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MUTUAL MISPERCEPTIONS: THE ACADEMIC AND THE SOLDIER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA



by

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(What are the mutual misperceptions held by the American academic and military professions? How might these misperceptions be dispelled?)



Our American society is a composite of many groups and subgroups. That society is in the midst of a dramatic re-evaluation and of change. Within this context of change, it is perhaps the academic and military "communities" which most distrust and misunderstand each other. Each seems to be convinced that it is the true guardian of American democracy as it was intended to be, and that the other is both the epitome of all that is wrong with our society and the chief enemy of our way of life. This is, of course, an intentional overstatement. But it contains enough resemblance to the perceptions each holds of the other to be worth examining further.

Actually, along with a number of deep philosophical differences, the two communities have many characteristics in common. Therefore, this mutual and deeply

rooted lack of understanding is doubly disturbing, and American democracy can only lose thereby. The purpose of this article is to identify some of the similarities and differences of the two communities, to point out the areas of their interdependence, and to emphasize the dependence of our society on both. It is limited to the misperceptions one profession holds of the other, and how they might be dispelled through mutual trust and understanding.

The "academic" and the "soldier" mean many things to many people. Therefore, it seems appropriate at this point to define these terms as they will be used here. The *academic* is considered to be a duly appointed member of the faculty of a recognized American college or university, a member of the "academic profession." Because of the nature of this paper most of the remarks will be directed to the "arts and sciences" segment of the academic profession and not to that portion associated with business or "professional" schools. The word *soldier* includes the career commissioned officer corps of the nation's armed forces in the same sense that it has been used by Professors Janowitz and Huntington. In other words, the "soldier" we are talking about is a member of the "military profession."


In discussing these two groups, one must guard against seeing them as monoliths which can be dealt with as homogeneous entities. Unhappily, such a misperception does appear to be held by the more radical and least informed elements in both professions. In actual fact, each of the professions consists of a somewhat heterogeneous assortment of human beings.¹

HISTORY


It is generally accepted that the academic

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and the soldier share a strong mutual antipathy. This attitude is deeply rooted in American history. Furthermore, neither the academic nor the military communities have been consistently held in especially high esteem by the nation as a whole. That this esteem has tended to be cyclic is exemplified, for example, by the wartime (World War II) popularity of the military profession, and the post-Sputnik popularity of the academic profession.

The cultural underpinnings for many of the mutual problems of the American academic and military professions are often typified in our literature by Western books or movies which include an academic and a soldier in their cast of characters. The academic is usually depicted as a school teacher who goes by the title of "professor" (it must be a man in this scenario), who is quiet and intelligent but apparently unmanly. The soldier, on the other hand, is frequently a military professional commanding the nearby fort who is shown as a manly but not too intelligent graduate of the United States Military Academy. In all probability, both have an alcohol problem induced by some dark page in their past and neither is inclined to be too "chummy" with the other. As a matter of fact, if left to their own devices they would, collectively or individually, bring great tragedy upon the frontier community.

The hero is a rugged individual clad in buckskin who somehow compensates for the shortcomings of both academic and soldier and saves the day. The soldier and the scholar are tolerated by the frontier community because of the service they provide, but the buckskin-clad hero and his friends can hardly accept them as full members of the human race. This stereotype of the soldier and the scholar has not disappeared totally from our national thinking.

SIMILARITIES

It was suggested earlier that the academic and military professions share a number of characteristics. Perhaps the most pronounced is a feeling of alienation from American society as a whole. One is struck by the fact

that, with the change of only a few words, long passages from Hofstadter's *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* would depict clearly the military professional's perception of his place in American society. The "nobody loves us" syndrome is undoubtedly shared by the two professions.²

The significant point is, however, not whether the professions are "unloved" or which ranks above the other but rather why the members are alienated from society. In both cases there may well be a self-imposed alienation. In the case of the academic, Shils has suggested that, "for the most part American scholarly and literary intellectuals lived in a world they never made and for which they took no responsibility."³ Another points out that some members of the intellectual community feel their alienation from society to be "an inevitable consequence of the character of their work and the social environment in which they live."⁴ The military professional, on the other hand, would probably be somewhat appalled by the first reason, because the acceptance of responsibility is allegedly part of his ethic. After additional thought, however, he would most likely concede that he too often denies any responsibility for American society except as its defender.

Prior to World War II, the American military professional normally did not vote because to do so was generally considered alien to the military ethic. Additionally, it was often impossible because today's elaborate machinery for absentee registration and voting was nonexistent. There are still some soldiers who do not vote because they feel it is professionally improper to do so. To many contemporary military professionals such self-imposed alienation from society has no more justification than does the self-imposed alienation of the academic. It must be emphasized that this sort of alienation is not typical of either profession. The argument that the "character of their work" alienates both professions from society as a whole seems to be more meaningful; however, it can hardly serve as a justification for professional hibernation.

Another characteristic shared by both

professions is something of an extension of the "separation from the mainstream" of American society mentioned above: it is a preference for community living. Outward manifestations of efforts to perpetuate the very isolation about which both professions are prone to complain are the cooperative shopping facilities, book stores, student unions, and faculty clubs on the campuses; and the commissaries, post exchanges, service clubs, and officers' messes on military posts. This comparison could be carried to great lengths, but it seems clear that both professions are possessed of something of a "reservation" or "total institution" instinct which tends to turn them inward at the same time they complain of being isolated from society.

Both professions are dominated by a recognizable hierarchical structure. In the academic profession this structure is almost completely decentralized and hence more meaningful on any given campus. In the military profession, with its centralized authority, the structure is more universal, more institutionalized, more meaningful, and less subtle than in the academic world. In both cases there is a set of standards of a technical and ethical nature to which the members of the profession are expected to conform. Broadly speaking, in the military profession, many of these standards are stated in published regulations and noncompliance can lead to legal or extralegal sanctions, including condemnation by peers. In the academic profession, transgression of an accepted norm is punished primarily by the condemnation of peers or other extralegal sanctions.

In any case the rules are there and success depends on staying within the accepted parameters. For practical purposes, it is the rank structure in both professions which makes the system work. The young scholar who wishes to pursue an academic career knows that he must satisfy his department chairman or other immediate authority if he is to succeed on a given campus. At the same time, if he is to establish a "scholarly" reputation, he must be concerned with the opinion of his professional colleagues on

other campuses. The young military officer knows equally well that he must satisfy his immediate superior if his career is to be a success, but early in his career he is normally less concerned with horizontal recognition.

Whichever form it takes, recognition is equally important to the academic and the soldier. The means by which the aspiring professionals within each group go about gaining the recognition of their peers and seniors varies, of course, in detail but conceptually it is quite similar. In the military profession most young officers gain recognition and acceptance by performing their assigned duties in the best possible manner within the parameters established by accepted attitudes, doctrinal concepts, and professional philosophies. In exchange they are rewarded by high fitness reports, based on closest possible observation, which become part of the officer's official record. In addition the officer may receive special letters of commendation and citations or medals for merit or gallantry. He may, of course, also receive letters of reprimand or uncomplimentary fitness reports. In combination, all these documents constitute the officer's "file" and, together with other less tangible measurements, establish his professional reputation.

The source of a new officer's commission may also have a bearing on the question of professional recognition. A graduate of one of the service academies normally starts his career from a more advantageous position than does an officer commissioned from other sources. Though the service academy is the "prestige" source of a commission, with few exceptions performance over the years determines a professional's career success.

The aspiring academic professional uses somewhat different techniques to gain professional recognition. It is difficult to pinpoint how his teaching ability is judged as direct "observation" seems nonexistent. Numbers of students who register for a course, pass/fail statistics, student evaluations, and other rather impersonal means may be the only units of measurement, if indeed there are any measurements at all. Academic recognition seems to come primarily from

research and writing. It is essential for the aspiring academic to write and publish and he will tend to seek out those positions in the academic community which permit him to emphasize research and writing over teaching. The more the young scholar publishes, the more likely he is to find employment on a prestigious campus.

The source of the young scholar's doctorate apparently serves much the same function as the source of the officer's commission. A recent study which evaluated the relative prestige of doctoral origin and scholarly performance in the selection for a position found that "among younger faculty, prestige of doctorate is used as a predictor of future performance by those who are responsible for faculty recruitment."⁵ Like the service academy commission, the prestige doctorate gives the young professional an advantageous position from which to launch his career. While in both professions it is performance over the years which determines professional success, it is recognized that once an academic professional has tenure his performance no longer matters in quite the same way, while in the military profession the "up or out" concept applies throughout a career.

The professional soldier is also encouraged to write for publication. His motivation is, however, quite different and his analysis will normally involve professional military matters rather than American society or public policy. The soldier usually writes in military professional journals which serve as a vehicle for him to bring his ideas to the attention of his peers and his seniors far up the chain of command outside normal channels. But, while encouraged, research, writing, and publication are not the primary route to success in the military profession.

Thus, the two professions place a different emphasis on "doing" and "thinking." In the military profession, success comes to the "doer," or the commander or staff officer who performs those essentially military functions which require technical military expertise. The academic professional, on the other hand, must seek recognition as a "thinker" if he is to succeed in his profession.

The purpose of this brief review of basic similarities is to discourage mutual fingerpointing and recrimination and to enhance mutual understanding between the academic and military professions. It is recognized fully that the similarities suggested above are somewhat superficial when compared with the profound philosophical differences which exist.

PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES

In the broadest sense, and realizing that the use of words like "liberal" and "conservative" is very imprecise, it can be said that many military professionals tend to lean more in the conservative direction while many of today's academic professionals lean toward the liberal side. Whether philosophical orientation points an individual toward one of the professions or whether professional association leads to a particular political philosophy is not completely clear. A politically ultraconservative youth would, in all probability, not be attracted to the academic profession, especially the humanities or the social sciences. It is equally likely that a politically ultraliberal youth would shy away from a military career. Aside from these extremes, however, there are many other factors which point one to or from either of the professions, with the individual likely to embrace the dominant professional ethic after he becomes a part of the community. Many members of both professions also tend to see themselves as the true "realists" who alone have the requisite insights to view the world as it really is.

It is in fact much more enlightening to examine the stance each profession takes in relation to the politics of the country. The academic feels he is a critic of contemporary society, including its political system and public policy, while the soldier sees himself as the defender of that society. This is not to say that most soldiers necessarily see themselves as defenders of the status quo; they are not opposed to change but they believe it must come about in an orderly manner. Soldiers constantly have in the back of their minds their basic mission of national defense.

Concepts such as unilateral disarmament or internal civic violence in pursuit of even the most valid social goal are, therefore, seen by many soldiers as detracting from the national security. They are worried about them for that reason.

The military professional takes an oath to "...defend the constitution of the United States..." That Constitution provides for the election of a President and makes the President the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Most soldiers have no difficulty accepting the fact that the Commander-in-Chief may be of a different political party or orientation from their own. The soldier's personal political philosophy is subordinated to the system. It follows that the military professional does not and cannot see himself as the critic of public policy as manifested by a given administration, and he is not, and cannot be, the nation's foreign policy conscience because that policy too changes with administrations.

The American military profession is normally considered a part of the national decisionmaking process and the individual military professional can, through his professional association, identify himself as something of an "insider" even if he personally did not participate directly in policy formulation. Perhaps this reinforces the military ethic of subordinating personal views to "policy." Although individual academic professionals occasionally step outside their profession to become "insiders," the profession as a whole, unlike the military profession, is "outside" the normal decisionmaking process. Most academics tend to see themselves as perennial "outsiders" and consequently have few inhibitions about criticizing the administration in power.

While most soldiers can, despite their personal political philosophies, bring themselves to live with either liberal or conservative administrations, so long as the administration is constitutional, many academics find this more difficult to do. They would see this tolerance of a contrary political philosophy in Washington as intellectually dishonest and in violation of their professional ethic, while most soldiers

would see their own public criticism of it as equally inappropriate.

A parting thought on the differences between the two professions concerns the fundamental purposes for which they exist. Clearly, the *raison d'etre* of the military profession is to protect the United States and therefore to "fight" if called upon to do so. Professor Lasswell's observation that the role of the military profession is the "management of violence" is perfectly valid. Every professional officer understands that after all the rhetoric is stripped away, his function within the profession has meaning only if it increases the ability of the profession to fight.

Most military professionals agree that the existence of a competent military profession should deter international activity leading to violence. This has not proven to be completely true in the past and the thoughtful soldier knows that he is expected to be adequately sophisticated intelligently to "manage" violence so as to keep it within bounds. He also knows that he has not always been successful at this.

It is more difficult to identify a universally accepted purpose for the academic profession. One writer has defined it as:

... the pursuit of truth and learning is the central value of the university. This value unites the university's *primary functional purpose of providing education* with the supporting purposes of generating knowledge, serving the community, and preserving our cultural heritage.⁷

(Emphasis added)

This observation suggests that the teaching function is primary but it is not at all clear that the profession as a whole agrees. Some academics would argue that "generating knowledge" is primary, while others would prefer either of the two "supporting purposes" referred to above.

To argue that the central value of the academic profession is the pursuit of truth and learning, equates roughly to saying the central value of the military profession is to provide for the national security. Few

professionals of either group would disagree with these somewhat abstract purposes. Taking the thinking one step further, however, uncovers a difference. To a man, military professionals agree that they see to the national security by being prepared to fight—to manage violence. Most academic professionals, on the other hand, are not in agreement as how best to achieve their purpose.

INSTANCES OF ACADEMIC-MILITARY PARTNERSHIP

There have been times when the academic profession's alienation from government has been circumvented and a mass transfer of scholars from the nation's campuses to Washington has taken place. The two most dramatic examples of mass transfers may be found in the Franklin Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy administrations.

In the 1930s, academic professionals felt wanted and needed, and many found in the New Deal philosophical tenets to which they could relate. Some military professionals also found themselves associated with the New Deal, not necessarily because they agreed or disagreed with it philosophically or because they felt wanted, but because the Commander-in-Chief directed their participation. Generally, professional soldiers saw that participation as a distortion of their basic mission and a dangerous dilution of their ability to perform that mission.

With the coming of World War II many American academic professionals again entered into a close association with the government and developed lasting ties with the nation's political and military elite.⁶ It was a popular war, as wars go. Scholars, especially those in the natural sciences, developed the weapons, and the soldiers employed them. Together they fought and won the war. In that war, academicians had little influence on the actual conduct of military operations and in fact expressed little concern over the now sometimes challenged concept of "unconditional surrender" or "mass destruction weapons." This is an important distinction because of what was to

happen in the 1960s. Following the war many academics who had joined the government returned to the campuses. Many, however, elected to retain an active relationship with the government, whether in the Department of Defense or elsewhere.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, possibly a delayed reaction to World War II coupled with over a decade of cold war, the academic community began to show a deep interest in military affairs as a significant, if not necessarily welcome, part of the American scene. This interest is illustrated by the publication of *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History*, by historian Walter Millis in 1957; *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington in 1957; and *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, by sociologist Morris Janowitz in 1960.

These "military sociologists" concerned themselves primarily with the American military profession as a part of society. At about the same time an academic interest by "strategic analysts" in military matters also manifested itself in such publications as *Military Policy and National Security*, by William W. Kauffman in 1956; *Strategy in the Missile Age*, by Bernard Brodie in 1959; *The Necessity for Choice*, by Henry Kissinger in 1960; and *Strategy and Arms Control*, by Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin in 1961. This is by no means a complete listing of the important works of the time but an illustrative identification of the type of work being done.

Over the years, beginning primarily with World War II, military professionals found themselves more and more involved in the formulation as well as the implementation of military and foreign policies. By the early 1960s, during the Kennedy Administration, academic and military professionals found themselves in an even more active partnership. The intellectual in the Pentagon was exemplified in the "systems analyst," and his counterpart in the White House and the Department of State was the "political scientist."

The decade of the 1960s, which commenced with more promise of success than any in recent years, turned out to be one of the most disastrous in our history. What went wrong? How could this happen with some of the best minds of the academic profession, and the best educated and most sophisticated of the military profession in our history making and implementing policy? Primarily, Vietnam went wrong. Much has been written about Vietnam and much more is to come. This article will not provide still another review of that unhappy situation. The effect of Vietnam on the academic and military professions is, however, relevant here.

By a combination of what is increasingly being perceived as some ill-conceived policies on the part of the academics, turned policymakers, and some poorly-implemented actions on the part of the soldiers, it turned sour. What should have been, by any standard, a brilliant example of "the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem," turned out to be something quite different. This was not a campus experiment which could be called off or redirected at will. It was a deep national involvement which defied rational explanation or solution. The effect it has already had on American society is well known. What had come to be a reasonably smooth working academic-military partnership, albeit a somewhat strained one, began to come apart at the proverbial seams as the nation moved even deeper into the morass of Vietnam.

Meanwhile, "back on the campus" many academic professionals entered into an impassioned debate over whether the United States should ever have become involved in Vietnam. Military professionals took note of this debate briefly and many suggested that it was interesting but, at the moment, quite irrelevant because the nation in general, and the soldier in particular, were in fact deeply involved and the real question should have been--What do we do now?

For the answer to that question many soldiers looked to the academic, turned policymaker, in Washington. Although the view may have been distorted by emotionally

clouded vision, what was perceived was something of a continuing exodus from that city by the academic hurrying back to his campus to write a book to explain away his responsibility for the involvement. To most soldiers this was inexcusable. Some were inclined to feel that the "Cambridge Professors" had involved the nation in a war and then placed unprecedented restraints on its conduct. Then, as many professional soldiers came to see it, when the going became difficult and the war became unpopular, the scholars "deserted" the administration and the military professional was left with a nasty mess to clean up.

There is a growing perception on the part of many military professionals that they are the victims of poor civilian policies. This is a most unfortunate perception in that at best it can provide a convenient scapegoat for some military professional shortcomings and will tend to encourage further alienation of the profession from American society. As a result, the soldier's opinion of the academic, which had become considerably more favorable over the years, has suffered a significant setback. Certainly, this adverse perception of his academic colleagues by the military professional is not universal. But a strong case can be made that it is the dominant view.

The Vietnam adventure also seriously strained any respect the academic professional may have had for his military associate. Many knowledgeable scholars pose legitimate questions concerning overall governmental policy in Vietnam, but they also question the conduct of the war by the soldier. They question the strategy of attrition and ask why it was not until mid-1968 that anything resembling a comprehensive pacification program evolved. They are on firm ground in asking why, if "Vietnamization" is a truly positive approach to finishing the task, it was not seriously undertaken until 1969. They question the misleading reports from the field and speak of the credibility gap. They will always wonder how the Tet offensive of 1968 could have been launched.

Shortly before he became a full time policymaker, Henry Kissinger criticized the military strategy as being essentially irrelevant

to the problem at hand. He argued that: "By opting for military victory through attrition, the American strategy produced what came to be the characteristic feature of the Vietnamese war: military success that could not be translated into permanent political advantage."⁷

The academic profession in general has considerably less respect for the American military profession now than it had before 1965. As with the soldier's perception of the intellectual outlined above, this view is not fully shared by all members of the academic profession but it is certainly widely held.

As a result of the war in Vietnam the prestige of both the American academic and military professions has fallen in the eyes of the other and in the eyes of the nation as a whole. The military profession has lost prestige by association with the policies which have become so unpopular in the United States and as a result of its conduct of an unpopular war. The academic profession has lost prestige, not so much because of association with the policies a very few of its members developed, but as a result of the campus unrest of recent years. Regardless of how it came about, a nation which has lost faith in its own academic and military professions has been ill served by both.

WHERE WE STAND

Nevertheless, there is still a broad area of mutual interdependence and cooperation between the academic and military professions. On a day-to-day basis, the military profession relies on the academic profession much more than the other way around. On a highly abstract level, the service the academic community receives from the military profession is national security and the maintenance of an environment in which academic affairs can be pursued freely.

Some academics find it hard to agree that it is the strength of the United States Government, as manifested in part by its military posture, which maintains the essential environment of intellectual freedom which permits criticism of the government. There is no doubt that most professional

soldiers, perhaps in their "simplistic" way, see this as their contribution and that they at times become impatient when they are vilified and condemned by those they think they are serving.

The military profession calls upon the academic community to provide many of its young officers. Even though the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) has been the subject of much anti-military activity throughout the country it continues to serve as a very important source of officers for the military profession. In the view of many military men, the true value of ROTC is qualitative rather than quantitative. It brings into the armed forces a diversity of socio-economic backgrounds and philosophical orientations which produces a leavening effect in the officer corps.

The anti-ROTC activity on the nation's campuses has driven deeper the wedge of mistrust between the academic and military professions. Many professional soldiers tend to see the academic community as responsible for the closing of some ROTC units in response to pressure from campus radicals. There is some truth in this. Many members of the academic profession seem to agree that academe has a responsibility to assist the military profession in the education of potential officers. They feel, however, that the military profession had failed to maintain an acceptable academic standard in ROTC programs and that it had been reluctant to take corrective action. When pressures were brought to bear to discontinue ROTC, its academic defenders (and there were many) had little basis for argument. They would argue that it was military intransigence, not academic anti-ROTC sympathy, which is to blame. There is some truth in this also.

The unfortunate fact seems to be that mutual distrust and lack of meaningful dialogue brought about the termination of a number of ROTC units at many of the nation's most prestigious universities. Many campuses, without a doubt, overreacted to radical pressures and many military professionals clearly overreacted to legitimate requests from the campuses to upgrade the programs.

The remaining area to be discussed is the dependence of the military profession on the academic community for scholarly analysis of the profession and for critical development of strategic concepts. It was suggested earlier that academic interest in the military profession on the socioeconomic level developed toward the end of the 1950s. At about the same time an academic interest in the field of strategy developed, the politico-military level also developed. Interest in both areas served to stimulate national concern for military affairs and, among other things, caused the military profession to do some serious soul-searching. This academic interest in military matters also caused the military profession to take academe ever more seriously.

In more recent years academic interest in military affairs seems to have waned. The reasons for this are not clear, but three broad suggestions follow. One reason may be that serious scholars feel the subject has been intellectually exhausted. A second reason might be the strong negative reaction to the Vietnam War on the campuses and elsewhere in the nation. National security is not a popular subject at best and any emphasis on military matters now would run counter to contemporary trends. The third suggested reason is that many academics had a hand in military affairs to an unprecedented degree, to include many of the details of implementation of policy in Vietnam. Some of those who became "doers" in Washington may feel that they have had their fingers burned and therefore tend to shy away from it all. Some indefinable balance between the first and second reasons is most likely the best answer.

In reviewing Michael Howard's "Studies in War and Peace" in *The New Republic*, Reed Whitmore commented on this phenomenon in part. He said:

In the late forties it was morally and intellectually respectable among my friends--graduate students, writers and young teachers-- . . . to talk strategy and tactics, to recognize the role of war and the military life in human affairs. . . .

He then continued:

The climate of opinion has now changed so drastically among young intellectuals that I am reminded of the wipe-outs that occurred regularly in the society of Orwell's 1984. . . .

For most young intellectuals now the mode of thought displayed by Michael Howard [that there is wisdom to be gained by scholarly study of things military]. . . is sure to be out of bounds. . . . The wipe-out process is profoundly anti-intellectual and illiberal, just as in Orwell; it has no place in the life of a free mind.⁸

Within the academic profession some are delighted to see the profession show less interest in the "nefarious military." Within the military profession there are some who are equally delighted to see this trend away from what they perceive as blind interference in military matters. There are many in both professions who are, however, deeply concerned lest academic disinterest in military affairs have a negative influence on the nation as a whole. If the campuses take no interest in military affairs the military profession will look more to its associated "think tanks" or its own officers for conceptual thinking. The end result will be that the academic profession will have less influence on military policy.

The generations which will produce the flag and general officers of tomorrow have pursued more formal education at civilian institutions than their predecessors, and have been more influenced by the American academic community than any before. Where are the succeeding generations of scholars interested in national security affairs to be found? Where are the successors to Millis, Huntington, Janowitz, Schelling, Brodie, Kauffman and Kissinger? Are the young scholars to be frightened away from this vital study of military affairs because it is no longer popular in academe and is no longer the sure way to achieve academic rank and recognition? If this is true, the academic profession has negated its right to be taken

seriously by the military profession and the nation in its criticism of national security affairs in general, and military affairs in particular.

The following broad hypothesis is suggested as the contemporary academic-military alignment. Within the academic profession the older members have more understanding of the military profession, including its strengths and weaknesses and its relationship with academe, than do the younger scholars. This can be attributed to the academic-military partnership established in and continuing from World War II into the early 1960s and to the negative reaction to Vietnam.

In the military profession, the most senior officers tend to have less understanding of academe, including its strengths and weaknesses, than do the more junior officers. This can be attributed in part to reluctant acceptance by many military officers of the academic partnership years ago and by their reaction to some harsh treatment, as they perceived it, by the "whiz kids" and other young intellectuals in government in the early 1960s. The much greater exposure of many younger officers to the academic community makes them less critical and more receptive.

What may be developing then is a situation in which the academic profession rejects military affairs at the very time that the military profession is intellectually best prepared to work closely with academe. If the academic community does not respond to the need for a scholarly interest in military affairs, the military profession will likely develop its own corps of in-house scholars to substitute for, rather than work with, the academic community. This is a somewhat frightening prospect and it should be carefully examined by the academic and the military professions.

It will be interesting to see how the mutual misperceptions discussed above may be affected by the recent revelations in the "Pentagon Papers." One could posit that there is adequate material in the "papers" to support almost any preconceived prejudice and that in the final analysis there will be little effect. Time will tell.

CONCLUSIONS

The introductory paragraphs emphasized the concern of this article with the American academic and military professions' perceptions of one another. Some of the perceptions discussed above are closer to the truth than others, but inter-professional relationships are built on perception, not necessarily truth. In today's complex domestic and international environment the nation cannot, for whatever reason, afford to have its academic and military professions on nonspeaking terms. There are "radical" elements in both professions who could not possibly find anything in common. They must be recognized by both as atypical.

Members of both professions must understand enough about the other to counter often emotionally generated negativism. A reasonable place to begin, and it is a shallow beginning at best, is to understand the basic similarities and differences. Both can then at least understand why the other thinks as he does. For example, I doubt seriously if the military profession as a whole understands the intellectual's perception of his role as a critic of society, and I doubt equally seriously if the intellectual community really understands why it is difficult for the soldier to criticize in a similar way. It is important for the academic to understand why the soldier may feel he was deserted in Vietnam by the academic community.

Understanding the differences does not and should not suggest agreement, but it should provide a basis for discussion. Both professions should have at least a fundamental understanding of the rules in each which lead to rank and recognition. Both must accept the fact that his own profession has many of the same human weaknesses as the other. The human motivation, for example, which drives an aspiring scholar to "publish" is not much different than that which drives the military officer to seek "command." The trend toward less mutual respect between the professions is dangerous. Time will heal some of the wounds but world events move quickly and unlimited time is not necessarily available.

The military tendency to rely more heavily

on the academic profession for the education of its officers is encouraging and a credit to the military profession. The willingness of academe to participate in these programs is equally encouraging and a credit to the academic profession. It is important that the academic community accept its responsibility fully. The apparent trend of the academic profession to move away from the scholarly study of military matters by both the military sociologist and the strategic analyst is disturbing and should be looked at closely.

The United States will be ill-served by a military profession turned "academic" and by an academic profession turned "soldier." On this there should be little disagreement. The nation does, however, need a military profession with the intellectual competence to understand and work with the academic profession, just as it needs an academic profession which maintains a scholarly interest in military affairs so as to provide rational, positive criticism. The separation between the "doer" and the "thinker" is valid and must remain, but the two must converse on a mutually understandable level.

In the final analysis, neither profession should rest content to permit the other to hold a monopoly in so vital an area as the

conceptual thinking pertaining to the security of our nation.

FOOTNOTES

1. For sociological studies on each of the professions see Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958) and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

2. Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969).

3. Edward Shils, "Intellectuals in America," *Survey*, Autumn, 1970, p. 5.


4. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 310.

5. Diana Crane, "The Academic Marketplace Revisited: A Study of Faculty Mobility Using the Cartler Ratings," *American Journal of Sociology*, May 1970, p. 953.

6. The University on Governance, "The Nature and Purposes of the University" (A Discussion Memorandum). Interim Report, Cambridge, Mass., January 1971, p. 3.

7. Henry Kissinger, "The Vietnam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1961, p. 212.

8. Reed Whitmore, "Wisdom and the Military," *The New Republic*, January 30, 1971, p. 25.



US ARMY

US Army War College students at work in the War College Library.