and nuclear nonproliferation. It will not attempt to answer whether the invasion of Iraq was justified or not, or if that act has made the United States more or less secure. Nor will it discuss non-nuclear WMD, counterproliferation or consequence management. While the methodology of this argument rests largely on facts concerning nuclear proliferation, which some might dispute as circumstantial and without direct linkage to the policy of preemption, the reality, as John Adams suggests, is that “facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.”³

Preemption, Imminence, and Intelligence – Connecting the Dots.

The right of “. . . preemption, defined as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, long has been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law.”⁴ Why, then, has this policy proven so controversial for Americans and become the centerpiece of foreign policy debates in the United States? And, if it has become a commonly accepted principle, many question why the United States found it necessary to reiterate explicitly the option in its current “National Security Strategy” by stating “we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to self-defense by acting preemptively.”⁵ First, the renewed emphasis by the United States on the concept of preemption came largely in response to the threat posed by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). As President Bush stated prior to his February 2005 visit to Europe, “September the 11th caused us to change our foreign policy.”⁶ Secondly, theorists generally have accepted the right to preemption as applying only in situations of imminent self-defense. However,

in the case of Iraq, imminence, based on intelligence reports, has proven difficult to justify. As the September 2002 "National Security Strategy of the United States of America" stated, the warnings of armies forming along borders no longer obtain. "We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries."⁷

With the benefit of hindsight, there is much discussion on whether future commentators will view this expansion of the definition of imminence as a legitimate reason for a preemptive attack. As the absence of WMD in Iraq highlighted, the determination of this new definition of imminence, based on conflicting and potentially faulty intelligence, is difficult to verify. Notwithstanding the Monday morning quarterbacking that has transpired since the failure to discover WMD in Iraq, the degree of imminence is proving equally difficult to ascertain in Iran and North Korea. Iran claims it does not have, and is not developing, nuclear weapons. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed El Baradei, supports this contention. He stated in February 2005 that there "have been no discoveries in the last 6 months to substantiate claims that Iran is secretly working toward building a bomb."⁸ U.S. intelligence sources, however, claim that Iran is using its nuclear power program as a shield to produce weapons.⁹

Assessment on North Korea's nuclear program also is uncertain. On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced for the first time that it had nuclear weapons and would not return to the six-nation talks.¹⁰ In response to North Korea's claim, Robert Zoellick, nominated to be the next deputy secretary of state for the United States, stated on February 15, 2005, that North Korea's announcement might have been a bluff.¹¹ He suggested that they actually may not possess any nuclear weapons at all. This suggestion further clouded the already murky picture provided by various intelligence agencies, each having its own assessment of North Korea's nuclear weapons development program. "Defense Intelligence Agency analysts believe North Korea may already have produced as many as 15 nuclear weapons . . . the CIA lowballed the estimate at two to three bombs, while the Department of Energy analysis puts it somewhere in between."¹² So, while Iran claims it is not developing nuclear weapons, the

United States claims that it is, and when North Korea claims it has developed nuclear weapons, the United States asserts that it may only be bluffing.

These contrasting intelligence estimates about both Iran and North Korea, and the intelligence failure in Iraq, will make it difficult to determine and assert the degree of imminence that must form the basis for future preemptive attacks. The need to protect sources and methods of the intelligence used to obtain information that is the basis for determining the imminence of a threat further complicates proving the reliability and sufficient level of imminence. Although many agree that the warnings of armies forming along borders no longer pertain and that one must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of current adversaries, reliably determining the degree of imminence to garner the necessary domestic or even international support for future preemptive action will be increasingly problematic.

Regardless of whether or not the United States exercises its self-proclaimed right to preemptive attack in the future, clearly its preemptive action in Iraq has had an effect on the international community. The prospect of the world's only superpower acting preemptively has proven distressing not only to its enemies, but even to many of its allies. Given the context of the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. Government interpreted its stated policy of preemption as a notice served to both friends and foes—a notice unheeded by Saddam Hussein that thereby led to his downfall. The interesting question is what message has this sent to both state and nonstate actors that either currently possess or are trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Has this policy discouraged nuclear proliferation or has it accelerated it? Has it served the United States well in the area of nuclear nonproliferation?

Developing Nuclear Capability – A Cost/Benefit Analysis.

Before answering these questions, one must examine two facts that have driven some nations to begin developing a nuclear capability. First, nations possessing nuclear weapons have never attacked each other. Nuclear weapons have proven an effective deterrent between nation-states. Nuclear optimists argue that offsetting nuclear weapon

capabilities are stabilizing, because they make war too costly.¹³ Akin to the democratic-peace theory of international relations, which posits that democracies do not attack each other, there appears to be an unwritten nuclear-peace theory based on the precedent that countries with nuclear weapons have not attacked one another. Second is the fact that nations with nuclear weapons receive different treatment on the international stage than those which do not possess them. Their importance is greater and their status elevated in the international community. This historically has been true going back to the establishment of the permanent United Nations (UN) Security Council, the members of which were coincidentally also the first five nations to possess nuclear weapons. In the days of the Cold War, nuclear weapons equated to prestige, power, and development.

The 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . . . divides its signatories into two categories: nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). Only those states that had developed and tested nuclear weapons before the treaty were included in the NWS category. These are the USA, USSR, Britain, France and China, who are also the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the so-called P-5.¹⁴

Despite the attempts by the P-5 to institutionalize what some termed nuclear apartheid, other nations have developed nuclear capability and eventually produced weapons. In subsequent years, Israel, South Africa, India, and Pakistan (for a combination of reasons to include national security, power, and prestige that nuclear status afforded), all developed nuclear weapons. The power and status that nuclear weapons states demanded in the international community only served to entice countries such as Iraq, Libya, Iran, and North Korea, each determining that the risk was worth the reward.

They all know that India, Pakistan, and Israel joined the nuclear club without ever accepting the rules laid out in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Even after India and Pakistan set off tests in 1998, the sanctions America imposed were relatively modest and short-lived. As soon as America needed Pakistan's help after the September 11, 2001, attacks, the country was transformed from nuclear outlaw to "major non-NATO ally."¹⁵

Iran and North Korea are the most recent examples of countries willing to accept the risks of developing nuclear capabilities. They represent countries which few would discuss or consult, if they did not have nuclear development programs. With nuclear development programs, however, they have become the subject of intense diplomatic negotiations, each being offered a variety of incentives to disband its nuclear capability. They know that these overtures would not be forthcoming except for their burgeoning nuclear development programs. They also understand that, while nations that acquire nuclear weapons historically have been the recipient of punishment from other countries or the international community, to date, the tools for enforcement have not included military force. There is growing fear that the system for preventing the spread of nuclear arms may be eroding irreversibly, signaling that a quiet, low-scale arms race may be taking shape.¹⁶ "If you don't do anything with a big cheater, what are the middle and future cheaters to think? The list could include Syria, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, Taiwan or Brazil, even Indonesia and Sudan."¹⁷

Based on these realities, it would appear logical for nations to conclude that attack, from the United States or another country with nuclear weapons, is less likely, if they possess their own arsenal. One could also deduce, based on the invasion of Iraq, on history, and on America's reassertion of a policy of preemption, that nation-states are vulnerable to preemptive attack while developing nuclear weapons, but less likely to confront an attack after they possess them. Part of the America's justification for attacking Iraq was that it was important to do so before Saddam Hussein acquired nuclear weapons. (U.S. intelligence believed that he possessed non-nuclear WMD, but was still in the process of developing nuclear weapons.) If this is true, then it is logical for nations possessing nuclear weapons to keep them, and countries in the process of developing nuclear weapons to accelerate their efforts. "Our demolition of Hussein was supposed to cow the others into submission. As it happens, the invasion apparently had the opposite effect. North Korea and Iran may have deduced that the greatest danger is not building nuclear weapons."¹⁸

Nuclear Proliferation or Modernization?

There is reportedly sufficient enriched uranium and plutonium in the world to fuel at least 100,000 nuclear warheads. Eight countries currently possess nuclear weapons and two countries (North Korea and Iran) either have newly developed nuclear weapons or are close to having that capability.¹⁹ “More than 31,000 nuclear weapons are still maintained by the eight known nuclear powers a decrease of only 3,000 since 1998. Ninety-five percent of these weapons are in the United States and Russia, and more than 16,000 are deployed operationally.”²⁰ Moreover, terrorist organizations have been trying for at least a decade to acquire the knowledge and material to build some form of nuclear weapon. Osama Bin Laden, who has spoken of acquiring nuclear weapons as a religious duty, has been at the forefront of such activities.²¹ There have been many treaties, agreements, and initiatives, which, taken collectively, aim at reducing the amount of nuclear material and number of nuclear weapons nations possess, preventing any other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons, and safeguarding or destroying weapons grade material to prevent it from falling into the wrong hands. To date these efforts have had mixed results.

The United States is arguably the leader and most active proponent of global nuclear nonproliferation. Its national security strategy and strategy to combat WMD make clear an intention to exercise global leadership on the matter. To this end, the United States took the lead in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Eleven countries agreed to that initiative in September 2003 in an effort to prevent nuclear material from being illegally transported, produced, or sold.²² A number of experts have heralded this cooperative effort as effective. Moreover, the United States has pledged to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal significantly. These cooperative and conciliatory efforts at global nuclear nonproliferation, however, stand in contrast to ongoing efforts by the United States to modernize its current nuclear arsenal and develop new tactical nuclear weapons and its reluctance to ratify, after already signing, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Other countries with nuclear weapons appear to have taken similar steps toward modernizing their nuclear weapons capability.

While it may, or may not, be the case that they are following the U.S. lead on nuclear weapon modernization, the United States cannot, based on its own efforts, legitimately condemn such nuclear modernization plans. For example, Russia currently is producing a new SS-27 *Topol-M*, a road mobile version of the SS-27 with a 7,000-plus mile range, a next generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a payload of 4,400 kilograms and up to 10 warheads, and new *Borey*-class nuclear-powered submarines, each of which will carry 12 surface-to-land ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and a range of more than 8,000 kilometers.²³ In addition, France has a detailed nuclear weapons modernization plan through 2015.²⁴ Not surprisingly, China, India, and Pakistan, have all outlined their plans to go forward with nuclear weapons modernization. The end result has been that, while there may be some promise of reduction in numbers of nuclear weapons from all these countries (mostly of antiquated systems already requiring disposal), there has been a simultaneous commitment to continue modernization and production of newer and more advanced weapons.

While nuclear weapons modernization plans pose a potential danger, the reaction in Russia is perhaps the most disturbing. Estimated to still have as many as 35,000 nuclear warheads,²⁵ Russia has, in light of the nuclear weapons modernizations discussed above, all but abandoned its previous commitment to disarmament. Despite early success and years of work under the Nunn-Lugar Treaty, the majority of its Cold War arsenal remains inadequately guarded and questionably accounted for.

For years the Ministry of Atomic Energy has blocked U.S. officials from helping Russia secure parts of its sprawling nuclear arsenal, including some 600 metric tons of bomb-grade fissile material and up to 25,000 warheads . . . The Ministry of Defense reported installing only about one-third of the 76 miles of perimeter fencing that the United States began providing in 1997 for warhead storage sites at 52 separate locations. Meanwhile the Department of Energy has finished installing security improvements at only 13 of 133 building sites in the nuclear weapons complex. Overall the United States has been given access to only 35 of 133 nuclear weapons complex buildings.²⁶

This poses the real, if not realized already, danger of nuclear material, technology, or weapons being stolen by or sold to state or nonstate actors. During the February 16, 2005, Congressional testimony, senior intelligence officials, quoting a National Intelligence Council report, made this danger clear. The report stated that “we assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, and we are concerned about the total amount of material that could have been diverted or stolen in the last 13 years.”²⁷ The report also noted that Russian authorities could not have recovered “all the [nuclear] material reportedly stolen.”²⁸ This material, in the hands of terrorist organizations, would represent the most significant of threats to U.S. national security.

Preemption’s Effect – Nuclear Deterrence or Incentive.

The most obvious success in countering such a threat was the discovery and break up the Abdul Qadeer Khan network, followed by Libya’s announcement that it was abandoning its nuclear weapons program and allowing verification by international inspectors who can now access its facilities. This action immediately followed the U.S. liberation of Iraq and the capture of Saddam Hussein. American policymakers hailed Libya’s announcement and actions as the premier example of the policy of preemption furthering the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. While Saddam Hussein’s fall certainly influenced Mohammar Qadafi’s decision, he was as much, if not more, influenced by the realization that international law enforcement efforts had compromised Libya’s nuclear development program.

Given the options, he decided it was in his best interest to announce a unilateral abandonment of Libya’s nuclear weapons program, rather than confront an international community with irrefutable evidence of his designs and the resulting consequences. “Caught in the act, Libya was forced to publicly reveal it had worked secretly to build nuclear as well as chemical weapons. Qadafi, concerned about his legacy and an economy hit hard by sanctions made the startling announcement in December 2003.”²⁹ In this way, Qadafi figured he could muster some semblance of international prestige, while at the same time negotiating a deal that ended years of sanctions against Libya for its role in the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am jet that killed 270

people in Lockerbie, Scotland.³⁰ Even with Qadafi's declaration that he would cooperate with international inspectors, many suspect that he still has not been entirely forthcoming.

While the policy of preemption's effect on Libya's supposed nuclear disarmament is arguable, it is difficult to argue that preemption has yet to produce positive results in North Korea and Iran. North Korea shows no indication of slowing or stopping its nuclear weapons program. Most reports agree that it currently has between six and eight nuclear weapons and continues its effort at extending its missile range capability.

North Korea is an economic basket case that desperately sells whatever it has to whomever will pay . . . it is known as 'Missiles R Us,' having sold missiles in the last decade to Iran, Libya and Yemen . . . It is actively constructing a 200-megawatt reactor and a 50-megawatt reactor. On this path, when North Korea is able to produce additional nuclear weapons-useable material, or indeed bombs, nothing will prevent it from becoming "Nukes R Us" for terrorists and other proliferators.³¹

Given the nuclear weapons modernization efforts of other countries with nuclear weapons, North Korea argues that international efforts aiming to disarm it are hypocritical. Moreover, North Korea seems to take an odd sense of pride in the prestige that it demands from the United States and other nations, a prestige which derives solely from its possession of nuclear weapons. The symbol of power that nuclear weapons provide singularly backs up its status and legitimacy in the world. Lastly, North Korea has been the subject of international punishment using all elements of power with the exception of one—the military. The North Koreans understand the concept of nuclear-peace theory and assume that the best way to prevent a preemptive attack is to cling stubbornly to a nuclear capability.

Iran is in a different situation. Believed not yet to have nuclear weapons, some have alleged that it is dangerously close to possessing its first nuclear weapon. It also announced recently that its missiles can range Europe.³² In its case, it appears the policy of preemption, as executed against its neighbor Iraq, has accelerated its nuclear proliferation efforts, not deterred them. One could argue that the preemptive attack on Iraq did not influence Iran's ambitions, and the Iranians would have proceeded with their nuclear development

program, even if the United States had not invaded Iraq. The relevant question, however, is whether the policy of preemption has, in any way, deterred its nuclear proliferation.

While it may still be too early to ascertain, the evidence suggests otherwise. Iran appears to be following the same model as North Korea, the implementation of which was seemingly hastened by Saddam Hussein's fate. Iran now receives international attention similar to North Korea's. Visited by international diplomats and offered a variety of quid pro quos, it has more bargaining power in the international community now than ever before. Iran also learned that it is most vulnerable to preemptive attack at present, while it is developing nuclear weapons. It also is aware that, if history is any indication of the future and the nuclear-peace theory proves true, the possession of nuclear weapons minimizes the likelihood of preemptive attack. The policy of preemption with regard to Iran has not deterred nuclear proliferation, but appears to have accelerated its nuclear weapon development.

This development in Iran is especially dangerous, given its support for radical Islam and associated terrorist organizations. This is the most likely nexus of WMD and terrorist organizations. Having stated that, there is no evidence that the policy of preemption has deterred terrorist organizations' efforts to acquire nuclear material, knowledge, or weapons. In fact, because they already have attacked the United States, most in the West would consider an attack on these organizations as a retaliatory attack and not a preemptive attack. Terrorists understand that they will be attacked if located, so the threat of preemption is moot.

The effect of this preemptive policy has only been evident on nation-states that possess or are trying to develop nuclear weapons and on those that support terrorist organizations. For those countries with nuclear weapons, the preemptive precedent, based on imminent threat set by the United States, already has been cited as justification for possible preemptive strikes. Shortly after the Beslan massacre, the chief of the general staff of Russia's armed forces declared that Russia will "take all measure to liquidate terrorist bases in any region of the world."³³ Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov echoed this shift in policy; he "also defended Russia's right to carry out preemptive strikes outside Russia."³⁴ The situation between India and Pakistan,

two countries with nuclear weapons, is now more dangerous with this preemptive precedent. Using the same logic that the United States expressed in its justification for its policy of preemption, it is plausible that Pakistan or India may determine that a preemptive strike is justified and necessary at some point in time to ensure its own national security.

The policy of preemption has only hardened North Korea's resolve to retain its nuclear capability and provided justification for its claims of self defense. North Korean Ambassador to the UN Han Sung Ryol claimed as much in an interview on February 20, 2005, when he stated, "We have no other option but to have nuclear weapons as long as the Americans are trying to topple our system. If the United States withdraws its hostile policy, we will drop our Anti-Americanism and befriend it. Then why would we need nuclear weapons?"³⁵

In Iran, the rhetoric also has grown increasingly hostile. Hassani Rohani, the secretary general of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, announced on February 6, 2005, that there was nothing the West could do to make it scrap its nuclear program, and that Iran would retaliate in the event of an attack by America or Israel: "We will definitely accelerate our activities to complete our [nuclear] fuel cycle."³⁶ This statement points toward an accelerated effort to achieve what Saddam Hussein was unable to accomplish. "Apparently, they (the Iranians) have reached the conclusion they need the bomb more than ever to keep the United States out of their business and out of their country."³⁷ These developments, particularly in light of the global nuclear modernization plans, suggest that preemption is working at cross-purposes against the policy of nonproliferation. The most successful recent effort at nonproliferation has been the Proliferation Security Initiative, which has international support and has the committed leadership of the United States. This is the type of commitment and leadership from the United States required in all nonproliferation efforts.

Conclusion.

The facts suggest that the policy of preemption, while not being surrendered as a principle of self-defense, should not be explicitly

written into subsequent U.S. National Security Strategy and used as policy doctrine. It is well-understood by the rest of the world that the United States has the power and will to exercise that right when it determines that imminent self-defense is necessary. Moreover, as most national security professionals have accepted nuclear terrorism as the gravest threat to national security, the United States should make real and tangible efforts in the global reduction of nuclear weapons and material, beginning with the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Others will see these nonproliferation efforts as sincere only if the United States stops its modernization and development of new nuclear weapons and declares a unilateral reduction of its nuclear arsenal. This will not weaken national security. On the contrary, such action would provide the United States and the rest of the international community additional and legitimate leverage to reduce the threat from state actors which possess nuclear weapons, weaken and delegitimize those state actors trying to acquire weapons, and reduce the amount of nuclear material becoming available to nonstate actors. This increased emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence will better serve the U.S. efforts to achieve its national security objectives. While preemptive action in Iran, North Korea or some other part of the world may well be necessary, American policymakers should view this option only as a choice of last resort and not a specified policy for achieving its national security objectives. These recommendations would reconcile the current friction between the conflicting policies of preemption and nonproliferation and further the U.S. realization of its national security objectives.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Washington, DC, September 2002, p.1.

2. George W. Bush, "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," Washington, DC, September 2002, p. 2.

3. John Adams, "Argument in Defense of the Soldiers in the Boston Massacre Trials," December 1770, available from www.quotationspage.com/quote/3235.html, Internet, accessed October 10, 2004.

4. Michael E. O'Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg, "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption," Policy Brief #113, December 2002, available from www.brook.edu/comm/policy_briefs/pb113.htm, Internet, accessed October 6, 2004.
5. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," p. 6.
6. Elisabeth Bumiller, "Bush Seeks To Begin A Thaw In Europe Still Cool To Him," *New York Times*, February 20, 2005, p. 1, available from ebird.dodmedia.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050220353122.html, Internet, accessed February 23, 2005.
7. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," p. 15.
8. Dafna Linzer and Glenn Kessler, "IAEA Head Disputes Claims On Iran Arms," *Washington Post*, February 16, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050216352324.html, Internet, accessed February 16, 2005.
9. Ken Silverstein, "Senator Urges White House To Join Talks On Iran," *Los Angeles Times*, February 14, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050214351792.html, Internet, accessed February 14, 2005.
10. "North Korea Admits Having Nuclear Arms, Quits 6-Nation Talks," *Baltimore Sun*, February 10, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050210351051.html, Internet, accessed February 14, 2005.
11. Joel Brinkley, "U.S. Official Says North Korea Could Be Bluffing On Nuclear Arms," *New York Times*, February 16, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050216352314.html, Internet, accessed February 16, 2005.
12. Knut Royce, "Debating North Korea Nukes," *Long Island Newsday*, February 16, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e2005021635417.html, Internet, accessed February 16, 2005.
13. Chris Gagne, "Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia: Building a Common Ground," *Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia*, Michael Krepon, ed., New York, 2004, p. 43.
14. M. V. Ramana, "The Indian Nuclear Bomb—Long In The Making," available from members.tripod.com/~no_nukes_sa/precis.html, Internet, accessed February 16, 2005.
15. David E. Sanger, "Nuclear Reality: America Loses Bite," *New York Times*, February 20, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s200502200353077.html, Internet, accessed February 23, 2005.
16. James Sterngold, "Experts Fear Nuke Genie's Out of Bottle," *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 22, 2004, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20041123339120.html, Internet, accessed November 23, 2004.
17. Sanger.

18. Steve Chapman, "The Looming Nuclear Danger," *Chicago Tribune*, February 13, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20050214351642.html, Internet, accessed February 14, 2005.
19. Reuters, "The New Nuclear Nightmare," *Chicago Tribune*, August 29, 2004, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20040830315836.html, Internet, accessed August 31, 2004.
20. "Current Time," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, September/October 2003, available from www.thebulletin.org/media/current.html, Internet, accessed August 31, 2004.
21. Reuters.
22. "The Proliferation Security Initiative," available from www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/34726, Internet, accessed October 6, 2004.
23. "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2004," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2004, available from www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/ja04nukenote.html, Internet, accessed August 31, 2004.
24. Bruno Tertrais, "Nuclear Policy: France Stands Alone," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2004, Vol. 8, available from www.thebulletin.org/issues/2004/ja04/ja04tertrais.html, Internet, accessed August 31, 2004.
25. "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2004."
26. Justin Bernier, "The Death of Disarmament in Russia?" *Parameters*, Summer 2004, p. 89.
27. Bill Gertz, "Goss Fears WMD Attack In U.S. 'A Matter Of Time'," *Washington Times*, February 17, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050217352536.html, Internet, accessed February 23, 2005.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Bill Gertz, "Libyan Sincerity on Arms In Doubt," *Washington Times*, September 9, 2004, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040909318899.html, Internet, accessed September 9, 2004.
30. Dafna Linzer, "IAEA Cites Doubts On Libya's Uranium," *Washington Post*, August 31, 2004, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040831316172.html, Internet, accessed August 31, 2004.
31. Graham Allison, "The Specter of Nuclear Proliferation," *Los Angeles Times*, February 17, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050217352582.html, Internet, accessed February 23, 2005.
32. Reuters, "Iran's Missiles Can Now Hit Europe, Ex-Official Says," *Washington Post*, October 6, 2004, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20041006326619.html, Internet, accessed October 6, 2004.
33. Dave Montgomery, "Russian Antiterror Plan May Involve Raiding Neighbor," *Miami Herald*, September 30, 2004, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040930324923.html, Internet, accessed September 30, 2004.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Bob Drogin, "North Korea Urged to Resume Talks," *Los Angeles Times*, February 20, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil.ebfiles/e20050220353148.html, Internet, accessed February 23, 2005.

36. Alec Washington, "Iran Challenges US Over Nuclear Programme," *London Daily Telegraph*, February 7, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil.ebfiles/e200507350303.html, Internet, accessed February 14, 2005.

37. "Bush Doctrine Gets A Nuclear Reaction," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, February 13, 2005, available from ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050214351832.html, Internet, accessed February 14, 2005.

CHAPTER 7

NATO: STILL RELEVANT AFTER ALL THESE YEARS?

Colonel Gregory C. Kraak

OVERVIEW

One commentator on European affairs recently noted, “During the Cold War, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) provided the proper linchpin of American—and West European—security policy, and served as a useful, even fundamental deterrent to Soviet military might and expansionism. However, NATO’s time has come and gone, and today there is no legitimate reason for it to exist.”¹ In contrast, the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) states that “NATO must develop new structures and capabilities to carry out [its] mission under new circumstances.” It then proposes to “expand NATO’s membership to democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests.”²

This represents two divergent views on a complex and contentious issue. This chapter will assess whether NATO still represents a relevant alliance, given the dissolution of the Soviet Union and emergence of the European Union (EU), and will provide, among a number of alternatives, a logical and appropriate course of action for the United States to adopt for its future NATO policy: expand, contract, or dissolve the alliance.

BACKGROUND

The end of World War II in 1945 brought new optimism to a war-weary world. After two world wars in the span of less than 30 years, many believed the nations of the world finally would be able to coexist peacefully without fear of the next war to end all wars. The establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 represented

an expression of hope for the possibilities of a new global security arrangement and for fostering the social and economic conditions necessary for peace to prevail.³

But the turbulent and often shaky relations during the war between the powers of the Grand Alliance (the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) were a precursor of troubled times ahead. A new empire was rising under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, and the Soviet Union now stood in direct opposition to the free world and democratic ideals.⁴ At the same time, Harry S Truman achieved election as President in his own right in 1948. His new administration placed much of its emphasis on domestic spending in the form of his version of the New Deal. The Fair Deal focused spending primarily on housing, schools, and national health insurance. To pay for these programs without increasing taxes or running a deficit, Truman trimmed military spending.⁵

Europeans, already threatened and distrustful of Soviet intentions, found themselves equally alarmed by the sudden inward shift towards domestic issues by the United States. They feared that the perception of an isolationist America might encourage Soviet expansionism by sending mixed signals. To reassure European concerns and demonstrate unity through collective defense against military aggression, the United States and 11 other nations created the NATO alliance in April 1949. From its inception, NATO's primary purpose was to demonstrate America's resolve to defend Europe against a Soviet attack. The alliance achieved this goal successfully for over 40 years until the Cold War ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In the wake of the Cold War's end, NATO has expanded twice: in 1999 to include the former Warsaw Pact countries of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic; and again in 2004 to include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. These eastward expansions have swelled membership to 26 nations (Figure 1). They also have not gone unnoticed in Moscow. NATO's latest expansion in 2004 extended its reach to within 160 kilometers of St. Petersburg and fueled suspicions within the Russian government, despite assurances from the West, of NATO's peaceful intentions.

Belgium	Greece	Norway
Bulgaria *	Hungary #	Poland #
Canada	Iceland	Portugal
Czech Republic #	Italy	Romania
Denmark	Latvia *	Slovakia *
Estonia *	Lithuania *	Slovenia *
France	Luxembourg	Spain
Germany	Netherlands	Turkey

Key:
joined in 1999
* joined in 2004

Figure 1. NATO Member Countries (2004).

But while NATO membership is still much coveted throughout Europe, the evolution of the EU, founded as the European Community in 1957, serves as a counterbalance to NATO, at least from an American perspective. The members of the EU finalized and agreed to the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in June 2004. The intent of this new constitution is to create a political and economic alliance among the 25-member nations (19 of which also belong to NATO—see Figure 2), and ultimately to develop a military arm as well. The constitution also includes the appointment of a foreign minister to oversee a combined, single foreign policy for all EU members. Clearly, as the EU continues to grow, it emboldens its members and provides a degree of independence that they have not often enjoyed within the U.S.-dominated NATO alliance.

NATO's future, therefore, is at a crossroads, and the United States must reevaluate its position in European affairs in light of the new roles of Russia and the EU. The fact that the United States is not a member of the EU increases the potential for NATO/EU friction. Consequently, the United States must determine what its future interests in Europe are and develop a new strategy that pursues expansion, contraction, or dissolution of NATO.

Country	Joined NATO	EU Member	Country	Joined NATO	EU Member
United States	1949	No	Czech Republic	1999	Yes
United Kingdom	1949	Yes	Bulgaria	2004	Applicant
Belgium	1949	Yes	Estonia	2004	Yes
Canada	1949	No	Latvia	2004	Yes
Denmark	1949	Yes	Lithuania	2004	Yes
France	1949	Yes	Romania	2004	Applicant
Iceland	1949	No	Slovakia	2004	Yes
Italy	1949	Yes	Slovenia	2004	Yes
Luxembourg	1949	Yes	Austria	No	Yes
The Netherlands	1949	Yes	Cyprus	No	Yes
Norway	1949	No	Finland	No	Yes
Portugal	1949	Yes	Ireland	No	Yes
Greece	1952	Yes	Malta	No	Yes
Turkey	1952	Applicant	Sweden	No	Yes
Germany	1955	Yes	Croatia	Prospective	Applicant
Spain	1982	Yes	Albania	Prospective	No
Hungary	1999	Yes	Macedonia	Prospective	No
Poland	1999	Yes			

Figure 2. NATO/EU Membership (2004).

ANALYSIS

One can use a number of relevant factors to assess NATO's future but the following are key: European goals and objectives, U.S. strategic interests, the impact of NATO military commitments, NATO-Russian relations, and the political will of selected key nations. Although NATO's future is certainly more complex than just these five factors, they nonetheless provide a framework within which to discuss the pros and cons of expansion, contraction, or dissolution.

European Goals and Objectives.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has lessened Europe's dependence on the United States and empowered the EU to move beyond a purely economic alliance into foreign and military policies. EU members now coordinate more than 80 percent of their positions in the UN and a coherent defense identity is emerging slowly.⁶ As a result, Europe's goals and objectives are no longer

necessarily consistent, or even compatible with those of the United States. This presents a potential schism in U.S.-European relations that threatens NATO's existence and relevance. In a world where homeland security, nation-building, and international legitimacy are increasingly important, particularly in European eyes, NATO at times might seem an anachronistic military defense organization constructed to oppose Soviet forces. Thus in some European eyes, it retains something of the static cast of cold-war deterrence.⁷

Many analysts believe widespread hostility toward U.S. foreign policy, coupled with the fear of American willingness to use force in the Middle East, could help push the EU toward a unity it has been previously unable to achieve.⁸ Increasingly, Europeans are more likely to view the key to their future as being more closely tied to the EU than to NATO. France and Germany are outspoken in their desire to lift EU restrictions on weapons sales to China, over the strategic and humanitarian objections of the United States, and also reject any future role for NATO in Iraq, although both countries have contributed troops to the International Security and Advisory Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

The EU also has recently shown an increased appetite for military deployments. It is creating rapidly deployable units of 1,500 troops each, with up to 13 units operational by 2007. "Four EU countries—France, Italy, Britain, and Spain—will each have units with their own national troops, and other member states will contribute troops to multinational units."⁹ The EU deployed troops to Congo and Macedonia in early 2003, and recently assumed control from NATO over operations in Bosnia. Still, these operations have all been at the lower end of the spectrum of military operations, and by host nation invitation only. According to an EU council source, the goal is to carry out operations such as "humanitarian tasks, rescue missions, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations."¹⁰ Limiting the focus to these types of missions will keep the full burden of response on the United States and/or NATO for higher end missions in hotspots around the world, if action is to occur at all.

NATO's future therefore is linked inextricably to the growing power of the EU, as that organization's new constitution clearly dictates. Article 40 of that constitution starkly states that, "until such

time” as the common defense policy materializes, “the participating member states shall work in close cooperation with NATO.” It makes no provision for cooperation after that time. As a whole, the constitution makes clear that NATO ultimately is superfluous to the security policies of the EU.¹¹ Thus, if the United States is to remain relevant on the European continent, it must identify new means with which to do so.

However, while the EU continues to grow, it remains an immature and somewhat uneasy alliance which the United States could manipulate to achieve its strategic goals. Only three of the EU’s 25 members had ratified the new constitution as of February 2005, clear evidence that consensus within Europe remains elusive. Washington’s strong relations with dual EU/NATO members Poland, Denmark and Britain also may provide the United States with further leverage against the EU’s opposition to NATO policies. As long as Washington maintains strong relationships with these allies, NATO’s future and relevance seems secure.

U.S. Strategic Interests.

The demise of the Soviet Union left the United States as the world’s lone superpower, thrusting global leadership on Americans whether they choose to accept this new role or not. The United States has adjusted to its new niche and seems determined to retain global military and economic supremacy for the foreseeable future. To accomplish this, Washington must keep the former great powers of Western Europe, as well as Japan, firmly within the constraints of the U.S.-created postwar system by providing what some might call “adult supervision.”¹² By continuing to cultivate NATO, the United States maintains a vehicle through which it can maintain relevance and dominance in European affairs, as well as a strategic counter to the growing influence of the EU. Hidden by all the lofty (and often misleading) rhetoric about NATO and transatlantic partnership is a simple fact: U.S. policy in Europe aims not only to counter others’ bids for hegemony, but to perpetuate America’s own supremacy on the continent.¹³

Impact of NATO Military Commitments.

Although NATO's creation aimed at deterring Soviet aggression, it has increasingly assumed preemptive, offensive purposes. In 1995, NATO deployed 50,000 peacekeeping troops to Bosnia to help enforce the Dayton Peace Accords, the first true military deployment in NATO's history. Shortly thereafter, the air war in Kosovo in spring 1999 created a new role for the alliance, one that transformed it from a purely defensive alliance into one with offensive capability. This new role now tends to support intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, the domestic policies of which offend NATO's values – even when such states pose no security threat to the alliance's partners.¹⁴

President Bush applied this “policy” again during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, as well as in operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan. In both cases, there were threats to NATO's members – thus the justification for preemptive military action. Iraq's suspected possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the increasingly destructive Al-Qa'ida terrorist network in Afghanistan triggered both responses. Thus, these out-of-area operations have created a new role for NATO.

On October 15, 2003, NATO inaugurated its response force in the Netherlands. This response force, which has now reached initial operational capability, combines elite land, air, sea, and special operations units into a single force, deployable anywhere in the world in 5 days and able to sustain itself for up to a month on a wide range of missions.¹⁵ It will number 21,000 soldiers once fully operational and will provide NATO with a tool to confront threats from international terrorism, hostile dictatorial regimes, and rogue states. NATO's main mission of protecting the nations that comprise the alliance will remain, but will now focus on new threats, rather than the old enemy of the Cold War, the Soviet Union.¹⁶

But the NATO response force is neither designed nor equipped to handle every NATO mission. Recent operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan have required much greater commitments. The challenge for the United States is to convince its NATO partners to commit military forces commensurate with their capabilities in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). NATO's

26 members have five million men in arms to draw on, but have displayed little inclination to commit these forces in any strength to NATO's ongoing missions. While many members have been critical of operations in Iraq and refuse to provide military support (85 percent of the 31 nations' troops are American—Britain and Poland provide the bulk of the rest), they equally have been indifferent to supporting operations in Afghanistan, which NATO has supported from the outset. At best, NATO will have 8,400 troops under its command in Afghanistan in the fall of 2004, or approximately one-fifth of the number it dispatched to Kosovo in 1999. The United States has some 18,000 troops in the country, but none under NATO command.¹⁷

NATO introduced the Partnership for Peace program in 1994, designed to assist member nations in restructuring their military forces to contribute to NATO and global needs. While hailed as a success in facilitating the combined training and cooperation exercised with the stabilization force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Kosovo Force (KFOR), it cannot overcome the current political reluctance of a number of members to contribute troops.

NATO-Russian Relations.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 provided Moscow with a “voice but not a veto,” and ensured that Russia would enjoy consultation on the key European security issues outside NATO territory.¹⁸ But the alliance's new Eastern European members still harbor anti-Russian sentiments and view NATO's true mission in historic terms: to deter possible Russian aggression. Some Poles, for instance, believe that President Vladimir Putin's goal is to consolidate power in Russia, then recreate the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and impose domination over Eastern Europe, as Russian leaders have done for centuries. For them, joining NATO was the only way for Poland to protect itself from this danger.¹⁹ Russia, however, is equally skeptical of NATO's intentions. Although Moscow's relatively muted response to the 2004 NATO expansion remains in stark contrast to its vocal opposition of 1999, NATO's methodical eastward expansion has created new levels of mistrust and suspicion.

Growing domestic uncertainty accompanies Russian insecurity. Despite its massive size and natural resources, Russia has major economic problems, as well as its own terrorism concerns in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Beslan school in September 2004. Whatever its strategic goals, these events might actually serve to push Russia towards improved relations with NATO and the West as a means to address such concerns. But, while the United States and NATO may no longer view Russia as an adversary, neither do its member nations yet see Russia as a friend.

Political Will.

The survival of NATO hinges on its member nations and prospective members sustaining the political will to support its continued existence and reach consensus on events which merit military action. The 10-member states admitted since 1999 certainly have this will, given that all only recently emerged from behind the Iron Curtain and Soviet control. Clearly, these nations are eager to reap the benefits afforded by both NATO and the EU, and six have already joined both organizations.

The true measure of political will is that which emanates from NATO's core members: France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. While other partners will exert some influence, the cornerstone of any debate over NATO's future will revolve around these four members. Because France and Germany do not share America's central preoccupation—the war on terror—this attitude tends to isolate the United States. Moreover, America is a country whose power is now so overwhelming as to invite dissent and countervailing currents.²⁰ This places even greater emphasis on Washington's long-standing warm and cordial relationship with London, which generally has supported American global policies, sometimes at the risk of its own isolation. The United States must exercise great care in nurturing this special relationship with Britain and use that connection judiciously as leverage against EU policies which oppose the United States and/or NATO.

OPTIONS

Given these factors, the United States has three potential courses of action:

Expand NATO Membership.

NATO has created the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to assist aspiring candidates for membership within the alliance. Although involvement in the plan does not in any way assure future membership, this “probation” provides a clear indicator of each nation’s interest and commitment to joining NATO. There are currently three countries participating in the Membership Action Plan: Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. Any discussion of NATO expansion must begin with these three states.

Albania and Macedonia joined seven other nations in becoming candidates in 1999. When NATO expanded in 2004, they were the only two of the nine nations not offered membership. While both are making significant strides to meet selection criteria, neither currently has sufficient resources (as measured by the gross domestic product [GDP] per capita – see Figure 3) available to devote towards NATO integration to merit serious consideration. Albania spends a paltry \$56 million on defense and has a GDP per capita of only \$4,500. Macedonia spends slightly more for defense, \$200 million with per capita GDP of \$6,700.²¹ Both nations recently have offered to deploy small numbers of troops to Bosnia and Afghanistan as a means of demonstrating their resolve and willingness to contribute to ongoing NATO operations. Neither, however, nor other prospects such as Malta and Cyprus, offer the same benefits as recent additions. For instance, Poland (1999) has contributed more troops to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan than any other NATO member, except the United States, Britain, and Italy. In an era in which the United States feels that some allies are not doing enough, the “new kids” from the previous two expansions have all contributed measurably.

The third Membership Action Plan candidate, however, would bring much to the table right now. With a per capita GDP of \$10,600, Croatia already surpasses the per capita income of many current NATO members, including recent additions Bulgaria and Romania,

Country	Per Capita GDP	Annual Military Spending	Military Manpower
Russia	\$8,900	Not available	30,600,000
Ukraine	\$5,400	\$618 million (1.4% of GDP)	9,565,000
Belarus	\$6,100	\$176 million (1.4% of GDP)	2,164,000
Croatia	\$10,600	\$520 million (2.4% of GDP)	874,000
Albania	\$4,500	\$56 million (1.5% of GDP)	775,000
Macedonia	\$6,700	\$200 million (6% of GDP)	448,000
Malta	\$17,700	\$33 million (0.7% of GDP)	79,000
Algeria	\$6,000	\$2.2 billion (3.5% of GDP)	5,675,000
Morocco	\$4,000	\$2.3 billion (4.8% of GDP)	5,529,000

Source—CIA: *The World Factbook*, 2004.

Figure 3. Prospective NATO Members.

as well as longstanding member Turkey. Its military budget of \$520 million surpasses that of every NATO 2004 inductee with the exception of Romania. Croatia also offers plentiful manpower in the form of 874,000 males fit for military service, and its strategic location along the Adriatic Sea and bordering NATO members Slovenia and Hungary makes it an attractive candidate. Croatia also has applied for EU membership, yet another reason the United States should place added significance on Croatian membership.

But the EU has not extended Croatia membership for the same reason NATO remains out of its reach: its failure to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In most parts of the former Yugoslavia, there is limited public support for war crimes prosecutions against members of the ethnic majority. And at present this is equally true in Croatia. Police assistance to war crimes prosecutors and investigative judges remains half-hearted at best, in part because police officers often are themselves implicated in the commission of war crimes.²²

Recently, the Croatian government has finally begun to show a willingness to step up and apprehend war criminals. It has recognized that its failure to do so is costing it membership in both the EU and NATO. But compliance is subjective, and it is uncertain that the EU and NATO have the same International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) compliance standards for Croatia. Croatia's recent actions make EU membership increasingly likely, perhaps as soon as 2008. Should Croatia gain admittance to the

EU and not receive an offer of membership in NATO, a potentially valuable new ally might devote its national resources and interests to EU integration, rather than to NATO. In such an event, the United States should prepare to compromise on its ICTY principles and actively facilitate Croatian membership into NATO.

Russia also is a potential, albeit unlikely candidate for membership. But recent events have strained Russia's relations with the West and provided fresh evidence that a sizeable gap still remains between Moscow and Washington. The terrorist school attack in September 2004 led President Putin to tighten the government's grip on Russian policies. These policies have resulted in new limits on civil liberties and threaten to derail, or at least slow, Russia's crawl towards democracy. But failure to extend membership to Russia results in other unintended consequences. It draws new lines of division in Europe, alienates those left out, and weakens Russians most inclined towards liberal democracy and a market economy. In the process, it also pushes Russia towards China instead of drawing it towards Europe and America.²³

A stable and democratic Russia, integrated as a contributing member of the Euro-Atlantic community, is clearly in the best interests of the United States. But ideological differences still remain. The National Security Strategy states, "Russia's uneven commitment to the basic values of free-market democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remain matters of great concern."²⁴ Regardless, inviting Russia to join NATO might serve as incentive for the Russians to improve on their past human rights record and thereby further speed their nation's transformation into a democracy.

Russian membership might also bolster American leverage within the alliance and in particular, against growing EU influence. American diplomatic efforts to engage and embrace Russia could lead to a powerful partnership between Moscow and Washington that, if harmonious, could dominate both NATO and EU policies. Furthermore, adding Russia to NATO would neutralize Russian nationalist arguments and agendas that view NATO enlargement as humiliating and an affront to Russian sovereignty.

But there are risks associated with such an action. It is not clear that any of NATO's current members want to add Russia to the

alliance. Former Soviet satellites, including Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, as well as the Baltic states, would almost certainly oppose it, given their long-standing (and historically justified) fear of Russian expansionist intentions. It also is unclear whether NATO's core members, Britain, France, and Germany, would support such a move, since Russian membership would include an economic cost, and the EU nations might be reluctant to spend capital or yield global power to a nation that has proven so menacing and distrustful throughout its history. It also might commit them to a Russian-Chinese confrontation, which would not be to their liking.

From an American perspective, the advantages of Russian membership are overshadowed by a hidden cost. The United States dominates NATO policies and the alliance in general and is not a member of the EU. As such, Washington uses NATO as a vehicle to wield power and influence in Europe and increasingly, the world. While it might be tempting to add Russian military might and manpower to the pool of available resources for the GWOT and other NATO-sanctioned military missions, one cannot be sure that Russia would be any more supportive of NATO's military commitments than many current members (i.e., Germany and France). In fact, from a Russian perspective, it seems more likely that the Russians would seek to marginalize U.S. influence and oppose U.S.-led positions. As a result, reduced American influence in NATO might offset the trade-offs gained through membership (Russian democratization and stability) and thereby seriously undermine U.S. policy goals and objectives around the world.

Ukraine is another possibility for NATO membership and merits close attention. The presidential election of pro-NATO candidate Viktor Yushchenko in December 2004 places Ukraine on the path towards the West and away from Russian influence. The United States and NATO should be willing to reach out to Ukraine and not yield to Russian threats and rhetoric. NATO membership should be a mere formality, since Ukraine already is contributing militarily to operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, unlike many current NATO members.

But adding Ukraine to NATO, with its growing military power and lengthy geographic border with Russia, almost certainly would

galvanize new Russian opposition. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov recently said his government would find any U.S. and NATO attempts to further expand their influence into the former Soviet sphere deeply worrisome. He then added that Russia sees no sense in further NATO enlargement.²⁵ The timing of his remarks seems clearly influenced by the Ukrainian election results. Still, the advantages of a pro-western Ukraine are far greater than the risks associated with Russian opposition. Therefore, NATO should seek to extend membership to Ukraine as soon as practical.

Belarus is situated directly north of Ukraine. Like Ukraine, it shares an eastern border with Russia. It also shares a history of fraudulent elections. President Alexander Lukashenko has established a de facto dictatorship of rigged elections, state-controlled media and persecution of opponents. Belarus, already dependent on Russian subsidies, is set to adopt the ruble as its national currency in 2005.²⁶ The U.S. State Department and the Organization for Security for Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) both declared the 2001 election undemocratic and continue their refusal to recognize the Lukashenko regime. The impact of this Western isolation has been to push Belarus even closer to Russia. Should NATO move to include Ukraine as a member, it might trigger further resentment from Belarus, as its fourth neighbor joins the alliance (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are the other three). Despite this risk, Belarus simply is not a viable candidate without free and fair elections with recognizable results. Clearly a nation that cannot adhere to the will of its people is not worthy of NATO membership. Furthermore, like Albania and Macedonia, it offers little in the form of economic or military means to justify inclusion.

Expansion of NATO should not remain limited to Europe. The alliance also should look to the south and evaluate the potential of nations along Africa's northern rim, specifically Algeria and Morocco. Although neither is ready at present for NATO membership, both exhibit strong potential for the future and their geographic locations along the Mediterranean make them even more attractive. Both have cooperated with NATO recently and show a willingness to join, or expand their roles, in the GWOT.

Algeria has agreed to begin training and other programs with NATO as part of a process to ensure interoperability and common

language. NATO also recently designated Algeria as its most promising partner in the Middle East region.²⁷ As coalition forces chase terrorists from within Iraq and Afghanistan, their next destination may well be Africa. Algeria already has a long history of combating terrorism from within and may offer new insights into successful techniques employed in the past that might prove successful against al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups.

Although Algeria is a promising potential partner with military resources and spending that dwarfs most current NATO members, it is not at present a serious candidate for NATO membership, nor has it given evidence that it seeks to become one. Algeria opposes many of NATO's policies, as well as the U.S.-led military presence in Iraq. But even if Algeria were never to join NATO, it might be a willing partner in the GWOT, which ultimately serves American strategic interests and objectives.

Morocco is another potential new ally. President George W. Bush recognized Morocco as a major non-NATO U.S. ally in June 2004 and acknowledged the country's support in the U.S.-led war on terror. Moroccan authorities have arrested about 2,000 people in cases linked to terrorism since their country suffered a suicide attack in Casablanca in May 2004.²⁸ Its key strategic location, opposite Spain across the Strait of Gibraltar and bordering both the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean, provides additional incentives to membership. But some current NATO members might take a dim view of the aggressive measures the Moroccan government has implemented in combating terrorism. Human rights groups have complained consistently that these measures have gone too far and that the rule of law must be honored and followed in all instances. At this point, therefore, Morocco and Algeria seem better designed to serve as valuable non-NATO American allies in the GWOT rather than NATO partners.

Contract NATO or Maintain Status Quo—No New Additions.

In light of NATO's recent expansions, contraction is not politically feasible. None of NATO's current members have given any indication that they wish to withdraw from the alliance and the

prospect of “voting out” existing members is counterproductive and would serve no political or strategic purpose. The real question is whether maintaining a status quo of 26 members will help NATO survive or result in it being outflanked by the EU.

Whether it knows it or not, NATO currently finds itself in a race for new members with the EU, over Croatia in particular. For now, only Croatia has aspirations to join both organizations, but with the increased benefits afforded by globalization, it is inevitable that other nations will pursue the same course. Resisting further expansion, therefore, could eventually hasten NATO’s irrelevance, as emerging candidates shunned by NATO direct their attention instead to the open arms of the EU.

The obvious advantage for current members in maintaining the status quo is that they maintain their political base of power within the alliance. Each new member gains a voting interest in the alliance and therefore its own “piece of the pie.” Old Europe members, such as France and Germany, rightly view new members as potential competitors for prestige within the alliance and, given their stated views and positions, would certainly prefer expansion of the EU (which both currently dominate), especially if it serves a dual purpose of thwarting NATO.

It is therefore imperative that the United States and its non-EU NATO partners (including Canada, Norway, and Turkey) continue to explore new ways for NATO to maintain its relevance and not serve as a billpayer for EU ambitions. Clearly, maintaining the status quo is a recipe for irrelevance and if adopted, the United States and NATO are likely to watch the EU overtake its position in Europe and the world.

Dissolve the Alliance and/or Create a Replacement for It.

Dissolving NATO, favored by many, would mitigate the risk associated with NATO enlargement and ease Russian concerns. The rise in prominence of the EU would make it ideally suited to fill the vacuum generated by the death of the alliance, and it seems increasingly likely that many nations in Europe would embrace a future free of U.S. interference and intervention in Europe’s affairs. A more balanced relationship between the United States

and Europe, and a European security order that is more European and less Atlantic, holds out the best hope for preserving a cohesive transatlantic community. As the 21st century progresses, America must become Europe's partner, no longer its pacifier.²⁹

Although the EU seems resigned to accepting NATO's continued existence for now, it is unlikely that it can fully replace NATO's military capabilities in the near future. The EU's military capability remains limited to the support of small scale missions, such as Macedonia and Bosnia, and it possesses neither sufficient military enablers (i.e., logistics, strategic lift capacity, intelligence), nor the political will and consensus necessary to take on missions on a larger scale. Even NATO's harshest critics acknowledge its military utility for the foreseeable future, in support of the GWOT, in general, and out-of-area missions such as Afghanistan, in particular.

A new alliance of like-minded nations with common values may be more applicable to today's needs. The GWOT provides the mission and purpose: defeat radical fundamentalists worldwide. A new alliance would be suitable, at least from an American perspective. A GWOT-focused alliance could begin with all of NATO's current members, then extend membership to Ukraine, Russia, and any other nation around the world committed to defeating terrorism. Such an alliance would be relevant to today's needs and therefore acceptable to the United States. It would also provide a vehicle through which other like-minded nations could channel their efforts to defeat terrorism, in the form of its extended new membership.

But such an organization might result in a 21st century version of the UN. The UN would certainly oppose it and rightly see such a new, global alliance as a threat to its own existence. Any new alliance would face the same challenges as NATO currently does, namely gaining consensus and garnering UN support before any action can be taken. Furthermore, the addition of Russia to either a new alliance or NATO itself would provide Moscow with power similar to what it enjoys on the UN Security Council, where the Russians frequently achieve their aims through possession of their veto authority.

From an American perspective, the United States would sacrifice significant power and control over European and global affairs by dissolving NATO or replacing it with a new alliance. Washington sees NATO enlargement as a mechanism to exert even greater

influence overseas and in particular, as a tool to stifle Russian ambition and influence. Given the GWOT's focus and open-ended commitment, the United States seems destined to rely even more heavily on NATO for offensive military operations in the future. Therefore, dissolving or replacing NATO currently is not acceptable to America's international interests.

RECOMMENDATION

NATO is still relevant, from an American perspective. It enables Washington to continue to dominate European affairs and remain an active player in Europe. Furthermore, continued expansion is prudent and beneficial to most of its members, the United States in particular.

NATO should extend membership to Ukraine under President-elect Yushchenko, as soon as it applies. NATO also should extend membership to Croatia once its government adheres to the principles of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or when the EU extends a membership offer, whichever occurs first. Croatia combines a strong military, growing economy, strategic location, and commitment to NATO's core principles that are impossible to overlook. The reluctance of many current NATO members to contribute to the GWOT makes the addition of these two nations even more appealing. Both also have the resources and political will to contribute to NATO immediately. Although Ukrainian membership would risk further antagonizing Russia, the potential benefits outweigh these risks. In fact, NATO's continuing eastward expansion might provide sufficient pressure to convince Russia to return to the path of democratic reforms, a prerequisite for consideration of Russia as a potential NATO partner.

Current American policy centers on the defeat of global terrorism and as such, the United States should aggressively engage Russia through diplomacy as a partner in this endeavor. The terrorist attack in Beslan in September 2004 has resulted in Russia now being added to the growing list of nations victimized by terrorism. The time is ripe for the United States and Russia to join forces in fighting terror around the world, although Russia so far has refused to cooperate with such overtures.

As NATO continues to grow, it should expand further to include other like-minded nations committed to battling terrorism. But in seeking new partners in the GWOT, America should set aside the idealistic notion that all nations must share its values. Promotion of human rights and advancement of democracy are noble causes, but Americans should not naively insist that every nation become a mirror image of themselves. Encouraging Russian behavioral changes through incentives such as the World Trade Organization, NATO, and the EU represents an intelligent strategy, but today's threats make it more important for the United States to have allies that share its national security policies than its democratic goals and ideals.

The United States needs NATO—for now. Although NATO's mission is no longer to deter Soviet aggression and Russia is no longer a legitimate threat to European peace and prosperity, Washington's influence continues to ensure that NATO's focus closely parallels its own strategic interests. Expanding NATO to include nations which will stand by America against terrorism is not just feasible, acceptable, and suitable, it is absolutely necessary to ensure the United States remains relevant in global affairs and retains its status as the world's predominant power.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Steven E. Meyer, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," *Parameters*, Vol. 33, Winter 2003/2004, p. 83.

2. George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Washington, DC, The White House, September 2002, p. 25.

3. Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era*, Boulder, CO, 2000, p. 2.

4. Charles M. Kuyk, "NATO's Evolution: Maintaining Relevance," Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, April 10, 2001, p. 1.

5. Ernest R. May, *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68*, Boston, 1993, p. 3.

6. Andrew Moravcsik, "Europe Takes Charge; Sure NATO is Relevant. But the Real Transatlantic Work is Being Done over at the European Union," *Newsweek*, July 5, 2004, p. 27.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Marc Champion and John Carreyrou, "Europe Surveys Its Options After Bush's Victory," *Wall Street Journal*, November 4, 2004, sec. A, p. 12.
9. Cybercast News Service, "European Union Agrees on Rapid Reaction Force," *CNSNews.com* [journal on-line], available from www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=%5CForeignBureaus%5Carchive%5C200411%5CFOR20041125a.html, Internet, accessed January 27, 2005.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, "Saving NATO From Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, November/December 2004, p. 114.
12. Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, "NATO: At 50, It's Time to Quit," *The Nation*, May 10, 1999, p. 15.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
15. NATO Update, "Response Force Ready For Missions," *NATO Update*, available from www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/10-October/e1013a.htm, Internet, accessed December 16, 2004.
16. "NATO Response Force – Proposed Rapid-Reaction Military Force," *Army-Technology.com*, available from www.army-technology.com/contractors/missiles/nato.html, Internet, accessed January 14, 2005.
17. Jackson Diehl, "NATO's 'Myth' in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, July 5, 2004, sec. A, p. 17.
18. Paul E. Gallis, "NATO Enlargement: Pro and Con Arguments," Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, 1998, p. 2.
19. Dmitry Shlapentokh, "Is NATO in Trouble?" *Contemporary Review*, March 2003, p. 152.
20. Roger Cohen, "Much of World Views U.S. As Chest-Thumper," *Startribune.com*, available from startribune.com/stories/484/5131406.html, Internet, accessed December 12, 2004.
21. "The World Factbook," Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, January 2004, available from www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/, Internet, accessed December 11, 2004.
22. *HumanRightsWatch.org*, "Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro," available from www.hrw.org/reports/2004/icty1004/3.htm, Internet, accessed January 14, 2005.
23. Kenneth N. Waltz, "NATO Expansion: A Realist's View," *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, Robert W. Rauchhaus, ed., London, 2001, p. 30.
24. Bush, p. 27.
25. *Bakutoday.net*, "Russian Defense Minister: Moscow Wants No Further NATO Expansion," available from www.bakutoday.net/view.php?d=11995, Internet, accessed January 14, 2005.

26. Editorial, "More Straight Talk," *The Washington Post*, September 17, 2004, sec. A, p. 26.
27. "NATO Cites Algeria as Model Partner," *WorldTribune.com*, available from 216.26.163.62/2004/eu_algeria_11_30.html, Internet, accessed December 16, 2004.
28. BBC News, "US Rewards Morocco for Terror Aid," *BBC News*, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3776413.stm, Internet, accessed December 16, 2004.
29. Charles A. Kupchan, "The Origins and Future of NATO Enlargement," *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, Robert W. Rauchhaus, ed., London, 2001, p. 147.

CHAPTER 8

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY IMPACT OF CHINA'S GROWTH IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Lieutenant Colonel Pierre E. Massar

For to win 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.

Sun Tzu

According to two experts: "In the 21st century, the Asian-Pacific region threatens to supplant Europe as the region of paramount national security interest to the United States."¹ If that is so, then the key question U.S. policymakers must address is: What should America's main national security policies be in this critical region of the world? The purpose of this chapter is to analyze current East Asia policy critically within the context of assessing U.S. national and security interests in the region. It will identify several main national interests in the region, emphasize key issues, and recommend policy choices to advance U.S. interests. It will suggest that the United States must actively engage itself in East Asia with determination, foresight, and clarity. This chapter will begin with an examination of the environment the United States must appreciate and understand.

The U.S. National Security Strategy is the defining source of the nation's current strategic outlook. Within this strategic outlook, three national interests hold primacy with respect to East Asia: peace and stability in the area, Asian economic recovery and viability, and the integration of China into a regional security and economic framework.² The U.S. Government characterizes the former two as vital regional interests and the later as important. Asian-Pacific peace and stability directly supports the American grand strategic goal of "work[ing] with others to diffuse regional conflicts."³ Second, Asian economic viability supports "ignit[ing] a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade."⁴ Last, the integration

of China into a regional security and economic framework, involves “develop[ing] agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of global power.”⁵ In order to better understand America’s ability to advance its interests in East Asia, one must first examine the external and internal factors that affect those interests.

This chapter will focus on three factors characteristic of or related to the region that cannot change in short order. Arguably, the most challenging is the proliferation and spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within not only the region but also throughout the world. The development of nuclear, biological, and chemical WMD, along with missile development, are the primary cause of various nations in the region seeking to limit American influence, and simultaneously, bolstering their own influence and prestige. For example, the introduction of a U.S. theater missile defense system would have an impact on the United States, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.

Furthermore, economic and political challenges caused by the 1997 Asian economic crisis have at least temporarily challenged U.S. interests with respect to regional states that hope to advance or modify their economic and political infrastructures. This may result in a loss of legitimacy in the political institutions and among leaders of the region due to the perception that they failed to appropriately manage the crisis with the United States as a tacit and opportunistic player. One author has gone as far as to “charge that the crisis allowed the United States, through the use of the International Monetary Fund, to orchestrate new agenda aims to open Asian markets for U.S. transnational corporations to acquire distressed Asian companies . . . to break down the traditionally closed financial systems all over Asia.”⁶ He argued that China’s economic issues therefore would become more “. . . forthcoming due to currency policies, greater foreign direct investment, and increased international debt.”⁷ Moreover, the developing nations of the region may have further challenges, exacerbated by rigid and archaic domestic economic systems.

Lastly, the United States does possess an opportunity to further its present and future national security interests. Presently, the United States is an integral and balanced partner and provides security in the

region particularly with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The United States possesses real political, economic, and military influence, allowing it to advance its interests further due to its long history as a significant actor among East Asian states. However, due to its Cold War operating practices, its approach all too often has been to favor traditional allies and partners. Furthermore, it has not applied this influence to promising nations, developing their potential as both economic and security interests. The values brought forth from this history have helped define the U.S. role and influence, and molded the character of the region. What should America's regional policy for East Asia be?

Policy Recommendations.

Such recommendations must capture the dynamic and germane characteristics of a region that historically has not received a balanced application of American national power. This chapter provides three important recommendations. First, the United States must even-handedly foster a region committed to cooperation. Second, East Asia must accept free trade and commerce—not an easy task to accomplish given the deep distrust that exists among the states. Third, the United States must employ and integrate the elements of its national power actively to create favorable outcomes in dealing with the People's Republic of China. Given these three recommendations, how should the United States advance its policy?

The answer lies with a measured and balanced regional strategic approach consistent with the objectives, strategic concepts, and appropriate and synchronized application of means. The first specific recommended goal must be an even-handed fostering of an East Asia committed to cooperation.

The United States must resolve to improve bilateral and multilateral relations with countries in the region and increase general awareness of U.S. presence. Americans must be clear on one point: U.S. national interests drive its national policies. While there are those who believe the current Bush administration “wants U.S. hegemony in military power; hegemony in NATO; hegemony in the Pacific to contain the growing power of China; hegemony in the World Bank,

the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions; hegemony in the Security Council; and hegemony over oil supplies from the Gulf,"⁸ a critical and unbiased national security practitioner is one who can analyze and discern fact from fiction, conviction from emotion, and truth from fantasy. While it is true that the United States currently enjoys considerable influence in Asian Pacific regional matters, it is likely that nations within the region itself will subject this hard and soft power to growing pressures. Therefore, the United States requires a balance of both bilateral and multilateral approaches, while at the same time restraining its unilateral tendencies. As John Ikenberry stated shortly after the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), "America's nascent neoimperial grand strategy threatens to rend the fabric of the international community and political partnerships precisely at a time when that community and those partnerships are urgently needed . . . It will trigger antagonism and resistance that will leave America in a more hostile and divided world."⁹ Is there any hope for a true and effective multilateral approach to regional issues?

The short answer is yes. While progress to solve the North Korean nuclear problem using the six party talks is still inconclusive, the seeds of a new multilateralism on the most important security issue in Asia already may have begun to germinate. Such an effort, if successful, could have an important impact on the region. However, for the full impact of multilateralism to occur, "the United States will have to pursue multilateralism as more than a tactic to pressure the North, and embrace it as a strategy to force a new security architecture in Northeast Asia."¹⁰ Furthermore, "hope springs eternal" in diplomatic actions in the region. With respect to Korean reunification, during a forum discussion sponsored by the Institute of New Asian Order, Okazaki Institute of Japan, and the United States Pacific Forum, the consensus was "that the Americans were actively stressing that it would serve the interests of Korea, Japan and even China for the United States to recognize the 21st century order of Northeast Asia in its initiatives and to continue to keep U.S. forces in the region."¹¹ Through pragmatic bilateral approaches, the United States can further its interests and position itself to influence events and actions. Under the auspices of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, the

Asia 2025 study states as a key strategic lesson that “[a] more active U.S. diplomatic and military effort to strengthen ties with India is the corollary to preventing a Sino-Indian alliance that could check growing Communist Chinese influence.”¹² Furthermore, it suggests that the “strengthening of bilateral alliances with Korea, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan should become central to limiting China’s exercise of its power in the South China Sea and western Pacific.”¹³

Moreover, the United States must promote continued market and economic reforms within a context of understanding the unique characteristics of each country and commensurate with their obligations to the well being of the region. With the region “[p]roducing 60 percent of the world’s manufactured and agricultural goods, it is the motor force of the global economy.”¹⁴ Given the economic leverage the region possesses on the world economic system, one can better understand how these nations can pursue diplomatic and military interests that may or may not complement U.S. policy interests. This leverage, applied both within the region and across regions, can be a foundation of stress and anxiety. China’s economic surge has produced tension throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and arguably, throughout the world. China’s demand for more resources and its production of more of the world’s goods already have created ripples that are being felt worldwide. With this effect, “China has affected the world power-balance so that America’s famously plain-spoken 43rd President has been forced to moderate his rhetoric toward Beijing.”¹⁵ Although China is important in this discussion, it alone does not fully illustrate the magnitude of the issue. To only name a few, the economic power of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan provide added support to the discussion of this regional and possibly global power.

However, given China’s economic power, one will find the economic and related social infrastructure fraught with both archaic and inequitable biases. As was evident with the quick and devastating economic collapse in the region caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the economic underpinnings of many Asia-Pacific nations are fragile. Furthermore, as experts look at the almost 13-year recession in Japan, they can see financial, economic, and social inflexibilities toward the effects of economic globalization. The inability of the

Japanese to deal with restructuring their domestic economy away from the fixation on heavy export, to upgrade the living standard of their overworked population, and to adjust their consumption patterns, challenges not only their nation, but also hampers and lessens its relationship as an influential ally of the United States with its international neighbors.

Americans must participate in confidence-building methodologies related to regional issues in order to instill continued trust and commitment. This region's future is both promising, and at the same time, potentially injurious to promoting important national interests, policies, and programs of the United States. Issues surrounding economic viability, present and potential availability and distribution of key regional and global natural resources, and historical and potential geo-political transforming manifestations could and will influence the region for better or worse depending on U.S. actions or inactions.

How can the United States improve bilateral and multilateral relations and provide constructive influence in the region? The reader must understand that the various actors are prone to situationally dependent motives. For instance, while the Chinese may agree to a multilateral dialogue with respect to North Korea's WMD program, their approach to nation-state interaction suggests a preference for bilateral approaches. This is a result of the tendency of the Chinese to distrust alliance-oriented or rigid multilateral interactions with extra-regional players. Therefore, America must employ a dynamic, balanced, and multifaceted approach to regional issues. The old phrase "the only thing constant is change" applies to this tactic. The North Korean WMD program directly threatens American allies, neutral nations, China, and arguably, the world. Only through a sincere, determined, and flexible economic, diplomatic, military, and informational approach will this issue truly be resolved, and only by using various resources such as food and trade arrangements. For instance, some of these are the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC), United Nations (UN), and World Trade Organization (WTO) auspices; verifiable and proactive internal and external North Korean, American, and regional actor diplomatic assurances; and firm but restrained regional military posturing of U.S., South Korean, Japanese, and Chinese naval, air, and ground forces.

With respect to promoting continued market and economic reforms, the United States must seriously analyze, understand, and appreciate the level and composition of each East Asian nation's economic market infrastructure and culture. By consistently providing economic assistance and aid to developing nations, the United States can leverage appropriate influence to facilitate economic change. Reforms through advocating and promoting economic recovery and prosperity through APEC, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, minimal use of trade sanctions or embargoes, and encouragement of reciprocal and beneficial business relationships with American and global corporations will promote these reforms. Facilitating UN, WTO, and Commerce Department expertise, the United States can assist in improving the fiscal policies of nations with developing banking systems. The result would start the process to transform regional economic conditions consistent with each nation's capability to accept change. However, and possibly more importantly, all the aforementioned actions would assist in supporting another regional objective: confidence-building.

The United States should participate in confidence-building methodologies with regard to regional issues that will instill and reinforce continued trust and commitment. This will require the incorporation of all the elements of national power. The United States must promote *reciprocal* free trade that is *equitable* and encourages regional interdependence. Furthermore, the United States can encourage economic actions to facilitate regional solutions to regional issues. It must promote continued military exchanges with pivotal and influential nations to foster an appreciation of capabilities and intent and reduce possible misconceptions. In addition, expanding the Cooperative Engagement strategy, especially with China, will have significant and long-term benefits for both nations and reduce ambiguities, misunderstandings, and misconception of U.S. actions in the region. "China loom[s] as a long-term potential challenger to the United States in East Asia, but China, like Russia, seem[s] much more preoccupied with successfully entering the global system than with contesting U.S. leadership."¹⁶ Within a construct of engagement with regional actors, to the fullest extent possible America should work within the mutual understanding of human

rights of the populace vs. the individual to foster issues beneficial to each. Moreover, the United States must nurture a positive and proactive role to facilitate change based on the unique character of each sovereign nation. The “one size fits all” approach has not and will not provide the desired endstate or promote long-term American interests in the region. Therefore, such actions as increased emphasis on bilateral and historical multilateral allied regional security arrangements and partnerships would alleviate fears of waning commitment and unilateralism in regional issues. Resources available include the focused and synchronized assets of the State, Treasury and Commerce Departments, U.S. Pacific Command, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to name just a few.

The People’s Republic of China.

The United States must employ and integrate the elements of national power simultaneously to create a synergistic outcome in dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). No discussion about American policy toward the region is complete without a thorough understanding and appreciation of the impact and influence of Communist China on this area of the world. Arguably, the PRC commands an almost hegemonic influence in the area. Neither recent administrations have produced a comprehensive regional approach that leverages the full implementation of all its elements of national power for a regional effect. While the Clinton administration utilized some degree of active engagement, it emphasized the economic and diplomatic elements of power and was usually confined to narrowly focused issues, North Korea in particular. The current Bush administration has not improved on this paradigm. Again, Bush’s dealings with the PRC primarily are focused narrowly on WTO and free trade issues, North Korean WMD development, and on Global War on Terror (GWOT) cooperation measures.

Modern China is undergoing an impressive economic and military transformation. Because of this transformation, the United States has a difficult task engaging China as a significant trade partner, while at the same time containing a possible military and diplomatic

adversary. This “partner and competitor” dilemma is at the heart of the present U.S.-Chinese relationship. Further Chinese economic prosperity will require greater access and demand for natural resources and markets for their goods. With this prosperity, China will enjoy greater global economic and diplomatic influence that will demand military focus to safeguard. Furthermore, this greater influence will begin to challenge the current Asia-Pacific status quo and create tensions in the region, thus requiring an appropriate response from the United States and its allies.

The issues concerning the Asian-Pacific region demand action more in tune with the past and present dealings with Europe. Issues such as collective regional security with the PRC as a stabilizing and responsible participant and regional economic integration that truly benefit the developing nations are just a few examples of the pressing matters facing the region and United States. The famous “China will never seek hegemony” statement by then Vice President Zeng Qinghong did not resonate or calm fears with many influential policymakers around the world.¹⁷ These policymakers and political actors share a feeling similar to the statement of former Senator John Ashcroft when he stated,

... there is a destabilizing force in the Pacific Rim today – and it is not the Asian democracies. There is an entity, which through its emerging economic and military might, intends to assert its power – and it is not the Asian democracies. There is a political system that sees as its enemy the free people of the world – and it is not the Asian democracies. No, the expansionist force in Asia is Communist China, a country that cares little for international law, and even less for the sacred nature of human life.¹⁸

As a news periodical editor once wrote, “Beijing has made impressive strides in relations with Russia and Central Asia. And Jiang, the originator of ‘Great Power Diplomacy,’ has gone beyond predecessor Deng Xiaoping’s cautious dictum about world affairs: ‘Adopt a low profile and never take the lead’.”¹⁹ The aforementioned was in reference to Communist China’s first participation in a formal regional bloc alignment, the six nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Combined with the Jiang-Putin summit held in Moscow a month later, many observers felt this new initiation of non-Western political and diplomatic arrangements “may be the

beginning of a counterweight to NATO and an important pillar of a multipolar world structure."²⁰ Coupled with the signing of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation, there is cause for heightened sensitivity to a more active Communist China in world affairs. Furthermore, tied to the possible inclusion of more countries such as Mongolia, Pakistan, and India, this "new paradigm" can only strengthen the idea of a new dynamic in the region and possibly other regions. Without active and positive involvement of the United States in a multilateral context, Thucydides' reasons for conflict, fear, interest, and honor will motivate American foreign policy, as opposed to understanding, cooperation, and respect.

The economic component of national power is arguably the preferred element in dealing with the People's Republic. China's trade surplus with the United States has "increased 27.1 percent in the first half of 2004, to \$68.5 billion . . . and [China] now has the largest [trade surplus] of any country in the world,"²¹ China "alone was responsible for 53 percent of the increase in the [U.S.] nonoil trade deficit through June 2004."²² Concurrently, the U.S. trade deficit with the rest of the Asia-Pacific Rim has "increased 17 percent thus far in 2004 with Japan increasing by 12.5 percent)."²³ Thus, the United States must borrow abroad to finance its trade deficits, the majority financed through long-term government bonds purchased by the PRC. With the aforementioned in mind, practically any economist might venture to state that the United States trade deficit poses potentially great risks for its economy. Furthermore, given "the eurozone's trade deficit with China soar[ing] to EU41.1bn (\$48.1bn, £28.6bn) in the first 10 months of last year," Mainland China truly is developing as a significant world creditor; a distinction once held by the United States immediately following World War II.²⁴

The results of increased American and Western European trade deficits are symptomatic of the "rapid decline in the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing industries."²⁵ Coupled with ongoing trade negotiations to "float" its currency which is based on the American dollar, China's intransigence has "also made it more difficult for other Asian nations to allow their currencies to rise."²⁶ It is no wonder that the primary topic of discussion of nearly every American official to the Chinese is trade-based. As the Chinese economy grows, so will

their need for basic resources, predominately oil. It will be important to watch if China can manage its transition to a market economy with broad-based growth successfully as either an authoritarian regime or possibly as a developing democratic nation. The problem lies in China having no history of democratic traditions. Without a doubt, economic factors are important to the well-being of all nations; however, the military aspects can ultimately be the final arbiter of long-term prosperity and security.

According to John Gershman, “[i]t is by now virtually conventional wisdom that Asia is the critical area of strategic focus and military operations for the Pentagon. China will be pegged as the only likely ‘peer competitor’ around which U.S. strategic doctrine in the first quarter of the 21st century will be oriented.”²⁷ Notwithstanding the current focus on the GWOT, the United States must look beyond this war to issues that may endanger its security with other state actors in the near and not so near future. In the *Asia 2025* report, the authors projected that China will be a threat whether it is strong or weak, stable or unstable. Gershman stated, “A stable and powerful China will be challenging the status quo in Asia constantly. An unstable and relatively weak China could be dangerous because its leaders might try to bolster their power with foreign military adventures.”²⁸ These possible “foreign military adventures” cause considerable worry among both military and political leaders. As one might expect, even challenging the status quo can have significant repercussions within the region both for the United States and between Asia-Pacific regional actors.

For the past 60 years, the most notable tension in the region has been the American relationship with Taiwan. While the United States officially advocates the “One China Policy,” the Mainland Chinese are apprehensive about its application. Their eventual goal is to assimilate the “lost province” into Greater China. Diplomatically, this could be an option, if both state actors could come to some mutual consensus and arrangement. In this arrangement, China prefers a bilateral arrangement with the United States while the Americans prefer an informal multilateral relationship to include Taiwan. However, as the last 60 years demonstrate, the military option of annexation could have serious complications for both. One

only needs to read almost daily to see a China aspiring to develop a “blue water” navy to protect its worldwide maritime interests and designs on “re-gaining their former status . . . and continu[ing] to try to regain Taiwan.”²⁹

While Taiwan is an important issue facing the region, it is not the only concern. The Japanese are beginning to react to China’s actual or perceived bellicose actions. A recent article provided details on “a plan to defend a chain of its southernmost islands in the East China Sea against invasion amid rising security concerns about China.”³⁰ Furthermore, in the article, a Japanese official stated, “China has been expanding its scope of activities as seen in the case of an invasion of Japanese territorial waters by a Chinese nuclear submarine last November.”³¹ The Japanese feel that “China, which has a great impact on security in the region, is pushing ahead with enhancing its nuclear and missile capabilities in modernizing its navy and air force while expanding marine activities.”³² Coupled with North Korea, it appears the Japanese are reevaluating the military landscape and reacting accordingly. The implications of Chinese action may destabilize the region further. Additionally, the United States is beginning to reevaluate its posture with similar implications.

For United States, while “China is at least 2 decades away from being able to deploy a fully functional carrier and aircraft,” it appears China is following a more Mahanian approach to national power.³³ As determined by an internal study at the Office of Net Assessment, it appears “China is adopting a ‘string of pearls’ strategy of bases and diplomatic ties stretching from the Middle East to southern China that includes a new naval base under construction at the Pakistani port of Gwadar.”³⁴ In summation, the article infers that China is building up military forces and setting up bases along sea lanes from China to the Middle East to project its power overseas and more than likely to protect its oil shipments. The following illustrates both the military and bilateral political Chinese efforts underway with various countries in the region:

- Bangladesh: China is strengthening its ties to the government and building a container port facility at Chittagong. The Chinese are “seeking much more extensive naval and commercial access” in Bangladesh.

- Burma: China has developed close ties to the military regime in Rangoon and turned a nation wary of China into a “satellite” of Beijing close to the Strait of Malacca, through which 80 percent of China’s imported oil passes. China is building naval bases in Burma and has electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal and near the Strait of Malacca. Beijing also supplied Burma with “billions of dollars in military assistance to support a de facto military alliance.”
- Cambodia: China signed a military agreement in November 2003 to provide training and equipment. Cambodia is helping Beijing build a railway line from southern China to the sea.
- South China Sea: Chinese activities in the region are less about territorial claims than “protecting or denying the transit of tankers through the South China Sea,” the report said.
- China also is building up its military forces in the region to be able to “project air and sea power” from the mainland and Hainan Island. China recently upgraded a military airstrip on Woody Island and increased its presence through oil drilling platforms and ocean survey ships.
- Thailand: China is considering funding construction of a \$20 billion canal across the Kra Isthmus that would allow ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca. The canal project would give China port facilities, warehouses, and other infrastructure in Thailand aimed at enhancing Chinese influence in the region.³⁵

All of these issues concerning China may represent a harbinger of things to come: a possible new “Asian Cold War.” All the indicators of growing political tensions, territorial rivalries, competition over energy resources between Japan and China, and China’s military build-up could foreshadow future conditions, if the United States does not employ and integrate all elements of national power actively to create a synergistic outcome in dealing with the PRC.

Risk Analysis.

These recommendations are not complete without a discussion of the associated risks. Consideration of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability are ever-present in this chapter. There are those who profess the need for the "United States to lead a new order that ensures no new hegemony state emerges that has absolute superior strength in the region."³⁶ While this approach could achieve the ends sought, its long-term effects could be much more damaging. The following risks need consideration. Primarily, the United States must possess the necessary and essential will to implement the recommended policy and strategy. Second, intransigence among the nation-states of the region in dealing with each other or the United States in an unhelpful fashion degrades America's ability to influence resolution and cooperation. Continued population and environmental pressures will cause a scarcity of resources that will override regional security for national survival. Irresponsible nations in the region place short-term desires over long-term stability with respect to WMD or continued build-up of conventional arms.

Conclusion.

If the time has come that "[t]he Asia/Pacific region is the geopolitical center of the struggle for world power,"³⁷ then the current U.S. ends in the region include Asia-Pacific peace and stability, Asian economic recovery and viability, and a regionally integrated China. The art and science of constructing adequate and effective ways and means to achieve these ends are available to us. The United States should more decisively and even-handedly foster a region resolved to cooperation and dedicated to free trade and commerce for all its nations. For the continued security of the United States, "[t]he challenge lies in identifying a new grand strategy that captures the critical characteristics of the new international security environment and identifies appropriate ends, ways, and means for organizing and executing the search for security in the post-Cold War world."³⁸

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, "The Asian-Pacific in the United States National Security Calculus for a New Millennium," *Directive & Lesson Book Subcourse 3: Assessing U.S. National Security Strategy, Appendix V Guide to Required Resources Lesson 2 East Asia*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003, p. 19.

2. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, p. 27.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

6. Henry C. K. Lui, "China vs. the Almighty Dollar," July 22, 2002; available from www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/720680/posts, Internet, accessed September 19, 2004.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Patrick Seale, "Bush Aim is Clear: Assert America's Global Hegemony," available from www.mafhoum.com/press/sea11mar31.htm, Internet, accessed September 21, 2004.

9. John G. Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5, September-October 2002, p. 31.

10. Dennis Florig, "The Bush Administration, the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, and the Future of Multilateralism in Northeast Asia," available from www.dflorig.com/ritzarticle.htm, Internet, accessed September 19, 2004.

11. Kim Yong-hui, "US Forces Need to Remain to Deter the Emergence of a Hegemony State," available from kimsoft.com/1997/us-sk1.htm, Internet, accessed September 15, 2004.

12. John Gershman, "We Have Seen the Enemy, and It Is China," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, May 2001, p. 5.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Joseph Gerson, "Asia/Pacific Peace and Security Issues," January 1997; available from www.fpij.org/briefs/vol2/v2n10asi_body.html, Internet, accessed September 21, 2004.

15. James Pinkerton, "The Credible Hulks," October 29, 2003; available from www2.techcentralstation.com/1051/printer.jsp?CID=1051-102903C, Internet, accessed September 21, 2004.

16. National Defense University, "Asian-Pacific Regions: Murky Futures?," in *Directive & Lesson Book Subcourse 3: Assessing U.S. National Security Strategy, Appendix V Guide to Required Resources Lesson 2 East Asia*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003, p. 3.

17. P. S. Suryanarayana, "China Will Never Seek Hegemony," May 9, 2004; available from www.thehindu.com/2004/09/05/stories/2004090502501200.htm, Internet, accessed September 21, 2004.

18. John Ashcroft, "The Theme is Freedom: Reconsidering U.S.-Sino Relations," April 23, 1997; available from www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8514/navy.htm, Internet, accessed September 21, 2004.

19. Willy Wo-lap Lam, "Combating American Hegemony," June 20, 2001; available from edition.cnn.com/2001/world/asiapcf/east/06/19/china.russia.willy/, Internet, accessed October 18, 2004.

20. *Ibid.*

21. Robert E. Scott, "Trade Picture," August 13, 2004; available from www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_econindicators_tradepict20040813, Internet, accessed January 22, 2005.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. Ralph Atkins, "Eurozone Trade Deficit with China Soars," January 20, 2005, available from news.ft.com/cms/s/146853ba-6b52-11d9-9357-00000e2511c8.html, Internet, accessed January 21, 2005.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

27. Gershman, p. 6.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Edward Roberts, "China in Conflict," July 2004, available from www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8514/china.htm, Internet, accessed October 5, 2004.

30. Agence France Presse, "Japan Maps Plan to Defend Southern Islands against Military Attack," January 16, 2005, available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/127625/1/.html, Internet, accessed on January 16, 2005.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*

33. Gershman, p. 7.

34. Bill Gertz, "China Builds Strategic Sea Lanes," January 22, 2005; available from www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050117-115550-1929r.htm, Internet, accessed on January 23, 2005.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Yong-hui.

37. Gerson.

38. Robert H. Dorff, "A Primer in Strategy Development," in *Directive & Lesson Book Subcourse 2: Developing U.S. National Security Strategy*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003, p. 212.

CHAPTER 9

TRANSFORMATION OF THE 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION, TEXAS ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Lee Henry

The events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), have fundamentally changed the way Americans look at homeland security. For the first time since December 7, 1941, the United States has suffered a major attack on its soil, and one launched by an enemy who does not represent a nation-state or fight by traditional means. This faceless enemy of international terrorism has struck at the heart of America's economic and military power and sent shock waves throughout the world.

Those events have served as a catalyst to drive the Department of Defense (DoD) in efforts to transform its forces from top to bottom. Moreover, President George Bush has added a new cabinet position, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), first under Secretary Tom Ridge. The DHS helped pass the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act.¹ The DoD began to change as well. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) became a new unified command and conducted Operation NOBLE EAGLE in the United States, while Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. These two efforts led to regime change in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Clearly, the United States has engaged its military forces in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) with no short term victory in sight.

At the signing of the FY 02 Defense Appropriations Bill on January 10, 2002, President Bush underlined that:

This nation must have ready forces that can bring victory to our country and safety to our people. . . . My administration is committed to transforming our forces with innovative doctrine, strategy and weaponry. This will allow us to revolutionize the battle field of the future and keep peace by defining war on our terms. . . . We will build the security of America by fighting our enemies abroad, and protecting our folks here at home. And we are committed. . . . to these most important goals.²

Many senior defense leaders took the President's comments to heart and acted to start the transformation process. Not surprisingly, transformation became the "vogue" term within the Pentagon and DoD. General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army during this period, already had pushed the Army into change, built around three main themes: readiness, people and transformation.³ Shinseki aimed at ensuring that the Army would be an equal partner and key player in the joint team. The results from Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM reinforced the fact that airpower represents a useful tool, but the United States must possess forces that actually can occupy ground. That remains the role for the Army.

General Shinseki felt that if the Army were to be relevant in future wars, it must transform its existing "legacy force" into an "interim force" and then in a final phase, to an "objective force."⁴ General Peter J. Schoomaker, current Army Chief of Staff, has stayed on the same path as his predecessor, but has altered the terminology. Schoomaker sees the transformation of forces as a continuum, categorized as the current force, the stryker force, and the future force. This Army vision looks to technology to enable future capabilities relevant not only to today's GWOT fight, but tomorrow's as well.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The 9/11 attacks on United States soil represented the nexus for the GWOT. The American response laid the foundation for the existing national security strategy. That strategy caused the DoD to reexamine its departments from the top down. It has determined the course for transformation to enable the DoD to better meet asymmetrical threats. There is no department or agency within the Department not affected by the need to change or to accept modularity. The Army National Guard is one of the many organizations within the nation's strategic reserve that must transform itself as well. The Guard has found itself engaged in constant operations from 9/11 to the present. Its operations have run the span from Operation NOBLE EAGLE to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. It has once again

demonstrated why it is a formidable force worthy of consideration as the nation's strategic reserve.

The national security strategy provides the necessary guidance in a format of ends, ways and means for U.S. military forces. As part of this guidance, it refers to certain core values for democracy as components of its strategic approach. These include the principles of political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other countries, and respect for human dignity.⁵ The ends for these core values are the defense of peace, the preservation of peace, and the extension of peace. It seeks to accomplish these goals through three concepts: strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, mitigating the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and defusing regional conflicts.⁶ Moreover, it hopes to accomplish these concepts through the careful articulation of the elements of national power with the underlying theme of readiness and transformation. Finally, it aims to accomplish this through intelligence, diplomacy, public information, and the military.

From the national security strategy, one can then assess the current National Military Strategy in the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), signed on September 30, 2001, by the Secretary of Defense. The QDR lays the foundation for a paradigm shift in force planning. It proposes a new force-sizing construct to shape the forces specifically to:

- Defend the United States;
- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts, while preserving for the president the option of calling for decisive victory in one of the conflicts—including the possibility of regime change or occupation and;
- Conduct a limited number of smaller scale contingencies operations.

In doing so, the DoD must maintain sufficient force generation capability and a strategic reserve to mitigate risks.⁷ The 2004 National Military Strategy refers to the above force sizing as simply the “1-4-2-1” sizing construct, which places a premium on increasingly innovative and efficient methods.⁸

U.S. ARMY 2004 POSTURE STATEMENT

General Peter Schoomaker has noted the following about the challenges confronting the United States: "Our Nation, and our Army, are at war. It is a different kind of war, fought against a global terrorist network, and not likely to end in the foreseeable future."⁹ He has laid out the most important core competencies of the Army as 1) training and equipping soldiers and growing leaders, and 2) providing relevant and ready land power to combatant commanders as part of the joint force. He has asserted that the military must remain agile, and the Army must develop an expeditionary mindset.¹⁰ General Creighton W. Abrams remarked after the Vietnam war, when DoD only called up 3,000 reservists, that "America should never go to war without calling up the spirit of the American people, and you do that by calling up the National Guard and the Reserves."¹¹ This became known as the Laird "Total Force Policy" or informally as the Abrams Doctrine.

In order to provide relevant and ready land power to combatant commanders, which included global commitments across the spectrum of military operations, the Army has mobilized more than 164,000 reservists of which more than 96,000 were National Guard soldiers. They have served the United States abroad in support of the GWOT.¹² Due to the increased operational tempo for the active force, the National Guard has seen an increase in deployments for peacekeeping operations to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the increase in its deployments, the National Guard is transforming itself as well. For instance, the Guard provisionally has organized 18 additional military police companies. This reorganization represented an effort to help reduce the personnel pressures on the active military police units.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 2005 POSTURE STATEMENT

The Army National Guard is unique in that it possesses a dual mission that places it under both state and federal governments. As a result, the Guard reports to the governors of its respective states and the president of the United States. The Guard's charter is the

Constitution of the United States. Article 1, Section 8 contains a series of “militia clauses” that vest distinct authority and responsibilities in the federal government and the state governments. These clauses and follow-on legislation have sculpted today’s Guard.¹³

As of May 2004, the Army National Guard possesses 3,150 facilities across 2,700 communities, and totals eight divisions and 17 separate brigades, with a total force of 350,000 men and women. By the end of fiscal year 2004, the National Guard will comprise 53 percent of the Army’s combat, 34 percent of the Army’s combat support, and 38 percent of the Army’s combat service support. Overall, it will possess 38 percent of the Army’s Force structure.¹⁴ The National Guard will remain, first and foremost, a provider of ready, trained, and equipped warfighting units to combatant commanders. As a result of the increased operational tempo, the Army Guard must change its Cold War training paradigm from “train, alert, mobilize, train, and deploy” to a mindset of “train, alert, and deploy,” if it is to remain relevant to today’s security challenges.

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, has begun the transformation from the top by starting with how the headquarters does business: In short the Guard will be a Joint Force. The National Guard Bureau has reorganized itself from three separate organizations into one joint organization, effective July 1, 2003. This reorganization flattened administration and made it more efficient and capable. It also aligned its staff functions and responsibilities with those of the Army Joint Staff and combatant commanders. Further staff transformations then took place at the state level. The Adjutants General consolidated 162 state headquarters organizations into 54, doctrinally aligned, standing joint-forces headquarters. In effect, it created a single joint-force headquarters in each state for all Army and Air Guard activities on October 1, 2003.¹⁵

To meet the requirements laid out in the Army’s posture statement of 2004, the Army Guard will focus on three main themes with corresponding subgoals. The first theme supports the conflicts in which the United States finds itself engaged, with the subgoals of readiness for overseas duty, mental and dental readiness, training soldiers and growing leaders, combined arms and joint force-on-

force training, improved recruiting and retention, and diversity initiatives and equal opportunity. The second main theme will be homeland defense including domestic operations, missile defense and continuity operations as subgoals. The last main theme for the Guard will be transformation for the 21st century, including force balancing and restructuring for high demand and modular units.¹⁶

It is the last theme, “transformation for the 21st century” that the remainder of this chapter will discuss regarding how the 36th Infantry Division, Texas National Guard, will transform itself to meet Army goals by 2008. On July 1, 2004, Texas reflagged its division from the 49th Armored Division to the 36th Infantry Division. The 36th Infantry Division traces its lineage back to World War I and combat in World War II. As America fights the GWOT, the Texas Guard thought it made sense to transform the division into a lighter force structure and to bring back the “T Patch” for a division that had fought against tyranny successfully. The 36th Infantry Division was one of eight Army Guard divisions that began transformation long before the reflagging ceremony.

As with most organizational changes, the division generated a vision or mission statement. That represents the nexus for the changes that the organization used as its litmus test. The Army’s Chief of Staff tasked those responsible for force structure design to focus on task force modularity; the result was a force structure consisting of units of employment (Y), units of employment (X), and units of action/brigade combat teams. General Schoemaker gave the following mission statement for modularity:

MISSION: Create a modular “brigade-based” Army that is responsive to the regional combatant commander’s needs, better employs Joint capabilities, facilitates force packaging and rapid deployment, and fights as a self contained unit in nonlinear, noncontiguous battlespaces.¹⁷

Based on the Chief of Staff’s mission statement and Title 32 state requirements, Major General Michael Taylor, commanding general of the division, developed and published a commander’s intent to his staff for use in developing possible force structure courses of action. As part of the mission analysis process, the division staff gained agreement from General Taylor on the following problem statement:

“How to place and staff units of the 36th Infantry Division from the current configuration into the new configuration of one unit of employment, two infantry units of action, one aviation unit of action, one support unit of action, and one fires unit of action.”¹⁸

In addition to the problem statement, the division staff aimed at providing General Taylor additional background information before he crafted and issued his commander’s intent. *Leaders and Soldiers* are and will remain the *Centerpiece* of our force:

- Adaptive and innovative
- Competent with technology and enhanced equipment
- Battle-focused leader/soldier training
- Organized to win the tactical fight.¹⁹

Now that the staff had developed a problem statement, collected some specific background information, and given it to General Taylor, he issued the following commander’s intent, key tasks and end state.

Purpose.

The purpose of this planning process is to apply a practical solution to restructuring the 36th Infantry Division from its current configuration to match Active Duty Force Structure and ensure continued viability of the Division for future State Active Duty (SAD) missions and Federal deployments.

Key Tasks.

Key tasks were identified as:

- Identifying locations that will demographically support the new unit structures.
- Minimizing soldier turmoil by requiring minimal travel and/or reclassification of Military Occupational Skills (MOS).
- Utilizing existing infrastructure.
- Locating subordinate organizations as close as possible to parent HQs.

- Limiting the number of Detachments.
- Attempting to have a presence in all geographic regions of the state.

End State.

The 36th Infantry Division now will be reconfigured to one unit of employment (X), and five units of action by FY-07, positioned to take advantage of existing facilities and demographic support for sustainment.²⁰ Once the staff had the approved commander's intent from General Taylor, it had to start the transformation of the existing force structure to the proposed configuration. Figure 1 depicts the current task organization of the 36th Infantry Division. The division comprises the traditional legacy force structure, mainly consisting of the M1A1 main battle tank and the M2A0 Bradley fighting vehicle.




Figure 1. "Current" 36th ID Force Structure.




Figure 2 depicts the proposed Force Structure that the 36th Infantry Division will transform to by FY-06 per the commander's intent provided by Major General Taylor.

Figure 2. "Proposed" 36th ID Force Structure.

PROPOSED OPERATIONAL TEMPO FISCAL YEAR 2005 AND 2006

The 36th Infantry Division was similar to other Guard units, when on 9/11, the nation tasked it to respond to the unknown threat of terrorists. Texas responded within hours to the Trade Center attacks by mobilizing several hundred soldiers to reinforce security at over 20 airports in the state. This increased operational tempo has not slowed over the past 3 years. Every infantry battalion has mobilized at least once, as have most other battalions within the state. As the National Guard Bureau continues to respond to the needs of the regional combatant commanders, states like Texas have to step up and provide crucial support. The following are planned Federal

Deployments for the 36th Division, which are known at this time. Dates are left off for obvious reasons, and unit names will only be given if the state's Public Affairs Officer has released them.

- One brigade combat team (56th) will deploy in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—fiscal year 2005. The 56th Brigade Combat Team will be the first brigade to go through transformation to the unit of action force structure upon its return in late fiscal year 2006. The soldiers within this unit have received many of the individual equipment upgrades from the rapid fielding initiative, but the majority of the transformation will conclude on the unit's return to the United States.
- One infantry battalion (+) will deploy in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—fiscal year 2005. This infantry battalion is organic to the 72nd brigade combat team that will complete its transformation after the 56th. This infantry battalion, like the 56th Brigade Combat Team, will receive the upgraded individual equipment provided through the rapid fielding initiative.
- One engineer battalion (368th) already has completed its mission rehearsal exercise and has been certified to deploy in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 4. This battalion will support the upcoming rotation of the 42nd Infantry Division.
- One main support battalion will deploy in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—fiscal year 2005. Receiving equipment issue as well, from the rapid fielding initiative, it is currently part of the division's support command, but on its return to the continental United States will be part of the sustainment brigade depicted in Figure 2.
- Command and sizeable staff will deploy in support of the Balkans operation for Kosovo Forces (KFOR) and provide the infrastructure for Task Force Falcon. The deployment will start with a train up phase beginning in the summer of 2005, continuing with command post exercises—fall, fiscal year 2005, and culminating with a mission rehearsal exercise that will take place overseas in early calendar year 2006.

With the possibility of additional deployments, the above five deployments are for the most part set and are the Federal deployments that both the division and state staffs are working on at the present time. In addition, the transformation and other various State missions exist that may come up when called upon by the Governor of the state of Texas.

STATE MISSIONS

Unfortunately the majority of the state missions in which the 36th finds itself involved cannot be planned, but are inevitable. Like most Gulf Coast states, Texas has more than its share of hurricanes, which result in heavy rains, inland flooding, evacuations, and support to the department of public safety for security missions. Texas military forces bring an enhanced capability for the military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) equation. The state's military forces are a self-contained and self-supporting organization that has the operational capability to augment all of the state organizations as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Disasters and emergencies, natural and manmade, increasingly are capable of causing major casualties and infrastructure damage in Texas and the rest of the United States, thus disrupting the day-to-day operations of the economy and active-duty forces. These events represent a significant challenge to civilian governmental resources, and the Texas military forces should expect civilian authorities to request appropriate consequence management (CM) support often. In addition to natural disasters, Homeland Security Policy states: "Homeland Security – A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to Terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur."²¹

The support to homeland security is a mission the active army has been performing for over 227 years. The National Guard has been upholding this mission since its inception over 365 years ago, as it traces its lineage back to the first militia forces, even before the founding of the United States. Some of the civil support or military assistance to civil authorities missions in which the 36th Division has found itself involved in this past year (2004) and which it will continue

to stand ready to support are the impact of space debris, counter drug operations, critical infrastructure protection, hurricanes, flood, snow storms, chemical incidents, and others.

IMPACT OF STRATEGIC ENDS

Today the 36th Infantry Division is meeting the needs of Governor Rick Perry and President George W. Bush. As the “hammer” for military force of Texas, the division continues to receive the majority of both federal and state missions because of its current force structure. Despite current and planned deployments for its military forces, Texas has been able to keep 50 percent of the force ready for possible commitment to state missions, unlike other states.

The transformation of the 36th Infantry Division into brigade sized units will support the mission statement provided by General Schoomaker to the modularity task force as well. By transforming to 43 brigade-sized units of action, the Army is planning to reduce the time frame between rotations of active forces and cut down the rotations of Guard units to once every 6 or 7 years. As part of the “full spectrum force” concept, the National Guard Bureau is proposing a “cycle system,” where a unit will be in the “red cycle” and responsible for homeland defense and homeland security for a period of 4 to 5 years. Then, that same unit will be part of an enhanced pool of units, “yellow cycle,” where it will receive enhanced training and resources in anticipation of a possible deployment. The period that a unit could be set in the enhanced pool or “yellow cycle” could range from 3 to 24 months. After being in the enhanced pool of units for the requisite period of time, a unit moves into a “green cycle,” where they could or could not “mobilize and deploy” for a period of 9 to 18 months. Just because a unit is in this category does not necessarily mean that unit would deploy. It means that as a regional combatant commander requested a certain force package, a unit set in the deployment “queue” would be the first to go. This unit would not have deployed for the last 4 to 5 years. Once the period of 9 to 18 months had ended, whether the unit had deployed or not, it would go back to a “red cycle” status and focus on homeland security and homeland defense missions for a period of 4 to 5 years.

With the transformation of the 36th Infantry Division, will come several enhanced mission capabilities. Soldiers will have the latest in individual protective equipment, communications equipment, more wheeled vehicles versus the preponderance of the fleet being tracked, leader and senior noncommissioned officer training in a joint environment, and units that are capable of working in self-contained and nonlinear areas of operation. The ability for Texas military forces to provide some level of predictability to the soldiers, their families, and their employers is crucial and should be attained at some point in the future, once they have completed the transformation. There are several enhanced mission capabilities for federal missions and/or deployments in addition to the above that will transform the needs of the active force. Nevertheless, the current transformation will provide brigade-sized units of action for the needs of the various regional combatant commanders. The ability for combatant commanders to have full spectrum forces that are brigade-size units, self-contained and deployable into a theater of nonlinear operations should provide greater flexibility and more predictability to the nation's Ready Reserve Forces.

The benefits above and beyond the discussed state and federal mission capabilities are the ability to enhance skills of the individual soldiers so that, upon their return and demobilization, they can get higher paying jobs within their communities. Recruiting and retention for the Guard could stabilize or gradually increase by having a more predictable force deployment schedule like those that are currently planned for outside of the continental U.S. rotations in support of KFOR missions in the Balkans and multinational force and observers (MFO) missions in Sinai, Egypt.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The 36th Infantry Division should request that the National Guard Bureau establish its training requirements and oversight relationship to five units of action as soon as possible. As a unit of employment (X), the 36th Infantry Division could have training oversight of up to five units of action. With the success that the division has had from its deployment in support of Stabilization Forces (SFOR 7) and the

close proximity of the 155th (Heavy) unit of action planned for in Mississippi, and the 45th Infantry (Light) unit of action currently in Oklahoma, it would make sense that those two brigades be a part of the oversight responsibility for the 36th Infantry Division as a unit of employment (X).

Next, Texas should do everything it can to get all or part of a maneuver enhancement (ME) brigade. The maneuver enhancement brigade's headquarters could come from the personnel who currently form part of the division's engineer brigade headquarters and rear area operations center (RAOC). Analyzing the current and proposed force structures, it is not clear what has happened to the three engineer battalions, one being currently deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In addition to the engineer assets that normally come as part of the ME brigade, there are one to two companies of military police and one company of chemical personnel that could leverage the existing personnel that form part of the state's civil support team (CST). In addition, many of the state missions could and have required the use of engineer support that range strictly from personnel to the use of heavy construction equipment. Since the brigade combat teams of the 36th Infantry Division will be "light" infantry, the engineer company organic to the brigade troop's battalion (BTB) will be light as well and have only six engineer squads and light equipment. Light engineer equipment is useful, but the fielding of a maneuver enhancement brigade could provide not only combat engineer vehicles for use, but dozers, dump trucks, and other pieces of construction equipment that are enormously important during consequence management operations. Lastly, a military police battalion of one to two companies, normally assigned to a ME brigade, could be critical in state consequence management missions. These military police unit(s) could be readily assessable for the Guard's Reaction Forces that National Guard Bureau has said each state should have in place. In addition, they would be available for military assistance to civil authority missions. On the Federal side, they could provide additional force protection to the division operationally along major supply routes, as well as security missions within the sustainment operations area for the division.

CONCLUSIONS

The question is no longer “if” the National Guard will deploy, it is more a matter of “when.” One of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s key mandates to the services is to find ways to make the National Guard more ready and accessible in its federal warfighting role.²² The National Guard Bureau has been working with the Army and Joint Forces Command to improve dramatically the way that units are mobilized, using the current four-phased process. Under current guidelines, it could take several weeks or months to prepare an Army Guard unit to mobilize and deploy—compared to the Air Guard model, where units deploy in a matter of hours or days.²³ The National Guard has historically been a “Train, Alert, Train, Certify, Deploy force” but it needs to move towards a “Train, Alert, Deploy force.” As goes the Army, so must go Army National Guard units. Since the Army has decided that the old divisional structure is no longer feasible in today’s asymmetrical fight, the Guard has begun major changes. The National Guard Bureau will continue to work closely with the Army to meet the goals provided by Secretary Rumsfeld. Moreover, the Army Guard is a community-based military organization and, as such, it can assist cities and towns in times of natural or man-made disasters. Guard Soldiers are citizen-soldiers, and recognize that they must fulfill dual roles as ordinary citizens and as members of the armed forces of the United States.²⁴

The initial priority should be for the National Guard Bureau to identify their units in the “full spectrum force model,” which would categorize units as a “red, amber or green” deployment force. This initial step would have a cascading effect from identification of units of action susceptible to a request for forces from regional combatant commanders, down to the units within the states expected to support state missions for disaster recovery or National Guard reaction force/consequence management missions.

To meet the guidance of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Texas’ 36th Infantry Division is well on its way in the transformation process and will meet the fiscal year 2008 time schedule outlined by the National Guard Bureau and Army. The ability for the state of Texas to support the division’s transformation will enable the

state to have more flexibility in supporting both state and federal missions. The sooner the National Guard Bureau can identify the units in the "full spectrum force model," the quicker it will provide some level of predictability, resulting in the following impacts for the individual Army Guard units: First, providing some level of deployment time frame predictability could lessen adverse stress in a soldier's family resulting in improved retention and recruiting. The support of soldiers families is important not only during deployments but in their possible consideration of reenlistment as well. Second, predictability or unpredictability gives a positive or negative message to the soldier's community. Finally, and almost as important is the positive support the citizen-soldier receives from his or her employer. Thus far, the majority of the National Guard soldiers deployed have received positive support from their employers. The latter, too, have a responsibility to their customers and ultimately to their stock holders. The absence of predictability over an extended period of time could have a negative impact on the Employer Support of the Guard Reserve (ESGR).

It speaks volumes towards the professionalism and passion of the officers, noncommissioned officers and all of the soldiers of the various units within the 36th Infantry Division when one looks at the recruiting, retention, morale, and the amount of time required to train up the soldiers to meet the required mission set for deployment. Within hours after the events of 9/11, all six brigades within the 36th Infantry Division were tasked to provide soldiers to support Operation NOBLE EAGLE. This support of soldiers and units would last over a period of 2 years through Operation NOBLE EAGLE 2. The perspective of this infantry battalion commander was that the soldiers arrived to their armories on time or ahead of schedule; 90 percent of the deployed soldiers reenlisted upon their demobilization or while they were deployed. The 8 percent of the soldiers that were lost to the national guard accessed onto active duty; while deployed, soldiers took advantage of opportunities to get additional noncommissioned officer education schooling and the mobilization provided a vehicle for the battalion staff to strengthen the family readiness group procedures which unbeknownst to the leadership would be utilized a short sixteen months later when the

battalion would be activated as part of the 56th brigade combat team to deploy to Iraq. The transition for a mechanized infantry battalion to meet the required security and support operation's mission set was minimal due to the fact that many of the individual and collective tasks were part of the mission essential task lists and common task training that had been done within the last 6 to 12 months. The unit climate surveys of this infantry battalion were conducted by the state and showed an 83 percent approval rating for the unit in the areas of mobilization process, pay/benefits, family readiness group support, and overall satisfaction for the deployment. The most consistent request by soldiers was that if they had received more notification prior to mobilization it would have enabled the soldier, his family and employer more time for administration and coordination for a smoother transition onto active duty.

When looking at the effects of the mobilization on a more macro level of strength, recruiting, retention, and morale there are many similarities as noted in the above infantry battalion's case. For recruiting, Texas and the 36th Infantry Division met their end strength goal for fiscal year 2004. Texas recruited 102 percent of its end strength and was only one of seven states to achieve this accomplishment. When comparing first quarter fiscal year 2005 to first quarter fiscal year 2004, Texas is plus 43 soldiers against an increased goal for 2005. Soldier retention for the state and division for the combat support and combat service support units that deployed for Operation NOBLE EAGLE is good. It is too early to tell what the retention numbers will be for the units that deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, but initial indications are comparable to the Operation NOBLE EAGLE results. Morale is one of the intangible categories which can ebb and flow on a daily basis. In e-mail message Colonel James K. "Red" Brown, Commander of the 56th Brigade Combat Team, stated ". . . that the morale has been excellent and the soldiers have been eager to accomplish every mission assigned to them in their brief time in Iraq."

The morale for the 56th Brigade Combat Team and the infantry battalion discussed earlier is and was excellent. There are several key factors to the unit's morale which, in this former commander's opinion, are constant communication up and down the chain of

command, ensuring that the chain of command is doing the basic requirements to take care of the individual soldiers and their employers, and making sure that when the soldiers are told that they are going home, in fact, they are going home. Solid dates are critical in the soldier and families' psyche throughout the duration of a deployment.

The soldiers of today's 36th Infantry Division are not unlike those who served their nation during World Wars I and II. The 36th Division, like other Army National Guard units, has a proud heritage. Its soldiers realize their traditions rest on the concept of the "minuteman militia" of some 368 years ago and they will continue to "defend the United States Constitution against all enemies foreign or domestic" throughout the 21st century.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Jose R. Davis, "Army National Guard Readiness: Transforming to Meet The Challenges of The 21st Century," Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 19, 2004, p. 1.

2. George W. Bush, "Remarks at the Signing of FY 02 Defense Appropriations Bill," Washington, DC, January 10, 2002.

3. Department of the Army, "The Army Vision," www.army.mil/vision, Internet, accessed August 23, 2004.

4. *Ibid.*

5. George W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, p. 1.

6. *Ibid.*

7. Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001, p. 17.

8. Richard B. Myers, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," Washington DC: The Pentagon, May 2004, p. 18.

9. Peter J. Schoomaker, "United States Army 2004 Posture Statement," Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 5, 2004, p. 1.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Robert F. Reel, "Abrams Doctrine Revisited—Letter to Editor," www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOIBY/is_2-80/ai_114698888, Internet, accessed November 15, 2004.

12. Schoomaker, p. 14.

13. Army National Guard, "Constitutional Charter of the Guard," <http://www.arng.army.mil/history/Constitution>, Internet, accessed October 20, 2004.
14. National Guard Bureau, "An Overview of The National Guard – America's State and Federal Military Force," Washington, DC: May 2004.
15. H. Steven Blum, "Executive Summary, National Guard 2005 Posture Statement," Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, p. 6.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-22.
17. John Bonin, "Modular Army Overview: Designing a Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 23, 2004.
18. Lee Schnell, "36th Infantry Division UEx/UA COA Decision," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Camp Mabry, Austin, TX, November 2004.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
21. George W. Bush, "National Strategy for Homeland Security," Washington, DC: The White House, July 2002, p. 2.
22. Blum, p. 3.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

CHAPTER 10

IN THE AFTERMATH OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Lieutenant Colonel John J. Hickey Jr.

Over the last several years, commentators have written much about the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Some have raised the question of whether this is really a war. They would use the dictionary definition that war is “a state or period of open and declared armed fighting between states or nations.”¹ Since there are no traditional states or nations in this conflict, how can the United States declare war? The proponents for describing U.S. efforts as a war argue that it is “a struggle between opposing forces or for a particular end.”² The “end” is freedom or liberty. Terrorists want to deny this “end,” therefore U.S. policy is to declare war.

The Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, defines war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”³ He further states “war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.”⁴ For the purpose of this chapter, Clausewitz’ view best describes the situation that the United States confronts in defining this conflict as a GWOT. Many traditional allies perceive U.S. policy as being focused too heavily on the military component. America’s European allies generally agree on the policy goals of promoting democracy and freedom. Much of the international criticism focuses on the U.S. policy of using military “means” to compel the enemy, specifically the preemptive strike on Iraq. However, U.S. policy for the GWOT is much larger than just Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The potential consequence of terrorists using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) requires a balanced strategy, using all instruments of national power. European cooperation, specifically the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is still a key element to winning the GWOT.

U.S. National Interest.

Before one can define the role of the EU and NATO in post war Iraq and the broader GWOT, one must first analyze U.S. global interests. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), many argue the nation's most vital interest lies in the defense of the homeland. Others with a more liberal view would argue that it represents a fight for democracy and security for the entire world. The National Security Strategy quotes President George Bush: "Our nation's cause has always been larger than our nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty."⁵ Thucydides, when discussing war, stated three causes: "interest, fear, and honor."⁶ Many conservative Americans believe the United States is at war because of honor. Terrorists attacked the nation on 9/11, and the United States needed to retaliate to defend its honor. The problem is that many in the international community believe the United States is at war because of interest; specifically the invasion of Iraq came as a result of that nation's vast oil resources. The stated policy for going to war in Iraq was the danger of the potential transfer of WMD to terrorists. After the U.S.-backed coalition invaded Iraq and found no cache of WMD, the international community attacked the legitimacy of the war. Many European governments used this failure to reinforce their opposition to the original invasion. The United States has spent the last 2 years trying to recover from this negative information campaign.

U.S. Policy and Strategy.

On January 20, 2005, President Bush announced in his inaugural speech, "... survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands." In the same speech, he defined U.S. policy as seeking to "support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."⁷ This ideological policy relates directly to the American belief in freedom and liberty for all. The U.S. strategy to win the GWOT as outlined in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) and further clarified in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

(February, 2003), represents an aggressive approach to fighting this war. The President himself stated, "We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act."⁸

The National Security Strategy also identifies the "ways" to achieve these goals. These "ways" rely heavily on partnering with others: ". . . strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with WMD . . ."⁹ The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism stated the objectives in the GWOT as: ". . . defeat terrorists and their organizations, deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists, diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and defend U.S. citizens interest at home and abroad."¹⁰ The Secretary of Defense stated it best, when talking about the war on terror, "Victory will require that every element of American influence and power be engaged."¹¹ Is the United States using every element of national power to win the war? Should the U.S. response include more focus on the European alliances, specifically the EU and NATO, to fight the perceived underlying causes of terrorism?

Importance of European Cooperation.

European cooperation is critical to the success of the GWOT. The attacks on 9/11 highlighted the necessity of sharing information in a timely manner. Information is critical to fighting terrorism because the other elements of national power depend on its success. If one does not know the simple questions of: when, where, why and how, it will be difficult to defend against an attack, much less defeat it. It is important to remember that many of the terrorists responsible for 9/11 lived or operated in Europe. This European base was vital to their success and remains critical to terrorist networks today from a diplomatic, informational, and economic standpoint.

Europe views the Middle East as important to their security, economies and future. Over 13 million Muslims of Middle Eastern descent live in Europe.¹² Many of these Middle Easterners migrated

to Europe to find economic opportunities. Most of these immigrants promote European policies that encourage support for their countries of origin.¹³ This is part of the reason Europeans view the strategy for fighting terrorism differently than the United States. The EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, recently stated, "There are old wounds in some geographical regions which as long as they are not healed will continue to create a fertile ground for terrorism to develop. . . ." He specifically cited the "Arab-Israeli" conflict.¹⁴ This view has led Europeans to focus on some of the causes of terrorism, including poverty and job opportunities. Over the last 3 decades, the EU worked to find a negotiated settlement to the Arab/Israeli conflict. The European premise is a negotiated settlement will help solve the underlying ideological and financial support for terrorism in the Middle East.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security describes the most immediate and serious threat as ". . . sophisticated terrorist networks spread across many countries, linked together by far-flung networks of financial and ideological supporters, and operating in a highly decentralized manner."¹⁵ Achieving a common understanding with European allies is imperative to America's ability to gain information superiority over the global terrorist threat. Europe's location and influence in the Middle East is critical to penetrating these terrorist networks. The nature of the threat demands a comprehensive and coordinated U.S. and European strategy in the GWOT.

EU Policy and Strategy Focus.

To understand European cooperation on the GWOT, there is not a better place to begin than with the EU. The EU has grown into an alliance of 25 nations. When originally formed in May 1950, it had only 6 member countries. France proposed the union, whose purpose was to create an alliance to integrate Europe and prevent a repetition of World War I or World War II.¹⁶ The EU today defines itself as ". . . a family of democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and prosperity."¹⁷

To better understand the European mentality about armed conflict, one must remember that European states have been at war with one another for thousands of years. The one thing they have in

common, as German military historian Hans Delbruck noted, is that “. . . Europe stands united in this one conviction: it will never submit to a hegemony enforced upon it by a single state.”¹⁸ Delbruck’s statement is significant because it depicts a strategic mindset that refused to allow a single authority to upset the balance of power in Europe. This mindset drives the European policy as it relates to the United States.

Traditionally, the EU focused on curbing U.S. global influence from an economic and political standpoint, while NATO worked with the United States on security cooperation. The security situation on the European continent often drove policy beginning with the rise of the Roman Empire in the third century BC and the First Punic War. The rise of Napoleon and the French Revolution reinforced this belief, and it culminated with the loss of millions in the world wars. Today, with the U.S. position in the world, one can state that much of the EU, and ultimately Europeans in general, will resist a single state imposing its will on the continent or more importantly the world. With this in mind, when developing a global information campaign where cooperation is the key, careful consideration needs to be used in developing global rhetoric. The statement that one is “either with us or against us” conveys an arrogance which sabotages U.S. efforts to express its desires to the world.

The encouraging news in Europe’s cooperation with the GWOT is that the EU’s policy of promoting global peace, stability, and democracy has much in concert with the U.S. policy. On June 26, 2004, the United States and the EU signed a formal declaration to combat terrorism. This agreement represents a comprehensive policy that includes the information, legal, intelligence, and economic elements of national power. Of the seven main points in the declaration, the third point is probably the most critical. This point states, “We commit to working together to develop measures to maximize our capacities to detect, investigate, and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks.”¹⁹ This requires the United States and the 26 member states that are part of the EU to share information. Sharing information is vital to preventing future terrorist attacks. The other interesting item in the declaration is the sixth point, “. . . work in close cooperation to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists can seize to recruit

and exploit their advantage by promoting democracy, development, good governance, justice, increased trade, and freedom . . .”²⁰ This joint declaration came only 3 months after terrorist attacks in Madrid, but almost 3 years after 9/11. The logical explanation for the delay is the EU only truly became interested in sharing resources after the attack on one of its members. This attack in Spain struck close to home and threatened democracy, trade, and freedom in the minds of the Europeans. The timing in connection with the Spanish elections and targeting a major transportation hub, reinforced the seriousness of the threat. All these factors led to an agreement between the EU and the United States to share information.

How has this declaration impacted the fight on terror? Has the United States seen any EU support for its strategy in Iraq? Interestingly, the answer is “yes” instead of the “no” the press often reports. The published strategy of the EU for Iraq includes three main objectives. These are, “development of stable and democratic Iraq; establishment of an open, stable, sustainable and diversified market economy; Iraq’s economic and political integration into its region and the open international system.”²¹ The major difference between U.S. and EU strategy has been in the selection of “ways” and “means” to execute policy. The EU traditionally has emphasized economic and diplomatic approaches in executing policy rather than military means.

In Iraq, this economic/financial emphasis is evident with the EU pledging 1.25 billion euro and spending 305 million euro in 2003-04.²² This pledge is relatively small in comparison to America’s commitments, but it is shaped by the Europeans negative view of the Iraqi War. By contrast, the EU delivered billions of euros to the Palestinian Authority in the last decade to promote economic development. This demonstrates the European attempt to solve the causes of terrorism, while benefiting from the economic trade. The EU is winning the diplomatic and informational campaign. The fruit of this labor is evident in the sale of European goods and services on the Arab streets. Its policy has assisted the EU in establishing economic dominance in the region. The EU is the “. . . biggest trading partner and donor of development assistance for nearly all the countries . . .” in the Arab World.²³

The latest EU effort has been the development of a military arm under the auspices of European Security and Defense Policy. This military component started in 1992 with the creation of Eurocorps, a French and Germany initiative to develop a European military headquarters. In 1993, Eurocorps grew to five nations and started its initial NATO coordination. The organization's rising importance came in 1999 when it added a crisis response capability and in 2003 when it established its out of area deployable headquarters.²⁴ The success of Eurocorps has led to a broader EU concept called EU Force (EUFOR), which in December 2004 took over responsibility from NATO for all peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is a clear policy shift for the EU, which prior to 1993 focused primarily on economic and diplomatic matters. The reason for this shift falls into two schools of thought. One school feels it represents an attempt to separate itself from a NATO dominated by the United States. The other school believes its purpose is to take more responsibility for European security matters, specifically peacekeeping missions. The truth probably falls somewhere in between. Viewing the major policy initiatives and critical conflict dates of 1993 (Bosnia-Herzegovina), 1999 (Kosovo), and 2003 (Iraq), there is a strong argument that suggests this shift resulted from disagreements between the EU and the United States on policy, specifically when to use military force.

In the broader perspective of the GWOT, this new peacekeeping role would be a much welcomed one, if the units assigned to European Union Force (EUFOR) were not the same ones assigned to NATO. The only real difference between the EU and NATO headquarters is the lack of U.S. participation. From a positive standpoint, this is one less mission for the United States. Additionally, it takes the burden off NATO for the same reasons. When the EUFOR took over the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia/Herzegovina in December 2004, this action freed up some NATO staff, including U.S. personnel. The long-term implications of the EU's expansion of its charter and what this means for NATO's future role is yet to be determined. The immediate impact in the GWOT is that the EU brought immediate relief for U.S. planning and manning requirements in Bosnia/Herzegovina. It has allowed NATO to focus on other areas, including Afghanistan and Iraq, if not with units, then with staffs.

NATO Focus.

NATO is a civil and military organization, founded in 1949 “. . . to ensure that the fragile democracies of postwar Europe had a decent chance for survival.”²⁵ The organization’s mission was to defend Western Europe, with mainly a defensive strategy and posture. The original purpose of NATO “. . . was to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means . . .”²⁶ This is still NATO’s stated policy but its success in achieving the goal of establishing “. . . a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law . . .” has evolved into the EU’s playing a larger role in determining European policy and security issues.²⁷ The Bosnia/Herzegovina SFOR mission and the combating terrorism declaration are two recent examples of the EU’s expanding role. The relatively peaceful situation in Europe, since the Kosovo Air Campaign in 1999, along with the growth in size and independence of the EU are the key enablers.

Europeans agree that their current security situation would not have been possible without the U.S. policy and strategy initiatives over the last decade. Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, when talking about the Balkan wars in the 1990s stated, “Alliance cohesion with a strong U.S. role have given clout to our political efforts, and forced the warring factions to stop fighting and start negotiating. U.S. engagement in European security was essential to our success.”²⁸ The security realities today are different. As U.S. ambassador to NATO R. Nicholas Burns has stated, “. . . if NATO is to remain the world’s most effective military and political alliance, it must adapt its fundamental strategy to the realities of the post-9/11 world.”²⁹ In fact, NATO is changing, and its support of the U.S. GWOT policy was almost immediate after the attacks of 9/11.

On September 12, 2001, less than 24 hours after the 9/11 attacks, NATO members, for the first time in history, invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states “. . . that an armed attack against one or more NATO member countries will be considered an attack against all . . .”³⁰ On October 4, 2001, the alliance agreed to eight U.S. initiatives to strengthen support for the fight against terrorism.

These initiatives provided immediate assistance in the fight on terror and long-term enhancements in intelligence sharing, security assistance, and increased basing and overflight options.³¹ Over the last 3 years, NATO policy has enabled the United States to divert forces into Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO provided direct support in the United States under Article 5 with aircraft, specifically Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), to supplement U.S. forces in the United States. This allowed the diversion of these scarce assets to overseas operations in Afghanistan. After 9/11, many NATO countries, including Germany, provided security for U.S. bases overseas, relieving the burden on U.S. forces to protect these staging and training bases.

NATO clearly has expanded its strategy for the GWOT. Since January 2002, when the UN deployed the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan, it has been under NATO command. This was the first NATO operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The mission has grown from security assistance in the Kabul area to the entire country.³² There are definitely challenges to NATO expanding out of the Kabul area of operations, but its policy and strategy precedents are notable. At the request of the interim Iraqi Prime Minister, Ilyad Allawi, NATO established a training mission in Iraq. The NATO Training Mission-Iraq is training mid and senior level Iraqi security personnel. The mission has grown from an original requirement of 75 personnel to its current authorization of 300.³³ With all this international support for the U.S. GWOT, why does a negative information campaign continue?

Initial Success in GWOT Strategy.

In assessing where the United States currently stands in the GWOT, it is important to examine the early operations. The initial phase of the GWOT to “disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by use of direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power . . .” was most successful.³⁴ The operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the use of a balanced strategy leading an international “coalition of the willing” against the al-Qa’ida and Taliban, both the terrorist organization and its state sponsor. The United States and its partners won the “war of

ideas: working closely with allies, supporting moderate and modern governments, and using effective public diplomacy . . .”³⁵ This is evident in the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 that passed (including the support from America’s European Allies in both the EU and NATO) committing money and troops to Afghanistan.³⁶ There was a demonstrated use of diplomacy in working with the moderate governments in Pakistan and Uzbekistan.

The information campaign complemented the diplomatic element of U.S. power by focusing on the key slogans: “. . . not a war against Islam . . .” and “. . . not a war against the Afghan people. . . .”³⁷ These slogans were credible and brought international legitimacy to the operation. The evidence of Taliban support to the al-Qa’ida terrorist network and the link to the 9/11 attacks provided the justification for the preemptive strikes. The United States used the international media to deliver its message or rationale. The humanitarian assistance mission in conjunction with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, is a classic example of successful diplomatic, economic, military, and information elements of power being fully integrated into operations supporting the U.S. objective of winning the “hearts” and “minds” of the Afghan people. Diplomacy secured the intermediate staging bases and overflight permissions; government and nongovernment agencies produced the supplies; the military loaded, flew, and dropped the material; the media provided positive information to the international community, which reinforced the legitimacy of the operation.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Implications on GWOT.

The integration of all elements of national power was missing in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. U.S. policy in Iraq has clouded America’s broader goals in the GWOT. Many traditional European allies and most of the Arab world view U.S. Iraqi strategy as too focused on military responses or plans. The National Security Strategy describes a cooperative effort amongst allies in combating terrorism. This cooperative effort is missing in the Iraqi campaign. The invasion of Iraq, without support from the United Nations (UN) and the European powers, specifically France, Germany, and Russia, casts a shadow over Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Prior to the war,

the Europeans questioned the U.S. justification for invading Iraq. The fact that coalition forces found no WMD damaged U.S. credibility in Europe. An overwhelming majority of the European public believe that the U.S. policies on Iraq were wrong.³⁸ This should be a concern for the United States because all of these countries are democracies. Without public support for U.S. policies in Europe and NATO, the “coalition of the willing” could quickly turn into an alliance of the few.

In fact, the support and commitment of coalition members in Iraq changed because of terrorist attacks and public opinion. The United States lost a critical European partner when Spain pulled out of the coalition after the Madrid Bombings. Other countries followed Spain including Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. The Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, and Hungary have all pulled out for various reasons, including public opinion and the continuing threat of terrorist acts.³⁹ Reports indicate Poland, Netherlands and Bulgaria will pull out during 2005 and a senior British military official stated that his country would start pulling out at the end of 2005.⁴⁰ The latest media reports on the accidental attack by U.S. forces on the kidnapped Italian journalist could further divide the coalition if the investigation and public relations activities are not handled properly. The United States can ill afford to lose the 3,000 Italian soldiers over this latest international incident.

This withdrawal of coalition support conflicts with two of the United States key National Security Strategy goals for combating terrorism: “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorist, and work with others to defuse regional conflicts.” The coalition’s initial combat success, which led to regime change, has not yet provided the international legitimacy the United States hoped to achieve in Iraq. The early mistakes in U.S. diplomacy in gaining support for the war and the intelligence failures in not finding WMD continue to hamper international support.

Strategy Adjustments.

In 2001, President Bush identified three countries as the “axis of evil” in the war on terror. They were Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. ⁴¹ The news that Iran, the second “axis of evil,” is developing nuclear

capabilities has presented a dilemma. What strategy should the United States use in approaching this development? The President stated, "My hope is that we can solve this diplomatically. We are working our hearts out so that they don't develop a nuclear weapon, and the best way to do so is to continue to keep the international pressure on them."⁴² Ironically, the Europeans are leading the diplomatic efforts in this endeavor because the United States does not have diplomatic ties with Iran.

The third "axis of evil," North Korea, has required a different diplomatic and informational challenge to tackle the nuclear proliferation issue. The United States is working the diplomatic effort through negotiations with a group of nations including: Russia, China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. This diplomatic effort has reinforced the Arab perception that the West has a double standard in dealing with the presence of WMD. The U.S. rationale for invading Iraq was the potential spread of WMD. The Arab question is, since North Korea has admitted that they are developing nuclear weapon capabilities, why doesn't the United States attack North Korea as they did Iraq? The evidence suggests that limited U.S. military means, especially ground troops, are driving an adjustment in U.S. strategy. That the United States had to pull out forces from one "axis of evil," the Korean Peninsula, to support another, Iraq, supports this conclusion. The inability of the United States to publicly admit military limitations reinforces Arab mistrust for Western policy. The U.S. information campaign is out of sync with its slogan that "it is not a war against Islam." In the greater GWOT this diminishes U.S. credibility and provides adversaries an opportunity to exploit this weakness.

The security situation in Iraq and an inadequate information campaign often inhibits other elements of national power from being effective. As the EU contends, it is difficult to help in reconstruction when the "security situation continues to impose limits on all those who want to help . . ." ⁴³ The United States has difficulty spending its allocation of reconstruction funds because of security issues: ". . . Of the \$18.4 billion appropriated by Congress in October 2003, only \$9.6 billion were obligated and \$2.1 billion spent by mid-December 2004."⁴⁴ The United States is in the middle of this dilemma with many international organizations demanding U.S. military security

while they are reducing or eliminating their presence in Iraq. The EU is clearly benefiting from economic trade with Iraq, but is unwilling to support security requirements. The recent emphasis on training Iraqi soldiers and using economic incentives to bring security under regional control, presents the best blueprint for victory.

Successful elections in Iraq and the subsequent positive media reports present a window of opportunity. European newspapers from France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Britain all provided positive reports on the recent elections in Iraq. Belgium's *De Standard* summed it up best: "It looked like an impossible gamble . . .," and yet this important step in the post-Saddam democratic process "has turned out all right."⁴⁵ The keys to free elections were the integration and execution of all elements of national power. The United States downplayed its military presence during the elections. It relied on the interim government and Iraqi political leaders to deliver the message or information to the people. It used Iraqi and coalition security forces around the polling areas for security. The outcome was the first democratic elections in Iraq in 50 years. The news media reports of the personal stories and the people celebrating in the streets did more in one day to rebuild unity of purpose amongst our European allies than all the diplomatic efforts have done in the last year-and-a-half.

Reassessing Policy.

The GWOT, specifically as it relates to European cooperation, is at an important crossroads. This war represents a number of complicated issues. There are many factors to assess, but as Clausewitz argued, "The first task, then, in planning for war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one."⁴⁶ It is difficult to narrow this war's center of gravity to one, but if Iraq has taught Americans anything, the "will of the people" still represents a crucial center of gravity for the war on terrorism. In reassessing the U.S. policy, the first question should be whether the United States is winning the information campaign in the Arab world. Is U.S. strategy creating or destroying more terrorists? The answers were negative several months ago, but recent events in Lebanon, Israel, and even Iraq suggest the tide may be turning.

What should the United States and Europe focus on to fight the GWOT? The EU Secretary General for Policy and Security Major General Solana has stated, "We [(Europeans)] believe the problem of terrorism must be resolved not only by dealing with its effects but also by concentrating on its causes."⁴⁷ The causes of terror are many. Solving all of them would be a monumental set of tasks, but finding a common ground or starting point is not that difficult. The Arab/Israeli conflict or more specifically the Israeli-Palestinian issue appears to be an underlying problem to peace in the Middle East, at least in the Arabs' and many European minds. As EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten stated, "Reforming the Middle East does not depend exclusively on progress in the peace process between Israel and Palestine, but it is hard to imagine the region reaching its full potential without a settlement."⁴⁸

Conclusion.

As many in Washington, DC, are coming to understand, the way to defeat global terrorism is to focus all national and international capabilities against the enemy. This is a war that requires extensive information operations. The best information strategy is to attack Islamic extremists by reducing their support among the moderate Muslim population. To accomplish this, the United States must first win the war of ideas. Winning the war of ideas means demonstrating U.S. commitment through actions that are political, economic, and educational. The United States started down the right path by attacking some of the underlying causes of terrorism. The recent elections in the occupied territories in Palestine, the cease fire between Palestine and Israel, and the successful elections in Iraq struck at the core ideology that terrorist hope to deny, freedom and liberty. As President Bush has stated, the "momentum for freedom" is now. With his February 21, 2005, speech in Brussels discussing the American and European alliances, he noted, "The future of our nations, and the future of the Middle East, are linked – and our peace depends on their hope and development and freedom."⁴⁹

The administration's strategy shift from military heavy "means" to a more European diplomatic approach is encouraging support for U.S. policies in Iraq and the broader GWOT. The Iraqi elections

created momentum and energized the international community. The United States built from this success by implementing an Iraqi reconstruction effort that engages all elements of national power. The Department of Defense (DoD) is working diligently to transfer interagency issues in Iraq to the State Department. The newly elected Iraqi government is providing information and communicating its message to its citizens through the media. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is expediting the transfer of funds to rebuild Iraq. The reconstruction efforts are focused on restoring basic necessities and schools. The labor force for reconstruction is primarily Iraqi. The United States and NATO military forces priority of effort is on training Iraqi forces to handle their own security requirements. In the broader GWOT, the executive branch is diplomatically reaching out to the United States' traditional allies in Europe. It was no accident that the first visit abroad of newly appointed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was to Europe and the Middle East. The press reports and publicity on the information front is positive. In the GWOT, a U.S. strategy that balances the elements of national power ultimately enhances America's ability to gain the information superiority it needs to win the war.

As Churchill warned America in spring of 1943, ". . . War is full of mysteries and surprises. A false step, a wrong direction, an error in strategy, discord or lassitude among the Allies, might soon give the common enemy power to confront us with new and hideous facts."⁵⁰ As the United States saw on 9/11, the potential always exists for surprise. The last 3 1/2 years have shown the ebb and flow of coalition and alliance warfare. It is clear that Europe still remains a critical partner in the GWOT. The only way to preclude an attack is to obtain reliable and verifiable information. The use of WMD by terrorists presents a horrific and terrifying capability. As Americans have learned, "winning" the war means attacking the enemy before he can attack you. U.S. policy that integrates all elements of national power to attack the enemy on multiple fronts and has strong European and international support will be the most effective strategy. As former Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, "We're not going to win the war on terrorism on the battlefield alone. . . . Good alliance relations, trade policy, energy policy, intelligence cooperation, public diplomacy, nation-building — all of these are part of our formula for victory."⁵¹

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. *The New Merriam-Webster Pocket Dictionary*, New York, 1970, p. 565.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Carl Von Clausewitz, On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 75.
4. *Ibid*, p. 87.
5. George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Washington, DC, September 2002, p. 1.
6. Michael Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 1 Spring 1999, p. 127.
7. George W. Bush, "Presidential Inaugural Speech," Washington, DC, January 2005.
8. George W. Bush, "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," Washington, DC, February 2003, p. 11.
9. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," p. 1.
10. Bush, "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," p. 11.
11. Allen W. Dowd, "Different Course? America and Europe in the 21st Century," *Parameters*, p. 73.
12. Shada Islam, "European Union's Southern Drive," *Yale Global Online*, May 30, 2003, p. 2; available from yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1738, Internet, accessed March 17, 2005.
13. *Ibid.*
14. "EU's Solana says causes of terrorism need tackling," available from www.eubusiness.com/afp/040904093239.20fu3jty, Internet, accessed February 1, 2005.
15. George W. Bush, "The National Strategy for Homeland Security," Washington, DC, July 2002, p. 10.
16. "The European Union at a glance," available from www.eu.int/abc/index_en.htm, Internet, accessed January 24, 2005.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton, NJ, 1986, p. 347.
19. "Text of U.S.-EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism," available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040626-5.html, Internet, accessed January 25, 2005.
20. *Ibid.*

21. "Iraq-EU relations: a strategy for the medium term," available from www.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/news/ip05_723.htm, Internet, accessed September 23, 2004.
22. *Ibid.*
23. "Commission statement on the transfer of power in Iraq," available from www.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/news/ip04_817.htm, Internet, accessed September 23, 2004.
24. "Eurocorps History," available from www.eurocorps.org/site/inde.php?language=en&content=history, Internet, accessed September 23, 2004.
25. R. Nicholas Burns, "The War on Terror is NATO's New Focus," *International Herald Tribune*, October 6, 2004, available www.ihf.com/articles/542089.html, Internet, accessed December 21, 2004.
26. The NATO Handbook, "Office of Information and Press NATO," Brussels, 1999, p. 23.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Tony Blair, "NATO, Europe, and Our Future Security," *Journal of Royal United Services Institute*, London, March 8, 1999; available www.britainusa.com/sections/articles_show.asp?sarticletype=1&Article_ID=713&i..., Internet, accessed February 10, 2005, p. 4.
29. Burns, p. 1.
30. "NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism," available from www.nato.int/terrorism/index.htm, Internet, accessed January 26, 2005.
31. *Ibid.*
32. "NATO in Afghanistan" available from www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.htm, Internet, accessed January 26, 2005.
33. "NATO's assistance to Iraq," available from www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance/decision.html, Internet, accessed January 18, 2005.
34. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," p. 6.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Marianne van Leeuwen, *Confronting Terrorism European Experiences, Threat Perceptions, and Polices*, The Hague, 2003, p. 193.
37. Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, New York, 2002, p. 115.
38. Stan Crock, "If You're Not With Us . . .," *Business Week*, September 13, 2004, Issue 3899, p. 38.
39. John Pike, "Non-US Forces in Iraq-15 January 2005," *Global Security*, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm, Internet, accessed February 2, 2005.

40. The ideas in this sentence are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, AY 2004-05.

41. "Bush: Iran won't have a nuclear weapon," Associated Press, September 28, 2004. available from www.cnn.com/2004/allpolitics/09/28/bush.Tuesday.ap/, Internet, accessed October 6, 2004.

42. *Ibid.*

43. "Iraq reconstruction: Commission releases EUR 160 million," available from europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/news/ip04_584.htm, Internet, accessed September 23, 2004.

44. Curt Tarnoff, "Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance," *Congressional Research Service*, Report to Congress, December 20, 2004, p. i.

45. European Press Review, "Hope for Iraq?," *Deutsche Welle*, available from www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1474009,00.html, Internet, accessed February 10, 2005.

46. Howard and Paret, p. 619.

47. "EU's Solana says Causes of Terrorism Need Tackling."

48. Humayun Chaudhry, "EU: 'Strategic partnership'," *Makka Times*, May 19, 2004 available from english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8E49A89B-64B8-403F-8D35-B21DE7B45E1E.htm, Internet, accessed February 10, 2005.

49. Concert Noble, "President Discusses American and European Alliance in Belgium," February 21, 2005, available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050221.html, Internet, accessed March 9, 2005.

50. Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, London: Yale University Press, 1992, p. 66.

51. Colonel Daniel Smith, "Spending Under Fire," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, March 11, 2004, available from www.fpiif.org/commentary/2004/0403budget_body.html, Internet, accessed September 23, 2004.

CHAPTER 11

THE DARK FRUIT OF GLOBALIZATION: HOSTILE USE OF THE INTERNET

Lieutenant Colonel Todd A. Megill

One of the second order effects of an internet connected world, a direct consequence of increasing economic globalization and technological diffusion, is that insurgent/terrorist organizations which are most against the process of globalization are using its infrastructure to target and attack its biggest proponent, the United States. As the world's greatest power and leading engine of change, the United States has created through the internet a "virtual global commons," one that anti-American and anti-globalization groups increasingly are using to conduct propaganda and plan attacks. This chapter will focus on the internet, developed as an agent of economic change, and its use by insurgents/terrorists to operate and conduct targeting operations employing a similar methodology adopted by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).

U.S. National Security, Economic Prosperity, and the Internet.

One of the major goals of the current U.S. National Security Strategy is to create and expand the world economy as a means for addressing some of the underlying causes of violence around the globe:¹

A Strong World Economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty.²

Creating a strong world economy will lead the United States even more toward embracing the concept and trends of globalization: "Globalization refers to those entrenched and enduring patterns

of worldwide interconnectiveness . . . it suggests that a growing magnitude or intensity of global flows such as that the states and societies become increasingly enmeshed in worldwide systems and networks of interaction.”³ The process of globalization, though initially created by U.S. technical creativity and economic power, is now truly a world-wide phenomenon as millions around the world contribute their expertise, creativity, and economic capital.

Globalization isn't a choice. It's a reality. There is just one global market today, and the only way you can grow at the speed your people want is by tapping into the global stock and bond markets, by seeking out multinationals to invest in your country and by selling into the global trading system what your factories produce. And the most basic truth about globalization is this: No one is in charge – not George Soros, not 'Great Powers' and not I.⁴

Technological advances in telecommunications and computerization leading to the creation of the internet are the leading characteristics of the process involved in globalization. “Today's era of globalization is built around falling telecommunication costs—thanks to microchips, satellites, fiber optics, and the internet.”⁵ If the global movement of goods and services are the lifeblood of the world economy, then the internet is the nervous system. It is constantly passing, collecting, and storing information that guides and directs such economic flows. The movement of information and data across the internet is so vast and pervasive in the United States, and the industrialized world in particular, that it has become a feature of modern life. Air travel, sea travel, land travel, and now virtual travel that cross these global commons are the norm. A commons represents a shared resource or area with poorly defined boundaries, widely used or accessible, with limited supervision or governance. The last form of travel has no association with geography, possesses no boundaries, and is limited only by access to the World Wide Web. The internet is a continually expanding virtual commons of information and communication stretching across the globe.

The Impact of a Virtual Global Commons.

The major impact of the internet is that it has evolved into the fourth global commons. There is a terrestrial commons of land

masses, an oceanic global commons that encompasses most of the globe, and an aerospace global commons that covers the earth and extends upward until the atmosphere ends in empty space.⁶ The internet has created a virtual global commons that extends as far as communications can reach and man has a desire to create an interface.

The virtual global commons that the internet provides for hostile users is unique and expands the opportunities for insurgency, criminality, terrorism, or other violent acts across the globe. There is little common agreement on the terms of terrorism or insurgency or if the current wave of Muslim fundamentalist extremism is a political movement linked to an insurgency or random terrorist acts.⁷ The use of the internet for violence does not predispose any political goal or objective, and so the term terrorist/insurgent is used in this discussion. The worldwide internet allows the hostile terrorist/insurgent to create and/or occupy a "Distributed Sanctuary." The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff defines a sanctuary as: "A nation or area near or contiguous to the combat area which by tacit agreement between the warring powers is exempt from attack and therefore serves as a refuge for staging, logistic, or other activities of the combatant powers."⁸ The worldwide internet allows an expansion of that definition. The refuge or sanctuary no longer has to be near or contiguous to the area of combat or operations.

The linkages provided by the worldwide internet allow the insurgents and terrorists to remain removed from the location they plan to attack. "The knowledge of how to conduct an attack is developed in one country, then that knowledge is combined with the raw materials, personnel, and training available in other countries, which can include the target country, to create a weapon in the target country."⁹ Options now exist to divide a sanctuary further, not only by location, but by function.

The world-wide internet allows an organization's fund raising to occur around the globe and its collection to occur in a country that looks favorably upon terrorist or insurgent goals. "Al-Qa'ida appears to have relied on a core group of financial facilitators who raised money from a variety of donors and other fund-raisers, primarily in the Gulf countries and particularly in Saudi Arabia."¹⁰ Terrorists and insurgents use existing legal and illegal networks to gain financing

including the use of free trade zones and the informal hawala system of currency transfers, including diamonds and gold.¹¹ The monies sent to those who are planning operations in another location or a nation-state, to locations with weak banking and financial laws, allows them to launder the monies collected.

Money laundering involves disguising assets so they can be used without detection of the illegal activity that produced them. . . . This process has devastating social consequences. For one thing, money laundering provides the fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, arms dealers, and other criminals to operate and expand their operations.¹²

Insurgents and terrorists can reside in a country where they are breaking no public laws and can maintain a low profile. In a second country or location, other members procure and assemble the weapons or explosives for shipment to marry up with the actual attackers in yet a third country or location. The terrorists and insurgents attackers can then flee or return to possibly a fourth country, the operation monitored by the group's leadership using news outlets and media access from yet another country. Finally, the terrorists and insurgents can develop the group's message and disseminate it throughout the world through the world-wide internet. Separating the various functions of insurgent and terrorist sustainment and operations or the phases of the targeting and attack methodology makes it difficult for national police or public security organizations to track and/or gather evidence of criminal misconduct. "The old police technique of tracking illegal activity by watching certain places and peoples does not work when communications is carried out on line."¹³

As we now know, support networks in Muslim diasporas, especially in Europe, have been key nodes in the funding and operations of extremist and terrorist groups. Ironically, the activities of these groups have been facilitated by the reluctance of Western security and law enforcement agencies to monitor the activities of allegedly religious groups. As the investigations following the events of September 11, 2001 have run their course, it has become apparent that Muslim diasporas in countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland have been implicated as important hubs of al-Qa'ida operations and recruitment.¹⁴

One of the challenges the worldwide internet poses as a global commons is that it already exists as an exploitable environment. It has the ability to be present or embedded into every aspect of mankind's existence. Thus, insurgents and terrorists do not have to expend much time, effort, or money to painfully build up the infrastructure for attack or revolt. The painstaking process of building cells, organizations, and networks and the risks of communicating with them greatly decrease when done remotely. "Even more challenging from a security point of view is that the people do not have to go out to establish these networks. They do not have to be in the same country or even on line at the same time."¹⁵

The internet is such a useful communications and economic tool that it is unlikely that a modern society can operate without it. The world economy, linked through a global communications network, has helped raise the standard of living of millions around the world.¹⁶ However, this communications infrastructure also brings change to much of the world. For those who do not want change and seek to deny it, the internet can become a tool for attacking the very bodies, values, and organizations that helped to create it.¹⁷ The Internet allows for a criminal, an insurgent, or a terrorist to expand his or her area of operations and gather the necessary information about targets they wish to exploit or attack without a physical presence until the actual tactical operation occurs.

Doctrine: Ours and Theirs.

In the U.S. military, at the Joint level, Joint Pub 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, dated January 17, 2002, promulgates the doctrinal underpinnings of the targeting process.¹⁸ The six-step process is used to define targets for attack in support of combat operations: (1) Commander's objectives, guidance and intent, (2) Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization, (3) Capabilities analysis, (4) Commander's decision and force assignment, (5) Mission planning and force execution, and (6) Combat assessment. Within this process, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps use the Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess Cycle (D3A) to support planning and link with the Joint Targeting Cycle (see Figure 1).¹⁹



Figure 1. The Joint Targeting Cycle.

This methodology is similar in many ways to the type of process that insurgents or terrorists use in defining, developing, and executing their attacks.²⁰ Moreover, the interconnectiveness of modern society and the presence of the internet allow the insurgents/terrorists to accomplish many of these steps from a distributed sanctuary, removed from the actual geographic location or population they intend to attack.

Commander's Objectives, Guidance, and Intent.

In both the U.S. military and insurgent or terrorist organizations, there are policy objectives achieved by the application of force or the threat of force. Both organizations provide this guidance and intent to subordinates in different forms: written documents, oral presentations, conversations, and graphics, stories, and pictures.²¹ The internet makes this important step easier, as it allows those physically separated to maintain a high level of contact and communication.

There used to be trade-off, they argue, between the reach of a message and its richness. A rich, detailed message required a one-on-one conversation; reaching out to thousands, for example, through advertising, meant you could send only simplistic messages. The tradeoff has now been killed by the new technologies: you can have rich, detailed customized information flowing from one to thousands or millions.²²

The internet allows the communication of a leader's or commander's intent and guidance to his or her subordinates accurately, without the risk of actual physical contact that could lead to identification, arrest, or attack.

Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization; and Capabilities Analysis.

This is the step that involves target selection. The U.S. Army's decide phase in the D3A Cycle is embedded in this, as military personnel decide what are the type of targets, where they are, who can locate them, and how they should be attacked.²³ This is a give-and-take process between intelligence and operations functions. A process that debates, assembles, and selects targets for lethal or nonlethal attack. Additionally, the evaluation and selection of the target results in the identification of the type of attack system or methodology likely employed against the nominated target. Again, the internet allows the insurgent/terrorist a similar capacity to communicate accurately over vast distances and keep track of individuals, ideas, and targets. The internet is an interconnected assemblage of databases that provides the insurgents/terrorists a low-cost, low-risk way of gathering information about their enemies. The Al-Qa'ida organization, a recent example of an evolving insurgent/terrorist network, uses computers and the internet as a matter of course to operate their organization and identify targets.

Al-Qa'ida was a modern army. It was as adept with computers as any organization, founded by the engineer son of a construction millionaire and staffed largely by middle-class educated males. Intercepting al-Qa'ida communications was hard mainly because the organization understood information technology so well.²⁴

Expertise with information technology and the internet allows the insurgents or terrorists to gather the information needed to conduct their planning, targeting, and weaponeering remotely:

Meanwhile, al-Qa'ida operatives used the Internet to scope out targets. They downloaded layouts of bridges and buildings from Web sites. In the past, collecting this kind of information might require traveling around the world. Getting it to someone in the field required undercover couriers. Now you could click, get the data, click again, and send the diagrams to a temporary, untraceable e-mail address.²⁵

A translation of an al-Qa'ida Training manual gives clear guidance to followers and operatives on how to gather information and intelligence about an enemy or target:

Any organization that desires to raise the flag of Islam high and proud must gather as much information as possible about the enemy. Information has two sources: Public Sources: Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of the information available about the enemy. . . . The one gathering the information should be a regular person (trained college graduate) who examines primary sources of information published by the enemy (newspapers, magazines, radio, TV, etc.). . . . The one gathering information with this public method is not exposed to any danger whatsoever. Any brother can gather information from those aforementioned sources.²⁶

The internet makes it possible for a global insurgency or terrorist networked organization to exist. Prior to the invention and dissemination of the internet, geography had a great influence on the movement of information. The physical distance between members made communications and information collection much slower, riskier, and more time consuming.

Commander's Decision and Force Assignment; and Mission Planning and Force Execution.

These two phases are intertwined so closely that they can occur nearly simultaneously. Now the commander approves selected targets, which are then attacked. In U.S. Army doctrine, this is the

deliver phase of the Joint Targeting Cycle. The U.S. military and insurgents and terrorists have a number of ways of attacking the target(s), but the U.S. military has the advantage in possessing specialized weapons that can afford it considerable target standoff and destructive power. Insurgents and terrorists on the other hand currently have neither standoff nor destructive capability, but they possess their own considerable capability.

The advance of technology is why we now worry about weapons of mass destruction. For the first time in history, a single attacker may be able to use technology to kill millions of people. . . . Technology will continue to alter the balance between the attacker and the defender, at an ever-increasing pace. In addition, technology will generally favor the attacker, with the defender playing catch-up.²⁷

The U.S. President has stated in the National Security Strategy, "The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology."²⁸ The internet can serve as a command, control, communications, computerization, and intelligence center to facilitate lethal attacks. In addition, there is a growing body of literature that indicates it could be the actual attack mechanism to disable or disrupt certain components of a modern industrialized society.²⁹ Again, the insurgent/terrorist need not be physically present in relation to the target when conducting such an attack.

Combat Assessment.

The Joint Targeting Process's final phase, mirrored in the U.S. Army's cycle, is the assessment phase. This represents the estimate of the damage resulting from the use of force.³⁰ The U.S. military uses intelligence and operational assets to evaluate the damage to the target and assess if it has achieved the commander's desired level of effect. If the needed level of effect is not adequate, then the target is attacked again. Insurgents or terrorists evaluate a target they have attacked in relation to its symbolic and propaganda value. The internet greatly facilitates such an evaluation as it grants nearly real-time knowledge of the attack and target impact due to the presence of the world media. An insurgent or terrorist attack is big news in most

of the world, and the immediate broadcasts of images of the attack help terrorists and insurgents evaluate their success. In a crude way, the sheer amount of reporting on a given attack provides insurgents and terrorists with an idea of how successful the organization's attack has been. Monitoring multiple media outlets from around the world is easy to do on the internet. It allows the insurgents or terrorists to monitor their attack at the same time they advertise their activities and promote their views and cause. This then completes the targeting process with the organization's message being enhanced or modified. The targeting process begins again with insurgents or terrorists looking for new targets to attack. The internet allows this targeting process to occur across the globe with the insurgent/terrorist network being connected by the thinnest web of electrons through the internet.

Conclusion.

The expanding use of the internet lies at the heart of the globalizing world economy. The interconnectiveness of the financial and business sectors around the world is critical to the quality of life and standard of living of Americans. The United States, in an effort to improve its national security posture, actively promotes the global economy as a way to address numerous social evils and promote basic human rights.³¹ The internet is a means of more firmly integrating all nations of the world into more interconnected and stable political units. This allows increased efficiencies that translate into economic improvements. However, the internet brings both opportunities and threats. It is a method of improving efficiencies and linkages between people and businesses. It also serves as a tool for those opposed to the globalized political economy and allows them to tap into the fears of dynamic change. Thus, they can carry on a networked anti-American insurgency.

The targeting methodology that the U.S. military uses at the joint level is similar at both the operational/strategic and tactical levels to how global insurgents and terrorists can now conduct their own operations using the internet. The ability to send clear, concise, information dense messages across the world enhances the

insurgents' security. They no longer have to meet face-to-face to encourage members or develop plans. The internet allows individuals and small groups with common agendas to make and maintain contact easily with each other. The internet serves as a global venue to disseminate their message or vision. The internet not only provides a highly effective means of organizing, commanding, and controlling an insurgent or terrorist network, but also serves as a useful tool to collect targeting information. Terrorists or insurgents can conduct operational planning, target evaluation, initial weaponeering, and a post-attack assessment without physically visiting the intended target. This remote targeting process, buried in the mass of traffic and data that flows across the World Wide Web, makes it difficult for security forces to track insurgent/terrorist activities. The internet allows the insurgents or terrorists to expose themselves to a minimal amount of risk of capture until the actual execution of the targeted attack. After attacking the target, the organization can monitor its success nearly instantaneously at almost no cost or risk to itself. Finally, the internet allows the insurgents and terrorists to trumpet their activities when they chose to do so throughout the world, again both quickly and with relative security.

The internet allows the establishment of a worldwide insurgency by non-state actors. Empowered angry young men can link themselves together via the internet and become a cohesive organization, networked together.³² Insurgents or terrorists seldom need to come together to maintain a functional organization. The internet allows insurgents and terrorists to remain scattered across the globe and hidden in small groups. They need not come together to operate, creating a difficult signature for security officials to find. The internet is a growing virtual global commons that affords small numbers of violent individuals the opportunity and capability to carry out a global insurgency and complex, devastating attacks. Thus, the expansion of the internet, linked to economic prosperity, is a two-edged sword, improving people's standard of living, while at the same time empowering those in violent disagreement with the values and concepts it embodies to attack its proponents more effectively.

Recommendations.

The internet is here to stay as a major component of the world's economic system and a highly visible presence in the process of globalization. The internet's rapid growth and penetration into all aspects of the industrialized and developing world has led it to become a part of a new "Virtual Global Commons." Since the internet is now an integral part of world civilization and has the nature of open access, there is no way to deny its use to insurgents or terrorists for their own criminal and violent agendas. Denying the internet as a distributed sanctuary is an impossibility for the United States. Attempting to cut the insurgents or terrorists off from the internet and its networks, would display a complete lack of understanding of its capabilities and operation. A quote from an earlier era illuminates the challenge to the United States in combating insurgents and terrorists on the internet.

Little minds try to defend everything at once, but sensible people look at the main point only; they parry the worst blows and stand little hurt if they avoid a greater one. If you try to hold everything, you hold nothing.

Fredrick the Great³³

There should be a two-pronged approach in addressing the insurgent and terrorist threat on the internet. The first would be to manage the risk the internet possesses as an insurgent or terrorist command and control and intelligence collection tool. This is the classic concept of force protection and physical security. General information about a target is probably not deniable to insurgents or terrorists. However, the United States needs to deny the insurgents detailed information about possible targets. This is a major component of the current strategy for defending cyberspace.³⁴ The United States is doing this, and it will make the insurgents or terrorist's targeting process more difficult. In addition, the United States government needs to continue to harden its own cyber-networks to minimize any direct collection or attack on vital network infrastructures through possible interfaces with the commercial or civil internet. The insurgent and terrorist likely will use the internet as a means to launch cyberattacks against selected targets.

The second approach to addressing a hostile use of the internet is less traditional, as it would seek to exploit the insurgents or terrorists use of the internet, rather than attempt to deny them access. The internet can work for the United States military as well as for insurgents or terrorists. The latter exploit the internet, but using the internet means that they have to utilize the technology it encompasses. The U.S. Government needs to expand and enlarge the internet, adding more nodes and infrastructure. By doing so, it will attack indirectly, using economic power, the source of people's frustrations and lack of hope that are breeding grounds for insurgencies and terrorism. The expansion of the internet will make it easier to track and monitor insurgent or terrorist organizations. The use of the internet leaves an electronic record, trail, or trace. Skilled operators and analysts can trace these links back to insurgents or terrorists. The tracking information can then be turned over to more classic human intelligence or technical collection for targeting. The ability to operate dispersed also makes insurgents and terrorists more vulnerable, since they lack the situation awareness and protection that massing provides. The distributed, global nature of the internet allows the United States to conduct remote collection against insurgents/terrorists, while minimizing the risk to its service members and increasing the efficiency of more traditional intelligence collection.

Moreover, the U.S. Government needs to encourage expansion and use of the internet on a global basis in an effort to deny insurgents and terrorists access to unaccountable operational funds. The free flow of undocumented currency allows the fusion of criminals and insurgents or terrorists to finance operations and suborn individuals to provide them information and support. The increasing use of the internet as a mechanism for retail and business-to-business financial transactions not only avoids the inefficient use of hard currency, but it also allows documentation of the financial trail. Tracing the financial transactions allows their exploitation by law enforcement agencies for arrest or the U.S. Government for military targeting. The more financial transactions travel across the internet, the less the potential for undocumented currency to become available to criminal or insurgent or terrorist organizations, which would limit their ability to conduct and promote operations.

Insurgents and terrorists use the internet as a propaganda and a recruiting tool. Through websites and internet chat rooms, they put out their message in an effort to influence and recruit. Again, the internet should allow the U.S. Government to monitor this process. Its representative could then use information operations, promoting a dialog by using or hiring religious or political leaders to promote moderate viewpoints. Any communications created during this dialog would not only work to counter the insurgents or terrorists message, but also create other opportunities for active, targeted collection.

Finally, the United States, as it continues to promote globalization and seeks to transform many federal government organizations, needs to maintain a priority of monitoring and researching the internet. The relative “newness” of the internet and the distributed, nearly chaotic way in which it grows and operates, means that its capabilities and effects are poorly understood. Insurgents and terrorists are using the internet and constantly evolving their tactics and techniques. Although they have adapted their organizations to take advantage of the internet, they have not yet evolved into “networked” insurgent organizations. The United States needs to remain vigilant as networked insurgent and terrorist organizations are still in their infancy. Through observation, research, and simulation its operatives, in cooperation with the private sector, need to understand the capabilities and limitations the internet imposes on its opponents.

The internet offers both opportunities and challenges to the United States as it creates and occupies a new global commons. Its representatives will need to conduct a sustained strategic campaign to operate in this new environment and minimize its use as a distributed sanctuary and communications tool for evolving insurgent and terrorist organizations. In its pursuit of insurgents and terrorists, it needs to make the internet a priority in its strategic endeavors. As General of the Army Douglas MacArthur once suggested:

We must hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of unglimped methods and weapons. The next war will be won in the future, not in the past. We must go on, or we will go under.³⁵

The opportunities and challenges the internet contains are great, and Americans ignore them at their own peril.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America dated September 2002 is the baseline federal document outlining the strategic security posture for the United States. All other U.S. Government and Department of Defense strategies flow from it.

2. George W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Washington: The White House, September 2002, p. 17.

3. David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds., *The Global Transformation Reader*, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, MA, 2003, p. 3.

4. Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York, 1999, p. 93.

5. *Ibid.*, p. xv.

6. Wayne Lee, *To Rise from Earth*, New York, 2000, p. 12. The height at which space begins is 121.9 Kilometers; at this altitude, there is no atmospheric pressure on an object.

7. John Baylis, et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Oxford, 2002, p. 210.

8. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, New York, 1987, p. 317.

9. Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*, St. Paul, MN, 2004, p. 38.

10. U.S. Congress, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, New York, 2004, p. 170.

11. Angel M. Rabasa, et al., *The Muslim World After 9/11*, San Monica, CA, 2004, p. 45.

12. Brett F. Woods, *The Art and Science of Money Laundering*, Boulder, CO, 1998, pp. 178-179.

13. Hammes, p. 40.

14. Rabasa, p. 44.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

16. J. F. Rischard, *High Noon*, New York, 2002, p. 29.

17. Friedman, p. 325.

18. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine for Targeting," JP 3-60, p. vi, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_60.pdf, Internet, accessed February 9, 2005.

19. *Ibid.*, p. C-2.

20. C. J. M. Drake, *Terrorists' Target Selection*, New York, 1998, pp. 175-182.
21. Norman Wade, *The Operations Smartbook-FM 3.0 Operations*, Florida, 2002, p. 1-50 to 1-51.
22. Rischard, p. 20.
23. JP 3-60, p. C-3.
24. Bruce Berkowitz, *The New Face of War*, New York, 2003, p. 10.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
26. Walter Laqueur, ed., *"Voices of Terror" Manifestos, Writings, and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other Terrorists from Around the World and Throughout the Ages*, New York, 2004, pp. 405-406. The stated second source of information for providing the other 20 percent of the needed information on a target is classic human intelligence (HUMINT) collection or espionage.
27. Bruce Schneier, *Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World*, New York, 2003, pp. 88-89.
28. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," p. 1.
29. Zalmay M. Khalilzad and John P. White, eds., *The Changing Role of Information in Warfare*, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, pp. 253-281.
30. JP 3-60, p. III-4.
31. George W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," p. 21.
32. Friedman, p. 322.
33. Peter G. Tsouras, ed., *The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations*, London, 2000, p. 137.
34. George W. Bush, "The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace of the United States of America," Washington, DC: The White House, February 2008, p. xviii.
35. Peter G. Tsouras, *Warriors' Words: A Quotation Book*, London, 1992, p. 222.

CHAPTER 12

A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE

Colonel James D. Shumway

Army forces will be organized into modular, capabilities-based unit designs to enable rapid force packaging and deployment and sustained land combat. . . . key to a Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities.¹

General Peter Schoomaker
Chief of Staff, Army (CSA)

Moving beyond the previous division-based structure, General Peter Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, envisions a modular, brigade-based force that supports the National Military Strategy, emerging joint concepts, and Army strategic planning documents. After announcing his "Focus Areas" in August 2003, General Schoomaker tasked the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop modular unit designs and operational concepts.² Subsequently, TRADOC's "Task Force Modularity" developed headquarters, combat, and support organizations to replace or augment current unit designs.

Modular organizations will be rapidly deployable, agile, tailorable, scalable, versatile, and more self-contained than previous units.³ Units of Employment-X (UEX) will be the primary modular war fighting headquarters, providing many functions which divisions or corps currently perform. Units of Employment-Y (UEY) will serve as army service component headquarters.⁴ New designs for infantry (light) and heavy (armored/mechanized) brigade combat teams will complement the medium *Stryker* brigade combat team (SBCT). To conduct extended land operations, these headquarters and combat elements require additional support.

In the past, division or corps level organizations provided this support through habitually task-organized units and other mission tailored elements. Modular support brigades will provide functional

and reinforcing capabilities to brigade combat teams, other support brigades, UEx, UEy, and various joint force elements. The five new support brigade types are: aviation, fires, sustainment, maneuver enhancement, and battlefield surveillance. Functional theater level brigades will augment or reinforce support brigades with additional engineer, military police, intelligence, signal, or other capabilities packages.

The maneuver enhancement brigade will enhance the full dimensional protection and freedom of maneuver of supported army, joint, and multinational forces. It will not replace theater functional headquarters, like engineer or military police brigades, but will provide an intermediate multifunctional capability. The unit's design addresses recent developments and modifications in operating environment, battlespace configuration, joint concepts, and transformation, while it continues to support enduring requirements. This chapter will analyze emerging mission sets for this unit design and recommend further refinements. The Army must continue to adapt and innovate to maintain an edge over potential adversaries and meet the challenges of the current operating environment.

Asymmetric Threats, Nonlinear Battlespace, and Emerging Missions.

Our position as the world's leading military power only reinforces the imperative for adaptation, innovation, and learning. Emerging powers study our successes, efficiently copy our strengths, and tailor their capabilities to attack our perceived vulnerabilities. Others develop asymmetric strategies and threats that avoid or circumvent our current capabilities altogether.⁵

Brigadier General David Fastabend

On the modern battlefield, fewer adversaries will attack U.S. strengths and risk defeat. Wise opponents will follow Sun Tzu's advice to "avoid strength and strike weakness."⁶ They will employ asymmetric weapons, tactics, and procedures against the perceived vulnerabilities of U.S. forces.⁷ Those forces must still guard themselves against conventional threats, as well as improvised explosive devices,

hostile information operations, opponents who ignore the laws of war, and weapons of mass effects and terror. In this environment, the enemy is hard to identify and difficult to protect against.

While linearity characterized the great European wars of the 20th century, the future battlefield will be less well-defined and more unpredictable. During the Cold War, the U.S. military divided battlespace between enemy and friendly, with distinct forward lines and rear areas. Designating contiguous areas of operation reduced risk and eliminated vulnerable unassigned areas between units.⁸ Conversely, recent actions, such as the 507th Maintenance Company's unfortunate engagement near An Nasiriyah in March 2003, blur distinctions between "rear" and "forward" areas. Close combat may occur anywhere. The trend continues toward greater nonlinearity, highly mobile warfare, and insurgent tactics. The current lexicon refers to nonlinear operations as distributed.⁹ In distributed operations, with no adjacent forces, units must provide all-around security including their flanks and rear.

Along with changes in threat and battlespace geometry, vagaries in operational phasing call for unprecedented unit flexibility. As the Center for Army Lessons Learned recently noted, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq display the "importance of rapid, fluid transitions from major combat operations to stability operations and back again."¹⁰ In such a complex environment, special operations, civil affairs, psychological operations, and conventional forces must work closely together. U.S. military forces must closely cooperate with coalition allies, government agencies, host nation authorities, and other security forces. Yet in failed or liberated totalitarian states, government institutions may crumble as easily as the decrepit physical infrastructure.

Modern "come as you are" military operations require units to be flexible, multifunctional, and capable of supporting stability and reconstruction operations with little notice or preparation. Many air defense, field artillery, and other units learned this lesson in Iraq.¹¹ Winston Churchill once cautioned, "Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace, and those who could make a good peace would never have won the war."¹² Yet this is precisely the agility across the range of military operations which this environment

demands of all types of units. There is little or no demarcation in time and space between major combat operations and “Phase IV” transition, stabilization, and reconstruction operations.

While not seeking to fight the last war again, this chapter draws heavily from lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. To paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz on the proper application of historical examples, however contemporary they may be, one must guard against the use of unrelated historical references and separate the enduring from the irrelevant.¹³ Important missions emerged during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM that were on few standing organizations’ mission essential task lists such as: exploiting sensitive sites, handling detainees, and protecting critical infrastructure from war damage, looting, or sabotage. Acting on a resultant Defense Science Board recommendation, the Secretary of Defense tasked the Army to develop modular units more able to support stabilization and reconstruction missions.¹⁴ Maneuver enhancement brigades may provide a partial solution. Emerging concepts, both new ones and others deeply rooted in history, will frame development of these new units.

Application of Joint and Army Concepts to Develop Unit Capabilities.

Even before Sun Tzu and others wrote about warfare, commanders wrestled with the impact of enemy, terrain, weather, and other influences on military operations. Then as now, leaders sought to maximize their ability to gain intelligence, protect and sustain their armies, maneuver forces to apply overwhelming combat power, and exercise command and control. In 413 BC, the Syracusans defeated the powerful Athenians in Sicily in what Thucydides called, “. . . the greatest reverse that ever befell a Hellenic army.”¹⁵ With their mighty navy defeated, 40,000 Athenians attempted to break out toward their allies. The Syracusans cut the Athenians to pieces with “missiles” and nonlinear engagements, while they crossed rivers and moved through mountain passes. The Athenians could not maneuver to apply dominant force or even protect and sustain themselves. Over 2,300 years later in Egypt, Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, a master

of maneuver, attacked the British El Alamein line. Over half of his forces either guarded or operated supply lines, which extended over 1,400 miles back to Tripoli.¹⁶ Even today, commanders struggle to maneuver, protect, and sustain forces. The armed services must develop, man, train, and equip forces capable of these essential functions.

Under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, the joint operations concepts provide a framework to develop specific capabilities and “an overarching description of how the future Joint Force will operate across the entire range of military operations.”¹⁷ The joint operating concepts span major combat operations, stability operations, homeland security, and strategic deterrence.¹⁸ The joint functional concepts address command and control, battlespace awareness, focused logistics, and protection.¹⁹ Maneuver enhancement brigades could perform missions spanning all four joint operating concepts and will provide capabilities across all five functional concepts. These brigades most significantly enhance joint capabilities under the force application, focused logistics, and protection functional concepts.

Force application represents “the integrated use of maneuver and engagement to create effects necessary to achieve assigned mission objectives.”²⁰ Focused logistics seeks to improve transportation networks and logistics systems, which are vulnerable to enemy attack or disruption.²¹ The protection functional concept “describes how the Joint Force integrates key capabilities to protect personnel, information, and physical assets of the United States, deployed forces, allies, and friends.”²² The maneuver enhancement brigade concept focuses on support to force maneuver and protection, which clearly aligns with these joint concepts.

Protection preserves the force’s potential to fight at the decisive time and place. Figure 1 displays key protection activities and mission capability areas.²³ Under the protection functional concept, the maneuver enhancement brigade must provide persistent threat detection; timely warning dissemination; and layered, active or passive, lethal and nonlethal countermeasures.²⁴

Full Dimensional Protection




Figure 1. Full Dimensional Protection.

Based on joint and Army doctrine, Figure 1 also outlines potential maneuver enhancement brigade response measures to ground based threat levels I-III.²⁵ All units provide self-defense for bases and base clusters. A maneuver enhancement brigade might employ a combined arms tactical combat force against higher level threats.

In accordance with draft Joint Publication 3-10, joint security coordinators “facilitate protection of joint bases that support force projection, movement control, sustainment, command and control, airbases/airfields, seaports, detention facilities, and other activities that support the joint force.”²⁶ In this role, the maneuver enhancement brigade could oversee area damage control and consequence management actions to respond, assist, and restore facilities after an attack.

Further defining required unit capabilities are the joint enabling concepts for information operations; interagency coordination; multinational operations; theater air and missile defense; and chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear defense.²⁷ To meet the

National Military Strategy's "Desired Attributes of the Force," the new brigades must be networked, expeditionary, decentralized, adaptable, effective, persistent, capable of information/decision superiority, and fully integrated with joint, interagency, and multinational partners.²⁸

As part of Task Force Modularity, Professor John Bonin of the U.S. Army War College, Mr. Clint Ancker of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, and representatives of various other organizations developed the initial protection support unit of action (later the maneuver enhancement brigade) concept.²⁹ In August 2004, TRADOC, through the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, assigned the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Battle Lab to "develop and experiment" with the maneuver enhancement brigade concept.³⁰ The Maneuver Support Center established a general officer working group to refine the mission statement, employment concepts, and organizational design.³¹ This group included Maneuver Support Battle Lab, military police, air defense, chemical, and engineer school representatives and a retired major general "graybeard" advisor. Headquarters, Department of the Army, TRADOC, various major commands, and other Army agencies conducted a modular support force analysis from August to December 2004 to determine unit requirements and resourcing for modular support forces, including maneuver enhancement brigades.³²

The maneuver enhancement brigade concept is shaping and being shaped by various ongoing Army concepts and force structure initiatives. Some of these predate Task Force Modularity's inception in August 2003. The U.S. Army Engineer School's assured mobility and future engineer force concepts fit well with modular force structure development.³³ Assured mobility is "a framework of processes, actions, and enabling capabilities intended to guarantee the force commander the ability to maneuver . . . to achieve his intent."³⁴ Future engineer force uses a joint capabilities framework to develop embedded engineer baseline forces, specialized mission modules, and engineer command and control elements.³⁵ The U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School recently updated its air and missile defense forces operational and organizational plan and continues to work towards an improved joint theater air and missile defense concept.³⁶

Over the past 2 years, the military police school conducted a bottom-up force structure review and created more modular internment and resettlement units.³⁷ Under Maneuver Support Center direction, the military police, chemical, and engineer schools are reshaping doctrine to accommodate the modular force structure.

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Missions and Organization.

Derived from various sources, Figure 2 displays the maneuver enhancement brigade's organization, mission statement, and proposed mission sets.³⁸ The brigade supports maneuver and mobility, protects forces and critical infrastructure, and mitigates effects of hostile action. During major combat operations, the unit could serve as a river crossing headquarters, protect the Unit of Employment-X (UEX) security area, and reinforce brigade combat team functional capabilities. This unit also might oversee stability and reconstruction operations, sensitive site exploitation, or serve as joint security coordinator for a small joint security area. The Maneuver Support Battle Lab and its established Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Working Group recognize two major mission types.³⁹ In functional missions, the brigade supports other units with specific engineer, air/missile defense, military police, chemical, and other capabilities. For protection missions, the brigade headquarters manages terrain, provides area security, controls forces, and protects critical infrastructure, lines of communication, and security areas. These mission sets overlap significantly and some distinctions drawn between them may seem artificial or contradictory.

The maneuver enhancement brigade provides a flexible, multifunctional command and control structure. The only organic elements are the headquarters and headquarters company, a network support (signal) company, and a brigade support battalion.⁴⁰ The staff includes air and missile defense, engineer, military police, and chemical/explosive ordnance disposal planning cells along with a small fire support element. If required for air/missile defense missions, it may receive a modular technical fire control section.⁴¹

The brigade staff must establish communications and maintain digital connectivity through Army battle command systems such as the air and missile defense warning system. Close coordination




Figure 2. Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Missions and Organization.

with Unit of Employment-X (UEX) staff counterparts is essential. In some capacities formerly provided by divisional or corps units, the maneuver enhancement brigade staff may supplement the UEX staff. Linkage to theater capabilities and reach-back systems will augment the limited staffing and partially offset technical shortcomings. The maneuver enhancement brigade must rely on the battlefield surveillance brigade for intelligence support, the fires brigade for indirect and joint fires, and other support brigades for sustainment and aviation support. Connectivity is critical.

Based on the mission, a higher headquarters could assign, attach, or place under maneuver enhancement brigade operational control a variety of unit types.⁴² Engineer forces might include combat engineering, construction, bridging, route/area clearance, route maintenance, and geospatial modules. Military police units could provide combat support, internment/resettlement, law and order, military working dog, and criminal investigation support. Chemical

capabilities may include reconnaissance, decontamination, biological detection, smoke, and technical escort. The mission might require short range air/ missile defense, explosive ordnance disposal, or civil affairs units. The maneuver enhancement brigade can command and control tactical combat force maneuver units against Level I-III threats.⁴³

Replacing Ad Hoc Headquarters with a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.

Currently, ad hoc headquarters provide command and control for missions where no standing headquarters exists, such as area security or river crossings.⁴⁴ Emerging missions call for even more flexible, adaptive headquarters to alleviate these ad hoc requirements.

During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, military police, chemical, engineer, civil affairs, and various support units experienced command and control challenges. Small, highly specialized elements, like biological defense platoons, arrived without their normal higher headquarters. "Unanticipated missions" like detainee operations and sensitive site exploitation compounded by "force caps and mobility constraints" prevented U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) from bringing in "doctrinally self-sufficient" organizations.⁴⁵ The CENTCOM staff (e.g., provost marshal and chemical officer) assumed "command functions normally reserved for theater level specialized commands" for some small units.⁴⁶ A C3 staff officer commanded a task force providing life support and force protection at Bagram Air Base.⁴⁷ In a small theater, like Afghanistan, a properly tailored maneuver enhancement brigade could serve as an operational protection and maneuver support headquarters to oversee such "orphaned" units.

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 3rd Infantry Division's engineer brigade functioned in some ways like an ad hoc maneuver enhancement brigade headquarters. The engineer brigade, augmented by an engineer group headquarters, commanded four combat engineer battalions, a construction battalion, four bridge companies, a terrain detachment, and an explosive ordnance disposal company.⁴⁸ At times, they also controlled an air defense battalion and

a mechanized task force. This headquarters planned and executed four division passages of lines and several river crossing operations and also provided traffic control due to a shortfall in military police.⁴⁹ At Baghdad Airport, the brigade conducted terrain management, life support, and force protection.⁵⁰ With little guidance or notice, the unit assisted in initial assessments and efforts to restore power, water, and sewage to parts of Baghdad.⁵¹ Problems included staff personnel shortfalls, insufficient logistics support, and inadequate communications. In a similar situation, a maneuver enhancement brigade headquarters would have more robust logistics and communications, but would lack the engineer brigade's functional planning expertise.

Moreover, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Army created an ad hoc headquarters to deal with sensitive site exploitation. Sensitive sites possess "special diplomatic, informational, military, or economic [DIME] sensitivity."⁵² They impact national elements of power and usually require interagency coordination and augmentation. In May 2003 the Pentagon tracked roughly 1,000 sensitive sites in Iraq, including 600 suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites.⁵³ The 75th Field Artillery Brigade (Exploitation Task Force) employed specialized teams to examine sensitive sites.⁵⁴ Mobile exploitation teams performed detailed site analysis, while site survey teams provided direct support to Marine and Army divisions. The 75th Exploitation Task Force included the 52nd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, 87th Chemical Battalion, intelligence assets, and aviation elements. In July 2003, the Iraq Survey Group took over, with 600 experts from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies.⁵⁵ The importance of chemical, military police, explosive ordnance disposal, and related capabilities suggests this could be an appropriate mission for maneuver enhancement brigades.

River crossing operations also employ a designated ad hoc headquarters. Projecting combat power across large water obstacles represents a complex combined arms operation, requiring careful planning, effective command and control, and specialized support. Under current doctrine, a division level river crossing with multiple crossing areas requires crossing-force and crossing-area commanders along with crossing-force and area engineers.⁵⁶ The crossing area

engineer controls the crossing sites and means (assault boats and rafting/bridging equipment), maintains routes, and oversees mobility related capabilities.⁵⁷ The crossing area headquarters oversees maneuver support units and provides traffic control, air/missile defense, concealment (smoke), and crossing area security.⁵⁸

The mix of engineer, military police, chemical, and air/missile defense elements suggests a maneuver enhancement brigade would be an appropriate multifunctional headquarters. Combining both crossing-force commander and crossing-force engineer functions under a maneuver enhancement brigade may entail some risk, depending on enemy capabilities and the magnitude of the crossing. The crossing is crucial to the tactical plan; it is not just a technical event. The Unit of Employment-X (UEX) or division-level headquarters must plan and orchestrate brigade combat team maneuver to seize near-shore objectives, assault across the river, secure the bridgehead, and continue the attack.⁵⁹ The UEX must synchronize fires, intelligence, maneuver, and sustainment. On the other hand, the maneuver enhancement brigade can assume a greater role than the old crossing-force engineer headquarters for terrain management, battlefield circulation, and crossing area protection. If the crossing is particularly large or complex, an engineer brigade headquarters could assist or assume the mission.

Functional Support to Army Forces.

Maneuver enhancement brigades typically will provide functional support to brigade combat teams or other support brigades under the same Unit of Employment-X (UEX). For example, heavy brigade combat teams require maneuver and protection capabilities such as assault bridging or short-range air defense. To support complex or extended missions, the maneuver enhancement brigade would require theater level assets to augment capabilities. For these missions, a functional brigade might provide a more suitable command and control headquarters. Assessing the maneuver enhancement brigade's value or liability as an intermediate headquarters must consider the complexity of the mission, staff capabilities, the number of functional elements (e.g., military police or engineer battalions) involved, and other factors.

Maintaining limited and congested ground lines of communication across forbidding terrain also presents major challenges. The maneuver enhancement brigade might control one or more engineer mission forces (battalion headquarters) with a variety of engineer mission teams and engineer effects modules.⁶⁰ These modules could provide tailored combat engineer, horizontal/vertical construction, mobility augmentation, bridging, and route/area clearance capabilities.⁶¹ Typical supporting tasks might include mine and debris clearance, route and bridge reconnaissance, bypass construction, and gap crossing.⁶² When available, military police would conduct traffic management and control to include marking and signing.

A maneuver enhancement brigade also possesses some capability to conduct initial triage and minor repairs to critical infrastructure. However, utility restoration, port repairs, and permanent reconstruction missions require immense effort and specialized skills. As soon as possible, the maneuver enhancement brigade should handoff this mission to an engineer brigade, higher headquarters, civil authorities, or other government agencies.⁶³ Engineer brigades can coordinate for specialized engineer mission modules, facilities engineer detachments, prime power specialists, or other U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Field Force Engineering assets. They can reach back virtually to Corps of Engineers centers and laboratories using “tele-engineering” capabilities.

Acting as a rear area headquarters, a maneuver enhancement brigade might oversee area damage control or consequence management. Area damage control includes “measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or manmade disasters to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects.”⁶⁴ Appropriate response might require engineer, military police, explosive ordnance disposal, chemical reconnaissance, decontamination, civil affairs, medical, and logistics elements. A properly task organized maneuver enhancement brigade could coordinate and execute area damage control over a limited geographic area.

Consequence management entails “measures taken to protect health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/

or high yield explosive situation.”⁶⁵ The consequence management mission could be domestic, in support of the federal government, state, or local authorities, or deployed in theater working with host nation authorities with widely varied local capabilities. The maneuver enhancement brigade might perform initial consequence management actions, before turning the mission over to functional theater assets or civilian agencies.

Internment and resettlement operations encompass managing detainees, enemy prisoners of war, and civilian refugees. Prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Army planned for 16,000 – 57,000 enemy prisoners of war and many civilian refugees.⁶⁶ However, the corps military police brigade, two battalions, and eight companies deployed late. This left divisional military police companies with an impossible mission load, as they attempted to conduct internment and resettlement missions, along with high-value asset and area security, law enforcement, and main supply route regulation.⁶⁷ Other troops hastily assumed security missions to free military police units to handle prisoners of war, detainees, and others.

In a similar situation, the modular brigade combat team military police platoon would conduct initial internment and resettlement operations until turnover to military police elements of the maneuver enhancement brigade. If appropriately task organized, a maneuver enhancement brigade could conduct internment and resettlement operations of limited duration and volume until handing off to a specialized theater level military police brigade or command.

Protection Missions in the Unit of Employment-X Area of Responsibility.

The protection mission set requires the maneuver enhancement brigade to exercise command and control over bases and base clusters, manage terrain, provide point and area security, and maneuver a tactical combat force. There is significant tension between this and the functional mission set. As the October 2004 TRADOC emerging insights report stated, the maneuver enhancement brigade “currently is tasked with two major missions which are each best executed at the exclusion of the other.”⁶⁸ Adapted from various sources, Figure 3 depicts potential maneuver enhancement brigade geographic areas of operations and protection missions.⁶⁹




Figure 3. Potential ME Brigade Missions and Locations.

As previously mentioned, true “rear areas” may not exist in the Unit of Employment-X (UEX) area of operations. Unit boundaries are not always contiguous and the maneuver enhancement brigade cannot be ubiquitous. Depending on the relative sizes of UEX and brigade combat team areas of operations, assigning all the unassigned area to the maneuver enhancement brigade could stretch limited capabilities and increase risk to an unacceptable level.⁷⁰ Area size, threat situation, tactical combat force composition, and functional mission load will constrain maneuver enhancement brigade effectiveness. Commanders must assess and mitigate risk. If maneuver enhancement brigade elements are unavailable, the UEX may divert other forces to provide security. Other units must defend themselves, their bases, and surrounding terrain.

The 1st Marine Division Operation IRAQI FREEDOM after action report identified a significant military police shortfall to provide security and traffic control on the three main supply routes.⁷¹ On short notice and without prior coordination, the Marines were called

on to rescue Army bulk fuel tankers near An Nasiriyah. A similar 3rd Infantry Division after action report noted that, "security of lines of communication that extend over 600 kilometers requires every soldier to be a rifleman."⁷² In the march to Baghdad, V Corps committed significant combat elements from the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions and 2nd Cavalry Regiment to secure lines of communication and bases.

To address this issue, the military police school is developing a mobility corridor operational and organizational plan which describes "a layered and integrated security approach to lines of communication security."⁷³ This concept would focus limited security, route clearance/maintenance, and sustainment assets on active mobility corridors. Commanders could "pulse" resources to "turn-on" an inactive mobility corridor.

In this mission set, effectiveness depends upon route length, number of critical infrastructure sites, threat, functional mission load, and available military police, tactical combat force, or other protection assets. During initial post-hostilities operations in Iraq, the available troops could not secure all critical civilian infrastructure, so commanders gave priority to militarily significant or sensitive sites. Even so, vandals looted many sites before they could be secured. Planners must identify and prioritize critical infrastructure security requirements. The maneuver enhancement brigade is only part of the solution. Every unit must be involved.

The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade General Officer Working Group and Maneuver Support Battle Lab categorize air and missile defense as part of the "Functional Mission Set" of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.⁷⁴ It also fits into the protection mission set. The TRADOC operational assessment of October 2004 limited maneuver enhancement brigade authority to positioning short-range air defense systems like the *Avenger* and the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile.⁷⁵ The theater Army Air and Missile Defense Command will normally position medium and high altitude systems like *Patriot*. As Brigadier General Francis G. Mahon of the Air Defense School suggests, a maneuver enhancement brigade does not possess the "system expertise and ability to integrate with joint and combined headquarters" (such as the Joint Force Air Component Command).⁷⁶ The brigade's limited

air/missile defense staff would find itself challenged to assess the threat, site, initialize, and coordinate *Patriot* systems. Considering past problems with *Patriot* fratricide, it seems prudent to keep those systems well-coordinated and linked with the Joint Force Air Component Commander.

The mission to detect and mitigate chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear hazards also straddles the protection and functional categories. The maneuver enhancement brigade's capabilities depend upon task-organized chemical assets. The brigade chemical section and UEX chemical section must maintain communications linkages via digital Army Battle Command Systems and the Joint Warning and Reporting System. The maneuver enhancement brigade must integrate appropriate capabilities for threat warning, planning, active/passive defense, engineering, host nation support, and consequence management.⁷⁷

Combat engineer route and area clearance units and explosive ordnance disposal teams often work together to detect and neutralize explosive hazards. During recent operations, units established mine action centers or mine/explosive hazard centers to maintain databases and coordinate actions to deal with mines, unexploded ordnance, and other explosive hazards. With the increased threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the Army's IED Task Force and Countermine/Counter Booby Trap Center at Fort Leonard Wood provide resources and reach back assistance capability.⁷⁸ The IED Task Force provides tactics, techniques, and procedures; intelligence; new equipment training and integration; and other support. During transition and post-hostility operations, units often clear unexploded ordnance and destroy enemy ammunition and weapons caches. Based on experience in Iraq, the 3rd Infantry Division recommended at least one explosive ordnance disposal company for a division (or UEx) zone during major combat operations and two companies during stability operations.⁷⁹ Maneuver enhancement brigades should establish a mine/explosive hazard center or similar organization to coordinate activities and integrate explosive ordnance disposal and engineer efforts.

Special Text (ST) 3-90.15 outlines Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sensitive Site Exploitation.⁸⁰ A task organized maneuver enhancement brigade could conduct this mission on a

limited scale, with appropriate military police, chemical, engineer, and other assets. Mobile exploitation teams and site survey teams may include 20-40 soldiers with nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance, explosive ordnance disposal, criminal investigation, human intelligence, and security specialties, as well as technical experts from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.⁸¹ The brigade should form a combined joint military operations center to plan, target, conduct intelligence fusion, and coordinate site exploitation missions closely with the UEx G-2, effects coordination cell, and other intelligence or targeting elements.⁸² Ultimately the brigade would likely turn over the mission to a civilian agency, such as the CIA's Iraq Survey Group or a United Nations/International Atomic Energy Agency inspection team.

With civil affairs augmentation, a maneuver enhancement brigade's engineers, military police, security, and other elements would conduct civil military operations.⁸³ V Corps established these civil-military objectives for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: (1) create a secure environment (establish civil order, eliminate arms caches/paramilitary threats, and train security personnel); (2) facilitate establishment of local governments (to include leadership, infrastructure, bureaucracy, and schools); (3) support economic development (identify local and regional economic centers of gravity; restore utilities, healthcare, food distribution, and public services; and develop commerce and financial institutions).⁸⁴ Maneuver enhancement brigade elements could play an important role in achieving some of these objectives.

A maneuver enhancement brigade might serve as a joint security coordinator to oversee security, communications, intelligence, terrain management, limited sustainment, infrastructure development, and host-nation support for a small joint security area.⁸⁵ The brigade can support other services, special operations forces, and theater forces. A maneuver enhancement brigade could support multinational forces, if augmented by more robust sustainment assets and a liaison team with linguists and foreign area expertise.

The Army provides a wide array of support to other services, especially the Marine Corps and Air Force, based on interservice agreements and executive agency determinations. This includes

port operations, engineering, theater missile defense, and enemy prisoner of war or detainee processing.⁸⁶ During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Army attached over 2,700 soldiers to the First Marine Expeditionary Force. Attached units included five *Patriot* batteries, two engineer battalions, three bridge companies, a military police battalion, a chemical battalion, and smaller units.⁸⁷ The maneuver enhancement brigade provides a potential headquarters for units supporting other services. The brigade might support a U.S. Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Force with area security, base air/missile defense, detainee operations, and engineer capabilities.

Despite improvements noted during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, special operations forces and conventional forces must better integrate planning, employment, battlespace coordination, force tracking, logistics, communication, and targeting and fires.⁸⁸ During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Army forces secured special operations bases and provided explosive ordnance disposal support.⁸⁹ In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, conventional forces and special operations forces conducted integrated operations in both western and northern Iraq.⁹⁰ Special operations forces rely heavily on the Army for base operations, force protection, and common services.⁹¹ A maneuver enhancement brigade might support a special operations group or joint special operations task force with area/base security, air/missile defense, detainee processing, construction, or other capabilities. Special operations units may work with a maneuver enhancement brigade during sensitive site exploitation or post-hostilities reconstruction and stability operations.

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, the 416th Engineer Command, the 52nd Ordnance Group, the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, and other units provided theater level protection and related support.⁹² Maneuver enhancement brigades will not replace specialized theater level engineer, military police, chemical, civil affairs, or air/missile defense brigades, particularly in a large theater. In a smaller theater, like Afghanistan, a maneuver enhancement brigade could oversee specialized battalion or separate company level organizations to perform duties including joint security area coordination, air/missile defense, and small scale detainee operations. Maneuver enhancement

brigades must interface with functional theater level headquarters for additional resources, unit capabilities, and reach-back technical assistance.

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Issues and Recommendations.

The Army's modular support force analysis referenced earlier in the chapter established a requirement for 16 maneuver enhancement brigades (11 to support major combat operations, one for homeland defense, two in strategic reserve, and two for forward presence).⁹³ Clearly, there will not be a maneuver enhancement brigade for every UEX, not to mention joint force, special operations, other service, and multinational requirements. In November 2004, the modular support force analysis recommended resourcing only 12 maneuver enhancement brigades (three active, six Army National Guard, and three Army Reserve).⁹⁴ In January 2005, the Army Vice Chief of Staff changed that to sixteen brigades (three active, ten National Guard, and three Army Reserve).⁹⁵ Given the plethora of potential missions, only three active duty maneuver enhancement brigades would impose a considerable limitation and place a larger burden on the reserve components to support upcoming missions. On October 4, 2004, U.S. Army Forces Command approved the provisional redesignation of the 555th Engineer Group as a maneuver enhancement brigade.⁹⁶ In addition, it appears that the Army will reorganize the 69th Air Defense Artillery and 8th Military Police Brigades as maneuver enhancement brigades.

A recurring theme in Army discussions is the challenge of properly developing a maneuver enhancement brigade commander and staff.⁹⁷ Most maneuver enhancement brigade functional staff officers will be captains or majors. Leaders must encourage more senior UEX staff officers to provide guidance and mentorship to these junior officers. TRADOC has proposed filling developmental maneuver enhancement brigade positions with air defense, military police, chemical, or engineer officers. With similar multifunctional experience in infantry or heavy brigade combat teams, brigade special troops battalion commanders may develop into future maneuver enhancement brigade commanders.⁹⁸ Regardless, there is a real challenge in developing, selecting, and assigning commanders

and staff with the broad experience necessary to lead such complex organizations effectively.

Unless the organization focuses on a more specific mission profile, brigade training and preparation will suffer. The wide range of potential missions requires commanders to set priorities and pare down the mission essential task list. The limited number of maneuver enhancement brigades will also create challenges in developing habitual relationships for training and staff planning and coordination.

The following recommendations address continued concept development, experimentation, and training:

1. Continue the vigorous dialogue on maneuver enhancement brigade structure and employment between the Maneuver Support Battle Lab, TRADOC's Futures Center, HQDA, the various schools, the analytical community, and others. Define realistic capabilities and limitations to better frame employment concepts.
2. Continue to gather observations and lessons from the provisional maneuver enhancement brigade, operational assessments, and exercises. Use them to refine employment concepts.
3. Train joint and Army planners to understand maneuver enhancement brigade limitations along with their wide ranging capabilities. In many operations, a functional brigade headquarters might be more suitable than a maneuver enhancement brigade.
4. Focus maneuver enhancement brigades on fewer specific missions during pre-deployment training and preparation. If the unit prepares for a hundred missions, it prepares for none. Develop a core mission essential task list for all maneuver enhancement brigades. Identify other tasks to train prior to deployment. Affiliate reserve component maneuver enhancement brigades with active UEX headquarters for training.
5. Refine the recommended career pattern to develop future maneuver enhancement brigade commanders and critical staff officers.

6. Develop maneuver enhancement brigade concepts into interim doctrine and rewrite related doctrine (e.g., river crossing) to reflect modular force units and headquarters.
7. Train maneuver enhancement brigades with joint, other services, and special operations forces at combat training centers and in-theater exercises to refine concepts and improve integration.
8. Continue to experiment with a variety of mission sets during simulations, command post exercises, and combat training center rotations. Assess staff capabilities to establish cells and centers required for special missions in addition to normal planning and coordination functions. Determine modular augmentation packages required for special missions.

Maneuver enhancement brigades possess true potential to improve the ability to maneuver and protect the joint force in the contemporary operating environment. These multifunctional headquarters will control essential capabilities, formerly resident at the division or corps level, to support maneuver brigade combat teams, the UEX, and other support brigades. They may also support special operations forces, other services, joint headquarters, and multinational forces, and work with other government agencies. The complexity and vast array of potential missions, coupled with the limited number of active maneuver enhancement brigades and other challenges, will constrain their effectiveness. Leaders and staff planners must be aware of their limitations and use discretion in assigning missions to these units beyond their capabilities. For certain missions, the maneuver enhancement brigade may provide the ideal headquarters. In other cases, functional engineer, military police, chemical, or air/missile defense headquarters might represent better choices. A properly task organized maneuver enhancement brigade could oversee sensitive site exploitation, limited critical infrastructure protection and repair, or provide joint security coordination. With many pertinent capabilities, it forms a partial solution to the Secretary of Defense's challenge to create modular units that support reconstruction and stability operations. This new organization will undoubtedly play a significant role in

providing joint, expeditionary, and campaign capabilities to support the Army Campaign Plan, joint concepts, and the “National Military Strategy.”

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. Peter J. Schoomaker, “Army Strategic Communications Talking Points,” Washington DC, November 5 2004, p. 25, available from www.army.mil, Internet, accessed January 27, 2005.

2. Peter J. Schoomaker, “The United States Army 2004 Posture Statement,” Executive Summary, Washington, DC, February 19, 2004, p. 2, available from www.army.mil/aps/04/index.html, Internet, accessed January 27, 2005.

3. Peter J. Schoomaker, “Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities,” Washington, DC, April 2004, pp. 10-11.

4. Task Force Modularity, “Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity,” Version 1.0, Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, October 8, 2004, pp. 1-7 to 1-13.

5. David Fastabend and Robert Simpson, “The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the U.S. Army: Adapt or Die,” *Army Magazine Online*, February 2004, p. 1, available from www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/0/EB5252A9404F977685256E220059F541, Internet, accessed December 31, 2004.

6. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., New York, 1971, p. 101.

7. Department of the Army, “Operations, Field Manual 3-0,” Washington, DC, June 2001, pp. 4-31.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-20.

9. Task Force Modularity, pp. 2-8 to 2-9.

10. Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Emerging Observations, Insights, and Lessons,” briefing to the 2003 Infantry Conference, Fort Leavenworth, KS, slide #5, available from call2.army.mil/oif/docs/briefings/EmergingObs_files/frame.asp; Internet, accessed January 15, 2005.

11. Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Chapter 1, Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended Distances,” *3rd Infantry Division After Action Review, Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003, pp. 1, p. 6, available from call2.army.mil/fouo/documents/3IDAAR/ch1.asp, Internet, accessed January 15, 2005.

12. Eliot A. Cohen, “Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World War II,” in *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, Paul Kennedy, ed., New Haven, CT, 1991, p. 67.

13. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. and eds., New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1993, pp. 199-204.

14. John Bonin, "RE: SRP Draft," electronic mail message to author, February 17, 2005.
15. Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, Robert B. Strassler, trans. and ed., New York, 1996, p. 472.
16. Polygram Video International, "The Battle for North Africa: Prelude to Battle," 57 min., distributed by Time Life Video, 1996, videocassette.
17. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Operations Concepts," Washington, DC, November 2003, p. 4.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-19.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
20. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Force Application Functional Concept," Washington, DC, February 2004, p. 4.
21. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, Version 1.0," Washington, DC, December 2003, p. ii.
22. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Protection Joint Functional Concept, Version 1.0," Washington, DC, December 2003, p. 4.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5, 8.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
25. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations, Joint Pub 3-10," Washington, DC, November 2000, pp. I-5 to I-7.
26. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Security Operations in the Theater, Draft Joint Pub 3-10," First Revision, Washington, DC, February 2005, p. I-6.
27. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Operations Concepts," pp. 20-21; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Protection Joint Functional Concept," p. 4.
28. Richard B. Myers, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004," Washington, DC, 2004, p. 14.
29. John Bonin, "SRP Topic—ME Brigade Employment," electronic mail message to author, October 4, 2004.
30. Richard Hornack, "Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Information Brief," briefing slides, Fort Leonard Wood, MO: U.S. Army Maneuver Support Battle Lab, November 7, 2004, slide #3.
31. Director of Force Management, FM, Army G-3/5/7, "MSFA Resourcing Council of Colonels," briefing slides, Washington, DC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 16, 2004, slide #1.
32. Director of Force Management, FM, Army G-3/5/7, "TRADOC Issues for MSFA Requirements GOSC," briefing slides, Washington, DC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 4, 2004, slide #1.
33. U.S. Army Engineer School, "The Future Engineer Force White Paper: Projecting the Capabilities of the Engineer Regiment to Meet the Needs of the

- Current and Future Force,” Fort Leonard Wood, MO: U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, April 20, 2004, p. 3.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
 36. Joseph M. Cosumano, “Where We’ve Been, Where We’re Going in Space and Integrated Missile Defense” *ADA Magazine*, p. 2, available from airdefense.bliss.army.mil/adamag/ADA%20Yearbook%202003/SMDC.pdf, Internet, accessed January 15, 2005.
 37. Richard A. Cody, “Adequacy of the Total Force,” Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Total Force, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, March 10, 2004, pp. 2-3.
 38. Maneuver Support Battle Lab, “Maneuver Enhancement Brigade General Officer Working Group,” Memorandum for Record, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, September 9, 2004; and Task Force Modularity, pp. 5-20 to 5-22.
 39. Hornack, “Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Information Brief,” slides # 4, 5, 9, 10.
 40. *Ibid.*, slides# 9-10; and Maneuver Support Battle Lab MFR, p. 1.
 41. Task Force Modularity, p. 5-21.
 42. Hornack, “Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Information Brief,” slide# 6.
 43. Task Force Modularity, p. 5-21.
 44. Department of the Army, “River Crossing Operations, Field Manual 90-13,” Washington, DC, January 1998, p. 3-2.
 45. John A. Bonin, “U.S. Army Forces Central Command in Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf during Operation Enduring Freedom: September 11, 2001 to March 11, 2003,” Carlisle, PA, 2003, pp. 14, 21.
 46. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
 47. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
 48. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *3rd Infantry Division After Action Review, Operation Iraqi Freedom*, “Chapter 15, Engineer,” p. 1, 7, available from call2.army.mil/fouo/documents/3IDAAR/CH15.asp, Internet, accessed January 15, 2005.
 49. *Ibid.*, p. 7, Topic C.
 50. *Ibid.*
 51. *Ibid.*
 52. Pete Lofy, “Managing Sensitive Site Exploitation – Notes from Operation Iraqi Freedom,” *Army Chemical Review*, September 2003 [journal online], p. 2, available from www.wood.army.mil/chmdsd/Army_Chemical_Review/pdfs/2003%20Sep/Lofy.pdf, Internet, accessed January 11, 2005.

53. Kathleen Rhem, "Coalition Forces Have Iraqi Mobile Bioweapons Facility," *Defense Link News*, May 2003 [journal online], p. 1, available from www.defense.gov/news/May2003/n0507.html, Internet, accessed January 15, 2005.
54. Lofy, p. 1.
55. Rhem, p. 1.
56. Department of the Army. "River Crossing Operations," p. 3-2.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4 to 3-7.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-3 to 3-7.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-2 and 3-10 to 3-12.
60. Bryan Watson, *et. al.*, "The Future Engineer Force, Projecting the Capabilities of the Regiment," *Engineer*, January–March 2004, p. 11.
61. Todd Semonite, "Army Modularity and the Future Engineer Force: Update for The Chief of Engineers," briefing slides, Washington DC, Office of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, September 23, 2004, slide #33.
62. U.S. Army Engineer School, "The Future Engineer Force White Paper," p. 25.
63. Todd Semonite, "Army Modularity and the Future Engineer Force: Update," briefing slides, Washington DC, Office of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, January 31, 2005, slide #14.
64. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations," pp. III-11 to III-12.
65. Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Protection Joint Functional Concept," p. 48.
66. Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn; *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003, p. 69.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
68. Hornack, "Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Information Brief," slide #13.
69. *Ibid.*, slide #16.
70. Maneuver Support Battle Lab MFR, p. 1.
71. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "1st Marine Division Observations [OIF]," Fort Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2003, pp. 1-2, available from call2.army.mil/oif/docs/observations/1MarDiv.asp, Internet, accessed January 15, 2005.
72. 3rd Infantry Division, "Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF," briefing to the 2003 Infantry Conference, slide #15, available from call2.army.mil/oif/docs/briefings/InfConf/3rdInf_files/frame.asp, Internet, accessed January 15, 2005.
73. U.S. Army Military Police Center and School, "Mobility Corridor Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan, Version 1," Fort Leonard Wood, MO, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, March 15, 2005, p. 1.

74. Hornack, "Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Information Brief," slide #10.
75. *Ibid.*, slide #13.
76. Brigadier General Francis G. Mahon, Deputy Commandant, Air Defense School, "Re: Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Air and Missile Defense Concepts," electronic mail message to author, January 11, 2005.
77. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *3rd Infantry Division After Action Review, Operation Iraqi Freedom*, "Chapter 23, NBC," pp. 1, 6-7, and 11-12, available from call2.army.mil/fouo/documents/3IDAAR/ch23.asp, Internet, accessed January 15, 2005.
78. Louis Weber, "Statement on Training and Army Actions to Meet Emerging Threats," presented to Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, Department of the Army, Army Director of Training, May 11, 2004, pp. 9-12.
79. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *3rd Infantry Division After Action Review, Operation Iraqi Freedom*, "Chapter 15, Engineer" p. 15, Topic D.
80. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Operations Involving Sensitive Sites, Special Text 3-90.15," Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 2002, p. 1.
81. Lofy, p. 3.
82. Vincent Price, Dale Owen, and Richard Gonzales, "75th FA Brigade: SOSO in OIF and BCT at the NTC," *FA Journal*, March-June 2004, p. 3, available from www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAU/is_2/9/ai_n6358290, Internet, accessed January 27, 2005.
83. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Pub 3-05," Washington, DC, December 2003, pp. II-10 to II-11.
84. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Targeting for Victory, Winning the Civil Military Operations Battle," *CALL Newsletter 03-23*, pp. 1-10, available from call2.army.mil/products/NEWSLTRS/03-23/ch-3.asp, Internet; accessed January 15, 2005.
85. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations," *Joint Pub 3-10*, p. vii.
86. Fontenot, p. 63.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
88. Arvel Masters and Ralph Nichols, "Special Operations Forces (SOF)—Conventional Forces Integration," *News from the Front!*, Center for Army Lessons Learned, November-December 2003, p. 1, available from call2.army.mil/Products/NFTF/novdec03/sof/sof.asp, Internet, accessed January 11, 2005.
89. William Carty, "Joint Training Must Reflect Combat Realities—Gaps Remain in the Integration of Special Operators and Conventional Forces," *National*

Defense, April 2004, p. 1, Available from nationaldefense.ndia.org/issues/2004/Apr/Joint_Training.htm, Internet, accessed January 11, 2005.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

91. Mark Jones and Wes Rehorn, "Integrating SOF into Joint Warfighting," *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXIII, No. 3, May-June 2003, p. 7.

92. Fontenot, p. 64.

93. Director of Force Management, FM, Army G-3/5/7, "Army Force Structure Operating Force Resourcing Council of Colonels," briefing slides, Washington, DC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 15, 2004, slide #10.

94. *Ibid.*, slide #11.

95. Semonite, "Army Modularity and the Future Engineer Force Update," January 31, 2005, Slide #12.

96. U.S. Army Forces Command, "Request to Establish the 555th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, Provisional," Memorandum for Commander, I Corps and Fort Lewis, Fort McPherson, GA, October 4, 2004.

97. Maneuver Support Battle Lab MFR, p. 1.

98. Futures Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Command of Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) for Heavy and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)" Memorandum for Director of Force Management, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army, Fort Monroe, VA, February 15 2005.

CHAPTER 13

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC AFGHANISTAN

Lieutenant Colonel Dave Gerard

The Afghan people are showing extraordinary courage under difficult conditions. They're fighting to defend their nation from Taliban holdouts and helping to strike against the terrorist killers. They're reviving their economy. They've adopted a constitution that protects the rights of all, while honoring their nation's most cherished traditions. More than 10 million Afghan citizens—over 4 million of them women—are now registered to vote in next month's presidential election. To any who still would question whether Muslim societies can be democratic societies, the Afghan people are giving their answer.¹

President Bush,
September 21, 2004
Three Weeks Prior
to Afghanistan's Democratic Election

On October 9, 2004, over 10 million Afghan men and women seized the opportunity to change their nation's future and voted in the country's first democratic election.² This landmark event represents not only a pivotal turning point for the country, but also will have a direct influence in the surrounding South Asia and the Middle East regions, as well as far-reaching global consequences for U.S. foreign policy and national strategy. The United States, the actions of which set the conditions for the election to take place, has much at stake in ensuring that its strategy ultimately is successful. Following the country's first ever national democratic elections, one key question requires comprehensive analysis and response from American policymakers: What is the next step for U.S. Strategy in the new *democratic* Afghanistan?

In the 3 1/2 years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States has achieved a number of successes in its policy in this impoverished country to include removal of the Taliban, denial of sanctuary to al-Qa'ida and other terror

organizations, establishment of a new constitution by the Loya Jirga (national grand council), and, most recently and significantly, free democratic national elections.³ While these bode well for peace and stability in Afghanistan and South Asia, there remain a number of underlying issues that, if left unresolved, could result in future difficulties for the new democracy, its neighbors, and the United States. The dramatic changes in the cultural and political landscape of the country that have occurred since October 2001 demand a review of current U.S. strategy.

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration unleashed a Global War on Terror (GWOT) with three specific strategic objectives in Afghanistan. These included the destruction of terrorist training facilities, the capture of al-Qa'ida's leadership, including Osama bin Laden and his senior lieutenants, and the removal of the Taliban from power.⁴ Although bin Laden is not yet in custody, the United States has largely succeeded in meeting these objectives. However, new challenges have already emerged in the aftermath of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). The purpose of this chapter is to answer the question posed above: What is the next step for U.S. strategy in a new, democratic Afghanistan? Answering this question requires an updated strategic appraisal of Afghanistan's significance to the broader security strategy of the United States, particularly in light of the recent elections and the ongoing war on terror that includes combat operations in Iraq. From this assessment, challenges emerge that the U.S. Government must address if it is to accomplish its goals. This chapter will outline those challenges, as well as recommend national objectives for a future U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

The strategic appraisal process must begin with a review of the President's "National Security Strategy" and the "Strategy for the Global War on Terror." A review of the broader national objectives of the United States, contained in those two documents, coupled with an analysis of Afghanistan's internal and external environment, should yield a clear vision of U.S. interests and potential objectives for the region. The origins of U.S. strategy in these documents, and expanded upon since their publication, lies in the fateful events of 9/11.

REDEFINING U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD

The attacks of 9/11 were among the most dramatic to occur on American soil. Previously, only three major foreign incursions had occurred within the borders of the United States, the first two during the War of 1812 in Washington and New Orleans, and the last, the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. Although each had a major impact on the national psyche, none produced the civilian casualties or national terror that the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Flight 93 caused. Like the attack on December 7, 1941, that drew the United States into World War II, the attacks of 9/11 dramatically changed the course of U.S. policy and national security strategy.

President George W. Bush signaled the dramatic and aggressive changes in U.S. strategy in a number of statements and press releases in the weeks that followed. On September 19, 2001, while meeting with President Megawati of Indonesia at the White House, he conducted a press conference during which he gave the first indications of his administration's emerging strategy. When questioned by a reporter about who he felt may be responsible for the acts of 9/11, the President stated:

I would strongly urge any nation in the world to reject terrorism [and] expel terrorists. I would strongly urge the Taliban to turn over the al Qaeda organizers who hide in their country. We're on the case. We're gathering as much evidence as we possibly can to be able to make our case to the world about all countries and their willingness to harbor or not harbor terrorists.⁵

The President then expanded his response to include a warning to all nations that a coalition was building for a "worldwide campaign against terror."⁶ He continued to condemn the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and expanded his emerging goals to indicate that U.S. counterterror objectives would require a global effort to locate and destroy terrorists "and those who support them."⁷ Clearly, his implication was that the way to accomplish these objectives was through the use of force, and his repeated reference to the latter was a foreshadowing of his emerging controversial strategy of preemption.

Towards a Strategy of Preemption and Democratization.

The President further solidified post-9/11 strategy for Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, less than 4 weeks after the terrorist attacks. That evening, he addressed the nation to announce that its military had begun striking installations and terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. The United States had given the Taliban 2 weeks notice to comply with three specific demands. It had failed to take action. Those demands were to “close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al-Qa’ida network; and return all foreign nationals . . . unjustly detained.”⁸ It would soon become clear that the Taliban would pay a high price for its noncompliance, and that the United States was willing to use unilateral preemption to accomplish its objectives. How far beyond Afghanistan Bush would pursue such foreign policy was not yet known, but his actions were representative of an emerging national strategy.

At this time, the President had not defined his long term objectives, other than to state that those nations who condoned terrorist organizations were murderers themselves, and the United States would bring them to justice. In addition, he reiterated what had become an early theme in the evolving strategy: America’s anger would not focus on Islam or the citizens of Afghanistan, but on terrorists and those who supported them.⁹ The message was clear, however: U.S. objectives would include more than the destruction of al-Qa’ida and the removal of the Taliban regime. It also would involve establishing a free and democratic government for the Afghans. The latter objective certainly was the logical outcome of the first two; however, the President had yet to define the strategy for establishing democracy in Afghanistan.

National Security Strategy, September 2002.

President Bush further expanded on his evolving strategy during his State of the Union Speech on January 29, 2002, with a clear statement of two principal U.S. strategic goals.

Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we

must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.¹⁰

The President's second objective expanded the scope for the GWOT beyond Afghanistan and seemed clearly intended to warn Iraq's Saddam Hussein, who consistently had defied the United Nations (UN) for over a decade and who, potentially, was in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). If there was any doubt about this implied warning, the President erased it later in his speech when he named Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, as part of an "axis of evil."¹¹ This revised strategy would eventually find its way into the President's National Security Strategy. The revised national strategy appeared in September 2002 and stressed America's role in championing human rights, defeating terrorism, and "expanding the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy."¹²

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003.

In February, 2003, nearly 18 months after 9/11 and more than a year after the fall of the Taliban, the administration published its anti-terrorism strategy, appropriately titled, "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism." This document represented an addendum to the National Security Strategy and has served as the blueprint for the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere to defeat terrorism. The 30-page document included the nature of today's terrorist threat, America's strategic intent for the war on terror, and U.S. goals and objectives:¹³

GOAL 1: Defeat terrorists and their organizations;

GOAL 2: Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists;

GOAL 3: Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and,

GOAL 4: Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.

Although this strategy aggressively addressed terrorism, it fell short of providing the ways and means for achieving the post-conflict objectives, or ends, which routinely follow any military action. It

failed to address the strategic concept of building an infrastructure of democracy within either policy document, but that reality increasingly became the focus of U.S. strategy over the following 2 years.

Early in 2005, in several speeches and foreign policy statements President Bush demonstrated his resolve to meet his strategic objectives of defeating terrorism and expanding democracy. Despite divisive rhetoric by anti-war opponents and objections from European allies, the President has remained outspoken in his aim to pursue terrorists, deny them sanctuary, and encourage democracy in regions where existing political conditions contribute to recruitment of potential terrorists. In a February 21, 2005, meeting with European leaders at the European Union (EU) Summit in Brussels, the President declared America's commitment to the growth of democracy in Afghanistan.

Our commitment to democratic progress is being honored in Afghanistan. That country is building a democracy that reflects Afghan traditions and history, and shows the way for other nations in the region. The elected president is working to disarm and demobilize militias in preparation for the National Assembly elections to be held this spring. And the Afghan people know the world is with them.¹⁴

Clearly, the President aims to continue the American strategy of defeating terrorists and democratizing countries susceptible to supporting organizations like al-Qa'ida.

EXAMINING THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTH ASIA

U.S. intervention in Afghanistan yielded a number of secondary effects throughout the South Asia region (see Figure 1), some intended and expected, others not. While American strategy successfully destroyed terrorist training camps and removed the Taliban from power, the political, informational, military, and economic landscape of Afghanistan and its neighboring countries altered significantly. The rapid pace of these changes and uncertain future of the transitional government caused American strategy to remain primarily reactionary. Democratic national elections in October

2004, however, represented a landmark event and heralded a new era for Afghanistan, the region, and future U.S. strategy. In light of this development, an updated and revised strategic assessment is essential to develop a new strategy.



Figure 1. U.S. State Department Map of Afghanistan and the South Asian Region.¹⁵

U.S. National Interests.

Removing the Taliban and destroying terrorist training camps, while sound, short-term objectives, did not address the long-term challenges of the GWOT, particularly the roots of radical Islamic hostility toward America and western culture. In addition to quelling terrorism at its roots, the United States has several national interests at stake in the region, consistent with marginalizing the influence

of terrorism. These include improving respect for human dignity, encouraging regional cooperation to defuse conflict, enhancing global economic growth and cooperation, and expanding the ideals of democracy. Each objective forms an integral component of the President Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy and has particular relevance as well as challenges in Afghanistan.¹⁶ An examination of the four elements of power within a democratic Afghanistan and its interaction with the rest of the South-Asia region underlines the extent of these challenges to U.S. long-term strategy.

Political Aspects and Challenges.

U.S. intervention in Afghanistan was the first demonstration of the President's strategy of preemption and democratization. Its *modus operandi* required the forcible removal of a belligerent regime by force, along with intensive stability operations to ensure the peaceful election of a democratic, representative government. In the 3 years following 9/11, the concepts applied in pursuit of this strategy have evolved in response to environmental changes. The political aspects of the current post-election environment still offer a number of problems for a successful democracy, but also provide insights into a dimension of Afghan culture that can enhance U.S. strategy for the entire region. Of the four aspects of strategy discussed herein—political, informational, military and economic—politics, more than any other, provides the foundation for successful accomplishment of long term goals. To appreciate the political challenges, one needs a firm grasp of the geography, history, and culture of the Afghans.

Afghanistan is a rugged landlocked country positioned between the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. Because of its poverty, underdevelopment and remote location, regional experts tend to minimize its significance, although it sits astride the historical land routes between the Middle East and Asia.¹⁷ Because of its central location, Afghanistan has seen many invaders enter its borders in an effort to conquer its provinces. However, few have succeeded. Rugged terrain coupled with fierce resistance to occupation by a conglomeration of tribes and ethnic groups, united primarily to repel invaders, has made conquest and occupation by outsiders particularly difficult.¹⁸

The culture of Afghanistan's population is probably the most elusive aspect for foreign analysts who often underestimate its complexity. Afghans are uniquely dissimilar; they consist of multiple tribes and ethnic groups scattered throughout the country. Their loyalties to local issues, customs, and authority generally outweigh their desire for a national identity. Their form of localism is unique because these same independent, disunified tribes, have historically rallied together to attack foreign invaders, most recently the Taliban. What these different tribes and cultures share is a common passion for independence and freedom in the face of adversity.

Afghanistan's geography, history, and cultural aspects have shaped its political challenges. Of these factors, localism plays a central theme and will remain a definitive part of the culture. Therein lays the greatest challenge to political stability: how to demonstrate to its localized cultures, the important value of their newly elected national government. For democracy to succeed they must view it as beneficial, while loyalties, provided previously to tribal leaders, must become subordinated to national interests and the country's first representative government.

Informational and Social Challenges.

The newly elected democratic government faces several political and informational obstacles in establishing legitimacy and confidence. These challenges include overcoming the tradition and loyalties of localism, the education of religious and social leaders on the dangers of extreme religious fundamentalist, and communicating these messages and others of legitimacy over the country's limited media outlets. Although the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has assisted in improving media outlets in support of the national election, it must do more to overcome hostile influences.¹⁹

The battle over hearts and minds pits the newly elected government against the hostile Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and other extremists, who gain their legitimacy through religious rhetoric. By leveraging fundamentalist Islamic views, extremists have gained a foothold in Madrassas and Mosques and spread their messages of deceit to recruit from a pool of candidates living in impoverished social and economic conditions.

Only by educating tribal, religious, and educational leaders can the government overcome the influence of rogue factions on a susceptible populous.

Critical to the education of these leaders, and the population as a whole, is the need to substantially improve the limited media infrastructure to legitimize the new government. The United States and other coalition partners have sent extensive media into Afghanistan to provide news to the outside world. However, only limited means exist to provide information within the country to millions of uneducated and illiterate citizens. The U.S. military has made efforts to ensure dissemination of information, but current conditions demand greater capabilities.

Military Challenges.

Despite the coalition victory over the Taliban and al-Qa'ida, belligerents still threaten Afghanistan's citizens, the newly elected government, coalition allies, and international aid workers. To counter this threat, coalition forces have established and trained over 20,000 soldiers for service in the first Afghan National Army (ANA) and another 25,000 for police service.²⁰ This effort only begins to address the continuing struggle for stability and security that confronts the nation.

One challenge lies in overcoming delays in fielding the Afghan National Army and National Police Force to regions of the country outside Kabul. Currently, there are 5,500 NATO peacekeepers working under a limited mandate to assist Afghan security forces in Kabul, and another 14,000 soldiers in the U.S.-led coalition training the Afghan Army and conducting combat operations throughout the country.²¹ Coalition forces are spread thinly throughout the country, and are inadequate to ensure peace, security, and order. The need for Afghan soldiers and police forces would seem appropriate for meeting this challenge. Yet challenges exist here to overcoming tendencies toward localism and the loyalty of most individuals to tribal militias.

Tribal militias represent another considerable challenge to the security and stability of the country. Because of tribal loyalties, many

citizens continue to support and rely on the militias for security. Compounding this problem is the increasing criminal activity by tribal leaders and warlords, who see the national government as a threat to their power base and livelihood. Their reliance on poppy growth and sales has provided an economic boost to many faction leaders and tribes, and runs contrary to an emerging security focus of the national police and army. Only a strong security presence by a nationally recognized Afghan military force can create stability.

Economic Challenges.

Closely related to the security challenges of Afghanistan are the difficulties of economic progress. Two major issues adversely affect the country's economy: the lack of a transportation infrastructure and geographic constraints on agricultural potential. By improving roads and common utilities and providing Afghanistan's farmers improved agricultural alternatives, the economy of Afghanistan will begin to improve.

Without railroads, the only modern methods of overland transport are existing road networks, which are in major disrepair after 25 years of neglect during war. The lack of roads significantly hampers the government in its ability to provide fundamental economic support to remote regions. As a result, the population's loyalty is again more susceptible to influence by the local warlords and thugs, who can provide some sense of security and economic well-being. Despite these drawbacks, some progress has occurred. USAID has assisted in rehabilitating 2,500 miles of road, reconstructed 31 bridges and has opened up three additional mountain passes over the Hindu Kish that had remained impassible for decades.²² This is a good start. However, there are thousands of miles of road yet to be restored.

A second economic challenge is the need to provide agriculture technology and enhancements to rural farmers as alternatives to opium poppy cultivation. The problem of drug cultivation, production, and trafficking in Afghanistan poses a serious security risk for the new government, because in many cases regional warlords rely on the drugs to provide income to support their interests. The national government is not likely to take any decisive action to eradicate

drugs because it may be construed as an attack on the local leader and intended to take away this livelihood. Moreover, drugs remain an unreliable source of income for a legitimate democracy, while exports of drugs to other countries will further remove Afghanistan from consideration as a legitimate member of the international community.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan became the highest drug producing country in the world in 2004 with growth of opium poppy plants more than double that of the previous year.²³ The heroin producing plant became the sole crop produced on more than 131,000 hectares of land.²⁴ To his credit, newly elected President Hamid Karzai recognizes the clear danger of the increasing opium poppy cultivation in his country. During his inauguration speech, he stated, "Our principal promises concern the strengthening of the security sector and ensuring lasting stability throughout the country, [and] the elimination of poppy cultivation and fight against the processing and trafficking of drugs." The cultivation of drugs provides sources of income that a democracy cannot and should not rely upon. However, reversing this state of affairs will not be easy.

RECOMMENDED STRATEGY

The U.S. strategic success in Afghanistan and the South Asian region is critical to successful prosecution of the war on terror and America's national security strategy. The focused application of available resources is the best way to achieve desired objectives. In simplest terms, a recommended strategy must not only address ends, or objectives, but should also recommend the means, or resources, and ways, or methodologies, to accomplish those ends. For the United States to ensure its ability to successfully accomplish its desired objectives in Afghanistan, it must prioritize its application of ways and means to pursue three major tasks that support the overall objective of democratic Afghanistan. These objectives include sustaining high levels of security, improving economic conditions, and enhancing Afghanistan's credibility in the region and throughout the world.

Sustaining Security.

The primary objective to ensure that democracy takes root and has the opportunity to flourish in Afghanistan is to provide, at whatever cost, the existence of a secure and stable environment. This objective is essential for the success of U.S. strategy. First, security of the democratic government is essential for its continued rule. Any reversion to Taliban rule, or its equivalent, would represent a major defeat. Secondly, the Afghan people have lived through many invasions. They are skeptical of the long-term commitment of the United States, and the best way for Americans to demonstrate their resolve is to ensure security. Finally, there is the need for a secure and stable environment that encourages international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private organizations to provide aid to, and invest in, this new democracy. Without an American presence that ensures and enforces a stable and secure environment, U.S. strategy cannot succeed.

Improving Economic Conditions.

The United States, as the world's greatest economic power, must resolve to make long-term economic investments in Afghanistan to demonstrate that commitment. The value of immediate and projected long-term U.S. commitment signals a confidence to the international community that will encourage other nations to follow America's lead. To be sure, such commitment does not occur without significant cost and risk, but the consequences of a failed policy in Afghanistan outweigh the alternative. Economic strategy must pursue two vital pillars that can bring Afghanistan improved conditions: improved infrastructure and agricultural alternatives to opium production and marketing.

The first pillar has not been ignored, but more work is necessary to insure an adequate economic future. Without roads, communications, and infrastructure, the citizens of Afghanistan will continue to live in poverty and remain isolated. By leveraging more international assistance, the United States can bring Afghanistan into the 21st century in terms of communications and transportation. As the

government provides these services for its people, it will gain their confidence and commitment to support democratic ideals.

The second area requiring attention lies in the area of agricultural development. Without alternatives, it is no surprise that farmers in Afghanistan would turn to opium poppy agriculture as a source of income. The subsequent transport and sale of this drug lowers Afghanistan's reputation in the international community and empowers local warlords, whose interests are often inconsistent with those of the national government. Advancements in agricultural alternatives, through use of chemical stimulants and fertilizers, will enhance the ability of the nation's farmers. Moreover, U.S. technology for irrigation and machinery can offer much to remote regions.

International Recognition.

Americans cannot afford to forget Afghanistan. It is a crucial ally of the United States, particularly when demonstrating unity in the face of terror and the ability to establish democracy in Islamic countries. The world must view Afghanistan as a positive example, but not a U.S. puppet.

One organization that is well-suited to raise Afghanistan's regional importance, give it more international visibility, and demonstrate its potential for economic and social change is the South Asian Agreement for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This organization came into existence in 1985; it consists of seven countries of the South Asia Region including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The mission of SAARC is to accelerate the process of economic and social development of member states by working together in a spirit of friendship, trust, and understanding.²⁵ Afghanistan, along with Myanmar, was not considered for membership in SAARC because of its difficult political situation at the time. Given its location, emerging prominence and inevitable future economic potential with the engagement of the United States and the international community, Afghanistan should be readily accepted into SAARC.

The SAARC summit held in Islamabad in January 2004 recognized the importance of interaction between the citizens of Afghanistan and its neighbors as vital to increasing regional cooperation and

improving the atrocious human rights record established by the Taliban.²⁶ The conference also addressed other political issues, including the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), and the suppression of terrorism. The active dialogue between these nations bodes well for the region and lends support to the national security policy goals of the United States, specifically, "strengthen (regional) alliances to defeat global terrorism . . . defuse regional conflicts . . . and champion aspirations for human dignity."²⁷

CONCLUSION

To date, the United States has achieved remarkable success in its post-9/11 strategy in Afghanistan. In only a few short weeks following 9/11, America organized and led a coalition of tribal factions and allies to overthrow the Taliban and root out al-Qa'ida and other terrorists. Since that time, an international coalition of more than thirty countries has conducted security and stability operations that set conditions for the free democratic elections that took place in October 2004.²⁸ Now that the initial national election is complete, the United States must revise its strategy in the new environment of a democratic Afghanistan.

Clearly, there is much work in Afghanistan on many fronts. A review of American strategy found in the "National Security Strategy," "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," and recent national security speeches provide focus for identifying the most critical objectives of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. There are several critical objectives that consistently cut across all aspects of U.S. strategy. Of these, three stand out. These are the needs to improve security, to provide economic assistance, and to enhance Afghanistan's legitimacy in the region and on the international stage. By supporting all three objectives, the United States can realize success in pursuing its goals of protecting democracy in Afghanistan and enhancing the stability in South Asia and the world.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. George W. Bush, "Policies in Focus," The White House, www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/afghanistan/index.html.

2. U.S. Department of State, "Afghanistan: Building a Free, New Society," December 7, 2004.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Global Security Report, "Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan," www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm.

5. George W. Bush, "Statement at Photo Op with President Megawati of Indonesia," September 19, 2001.

6. *Ibid.*

7. George W. Bush, "Speech to Congress," September 20, 2001.

8. George W. Bush, "Presidential Address to the Nation," The White House, October 7, 2001.

9. *Ibid.*

10. George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address," Washington DC, January 29, 2002.

11. *Ibid.*

12. George W. Bush, "National Security Strategy," The White House, September 27, 2002, p. 2.

13. George W. Bush, "The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," Washington, DC, February 2003.

14. George W. Bush, "Remarks at Meeting of the European Union," February 21, 2005.

15. DOS Web Site.

16. Bush, "National Security Strategy," all pages.

17. To be sure, even U.S. Government agencies that bureaucratically subdivide the world into regions treat Afghanistan differently. The Department of Defense, for example, includes Afghanistan as part of the U.S. Central Command's areas of responsibility, which includes predominantly the Middle East, while the U.S. Department of State includes it in South Asia along with Pakistan, India, and others. Also see U.S. State Department Website and how it defines regions.

18. Jeffrey Roberts, *The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan*, Westport, CN: Praeger, 2003, pp, XI-XV.

19. USAID, "Restoring Media," www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/afghanistan/media.html.

20. "Afghanistan: Counter-narcotics and Rule of Law Programs," U.S. Department of State, Testimony of Robert Charles, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to the House International Relations Committee, September 23, 2004, www.state.gov/inl/rls/rm/36500.htm.
21. Center for Strategic and International Studies, "South Asia Monitor," No. 69, April 2, 2004.
22. USAID, "Restoring Infrastructure," www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/afghanistan/infrastructure.html.
23. UN Press Release, "United Nations Drugs Office Reports Major Increase in Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan," Press Release AFG/269, SOC/NAR/917, November 18, 2004, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/afg269.doc.htm.
24. *Ibid.*
25. WEBSITE, SAARC, www.saarc-sec.org/main.php.
26. South Asian Media Net, "Human Rights and SAARC Nations," by Ashwani Kumar Chrungoo, March 19, 2004, www.southasianmedia.net/index_opinion4.cfm?id=24821.
27. Bush, National Security Strategy, p. 1.
28. Bush, "State of the Union Address."

CHAPTER 14

AL-QA'IDA AS INSURGENCY: THE QUEST FOR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris

“The National Strategy for Homeland Security” designates al-Qa’ida as “America’s most immediate and serious threat.”¹ Conventional wisdom, reflected in news media; public opinion; and government studies, such as the “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” characterizes the al-Qa’ida menace as one of transnational terrorism. Recently, however, some analysts have begun to challenge that conclusion. They argue instead that al-Qa’ida represents the emergence of a new type of insurgency.² Assessing the nature of the enemy is a critical first step in the crafting of effective strategy. In the case of al-Qa’ida, one must answer three important questions to clarify the extent of the danger and further hone America’s strategic response. First, does the movement actually represent an insurgency? If so, are there, indeed, new elements that make al-Qa’ida different than previously encountered insurgencies? Finally, what implications do these answers have for the current war against Osama bin Laden’s movement? The analysis that follows suggests that al-Qa’ida represents an emerging form of global Islamic insurgency, the inchoate strategy of which undermines its potential to achieve revolutionary goals. Nonetheless, not unlike previous failed insurgencies, it possesses both durability and an immense capacity for destruction. These characteristics mandate a counterrevolutionary response at the strategic level that aims to destroy not only al-Qa’ida’s organization, but also discredit its ideological underpinnings.

Terrorism Versus Insurgency: A Distinction with a Difference.

The distinction between terrorism and insurgency is not merely theoretical, as the appropriate responses to the two phenomena are quite different. Before addressing preferred strategies to counter

each, one needs to establish how they are alike and how they differ. Unfortunately, existing definitions do more to cloud than clarify the issues. Neither academic nor government experts can agree on a suitable definition for terrorism.

The Department of Defense's (DoD) definition focuses on the type of violence employed (unlawful) towards specified ends (political, religious, or ideological).³ This characterization fails to address the argument from moral relativity that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." In essence, this objection to a suitable definition submits that, while violence may be "unlawful" in accordance with a victim's statutes, the cause served by those committing the acts may represent a positive good in the eyes of neutral observers. In an effort to escape this dilemma, the recently recommended (but not yet approved) United Nations (UN) definition of terrorism focuses instead on the targets (civilians or noncombatants) of violence rather than on its legal nature or intended objective.⁴ Still, the UN and the DoD definitions both sidestep the notion of state-sponsored terrorism. The DoD definition cites only unlawful violence (thereby making state terrorism an oxymoron), whereas the UN definition excludes state-sponsored terrorism and deals with state violence against civilians as bona fide war crimes or crimes against humanity under the Geneva Convention. More importantly for a strategist trying to characterize the nature of the threat, neither definition conveys exactly what distinguishes the violence of terrorism from that of an insurgency.

Definitions of insurgency have similar difficulties. DoD defines the term as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."⁵ Terrorist organizations with revolutionary aspirations seem to meet that criterion, and thus the insurgent definition also fails analysts in differentiating one from another. Bard O'Neill comes closer to distinguishing the two phenomena by including an overtly political component in his definition of insurgency:

A struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses *political resources* (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and *violence* to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.⁶

Thus, insurgencies combine violence with political means in pursuit of revolutionary purposes in a way that terrorism cannot duplicate. Terrorists may pursue political, even revolutionary, goals, but their violence replaces rather than complements a political program.

If definitions offer only a partial aid in discriminating between terrorism and insurgency, organizational traits traditionally have provided another means to tell the two apart. Insurgencies normally field fighting forces orders of magnitude larger than those of terrorist organizations. Typically, insurgents organize their forces in military fashion as squads, platoons, and companies. Terrorist units are usually smaller and comprised of isolated teams or cells not organized into a formal military chain of command. Insurgent forces often are more overt in nature as well, especially in the sanctuaries or zones, which they dominate. Terrorist organizations, which tend towards extreme secrecy and compartmented cells to facilitate security, seldom replicate an insurgency's political structure.

One characteristic that does not serve to distinguish terrorism from insurgency is the use of terror tactics. Terrorists and insurgents may employ exactly the same methods, and utilize force or the threat thereof to coerce their target audiences and further the organizational agenda. Both groups may threaten, injure, or kill civilians or government employees by using an array of similar means. Thus, the use of terror in and of itself does not equate to terrorism; the former is merely a tactical tool of the latter.⁷ Lawrence Freedman suggests that the terror of terrorists equates to "strategic" terrorism, because it is the primary means by which they pursue their agenda. However, the terror insurgents employ is more tactical in nature, since it is only one of several violent tools such groups wield.⁸ This parsing underscores the point—a variety of agents, including states, insurgents, or even criminals, as well as terrorists, may employ the same techniques of terror.

Given the challenges of definition and the shared use of the same tactical repertoire, it is hardly surprising that the terms terrorism and insurgency frequently appear synonymously. The State Department register of terrorist organizations lists small, covert, cellular groups like Abu Nidal and Greece's "Revolutionary Organization of November 17," as well as larger organizations with shadow governments in established zones, strong political components, and

well-defined military hierarchies, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Philippine's New People's Army (NPA).⁹ Most analysts would characterize FARC and the NPA as insurgencies, albeit ones that employ strong doses of terror on both opponents and the surrounding populace. Not surprisingly, al-Qa'ida is also on the Department of State's list of 37 foreign terrorist organizations. In an effort to determine if it belongs there, this chapter will employ a third analytical framework to supplement the insights offered by existing definitions and traditional organizational characteristics.

In the 1980s, French sociologist Michel Wieviorka conducted research that determined terrorists find themselves estranged from both the social movements that spawned them and the societies they oppose. He uses the term "social antimovement" to describe the intermediate stage between legitimate social movements and terrorism. Antimovements may employ violence, but they maintain some association with the parent social movement. It is only when that linkage dissolves, a process Wieviorka calls "inversion," that a militant becomes a terrorist. The violence of terrorist actors no longer is purposeful—in pursuit of a rational political goal—but replaces the parent social movement's ideology. In essence, this conclusion underscores a frequent contention in the literature on political violence: that terrorism is the domain of organizations, where the strategic repertoire of violence conflates means and ends.¹⁰

Importantly, Wieviorka's construct does not provide a means upon which one can hang a consensus definition of terrorism. Instead, it offers another means to distinguish terrorism from insurgency. Specifically, this theory posits that the degree of linkage remaining between a given radical group and its parent social movement determines what Wieviorka refers to as "pure terrorism."¹¹ There is a connection between this notion and the broader political nature of insurgency, though it is not an angle Wieviorka himself examines. Organizations which have not yet inverted, and which maintain connections to a significant segment of society, represent not just social antimovements, but potential insurgencies.¹²

Using the three analytical lenses—definitions, organizational traits, and Wieviorka's inversion theory—where does al-Qa'ida fall on the terrorism vs. insurgency scale? Certainly al-Qa'ida meets the

component tests of the various terrorism definitions: (1) unlawful (a nonstate actor); (2) political/religious/ideological in intent (fatwas calling for the removal of Islamic regimes guilty of religious heresies); and (3) targeting civilians (e.g., the World Trade Center). It also comprises “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict,” in accordance with the DoD’s insurgency definition. In terms of exhibiting a political component, some have called al-Qa’ida an armed political party and the extremist wing of a political religion.¹³ The group’s political works include propaganda efforts such as the issuance of fatwas, protection and projection of Salafist religious infrastructure, and mobilization of grass roots support through cooperation with Islamist parties, as well as orchestration of favorable media coverage in the Islamic press.¹⁴ The al-Qa’ida training manual underscores its commitment to both politics and violence as a mechanism for change:

Islamic governments have never been and will never be, established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been by pen and gun by word and bullet by tongue and teeth.¹⁵

Finally, the terror tactics employed in pursuit of al-Qa’ida’s ideological goals qualifies it for either insurgent or terrorist status.

In terms of traditional characteristics of classic terrorist and insurgent organizations, al-Qa’ida turns in a mixed score. It is relatively small (< 100 hard core adherents), but in Afghanistan, it did train approximately 18,000 fighters, who have subsequently dispersed around the world in some 60 countries.¹⁶ Of this small army (bigger, in fact, than 61 of the world’s 161 armies), perhaps 3,000 are true al-Qa’ida troops, as opposed to mere beneficiaries of al-Qa’ida tactical training.¹⁷ The small, relatively cellular structure of the hardcore suggests a terrorist organization, while the scope and scale of its dedicated, deployed militants indicates a significant, if somewhat dispersed insurgency. When al-Qa’ida enjoyed political space in which to operate unhindered in Afghanistan, it conducted its business in a relatively overt manner as insurgencies usually do. Under duress since September 11, 2001 (9/11), it has regressed

back to a more covert style of operation in accordance with terrorist protocol.

Wieviorka's precepts suggest that al-Qa'ida has not inverted yet and transitioned to pure terrorism. Osama bin Laden's organization stemmed from the political tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood, which promised an Islamic alternative to capitalist and Marxist models of development.¹⁸ Normally, social movements such as those represented by the Muslim Brotherhood could compete effectively in an environment of democratic elections. In a Muslim landscape devoid of free elections, however, alternate ideological competitors either die or become subversive to continue the political fight.¹⁹ Al-Qa'ida represents a version of the latter. While the group's methodology of martyrdom (reflecting the radical ideology of bin Laden's Palestinian spiritual mentor, Abdallah Azzam) is apocalyptic from a Western perspective, it is in accord with at least a version of the religious tradition of jihad within Islam. Thus, it is not a complete departure from its own societal norms.²⁰ Moreover, bin Laden's popularity throughout the Muslim world, the fact that the populace among whom his operatives hide, despite the offer of large rewards, has delivered to Western security forces neither him nor his chief lieutenants, and the relative lack of condemnation of his group's activities by leading Islamic clerics suggests that al-Qa'ida has not severed its connection with significant segments of its social constituency.²¹

This grass roots support indicates an organization still in the social antimovement phase, rather than a terrorist group divorced from the population it claims to represent. Al-Qa'ida has disengaged itself radically and politically (perhaps inevitable, given the autocratic nature of the regimes it opposes), is hyperaggressive towards those it perceives responsible for its political weakness (Jews, Americans, and apostate Muslim leaders), and advocates a utopian dream promising a powerful yet thoroughly isolated Islamic world. Such traits are symptomatic of a social antimovement. Pure terrorism, on the other hand, might exhibit the same radical goals and appalling acts, but would result in far broader condemnation of al-Qa'ida's agenda than has occurred so far throughout the Muslim world. Analysts who conclude that bin Laden is winning the war of ideas

between the radical and moderate Islamic religious traditions further reinforce the counterintuitive determination that al-Qa'ida is not (yet) a terrorist organization.²² Such evidence indicates a growing linkage between the purveyors of violence and the polity they claim to represent. Purposeful political violence committed on behalf of a sizable segment of society suggests insurgency. Importantly, the judgment that al-Qa'ida has not descended into terrorism is not to sanction the group's horrific conduct or render support for its political objectives. Instead, it represents an effort to assess al-Qa'ida's current status, accurately portray its nature, and thereby help determine how best to combat it.

Combating terrorism and insurgency requires different strategic responses. Certainly, both pose significant threats to the United States. Terrorists, in an age of transnational cooperation and access to weapons of mass destruction, have the means to unleash catastrophic attacks on modern societies that dwarf even the terrible blows of 9/11. But terrorism, however powerful in a destructive sense, remains the province of the politically weak. Terrorists are physically and psychologically removed from broad popular support. Because terrorists remain isolated from the social movements from which they sprang, and their political goals become, over time, more and more divorced from reality, it is neither necessary nor possible to negotiate with them. They are a blight, like crime, that one cannot eliminate but which states must control to limit their impact. Of course, states must hunt terrorists possessing the means and will to conduct catastrophic attacks not only with national and international police resources, but also with all the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power.

However, states must handle insurgents differently, because they represent both a political and a military challenge. They combine an ideologically motivated leadership with an unsatisfied citizenry (the so-called "grievance guerrillas") into a challenge to existing governments. Only a war of ideas can confront and defeat ideologies. An integrated counterinsurgency program that enables the targeted government to offer more appealing opportunities than the insurgents' (doubtless utopian) vision must peel away popular support. Finally, a successful approach must identify and neutralize

systematically the insurgent strategy's operational elements. Al-Qa'ida represents not terrorism, but an insurgency featuring a Salafist theology which appeals to significant portions of Muslim believers and which sanctifies terror. The next section will explore whether the nascent insurgency has the strategic wherewithal to enact revolutionary change.

Al-Qa'ida's Insurgency: A Policy-Strategy Mismatch.

Islamic insurgency is not a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, historically, it has not been a successful one.²³ Moreover, as Lawrence Freedman notes, revolutions that rely on terror as the primary means of political violence court strategic failure.²⁴ Does al-Qa'ida's methodology promise a different outcome? The movement's goals are revolutionary. They envision remaking society such that religious faith is foundational, social stratification is enforced, and the government is autocratic in nature and controlled by clerics. The Islamist governments of Iran, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Sudan illustrate an approach to the ideal. Al-Qa'ida intends to establish like regimes in lieu of apostate Muslim governments such as those of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The new Salafist administrations would strictly enforce Sharia law and block military and cultural influences from the West. Al-Qa'ida's political objective, then, remains unlimited vis-à-vis targeted Islamic regimes. It seeks to overthrow their form of government. With regard to the United States, the group's political objectives in the short run are more limited: to coerce America to withdraw from the Middle East and abandon its sponsorship of Israel.²⁵

While it is important to classify an insurgency's type and understand its goals, the operative question is how the movement uses the means at its disposal to achieve its desired ends—in other words, what strategy does it employ? It is not enough to have a guiding ideology and a susceptible body politic with significant, and potentially exploitable, grievances against the existing government. In the operational realm, something must connect the two. Without this critical linkage, ideologies may produce terrorists and grievances may spawn rebellions. But it is only when ideology and grievances

combine that insurgencies result.²⁶ Understanding how strategy effects that combination provides insight into the best ways to counter a particular insurgency. Current doctrine identifies two basic insurgent strategies: mass mobilization (best illustrated by Mao Tse-Tung's people's war construct) and armed action (featuring either rural based *foco* or urban warfare oriented styles).²⁷

Al-Qa'ida exhibits an interesting blend of both insurgent strategies. Primarily bin Laden's movement employs the urban warfare version of the armed action strategy. Certainly most of the group's infamous activities have been military rather than political in nature. It has not sought to use rural-based military forces to court recruits and wage a systematic campaign of destruction against target governments. Instead, al-Qa'ida has employed violence against both government and civilian targets to create instability and undermine the confidence and political will of its enemies. Small, covert teams employing creative suicide techniques planned and executed its attacks against the USS *Cole*, the Khobar Tower barracks in Saudi Arabia, and the World Trade Center/Pentagon.

Al-Qa'ida has not adopted a mass mobilization strategy, but it does employ some of Mao's key concepts. The Chinese Communist Party's carefully managed mass line finds its analog in the Islamic madrasahs, mosques, and media outlets. These forums publicize bin Laden's philosophy, capture and echo the people's complaints, and conjoin the ideology and grievances in a perfect storm of revolutionary fervor. Islamic madrasahs, mosques, and media also provide a suitable venue for aspects of political warfare. Bin Laden's attempts to communicate directly with and threaten the American people have been neither sophisticated nor effective, but they do illustrate an effort to address his enemy's political vulnerabilities. Al-Qa'ida also has proven quite willing to cooperate, in a virtual united front, with a long list of otherwise dubious allies including Shiite Hezbollah, secular Baathist officials, and Chinese criminal syndicates.²⁸ International support for al-Qa'ida is important. Since the displacement of Afghanistan's ruling Taliban party, primary support comes from countries such as Iran and Syria, as well as a host of like-minded state and regional insurgencies and terrorist organizations.²⁹

Mao's prescription for protracted war is also in keeping with al-Qa'ida's brand of Islamic revolutionary war. The mujahedin employed long-term guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan to drive out the Soviets; bin Laden looks to replicate that success in a similar protracted campaign against America.³⁰ In addition to the small unit attacks characteristic of traditional guerrilla warfare, the larger operations conducted by thousands of al-Qa'ida trained soldiers in Afghanistan against the Russians (and later the Northern Alliance) indicate that bin Laden does not oppose amassing and employing more conventional military power if the time, resources, and political space permit. For example, bin Laden's May 2001 communiqué called for the formation of a 10,000-man army to liberate Saudi Arabia.³¹

When denied the opportunity to fight conventionally, al-Qa'ida is willing to fall back on a more limited urban warfare strategy. Such a strategy is in consonance with a protracted war timeline, if not the ponderous methodology of its Maoist antecedent. Urban warfare seeks only to disrupt, not to build a conventional force capable of challenging government forces in pitched battles. It subverts targeted governments in preparation for the day when military action may remove a greatly weakened regime. Regardless of which military strategy al-Qa'ida employs, it is apparent that bin Laden has taken the long view of history necessary to persevere in a protracted war. His religious faith is unperturbed by short-term setbacks or the lack of immediate progress in unseating target governments. He sees even death in combat as motivational for those warriors who follow in the footsteps of the martyred mujahedin.³²

While al-Qa'ida does not use the same mobilization techniques Mao's strategy employed, it nonetheless benefits from similar operational effects achieved in a different way. The purpose of covert infrastructure is to operationalize control of human terrain.³³ The shadow government provides or controls education, tax collection, civil and military recruiting services, public works, economic infrastructure development and operation, police functions, and legal adjudication. While there is no evidence of an al-Qa'ida equivalent to a communist style covert infrastructure as seen in China, Malaya, or Vietnam, the radical Islamic religious movement has developed a construct that militant ideologues could subvert and employ to

attain the same ends. One expert notes that religious institutions may replicate the parallel hierarchies of covert infrastructure and that religious inducement is more compelling to potential insurgent recruits than secular ideology.³⁴

The militant Islamist construct that illustrates such a parallel hierarchy is a virtual counter state known as the da'wa.³⁵ Grassroots social programs comprise this alternate society, which aims at proving the efficacy of fundamentalist policies and gradually building a mass base that eventually could translate into political power. The da'wa includes associations of middle class professionals, Islamic welfare agencies, schools and student groups, nongovernmental humanitarian assistance organizations, clinics, and mosques. These venues advance political ideas and sometimes instigate mass protests. Though this overt nucleus of a parallel government has developed in nations such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, it has not yet attained the revolutionary capacity exhibited by the covert infrastructure of a Maoist people's war. Opposition parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood have not been able to leverage this latent source of organizational strength into a successful challenge to sitting governments.³⁶ Theodore Gurr observes that the existence of dissent options like the da'wa sometimes bleed off revolutionary potential energy and actually make successful insurrection less likely rather than facilitating its advance.³⁷ The da'wa's capacity as a conduit for Maoist style political mobilization is nonetheless striking.

The strategy of al-Qa'ida is thus a blending of the more familiar mass mobilization and armed action strategies. Some of the factors that made Mao's people war strategy effective also are present in al-Qa'ida's twist on "making revolution." The religious foundation of al-Qa'ida's ideology and the devout nature of the societies it seeks to co-opt create a novel dynamic with a potentially new way of connecting means to ends. So far this potential is unrealized. In the modern era, radical Muslims have applied the coercive social control consistent with bin Laden's brand of Islam only following the seizure of political power. In Iran, Afghanistan, and Sudan the da'wa did not serve as a virtual counter state as shadow governments do in Maoist people's war. But in the future al-Qa'ida may not have to replicate Mao's secular infrastructure because alternate mechanisms

of control already reside in the target societies. The challenge for Islamic insurgents is to transition the da'wa's capacity for social influence into one of alternate political control.

Whether or not such an evolution proves feasible, al-Qa'ida's armed action approach seeks to achieve its limited political objectives against the United States via a military strategy of erosion. That is, additional strikes of sufficient magnitude could induce America to reconsider its policy options in the Middle East.³⁸ In addition to the strategic intent of influencing enemy policy, these attacks also serve to mobilize the Muslim world; generate recruits, money, and prestige; demonstrate the global capacity to disrupt; and provide a forum for a kind of "performance violence" that symbolically underscores the righteousness of its cause.³⁹ Failure to harness a more potent political component with its military erosion option, however, means that al-Qa'ida is less likely to overthrow targeted Islamic regimes. The unlimited political objective associated with the constrained military means creates a fatal policy-strategy mismatch that dooms its insurgency to failure.⁴⁰

Thus far this chapter has established that al-Qa'ida's connection to the people in a number of Islamic countries means that its methodology is not terrorism but a kind of insurgency. The strategy of that insurgency, combining a variety of forms and styles in pursuit of both limited and unlimited political goals, demonstrates the ability to disrupt on a massive level, but less likelihood of actually enacting revolutionary change. The final question is how to modify existing policies to better address the peculiar nature of the emerging al-Qa'ida threat.

Implications for Counterrevolutionary Policy.

The insurgent nature of the al-Qa'ida threat suggests that the United States and its allies must counter the enemy's ideology, his strategy, and the grievances he seeks to manipulate. The Army's October 2004 *Interim Counterinsurgency Operations Field Manual*, FMI 3-07.22, mentions all of these aspects of the struggle. Although the new manual recognizes al-Qa'ida as an insurgency, it does not speak to the unique challenges inherent in battling the first global insurgent

movement. Some of the traditional counterinsurgency prescriptions are difficult to apply to a netted, transnational movement like al-Qa'ida. For example, "clear and hold" tactics do not work when the opponent disperses across 60 nations around the globe. Similarly, sanctuary is no longer a state or even a regional problem; with a global threat, it becomes an international issue. The scope of the challenge increases vastly when potential sponsors include not only nations such as Iran, Sudan, and Syria, but also regions in turmoil such as Chechnya and failed states such as Somalia.

Unlike extant counterinsurgency doctrine, the "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism" does not recognize the insurgent nature of the al-Qa'ida threat. Instead the document characterizes al-Qa'ida as a multinational terrorist network. Nonetheless, the methodology laid out in the strategy incorporates a variety of counterinsurgency techniques. These include winning the war of ideas, eliminating sanctuaries, interdicting external support, and diminishing underlying conditions.⁴¹ Interestingly, the National War College student report that inspired much of the Global War on Terrorism strategy paper, concluded that al-Qa'ida represented an evolution of terrorism which the authors dubbed "pansurgency." The students defined this phenomenon as "an organized movement of nonstate actors aimed at the overthrow of values, cultures, or societies on a global level through the use of subversion and armed conflict, with the ultimate goal of establishing a new world order."⁴² That conclusion was the most important idea in the study that did not make it into the National Security Council's approved Global War on Terrorism strategy paper. Doubtless, the National Security Council preferred the illegitimacy inherent in the terrorist label rather than the ambiguity associated with an insurgent status.

Greater emphasis on counterinsurgency methodology, however, would have improved the national counterterrorism strategy's prescriptions for addressing al-Qa'ida's ideology, strategy, and exploitation of grievances. Addressing grievances is essentially a tactical response. The current strategy rightly indicates that championing market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law will serve to mitigate conditions that enemies exploit to recruit insurgents.⁴³ But experiences in Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan,

and Iraq indicate the overwhelming resource challenges inherent in such nation building. “Draining the swamp” as a means of removing grievances based on poverty, lack of education, poor medical care, and culturally induced violence is a generational investment and fiscally prohibitive even on a state level, much less in a regional sense. Thus, the most effective means to resolve grievances is not through development or repair of shattered infrastructure, but via reform of the targeted state’s political process. Broadened opportunity to participate in the sine qua non of politics—the decisions about who gets what—undermines radical Islamic movements’ protected status in much of the Muslim world as virtually the only available option through which to express dissent. Al-Qa’ida is a religiously inspired revolutionary movement, but fundamentally it is political in nature.⁴⁴ Thus competitors offering different solutions for extant social, economic, and political grievances most threaten the movement’s political potential. In a largely nondemocratic Islamic world, however, a move to greater electoral participation is fully as revolutionary as the theocratic vision peddled by bin Laden. Consequently, it remains a diplomatic and political hurdle of the highest order.

At the operational level, the “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” identifies a number of useful diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments for use against al-Qa’ida. The paper endorses a military strategy of annihilation, but it does not identify a defeat mechanism. Against mass mobilization style insurgencies, destruction of the covert infrastructure is the preferred defeat mechanism. Al-Qa’ida exerts far less control over a targeted population because its strategy establishes no shadow government, but the organization remains much more elusive as a result. Sir Robert Thompson recognized the dilemma posed by insurgencies without infrastructure. He noted that either organization or causes are the vital factors behind insurgencies; which one pertains dictates the appropriate strategic response.⁴⁵

If Maoist people’s war features organizational strength, then the American Revolution illustrates insurgency motivated by an idea. The colonies possessed a degree of local government, but they lacked the kind of pervasive organizational control that would

ensure citizens had to support the revolutionary movement. Instead, the glue that held the insurgency together was the popular idea of political independence. Similarly, al-Qa'ida's strength lies in the appeal of its Salafist/Wahhabian philosophy. This insight suggests that al-Qa'ida has no structural center of gravity at the operational level. This verdict reflects the amorphous strategy employed by the group thus far and reflects its lack of success in either toppling Islamic governments or causing the West to withdraw from the Middle East. But it also underscores the tremendous potential energy possessed by a movement whose ideas appeal powerfully to a sizable minority throughout the Muslim world.

Such an assessment dictates a different kind of response at the strategic level. The conflict is one between competing visions of Islam. Moderate Islam is willing and able to accommodate modernism; radical Islam insists that the religion return to the halcyon days of the 7th and 8th centuries. This is a civil war of sorts, and one which the West is poorly positioned to referee and ill-suited to encourage or end. The contest is not the venue of an information operation writ large. Rather, it is the age-old and fundamental debate on religion's role in governance. Each people must make its own choice; Madison Avenue marketing techniques and western-style politics are neither necessary nor sufficient to sway the result. Instead a sophisticated form of political warfare must support and encourage moderate governments that champion tolerant forms of the Islamic faith, while opposing religious fascism. The "National Security" and "Combating Terrorism" strategies mention, but do not stress this war of ideas.⁴⁶ It deserves more emphasis and attention, because failure in this arena will render moot even the destruction of al-Qa'ida. Osama bin Laden's movement is merely representative of the threat posed by Salafist theology. Other groups, though less well-known, harbor similar political objectives, and the conflict will continue until the underlying ideas are rejected by the Muslim umma. The threat posed by radical Islam today resembles that posed in 1917 by communism — a bad idea poised to justify the spread of totalitarianism.⁴⁷

The strategic challenge is to discredit a fascist religious ideology before victim states experience a century of social, economic, and political oppression and recognize too late that Wahhabism is

simply another failed philosophy of government. Key to meeting that challenge is to recognize threats as they are rather than as one wishes them to be. The present “National Security Strategy” fails this charge when it claims the enemy is terrorism rather than the ideology that justifies the terror. This analysis confuses the symptom for the disease. The real problem is a religiously inspired political ideology, the specified end state of which is global hegemony. Al-Qa’ida exemplifies this ideology and represents an emerging danger that demands a clear policy response. Such a policy should promulgate a comprehensive new doctrine encompassing the following elements:

- The United States opposes those nations whose governments embrace Salafist jihadist ideology.⁴⁸
- The United States will seek to contain the spread of Salafist jihadist ideology.
- The United States will hold accountable those nations that host, sponsor, or support Salafist jihadist groups.
- The United States will support allies (or nations whose survival is considered vital to its security) if Salafist jihadist nations or movements threaten their sovereignty.

A doctrine such as this, not unlike Cold War-era anticommunist policies, clarifies the national position, while enabling political leaders to protect American interests by selectively supporting authoritarian allies and/or encouraging political reform. This choice, reflecting the persistent foreign policy tension between idealism and realpolitik, remains the essence of effective diplomacy.

Choosing wisely between idealism and realism is challenging and important because the militant Islamic threat which al-Qa’ida represents is not monolithic in nature.⁴⁹ Branches of al-Qa’ida and organizations similar to bin Laden’s may be different in important ways. In the early days of the Cold War, the West thought the communist threat was monolithic; time and experience proved that it was not. Neither is the Salafist world. All politics are local—even the politics of religion. Counterinsurgency strategists must therefore evaluate each case on its own merits. While Islamic militants may cooperate with each other in a global fashion, the program they craft

to topple a particular government requires independent analysis and a counterrevolutionary strategy that recognizes and leverages local conditions. It is also important to remember that insurgency is only one way to enact social and/or political change. Revolutions also occur peacefully (as the Shah of Iran learned in 1979), via coup (as Lenin demonstrated in 1917), or even by the ballot box (with the prospect of “one man, one vote, one time” should a totalitarian party win).⁵⁰

Conclusion.

Al-Qa’ida is the most deadly of the more than 100 Islamic militant groups formed over the past 25 years.⁵¹ The danger it poses flows from its willingness to employ weapons of mass effect, its global reach, its focus on targeting America, and, most importantly, its revolutionary and expansionist ideology.⁵² The size of bin Laden’s organization, its political goals, and its enduring relationship with a fundamentalist Islamic social movement provide strong evidence that al-Qa’ida is not a terrorist group, but an insurgency. Armed action is its primary strategy, but there are intriguing aspects of mass mobilization techniques that serve to strengthen its organizational impact and resiliency. Elements unique to its methodology include transnational networking and a multiethnic constituency.⁵³ Together these factors comprise an evolving style of spiritually based insurgency that is somewhat different from the Maoist people’s war model which underwrites most counterinsurgency doctrine.⁵⁴

The disparate nature of the threat—in essence a global, but somewhat leisurely paced guerrilla war—makes it difficult to focus an effective strategic response. But al-Qa’ida’s organizational and strategic choices also make it tough for the movement to concentrate its power in ways that achieve its political ends. Thus far no targeted Islamic government has fallen to al-Qa’ida inspired violence. Nor have bin Laden’s attacks compelled or coerced America to alter its policies in the Middle East. The resulting contest of wills is classically asymmetric. Long-term success for the United States will require support for true political reform, a revolutionary cause in itself, among autocratic Islamic governments. This path, though

potentially destabilizing in the short term, holds more promise in the long run as radical Islamic insurgents are forced to compete with more moderate political rivals in the market place of ideas.

A clear policy—one that identifies Salafist ideology as the problem and enunciates America's opposition to the politics of jihad—is essential. Victory also demands delegitimizing the radical Wahhabian strain of Islam that considers the killing of civilians not just a useful tactic, but also a religious imperative. This goal, though beyond the means of a non-Muslim country to effect independently, is the crux of the issue. The rise of Islamic fascism, championed by groups such as al-Qa'ida, is the central strategic problem of the age. Only victory in the simmering campaign against the emerging global Islamic insurgency will prevent that challenge from evolving into a much longer and more brutal clash of civilizations.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14

1. George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Washington, DC, 2002, p. vii.

2. According to this school, much of what Ian Lesser, *et al.*, characterize as a new form of terrorism in their study, *Countering the New Terrorism*, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, is, in fact, a new version of insurgency. See for example, Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, Washington, DC, 2002, pp. xvii, 24, 279; Paul Rich, "Al Qaeda and the Radical Islamic Challenge to Western Strategy," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 46, Spring 2003, p. 46; Thomas R. Mockaitis, "Winning Hearts and Minds in the 'War on Terrorism,'" *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 14, Spring 2003, pp. 21, 37; James Risen, "Evolving Nature of Al Qaeda is Misunderstood, Critic Says," *New York Times*, November 8, 2004, sec. A, p. 18; Kimbra L. Fishel, "Challenging the Hegemon: Al Qaeda's Elevation of Asymmetric Insurgent Warfare onto the Global Arena," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 11, Winter 2002, pp. 286, 290; John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, "Multi-Lateral Counter-Insurgency Networks," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 11, Winter 2002, pp. 353, 364, 366; Rohan Gunaratna, "The Genealogy of Al Qaeda," *Gaiko Forum*, Vol. 14, Fall 2004, p. 16; Michael Vlahos, *Terror's Mask: Insurgency within Islam*, Laurel, MD, 2002, pp. 1-28, *passim*. Only the last of these studies attempts to establish why the threat constitutes insurgency instead of terrorism. The others simply assert that insurgency is the issue and then prescribe various remedies. Vlahos uses a cultural construct to establish the relationship between violence and the political movement it serves. He terms the existential negotiation between insurgent and regime "civilizational insurgency"—a notion that amounts to a contest for

legitimacy. Terrorism, then, is not just a type of political violence, but “. . . an expression of changing relationships within culture and society,” p. 7. Of note is that, with regard to the threat’s status as terrorist or insurgent, Vlahos arrives at a similar judgment as this chapter via a different analytical methodology.

3. “Terrorism—the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 428.

4. The recommended UN definition reads: “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566, 2004, that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” United Nations, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York, 2004, pp. 51-52.

5. Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, p. 207.

6. Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, Washington, DC, 1990, p. 13.

7. The distinction between terror and terrorism is a common theme in the writings of Dr. Thomas A. Marks, perhaps the foremost authority on Maoist insurgency. See, for example, his exposition on the use of terror by the Philippine insurgents of the New People’s Army in Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam*, London, 1996, pp. 151-173.

8. Lawrence Freedman, “Terrorism and Strategy,” in *Terrorism and International Order*, Lawrence Freedman, et. al., London, 1986, p. 58.

9. Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Foreign Terrorist Organizations*, Washington, DC, 2004, pp. 1-3, 22-23, 83-86, 90-92, 96-97.

10. Michel Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, David Gordon White, trans., Chicago, 1988, pp. 3-41, 61-77. Wieviorka conducted a comparative analysis of four sets of terrorist groups. He investigated the nature of the relationships among the terrorists themselves, the social movements they originated from and the polities they sought to change. Wieviorka determined that the relationship between a terrorist and his parent social movement has been destroyed. The social movement’s radicalized terrorist descendent has abandoned his roots and the people whose message he claimed to champion. Over time, the violence of terrorism tends to become more nihilistic and its perpetrators less lucid.

Wieviorka’s social antimovement construct explains the devolution of legitimate social movements (such as proletarian labor or Palestinian nationalism) to a state of terrorism. Groups in this in-between status become the antithesis

of their parent social movement. The antimovements begin to advocate abstract notions that no longer reflect the real issues of the original interest group. For antimovements, political rivals become threats that must be fought or destroyed rather than competed against or negotiated with. Eventually these groups undergo radical disengagement from existing political systems. Soon utopian goals mandate destruction of existing social compacts in order to erect a new reality.

Wieviorka asserts that social antimovements are similar in nature to totalitarian states and certain religious sects—the combination of which can produce the Islamic fascism of the Taliban. The extreme form of such antimovements *may* spin off terrorist groups the way Abu Nidal's cell emerged from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (social movement) and Fatah (social antimovement). The process by which this divorce occurs is termed inversion. Inversion transitions an already separated group from a stance of defensive aloofness to one of radical ideological offensiveness; the associated terrorist violence becomes increasingly apocalyptic and even self-consuming.

With regard to terrorism's conflation of means and ends, *The Quranic Concept of War* states it plainly: "Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. . . . Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him." Quoted in Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*, Roseville, CA, 1999, p. xv.

11. Wievorka, pp. 63, 290, 297.

12. Wievorka, in fact, uses the term insurgency interchangeably with the term terrorism in his sociological analysis. The author is indebted to Dr. Thomas A. Marks for the insights which application of Wievorka's theory provide to differentiating terrorism and insurgency.

13. Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qa'ida: Global Network of Terror*, New York, 2002, p. 240; Jason Burke, *Al-Qa'ida: Casting a Shadow of Terror*, London, 2003, p. 12; *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, pp. 162-164.

14. Al-Qa'ida has requested Islamic political parties to do propaganda, fund-raising and recruiting on its behalf in order to "free a warrior to fight." Gunaratna, p. 226. The term "Salafist" refers to those who seek to copy the way the earliest Muslims practiced Islam. "Wahhabi" refers to followers of the eighteenth century puritanical Arab mullah Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. As Jason Burke notes, "Bin Laden and his fellow extremists are Millenarian, fundamentalist, reformist, revivalist, Wahhabi/Salafi and, at least in their rootedness in modernity if not their programme, Islamist." Burke, pp. 38-39. This essay uses both Wahhabi and Salafist to describe al-Qa'ida.

15. Gunaratna, p. 5.

16. Bruce Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 27, November-December, 2004, p. 552; Burke, p. 10.

17. Gunaratna, p. 8. For listings of world army strengths, see "Armed Forces of the World," available from www.strategypage.com/fjyeo/howtomakewar/databases/armies/default.asp, Internet, accessed January 29, 2005.

18. For background on the Muslim Brotherhood, see John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* New York, 1992, pp. 120-133. For the Muslim Brotherhood's relationship to al-Qa'ida, see Gunaratna, p. 96.

19. Of 41 countries with populations at least 2/3 Muslim, the annual Freedom House assessment lists none as free (protecting both political and civic rights). Eight are shown as "partially free," while the rest are categorized as "not free." Seven of the eleven states listed as most repressive are Muslim. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, New York, 2004, p. 499. Of the 57 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Bernard Lewis credits only Turkey with political, social, and economic freedom. Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, New York, 2003, p. 163. When religious dissidents do become subversive due to a lack of political "space," they enjoy some advantages over their secular competitors because even ruthless tyrants have difficulty suppressing the religious infrastructure that shields the opposition. See Lewis, pp. 23, 133.

20. For the impact Azzam had on bin Laden, see Burke, pp. 68-71. For a discussion of al-Qa'ida's apocalyptic qualities, see Gunaratna, pp. 93-94.

21. Shibley Telhami, a University of Maryland professor who conducted a poll of Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates discovered that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden tied for fourth place on a list of most admired world leaders behind Jacques Chirac of France (1st), deceased Egyptian president Nasser (2nd) and Hezbollah's leader in Lebanon (3rd). Telhami agrees there is a battle for hearts and minds afoot. "But, unfortunately, things went the way al-Qaeda wanted them to go rather than the way the U.S. wanted them to go in terms of public opinion. . . . What we're seeing now is a disturbing sympathy with al-Qaeda coupled with resentment toward the United States." Dafna Linzer, "Polls Showing Growing Arab Rancor at U.S.," July 23, 2004, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7080-2004Jul22.html, Internet, accessed February 10, 2005. Some 60 percent of British Muslims believe al-Qa'ida is "fighting the right fight," while 95 percent of Saudi middle class and professional men between the ages of 21 and 45 supported bin Laden in a 2002 poll. Vlahos, pp. 19-20. The 9/11 Commission Report cites similarly negative polling data. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Washington, DC, 2004, p. 375.

22. Burke, pp. 5-6; Yossef Bodansky, *The Secret History of the Iraq War*, New York, 2004, pp. xvi-xvii. The virulent Wahhabi strain of Islam, combining intolerance with a call to jihad, is promulgated in particular by Saudi Arabia. That country alone established some 1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centers, and 2,000 madrasahs worldwide between 1982 and 2002. This level of proselytizing accounts, at least in part, for the increasing popularity of radical Islam and its sanction of political

violence. Dore Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism*, Washington, DC, 2003, pp. 12-13, 126.

23. Henry Munson, Jr., *Islam and Revolution in the Middle East*, New Haven, CT, 1988, pp. 104, 125-137.

24. Freedman, p. 65.

25. There are those who argue that al-Qa'ida's long-term objective encompasses nothing less than the destruction of the United States and the West. See Earl H. Tilford, "The War on Terror: World War IV," *ROA National Security Report*, October 2004, pp. 37-44.

26. Thomas Marks' work stresses the critical linkage between the ideology of the dissident leadership and the practical grievances of the masses. He sees mobilization, orchestrated by covert political infrastructure, as the key operational connector between insurgent leaders and their followers. See Marks, *Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam*, pp. 285-288; Thomas A. Marks, "Ideology of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War Distortions?" *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 15, Spring 2004, pp. 107-128; Thomas A. Marks, "Evaluating Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Performance," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 11, Winter 2000, pp. 33-34.

27. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Field Manual-Interim No. 3-07.22, Washington, DC, 2004, pp. 1-5 to 1-7. Each style exhibits strengths that make it dangerous and weaknesses that leave it vulnerable. Mass mobilization is best exemplified by the people's war waged by Mao Tse-Tung's Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Mao's experience and writings provided, in essence, a blueprint for insurgency that has been the most successful and thus most widely copied strategy. People's war emphasizes politics over military considerations. Accordingly, Mao's strategy is designed to build strength in a gradual fashion rather than seize power in a lightning strike. Key operational elements of that strategy include the mass line, the united front, political warfare, covert infrastructure, protracted war, and international support. The mass line is a feedback mechanism that translates the people's complaints into elements of the party's pronounced policy. The united front is a broad assemblage of social movements, political parties, and trade organizations that also oppose the existing government. The insurgency makes common cause with these organizations when convenient and looks to infiltrate and subvert as many as possible in a bid to broaden its own base and power. Political warfare – the concerted use of soft power (such as propaganda, public diplomacy and subversion of the enemy's political or media elements) – is used to enhance the party's own political position while undermining that of the enemy. Infrastructure is the covert "shadow government" that is built and employed to wrest control of the population gradually from the existing government. This infrastructure also is the primary link between revolutionary leaders and their followers – it is the mechanism by which control of the human terrain is forged. Protracted war, perhaps the most well-known of Mao's devices, makes a virtue of military weakness by starting with local guerrilla forces and then developing them into larger, more capable mobile formations

and ultimately regular units that engage the enemy in conventional combat. This progression is phased, starting with the strategic defensive, then a period of preparation for offensive operations and culminating with the assumption of the strategic offensive. International support is the final pillar in the Maoist strategic construct. It stresses the importance of external diplomatic, military and economic assistance for the insurgency and/or hindrance of the target government. Mao's thoughts on his strategy may be found in Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung*, Peking, 1967. General overviews of Maoist strategy are available in John Ellis, *From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary and Counter-Insurgency Warfare, from the Romans to the Present*, London, 1995, pp. 177-199; and O'Neill, pp. 34-41.

The armed action option subordinates political to military considerations. Mobilization of the population and patient development of covert infrastructure do not play critical roles in this strategy. Instead, the operational link between grievance-inspired followers and ideology-driven leaders is the campaign of violence itself in this style of insurgency. Subcategories of this approach include rural-based *foco* insurgencies and urban warfare insurgencies. The former is best illustrated by the Cuban revolution. *Foco* insurgencies are marked by a relatively small military force that commences guerrilla operations and recruits additional membership via the success of its military strikes. These strikes create new and exacerbate existing grievances of the people. O'Neill, pp. 41-45. There is no separate party that directs military conduct; instead, in the words of Regis Debray "... the guerrilla force is the party in embryo." Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America*, New York, 1967, p. 106. *Foco* strategies have not been particularly successful outside of Cuba; they lack the staying power that mass mobilization provides and have no reserve manpower available to tap following catastrophic military setbacks.

The urban warfare variation of the armed action strategy features raids, bombings, assassinations, and sabotage against political and economic targets in the target country's leading cities. The goal is to create chaos and discredit the government in the eyes of its people. The population's loss of confidence in the government's ability to provide the first mandate of its charter—security for its citizens—may lead the citizenry to side with the insurgents. This strategy is clearly at work in contemporary Iraq. Without an analytical framework such as Wiewiorka's, the urban warfare strategy is hard to distinguish from similar patterns of terrorism. Palestine in 1947, Cyprus in 1958, and South Yemen in 1967 provide successful examples of urban warfare. Otherwise, this style has proven as barren as its *foco* counterpart because effective police and security forces have been able to either mitigate or destroy urban insurgents. See O'Neill, pp. 45-47; Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study*, Boston, 1976, pp. 343-352. Laqueur equates "urban guerrilla warfare" to terrorism, p. xi, but his description of the strategy and its development is useful. Moreover, he concludes that the style is relatively ineffective due to its lack of an adequate political component, p. 404.

28. Gunaratna, pp. 146-149; Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism*, Boston, 1999, pp. 216-219; *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, p. 56.

29. Bodansky, pp. 304, 310, 345-346, 405-406, 426-7, 430, 439. For evidence of collaboration with Iraq on the development of chemical weapons, see *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, pp. 124, 188-189. Between 1996 and 1998, 10 percent of Osama bin Laden's phone calls were placed to locations in Iran. Gunaratna, p. 12.

30. Don D. Chipman, "Osama bin Laden and Guerrilla War," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 26, May-June 2003, pp. 155-167; Hoffman, p. 555.

31. Burke, p. 128. For al-Qa'ida's appreciation of the merits of conventional fighting, see *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, pp. 104-105.

32. For the use of terror in support of a protracted war methodology, see Lesser, *et al.*, p. 39. On al-Qa'ida's preference for suicide attacks, see Gunaratna, pp. 91-92.

33. The notion of covert political infrastructure as a mechanism to "dominate human terrain" is a key insight found throughout much of Dr. Thomas A. Marks' work on Maoist insurgency. See, for example, Thomas A. Marks, "Urban Insurgency," *Small Wars & Insurgency*, Vol. 14, Autumn 2003, p. 142. For a series of case studies on insurgent infrastructure in Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Peru, see Marks, *Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam*, pp. 26-34, 96-110, and 154-169, 189-194, 261-268, respectively. The salient point with respect to Islamic insurgency is to what degree infrastructure, or something like it, pertains as a viable mechanism for attaining political power.

34. O'Neill, pp. 77, 93.

35. Da'wa is not to be confused with the Islamic al-Da'wa political party in Iraq (a descendent of an Iranian-backed Shiite revolutionary movement founded in 1958). Rather, it is a type of Islamic proselytizing that, in effect, has morphed into a way of seeking what Emmanuel Sivan calls "'re-Islamization from below,' the long-term infiltration into society's every nook and cranny as a way to gain eventual political control." See Emmanuel Sivan, "Why Radical Muslims Aren't Taking Over Governments," in *Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East*, Albany, NY, 2003, p. 4.

36. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., *Islamic Fundamentalism*, Boulder, CO, 1996, pp. 61-66; Sivan, pp. 1-9; Barry Rubin, ed., *Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East*, Albany, NY: 2003, p. 211. More than 20 percent of the Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) worldwide have been infiltrated by radical militant organizations. Many Islamic NGOs originally were established and remain controlled by these militant forces, which use these organizations as fronts to radicalize and mobilize unsuspecting populations. Gunaratna, pp. 6, 227, 239.

37. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, 1970, pp. 354-355.

38. For an assessment of al-Qa'ida's evolving strategy with regard to non-United States targets, see Byrnjar Lia and Thomas Hegghamer, "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 27, September-October 2004, pp. 355-375.

39. Lesser, *et al.*, pp. 41, 89-90; Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, Berkeley, 2000, p. 124; Burke, p. 163.
40. Brad McAllister concludes that al-Qa'ida will fail for another reason—the inherent inefficiencies of its chosen networked organizational construct. Specifically, he posits that the group's size and complexity are disadvantages rather than virtues as usually assumed. See Brad McAllister, "Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm: Demythologizing the Network," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 27, July-August 2004, pp. 297-319.
41. George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Washington, DC, 2003, pp. 21-24.
42. National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism, *Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World*, Washington, DC, 2002, p. 10.
43. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, p. 23.
44. Marks, "The Ideology of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War Distortions?" p. 125.
45. Robert Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969*, New York, 1970, pp. 8-9.
46. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC, 2002, p. 6; Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, pp. 23-24. The importance of political warfare is a common refrain among both counterinsurgent and counterterrorist strategists. The problem is that no one is quite certain how to operationalize the concept. See Paul Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda*, Santa Monica, CA, 2002, pp. 46-47; and Stephen Biddle, "War Aims and War Termination," in *Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses*, ed. John R. Martin, Carlisle, PA, 2002, pp. 10-12.
47. The Soviet analogy was posed to a Washington, DC, foreign policy symposium by General John Abizaid, USA, Commanding General of U.S. Central Command, in October 2004. See David Ignatius, "Achieving Real Victory Could Take Decades," *Washington Post*, December 26, 2004, p. B1.
48. "Salafist jihadists" is the term employed by General Abizaid to describe the generic militant Islamic threat which al-Qa'ida exemplifies. See Ignatius, p. B1.
49. In the days immediately following 9/11, analysts feared that al-Qa'ida represented a new type of terrorism: millennial in character, monolithic in nature, global in scope, huge in scale, and equipped with weapons of mass destruction that would render its challenge more existential than any previously encountered. More recent scholarship indicates that al-Qa'ida comprises a relatively small inner circle of bin Laden followers, a panoply of loosely linked but similarly motivated spin-off groups, and a guiding ideology that motivates both the original organization and its clones. See Burke, pp. 7-17. For a broader overview of the variance resident in the Islamic militant camp, see Esposito, pp. 243-253.

50. Coups are far more prevalent historically than revolutions wrought by insurgency. Walter Laqueur's dated but still valuable study notes that between 1960 and 1975, 120 coups took place while only five guerrilla movements came to power (three in Portuguese Africa, one in Laos and one in Cambodia). See Laqueur, p. 408. The Islamic government in Sudan, for example, came to power via a coup supported by the Sudanese army in June 1989. See Burke, p. 132.

51. Gunaratna, p. 240.

52. Bin Laden's emphasis on defeating America before overthrowing apostate Islamic states represents a significant switch in philosophy and strategy from that of previous Islamic militant groups. See *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, pp. 170-177.

53. Normally al-Qa'ida's networking receives the lion's share of the analytical attention, but it is perhaps even more important that the group is one of only two multiethnic militant movements formed since 1968. (The other is Aum Shinrikyo, another religiously based organization that employs terror in pursuit of its policy objectives.) This open door policy enables al-Qa'ida to mobilize disaffected Muslims worldwide. Gunaratna, p. 87.

54. Steven Metz first suggested the concept of a "spiritual insurgency." Metz posited that an insurgency's ideology, goals and strategy are less important than its psychological motivation in terms of understanding its character. To that end, he coined both "spiritual" and "criminal" as categories of insurgency worthy of further study. See Steven Metz, *The Future of Insurgency*, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1993, p. 9.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ANDREW J. CERNICKY, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force, is a command pilot and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. He currently serves as Chief, Plans Support Division, Strike Analysis Branch, United States Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. He has served in a variety of command, operational and support positions over the past 19 years. Most recently, Colonel Cernicky commanded the 394th Combat Training Squadron at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. He has flown combat missions in the B-52G during Operation DESERT STORM and in the B-2 during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Colonel Cernicky holds masters degrees of Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; and Business Administration from Louisiana Tech University.

JIM COONEY is a 1989 Graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy after which he entered the U.S. Navy Supply Corps. His sea tours include Division Officer tours aboard the USS *Denver* (LPD-9) and USS *Ranger* (CV-61), and a Department Head tour aboard USS *Dubuque* (LPD-8). Commander Cooney has been stationed in San Diego, California; Rota, Spain; Sasebo, Japan; and Naples, Italy. He holds a Bachelors degree in History from the U.S. Naval Academy and a Masters Degree in Petroleum Management from the University of Kansas. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005.

DAVE GERARD is an infantryman and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. Over the past 2 decades, he has served in a variety of command and staff positions in light, mechanized, airborne, and ranger units, participating in deployments to Haiti, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. Most recently, Lieutenant Colonel Gerard served as commander of 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, deploying to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. He is currently assigned as the Joint Training Policy Branch Chief in the Joint Training Directorate, J7, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SAMUEL LEE HENRY, a lieutenant colonel in the Texas Army National Guard, is an infantry officer and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS over the past 22 years. He commanded 2nd Battalion, 142nd

Infantry, 36th Infantry Division in Lubbock, Texas, and most recently served as the Technology Team Chief for the U.S. Army's Improvised Explosive Device Task Force at the Pentagon. He currently serves on the 36th Infantry Division staff deployed to the Balkans in support of KFOR. Lieutenant Colonel Henry holds a master's degree of Business Administration from Touro University, Cypress, California.

JOHN J. HICKEY, JR., a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, is an information operations officer and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS, Europe, and Asia over the past 20 years. Lieutenant Colonel Hickey also served as the Chief Information Officer Joint Spectrum Center, Annapolis, Maryland. He currently serves as Chief Engineer, Defense Information Systems Agency, Falls Church, Virginia. Lieutenant Colonel Hickey holds a masters degree in Business Administration from Jacksonville State University and an undergraduate degree in Corporate Finance from the University of Alabama.

BJARNE M. IVERSON is a U.S. Army engineer lieutenant colonel and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. He also serves as a Middle East Foreign Area Officer. Over the past 21 years, he has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Germany, and the Middle East. Prior to attending the U.S. Army War College, he commanded the 70th Engineer Battalion (Combat), 1st Armored Division, in Baghdad, Iraq, and then served as the political-military advisor to the Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-Seven, from April 2003 to July 2004. Lieutenant Colonel Iverson currently serves as the Chief of Staff, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in Baghdad. He is a veteran of Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. Lieutenant Colonel Iverson is a graduate of George Mason University and holds master's degrees in Middle Eastern studies from Princeton University and strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College.

GREGORY C. KRAAK, a colonel in the U.S. Army, is a field artillery officer and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS and Europe over the past 23 years. Colonel Kraak commanded 6th Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery (MLRS) in III Corps Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and most recently served as the Chief, Future Force Integration at the

Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill. He currently serves as Chief of the Field Artillery Center's Fires Strategy and Policy Group, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Colonel Kraak holds master's degrees in National Security and Strategic Studies from both the United States Army and Naval War College, as well as a Master in Business Administration from Syracuse University.

PIERRE E. MASSAR, a lieutenant colonel in the California Army National Guard, is an ordnance officer and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS and Europe over the past 20 years. Lieutenant Colonel Massar commanded the 540th Main Support Battalion, 40th Infantry Division at Bell, California. He will be serving as the Operations Officer, 40th Corps Support Group, Long Beach, California. Lieutenant Colonel Massar holds a master's degree in Business Administration from The College of William and Mary.

TODD A. MEGILL, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, is a Military Intelligence Officer and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS, Korea, and Europe over the past 21 years. He commanded the 104th Military Intelligence Battalion/4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, and in Iraq during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, and most recently served as the G2, 4th Infantry Division and Task Force Ironhorse while in Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel Megill currently serves as Director, Intelligence Plans and Special Projects, G8 United States Army, The Pentagon, Washington, DC. Lieutenant Colonel Megill holds master's degrees in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College; Defense Intelligence Agency; and in Military Arts and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

MARK MILLS, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, is a field artillery officer and was a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. He has served in a variety of command, staff and foreign area officer positions in CONUS and Europe over the past 22 years, to include command of the 4th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He currently serves as Director, Fire Support Evaluation Directorate at the Army's Evaluation Center in Alexandria, Virginia. Lieutenant Colonel Mills holds a master's degree in Political Science

from the University of Kansas and in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

MICHAEL F. MORRIS, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps, is an artillery officer and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS and abroad over the past 20 years. Most recently, Lieutenant Colonel Morris served as the Inspector-Instructor for Third Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (3d ANGLICO) and as a planner for 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in Operation *Iraqi Freedom I*. He currently serves as a Faculty Advisor at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia. A 1985 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Lieutenant Colonel Morris holds Master's Degrees from American Military University (Unconventional Warfare), Marine Corps University (Military Science), and the U.S. Army War College (Strategic Studies).

WILLIAMSON MURRAY is currently professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University. He has served as the Harold Johnson Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Murray is also the author and editor of a number of major works, the most recent of which is *A War to Be Won, Fighting the Second World War*, published by Harvard University Press.

JAMES D. SHUMWAY is a colonel in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. Over the past 23 years, he served in various command and staff positions in Europe and the United States to include command of the 20th Engineer Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas, from 2000-2002. Most recently, Colonel Shumway served as a strategic planner in the Army Initiatives Group, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7. He currently serves as Commander, Engineer Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Giessen, Germany. Colonel Shumway holds a masters degree in Civil Engineering-Construction Management from the Pennsylvania State University.

KEN TOVO, a colonel in the U.S. Army, is a Special Forces officer and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States and Europe

over the past 22 years. Colonel Tovo commanded the 3d Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and most recently served as a planner in the J-35, United States Special Operations Command. He currently serves as Commander, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Colonel Tovo holds master's degrees in Military Arts and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, and National Strategy and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.