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A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change

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A NATION AT WAR IN AN ERA OF STRATEGIC CHANGE

Williamson Murray
Editor

September 2004

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FOREWORD

The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Army's Chief of Staff have all stated that the United States is a "Nation at War." This fundamental fact is key to what we do at the U.S. Army War College. Because of our continued emphasis on the Global War on Terrorism, we face significant strategic challenges as we continue to transform the force, improve interagency integration into joint operations, and, all the while, engage in active combat operations.

This collection of outstanding essays—three of which won prestigious writing awards—by the students enrolled in the Army War College Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) highlights some of these strategic challenges and offers thoughtful solutions. The authors provide insights that undoubtedly will prove useful to decisionmakers at the highest levels of our national security establishment. Our ASAP graduates continue to make their mark as outstanding theater strategists in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Army Staff, and in the Combatant Commands.

DAVID H. HUNTOON, JR.
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant

CHAPTER 1

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

Dr. Williamson Murray

INTRODUCTION

It is a pleasure to once again have the opportunity to write an introductory essay for the collection of essays written by the students of the U.S. Army War College's Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP). This year's students, as their essays suggest, more than lived up to the standards of their predecessors in the program. Last year, two of the essays won prizes at the U.S. Army War College's Graduation. This year, *three* students received writing and research awards at the college's graduation ceremonies. Commander Steven W. Knott's essay on the importance of intellectual effort in transformation received the second place award in the Chairman's essay contest, while Lieutenant Colonel John D. Nelson's essay on the problems in transitioning from combat operations to stabilization operations won the AUSA's Land Warfare Award. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Riddle's examination of the implications of the Electromagnetic Pulse Threat to Homeland Security won the Armed Forces Communications-Electronics Association award.

Not surprisingly, a number of this year's essays address the problems of transition operations after conventional military victory. This is a problem that will confront the American military for the remainder of the 21st century. The concerns of the students in the Advanced Strategic Arts Program thus reflect the realities that they and their fellow officers in Iraq already confront. There is, and will be, no easy route to political and strategic success in the conflicts that America will confront over coming decades.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IRAQ WAR

There have been a number of observers within and outside the Services who have suggested that the American military has

little to learn from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, since the Iraqi military, as in the Gulf War, for the most part put up such a poor showing. Nothing could be more dangerous in the years ahead. Whatever the weaknesses of the Iraqi Army, military operations in this war suggested a number of issues that the services and the joint world need to address. If these weaknesses showed up during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, there is every reason to believe that more effective and adaptive enemies will be in a position to take advantage of American mistakes in a fashion that will have a direct and painful impact on the lives and well being of young soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen—the life blood of this nation.

What has been particularly encouraging about the reaction of the American military to this conflict has been willingness not only of the Services, but the Joint world as well, to address the whole business of lessons learned in an honest and forthright fashion.¹ The difficulty now confronting the American military is the reality that no conceivable power is going to challenge its power directly. Instead, throughout the world military organizations and others are thinking about asymmetric challenges that could address American military power indirectly. U.S. forces are already seeing the results of such thinking and adaptation in the streets and along the highways of Iraq. Technology alone will not address the challenges of the 21st century, because man is an inventive and adaptive animal to the ever changing conditions and context of his environment.

Above all, the victory over Saddam Hussein's forces underlined that the fundamental nature of war is not going to change, whatever the technological superiority that American forces bring to the battlefield. The technological monism that has molded so much of the debate about transformation and military technological revolutions has quite simply foundered on the realities of the battlefields in Iraq. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that those realities have had an impact on the technophiles, since they have so little interest in history, including even the history of the recent past.

In fact, the head of the Office of Force Transformation has recently argued that the American military can discard the traditional approach of the inductive method of learning from experience (i.e., history and experience) in favor of the deductive method, where one can derive the future from assumptions. In other words, the

Department of Defense (DoD) has supposedly reached a position where it can posit what the future is going to look like without reference to the past and thus determine what capabilities are transformational and which are not.² Interestingly, such an approach flies in the face of everything that historians have uncovered about successful and unsuccessful transformations in the past, where careful analysis of military experience and past history by armies, navies, and air forces was crucial to keeping innovations relevant and effective on future battlefields.³

The conflict also suggests that the American military needs to think in a more holistic fashion about the conduct of war at the operational level. Since war is a political act, the defeating of enemy military forces in combat operations only represents a portion of the far larger mosaic that must include not only the planning stages, but the transition stages from war to peace as well. In fact, as Americans are discovering in Iraq and Afghanistan, the latter may represent as important a component of operational art as the direct battlefield confrontations in securing the political ends for which the United States has waged war. And those political aims are the only conceivable reason that the U.S. military will engage in war.

Americans should not believe that all their opponents in future wars will prove as militarily inept and ineffective as did the Iraqis.⁴ And here lies perhaps the most dangerous lesson of the war. American intelligence provided a clear picture of numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, and divisions that the Iraqis possessed. But in the largest sense, it failed to provide what matters most: an understanding of the enemy as a human, dynamic polity. That failure, of course, was not confined alone to America's intelligence agencies. The general framework of planning and preparation for the war reflected a general ahistoricism and lack of knowledge of the cultural and historical framework within which Iraqi society and Saddam's tyranny were coexisting. Not surprisingly, that failure had a devastating impact on the implementation of the transition from war to stabilization in an explosive and dynamic situation that came with the collapse of the Ba'ath regime.

This introductory chapter then aims to suggest some of the wider and more complex lessons of recent military operations. And those lessons form the only reasonable framework for thinking about what

kinds of military forces the United States will need for both the short term and the long term. There is no easy road for America's military to the future. Yet the signposts are there from the conduct and the fallout of the Iraq War. Americans can delineate those lessons now and adapt their thinking to what the past suggests. Or, they can wait and relearn those lessons in the future, but then only at the cost of the lives of young Americans.

LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFRONT: THE ANCIENT VERITIES MATTERS

Much of what the military operations against Iraq suggest, one can argue, simply boils down to a reaffirmation of the old verities. The "western way of war" first began to emerge with the Greeks, came to full flower under the Romans, and then was rediscovered by the Europeans at the beginning of the 17th century.⁵ Through the centuries it has relied on three basic pillars: discipline, training, and cohesion.⁶ The first has provided the glue that makes tough, realistic preparation possible, while discipline and training have provided the glue that has not only kept soldiers and marines under the trauma of battle, but enabled them to fight as a part of a coherent and effective killing machine.

The historian of the Roman-Jewish War of the first century AD, Flavius Josephus, depicted the interplay of those factors with an economy of words that would do justice to the military forces of 21st century America:⁷

And, indeed, if anyone does but attend to the other parts of their military discipline, he will be forced to confess, that their obtaining so large a dominion hath been the acquisition of their valour, and not the bare gift of fortune: for they do not begin to use their weapons first in time of war, nor do they put their hands in motion, having been idle in times of peace; but as if their weapons were part of themselves, they never have any truce with warlike exercises; nor do they stay [their hands] till times of war admonish them to use them; for their military exercises by no means fall short of the tension of real warfare, but every soldier is every day exercised, and that with real diligence, as if it were in time of war, which is the reason they bear the fatigue of battles so easily; . . . nor would he be mistaken that would call those their exercises unbloody battles, and their battles bloody exercises.⁸

For all the enabling advantages that modern technology provided U.S. forces, the real superiority that U.S. soldiers and marines brought to combat in the Mesopotamian Valley in March and April 2003 had to do with their discipline and training regimen. One can see that discipline etched in the thousands of photographs of soldiers and marines engaged in combat, and yet unless firing their weapons, every one with his index finger on the trigger guard, not on the trigger.⁹ Indeed one might not be going too far in claiming that had the equipment of the two forces been reversed, and the Iraqis possessed the technologically superior equipment, the results would still have been the same: an Iraqi defeat—although admittedly at considerably higher cost to American forces.

The first steps in the recovery of American military forces after the catastrophe of the Vietnam war came not with new technology, but with the restoration of military discipline in the barracks in the 1970s.¹⁰ Only when America's military forces again reflected the norms of discipline could the revolution in training begin. Here the technologies that supported the creation of realistic training ranges at the National Training Center and on the ranges of Nevada and southern California allowed for the creation of training regiments that slowly but surely turned the U.S. military into the deadly tactical forces that have devastated America's opponents in the wars since the ending of the Cold War.

LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: CLAUSEWITZ IS ALIVE AND WELL

One of the sadder aspects of recent military literature has been the minimization of Clausewitz's understanding to the understanding of war in the modern world not only by military pundits, but by military historians as well.¹¹ The anti-Clausewitzian tide in the American military reached fever pitch in the 1990s, with claims about the supposed ability of future technologies that would soon be available to the American military to see everything and understand everything in the battlespace. The foremost exponent of such views was and remains Admiral Bill Owens, former Vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).¹²

Unfortunately for such views the Iraq War suggests that the removal of Clausewitzian concepts such as friction and the fog of war—in other words that uncertainty and ambiguity will always dominate the battlespace—is simply never going to happen in the real world. In fact, everything that modern science is telling us about the nature of the universe has suggested that such views are simply incompatible with reality.¹³ Virtually everything in the planning and preparation, the conduct, and the results of the Iraq War underline that Clausewitz's understanding of the fundamental nature of war is much closer to reality than the technological dreams produced in the last decade, a century and three-quarters after his death.¹⁴

The American military brought the 21st century's technology to the battlefield. But they were never able to escape the reality not only that their enemies were attempting to kill them, but that the physical debilities that accompany intense experiences affected everything that they attempted to do. Danger, fear, and anger all molded the views of those involved in combat—factors that the realities of extreme physical exertion and fatigue only served to exacerbate. As Clausewitz suggests:

In the dreadful presence of suffering and danger, emotion can often overwhelm intellectual conviction, and in this psychological fog it is . . . hard to form clear and complete insights . . . It is the exceptional man who keeps his power of quick decision intact.¹⁵

Extreme physical exertion and fatigue accompanied the dangers of war. There is a recurring theme in the accounts of soldiers and marines: the bone-deep weariness of day-after-day tension during the movement to contact. Fatigue and fear, along with sleep deprivation, hunger, filth, the brutal climate, an alien landscape, and the terrifying sight of the dead and wounded led to mistakes, miscalculations, and accidents. Technology could alleviate some of the suffering of the wounded, but it could do little to mitigate the dismal conditions under which those living on the sharp end must inevitably live.

For those at the higher levels of decisionmaking, the technology of the information age brought in its wake a fire hose that spewed forth data in almost infinitive amounts. However, those technologies

brought in their wake precious little knowledge. In some case technology helped to remove old frictions, such as the difficulties commanders often have in communicating with their subordinates, their superiors, or their colleagues. But at the same time, by providing so much information, technology may have introduced even more uncertainty into the equation. Information did not, as was the case in previous wars, translate into useable knowledge either easily or smoothly. Those in command of coalition forces had to make decisions of life and death under this unprecedented barrage of information that was often ambiguous, uncertain, contradictory, or even wrong.¹⁶

Moreover, senior commanders found themselves bombarded by demands from Washington at hours that were entirely outside their own body rhythms. At best, information technologies allowed commanders to make decisions more quickly, but still in an uncertain and ambiguous universe. There was a real reason why Lieutenant Commander of V Corps General William Wallace and Major General Jim Mattis spent most of their time in forward headquarters where they could gain a direct sense of what was happening on the battlefield. Icons simply do not represent reality—especially in terms of a human endeavor like combat, where psychological factors are, in many cases, the most important.

Like the best generals in World War II, Wallace and Mattis felt that intuition, gained by being immediately in touch with the battlefield, was crucial. The worst contribution that technology could make to the U.S. military would be to recreate the chateau generalship of the First World War, where military leadership remained out of touch with the realities of the battlefield, happily ensconced in the belief that technology could provide both safety and knowledge to those in command.

LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

The Iraq War underlined some significant weaknesses in the whole framework of American intelligence. This is not to say that the United States does not possess some extraordinary intelligence capabilities, or that in some areas intelligence did not contribute

significantly to the triumph of American arms. Situational awareness of where Iraqi units were and what their strength was remained at a high level throughout most of the campaign. As one battalion commander commented after the war, he could not have been better informed about the disposition and capabilities of the units immediately to his front.¹⁷

However, knowledge of physical realities such as the number of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces that the enemy possesses does not equate to perfect knowledge, because it does not tell combat commanders much about the human dimensions of the units that their opponents have put in the field. How will they fight? What is their morale? What is their tactical effectiveness and what is the competence of their leaders? How does the enemy view the coming war? How well does he know and understand how U.S. forces will fight? The battalion commander, quoted above, also commented that, while his understanding of the placement of enemy equipment was outstanding, he possessed virtually no understanding of the cultural and ideological framework within which his Iraqi opponents would fight. Thus, when he reached Baghdad, his unit still possessed nearly all the anti-tank rounds that he had begun the campaign with, but that he was in condition “black” with regards to anti-personnel ammunition—a condition which no one in the division had expected at the beginning of the campaign.¹⁸

In the end, it is not the number of tanks, or armored personnel carriers, or soldiers that matter; it is the soul of a military organization—the morale, training, and cohesion that they bring to the fight—that matter in determining the outcome of war.¹⁹ And little of that is calculable before and often during war. In Tolstoy’s great novel about the French invasion of Russia in 1812, *War and Peace*, the nobleman Pierre comments to Prince Andrei that war is like a game of chess. To which the Prince answers in the affirmative:

[B]ut with the slight difference that in chess you can think over each move as long as you please, unrestricted by conditions of time and with the further difference that the knight is always stronger than a pawn, and two pawns always stronger than one, while in war a battalion is sometimes stronger than a division, and sometimes weaker than a company. No one can ever be certain of the relative strength of

armies. . . . Success [in war] never has and never will depend on position or equipment, or even on numbers . . .²⁰

It is in the area of cultural understanding that considerable failures in intelligence occurred.²¹ The intelligence agencies of the United States did not understand the culture and framework within which not only the Iraqi opponent, but the Iraqi people would operate. This was true at the strategic and political levels as well as at the operational and tactical levels. And that flawed understanding played a major role in the huge problems—many of them self-inflicted—that the Coalition confronted in the transition phase after major combat operations had ended.

History, culture, and language still matter in intelligence. The United States confronts a wholly new strategic and political environment since the ending of the Cold War. That said, neither its intelligence agencies nor its military organizations have adapted to that reality. In the end, intelligence is not just about counting things, but understanding living, adaptive opponents. And in the future, the United States will inevitably confront opponents who are smarter and more adaptive than Saddam's thuggery proved to be.

LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: OPERATIONAL ART

In addition to the traditional human capabilities that played such a key role in the American victory, there was an additional factor: a system of professional military education that produced senior officers deeply knowledgeable in their profession at the operational level of war. The second war against Iraq was by far and away more successful than the first in terms of the operational performance of American military forces. The first war saw an enormous buildup of air, ground, and naval forces. It began with a stunning blow that entirely deconstructed Iraq's air defense system in a matter of hours.²²

But that success was followed by an interminable air campaign that lasted for over a month before the ground campaign began on February 24. While the advance of V Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps in the west were supposed to be coordinated with the Marine advance toward Kuwait City, there was, in fact, no ground component

commander. Thus, there was no coordination between soldiers and marines. Thus, one can hardly speak of a truly joint effort outside of the air campaign under Air Component Commander Lieutenant General Chuck Horner and his planners in the “Black Hole.”

The ground campaign took few risks; III Corps’ advance against a badly beaten and retreating foe proceeded at a snail’s pace, stopping on the initial night after advancing for a few hours. The result was that the great left hook, which was supposed to slam shut on Saddam’s Republican Guard divisions, failed to close fast enough. The Republican Guard divisions escaped through Basra and then played a crucial role in putting down the rebellions that broke out through Iraq, particularly in the Shi’ite and Kurdish areas, and in 1994 almost re-invaded Kuwait at Saddam’s instigation. On the tactical level, American soldiers and marines performed in exemplary fashion, which the action at 73 Easting exemplified.²³ Nevertheless, the campaign at the operational level was less than a singular success, while relations among the generals appear to have been less than impressive.²⁴ As for air-ground jointness, that factor never really received a fair test because the ground campaign was so short, while severe weather conditions prevented air attacks for much of the period.

The performance of soldiers and marines during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was as impressive on the tactical level as it had been during the first conflict against Iraq. What was significantly more impressive about this war was the performance of U.S. forces, both in the joint arena and in the conduct of the operational level of war. It is impossible to separate out the direct contribution made by air and ground forces to the destruction of Iraq’s Army and Republican Guard formations from the overall wreckage of defeat which underlines the full triumph of jointness. Commander of the 101st Airborne Division Major General David Petraeus commented that throughout the war he never knew what service, including his own, was providing the fire power that decimated the Iraqi enemy.²⁵

Equally significant in terms of jointness and combined operations was that there was an overall ground component commander in the second war against the Iraqis. Lieutenant General David McKiernan was the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander, with Major General “Rusty” Blackman, USMC, as his chief of staff. Directly

under McKiernan was V Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General William Wallace, and I MEF, commanded by Lieutenant General James Conway. In addition to its marines, I MEF had under its command the British 1st Armoured Division, which itself was formed from units of the British Army and Royal Marines.

Moreover, during the initial days of the campaign, the British division had under its control the U.S. Marine Corps' 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit.²⁶ What is so impressive about the conduct of operations by the Coalition Land Forces Component Commander was the smoothness with which the individual pieces cooperated in a rapid and devastating articulation of force to achieve the overall effects, which led to the fall of Saddam's tyranny in less than 3 weeks. That performance reflected the educational and intellectual framework that has taken hold in the American military over the past 2 1/2 decades.

Thus, it was the conduct of the campaign that suggests a true masterpiece in joint, combined operational art. Tactical proficiency, technology, and jointness were clearly all significant enablers to the victory, but the articulation of the main drives of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division represented a far more daring and effective utilization of operational art than was the case in the first war against Iraq. One British officer in the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander headquarters commented that watching the 1st Marine Division's use of its three regimental combat teams to slice through the Mesopotamian Valley, entrap significant Iraqi forces, and then drive up to the east of Baghdad was "a thing of beauty."²⁷ The performance of the 3rd Infantry Division was equally impressive in its dash up the western bank of the Euphrates and then through the Karbala Gap, with its drive straight at Baghdad's airport and then the city itself. The result was the complete destruction of Iraq's military forces in less than 3 weeks, all accomplished with minimal U.S. casualties.

In retrospect, the performance of American military forces lived up to the expectations of the military thinkers of the 1980s, who first argued for the study of operational art as the fundamental heart of the military profession. That thinking led to the two greatest doctrinal manuals that the American military has ever produced: the U.S. Army's 1986 edition of Field Manual 100-5 and the Marine

Corps Fleet Marine Field Manual 1, *Warfighting*.²⁸ The extent of that intellectual contribution is suggested by a comparison of their intellectual content and vigor with what passes for doctrine today. In fact, the diminution of intellectual vigor in the doctrinal manuals reflects an unfortunate decline within the services of serious debate and study of the military profession. Undoubtedly, part of the problem has been the increasing operations tempo that has made the services increasingly unwilling to devote their human capital to the intellectual preparation of future warfighters. That decline has also been reflected in professional military education, where the senior leaders of the American military, themselves the product of professional military education, are exhibiting less interest in the education of the next generation than was the case of their predecessors over the past 2 decades.

Thus, for all the impressive nature of the campaign's conduct at the operational level, there were problems with how the American military is, at present, thinking about and preparing for operational art in future campaigns. As one perceptive commentator noted in the late 1990s: "That too little of this debate and discussion still goes on is, perhaps, indicative of the need to continue pressing for further development of the operational art concept in an armed forces once more caught up in a perceived technology-based revolution in military affairs."²⁹ Serious intellectual debate within and outside DoD has almost entirely dried up, to be replaced by power point briefings that are remarkable for their lack of content.

The success at the operational level in the Iraq War rested to a great extent on the intellectual preparation and education of today's senior leaders that took place throughout the 1980s. In other words, the intellectual climate of that time formed the thought processes of those who led the Coalition to victory in the Iraq War of 2003. The question, then, remains: What intellectual framework is forming the mental horizons of the majors who will be leading America's military forces in 15 years? One senior retired four-star Army general has suggested to this author that the state of professional education is as bad as it was in the mid-1970s, when he and a number of other senior army generals attempted to improve the position of education in the Army.

What capital the American military is willing to devote to preparing the horizons of its officers to deal with an increasingly complex world will exercise an enormous influence on the nation's military effectiveness in the coming decades of the 21st century. It is a situation analogous to the television commercials for frequent oil changes in which the car dealer comments: "You can pay me now, or you can pay me later." And the great difficulty is that the results of penny-wise, pound-foolish educational policies will not be clear until well after those who are responsible for such an approach have passed from the scene.

TRANSITION OPERATIONS: TOWARD A WIDER UNDERSTANDING OF OPERATIONAL ART

The interest in operational art in the late 1970s and early 1980s lay in a growing realization among military thinkers and analysts that there was an area of war that the study of war at the tactical level or at the strategic level simply failed to address. Both the German and Soviet military had been addressing that gap by studying what they called "the operational level of war," which helped to push the American military toward a new paradigm for understanding war.³⁰ Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, the understanding of operational art as it evolved in the American military over the course of the last 2 decades of the 20th century has remained almost entirely focused on combat operations.

Admittedly, the American understanding as it has evolved is far broader in scope than was the case with Germans. The Wehrmacht's generals, for cultural reasons, left logistics as well as intelligence out of their understanding of operational art.³¹ The Americans, on the other hand, have had to address logistics and intelligence as the first step in projecting military power abroad.³² And the services have confronted over the past decade—especially in the run up to Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM—the fact that the United States increasingly depends on projecting its military power from North America as its military forces return from bases abroad.

Nevertheless, for all the skill U.S. military forces have displayed in conducting tactical and military operations over the course of the

period since the ending of the Cold War—including Operation JUST CAUSE—the period that has followed the ending of major hostilities has been less than satisfactory. Yet, the only reason that states are supposed to fight wars—at least according to Clausewitz—is to achieve a satisfactory political outcome.

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.³³

Looking at the experiences of the past 2 centuries, Clausewitz would certainly include the period after major military operations have concluded as being essential to the achievement of the political objective. This was certainly the case in the period after April 15. Others are already apportioning the blame, but that is not the issue here. What is crucial is what the American military services learn from the post-conflict difficulties of the past decade.³⁴ Operational planning and execution must include serious attention to the post-conflict phase, as well as the political goals for which the United States is engaging in military operations. There is considerable interest at present in the conduct of “effects-based operations.” If such an approach is to mean anything, effects-based operations must take into account the political ends above all. Within such a framework, the bombing of the Iraqi ministries during the initial “shock and awe” portion of the war against Saddam’s regime made no sense at all. In fact, in terms of the final political goal of bringing a more equitable government to Iraq, the destruction of the ministries and their records inevitably damaged the future running of the country as well as the potential to bring Saddam’s thugs to justice.

Thus, the American military must never think of operational art as the purely military portion of a campaign. Operational art must involve a holistic approach in which planning, major military operations, and the inevitable clean up and restoration of government all are considered together. In the world of the 21st century, transition or post-conflict operations may be more important than the conduct

of major military operations in the achievement of the political goals for which the United States will fight its wars.

CONCLUSION

The Iraq War may well represent a milestone in the projection of American military power to achieve national goals. It is unlikely, given the results, that any nation will directly take on the American military in the fashion that Saddam's Iraq was willing to do. But already the enemies of the United States are looking for other alternatives: low intensity conflict, weapons of mass destruction, cruise missiles and mines, new technologies, dispersed operations with highly disciplined forces, and extensive use of special forces and/or terrorists. Nor is it likely that future opponents of the U.S. military will be as badly trained, prepared, and led as were the Iraqis. Above all, the American military must think in terms of fighting the next war as an enterprise where the *political goals* receive the fullest of attention. No *deus ex machina* of the United Nations or reformed interagency processes will save military organizations which have failed to plan for the reconstitution of politics after the noise of battle has ceased.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. That was certainly not the case in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The Joint world managed to produce a superficial report to Congress that the Services largely provided. The Army and Marine Corps largely produced lessons-learned reports that focused on tactics, techniques, and procedures or hagiographical accounts. The only service to produce a careful examination of the Gulf War was the Air Force with its *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, Eliot Cohen, ed., Washington, DC, 1993. However, that report existed only because of the support and interest of Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice and with considerable opposition from the institutional Air Force. And with the change over to the Clinton administration, the institutional Air Force entirely buried the survey.

2. Statement of Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, before the subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, House Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2004.

3. For military transformations, see, among others, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050*,

Cambridge, 2000; Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, Cambridge, 1996; James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform*, Lawrence, KS, 1992; Robert Doughty, *Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939*, Hamden, CT, 1985; David E. Johnson, *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, Innovation and the U.S. Army, 1917-1945*, Ithaca, 1998; Harold R. Winton, *To Change an Army: General Sir John Stuart-Burnett and British Armor Doctrine, 1927-1938*, Lawrence, KS, 1988; and J. P. Harris, *Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939*, Manchester, 1995.

4. For the reasons lying behind the extraordinary ineptitude of Iraq's military institutions, see Williamson Murray and Robert Scales, Jr., *The Iraq War, A Military History*, Cambridge, MA, 2003, chpt. 1.

5. For a discussion of the importance of the Greek model of war, see Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War, Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*, Oxford, 1989. One of the more important points inherent in Hanson's book is the inherent superiority of the cultural discipline of Greek hoplites over their barbarian opponents, where each soldier fought as an individual. This was even more the case of the Romans where consistent, ruthless discipline produced legionnaires who fought as a part of the legion, not as individuals.

6. For the role that these factors played in the first military revolution in the West and the creation of military forces that were simply unbeatable by any other civilization, see MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050*, Cambridge, 2000, chpt. 1.

7. And Josephus would have reason to understand the strength and ferocious effectiveness of the Roman military system, since he commanded the Jewish forces in Galilee against them.

8. Flavius Josephus, *The Great Roman-Jewish War: A.D. 66-70*, William Whiston, trans., and William R. Farmer, ed., New York, 1960, p. 121. What makes the Roman example so intriguing is that only 30 legions, each of approximately 5,000 men, were sufficient to defend the entire Mediterranean basin from the barbarian forces which ranged across the empire's frontiers.

9. The same goes for British soldiers and marines. I am indebted to Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich, U.S. Army retired, for this point.

10. A number of officers in both the Army and the Marine Corps have emphasized to me that they and their NCOs had to go armed into the barracks, so bad was the discipline and the culture of disobedience. It took much of the 1970s to restore order.

11. For a particularly egregious example by one of the world's foremost historians, see John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, New York, 1993.

12. For Owens' views, see Admiral Bill Owens with Ed Offley, *Lifting the Fog of War*, New York, 2000.

13. For the scientific reasons that make such claims of future technological capabilities wrong-headed and dangerous, see Barry D. Watts, *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War*, Washington, DC, 1996. For a study that connects Clausewitz's theory of friction with modern concepts of nonlinearity which are increasingly influencing how scientists view the world, see Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security*, Winter 1992/1993.

14. Similarly, the greatest historian of war, Athenian general Thucydides, commented in his history of the Peloponnesian War: "These . . . events which happened in the past . . . (human nature being what it is) will at sometime or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future." Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Rex Warner, trans., London, 1954.

15. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NY, 1996, pp. 108, 113.

16. The CNN special, filmed over several hours at Lieutenant General McKiernan's headquarters while the war was on going and shown this last summer, underlined for this observer, at least, that, while the senior officers in the headquarters of the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander had immense amounts of reports, data, and other bits of information at their disposal, actually deciding what it all meant was still as difficult as in the past.

17. Conversation between Major General Robert Scales, Jr., U.S. Army Retired, and one of the battalion commanders from the 3rd Infantry Division.

18. *Ibid.*

19. In the summer of 1940, the Italian fleet outnumbered and possessed considerably newer ships than its opponent in the Royal Navy. Yet from the first battles off Sicily and Calabria in July, the Royal Navy fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean under Admiral Andrew Cunningham established a tactical and operational dominance over the Italians that lasted for the rest of the war. For a discussion of why this was so, see MacGregor Knox, *Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War*, Cambridge, 1982.

20. Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, Anne Dunnigan, trans., New York, 1969, pp. 929-930.

21. One senior army general told this author in mid-April 2003 that the most surprising aspect of the campaign against Iraq had been the degree of control that the Ba'ath party had been able to exercise over the Iraqi population right up until the regime's final collapse.

22. For a discussion of how this was done, see Williamson Murray, *Operations*, Report 1, Vol. 2, *The Gulf War Air Power Survey*, Eliot Cohen, ed., Washington, DC, 1993.

23. In this action, a troop of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment under the command of Captain H. R. McMaster destroyed a brigade plus of Iraqi armor in less than half

an hour with no casualties to itself. For a description of this action, see Murray and Scales, *The Iraq War*, preface.

24. For a critical look at the campaign, see Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *The Generals' War*, New York, 1996.

25. Comment by Major General David Petraeus made to Major General Robert Scales, Jr., immediately after the end of the war.

26. For a delineation of the Coalition military forces and their organization for the campaign, see Murray and Scales, *The Iraq War*, chpt 1.

27. Interview conducted by the author with a British officer at Upavon, Director General of Doctrine and Development, June 2003.

28. The increasing interest in rethinking the understanding of the American military about the nature of war was undoubtedly sparked by the appearance of a more sophisticated and clear translation of Clausewitz's classic study of the nature of war in the mid 1970s. See Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Howard and Paret.

29. B. J. C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, *The Operational Art, Developments in Theories of War*, Westport, CT, 1996, p. 166.

30. To a certain extent, this gap in American understanding was crossed by referring to the operational level of war as the realm of grand tactics. But that terminology was confusing itself as to what the separation might be between tactics and grand tactics.

31. The reason for this had to do with Germany's placement in the center of Europe, where the Germans did not have to get to the war. Thus, logistics were much less important than has been the case with the American military, which has always had to get to the war as the first step. Moreover, Germany obviously has had a direct interchange with its neighbors, making intelligence at least at the beginning of a conflict far less important. In World war II, that almost exclusive focus on the combat portion of operational art worked very well until the Germans discovered themselves engaged in a world war that ran from the depths of the North Atlantic to the depths of European Russia, and from the North Cape to the shores of North Africa. Then logistics and intelligence *did* matter, and the Germans failed miserably at both.

32. And this was true even in the Civil War, when the Federal military forces were not in a position to bring about the defeat of the Confederacy until they were able to project military power into the South's heartland in 1863, 1864, and 1865. Only then were they able to break the will of the Southern people to continue the struggle—a factor that Union commanders consistently underestimated until well into 1862.

33. Clausewitz, p. 579.

34. And one should not believe that this is a new issue. The post-conflict phases in dealing with Germany and Japan after the Second World War succeeded because those operations had received extensive attention and planning effort

while military operations were going on. Moreover, planners dealing with the postwar period also drew extensively from the failures of post-conflict operations after World War I, as well as the extensive lessons-learned analyses they were able to do with the occupation of Italy which began with the seizure of Sicily in July 1943.

CHAPTER 2

“KNOWLEDGE MUST BECOME CAPABILITY”: INSTITUTIONAL INTELLECTUALISM AS AN AGENT FOR MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Commander Steven W. Knott

While academics and military professionals have debated the value of intellectual pursuits to the profession of arms in recent years, that dialogue to date has failed to address the salient issue: the concept of institutional intellectualism and its catalytic role as an agent for transformation. Leading advocates of the military as an intellectual profession have attempted—with varying success—to convince their community that there exists an historic bias against intellectuals (thinkers) in favor of individuals of action (doers). The commonly held opinion that intellectuals provide little of practical value and fail to function effectively as combat leaders serves as the origin of that bias.¹ These proponents further argue that despite examples to the contrary—including Joshua L. Chamberlain and George S. Patton—such individuals succeed “in spite of and not because of official encouragement,” their intellectual talent largely ignored and veiled in the shadow of their battlefield achievements.² The opinion of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who disdainfully characterized an intellectual as one “who takes more words than are necessary to tell more than he knows,” best represents the traditional military view of intellectualism.³ This typical and pervasive bias has compelled current advocates of military intellectualism to caution the uniformed services against rejecting or marginalizing individual thinkers, thereby depriving themselves of “precious intellectual capital” and the innovative capacity required to adapt successfully to the evolutionary character of war.⁴ One cannot dispute the merit of this conclusion; the warning is germane. Nevertheless, the prevailing debate over whether intellectual bias exists or not remains largely superficial and serves only to obscure the far more important issue of institutional intellectualism.

It is irrelevant that Joshua Chamberlain and George Patton were gifted intellectuals; as military professionals, their intellect had

no influence on doctrine or in catalyzing change, transformation, or a revolution in military affairs (RMA). While it is possible for exceptional combat leaders like Chamberlain and Patton to employ their intellect in solving battlefield challenges, this is far different from the individual who uses his intellect to drive institutional change that results in transformation throughout the organization as a whole. And herein resides the salient point: only institutionalized military intellectualism can achieve successful transformation or, on rare occasion, revolutionize warfare; conversely, individual intellectualism that remains outside of an institutional context is largely impotent.

One can best define institutional intellectualism as system-sponsored critical thinking that focuses intellectual capital to effect transformational change and continual renewal within an organization. First, and of paramount significance, it operates within and as a function of the military system; this means that institutional intellectualism resides (formally or informally) within the organization's official structure, and that it is capable of influencing mainstream thought and processes. Yet thinkers working within the system will always encounter opposition to change from entrenched traditional elements. This phenomenon offers an interesting paradox: the nature of the military system ideally produces and empowers the traditionalists, while simultaneously affording legitimacy and sanctuary to the intellectual progressives—in turn preventing their marginalization. Second, institutional intellectualism can only exist—and succeed—in an organizational climate that promotes free-thinking and a critical exchange of ideas. Not only is such an environment a prerequisite for creating institutional intellectualism, but it is indispensable for catalyzing change within a system and for overcoming inevitable resistance from ensconced traditionalists. Third, institutional intellectualism achieves a synergistic effect that focuses intellectual energy in a highly disciplined, organized, and coordinated fashion. As a result, collective ideas are transformed more effectively into reality—and resulting military capability. Moreover, individual efforts working within an institutional context contribute to this intellectual synergy rather than remaining disconnected from the process. Lastly, institutional intellectualism is not military orthodoxy. In order for focused intellectual energy

to push the envelope of convention, it must remain dynamic and be infused periodically with fresh perspective. This is best achieved by ensuring the system embraces new intellectual capital, while simultaneously replacing those veteran thinkers whose former ideas or theories now constitute established operating doctrine—or orthodoxy.

Man is a problem-solver. By nature, he applies intellectual energy to overcome current—and anticipated—challenges. The complex, fluid environment of war demands the institutionalization of this intellectual energy to affect the necessary organizational and doctrinal changes required to influence the nature and alter the character of armed combat. Simply illustrated, institutional intellectualism gives birth to theory and corresponding organizational-doctrinal change. New systems and doctrine in turn act as the primary determinates for successful transformation, and transformation historically will constitute one of two forms: it will be in response to an RMA, or it will prove the catalyst for such a revolution itself. Moreover, in contrast to prevailing military beliefs, transformation remains primarily the product of intellectual energy, and is rarely borne of technology.⁵ Technology is a powerful military tool, but it traditionally remains ineffective until wedded to a doctrinal system on the battlefield. The English longbow⁶ and the tank, for example, failed to catalyze transformational change in the military art simply as a result of their invention; rather it required the innovative and systematic application of these weapons to realize their full potential.⁷

Two historic case studies will serve to illuminate more clearly the role of institutional intellectualism in producing successful transformation. The first provides an example of a specially constituted team of intellectuals responsible for transforming an entire military organization in response to an adversary's military revolution: the Prussian reforms following catastrophic defeat by Napoleon at Jena-Auerstädt in 1806. The second example demonstrates how individual intellectuals collectively can propel transformation within an institutional context—and in this case also initiate an RMA: the creation of the German armor force (*Panzerwaffe*) during the inter-war period. Prusso-German examples especially are relevant, given the traditional success that nation's

military has enjoyed in fostering a culture embracing intellectualism (thinkers) and tactical-operational excellence (doers) within the same institutional framework.⁸ Moreover, as military transformation can influence only tactical-operational events and remains divorced from the realm of strategy,⁹ the Germans again provide a valid example as their land forces historically (in the wake of Prussian reforms) have maintained an exceptional level of professional skill, ingenuity, and combat effectiveness at the tactical and operational levels of war.

THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY REORGANIZATION COMMISSION

Following the destruction of the Prussian Army at Jena-Auerstädt in 1806, Carl von Clausewitz sardonically observed that “it was not just a case of a style [of warfare] that had outlived its usefulness, but the most extreme poverty of imagination to which routine has ever led.”¹⁰ Indeed, the Prussian Army had arrived on the field woefully ill-prepared for battle against Napoleon. Yet few in the ranks or among the senior leaders realized that the character of war had changed fundamentally until they were overwhelmed so swiftly and decisively by Napoleon’s Grand Army. Despite a self-confidence securely rooted in the military achievements of Frederick the Great, the Prussian Army of 1806 was flawed institutionally. The officers, more concerned with status and social affairs than professional matters, were of inconsistent talent and inadequately schooled. A considerable percentage of soldiers were poorly trained, and many were well over 40 as the Prussian state required up to 30 years of service before granting military exemption. More significantly, the soldiers lacked patriotic and military spirit because their interests were not one with the king; simply put, the fate of the nation in war had little influence on their day-to-day lives as disenfranchised subjects of the crown. Compounding these moral deficiencies, the Prussian Army also suffered from poor administration and equipment; specifically, the troops lacked proper uniforms and the weapons, field gear, and rations were the worst in Europe. Moreover, the military organization and tactical doctrine employed by the Prussians were obsolete as well.¹¹ In retrospect, given the atrophied

state of Prussian arms and the transformational nature of the French military revolution, the decision at Jena-Auerstädt was inevitable.

The French Revolution had bequeathed Napoleon the unprecedented military potential of the world's first modern nation-state; once harnessed, molded, and exploited in the hands of genius, such power-in-being gave birth to the first truly modern army and ushered in a new age of warfare across Europe:

. . . In 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination. Suddenly war became the business of the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens . . . The people became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance. The resources and efforts now available for use surpassed all conventional limits; nothing now impeded the vigor with which war could be waged, and consequently the opponents of France faced the utmost peril.¹²

Acknowledging the need for change (if not the socio-political implications of the French transformation), Prussian King Frederick William III convened a military commission in 1807 to investigate the debacle at Jena-Auerstädt and propose reforms to the existing military structure. While the king failed to recognize that Prussia's defeat lay beyond the sole realm of military concerns, the individuals he appointed to the commission fortunately possessed far greater intellectual vision.¹³ The principal members were Prime Minister Baron Carl vom und zum Stein, General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Colonel August von Gneisenau, Major Carl von Grolman, and Major Hermann von Boyen; Clausewitz, as a young captain and administrative assistant to Scharnhorst, also became a de facto participant of some influence.¹⁴ Stein and Scharnhorst were selected to lead the commission because the prime minister was one of the king's most trusted political advisors and the general proved one of the few senior military leaders who had performed well on the field against Napoleon. Moreover, Scharnhorst had gained universal respect as a military scholar and thinker while serving as director of the highly regarded *Militärische Gesellschaft* (Military Society), the first institution of its kind devoted exclusively to the academic study of war. Significantly, Scharnhorst chose the remaining members of the commission based on their intellectual contributions to the

Militrische Gesellschaft and their recent performance in combat—in short, they were the “best and brightest” the Prussian Army had to offer.¹⁵ Despite a diverse range of experience and political influence among the reformers, they shared a common belief that the nature of the problem transcended military organizational deficiencies. Each possessed a keen intellect and a progressive worldview that enabled the commission to discern the need for institutional transformation across a broad societal, political, and military spectrum.¹⁶ Consequently, the reformers recognized the significance of the fundamental shift in the relationship between government, the people, and military power that had occurred in France. Similar reforms—short of revolution—would have to occur in Prussia to reverse the results of 1806.

The Military Reorganization Commission began by correcting straightforward organizational discrepancies. The army received improved uniforms and equipment, state-of-the-art weapons, and new tactical procedures (authored in part by Clausewitz).¹⁷ Once the means were in place to correct these deficiencies, the commission turned its attention to more difficult challenges. In addressing the pervasive socio-political faults within the army, the commission embarked on a more radical path that led to the creation of a new officer corps, the citizen-soldier, and a revolutionary general staff system. The reformers’ guiding objective in pursuing these initiatives was to imbue the Prussian army with “institutionalized military excellence”; specifically, “organizational genius . . . led in battle by operational genius.”¹⁸ Scharnhorst and his associates believed fervently that to achieve this ambitious transformational goal was to provide the nation with its best insurance against revisiting Jena-Auerstdt.

Prior to overhaul by the reorganization commission, the state had reserved admission to the Prussian officer corps almost exclusively to members of the aristocratic landed gentry, or Junker class. Commissions rested on the basis of political influence and patronage rather than an officer candidate’s actual merit or military potential. As a result, inconsistent talent, insularism, and professional stagnation had characterized the Prussian officer corps before 1807. Moreover, the Junkers discounted the value of formal education (believing that

it made one “soft”—a thinker rather than a doer); as a result, the intellectual capacity of the officer corps remained limited as well. The reformers transformed the officer corps first by persuading the king to grant eligibility to all elements of society. New officers—whether Junker or commoner—would receive appointment through a universal examination process blind to station or influence. This measure alone served to expand significantly the talent pool from which candidates came, and it proved to be the principal foundation upon which the new Prussian officer corps would rest. Secondly, Scharnhorst, recognizing the value of education, supervised the creation of three military schools to provide basic instruction to all newly commissioned officers prior to assignment with the active force. Compulsory military education was also unprecedented in Prussian military tradition; yet it proved equally successful and ensured standardization of quality while promoting intellectual growth among the new officer corps.¹⁹

In tandem with reforms to the officer corps, the commission also pursued significant transformational objectives in recasting the Prussian soldier. At Jena-Auerstädt the men in the ranks did not constitute a peoples’ army whose common interests were coupled with those of the state; in fact, most viewed the war as solely the concern of King Frederick William (and the Junker class), thereby resulting in an alarming popular indifference to the French invasion. Consequently, the average soldier was bereft of *esprit de corps* or patriotic spirit, and, equating service in the king’s army with unjust coercion, he was likely to desert at the first opportunity.²⁰ The reformers pursued a twofold scheme to transform the Prussian commoner-in-arms into a citizen-soldier. The first was through a system of egalitarian universal conscription which denied exemption to any element of society and mandated a shorter period of obligation. The goal of universal conscription was to ensure that the military “burden . . . was carried on all shoulders” and that service in the Prussian Army became “a proud civic duty . . . that turned the cause of the state into the cause of every man.” An additional advantage would be in promoting a new nationalistic spirit in which fealty to the king also encompassed a growing loyalty to the state—or Fatherland.²¹ Secondly, primarily through the work of Stein, the reformers wished

to expand markedly the powers of the constitutional element of the government vis-à-vis the king. They hoped this would encourage a feeling of general enfranchisement among the people to combat the pervasive sense of alienation from government resident throughout Prussia. Moreover, included in this initiative was an attempt to transfer control of the army from the king to constitutional civilian authorities.²² While the reorganization commission was extremely successful in implementing universal conscription in 1808, the king rejected initiatives to expand constitutional powers or surrender control of *his* army.²³ Nevertheless, sufficient measures were in place to transform the existing system and produce Prussia's first citizen-soldiers as the reformers envisioned.

Having addressed successfully basic organizational deficiencies as well as implemented initiatives to transform the officer corps and the Prussian soldier, the commission members likewise created the means to administer, train, and lead this new army with "institutionalized genius"—the general staff system. This measure proved the most unprecedented and intellectually revolutionary of all the reforms in the commission's efforts to counterbalance France's military revolution (as well as Napoleon's genius). Best described as "the intellectual center of the army,"²⁴ this new general staff concept far transcended traditional European staff organizations responsible primarily for executive clerical and courier functions. The Prussian Army meticulously selected, organized, and empowered the best officers—intellectually and professionally—to function collectively:

. . . as a single, coordinated brain, but always be fully responsive to the commands and desires of the Commander-in-Chief . . . This was to be done in both systematic and dynamic ways. New General Staff officers . . . would be educated carefully and intensively to replace older officers as they lost their sharpness and faded into retirement. The chief of this elite group would be the individual who combined the best in experience, education, imagination, vigor, and intellect. He would not be the Commander-in-Chief, since that post would still be reserved for the monarch . . . But the advice and information that the Chief of the General Staff could give the king, and the assistance that he and the Staff could also provide in the exercise of command, were expected to assure that wise decisions could and would be made by the least able of monarchs, and that even if a headstrong ruler were to make a blunder, the Staff would be able to retrieve it.²⁵

Moreover, the general staff's organization encompassed operational, mobilization, and logistical planning functions, as well as responsibility for the coordination of operations once hostilities commenced. General staff officers routinely transferred between assignments with field units (where they assisted the unit commander and facilitated coordination with higher echelons) and the Great General Staff (at the War Ministry) to broaden their experience and perspective. Of significance, selection to the general staff was competitive and entailed exceptionally high standards. A system of examination selected only 150 candidates per year to attend the *Kriegsakademie* (war academy—founded by Scharnhorst in 1810). On graduation, each officer served with the general staff for a 2-year trial period; at the conclusion of this probationary assessment, only *three* or *four* officers received permanent assignment to the general staff.²⁶ In its unprecedented ability to create and promote institutionalized military excellence, this unique general staff system remains the most significant initiative born of the reorganization commission—and its success underlies the fact that every major European army would eventually attempt to emulate it in one form or another.

The achievements of the reorganization commission provide a persuasive example of institutional intellectualism as an agent for military transformation. Working under a mandate from the army commander-in-chief (King Frederick William III), the reformers operated within and as a function of the military system. Moreover, they enjoyed a degree of intellectual freedom and engaged in a critical exchange of ideas that were remarkable for the time. This climate in turn allowed for the synergistic union of Prussia's leading military thinkers—and their focused intellectual energy achieved a level of societal, political, and military reform that truly was transformational.

Admittedly, concerted elements of the Junker Class—both civil and military—remained convinced that organizational military reforms were sufficient alone to cure the ills of Jena-Auerstädt and opposed the commission's initiatives.²⁷ These traditionalists attempted at every turn to counter the reformers' efforts at socio-political change. Significantly, only within the system can

intellectual energy achieve the necessary cohesion and influence to overcome this traditional opposition. One easily can imagine that even the extraordinary intellect and vigor of Scharnhorst would have failed had he waged a crusade alone, disconnected from the political and military institutional framework. Furthermore, the commission's work did not constitute military orthodoxy; indeed, one of the functions it envisioned for the general staff system was to prevent organizational stagnation and promote fresh perspectives that would challenge convention well into the future.

One final observation is germane: the immutable factor of time. Even institutional intellectualism takes years—possibly decades—to reap the fruit of its transformational seeds. The Prussian reformers put sweeping socio-political-military changes in place between 1807 and 1812. As a result, the Prussian Army performed significantly better in the campaigns of 1814 and 1815 against Napoleon; yet the full return on their intellectual labor was not realized fully until the wars of 1866 and 1870, in which the Prussian Army defeated Austria and France, respectively, and established the Prusso-German nation as the greatest power in Europe.

THE CREATION OF THE *PANZERWAFFE*

In 1933 Adolf Hitler witnessed a rather modest military demonstration which proved to be the harbinger of profound transformation within the German Army and, in time, was to usher in an RMA. This exhibition introduced the militarily ambitious German Chancellor to the basic components of the newly created mechanized army and included coordinated maneuvers by motorcycle, anti-tank, and armored reconnaissance units in cooperation with a platoon of light tanks. Hitler was so impressed by the demonstration that he announced enthusiastically to the assembled officers and political leaders: “That is what I need! That is what I want to have!” While it is doubtful that Hitler recognized the true military potential of this infant force, he did provide an important institutional impetus to its further development and incorporation in the operational doctrine of the German Army;²⁸ significantly, it is this doctrinal change that transformed the character of war in 1939.

Unlike the Prussian Military Reorganization Commission, the thinkers most responsible for the creation of the German armor force (*Panzerwaffe*)—and its revolutionary application to *Blitzkrieg*—had no formal organization. Instead, they achieved transformation through their collective individual actions, albeit working in an institutional context and within a system that encouraged innovation. The first of these individuals whose achievements warrant discussion is General Hans von Seeckt. Seeckt, in his position as chief of the Army Command Troop Office, served as a clandestine chief of the general staff and led the German Army between 1919 and 1926. A progressive thinker who recognized the need for military reform, Seeckt's first initiatives involved purging many traditionalist elements from the officer corps and undertaking a comprehensive analysis of lessons-learned from the First World War. Not only was he successful in creating "a very different officer corps from that which had existed before World War I, one whose cultural ethos emphasized intellectual as well as tactical and operational excellence," but his investigation into the causes of Germany's defeat (conducted by over 500 officers working in specialized committees) yielded tangible results and provided the genesis for a revolutionary new doctrine.²⁹ Army Regulation 487, entitled *Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen*³⁰ (*Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms*) and published in 1921-23, first articulated this doctrine. Written under Seeckt's supervision, this regulation described in great detail combined arms operations emphasizing offensive action, speed of maneuver, penetration and exploitation, and decentralized command and control.³¹ Significantly, Army Regulation 487 devoted an entire section to the use of tanks and other armored vehicles and recognized their potential for massed operations and deep penetration; likewise, "using tanks in small numbers or on a narrow front was emphatically discouraged."³²

Seeckt initiated several other measures during his tenure as army chief aimed specifically at cultivating the fledgling panzer force. He created the Inspectorate of Motor Troops in 1924 and assigned an armor officer to all units and garrisons. This officer was to indoctrinate and train officers and noncommissioned officers throughout the army in armor technology and procedures; additionally, he advised unit commanders in matters pertaining

to mechanized warfare and assumed command of mock tank units during field exercises. The importance Seeckt placed on this program is evident in the fact that assignment and transfer of these armor officers had to be approved by the Inspector of Motor Troops. Seeckt also personally directed every year between 1920 and 1925 that more training and emphasis be devoted to armored warfare. Moreover, the army commander further insisted that tanks and motorized elements take part in all field exercises to the maximum extend possible.³³ While these initiatives certainly were beneficial to the early development of the *Panzerwaffe* and subsequent armor doctrine, Seeckt's primary contribution was in creating an intellectual environment that encouraged free-thinking and the critical exchange of ideas. Significantly, he enabled key armor theorists and advocates to work within a system that provided institutional legitimacy to their continuing efforts at doctrinal reform.

The leading German armor theorist during the formative years of the *Panzerwaffe* was Lieutenant Ernst Volckheim. A tanker during the First World War, Volckheim had the opportunity to observe first-hand the success of Allied armor in reversing 4 years of stalemate on the Western Front in 1918. Consequently, following the war he began a concerted study of mechanized warfare, becoming Germany's leading authority during the 1920s. Volckheim was a prolific professional writer, authoring over two dozen articles on armored warfare between 1923 and 1927, as well as publishing two comprehensive books on the subject during the same period: one an autobiographical account of the German tank corps during the First World War; the second a theoretical work on armor technology, tactics, and doctrine that became a standard army text. Convinced that future operations would entail armored spearheads to effect penetration (with the requirement to destroy enemy armor), Volckheim was the first theorist to discount the value of light tanks in favor of more heavily armored and gunned medium battle tanks. He also stressed the need to maintain a mobile armor reserve, believing this to be the best doctrinal solution for defeating a successful enemy tank penetration through friendly defenses. Additionally, Volckheim was the first German to advocate equipping all armored vehicles and supporting arms with radio gear, recognizing that

wireless communications would enhance command and control functions and greatly increase the tempo of operations.³⁴ The young theorist devoted his considerable intellectual energies to the pursuit of these concepts—all of which were included in subsequent German armored doctrine.

Following the First World War, two schools of thought emerged governing the employment of armor in battle. The majority view, advocated by the traditional officer corps of every major military power, recognized the tank as simply another supporting arm for the infantry; the minority school, championed by a small number of independent thinkers, envisioned the tank as the principal combat arm to be supported instead by the infantry (as well as the other traditional supporting arms).³⁵ In Germany, the leading intellectual champions for independent armored units were Colonel Werner von Fritsch, Colonel Werner von Blomberg, and Colonel Ludwig Beck (all destined to be senior leaders in the German Army). During the mid-1920s these officers advocated the creation of independent mechanized units which possessed the inherent capability to breach or envelope an enemy position and then achieve rapid penetration in depth. In this manner, with powerful armored forces ranging throughout the enemy's vulnerable rear areas, victory would prove inevitable, providing the mechanized formations maintained a rapid tempo of operations and retained the initiative. Moreover, they envisioned a totally mechanized force in which the supporting infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, and staff units also would be motorized and capable of maintaining pace with the tank formations. Fritsch wrote in 1927 as Army Command Troop Office operations chief that "armored, quickly moving tanks most probably will become the operationally decisive offensive weapon. From an operational perspective this weapon will be most effective if concentrated in independent units like tank brigades."³⁶ While the Germans possessed no tanks during the 1920s, these officers validated their views concerning the potential for combined arms armor operations by closely observing British maneuvers during this period and extrapolating their own conclusions:

... one can now clarify what will happen with tanks behind the enemy's main line of resistance after a successful breakthrough. Tanks can be used: for attacks on the enemy's rear positions, against advancing reserves, as

well as against command posts and artillery emplacements. For such tasks, present- day tanks are far more capable than older models.³⁷

Fritsch, Blomberg, and Beck's vision began to be realized in 1928 with the creation of the first independent mechanized battalion with permanently assigned armored car, motorcycle, and mock tank units (actual tanks would be added in 1933). This was accomplished under the able direction of two influential armor pioneers in the Inspectorate of Motor Troops: Colonel Oswald Lutz and Colonel Alfred von Vollard-Bockelberg. These two officers were also responsible for the design of Germany's first generation of light and medium tanks, as well as for expanding the technical curriculum at the Panzer Troops School to include formalizing training in mechanized warfare doctrine and combined arms tactics.³⁸ Given the conviction and vigor of all these officers in pursuing transformation, it will come as no surprise that Fritsch and Lutz later supervised the creation of the first three panzer divisions in 1935 as the army's Commander-in-Chief and Commander of Panzer Troops, respectively.³⁹

An observation concerning the contributions of General Heinz Guderian is necessary at this point. While active in the development and expansion of the mature *Panzerwaffe* in the late 1930s as Commander of Panzer Troops, Guderian played little intellectual role in the creation of the armored force and associated doctrine despite subsequent assertions to the contrary. In fact, Guderian later claimed authorship for virtually *all* of the innovations and achievements described in the preceding paragraphs!⁴⁰ Nevertheless, in 1937 Guderian published a credible overview of German armored warfare doctrine in a widely circulated work, *Achtung-Panzer!*⁴¹ This book reiterated the conviction that “. . . tanks would only be able to play their full part within the framework of a modern army when they were treated as that army's principal weapon and were supplied with fully motorized supporting arms.”⁴² Moreover, Guderian emphasized the need to concentrate the panzer divisions at the “decisive point of action” in order to maximize their advantage in mobility, firepower, and shock value; conversely, operational dispersion of the *Panzerwaffe* would undermine its inherent strengths and negate its decisiveness.⁴³ Consequently, as Guderian concluded: “In an attack that is based on a successful tank action the

'architect of victory' is not the infantry but the tanks themselves; for if the tank attack fails, then the whole operation is a failure, whereas if the tanks succeed, then victory follows."⁴⁴ The concept of the independent panzer division as described by Guderian in *Achtung-Panzer!*, with its potential for massed action against the enemy's front or flank—followed by relentless exploitation in the rear—made the transformation of German operational doctrine possible.

In the wake of the creation of the first three panzer divisions in 1935, Beck (now a general and Fritsch's Chief of Staff) initiated a study to determine the feasibility of panzer corps and panzer armies. Subsequent field exercises and operational experience in the occupation of Austria in 1938 prompted the general staff to make ongoing improvements to the organization, training, and tactical procedures of the panzer divisions: "The result was a process of steady incremental improvement and innovation that amounted over the long term to systematic change, but without the risk of following false paths due to the misplaced enthusiasms of reformers or the troglodytic opposition of conservatives."⁴⁵ During the operation in Austria, the panzer divisions were employed piecemeal with subordinate units attached to infantry corps; the seizure of Czechoslovakia in 1939, however, witnessed the panzer divisions operating independently, though still under the control of an infantry corps commander. In short order, with procedures and doctrine further refined, the panzer divisions were organized in dedicated armor corps and teamed exclusively with motorized infantry divisions for combat operations against Poland.⁴⁶ As such, by the outbreak of war in September 1939, the intellectual vision begun by Seeckt and Volckheim had been institutionalized successfully within the organizational and operational framework of the army—transformation was a reality. And in a devastating endorsement of the validity of German armored doctrine, the *Panzerwaffe* proved a revolution in military affairs and made possible in 4 weeks in May-June 1940 what had eluded German arms for 4 long years during World War I—the total defeat of France.

The creation of the *Panzerwaffe* offers another persuasive example of institutional intellectualism as an agent for military transformation. The collective efforts of several individuals—Seeckt, Volckheim, Fritsch, Blomberg, Beck, Lutz, and Vollard-Bockelberg—

achieved organizational and doctrinal change within the system solely as a result of synergistic, focused intellectual energy. Seeckt set the conditions for transformation and sponsored progressive intellectual activity within an environment that encouraged a critical exchange of ideas; moreover, his endorsement assured that contemporary and follow-on reformers remained shielded within the system and never forfeited their institutional legitimacy. Of course, they faced inevitable opposition from old school advocates; General Gerd von Rundstedt clearly expressed the opinion of the traditionalists when, at an exercise involving the new tank units, he declared: “All nonsense, all nonsense, my dear Guderian.”⁴⁷ Yet—significantly—the conservative element never seriously impeded the development of the *Panzerwaffe* or associated organizational/doctrinal reform because debate remained protected within the system where it could influence mainstream thought and processes. Additionally, it is important to note that the march of intellectual progress never stagnated into premature orthodoxy; the vision was continually renewed by succeeding generations of progressive thinkers who refused to stop short of real transformational success. Consequently, orthodoxy emerged only over time—when *Blitzkrieg* became relegated to the realm of convention.

Two final observations are worth reemphasizing: While the German achievements in France certainly included a significant technological dimension, the RMA was not born simply of new tank designs and ubiquitous radios; instead, it resulted from the correct (and decisive) application of technology through a transformational doctrine. The doctrine was revolutionary, not the tank.⁴⁸ Secondly, the factor of time again is apparent; it took nearly 2 decades for the collective intellectual vision of Seeckt, Volckheim, and the other progressive thinkers to mature into actual operational capability—illustrating well that military transformation, by its nature, is never a timely or efficient process.

“KNOWLEDGE MUST BECOME CAPABILITY”

The catalytic role of the Prussian Reorganization Commission and the architects of German armored doctrine in promoting transformation within their respective military organizations should

be apparent; as such, one can garner several instructive themes from these case studies that are relevant and applicable to current—and future—efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to embrace transformation.

Intellectualism must work within an institutional context to succeed. Transformation is born of intellectual energy, but as demonstrated in the preceding case studies, it can only thrive within an institutional framework which is wedded to the system. Organizational endorsement—as witnessed by King Frederick William III and Seeckt—provides indispensable legitimacy and intellectual freedom. The recent creation of the Office of Force Transformation under the direct purview of the Secretary of Defense offers a potential institutional framework for intellectualism to flourish and exercise influence within DoD. Similarly, the Army’s Doctrine Command, coupled with Joint Forces Command’s responsibility for the creation of Joint doctrine, afford additional opportunities for institutional intellectualism to work within and for the system. Unfortunately, these organizations to date largely have been incapable of catalyzing significant and enduring institutional change because they remain culturally divorced from the mainstream of events within the armed forces. Simply, while the structure is in place, the intellectual capital it houses is not integrated within the system in the manner achieved by Scharnhorst or Seeckt. Moreover, this structure fails to promote effective innovation, free-thought, or a critical exchange of ideas within and throughout the organization as a whole; instead, these endeavors are confined to “think tanks” and reside within the walls of academia—well outside the organizational and professional mainstream. Perhaps in time the Office of Force Transformation will correct these deficiencies; if not, substantive transformation will prove impossible until intellectual endeavor is institutionalized in a way Scharnhorst and Seeckt would recognize.

The absolute best intellectual capital must be assigned to transformation duties. The Office of Force Transformation, Doctrine Command, and Joint Forces Command must be staffed with the “best and brightest” to ensure the highest caliber of intellectual power, energy, and vigor is applied to transformation activities. Furthermore, these individuals primarily should be military professionals with

operational experience. Successful transformation requires critical thinkers demonstrating exceptional “agility of the mind.”⁴⁹ At present, it remains highly questionable whether those organizations responsible for transformation are staffed with the proper intellectual capital. Are the contemporary intellectual peers of Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, and Seeckt in residence at the Office of Force Transformation or Doctrine Command? They are not, because the system resists assigning them to duties presently considered “non career-enhancing.” Additionally, a concerted effort is required to identify and employ young officers of exceptional intellectual talent as demonstrated by the personnel selections of Scharnhorst and Seeckt; intellectual renewal and avoidance of orthodoxy are possible only when the system empowers young critical thinkers such as Clausewitz, Grolman, Boyen, and Volckheim to temper the experience of senior officers and press the envelope of convention. Again, in the absence of our best intellectual capital (of all ranks), transformation will prove chimerical.

Technological achievement does not constitute transformation. As illustrated in both case studies, transformation is born almost exclusively of organizational, systemic, and/or doctrinal innovation; therefore, while there is frequently a technological component to transformation, technology is incapable of catalyzing transformational change or an RMA until it is subordinated to effective ideas. Consequently, there is an intellectual danger in staffing the Office of Force Transformation, Joint Forces Command, or Doctrine Command with technocrats rather than critical thinkers. Given the current euphoria surrounding modern military technology, it is logical to assume that technocrats hold great influence within these organizations—and transformation efforts dominated by technocrats will not succeed regardless of how revolutionary their technological achievements may be.

Transformation takes time to achieve. Presently, there exists a pervasive misconception throughout all levels of the American military establishment that transformation can be accomplished in short order. As described previously, the Prussian Military Reorganization Commission required decades for its sweeping transformational goals to be realized, while the creation of the

Panzerwaffe and associated doctrine consumed nearly 20 years in catalyzing less ambitious transformation. Of course, the complexity and scope of the transformation process will dictate the time required to achieve the desired end state—but the duration likely always will be measured in years. Therefore, since historical experience dictates that military reform is a laborious, time-consuming process, it would be logical to conclude that current transformation efforts within DoD will likely not reach maturation in less than several years.

Transformation will always face concerted opposition from traditionalists. “Transformation requires changing culture and attitude.”⁵⁰ It is human nature to resist change; as such, intellectual efforts to drive transformation will always have to contend with traditional conservative elements supporting the status quo and resisting change. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the preceding case studies, this opposition can be overwhelmed by ensuring the intellectual impetus for transformation remains institutionalized and resides within the system. Therefore, conservative opposition to present American efforts at military transformation, while extant, does not pose any real challenge as long as the transformation effort is driven by institutional intellectualism, continues to work within the organization, and retains administration and Secretary of Defense patronage.

The purpose of transformation is to turn intellectual vision into military capability. Whether this transformation is in response to an RMA or constitutes a revolution itself, the driving force will—and must—remain institutional intellectualism; and this is why professional debate on intellectualism in the military must confine itself to this salient issue. To do otherwise is to lose sight of the most important aspect of intellectualism and its exclusive role as an agent for military transformation. Clausewitz emphatically reminds us in *On War* that “knowledge must become capability.”⁵¹ We must never forget that, without institutional intellectualism, this is not possible, and professional stagnation and atrophy must eventually result.

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CHAPTER 3

SWIFTLY DEFEAT THE EFFORTS, THEN WHAT? THE “NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR” AND THE TRANSITION FROM DECISIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS TO POST-CONFLICT SECURITY OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Nelson

Since the first Gulf War, the United States has fought three major campaigns: Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq. The principles of rapid decisive operations have influenced the pattern and conduct of operations in all three conflicts. These principles evolved from early work by Harlan Ulman and James Wade, Jr., in *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance*, published in 1996.¹ The principles of rapid decisive operations created such success in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM that Max Boot called the approach a “New American Way of War.”²

It was the promise of rapid decisive operations that served as the lynchpin for the revision of the two Major Theater of War (MTW) force sizing constructs during the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review*.³ This revision resulted in a new force sizing, one that mandated

. . . forces be shaped to defend the United States; deter aggression and coercion forward in four critical regions; swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts—including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and conduct a limited number of smaller scale contingency operations.⁴

The Office of the Secretary of Defense embraced the new concept of “swiftly defeat the efforts” of an adversary, in large part, on the hope that this would yield force savings with no discernable risk.⁵

The last three combat operations undertaken by the United States in the period since the first Gulf War suggest that the assumptions postulated in the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations to justify the force sizing choices made in the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* were justified. However, the authors of the concept, those who

operationalized the concept in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and most especially the policymakers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, have failed to include post-conflict operations as part of their calculus. The notion of rapid decisive operations was one of “hit and run” rather than “fight and stay.” Yet fight and stay is precisely what happened in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Paradoxically, it now takes more ground forces to secure the peace in periods after war than to carry out decisive operations.⁶

This condition would not be much of a problem were it not for the rules associated with the *Quadrennial Defense Review's* force-sizing construct, which allows the sizing of forces only for the conduct of the decisive operations. It considers other force structure “lesser included” and, for analytical purposes, to be extracted from a stability operation to conduct decisive operations.⁷ However, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the United States did not extract forces from on going stability operations in the Sinai, Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan. The post-conflict operations that the nation has committed the U.S. Army to exceed the forces sized to meet the decisive operations needs envisioned under the two major theater war concept. A force improperly sized, if not corrected, can lead to symptoms of increased force stress and result in decreased readiness, increased retention problems, and larger institutional problems.

This chapter will examine the paradox created by the “New American Way of War,” as represented by the concept of rapid decisive operations and the increased need for ground forces to secure the peace compared to the conduct of decisive operations. To examine this paradox, this chapter will compare the concepts associated with rapid decisive operations and the “New American Way of War.” The primary focus will be on the period of time in a campaign when decisive operations transition from conflict termination to post-conflict stability operations. It will compare the concepts in the previous sections to the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq to provide conclusions and recommendations for use in force-sizing discussions in the 2005 *Quadrennial Defense Review*.

A NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

The “New American Way of War,” as described by Max Boot in *Foreign Affairs*, is a method of war characterized by rapid maneuver

and precision firepower to achieve quick victory with minimum casualties. This new style of warfare puts a premium on flexibility and surprise. It relies on special operations forces to a much greater extent than in the past. The “New American Way of War” depends on the heavy use of psychological and information operations to force opponents to capitulate without fighting. The main pillar of this “New American Way of War” is the use of information technology to integrate air, land, and seapower to accomplish assigned missions.⁸

Boot points to U.S. operations in Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and in Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM as evidence that this transformation in the American Way of War has occurred right before the eyes of Americans. Admittedly, Iraq was a far better example of the “New American Way of War” than U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM involved greater combined arms operations, for there were far more conventional land forces than used in Afghanistan.⁹ Boot’s analysis of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM demonstrated the difficulties of not employing sufficient land forces in an operation, since some of the most significant Taliban and al Qaeda forces eluded destruction.¹⁰

Boot’s vision of the “New American Way of War” couples the increased precision of airpower with the networking of the total joint force to increase the efficacy of airpower. However, this does not obviate the need for ground forces during decisive operations. He argues effectively that the United States will require ground forces in lesser numbers during decisive operations to defeat forces that airpower cannot destroy due to dispersion and concealment.¹¹ However, one cannot conclude that the United States can gain savings from the “New American Way of War” by reducing the size of ground forces. He argues, paradoxically, that the United States will require more ground forces to secure the peace.¹²

Similar views about the changing nature of the American Way of War have appeared. Their authors, the current director of the Office of Force Transformation along with a professor from the Naval War College, argue that Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan showcased the “Emerging American Way of War.” In the January 2003 issue of *Proceedings*, Vice Admiral (Retired) Cebrowski co-

authored, with his Assistant for Strategic Futures, a vision of the “Emerging American Way of War.”¹³ He has expanded this vision in further detail in a subsequent article titled “The Top 100 Rules of the New American Way of War.”¹⁴ Together, for all intents and purposes, these two documents outline the Department of Defense’s (DoD) vision for the future of warfare. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will view and implement future transformational concepts and white papers through the lens of the “Emerging American Way of War.”¹⁵

The “Emerging American Way of War” showcases special operations forces operating with local knowledge from remote locations and applying information-age technology to leverage networked precision capabilities. These forces will receive the support of units capable of nation-building and constabulary operations at the end of strike operations to free elite forces for subsequent missions. Ultimately, super-empowered individual warfighters (meaning special operation forces) will perform as super global cops, neutralizing enemies of the United States such as Osama bin Laden. The “Emerging American Way of War” will push jointness down to the tactical level. This vision exhibits speed in execution of operations and increasing precision of operational effects to limit an adversary’s strategic choices.¹⁶

The “Emerging American Way of War” is possible through the networking of military capabilities to allow more discreet use of those capabilities in surgical strikes rather than the imprecise battles of old fashioned war.¹⁷ This networking of capabilities will mean that: “. . . as information moves down echelon, so does combat power, meaning smaller joint force packages wield greater combat power. Network-centric warfare generates new and extraordinary levels of operational efficiency.”¹⁸

Or put another way, the “Emerging American Way of War,” through the use of Network Centric operations, supposedly will provide the promise of less land forces in contact with the enemy during decisive operations. The “Top 100 Rules of the New American Way of War” goes so far as to argue that the United States “endeavors to keep the ground forces’ ‘footprint’ as economical as possible.”¹⁹ How does this concept enable the limited use of ground

forces? The joint force “aims for rapid dominance of any battlefield it may enter so the initial blows come from the air.”²⁰ This is the connection the authors of the “Emerging American Way of War” make with the concepts of rapid dominance and rapid decisive operations. In these concepts, ground forces will “roll up enemy ground forces that have been softened by air attacks and . . . occupy terrain.”²¹ Thus, the authors of these concepts envisage limited ground forces only to impose a decision already facilitated by the network-centric, rapid decisive operations.

The authors of the “New American Way of War” remain largely mute about the issue of securing the peace. They envision constabulary and nation-building forces that will allow elite forces to exit upon completion of decisive operations. Their notion is that there will be a clear delineation between decisive-combat and post-conflict operations. The concept of securing and occupying terrain and controlling the adversary’s populace receives virtually no attention other than the assumption that limited land forces will have to secure the peace due to the decisive nature of the network-centric, rapid decisive operations. In fact, the authors of the rules for “The New American Way of War” envision a short stabilization period due to passing of security of the countryside to the local constabulary or to other national peacekeeping forces.²² The authors further elaborate on this concept as part of their ideas for the employment of ground forces in which the Army maintains the peace as a “premier long-term occupation force.” The Army will maintain the peace only until the United States can transition the post-conflict stability duties to international or local civilian rule.²³

What emerges from the Office of Force Transformation’s view of the “New American Way of War” is somewhat different from that of Max Boot. The Office of Force Transformation’s view rests on the belief that because of the changing nature of war, there will be only a limited need for ground forces during decisive operations. One may assume the same ground forces needed for success during decisive operations could handle the post-conflict, since their argument makes no mention of increasing the number of ground forces in the transition to post-conflict operations. Perhaps a more detailed look at the concept for rapid decisive operations or the emerging joint

operations concept for major combat operations, largely based on ideas drawn from rapid decisive operations, might provide insights into the transition from conducting decisive operations to securing the peace and whether this transition requires more land force than decisive operations does.

FROM RAPID DOMINANCE TO RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS

The seeds for the “New American Way of War” originated in 1996 by a group of military theorists from the National Defense University and outlined in *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance*. The concept of rapid dominance emerged in response to the changing strategic environment of the post-cold war period. This environment was one of increasing technological change and diversification of strategic threats. One of the main drivers behind the concept of rapid dominance was the need to change the two major regional contingency (MRC) force structure and replace it with one that was less costly.²⁴ Through the use of perfect, or near perfect, situational awareness on the battlefield, more efficient forces supposedly could defeat or destroy an adversary.

Thus came the idea of rapid dominance aimed at harnessing these technological innovations to produce desired strategic results. The goal of rapid dominance would render an adversary incapable of further resistance through the use of physical and psychological means. The end result, achieved with minimal U.S. forces, would be complete submission of the enemy through “shock and awe.”²⁵ The idea of rapid dominance is predicated on four characteristics; perfect knowledge of the operational environment; rapidity of application of capabilities; total control of the information and intelligence; and brilliance in empowering individuals at the lowest levels to apply such capabilities against an adversary.²⁶

Virtually no description about what occurs after decisive operations occurs in writings about rapid dominance. The concept envisioned by the authors is such that “Rapid Dominance seeks to impose (in extreme cases) the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki

had on the Japanese.”²⁷ Therefore, with the implementation of rapid dominance, decisive victory will entail small forces on the ground with near perfect information and intelligence directing and applying lethal and nonlethal weaponry against an adversary. They will so overwhelm the enemy physically and psychologically that he will capitulate. The transition to post-conflict is therefore just a matter of moving a relatively benign constabulatory force to occupy an adversary’s territory for a short period of time, at least until a handover to local or international authority occurs. While the authors of rapid dominance never really address the transition to post-conflict, the metaphor that Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide suggests that there will be a relatively rapid transition requiring few ground forces to secure the peace.

The Joint Forces Command took the ideas of rapid dominance and developed the concept of rapid decisive operations. The concept of rapid decisive operations will serve as the blueprint for future concept development and experimentation.²⁸ In addition, the Joint Forces Command released the recommendations for rapid decisive operations to coincide with the release of the results of the *Quadrennial Defense Review* of 2001.²⁹ Not surprisingly, none of the recommendations really addressed the issue of transitioning to post-conflict from decisive operations or for the security forces required for ensuring the success of the transition to the post-conflict. Rapid decisive operations, as described in the White Paper, integrates knowledge, command and control, and operations, while leveraging other elements of national power, to enable the United States and its allies to attack an adversary asymmetrically from different directions and in different dimensions. These operations supposedly will so overpower an adversary that he will lose coherence, will realize he cannot achieve his objectives, and thus will capitulate or will ultimately be defeated.³⁰

A rapid decisive operation, as outlined in the White Paper, envisions decisiveness by imposing U.S. will on an adversary through breaking his coherence and defeating his will and ability to fight. Friendly forces will use the concepts of rapid decisive operations through knowledge of the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities; effects-based planning and execution; use of information superiority;

dominant maneuver; and precision engagement to synchronize precision effects to generate relentless overwhelming shock on the adversary.³¹ As envisioned in the White Paper, rapid decisive operations will focus on rapid resolution. Rapid decisive operations thus are:

not designed for long-term commitment or to resolve long-standing problems. A rapid decisive operation creates the desired outcome itself or it establishes the conditions to transition to a higher (e.g., major regional contingency) or lower (e.g., security and stability operation) level of commitment.³²

Therefore, the concept for rapid decisive operations, while described as simultaneous and parallel in its characteristics, envisions a sequential and serial post-conflict transition. The forces required for the transition may or may not be available to the Joint Force Commander since the White Paper concept does not address the transition to post-conflict and conflict termination. Moreover, the White Paper never really addresses the need for the Joint Force Commander to fight decisive operations, while simultaneously securing the peace. There really is no mention of a transition from decisive operations to post-conflict operations. Yet the ideas of rapid decisive operations reflect the hallmarks of the “New American Way of War” as outlined by the Office of Defense Transformation with its emphasis on speed, networked command and control, and the enabling of effects-based operations at the lowest level to achieve decisive results.³³ The ideas of rapid decisive operations also permeate the new “Joint Operating Concept for Major Combat Operations.”³⁴

The central theme for the “Joint Operating Concept for Major Combat Operations” is that the joint force will bring conflict with a regional nation-state to decisive conclusion through the use of swiftly executed, simultaneous, and sequentially applied power in a contiguous or noncontiguous manner.³⁵ The characteristics of how Joint Forces Command views the future conduct of major combat operations are to employ a knowledge-enhanced, effects-based approach, applying relentless pressure, and engaging the adversary comprehensively. The joint force will accomplish this by

using collaborative processes, aligning deployment, employment, and sustainment actions, and protecting itself throughout the battlespace. The joint force will start a major combat operation with a strategic purpose in mind to achieve decisive conclusions.³⁶

The description of how a joint force fights in a major combat operation in the joint operating concept is similar to the characteristics of rapid decisive operations. Rapid decisive operations highlight a knowledge-enabled, effects-based force that uses precision weaponry to generate relentless overwhelming shock to the enemy's system. As with rapid decisive operations, the "Joint Operating Concept for Major Combat Operations" provides few details on how a joint force would transition from decisive operations to post-conflict operations. It envisions that the joint force, if it implements the concept fully, will "use decisive defeat of enemy combat forces as a means to achieve decisive conclusion to war."³⁷ But, of course, it is the enemy who determines that the war is over.

The concept thus assumes that a coherent enemy force remains at the end of combat operations to capitulate and terminate the conflict. There is no mention of simultaneous conduct of decisive combat along with stability operations or security operations to impose U.S. will on an adversary who no longer represents a coherent fighting formation but has decomposed into guerrilla bands or terrorist cells. The concept makes mention of ideas for post-conflict: "Successfully imposing our will on an adversary whose behavior brought us to engage him in combat operations may very well rest upon what we do after we have forcefully and successfully engaged an adversary's ability to resist."³⁸ The unstated assumption is that decisive operations have brought relative stability to the region. There is no mention of the chaos created in the wake of decisive operations due to a power vacuum created by the swift disintegration of an enemy force. In short, there is no meaningful treatment of transition of decisive operations to post-conflict stability operations.

TRANSITIONING FROM DECISIVE OPERATIONS TO POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

Joint Forces Command, in lieu of integrating a concept for transition to post-conflict operations in the "Major Combat

Operations Joint Operating Concept," has chosen to stovepipe the concept into a separate "Joint Operating Concept for Stability Operations." The entire focus of the stability operations joint operating concept is to describe the stability operations following a major combat operation.³⁹

The joint operating concept for stability operations envisions a stability force separate and distinct from a combat force. The joint operating concept envisions that a separate and distinct commander will command the "Stability Force." The purpose of this force will be two-fold during combat: to ensure continued momentum of decisive combat operations, and to create conditions that would ensure the long-term success of post-conflict operations. The stability force then will transition to post-conflict actions, following decisive combat operations that will focus on assisting the interagency, international community, and local government by conducting security operations and civil-military operations in "restorative" stability operations.⁴⁰ Much of this concept calls for an organization and force structure that is separate and distinct from the force structure and organizations that execute the major combat operations.⁴¹ Therefore, the Joint Force Command concept is looking to a constabulary force, a force structure and organizations separate and distinct from conventional operational forces to conduct the post-conflict operations. This concept compliments a proposal published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University.

In *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson recognize that the advent of the "New American Way of War," characterized by rapid decisive operations with the use of network-enabled, precision effects based operations, brings the need to secure the peace in a rapid simultaneous fashion. The authors conclude that the force needed to conduct decisive operations was inadequate to secure the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴² Establishing a safe and secure environment will be the primary mission of military forces in post-conflict operations. "Embedding" civilians with the expertise required for essential post-conflict activities would facilitate the rapid return of governance and civil services, essential to long-term success of

the post-conflict operations.⁴³ The authors propose establishing separate and distinct joint organizations to conduct post-conflict operations rather than providing a single warfighting commander the resources needed to execute simultaneously decisive combat operations and post-conflict operations. The idea would be that the joint stabilization force would plan the post-conflict operations and then roll in behind major combat operations forces to conduct post-conflict operations in a concurrent manner.⁴⁴ Military police, with a Tactical Combat Force provided as back-up, would constitute the bulk of the security forces envisaged in this concept, depending on the enemy situation.⁴⁵ The command and control relationships are somewhat vague for the joint stability force. Would the force report directly to the regional combatant commander like other joint task forces, work for the Coalition Joint Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC), or, because of the large involvement with the Interagency, report back to the Secretary of Defense, or some combination of these that evolve over time?

These are all questions dealing with the transition to post-conflict operations that a variety of researchers have asked. However, the answer to the most important question about what the military provides best during the transition to the post-conflict will determine the right force structure solution for the problem. Consensus amongst these researchers is that the main task that military forces must accomplish rather quickly in transitioning from decisive operations to post-conflict operations is to provide security to enable the inter-agency, international community, and local authorities to reestablish services and governance.⁴⁶

In *A Wiser Peace*, researchers from the Center for International Studies recommend that the United States should not underestimate the needs for security in post-conflict situations to ensure a successful transition from decisive combat operations to peace. Deficiencies in security forces were endemic in post-conflict Afghanistan and to a lesser extent post-conflict Kosovo.⁴⁷ They argue that a post-conflict security force should be part of any combined coalition force that leads combat operations. Unity of effort for the security forces as they transition from decisive operations should ensure swift deployment of adequate security forces to eliminate the possibility of a power

vacuum in the wake of swift decisive operations.⁴⁸ The authors envisioned that a “constabulary” force would complete these tasks. They assume that this force would focus on civil security, primarily policing common crime, but not conducting operations against guerrillas or terrorists in an asymmetric conflict. They recommend that coalition combat forces disarm the adversary’s army, purge undesirables, and retrain it to meet internal and external instability needs. The coalition combat forces would have to meet those missions until such time as the new force was prepared to assume post-conflict security needs.⁴⁹ Thus, if instability exists and local indigenous capability was not available, coalition combat forces would be required. These combat forces would be an integral part of the coalition forces for unity of effort and assume these missions as soon as decisive operations transition to post-conflict operations or maybe simultaneous with decisive operations.

In *America’s Role in Nation Building: from Germany to Iraq*, researchers from the RAND Corporation examined post-conflict operations that the United States conducted from Germany and Japan to Iraq. The researchers conclude that in the transition from decisive operations to post-conflict, one of the most important considerations will be security. Their research concludes that there is an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and risk. The higher proportion of stabilization force appears to reduce the number of casualties taken in the post-conflict.⁵⁰ They argue that there will be no quick solution to post-conflict since the average post-conflict operation that the United States has participated in lasted approximately 5 years.⁵¹ Indeed, the researchers from Rand discovered that: “It seems that the more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult post-conflict stabilization can be.”⁵² Thus the “New American Way of War” may have created the conditions that require more forces to succeed in post-conflict than is required for success in decisive operations.

The actual practice of transition from decisive combat operations to post-conflict operations informed the researchers from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and from RAND and shaped their conclusions and recommendations. The “Stability Joint Operating Concept” from Joint Forces Command and the “Concept

for Transforming Stability and Reconstruction Operations” out of the National Defense University seem less grounded in actual practice. All recognize the need for security in the transition from decisive combat to post-conflict operations. The concepts from the Joint Forces Command and the National Defense University take a different path to achieve that transition. Two differences between the concepts and the actual practice, as represented by the RAND and the CSIS study stand out: First is the use of specialized fixed organization constabulary forces, rather than conventional combat forces, with the proper capabilities in the right numbers to meet the mission sets as determined by the coalition commander on the ground. Second is the idea of a separate joint command for stabilization in post-conflict, rather than the integrating stabilization forces under the overall joint force commander, to enable a simultaneous transition from decisive operations to post-conflict operations. Finally, there is one other difference between the two concepts and the review of the modern historical record. The modern historical record suggests that a larger ground force is required to provide security during the transition from decisive combat to post-conflict than the force required to be successful during decisive combat operations. The two concepts to establish stability forces, on the other hand, envision no need for additional combat forces for success. In fact, the two concepts assume that lighter forces may be successful in modern post-conflict operations.

TRANSITIONING FROM DECISIVE COMBAT TO POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION: THREE CASE STUDIES

Three modern operations demonstrate the differences between the actual practice in transition from decisive operations to post-conflict stabilization and the proposed concepts to accomplish stabilization under the “New American Way of War.” The operations are ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and IRAQI FREEDOM. These operations exhibit the characteristics of the “New American Way of War.” All three operations showcased the use of networked, precision, air and seapower, enabled by special operations forces concluding in rapid

decisive victory of adversary military forces. All three also required a transition to post-conflict operations. This will be the focus of the evaluation of the case studies highlighting the size of the force during the transition to post-conflict operations, the command relationships associated with that force, and, finally, the efficacy of the post-conflict security arrangements.

Operation ALLIED FORCE-Kosovo.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted ALLIED FORCE to enforce compliance with United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1199, which called on the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cease hostilities and redeploy mobilized forces from the province of Kosovo. ALLIED FORCE was primarily an air operation, which NATO commenced on March 23, 1999. The conflict ended on June 10, 1999, with the Yugoslav security forces complying with a Military Technical Agreement, which called for the full withdrawal of Yugoslavian forces from Kosovo. The operation lasted 78 days and returned Kosovo to *status quo ante bellum*.⁵³

The commander of the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) implemented ALLIED FORCE under direction of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) commanded the air operations with the Commander of the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force executing air operations.⁵⁴ However, in practice, SACEUR retained much of the command of Operation ALLIED FORCE.⁵⁵ In addition to the command of NATO air forces, the Commander of AFSOUTH also had NATO operational control of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps that fulfilled the role of the land component command. The commander of AFSOUTH was dual-hatted as the U.S. Commander of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil. In this capacity, he had tactical control of the Joint Special Operations Task Force as well as operational control of all U.S. forces within the operating area.⁵⁶

ALLIED FORCE demonstrated a pattern of war that is similar to the “New American Way of War.” The use of air delivered precision weapon systems by network centric forces achieved a relatively swift

victory with minimal casualties.⁵⁷ Indeed one of the major lessons learned during Kosovo was a validation of American investment in precision weapons, command and control information technology, and extensive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to enable the U.S. dominated NATO forces to conduct this “New American Way of War.”⁵⁸ That is not to say this was exclusively an air operation. Notwithstanding the potential contributions of Task Force Hawk, ground forces played a role in ALLIED FORCE. The Kosovo Liberation Army acted as a force on the ground that facilitated the targeting of the Yugoslav forces in order to increase the effectiveness of the air operations, thus enabling the “New American Way of War.”⁵⁹ At the time of ALLIED FORCE, the Kosovo Liberation Army numbered from 5,000 to 15,000 soldiers.⁶⁰

Ground forces were absolutely essential in securing the peace. General Clark gave the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps the mission to move into Kosovo immediately upon cessation of hostilities in order to secure the agreement reached with the Yugoslavian military and NATO forces. This was no small task and included the mission to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, to include public safety and order. The initial size of the force under the name Operation JOINT GUARDIAN was 42,500 troops deployed in Kosovo directly. This force was under the command of the commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe who acted as the joint force commander for the first 3 months of the operation.⁶¹ The size of this force correlated to one soldier per 100 residents.⁶²

Thus in one of the first operations that could claim the definition of the “New American Way of War,” a land force that was larger than the land force used during the decisive operations had the task to conduct post-conflict security operations. This post-conflict security force was under the command and control of the joint force commander who had the responsibility for decisive operations, thereby achieving unity of command and synchronizing the near-simultaneous post-conflict security with the end of decisive operations. The overall effect of the post-conflict security was relatively successful and has returned the province to *status quo ante bellum* in the last 5 years, with a relatively modest NATO and international presence remaining.⁶³

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Afghanistan.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan commenced on October 7, 2001, in response to the Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. ENDURING FREEDOM was a U.S.-led operation with coalition forces. The United States contributed the bulk of the air forces and special operations forces, while the coalition partners from 30 nations provided some airpower, special operations forces, and niche specialty forces. The bulk of the ground forces during decisive operations, numbering some 15,000, came from the Northern Alliance, a rebel army that had been in conflict with the ruling Taliban forces for several years prior to ENDURING FREEDOM.⁶⁴ Although, the operation is on-going, decisive combat operations subsided in December 6, 2001, after only 59 days, with the capture of Kandahar and the removing from power of the ruling Taliban leadership.⁶⁵

The commander of coalition forces in ENDURING FREEDOM continues to be the commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The Commander of CENTCOM assumed the command of all land forces on November 11, 2001, as the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC). The Special Operations Command Central Command held the command of special operations forces. The commander CFLCC synchronized special operations activities with his own operations; including the transition to post-conflict security, which occurred near simultaneously as combat operations progressed with the 10th Mountain Division and a Marine task force providing some post-conflict security.⁶⁶ Eventually post-conflict security operations transitioned to the International Security Assistance Force in accordance with the Bonn Agreement on December 6, 2001. That force has post-conflict security responsibility only for Kabul and its environs.⁶⁷ The post-conflict security responsibilities for the remainder of Afghanistan are somewhat vague.

Initially, decisive combat operations in ENDURING FREEDOM displayed the use of networked precision firepower directed by teams of special forces on the ground, operating with local indigenous Northern Alliance Forces, which closed with and defeated opposing

Taliban and Al Qaeda forces.⁶⁸ Eventually, U.S. conventional forces deployed and joined with the special forces-assisted indigenous forces to conduct Operation ANACONDA. The forces required to conduct decisive combat were approximately 15,000 Northern Alliance soldiers⁶⁹ assisted by a handful of special operations A teams, joined later by approximately a division sized element to conduct follow-on operations to include Operation ANACONDA.⁷⁰ Therefore, the operations in Afghanistan during ENDURING FREEDOM resembled the pattern of the “New American Way of War” for decisive combat operations.

The transition to post-conflict security from decisive operations was less successful, and its second and third order effects continue to plague Afghanistan to this day. There was never a general recognition that post-conflict security should be an integral part of the transition from decisive operations, and that these actions should occur simultaneously or near-simultaneously. Instead, a separate organization was established in the form of the International Security Assistance Force and employed about a month after decisive combat in Kabul ended, creating a gap in security. The gap has never closed, to the point of placing post-conflict reconstruction efforts and political actions, such as elections, in jeopardy.⁷¹ The United States limited the military forces committed to the post-conflict security effort by design. The Secretary of Defense’s answer to a reporter’s question regarding the deployment of peacekeeping forces 10 days after the completion of decisive combat in Kabul is informative to the issue of the design of the post-conflict security effort:

My feeling is that you don’t get peacekeeping until you get peace. I like to refer to it as a security force. I don’t think that it will have to be a terribly big one. The only place they are talking about having it is in Kabul, the capital. Most of the other places are relatively calm. There is still fighting and lawlessness, but this is true in some American cities as well.⁷²

The post-conflict security force represented a ratio of one military member for every 1,730 residents.⁷³ The deliberate under-resourcing of post-conflict security and placing the effort under a separate command that arrived late may be one of the factors that still are hampering U.S. efforts to secure the peace in Afghanistan.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM-Iraq.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a U.S.-led coalition operation conducted to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Iraqi support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people from the tyranny of the Baath party.⁷⁴ IRAQI FREEDOM was a joint and combined operation directed at the removal of the regime of President Saddam Hussein. Decisive combat operations began on March 19, 2003, and the President of the United States declared decisive combat operations, lasting just 44 days, over on May 1, 2003.⁷⁵ The Coalition removed President Saddam Hussein from power, and operations to secure the peace continue to this day.

Commander of CENTCOM General Tommy Franks was the coalition and joint force commander. CENTCOM organized air, sea, and land operations under the command of functional component commanders who may have commanded similar “functions” from two or more services. General Franks delegated command of all land forces to the CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan.⁷⁶ The Commander of Special Operations Command, Central Command (SOCCENT) led the Coalition Forces Special Operations Command (CFSOCC). Command and control of the post-conflict security force was somewhat ambiguous. The Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was to lead the effort of post-conflict civil assistance actions and report directly to the Secretary of Defense with a loose coordination relationship with the CFLCC. General McKiernan did not view post-conflict security as his mission, but rather that of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.⁷⁷ Since there was a clear delineation of responsibility between conflict and post-conflict security operations, neither organization planned for the transition. The need for the transition to post-conflict security to occur simultaneously with decisive operations compounded the problem of transition for both organizations.

Clearly the decisive combat operations in IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated the “New American Way of War”: networked precision munitions, synchronized with the maneuver of modest ground forces, rapidly achieved decisive victory.⁷⁸ Joint Forces

Command is already integrating lessons from IRAQI FREEDOM into the joint operating concepts for the conduct of major combat operations into the future.⁷⁹ Yet, despite the stunning decisive victory, the United States has not secured the peace in Iraq.

The limited number of ground forces required to achieve decisive victory actually proved an impediment to the rapid implementation of post-conflict security. The force that CENTCOM and CFLCC originally planned to achieve the operational endstate of a safe and secure Iraq was five divisions organized under the V Corps and I Marine Expeditionary Force. The size of the force that actually conducted the operation was a little over three divisions.⁸⁰ This translated to approximately 151,000 coalition soldiers and marines in the land forces during the transition to post-conflict stability, which represented one soldier or marine for every 164 Iraqi residents. Therefore, rapid transitioning to post-conflict security simultaneously, or near simultaneously, was difficult, since the forces required to follow and support, or follow and assume, the mission to secure bypassed territory, or bypassed forces, were not available in sufficient quantities to conduct those operations. Indeed, when it came time to secure key civilian institutions in Baghdad, General McKiernan, upon completion of decisive combat operations, was not able to meet all the post-conflict security missions.⁸¹

Therefore, the pattern of the “New American Way of War” continued in IRAQI FREEDOM. A new pattern emerged as well that germinated from ENDURING FREEDOM, which was to use limited ground forces during decisive combat with the assumption that these same forces would be adequate to conduct post-conflict security missions. Indeed, when presented with the testimony of Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki’s estimate of several hundred thousand soldiers to secure the peace in a post-conflict Iraq, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that “It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces. Hard to imagine.”⁸² Indeed, hard to imagine. Yet later in the year, the number of coalition ground forces working to secure post-conflict Iraq numbered 185,000 soldiers just for the U.S. Army, let alone coalition partners.⁸³ Thus,

the latest war in the pattern of the “New American Way of War” demonstrated that the rapid nature of decisive combat operations requires more ground forces to secure the post-conflict peace than it does to achieve decisive victory.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The “New American Way of War” cannot deliver on the promise of reduced ground forces for which the authors of the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* hoped. In the drive to swiftly defeat the efforts of an adversary and return conditions to *status quo ante bellum*, American forces will require more ground forces to secure the peace than to complete decisive combat operations. Indeed, to conduct and win a decisive campaign in a major combat operation, the United States will require more ground forces to remove a regime. Two lessons regarding the transition to post-conflict security emerge from the recent past.

To secure the post-conflict peace effectively, an overwhelming combat force is necessary. In Kosovo this meant deploying 40,000 NATO soldiers to provide presence and impose the Alliance’s will upon the Serbs and Kosovars. This translated to one combat soldier for every 100 residents. The joint force commander may reduce the overwhelming forces required in the initial transition later once peace and stability return, as occurred after ALLIED FORCE. NATO reduced forces in Kosovo to half of what they were at the start of the operation. The United States chose to employ modest forces to secure the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today the United States still is unable to provide a stable and secure environment in both nations. In Kosovo the United States and NATO provided a safe and secure environment within months of the end of decisive combat.

To secure the post-conflict peace effectively as a result of “The New American Way of War,” the Joint Force Commander needs to provide simultaneously, or near simultaneously, post-conflict security, while engaged in decisive combat operations. In Kosovo, this meant deploying land combat forces as soon as NATO signed the technical agreement with the Yugoslavs. In Afghanistan, coalition forces waited for a month to provide post-conflict security to Kabul,

while waiting for the arrival of the International Security Assistance Force. In Iraq, the coalition forces secured terrain as they progressed, but the arrangements for transition to post-conflict security with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance were ambiguous. This led to a power vacuum resulting in the massive chaos that coalition ground forces still are not able to control almost a year after the war. Unity of effort is essential for a simultaneous or near simultaneous transition to post-conflict security from decisive combat operations. The idea that a separate organization should be responsible for post-conflict security flies in the face of this lesson.

In order to provide the joint force commander the right capabilities needed to transition to post-conflict security in future decisive operations, the United States should consider the following recommendations:

- Properly resource the land component commander responsible to conduct decisive operations with combat formations that can follow and assume security missions for bypassed enemy and provide presence on occupied terrain. The amount of force sized to secure the peace in ALLIED FORCE could serve as a good rule of thumb, which was 1 ground combatant for every 100 residents.
- Place post-conflict security forces under the command of the land component commander for unity of command. Task organize additional specialized forces such as civil affairs, military police, and engineers to the combat formations to assume some post-conflict civil reconstruction, police, and infrastructure repair missions until the security situation allows a transition to international, local, or nongovernmental solutions. Such a step would eliminate the need for a separate joint stability force organization, since the land component commander would possess the right capabilities to secure the peace in parallel with decisive combat operations.
- Adjust the rules for force sizing in the next *Quadrennial Defense Review* to allow for the sizing of a potentially larger post-conflict ground security force in comparison to the ground force required for success in decisive combat operations.

This should be additive force structure rather than a lesser included force structure.

Implementing these recommendations may provide the future joint force commander the right capabilities to ensure that winning the decisive victory includes securing the peace. A full understanding how “The New American Way of War” has transformed the nature of war may help in visualizing the reality that more ground force is now required to secure the peace than to conduct decisive combat.

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CHAPTER 4

NUCLEAR HIGH ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE: IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Riddle

The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.

President Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States recognizes that over the past decade, “advances in technology and an increasingly globalized international environment have contributed to the proliferation of the means for new adversaries to organize and threaten great nations in ways that previously required the creation and maintenance of large armed forces and supporting industrial capabilities to achieve.”¹ The strategy emphasizes chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them because these threats are “coveted by rogue nations as tools of intimidation, military aggression, blackmail, and the means to overcome the conventional superiority of the United States.”² The use of a single nuclear-armed ballistic missile could offer an adversary the means to accomplish this objective.

Open hearings in the House of Representatives in 1997 and 1999 indicated that the detonation of a nuclear weapon at an altitude of approximately 500 kilometers (km) over the United States would generate a high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) which

instantaneously could disrupt or destroy electrical and electronic systems that operate the critical infrastructure of the United States, as well as portions of Canada and Mexico.³ Largely as a result of the testimony presented during these hearings, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to establish a “Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack.”⁴ Although the interim efforts of the commission are not publicly available, consideration of the previous testimony, coupled with a review of on-going efforts to manage the current strategic environment, provides a suitable vantage point to consider what additional efforts are required.⁵ Those interested in the efforts to ensure an effective homeland defense and homeland security effort should understand the implications of a successful HEMP attack on the United States, and the factors that influence the probability of an attack, as well as continuously seek innovative ways to prevent such an attack from ever occurring, and simultaneously, to prepare for it, if preventative efforts should fail.⁶

This chapter will explore how a nuclear weapon would create a HEMP. It will then address the effects that such an attack would have on electrical and electronic systems and the implications for the nation’s critical infrastructure. It then will turn to a discussion of the risks of such an attack and the contributions of the existing national strategies to prevent and prepare for a HEMP attack. After identifying areas of concern, the chapter concludes with recommendations to strengthen the nation’s capability to prevent or mitigate and recover from the effects of this ultimate form of asymmetric attack. To appreciate properly the implications for homeland defense and homeland security, however, it first is necessary to begin by defining what an electromagnetic pulse is.

HIGH ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE

The Technology Division of the National Communications System defines an electromagnetic pulse as a wide frequency range, high-intensity, extremely rapid, and short duration burst of electromagnetic energy. Such a burst produces electric and magnetic fields which can couple to metallic conductors associated with

electrical and electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges.⁷ One noted expert in the field of nuclear weapons and electromagnetic pulse effects characterized such a pulse as being similar to “. . . very intense static electricity that is carried on radio-frequency electromagnetic waves.”⁸ Although electromagnetic pulse can result from both nuclear and non-nuclear means, this chapter will concentrate on a pulse created by a high altitude nuclear detonation.⁹

In general, a nuclear explosion creates an electromagnetic pulse through the interaction of high energy nuclear emanations with atoms in the atmosphere.¹⁰ At altitudes above approximately 40 kilometers (km), this effect becomes particularly significant due to the large volume of the atmosphere underneath the explosion that interacts with the high energy nuclear radiation. According to one expert, the nuclear weapon’s high energy radiation interacts with air molecules and essentially transforms the atmosphere underneath the explosion into a gigantic, radio-transmitter antenna.¹¹

The Director of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab testified that there are two overriding characteristics that make a HEMP attack unique.¹² These characteristics are of particular interest to those concerned with an effective homeland defense and homeland security. First, the area affected by the electromagnetic pulse could be continental in scope. As the altitude of the detonation increases the area in line of sight to the radiation and, therefore subjected to direct electromagnetic pulse effects, also increases.¹³ A detonation at an altitude of approximately 500 km could impact the entire continental United States as well as portions of Canada and Mexico, although at the edges, the field intensity would be approximately half of the peak levels, while the field strength would not be uniform over the entire area.¹⁴

The second HEMP characteristic is that peak electromagnetic field amplitude and the speed at which it increases are extremely high.¹⁵ Although electromagnetic pulse has often been compared to a lightning strike, such an analogy is only useful as an illustrative comparison to understand the scale of some effects. There are significant differences. For example, a HEMP is comprised of several components, each generated by different effects of the nuclear

weapon.¹⁶ Each has unique characteristics and pose different protection challenges. Moreover, electromagnetic pulse generated by an exoatmospheric nuclear explosion develops its peak electrical field much faster than lightning, making it harder to protect against.¹⁷ Finally, lightning remains a localized event, while the implications of a continental-sized electromagnetic field create unique propagation effects.

Since an electromagnetic field interacts with metallic conductors to induce currents to flow through them, any metallic object (such as power lines, local area network cables, or even plumbing) could act as antennae which would gather in the electromagnetic signal and convert it to current flow.¹⁸ Long-line conductors such as power lines and metallic communication cables could extend further these currents throughout and beyond the area illuminated by the line-of-sight effects. The direct and indirect electromagnetic coupling effects are the means by which such a pulse generated by a high altitude nuclear detonation could cause near-instantaneous, potentially damaging voltages and currents in unprotected electronic circuits and components throughout an entire continental-sized area.¹⁹

Modern electronics and computer systems depend extensively on semiconductor technology. Due to the exceptional sensitivity of modern semiconductors to relatively small amounts of energy, the extreme voltages and/or current spikes produced by an electromagnetic pulse event could create irreversible damage to unshielded or specially designed electronic and computer devices. Such a result underlines why a high altitude electromagnetic attack would be so potentially catastrophic to the United States—this nation is the most electronically dependent country in the world.

CONSEQUENCES OF A HEMP ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES HOMELAND

A detailed prediction of all of the potential effects of a HEMP attack is difficult due to the complexity of interdependent systems, the diverse environments throughout the effected areas, and the uncertainties associated with the manner of nuclear weapon employment. While an electromagnetic pulse and its effects on

various devices and equipment has received intense scrutiny over the past 40 years, much of this analysis was conducted by DoD and focused on nuclear command and control systems. As a result, much of the material produced about electromagnetic pulse remained highly classified. A great deal of the publicly available information regarding the effect of electromagnetic pulse on military and civilian infrastructure has resulted from several open hearings held by the House of Representatives in 1997 and 1999. Those hearings form a foundation to understand the effects that a successful HEMP attack on the United States could have.

One expert described the results of a successful HEMP attack in a hearing before the 1997 Military and Research Sub-committee of the House Armed Services Committee:

. . . [a successful HEMP attack] . . . is a continental scale time machine. We essentially . . . move it back in time by about one century and you live like our grandfathers and great grandfathers did in the 1890s until you rebuild. You do without telephones. You do without television, and you do without electric power . . . and if it happens that there is not enough fuel to heat with in the winter time and there is not enough food to go around because agriculture has become so inefficient and so on, the population simply shrinks to meet the carrying capacity of the system.²⁰

Taking into account the increasing interdependence of the critical infrastructure in the United States, the picture is particularly grim.²¹ The critical infrastructure of the nation utterly depends on information age technologies.²² Indeed, all of the 13 interdependent critical infrastructure sectors (agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry and hazardous materials, postal and shipping²³) inextricably are reliant on the proper functioning of electrical power, electronic devices, and computer systems. Virtually all of the technology that operates each of these critical infrastructures may be highly vulnerable to the effects of electromagnetic pulse.²⁴

In addition to the immediate disruptions caused by the loss of extensive portions of the information age infrastructure, the cumulative effects of such an attack would have long-term

consequences on restoration efforts. Unlike the localized effects of a hurricane or even a “traditional” low altitude nuclear weapon detonation, the instantaneous, continental scope and infrastructure-wide effects of a HEMP attack would make recovery attempts exceptionally difficult and a lengthy process. Essentially post-attack America would remain stuck in the 19th century until replacement electrical equipment and components became available (most likely having to be brought in from abroad) and installed.²⁵ Of course, this assumes those in charge could locate and efficiently employ the variety of skills required to conduct such a recovery in a population attempting merely to survive the anarchy that would inevitably result.

Additionally, America’s military forces have increasingly returned to the continental United States. A HEMP attack would also affect them directly. Although the strategic nuclear forces (and portions of their supporting infrastructure) possess the means to resist the effects of electromagnetic pulse, the general purpose forces have not received the same capabilities. After a successful HEMP attack, the posts, camps, bases, and stations throughout the country likely would be unable to provide the services necessary to function as power projection platforms. Although some military programs have incorporated electromagnetic pulse survivability within their design and acquisition process, increasingly, the military forces have turned to commercial-off-the-shelf equipment that has little or no such protection.

To jump start national recovery efforts likely would require significant portions of the remaining overseas military resources of the United States to focus their efforts on domestic recovery. The resulting lack of a viable forward military presence, coupled with an American government intently focused on internal recovery, undoubtedly would result in numerous regional conflicts as nations attempted to gain advantage or to redress old grievances. Several of these regional conflicts (India-Pakistan, Israel-Syria, China-Russia, China-India) certainly have the potential to involve further use of nuclear weapons with their attendant effects.

Moreover, the worldwide economy increasingly has grown interdependent. The economic disruptions that occurred in the

wake of the 2001 attacks suggest a clear demonstration of this interdependence. The disruption of the interdependent critical infrastructure of the United States would likely produce worldwide economic turmoil. The extended loss of the American consumer markets, disruption of domestic manufacturing capability, and chaotic financial institutions would contribute to an extended period of worldwide economic chaos. Clearly, the United States is vulnerable, and the consequences of such an attack, both within the United States and across the globe, are unacceptable. However, the existence of exceptional vulnerability does not equate necessarily to risk. One needs to make an assessment of the probability of a HEMP attack on the homeland of the United States to determine the relative degree of risk that is acceptable.

ASSESSING THE RISK

When considering potential threats, one must conduct a risk assessment to gain an appreciation for an event's occurrence. This is necessary to provide a basis to ensure the proper provision of national resources to reduce the likelihood of the event occurring or the severity of its impact. This risk assessment will first evaluate the current nuclear proliferation environment and provide a broad assessment of the availability of suitable delivery capabilities. This will provide a basis to judge the likelihood of a HEMP attack.

Nuclear Proliferation.

Although it is a gross generalization, the reader can assume that essentially every nuclear weapon will produce infrastructure-significant electromagnetic pulse effects when detonated at high altitude. The Institute for Science and International Security estimates that approximately 30 countries have either sought to develop nuclear weapons or indicated their intentions to do so. Other than the United States, the following countries have successfully developed nuclear weapons: Great Britain, France, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India. Israel is suspected of possessing nuclear weapons, as is North Korea.²⁶ In a June 2003 report to Congress, the Director of

Central Intelligence stated that, although Syria is a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty, broader access to foreign expertise warrants concern about that nation's nuclear intentions.²⁷ Of the remaining nations that either had established programs or had advocated the development of nuclear weapons, only three were considered to be actively seeking nuclear weapons: Iraq, Libya, and Iran.²⁸

Nevertheless, there have obviously been substantial developments over the last year in the arena of nuclear proliferation. Two of these nations reportedly seeking nuclear weapons, Iraq and Libya, have terminated their programs. Analysis of the intentions and methodologies of their programs is on-going and likely will provide valuable knowledge about other nation's weapons efforts and nuclear technology proliferation in general. However, other recent proliferation developments warrant particularly careful attention. First, Iran has confirmed the existence of a substantial weapons-grade material processing capability.²⁹ Although the International Atomic Energy Agency trumpeted the announcement that the Iranians have signed the additional protocol on nuclear safeguards in December 2003, doubts remain as to the extent of that nation's future cooperation with full verification measures (as well as the efficacy of those inspections).³⁰ Thus, the full extent and maturity of Iran's nuclear weapons program remain unknown.

The second proliferation development that warrants careful attention is the exposure of a highly efficient and organized international "proliferation for profit" effort. The acknowledged extent and activities of the Pakistani "Kahn Network" is particularly troubling.³¹ President Musharraf has publicly disavowed the involvement of the Pakistani government or military (supported by the prepared statement of Dr. Kahn) with this international proliferation effort. Nevertheless, there are troubling indicators that the government of Pakistan has been actively supporting the spread of nuclear weapons technology throughout the Islamic world.³² The interception while enroute from Malaysia to Libya of equipment (of Pakistani specification) destined for use in uranium refinement is just one example.³³

The final area of concern about proliferation remains the access to existing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-grade material

by nations and others interested in possessing nuclear weapons. A recent article in the *New York Times* reiterates that the refinement of weapons-grade material is not a simple matter, and that the production of atomic weapons still remains a complex undertaking.³⁴ This creates an extensive demand for states and others with nuclear ambitions to obtain either complete nuclear weapons or weapons-grade material. Although any nation with fissile materials or nuclear weapons is potentially a source, Russia, the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and the former satellite nations remain a particularly significant proliferation concern due to the economic turmoil, massive stockpiles of fissile materials, inadequate nuclear storage security, and continuing susceptibility to demand-side diversion.³⁵

The inadequate security arrangements surrounding Russian fissile stockpiles and nuclear weapons storage facilities, the proliferation of nuclear technologies by organized networks (such as created by Dr. Kahn), and the nuclear programs of states such as Iran, North Korea, and, potentially, Syria are clearly of significant concern to U.S. policymakers and strategists. However, to conduct a HEMP attack successfully, a nation or terrorist organization must match the weapon to a suitable delivery means.

Nuclear Weapon Delivery.

To conduct a successful HEMP attack on the United States, the perpetrator confronts the significant challenge of getting the weapon to the required altitude. Due to the area affected by such an attack, exact geographic accuracy is not a primary requirement. Obviously, an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with sufficient payload capacity to carry the weapon would suffice. Similarly, weapons traditionally considered as either short, medium, or intermediate range ballistic missiles would also be suitable, if of sufficient payload capacity and positioned at a launch point close enough to the United States.

The 1998 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (the Rumsfeld Commission) observed that the use of Soviet-era patterns of ballistic missile development as guides to

evaluating current threats are misleading.³⁶ Those seeking the means to threaten or attack the United States may use ballistic missile development and deployment approaches that were not used by the major Cold War powers for reasons of efficiency, safety, or quality control.³⁷ The report cited transfer of operational missile systems as a specific concern. Similarly, the commission specifically identified several countries that were pursuing sea launch capabilities (a troubling aspect of this development is the increased difficulty of correctly assigning responsibility for such an attack).³⁸ This development obviously expands the potential threat envelope to shorter range surface-to-surface missiles such as Scuds.³⁹ Within this framework of uncertainty, an overview of those nations that could potentially possess nuclear-capable ballistic missiles is in order.

Of the existing nuclear armed nations currently of concern, Russia and China possess both land and sea based ballistic missile systems capable of conducting a HEMP attack on the United States.⁴⁰ In a June 2003 report to Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence assessed that North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan possessed a range of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, with North Korea finalizing a limited range ICBM capability.⁴¹ The report also cited Syria as having a domestic Scud production program, as well as a development program to produce longer range Scud variants.⁴² Possession of nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capability are the entry level requirements to threaten the United States with a HEMP attack. But sufficient technical expertise must be available to integrate the systems together, along with a degree of confidence that the system will perform as required. Countries that possess a domestic ballistic missile manufacturing program undoubtedly possess sufficient technical expertise to do so. How then does the United States intend to meet these threats?

U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGIES.

The mutually supporting NSS and National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) aim to provide an integrated, comprehensive, strategic framework that simultaneously seeks to create and seize opportunities to strengthen national security and

prosperity as well as provide a secure foundation for on-going global engagement.⁴³ Central features of both strategies either contribute to the prevention of a HEMP attack on the U.S. homeland or establish suitable frameworks to enable national preparedness, should such an attack occur.

Two of the central objectives of the NSS are to “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism” and “work to prevent attacks against the United States and its friends and to prevent the enemies of the United States from threatening it or its allies and friends with WMD [weapons of mass destruction].”⁴⁴ Many of the initiatives that support these objectives directly and indirectly contribute to the prevention of a HEMP attack on the United States homeland.

Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks.

The NSS recognizes the dangers created by the nexus between terrorists, state sponsors of terrorism, and WMD.⁴⁵ The al-Qaeda organization sought to acquire WMD with enormous enthusiasm and remains a target of particular interest to the United States.⁴⁶ The continued interdiction of its sanctuaries, the explicit elimination of the distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly aid or harbor them, and the emphasis on the prevention of the transfer of WMD and their means of delivery to terrorist organizations contribute directly to the prevention of a HEMP attack on the United States by state-supported terrorists. The NSS framework also seeks to prevent the use of WMD through the execution of three broad elements: counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and effective consequence management. There have been substantial developments in the execution of each that contribute to the efforts to prevent a HEMP attack on the United States.

Counterproliferation.

Ongoing proactive nuclear and ballistic missile counterproliferation efforts are providing substantial dividends that contribute to the prevention of a HEMP attack. First, the intelligence

efforts to unmask the extent of the nuclear proliferation network created by A. Q. Kahn provide an excellent example of on-going initiatives to strengthen counterproliferation efforts.⁴⁷ Similarly, the decision to implement an earlier deployment of an initial ground-based interceptor and improved ballistic missile tracking capabilities will support the improved passive and active defenses called for in the NSS.⁴⁸ Moreover, the convincing demonstration of the continuing efficiency and effectiveness of America's global precision strike capabilities during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is a clear indication that multidimensional counterforce capabilities remain a viable element of America's counterproliferation capabilities. Such capabilities would clearly contribute to the prevention of a HEMP attack on the United States. Finally, the U.S. demonstrated willingness to conduct preemptive strikes to neutralize WMD under the concept of imminent defense adds an unmistakable dimension to the concept of deterrence for those seeking to acquire WMD.⁴⁹

Nonproliferation.

Another initiative specified in the NSS that is contributing to the prevention of a HEMP attack on the U.S. homeland is the continuing emphasis on strengthened nonproliferation efforts. For example, although the Bush administration initially decreased the emphasis and associated funding of threat reduction assistance to Russia in 2002, after Congress replaced and mandated additional funding the following year the Bush administration fully supported the program.⁵⁰

Strengthened nonproliferation diplomatic efforts have also been successful. One particularly promising multilateral diplomatic initiative has been the development of the Proliferation Security Initiative.⁵¹ This initiative combines the efforts of 11 countries to combat trafficking to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern of WMD, their delivery means, and related materials.⁵²

That initiative also provides the multilateral framework that supports another nonproliferation initiative identified in the NSS: interdiction. The countries participating in the Proliferation Security

Initiative agree to interdict the transfer or transport to and from states (and nonstate actors) of proliferation concern of WMD, their delivery systems or related materials, either domestically or internationally.⁵³ Although aimed at the entire range of WMD, this interdiction protocol contributes to the prevention of a HEMP attack by seeking to curb the free transport of nuclear technologies, weapons and ballistic missile systems.

Consequence Management.

The final portion of the NSS framework that seeks to prevent the use of WMD on the United States, its allies, or its friends is effective consequence management.⁵⁴ Effective consequence management, although primarily a preparedness concept, also contributes to the prevention of a high altitude electromagnetic attack. By seeking to minimize the effects of WMD on its people and those of allied and friendly nations, consequence management contributes to deterrence by demonstrating to the enemies of the United States that their WMD acquisition and employment strategies will not be worth the risks.⁵⁵

The most significant contribution to the concept of an effective consequence management strategy has been the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the implementation of a comprehensive national homeland security strategy. A brief review of some of the on-going homeland security initiatives will illuminate some of the efforts that are underway and which are creating an effective framework to pursue national preparedness from the effects of a HEMP attack.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (NSHS)

The July 2002 NSHS is the first-ever national homeland security strategy and provides the initial framework to secure the homeland from terrorist attacks.⁵⁶ The three strategic objectives of this strategy are to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.⁵⁷ Since the DHS is a relatively new

organization and faces an immense task of avoiding the expectation that it must try to defend everything, everywhere, all at once, it is reasonable to find that its on-going initiatives do not specifically concentrate on direct protection against a HEMP attack. However, of the six critical mission areas created by the strategy, two of them offer a promising framework to reduce the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets.

The NSHS recognizes that American society and its modern way of life are dependent on networks of physical and virtual infrastructures.⁵⁸ Of the eight major initiatives to protect these assets, systems, and functions, five develop organizational or procedural frameworks that will contribute to the preparedness of the United States against the effects of a high altitude electromagnetic attack.

The creation of the DHS resulted in the assignment of a single accountable official to ensure the United States addresses vulnerabilities that involve more than one infrastructure sector.⁵⁹ This step integrated the assessment of threats and vulnerabilities for the range of interdependent critical infrastructures that support the United States.⁶⁰ While the NSHS does not specifically reduce the vulnerability of the critical infrastructure to high altitude electromagnetic attack, it makes the Secretary of Homeland Security specifically responsible to assess and reduce critical infrastructure vulnerabilities to the effects of this type of attack.

The NSHS also specifies that a key role of the DHS will be to build and maintain a complete critical infrastructure assessment.⁶¹ This comprehensive, up-to-date analysis of the vulnerabilities and preparedness of key points across the critical infrastructure centers is designed to permit the DHS to match current threat information against current vulnerabilities to efficiently direct the appropriate actions.⁶² As with the initiative to unify critical infrastructure responsibilities, this framework will enable homeland security personnel to determine the appropriate critical infrastructure systems that need to be protected against HEMP effects as well as a means to track the accomplishment of vulnerability reduction.

Another key initiative that supports preparedness to mitigate and recover from the effects of a HEMP attack is the effort by the DHS to construct effective partnerships with state and local governments and the private sector.⁶³ As with the other elements, this initiative does not provide direct improvements in the effort to prepare the U.S. homeland against the effects of such an attack. However, the establishment of effective mechanisms for the federal, state, and local governments to partner with the private sector has laid the groundwork to introduce specific HEMP infrastructure improvements.

The next homeland security critical mission area that offers the potential to reduce infrastructure vulnerabilities to a HEMP attack is the development of a national infrastructure protection plan. This plan provides the methodology for “. . . identifying and prioritizing critical assets, systems, and functions, and for sharing protection responsibility with state and local government and the private sector.”⁶⁴ The effort to establish standards and benchmarks for the protection of critical infrastructure will be invaluable as the mechanism for the prioritization of appropriate HEMP hardening measures.

The final initiative to protect critical infrastructures is the ongoing effort to develop effective protective solutions through effective modeling and analysis.⁶⁵ Specifically, advanced simulations can assist in determining which assets, systems, and functions are particularly important in a series of interdependent infrastructures. This will support the efficient use of scarce resources to harden “high payoff” portions of the infrastructure to the effects of a HEMP attack.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

As with protecting critical infrastructures, there are several initiatives underway to support the critical mission area of emergency preparedness and response. This mission area seeks to minimize the damage and recover from terrorist attacks. The DHS has made significant progress in the effort to consolidate multiple existing federal response plans under a single all-discipline incident

management plan. The Initial National Response Plan, dated September 30, 2003, represents a “. . . significant first step toward integrating the current series of federal prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a single, all-discipline, all-hazards plan.”⁶⁶ Due to the substantial effects of a high altitude electromagnetic attack, the development of a plan to synchronize the national response to mitigate the effects and guide national recovery is especially critical.

A related initiative which directly supports the execution of the national response effort is the creation of a national incident management system. This system seeks to define common terminology, provide a unified command structure, and is scaleable to manage incidents of all sizes.⁶⁷ According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, the national incident management system will provide “. . . a consistent nation-wide approach for federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”⁶⁸ Along with the creation of a National Response Plan, the national incident management system will be absolutely essential to managing the consequences and organizing the national recovery from the continental-wide, sustained collapse of substantial portions of the interdependent infrastructures that a high altitude electromagnetic attack would cause.

A supporting initiative for the emergency preparedness and response critical mission area is to enable seamless communications among all responders.⁶⁹ In the aftermath of a HEMP attack, reliable communications among federal, state, and local responders will be a key enabler of the prolonged national recovery effort. The development of the national emergency communications plan will establish protocols, processes, and national standards for technology acquisition. Incorporation of suitable electromagnetic pulse hardened communications must be a key component of this plan.

The DHS recognizes that it must plan carefully for military assistance to civil authorities to ensure that, when duly authorized by the President, military forces (which remain under the command

of the Secretary of Defense) are efficiently and effectively used.⁷⁰ Military assistance to civil authorities may take the form of technical support and assistance to law enforcement (Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies), assisting in the restoration of law and order (Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances), and assisting in incident management. U.S. Northern Command is responsible for both homeland defense and for assisting civil authorities when directed by the President (through the Secretary of Defense).⁷¹ During the massive societal upheaval that will follow the comprehensive, extended disruption of the nation's critical infrastructure after a HEMP attack, DoD will play a critical role in consequence management, maintenance of civil order, and supporting the national recovery effort. For this reason, the planning and training efforts between the DHS and DoD must include the effects of a HEMP attack as a critical requirement.

Although both the NSS and NSHS have accomplished some successes that help to protect the United States from a range of complex threats, including HEMP, there are clearly areas that require improvement. Policy and strategy makers concerned with an effective national defense and homeland security strategy framework should consider the following recommendations to strengthen national efforts to ensure suitable and adequate prevention and preparation measures against a HEMP attack.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the HEMP threat grew out of the Cold War, the threat of this form of attack exists as long as there are nuclear weapons and delivery systems that may be targeted against the United States. Indeed, the advantages to a potential enemy of the United States may be increasing as the military seeks to further increase its dependence on commercial-based information technologies. However, the psychological tendency is to shrug off the implications of a HEMP attack because the consequences are so enormous.⁷² Nevertheless, the threat and the vulnerabilities are real and must be acknowledged, prioritized, and planned for by both the homeland defense and homeland security communities. While the Electromagnetic Pulse

(EMP) Commission will present a thoroughly comprehensive list of recommendations in the near future, some broad recommendations are worthwhile presenting here.

As the Rumsfeld Commission warned, and the events of September 11tragically demonstrated, enemies of the United States will seek to attack in ways that the nation is not prepared for, using methodologies that have not been previously tried.⁷³ The on-going effort to improve the intelligence agencies of the United States must continue. One particular area of emphasis for all members of the intelligence community should be the integration of adaptive red teams that are used to identify idiosyncratic methods of attacking the United States.

The inevitable tension between homeland defense and homeland security creates a potential seam that must be recognized and eliminated or minimized. The efforts by U.S. Northern Command to craft a joint operating concept to close this seam are particularly promising. Similarly, the proactive relationships at multiple levels between the DHS and DoD indicate that both organizations are seeking diligently to mature their relationship. One specific area that should be developed by DoD as a matter of some urgency however, is a mandated series of planning sessions and simulations to determine the most effective and efficient way to employ its resources in the aftermath of a HEMP attack. Specific care should be paid to the incorporation of the reserve component and returning overseas based military capabilities. Planning and prioritization of military assistance to civilian authorities in a post high altitude electromagnetic attack scenario should be of particular emphasis.

Another area of concern is that many of the remaining nuclear physicist personnel, specifically those associated with EMP, are retiring without a next generation to follow their lead.⁷⁴ Similarly, the physical plant to conduct EMP testing and simulation has atrophied almost to the point of nonexistence.⁷⁵ Building upon suggestions originally proposed in 1999, Congress should mandate and oversee the creation of an interagency, DoD-DHS led organization to champion the revitalization of both of these resources.⁷⁶

Finally, as indicated earlier, the NSHS has made a good organizational start in several areas. Congress should mandate the

DHS specifically incorporate HEMP into the appropriate initiatives in emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protection. Specifically, the DHS must conduct an analysis of the detailed vulnerabilities of various portions of the critical infrastructure to HEMP and, as a matter of priority, integrate selected initiatives to minimize critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.

CONCLUSION

Increasing proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technology, continued insecurity of fissile stockpiles, and the presence of capable adversaries dedicated to the destruction of the United States make a HEMP attack an increasingly likely scenario. A successful HEMP attack would severely damage the critical infrastructure that supports the national elements of power of the United States for an extended period of time. As such, the consequences of this type of attack are unacceptable.

Implementation of the concepts contained in the NSS and the NSHS are achieving successes synchronizing the diplomatic, informational, economic, and military elements of national power to prevent a HEMP attack, while simultaneously establishing promising organizational frameworks which may help to prepare the United States for the consequences of such an attack. The approaching report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack will provide extensive recommendations to mitigate the risks to the United States from a HEMP attack. This much is certain: the threat has not diminished; the vulnerabilities to this type of attack exist; there is much that can and must be done.

The challenge will be for the nation and its leaders to hear the report, to evaluate objectively the recommendations, and to implement them effectively. In the end, the United States must ensure that, in the words of Colin Gray, it does not lose the only strategic resource that can never be regained: *the time to act*.⁷⁷

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. George W. Bush, "The NSS of The United States of America," Washington, DC, 2002, p. 13.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

3. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Dr. Gary Smith, Prepared Testimony, *Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure*, 105th Congress, 1st Session, July 16, 1997; available from http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997_h/h970716s.htm, Internet; accessed February 3, 2004.

4. Establishment of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack; August 14, 2001; Available from <http://armedservices.house.gov/reports/2001executivereports/01-08-14electromagnetic.pdf>, Internet, accessed January 31, 2004. Specifically, the commission has been chartered to:

Assess the nature and magnitude of potential high-altitude EMP threats to the United States from all potentially hostile states or nonstate actors that have or could have or could acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles enabling them to perform a high-altitude EMP attack against the United States within the next 15 years; the vulnerability of the United States military, and especially civilian systems, to EMP attack, given special attention to the vulnerability of the civilian infrastructure as a matter of emergency preparedness; the capability of the United States to repair and recover from damage inflicted on United States military and civilian systems by an EMP attack; the feasibility and cost of hardening select military and civilian systems against EMP attack.

5. Mike Frankel, Executive Director, EMP Commission, mfrankel@empc.org, "HEMP" electronic mail message to Thomas Riddle, thomas.c.riddle@us.army.mil, January 27, 2004. Mr. Frankel stated that the EMP Commission was not releasing any interim reports prior to its report to Congress.

6. The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines Homeland Security as ". . . a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur." The Defense Planning Guidance defines Homeland Defense as "The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression."

7. National Communications System, Technology and Standards Division, *Telecommunications: Glossary of Terms*, August 7, 1996, available from http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-013/_1938.htm, Internet, accessed October 19, 2003.

8. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Dr. Lowell Wood, Prepared Testimony, "Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure," 105th Congress, 1st Session, July 16, 1997; available from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has197010.000/has197010_of.htm. Internet, accessed October 19, 2003.

9. Carlo Kopp, "The Electromagnetic Bomb—a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction," 1996, available from <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/kopp/apjemp.html>, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003, p. 2. Kopp has written extensively on the subject of EMP and how it may be used against a technologically dependent adversary such as the United States. Due to the relative ease with which such attacks may be resourced and conducted, localized, non-nuclear EMP attacks are a subject of increasing concern among security professionals.

10. Samuel Glasstone, and Philip Dolan, eds., *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons*, Washington DC, 1997, p. 518. This book has an excellent chapter on the EMP effects generated by nuclear weapons and is one of the foundation references on the overall effects of nuclear weapons.

11. Congress, "Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure," p. 6. Interestingly, the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon is not as critical as the design—a device of less than 10 kilotons (optimized for the production of particular characteristics) can have much more of an EMP effect than a crudely designed weapon in the megaton range.

12. Congress, Smith, p. 3.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Research and Development Subcommittee, "Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure," 105th Congress, 1st Session, July 16, 1997, available from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has197010.000/has197010_of.htm; Internet, accessed October 19, 2003, p. 14. Refer to Radasky, "High Altitude EMP (HEMP) Environments and Effects," *NBC Report*, Spring/Summer 2002; Glasstone and Dolan, for additional details on the factors that influence the specific distribution of the HEMP-created electrical fields on the surface of the earth.

15. Congress, Smith, p. 3.

16. Dr. William A. Radasky, "High Altitude EMP (HEMP) Environments and Effects," *NBC Report*, Spring/Summer 2002, pp. 24–27. This is an extremely informative article and is highly recommended for those interested in gaining an initial understanding of the E1, E2, and E3 components of a HEMP pulse and the generation mechanism for each.

17. Congress, "Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure," p. 15.

18. Congress, Smith, p. 4.

19. Congress, "Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure," p. 16.

20. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Government Programs and Oversight, "Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): Should This be a Problem of National Concern to Private Enterprise,

Businesses Small and Large, As Well As Government?" 106th Cong. 1st Session, June 7, 1999, available from <http://www.house.gov/smbiz/hearings/106th/1999/990601/transcript.html>; Internet, accessed September 22, 2003.

21. George W. Bush, "The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets," Washington, DC, February 2003, p. 6.

Critical Infrastructures are systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

22. Congress, "Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure," p. 20.

23. Bush, "The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets," p. 6.

24. Congress, "Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure," p. 35

25. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

26. Institute for Science and International Security, "Nuclear Weapons Programs Worldwide: An Historical Overview," available from <http://www.isis-online.org/mapproject/introduction.html>, Internet, accessed February 10, 2004, p. 1. South Africa remains the only country to have succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon and then subsequently dismantling its weapons program. Three members of the former Soviet Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) inherited nuclear weapons but claim to have returned the weapons to Russia and declared themselves to be non-nuclear states.

27. Director of Central Intelligence, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1 Through June 30, 2003," available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm, Internet, accessed February 24, 2003, p. 6.

28. Institute for Science and International Security, "Nuclear Weapons Programs Worldwide: An Historical Overview," available from <http://www.isis-online.org/mapproject/introduction.html>, Internet, accessed 10 February 2004, p.1.

29. Natural Resources Defense Council, "Iran Develops Nuclear Technologies in Secret for 18 Years," December 12, 2003, available from <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/iaeaairan.asp>, Internet, accessed February 10, 2004.

30. International Atomic Energy Agency, "Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards," December 18, 2003, available from <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News2002/iranap20031218.html>, Internet, accessed February 10, 2004.

31. Bernard Levy, "Abdul Qadeer Khan," *Wall Street Journal*, February 17, 2004, p. A20.

32. "Pakistan's Nuclear Crimes," *Washington Post*, February 5, 2004, p. A20.

33. *Ibid.*

34. Greg Easterbrook, "The Atomic Club: If the Bomb is so Easy to Make, Why Don't More Nations Have It?" *New York Times*, January 4, 2004, p. 4.1.

35. Rensselaer Lee, "Nuclear Smuggling: Patterns and Responses," *Parameters*, Spring 2003, available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03spring/lee.htm>, Internet, accessed November 10, 2003.

36. Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, "Executive Summary, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States," July 15, 1998, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/index.html>, Internet, accessed February 1, 2004.

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38. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Military Research and Development Subcommittee, "Electromagnetic Pulse Threats to U.S. Military and Civilian Infrastructure," 106th Cong. 1st Session, October 7, 1999. Available from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has280010.000/has280010_0.htm; Internet, accessed September 22, 2003, p. 68.

39. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Government Programs and Oversight, "Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): Should This be a Problem of National Concern to Private Enterprise, Businesses Small and Large, As Well As Government?" 106th Cong. 1st Session, June 7, 1999. Available from <http://www.house.gov/smbiz/hearings/106th/1999/990601/transcript.html>, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003.

40. National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015 (Unclassified Summary of the National Intelligence Estimate)," December 2001, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/bmthreat-2015.htm>, Internet, accessed January 10, 2004.

41. Director of Central Intelligence, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1, Through 30 June 2003," available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm, Internet, accessed February 24, 2003, p. 6.

42. *Ibid.*

43. George W. Bush, "The National Strategy for Homeland Security," Washington, DC, July 2002, p. 5.

44. George W. Bush, "The NSS of The United States of America," p.1.

45. *Ibid.*, p.6.

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47. George J. Tenet, "Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction," February 5, 2004, available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicaffairs/speeches/2004/tenetgeorgetow>

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48. Bradley Graham, "U.S. Missile Defense Set To Get An Early Start," *Washington Post*, February 2, 2004. Also George W. Bush, "The NSS of The United States of America," p. 15.

49. Bush, "The NSS of The United States of America," p. 15.

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51. White House, "Fact Sheet on Proliferation Security Initiative," September 4, 2003, available from http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.1024958.1064417927&modele=jdc_34, Internet, accessed September 24, 2003.

52. *Ibid.* The PSI is cited by the White House as being consistent with the statement of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992 and recent statements of the G-8 and the European Union that more consistent and coherent efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD.

53. *Ibid.*

54. Bush, "The NSS of The United States of America," p. 14.

55. *Ibid.*

56. George W. Bush, "The National Strategy for Homeland Security," Washington, DC, July 2002, pp. iii-iv, vii. The NSHS broadly defines terrorism as ". . . any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments." The NSHS definition covers the use of nuclear weapons and "foreigners, acting in concert with others, on their own, or on behalf of a hostile state." Presumably then, any HEMP attack conducted by persons other than the regular military of a hostile state could be considered a terrorist attack.

57. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

58. *Ibid.*, p. ix.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*, p. ix.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

65. *Ibid.*

66. Department of Homeland Security, "Initial Response Plan Fact Sheet," Washington, DC, October 10, 2003, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=1936&print=true, Internet, accessed February 24, 2004.

67. Bush, "The National Strategy for Homeland Security," p. 43.

68. George W. Bush, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HPSPD-5," Washington, DC, February 28, 2003, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=42&content=4961, Internet, accessed January 20, 2004.

69. Bush, "The National Strategy for Homeland Security," p. 43.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

71. *Ibid.*

72. Colin S. Gray, "Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror," *Parameters*, Spring 2002, p. 9.

73. Montgomery C. Meigs. "Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare," *Parameters*, Summer 2003, p. 8. Meigs posits that the al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, demonstrated the terrorist's ability to combine asymmetry (techniques lacking a common basis of comparison) with an unorthodox approach to apply a capability (idiosyncrasy). Specifically, Meigs describes the terrorist attacks as the use of an asymmetric weapon combined with an idiosyncratic approach: ". . . the use of unique, one-time cellular teams and support structure formed for this particular operation, combined with stealth and surprise and culminating in an idiosyncratic approach by terrorists inserting themselves into the cockpits of airliners." Meigs also observes that standards of living worldwide depend on technical systems that are susceptible to idiosyncratic threats and suggests that the operational patterns of al Qaeda indicate further attacks using idiosyncratic techniques and asymmetric means.

74. Wood.

75. *Ibid.*

76. *Ibid.*

77. Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, New York, 1999, p. 16.

CHAPTER 5

IRAQ, 2003-04, AND MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-18: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN ENDS AND MEANS

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This chapter presents a comparison of the linkage of strategic ends with operational ways and means between current operations in Iraq in 2003-04 and the British campaign in Mesopotamia in 1914-18. The two campaigns took place literally over the same ground. The United States now, and Britain then, confronted significant challenges in the projection and maintenance of military power in the Middle East. Moreover, the two great powers inherited daunting civil-military requirements.¹

This chapter considers the conduct and integration of both military and post-conflict operations. It will begin with a discussion of each campaign, analyzing its strategy. What strategic imperatives necessitated the initiation of military operations in this far-flung corner of the world? What strategic assumptions dictated operational, sometimes tactical, ways and means allocated for execution? In particular, how did strategy change over time? Did it change during the course of operational execution of both military and post-conflict operations?

Historical analysis often carries the burden of demonstrating clear lessons. This comparative analysis did not set out to prove any specific “lessons learned.” Rather, the author believes the value of history lies in its ability to provide “points of departure” for problem solving. The course of research and interpretation of evidence has unearthed significant insights into the British experience in comparison to the American experience now ongoing. This chapter is too late to affect what has already transpired in Iraq in 2003, but it should provide insights relevant to the continued American presence in Iraq and for future deployments.

MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-18: SWEEPING SUCCESS, DISASTER, AND RECOVERY

The British campaign in Mesopotamia during the First World War was primarily an Indian Army operation. British rule in India

represented a unique aspect of the age of imperialism. British India encompassed what today are India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.² Britain's control in India underwent drastic revision following the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The mutiny ended the political role of the Honourable East India Company. From this point, a select, chosen, British aristocracy governed India and controlled the Indian Civil Service (ICS). Its members could not own land in India or participate in trade. Unlike their contemporaries in Britain, they obtained their jobs through open, competitive examinations.³

The cabinet in London appointed a viceroy as senior head. He did not rise from within the ranks of the British-Indian aristocracy, and thus, in that sense was even more an outsider. The Viceroy was answerable to His Majesty's Government with a supervisory chain that went back to the Secretary of State for India at the India Office in Britain, who was a Cabinet Minister, and hence ultimately answerable to Parliament. Viceroys, who operated with excessive independence, faced recall.⁴ This political system granted the Viceroy considerable latitude, understandable in an age of limited communications.⁵ The Viceroy had a council of five or six members, of whom one-third to one-half were outsiders in the same sense as he.⁶ This council, a critical component of British rule in India, originally included a military member.⁷

The Secretary of State for India also selected a Commander-in-Chief, India. The Commander-in-Chief, India was separate from the British Army's Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Field Marshal Lord Kitchener's tenure as Commander-in-Chief, India in Khartoum between 1899-1906 marked three milestones. Following the elimination of the three presidency armies of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras in 1895, he integrated all regiments within a single scheme of numbering and titles. The second established nine permanent divisions with fixed brigades. The third abolished the military member of the Viceroy's Council after a bitter, internecine political struggle with the Viceroy, Lord Curzon. The viceroy and commander-in-chief became the most powerful men in India.⁸

Britain's leaders did not expect large-scale Indian Army participation in a world war. Diplomatic reconciliation with Russia in 1906 removed the long-time fear of a Muscovite invasion, but

the turbulent kingdom in Afghanistan and volatile border tribes provided the Indian Army with sufficient missions, considering its size. Thus, the North West Frontier and internal order were the principal missions, in accordance with extant constitutional practice, whereby the army's principal role was defense and the maintenance of internal order.⁹ Moreover, the Indian Army did not possess the force structure or organization for distant expeditionary operations, especially against a modernized, regular army.

Strategy and Conventional Operations In Mesopotamia.

There was neither intent nor plan to conduct operations in Mesopotamia upon the outbreak of the First World War. However, on the outbreak of war, the government of India and His Majesty's Government discussed the participation of the Indian Army in imperial missions beyond South Asia. India agreed to provide troops to France and Aden.¹⁰ Subsequently, they sent an expeditionary force to East Africa as well.

The region first entered the strategic realm on August 25, 1914, with a requirement for the India Office to prepare a ground force to guard the scattered refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company from Abadan Island, and gunboats to secure the Shatt-al-Arab estuary.¹¹ This mission in modern parlance was a force deterrent option (FDO). The 16th Indian Brigade Group under Brigadier General W. S. Delamain reached Bahrain on October 23, 1914. Mesopotamia entered the strategic formula in October with the requirement for precautionary action to show British goodwill for the Arabs in the event of war with Turkey.¹² Britain's *primary* strategic aim was not to protect the oil fields. Rather, it was to show support for the Gulf sheikhs; to impress the Mesopotamian Arabs, who respected only tangible victory; and to ensure that the Arabs did not join the Turks in a *jihad*.¹³ The British also worried about the sympathies of their Indian Muslim troops.¹⁴

Britain declared war on Turkey on November 5. In a contingency operation, the 16th Brigade landed at Fao on November 6 and secured the Shatt-al-Arab on the 14th. Delamein was under the overall command of Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Barrett, commander-

in-chief of Indian Expeditionary Force D, even though the parent 6th Indian Division would not be complete until mid-December. Nonetheless, the British then decided to advance on Basra in order to reinforce success. Boldness paid off when Basra fell on November 22. Operations continued north to ensure the port's security, and the British took Qurna on December 9.

The decision to advance on Baghdad itself lies at the heart of the controversy over British strategy.¹⁵ Both the viceroy and the commander-in-chief, India agreed that the forces available in India could not exceed a two-division corps due to other commitments: II Indian Corps under Lieutenant General John Nixon with the 6th and 12th Indian Divisions.¹⁶ There would be no reinforcements. This buildup to two divisions alone took until April 1915, and the two divisions even then still were not at 100 percent strength, especially in transport.¹⁷

Indian Expeditionary Force D resumed its advance in May 1915. Nixon had replaced Barrett on April 9 in command of operations, while Major General Sir Charles Townshend's 6th Indian Division spearheaded the offensive. British victories in spite of severe environmental conditions, paltry logistical capability, and the hardships were extraordinary. Amara fell on June 3; Nasiriya, on July 25; and Kut al Amara, on September 28.

The string of triumphs ceased at Ctesiphon on November 21, when the Turks repulsed all British attacks. At this point the 6th Indian Division was nearing collapse. Indeed, Townshend's assessment of its state led to a revised plan to withdraw to Kut-al-Amara and accept a siege if necessary.¹⁸ Belated reinforcements would then aid the 12th Indian Division to rescue the 6th Indian Division and raise the siege. Unfortunately, the Turks stymied every attempt of the relief force, now under the command of Lieutenant General Sir. P. H. N. Lake, to break through.¹⁹ Townshend's surrender of the half-starved remnants of 6th Indian Division at Kut on April 29, 1916, turned success into disaster.²⁰

Failure alone should not be the mere criteria of a strategy's wisdom. Hindsight makes an indictment of the British insistence to push on to Baghdad in 1915 relatively easy. Such criticism fails to take account of the changing imperatives of strategy over time,

especially during wartime. This chapter needs to emphasize five points. First, British decision and strategy making took careful note of operations in other theaters. British strategists were keen to assess second- and third-order effects with Afghanistan, the North-West Frontier, Persia, Arabistan, Arabia, Egypt, Gallipoli, and the Caucasus.²¹ Strategists also understood the fickle nature of Arab support, which rallied to the winner and plundered the loser. Second, the Mesopotamian Campaign brought the Indian Army to a state of strategic overextension.²² It was a secondary theater, a sideshow among several sideshows, that existed in an environment of insufficient troops and resources.²³ The Indian Army was balancing the demands of France, Egypt, and East Africa, while simultaneously executing an unprecedented expansion.²⁴ The exploits of Indian Expeditionary Force D through November 1915 had been truly admirable. Indeed, they led to the third point. Continued victory bred an underestimation of the Turks. Obviously surprised by the British incursion into Mesopotamia, the Turks rebounded, so the British faced a revitalized foe at Ctesiphon.²⁵

Fourth, inadequate logistics capability finally broke down. Indian Expeditionary Force D's combat service support was inadequate from the campaign's start. River transportation was a concern from December 1914 and only deteriorated thereafter.²⁶ Continued tactical and operational success never rested on a firm structure. The costly repulse at Ctesiphon broke the back of the administrative services. There was an inadequate appreciation how tactical and operational success rested upon an efficient port operation at Basra and a robust transportation system to project military power and sustain it.²⁷ One effect was a collapse in medical support.²⁸

Two aspects of this logistical breakdown warrant further comment. Strategic decisionmakers and operational commanders and staff maintained a parsimonious, peacetime obsession with "economy," creating "an indisposition to forward or press demands" regardless of need, and too often in an atmosphere of isolation from front-line realities. They did not abandon this obsession with economy after the war started, despite the fact that Parliament had already approved funding of the Indian Army's expenses on all overseas missions conducted on behalf of the Empire.²⁹ A number

of operational commanders and staff officers also squelched those who asked for additional resources. The Parliamentary commission convened to investigate the disaster at Kut thus commented sharply on the glaring failure to anticipate and expedite fixes.³⁰ Administrative confusion resulting from two differing systems, Indian and British, exacerbated matters.³¹ Kitchener's elimination of the military member of the Viceroy's Council forced the Commander-in-Chief, India and his staff to do both jobs, since the administrative structure and system still functioned as if there were two separate offices.³² The Commander-in-Chief, India could not possibly perform both jobs effectively with active operations on three continents and in the midst of its greatest expansion in its history.

Another deficiency which the Parliamentary Commission cited specifically was the unprecedented volume of correspondence among senior officials marked as "private." The Commission viewed this practice with undisguised concern. They concluded that this departure from practice in effect "dispossessed" the staffs from their superiors. The Commission believed that the staffs could have worked solutions for the logistical shortfalls more easily and quicker than otherwise happened.³³

Finally, the decision making process which pushed Indian Expeditionary Force D into a march on Baghdad was unlike anything His Majesty's Government and the Government of India had ever anticipated. The balance in relationships between the Government of India and the India Office had broken down. The responsibility to capture Baghdad rested with Nixon; his political advisor, Sir Percy Cox; and the Commander-in-Chief, India Sir Beauchamp Duff, with the support of Viceroy Lord Hardinge of Penshurst. Together they instituted a major policy change reflecting their assessment, without the proper degree of consultation with the Secretary of State for India and the India Office in England. This gap, in turn, resulted in a dearth of information among British cabinet members. The Parliamentary Commission concluded that the Home Government in London lacked an appreciation of the scope of Nixon's instructions from Duff as far back as April-May 1915, which had told him to resume the advance. Moreover, pushing onto Baghdad constantly appeared in their discussions.³⁴ There was not

necessarily a conspiracy by the Government of India; events moved quickly. The communications flow between Mesopotamia, India, and London left ample opportunity for confusion.³⁵

Deliberate, painstaking reorganization and buildup took place before the British resumed the offensive. The British War Office assumed operational control from February 1916 and all policy and management from July 1916.³⁶ Lieutenant General Sir F. S. Maude replaced Lake on August 28, 1916. The British captured Baghdad in March 1917 with seven divisions in two corps supported with a robust theater support structure. Indeed, the Indian Army defeated two Turkish corps in 6 weeks.³⁷ Even then, the British did not continue the advance north for another 8 months, capturing Tikrit in November 1917 and Mosul only in October 1918. Originally starved of troops and materiel, the Indian Army eventually reached a strength of 420,000 in Mesopotamia.³⁸

“Post-Conflict” Operations in Mesopotamia.

There was no more of a plan to conduct post-conflict operations than there was an operational plan to achieve victory. British intervention in Mesopotamia created a political vacuum once the Turks withdrew. Moreover, when the Turks departed, they left a wake of urban destruction by ensuring nothing of use and/or value fell into enemy hands. The British then implemented a highly-successful reconstruction operation. Certain aspects survived through the post-war period of mandate until Iraq became independent in 1930.

The Arabs were receptive to British overtures. The large Turkish administrative machinery had existed largely on paper. Recognized authority rested upon the village headman, tribal sheikh, and local *seiyid*.³⁹ Thus, local and imposed institutions had remained separate and distinct. The British could still not take Arab support for granted. Arab loyalty went to the winner; any loser was a prime subject for plunder. This reality spelled the difference between relative tranquility and a line of communications subject to constant harassment. The Turks did use Arab irregular units but these generally participated in conventional operations. There was no concerted Turkish effort against British lines of communications.

The threat was the Arab interest in booty.⁴⁰ The British also had to show the will to remain in the areas they conquered to maintain Arab support. Turkish retribution in a reoccupied area would have been merciless.

Certain aspects of “reconstruction” reflected military necessity. For example, Arthur Lawley, a Red Cross Commissioner, visited Basra and Amarah in early 1916 in response to a request for assistance from the Viceroy. Lawley noted that Basra had an adequate water supply, an effective “anti-fly” crusade, and sound sanitation. The inhabitants had to conform to these regulations and benefited from them.⁴¹ Basra was the primary seaport of debarkation in Mesopotamia, so the British built numerous wharves, warehouses, railroads, etc. Basra was just one example of massive British investment in infrastructure which demonstrated the will to stay over the long haul and the generosity to make permanent improvements.

Basra eventually set the example for the rest of Mesopotamia’s major cities, but the expansion of reconstruction operations all over the country was a major resource challenge following the fall of Baghdad. Politicians in London wanted to preserve the “existing administrative machinery” with participation from local representatives, thus reducing the British presence to an advisory function. This idea was not viable. There was no existing machinery of government, and Arabs did not come forward initially. Besides assurances of no Turkish return, they awaited news of British intentions as to the post-war government in the Mesopotamian Valley.⁴²

The British progressed well beyond projects of military necessity. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wilson, himself a Civil Commissioner, proudly recorded the growth of a civil administration behind and on the flanks of the army. Its mission was clearly to replace the Turkish administration, “to make good by successive instalments [sic] the promises of liberty, justice, and prosperity so freely made to the Arab inhabitants at the very outset of the campaign.”⁴³ Gertrude Bell, a civil servant who visited Mesopotamia in early 1916 from Egypt, typified this dedication. Her visit to Mesopotamia became permanent. She commented on February 8, 1918, “We are pledged here. It would be an unthinkable crime to abandon those who have loyally served us.”⁴⁴

The first British action upon entering Basra was to establish “public order” in the city. The Turkish police chief and his staff were gone; looters had sacked the city within 48 hours of their departure. British and Indian military police were patrolling the streets within hours of the British entry into Basra on November 22, 1914, but they were few in number. Wilson acknowledged the challenges in forming a permanent police force. Initially, officers were Moslem Indians from the Punjab. They successfully established civil peace by April 1915 and extended these urban patrols to Amara a few weeks later, then to Naziriya.⁴⁵ Upon occupying Baghdad, the British conducted house-to-house searches for weapons and prioritized occupation of road connections and bridges.⁴⁶ They supplemented military police and troops with two forces. Local headmen formed small patrols in the smaller towns. The British recruited an irregular, district police to patrol the hinterlands. Their name roughly came from the Persian for night watchmen. These district police proved highly successful, relieving the army of the need to provide many road and river patrols.⁴⁷

An important step in the establishment of a viable civil administration was the painstaking collection, organization, and systematization of information. Reassigned to the Political Department, Gertrude Bell played a key role here. She classified tribal data and other details, beginning with information obtained from the Intelligence Department, then adding updates based upon the continued British advance. By February 1917, she could claim that her office had not only organized a mass of data, but all tribal and some other material was available in official circulars. Thus, it had compiled an exact accounting of the country as the British found it.⁴⁸ The process had taken 11 months.

Perhaps the soundest success story was in the legal system, which demonstrated by daily action the British reputation for fair, impartial justice. Senior Judicial Officer and barrister Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Knox presided with a temporary/provincial Code of Law, using a combination of Indian and Turkish law, from April 1915. After the fall of Baghdad in March 1917, courts conducted business with an “Iraq Occupied Territory Code” in Arabic. These replaced all military courts for cases not involving the safety of the armed forces.

Significantly, the British used the sheikhs and religious leaders in the administration of justice, integrating both tribal custom and Islamic law. This system formed the basis for a unitary Iraqi court system.⁴⁹

British civil administration became increasingly effective. In the summer of 1917 the senior Political Officer became the civil commissioner in Baghdad, who had deputies in the other major cities. Civil administrators remained under military authority.⁵⁰ The junior officials were quite young, often captains and majors from the Indian Army.⁵¹ Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs from the Indian Political Department became the head of a Revenue Department. A separate Customs Department fell under Mr. C. R. Watkins, who came from the Imperial Indian Customs Service. The British also fostered the development of a press with the establishment of *The Basra Times* on November 29, 1914. It was a government paper until commercialization in 1921. Later, *The Baghdad Times* published in English and Arabic, becoming an Arab government press in 1921. A major from the Indian Medical Service began a civil medical system on December 30, 1914, and became the first civil surgeon. The port health and quarantine services, a civil service which helped the army, dealt with plague in the winter of 1916 and the spring of 1917, and the 1918 influenza outbreak, which did not hit Mesopotamia as hard as it did Persia and Europe.⁵²

A viable currency system became a necessity in the light of developing revenues from taxation and customs duties. The British began by setting up branches of the Imperial Bank of Persia which dealt in rupees, rather than gold as in Arabia. They still faced the challenge of limited acceptance of paper notes, especially in Baghdad. Constant assessment and timely response precluded a currency crisis and passed a rigorous audit. The British even implemented an interim postage stamp system.⁵³

Finally, the British effort at reconstruction in Mesopotamia included a rough, embryonic form of what today would be termed interagency operations and coordination with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Thus, Lawley commented favorably upon the military cooperation he received. Indeed, he commented that Mesopotamia saw a "fresh recognition" by army authorities of the Red Cross as an integral part of the military medical service.⁵⁴

However, in general there remained a tension between the civil administration and the army throughout operations in Mesopotamia. First, running the civil service was a major drain on military manpower. Townshend commented in late 1915 that he asked in vain for the return of his British soldiers to 6th Indian Division who were functioning as policemen, clerks, and sundry augmentees to help run and protect the river transport.⁵⁵ The civil administration drew heavily on personnel from India: the Indian Army, the reserve of officers, civil service, Imperial and provincial police forces, as well as those who had been serving in the Sudan, Egypt, and Britain. The other major tension resulted from differing attitudes towards the Arabs. Civil administrators, whether civilian or military, eventually spent years dealing with the general staff and military departments who remembered only Arab hostility, theft, and rapacity.⁵⁶ However, military officials learned that fining was a more effective retaliation and deterrent against Arab marauders than burning and shelling villages.⁵⁷

The British campaign in Mesopotamia began as a strictly limited operation. Excessive ambition led to disaster, the fall of Kut in April 1916. An advance to Baghdad in 1915 was indeed a failure in matching ends and means—the proverbial bridge too far. Paul K. Davis titled his 1994 book *Ends and Means* aptly. However, the modern reader cannot appreciate how the Government of India in particular was sensitive to any threat of *jihad*. The threat was no chimera.⁵⁸ Driving a political and social wedge between the Arabs and Turks was crucial in Delhi's view, and that course of action demanded military success and support for the Arabs. Thus, the need for Arab cooperation became an obsession.⁵⁹ The prize would be favorable repercussions in Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan, the North West Frontier, and within India itself. This imperative appeared all the more critical in the light of the failed Gallipoli expedition and the periodic delays in the advance on Baghdad. Basra alone did not meet the strategic imperative.⁶⁰ Unfortunately, the Indian Army, as an imperial strategic reserve, already had expended its available manpower. The Indian Army was in too many locations when the Government of India needed more troops to capitalize upon success and achieve a decisive victory. Overwhelming political need drove a strategy without commensurate means.

The end of the First World War was merely a passing event for the civil administration. Mesopotamia became a British mandate under the League of Nations. Much work remained. The religious question was significant.⁶¹ Achieving a lasting political settlement would prove difficult in the wake of regional diplomatic contradictions such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration. The former divided the Ottoman provinces among the Entente. In general, France obtained Syria and Lebanon. Britain received Palestine, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, though Jerusalem originally was supposed to be under international jurisdiction. Britain in essence compromised previous commitments to the Arabs. The Balfour Declaration complicated matters even further with its favorable stance on the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The British also were unable to find a viable successor ruler within Iraq. They chose Feisal, the third son of Sherif Hussein ibn Ali, Amir of Mecca and King of the Hejaz.⁶² Nonetheless, the British Mesopotamian Campaign demonstrated the successful, simultaneous conduct of conventional combat and reconstruction operations.

IRAQ, 2003: THE STRATEGY OF PREEMPTION

This comparative analysis views the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 as a comprehensive strategy for the Global War on Terrorism, the Middle and Near East, and the wider view of foreign policy, since all are interrelated.⁶³ The clear focus of the Global War on Terrorism is upon radical, Islamic fundamentalism. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan was a retaliatory strike. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is a different case altogether. It targeted a potential ally of Islamic terrorists like al-Qaeda. Regime change removed a major destabilizing element in the region, in particular for Israel, Kuwait, and Iran. In the long run, American intervention to help the Iraqi people could demonstrate the viability of a representational form of government in Arab Moslem states. Toppling the Saddam dictatorship and Ba'athist oligarchy sent a clear, if radical, warning to other potential foes, e.g., North Korea, Iran, and Syria.⁶⁴ Preemption would also eliminate any weapons of mass destruction and punish Saddam Hussein for defiance of UN resolutions.⁶⁵

The Osama bin Laden tape of early January 2004 supports this interpretation. He was disappointed that Arab rulers failed miserably to resist American efforts in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, torpedoing any chance of a great Islamic rising. In Iraq American and coalition forces have begun to turn the tide against a poorly-supported insurgency. Worse, he views the “capitulation” of Iran, Libya, and even Syria as a most unsatisfactory, global strategic situation.⁶⁶

The Rolling Campaign Start.

The American military conducted detailed, systematic, continuous planning prior to the invasion of Iraq. Indeed, the campaign may have been the most planned operation since D-Day on June 6, 1944, and Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, although plans changed constantly during the final months and weeks.⁶⁷ Two aspects of that planning warrant particular examination. The first concerns the implications, tactical and logistical, of the so-called rolling start. The second concerns the nature and degree of prewar planning for Phase IV or post-conflict operations.

There was considerable controversy about the operational ramifications of the rolling start. The inability to land the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Turkey in order to launch an attack from the northern front represented a major loss of combat power. However, commanders demonstrated that adequate combat forces were on the ground to execute decisive operations. However, success does not mean that more combat power was not a requirement. Indeed, the sheer rapidity of success with so few troops perhaps resulted in a psychological misunderstanding of the depth of their defeat on the part of the Iraqis. This chapter, however, will focus more on the effects on logistics and post-conflict operations.

The most glaring deficiency for the conduct of decisive operations that emerged from the rolling-start was a failure in logistics. Generally speaking, bulk fuel, ammunition, food, and water sufficed, albeit to different degrees; habitual sustainment was an overall challenge. The timely delivery of Class IX repair parts was an especially-glaring failure.⁶⁸ Logisticians at all echelons lacked

timely knowledge of actual requirements, visibility of where items were in the pipeline, and an effective transportation network.⁶⁹ There was no deliberate, tiered establishment of a logistics architecture of direct support and general support units at corps and theater levels. Worse, logistics units had no priority in the deployment sequence.⁷⁰ The sheer effort required for the results obtained, and the hand-to-mouth existence which ensued in certain commodities, do not represent acceptable standards.⁷¹ While Iraq was different from Afghanistan, the repetition of certain logistical challenges suggests a failure to integrate lessons learned from one operation to another.⁷²

Post-Conflict Operations.

There was considerable discussion about the challenges of reconstructing an Iraq after Saddam Hussein's defeat well before the war commenced. Writer James Fallows has articulated convincingly that nearly everything that has occurred in Iraq since the fall of Saddam's regime was the subject of prewar discussion and analysis, laid out in detail and in writing for decisionmakers. Those discussions began in October 2001.⁷³

The breadth and depth of prewar analysis are impressive. One think tank assessed potential human problems following war.⁷⁴ An exceptionally-detailed study identified four broad categories for post-conflict reconstruction: security, governance and participation, justice and reconciliation, and social and economic well-being.⁷⁵ The U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute study laid out a detailed mission matrix for Iraq with a transition phase beginning during the Decisive Operations phase.⁷⁶ Begun in October 2002, 4 months elapsed before the study's publication in February 2003. Commentators often view the document as a superb analysis of lessons learned in Iraq. Yet the authors' intent was to publish clear guidelines prior to the invasion.⁷⁷ The State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs began a comprehensive, classified analysis in March 2002, which became the "Future of Iraq Project."⁷⁸ It concluded that reconstruction would require a long-term, expensive commitment.⁷⁹

Two observations emerge from an unclassified analysis of the U.S. Government's prewar strategic planning. First, the plan for

the post-conflict phase, due to factors of time and the focus on decisive military operations, was inadequate for the sheer scope of the mission, which, in fact, occurred. A “rolling-start” campaign with its emphasis on rapid “decisive action” and “shock and awe” could not focus with minute detail on the establishment of effective bureaucratic administration and the execution of essential public services over the long haul. However, of greater significance were faulty assumptions at strategic level which refused to credit and accept the detailed, prewar post-conflict planning.⁸⁰ One writer contends that Pentagon plans for postwar Iraq rested on three assumptions—all of which turned out false.⁸¹ Others have echoed the assessment concerning false planning assumptions.⁸²

What did all this mean on the ground? In short, the conception of the “rolling-start” did not understand or rejected the notion that Phase IV operations would require more troops than Phase III. Hence, there were no provisions for deployment of robust follow-on forces to assume a significant security mission, e.g., more combat units and/or a military police brigade with appropriate subordinate elements. Instead, troops intended to participate in decisive operations, whose deployment the Pentagon had delayed, became de-facto security forces upon arrival in Iraq. Most were already too late to prevent much of the looting, but they did little to stop what looting was still occurring upon arrival.⁸³ The decision of Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, to disband the Iraqi armed forces exacerbated difficulties. De-Ba’athification of the Iraqi military did not require total disbandment of the army. Granted, numerous Iraqi forces simply melted away, but internal disintegration does not explain the entire story. Disbandment created a pool of armed, unemployed Iraqis who became part of the problem.⁸⁴

Likewise, the plan should have “packaged” a significant force of combat support and combat service support units to begin the humanitarian, stability, and support operations. Admittedly, finding the correct mix and number of units was a daunting task—and will remain so. But there was no realistic alternative. The lack of international support reduced UN participation to a minimum. Moreover, NGOs did not flee Iraq only in the wake of the latest terror. They had largely abandoned Iraq as far back as mid-1992.⁸⁵ Those few

present in 2003 lacked on-the-ground experience.⁸⁶ Coalition troops, in fact, did well in humanitarian operations—in large measure due to the preparation for and study of worst-case scenarios.⁸⁷ However, the Combined Forces Land Component Commander lacked the ground forces and the direction to inaugurate other post-conflict operations with a firm hand.

American military capability in the 21st century is clear. This superiority notwithstanding, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM before it, appear as attempts to wage war “on the cheap.” Stated differently, Phase III decisive operations now require fewer troops than Phase IV. However, while the former wins the war, the latter wins the peace.

LESSONS LEARNED

A comparison of the First World War’s Campaign in Mesopotamia by British forces and the current American/coalition operation in Iraq highlights differences as well as similarities. In the interest of balance, this chapter will begin with the differences. First, there is little comparison between the levels of strategic and operational planning of the two campaigns. The British had no intent of operating in Mesopotamia in August 1914. They eventually formulated and executed a contingency operation a mere 3 months later in November 1914. The American operation came after meticulous planning, albeit subject to considerable change and with certain, significant, misconceived assumptions.

Second, conventional, military or “decisive” operations proceeded along different lines. The British had to advance in distinct phases, in particular after the disastrous surrender of Townshend in Kut in April 1916. Two years and four months passed from the initial British landing in the Shatt-al-Arab to the capture of Baghdad. Conversely, the American offensive was a single, sweeping campaign that involved a swift advance to Baghdad and the rapid overrunning of the entire country. The conventional Iraqi defense was feeble compared to expectations—the absence of urban fighting a pleasant surprise. President George Bush declared major combat operations over in 6 weeks. The shock came later.

Third, the British faced an easier task in the conduct of post-hostilities operations for one distinct reason. Ineffective Turkish rule over the Arabs left viable, local institutions. The British were able to capitalize on these local institutions and link them with British organization and concepts of justice, as well as the rule of law to establish political and social order. Their major task was simply to demonstrate Britain's intention to remain. The Americans faced a far more daunting task. The Iraqi people were not just venturing into unexplored ground. A quarter-century of unprecedented fear and repression had left Iraqis psychologically paralyzed in every way, and utterly unprepared to do anything in a cooperative manner. Newfound freedom conflicted with fear of the past and the unknown.⁸⁸ Expatriate Iraqi population elements frankly misled planners and/or decisionmakers and bred misconceptions about how to proceed effectively.⁸⁹

However, some fascinating similarities emerge from this comparative analysis. First, both campaigns had to conduct post-conflict operations as a result of successful combat operations. Granted, the initial basic strategies appear to exhibit drastic differences in scale. The British originally intended a peripheral operation to protect friendly Arab rulers and develop pro-British sentiment to preclude successful, Arab-Turkish holy war. The American goal of regime change in 2003 was far more ambitious from the start. But both filled a political vacuum.

Second, this chapter concludes, rather harshly in some minds, that both the Mesopotamian Campaign through 1916 and the Iraqi Campaign in 2003 were logistical failures. Logistics exerted such significant constraints and restraints as to inhibit commanders at the tactical level. Both the British in 1914-15 and the Americans in 2003 took considerable risks, given inadequate logistics in the theater. Interestingly, transportation shortfalls figured prominently in both campaigns: boats for river transport in Mesopotamia, and trucks for ground line haul and air transport in Iraq. Mesopotamia scandalized the British with the utter breakdown of medical services. In Iraq the breakdown lay in selected supply and services, especially in Class IX repair parts, although asset visibility and distribution management in general failed to meet expectations.

Third, combat operations triumphed singularly against the enemy. The Turks in late 1914-early 1915, and again in 1917-18, and the Iraqis in 2003—were simply no match for their opponents. But these triumphs did not end the fighting. Both the British and Americans still faced chronic threats to their lines of communication. This threat differed slightly in scope and origin. The principal British foe was the Arab raider, interested in plunder and preying on the weak, losing side. As ultimate British success became more evident, this raiding petered out. The Americans faced a more fanatical, ideologically-motivated threat, which crystallized into an insurgency, one which the American and coalition partners appear to be gradually winning as of January 2004.⁹⁰ However, both the British in 1914-18 and the Americans in 2003-04 were fortunate that their opponents had no comprehensive plan to target lines of communication. Otherwise, already-stretched supply lines might well have collapsed.

Fourth, neither the British nor the Americans took sufficient note of post-hostility requirements in planning. Indeed, both governments, in 1917 and 2002-03, expected short periods of transition to Arab self-rule. Both views were extremely optimistic, if not myopic and fanciful. Defeat of the enemy army brought the fall of the state and left a power vacuum. Both campaigns also demonstrated excessively-optimistic expectations of Arab support, both domestically “in country” and internationally in the region.

Fifth, both the British in Mesopotamia and the Americans in Iraq instituted largely ad-hoc post-conflict operations. The British in Mesopotamia capitalized on a wealth of available talent in officials who had decades of experience in India, Egypt, the Sudan, and knowledge of the Persian Gulf region. They were also able to develop procedures in the Basra vilayet first, before moving onto Baghdad. The Americans faced a more difficult mission, and lacked a similar pool of long-experienced personnel. Nonetheless, adaptable soldiers, many with previous experience in the Balkans, exercised initiative and devised suitable methods at local level. The effort still appears more halting and, indeed, amateurish in comparison. This statement in no way diminishes the phenomenal accomplishments of troops who identified a need and set to work with zeal. The

comment underlines the abject failure to prepare at strategic and operational levels for a comprehensive nation-building operation. A dire result, even a year following the invasion, is a damaging insurgency. Another after effect has been the sheer ignorance on the home front and in the international community of what the coalition forces already have accomplished.

Thus, the recent British after action report for Iraq not surprisingly concluded that a great deal of advance planning must occur “a long time ahead of a decision to undertake the military option” of intervention.⁹¹ A significant mitigating factor for Iraq has been that sheer secrecy worked against the ability to conduct in-depth, interagency planning,⁹² as the British Mesopotamian “private” correspondence had stymied full cooperation.

Sixth, security became the primary post-conflict mission requirement. In both Mesopotamia and Iraq, the interval between the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces with the collapse of any residue political authority, and the occupation of key facilities and nodes by friendly forces was critical. The majority of the looting took place during this period of unmistakable power voids in both conflicts.⁹³ Seventh, and perhaps most significantly, the armed forces, mainly the Army, became the primary tool of action. The Indian Army in 1914-18 and the U.S. Army and coalition forces in 2003 conducted nation-building because there was no one else able to do so.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This comparative analysis suggests several important recommendations for senior leaders. First, expeditionary operations by U.S. forces to problem areas of the world will likely continue in the 21st century. American political leadership may determine another regime change to be necessary. Intervention may occur in a failed state. Whatever the reason, U.S. armed forces must be ready to conduct both decisive combat and post-conflict operations in a theater *simultaneously*. Hence, post-conflict operations require the same depth and breadth of joint and combined/coalition planning *before operations commence* as that devoted to the conduct of decisive operations, as well as the added complexity of integrated and synchronized interagency planning.

Moreover, plans for the Middle and Near East should avoid the temptation to overestimate the scope of potential Arab support for any Western intervention operation.⁹⁴ Such support for Western action, regardless of the justice or necessity, cannot overcome historical suspicion and resentment. However, more effective information operations can mitigate the effects.

Second, even the best efforts of the UN and the dedication of NGOs and international organizations will be unable to accomplish much in the early stages. The death of a state, no matter how oppressive or how feeble, will be a traumatic experience. Invariably there will be significant infrastructure challenges, due to destruction, damage, or simple nonexistence. The U.S. Army will remain the primary instrument of post-conflict operations during initial intervention and for an indeterminate period thereafter. Frankly, no one else has the resources to do the job.

Third, the primary post-conflict mission is to establish security. This requirement almost always will necessitate a dual task, the simultaneous conduct of decisive operations with military operations other than war (MOOTW) law-and-order missions. A political and societal power vacuum marks this sensitive period. The sooner the occupying force establishes presence, the fewer the losses to wanton looting.

Fourth, Army logistics requires significant overhauling in order to sustain the warfighter effectively in the 21st century. The vision for the fixes exists; the issue is funding.⁹⁵ The “bottom-line” is that the logistics doctrine which won the Cold War and the First Gulf War is not flexible enough for short-notice, expeditionary warfare. Best-business practices, which created efficiencies in the 1990s, have proven incapable of delivering “just-in-time” logistics support. The necessary technological enablers were absent. Such tools exist, but are expensive. These efficiencies must combine with more flexible and responsive support for “reach-back” sustainment to provide proper support forward. Even when a proper system is in place, experience in both Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM suggests the need still for larger stocks in units for short-term use followed by sustainment from the strategic, wholesale supply system. However, a theater-level logistics structure will most

likely still be required. Moreover, this sustainment pipeline can also no longer assume 100 percent security of all lines of communication “from factory to foxhole.” Finally, Army logistics unit structure requires considerable streamlining. There are too many levels for expeditionary warfare.

Fifth, the experience of expeditionary warfare to the world’s problem areas over the last decade has highlighted significant shortfalls in Army force structure. Simultaneous operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, and the Sinai have severely taxed active and reserve components alike, given the requirements for both initial-entry and follow-on forces. The strains began in 1995 with the onset of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The addition of Afghanistan and now Iraq, which equates to a major theater of war given the numbers deployed, has nearly broken the system. This dilemma is the result of an army force structure geared to fight a Cold War gone “hot,” during which the nation would have time for a deliberate mobilization. The need now is to respond to generally short-notice, then simultaneous, open-ended, expeditionary and/or imperial-policing operations.

The Total Army requires radical restructuring between active and reserve components. This restructuring is not about saving Army divisions. Rather, it must deal with the entire range of combat, combat support, and combat service support units, their specific type, and the proportional alignment among active and reserve components in order to optimize the capability desired both to implement national policy, and in accordance with the deployment guidelines of the Secretary of Defense’s Memorandum dated July 9, 2003, and entitled Rebalancing Forces. The answers must address not only rebalancing the current ratio, but also the potential need to raise new units. For example, the ratio of transportation truck, water purification, maintenance, or general supply units may alter between reserve and active components without changing the total number. Other requirements are small, extremely low-density organizations with highly-specialized capabilities that can facilitate deployment or conduct significant infrastructure tasks during the early stages of post-conflict operations. The former category includes the array of transportation units related to movement control, as well as

other logistics units which execute port support activities. The latter category includes diverse units like vertical (construction) engineers, facility/utility engineers, engineer fire fighting detachments, and the rarely-mentioned railroad units.

Sixth, there is need for closer, deeper integration between the Departments of State and Defense. Though not preferred, the British experience in Mesopotamia and the American experience in Iraq—and virtually every “small war” in the 20th century for that matter—has demonstrated that the military must remain in charge of initial post-conflict operations, not only to ensure security, but also to conduct a host of noncombat missions for which the Army alone possesses the capability. *These missions must begin while decisive operations are still ongoing.* Moreover, their duration is uncertain. Finally, the nature of conflict in the 21st century has spotlighted the need for a doctrine of interagency operations in a deployed theater.⁹⁶ This chapter also recommends that such doctrine recognize the initial preeminence of the Department of Defense in an operational theater, to include the commencement of reconstruction missions, then to highlight guidelines to determine the optimal period to hand over proponentcy to the State Department. Such a stage would still involve a security mission, etc., but the senior authority would be the American ambassador or some other civilian authority.

This comparative analysis also highlights the utility of history. There is no evidence planners looked at the British operations, as well as a number of other experiences. They should have. The British campaign foreshadowed many problems the Americans would face. A summary of the most critical at strategic level follows.

The strategic imperative to match means with ends to set the stage for operational success is paramount. The British failed to do so, and that failure culminated operationally following the demoralizing defeat at Ctesiphon on November 22-24, 1915—a defeat that resulted in the disastrous surrender of 6th Indian Division at Kut on April 29, 1916. U.S. and coalition forces wielded overwhelming material and technological superiority against a qualitatively-inferior foe in Iraq in 2003. This military dominance did not convert to the requisite number of “boots on the ground” to initiate post-conflict operations effectively. The failure to establish immediately a comprehensive security was especially glaring.

The utter lack of timely strategic guidance regarding any post-conflict operations, and/or nation-building in both campaigns exacerbated the disconnect between ends and means. Only the selfless, timely initiative of military forces in theater prevented potential civil-military cataclysms of significant proportions.

Another painful lesson was the direct relationship between effective combat power and sound logistical arrangements. The British administrative apparatus was never robust until the major reorganization following the Kut fiasco. The absence of a host of combat support and combat service support units in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a calculated risk. American units in 2003 would have been hard pressed to continue Phase III decisive operations much longer than they did. Up to that stage, the risk appeared tolerable. Afterwards, the lack of these units underlined the woeful inadequacy of plans and hence preparedness to conduct post-conflict operations. The United States cannot afford to repeat such mistakes in the campaigns that will inevitably occur in the coming decades of the 21st century, otherwise confirming the words of philosopher George Santayana, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."⁹⁷

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. This chapter has restricted its research to unclassified sources on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Open-source research for an ongoing campaign greatly complicated attainment of a comprehensive understanding of the linkage between ends, ways, and means, but such an approach facilitates frank debate with wider dissemination.

2. For example, the current Afghan-Pakistani border is nothing more than the Durand Line of 1894. It originally demarcated the border between Afghanistan, the Amir's territory, and the fiercely independent tribes of the famed North West Frontier.

3. Philip Mason, *The Men Who Ruled India*, New York, 1985, pp. 207-208. This book is a rework of two earlier volumes, *The Founders* and *The Guardians*, published in 1953 and 1954, respectively. Philip Mason also published under the pseudonym Philip Woodruff.

4. T. A. Heathcote, *The Indian Army: The Garrison of Imperial India, 1822-1922*, New York, 1974, pp. 18-19.

5. The potential for great autonomy has significant relevance with regard to the Mesopotamian Campaign; this chapter will return to this topic later.

6. Mason, *The Men Who Ruled India*, p. 208.

7. Historians find periodic reference to the term "Governor-General-in-Council" which articulated the legality of the decisions reached by the Government of India. The term can be confusing because the senior British official previous to the Indian Mutiny was the Governor General.

8. Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers, and Men*, New York, 1974, pp. 397-399. Kitchener insisted that there should be only one senior military man to advise the Viceroy.

9. Brigadier General F. J. Moberley, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., P.S.C., *History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 4, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1927, p. 31. Constitutional practice is more appropriate than constitutional law since a small number of Indian Army units had deployed overseas for the Egyptian Campaign of 1882 and the First Sudan Campaign of 1884-85.

10. For Indian Army operations on the Western Front, see Lieutenant Colonel J. W. B. Merewether, C.I.E., and Lieutenant Colonel Sir Frederick Smith, Bart., *The Indian Corps in France*, London, 1918; reprint ed., Dallington, England, 1996.

11. Paul K. Davis, *Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission*, London, 1994, p. 31.

12. Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 1, pp. 83, 95.

13. Davis, *Ends and Means*, p. 50.

14. Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 1, p. 112. The Indian Army's composition did not reflect Indian society proportionally in the sense that senior officials recruited based upon their concept of the "martial races," whom they deemed made the most suitable soldiers.

15. The Government of India provided the higher direction at this stage. They were subject to the same procedures discussed above.

16. Indian Expeditionary Force D became II Indian Corps, because I Indian Corps was in France.

17. There were subtle differences between an Indian division and a British division, though both had twelve battalions in three brigades. Neither had a regimental structure as in continental European divisions. The major difference was that that an Indian division consisted of nine Indian and three British battalions. The Indian battalions had similar organization to the British, but a smaller authorized strength. Division troops allocations also varied. Indian divisions had to await the availability of British field artillery brigades, since the only Indian artillery was mountain artillery, the famous screw guns. Indian divisions were also almost wholly reliant on pack animals for transport.

18. Major General Charles Vere Ferrers Townshend, *My Campaign*, 2 vols., New York, 1920, Vol. 1, p. 298, Vol. 2, pp. 7-8; Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 2, p. 134; Davis, *Ends and Means*, p. 141.

19. A. J. Barker, *The Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign, 1915-1918*, New York, 1967, p. 208, has a map with notes which effectively summarize the challenges of the relief force. Barker's book in Britain was published under the title of *The Neglected War*.

20. Townshend's conduct as a prisoner of the Turks caused great outrage in England. This debate has often clouded the phenomenal accomplishments of his leadership of 6th Indian Division through the Battle of Ctesiphon. For example, perhaps the most impassioned work remains Russell Braddon, *The Siege*, New York, 1969.

21. Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, traces this linkage throughout its four volumes.

22. *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 2, briefly discusses the general state of Indian military exhaustion.

23. BEF operations in France in 1914 crippled the small regular army; the Territorial Army took a beating in 1915. Kitchener's New Armies would not be ready until mid-1916, bloodily baptized at the Somme on July 1, 1916.

24. F. W. Perry, *The Commonwealth Armies: Manpower and Organization in Two World Wars*, Manchester, England, 1988, pp. 87-92, contains a succinct discussion of the demands upon Indian Army manpower and the expansion effort up to 1916. Perhaps the biggest hurdle in the expansion of the Indian Army was the availability of bi-lingual, British officers. The language of command in the Indian Army was Urdu, not English.

25. The British now faced a majority of native Turkish troops, rather than the regular Arab units, who came mostly from Syria and Mesopotamia.

26. Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 2, p. 18; Great Britain, Parliament, Commissions, *Mesopotamia Commission: Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia Together with a Separate Report* by Cdr. J. Wedgwood, D.S.O., M.P. and Appendices, London, 1917, pp. 18-19, 36, 43-57, passim, pp. 102-103.

27. Maj. R. Evans, M.C., P.S.C., *A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia*, London, 1926, pp. 45, 54-55, contains a succinct overview of this overextension and the linkage between troop strength and the logistic capability to support them.

28. *Mesopotamian Commission*, pp. 63-95, represent 33 pages on the collapse of the medical services alone.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 103-107.

30. Barker, *The Bastard War*, p. 112, cites one specific example which typifies the attitude. See, too, *Mesopotamian Commission*, p. 61.

31. Martin Swayne, *In Mesopotamia*, London, 1918, p. 29.

32. *Mesopotamian Commission*, pp. 98-99.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18, 20; Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 1, pp. 238-239. Davis, *Ends and Means*, p. 71, emphasized the India Office's knowledge gap as 6 weeks behind during this particular time period.

35. This issue is complex and complicated. The point is the issue's contributory factor. Space precludes a more detailed discussion.

36. Formal transfer of authority from India to the British War Office did not change the fact that India still provided the bulk of habitual sustainment out of the port of Bombay.

37. Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Burne, D.S.O., *Mesopotamia: The Last Phase*, London, 1936, pp. 55, 113-10.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

39. Gertrude Bell, *The Arab War: Confidential Information for General Headquarters from Gertrude Bell, Being Dispatches Reprinted from the Secret "Arab Bulletin"*, n.p., 1940, pp. 9-10. The comments appear in the "Arab Bulletin" dated October 5, 1916.

40. Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 1, pp. 163, 271; Vol. 2, pp. 47; Vol. 3, pp. 3-4, 56, 199.

41. Honorable Sir Arthur Lawley, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *A Message from Mesopotamia*, London, 1917, pp. 2-3, 17, 32-33.

42. Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 3, p. 254; Lieutenant Colonel Sir Arnold T. Wilson, *Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1914-1917: A Personal and Historical Record*, Oxford, England, 1930; reprint ed., New York, 1969, pp. 240-241.

43. Wilson, *Loyalties*, pp. xi-xii.

44. Gertrude Bell, D.B.E., *The Letters of Gertrude Bell*, 2 vols., New York, 1927, Vol. 2, p. 444.

45. Wilson, *Loyalties*, pp. 12-13, 65.

46. Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 3, p. 254.

47. Wilson, *Loyalties*, p. 65. Wilson's exact statement was optimistic. The British still had to commit troops for security missions, especially cavalry.

48. Bell, *Letters*, pp. 370, 378, 397-398.

49. Wilson, *Loyalties*, pp. 67-69, 144. British success made the Turkish system appear even more heinous and foreign to the Arabs.

50. Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 4, p. 26. The British also appointed Military Governors.

51. Edmund Candler, *The Long Road to Baghdad*, 2 vols., Boston, 1919, Vol. 1, pp. 277-279. Candler was a war correspondent in theater.

52. Wilson, *Loyalties*, pp. 69-73, 289. Dobbs was an Indian Civil Service (ICS) veteran who had traveled extensively in Mesopotamia and Persia before the war. He had also served on the Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 283-287, 321-322.

54. Lawley, *A Message from Mesopotamia*, Vol. 4, p. 99.

55. Townshend, *My Campaign*, Vol. 1, pp. 226-227.

56. Wilson, *Loyalties*, pp. 12, 54.

57. Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 3, pp. 367.

58. See Peter Hopkirk, *On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire*, Oxford, England, 1995, on the Germano-Turkish attempt to ignite *jihād* in India during the First World War. This book was published in the United States with the title *Like Hidden Fire*.

59. Moberley, *The Campaign for Mesopotamia*, Vol. 1, p. 139.

60. *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 1. The British, in fact, exaggerated the potentially dire consequences. There was surprisingly little effect in the Muslim world after the evacuation of Gallipoli and the fall of Kut. *British Official History*, Vol. 2, p. 309.

61. Wilson, *Loyalties*, p. 236.

62. Feisal led the Arab Northern Army during the Arab Revolt. He became King of Iraq after the war, but this marriage of ruler and ruled turned out to be an unhappy one.

63. "Beyond Iraq," *The Stratfor Weekly Online*, January 21, 2004 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.stratfor.com>; Internet; accessed January 23, 2004, appeared after the author wrote this section. It, too, sees American intervention in Iraq with multiple, strategic purposes; their analysis: to demonstrate the ability to conduct extensive military operations to conclusion, despite casualties, and a geopolitical victory to change several Arab countries' behavior given Iraq's central position in the region.

64. Tom Friedman, writer and commentator, Television interview by Tim Russert, September 20, 2003. Friedman provided a foundation of sorts to develop these ideas. The author tied together the multiple objectives for war.

65. The issues of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Saddam Hussein's chronic defiance of UN resolutions have become highly politicized, both domestically and internationally. The author believes they are too narrow in scope as a solitary *casus belli*.

66. "Bin Laden Tape: Honesty and Gloom," *The Stratfor Weekly Online*, January 7, 2004 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.stratfor.com>; Internet; Accessed January 14, 2004. The article's assessment sees two likely al Qaeda actions, the assassination of President/General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan and the overthrow of the Saudi regime. The issue of future, direct attacks on the United States remains open, but unlikely in its view.

67. Strategic and operational planning in the years after the Gulf War of 1990-91, plus the preparations for this particular war, account for the scope and depth of planning.

68. Several logisticians disagree with this assessment. The ideas in this paragraph are based in part on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandment's Lecture Series and "OEF/OIF Logistics Lessons Learned," lecture, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, January 6, 2004. This informal discussion among members of the Class of 2004, staff, and faculty crystallized further the writer's estimate. This conclusion remains the author's.

69. *Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003, pp. 2-4, 14-17, 19-22, underlines the problems in asset visibility and theater distribution.

70. Eric Schmitt, "Army Study of Iraq War Details a 'Morass' of Supply Shortages," *The New York Times Online*, February 3, 2004 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/03>; Internet; accessed February 9, 2004; and David Wood, "Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems in Iraq," Newhouse News Service, January 22, 2004 [service on-line]; available from <http://www.newhouse.com>; Internet; accessed January 23, 2004. Schmitt references the Army study by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. Wood cites mostly the Army G-4's assessment.

71. A recent study cited the primary cause as a lack of "common metrics" between warfighters and logisticians. Gerry J. Gilmore, "Military's Logistics System Found Wanting in Iraq War," American Forces Press Service, January 21, 2004 [service on-line]; available from http://www.afisnews_senderADTIC.MIL; Internet; accessed January 23, 2004.

72. These similarities figure prominently in air transport flow, ground transportation, and Class IX repair parts. Generally speaking, the key problems were also asset visibility and theater distribution. General Accounting Office, *Defense Logistics*, pp. 4, 23, cited a failure to incorporate lessons learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

73. James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," *The Atlantic Monthly*, January/February 2004, pp. 54, 56.

74. Sarah Graham-Brown and Chris Toensing, *Why Another War? A Background on the Iraq Crisis*, n.p., 2002, pp. 2, 7, 14. Iraq had an impressive welfare state, which began to unravel in 1990 with the start of the Iraq-Iran War. The study viewed a public health emergency as the most likely critical challenge and the most frequent cause of death, not hunger, especially for children under age 5.

75. Ten critical recommendations followed the four broad categories. This particular analysis also recommended preparation for humanitarian support beyond a year. Reinforcing these suggestions were eight clearly articulated "Lessons Learned" from previous operations, ranging from Haiti to Afghanistan. Frederick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker, *A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq*, n.p., 2003, pp. 11-25.

76. Transition itself consists of four sub-phases: Security, Stability, Build Institutions, and Handover. The matrix lays out no less than 135 tasks for

execution: 35 critical, 32 essential, and 62 important ones. Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 44-47. The Matrix itself is on pp. 63-72.

77. The specific source is currently based on nonattribution.

78. Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," pp. 56-58.

79. George Packer, "Letter from Baghdad: War after War," *The New Yorker*, November 24, 2003, p. 62. Packer noted that the State Department included 16 groups of Iraqi exiles.

80. Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," p. 54; Packer, "Letter from Baghdad," p. 67.

81. These were that oil would fund reconstruction, Iraqi troops would help keep the peace, and resistance would fade quickly. Indeed, he termed the situation in September 2003 as "Superbowl Jihad." A nonattributable source believes that Elliott was able to talk to several points of contact within the Army to draw these conclusions. Michael Elliott, "3 Flawed Assumptions about Postwar Iraq," *Time*, September 22, 2003, pp. 30-31.

82. The ideas in this sentence are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandment's Lecture Series. He cited five: rapid establishment of a new Iraqi government, viability of surviving Iraqi security forces, volume of international assistance available, a rapidly-resuscitated economy, and little degree of Iraqi resentment. These could be due to political bias, which ignored intelligence reports and analysis; strategic priorities required a rapid campaign with a small footprint; and/or simply erroneous assumptions honestly made.

83. Packer, "Letter from Baghdad," p. 64.

84. Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," p. 74.

85. Graham-Brown and Toensing, *Why Another War?* p. 7.

86. "Iraq at Peace," *Peace Watch*, Vol. 9, April 2003, p. 2.

87. Packer, "Letter from Baghdad," p. 62.

88. See Cynthia E. Ayers, "Iraqi Resistance to Freedom: A Frommian Perspective," *Parameters*, Vol. 33, Autumn 2003, pp. 68, 78-79; Packer, "Letter from Baghdad," pp. 81-83.

89. Packer, "Letter from Baghdad," p. 62.

90. There is much discussion over the Army need to "rediscover" counterinsurgency techniques. See Conrad C. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. A good perspective at tactical level which does not deny the ever-present element of uncertainty is Peter Maas, "Professor Nagl's War," *The New York Times Online*, January 11, 2004 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://graphics7.nytimes.com/images/dropcap/u.gif>. Internet; accessed January 14, 2004.

91. Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, *Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future*, p. 69. The format is that of a slide presentation.

92. Packer, "Letter from Baghdad," p. 64.

93. The Iraq portion in this paragraph is based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandment's Lecture Series.

94. In the case of Mesopotamia, see the frank admission in Moberley, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 1, p. 88.

95. David Wood, "Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems in Iraq," Newhouse News Service, January 22, 2004 [service on-line]; available from <http://www.newhouse.com>; Internet; accessed January 23, 2004.

96. In other words, develop a document which would form the doctrinal foundation at interagency level above Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination*. William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters*, Vol. 33, Autumn 2003, pp. 95-112, provides a starting point for discussion.

97. Santayana wrote these words in *The Life of Reason*, cited in Robert Andrews, Mary Biggs, and Michael Seidel, *Columbia World of Quotations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, available from <http://www.bartleby.com/66/29/48129.html>.

CHAPTER 6

WAGING PEACE: ECLIPSE IN POSTWAR GERMANY AND IRAQ

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth O. McCreedy

The decision for war usually rests on rational calculations that conflict will create satisfactory conditions to achieve strategic objectives. The scale of the objective, Clausewitz suggests, defines the character of the war. The character of the war, in turn, inevitably dictates the peace that follows. As war drives toward fulfilling its terrifying logic, Clausewitz argues, passions overthrow reason, violence spirals, and stakes grow. Statesmen must assemble the ways and means to achieve the desired ends. So great is the effort required to wage war, so high the costs, that it can consume political and military leaders who thus often fail to look beyond the fighting. Yet such vision is the most significant requirement of strategists: It is not enough to win the war—they must also win the peace to secure broader policy objectives, without which the sacrifices of war have no meaning. This effort demands the appropriate application of ways and allocation of means as does the war that precedes it. Waging peace requires a level of planning, commitment, and exertion consistent with the ends pursued in the war. Failure in waging war can have disastrous results, more often than not the price of a flawed ends-ways-means assessment. Similarly, failure in waging peace will undermine the sacrifices of war and wrest defeat from victory by undermining the achievement of broader policy aims for which military forces have waged (or should have) the conflict.

In May 1943, Allied staff officers in London began working on a complex plan that arguably had as significant an impact on the postwar world as its more famous companion, Operation OVERLORD. The plan became ECLIPSE, the operation that governed the occupation of Germany by the western allies. Sixty years later, the Combined Forces Land Component planning staff titled its plan for postwar operations in Iraq ECLIPSE II. As present day operations

unfold, Operation ECLIPSE offers a lens through which to examine its successor. It brings into sharp focus the extent to which planners and policymakers anticipated the requirements for successful post-conflict operations, the assumptions underlying their plans, and the way the United States postured itself to conduct postwar operations. Despite distinct differences in the circumstances of both Operations ECLIPSE and ECLIPSE II, there exist fundamental commonalities in the challenge of defining and balancing ends, ways, and means in such a manner as to advance national interests. While a perfect correlation does not exist between the circumstances that pertained in the two events, each ECLIPSE operation offers instruction about how to think about, plan, and conduct postwar operations.

OPERATION ECLIPSE

On February 12, 1944, General Dwight Eisenhower received the celebrated directive to “enter the continent of Europe and . . . undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” What historians understandably tend to ignore is a less ringing passage entitled: “Relationships with Allied Governments—the Re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories with the Administration of Enemy Territories.” Allied staffs planning postwar operations must have eagerly looked here for long-awaited policy guidance, only to find that: “Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.”¹ In fact, policymakers were unable to define the desired end state beyond the immediate objective of defeating and occupying Nazi Germany. Not unusually for a politician, President Franklin Roosevelt preferred to keep his options open, and not surprisingly, he vacillated between competing visions of a retributive and realist peace. More importantly, he had to consider the demands of maintaining a wartime coalition: So long as the decision hung in the balance it was folly to raise troublesome issues arising from competing visions of the postwar order.²

Responsibility for conducting the war resided with the War and Navy Departments. Left undefined was which government agency would bear responsibility for planning and administering

the peace. Roosevelt's ideological preference for civil administration over military government suggested that he would turn to the Department of State to meet this requirement. The New Dealers who surrounded Roosevelt reflexively viewed the military with suspicion and were sensitive to any hint of imperialism or militarism in American policy. From April to December 1943, a debate raged within the Roosevelt administration over the propriety of military government. The Army's provost marshal general reported that, at a cabinet meeting in early 1943, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes "denounced our military government plans as 'imperialistic' and the President told the Secretary of War by memorandum that he thought the government of occupied territories was a civilian rather than a military matter."³ However, events in North Africa after Operation TORCH underlined the practical fact that the State Department lacked the capacity for planning and conducting such a complex task. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Secretary of State Cordell Hull had established an advisory committee to consider postwar foreign policy. Most important was the work of a number of subcommittees that met periodically to address economic reconstruction, postwar European structures, and security issues. The last sub-committee included representatives from the War and Navy Departments, the first interagency body to consider postwar policy.⁴ The work of these committees abruptly ended in June 1943 when the Combined Chiefs of Staff, wrestling with how to deal with liberated territories in the wake of Operation TORCH, brought postwar policy into the War Department by establishing the Combined Civil Affairs Division under Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy. The State Department had representation on this committee, but there is no evidence that it used this venue to shape policy.⁵

The most significant product of the Combined Civil Affairs Division was CCS/551, the "Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender," issued to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces on April 28, 1944. This order vested in the supreme commander the authority and responsibility for governing occupied Germany and established basic principles for him to follow. Because the directive applied only to the presurrender period, however, significant questions as

to the policy the United States intended to pursue and the military's role in postwar occupation remained unanswered. In the absence of political decisions, commanders and staffs remained in limbo about the ends the President was pursuing and the instruments of national power he intended to apply. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith, sought guidance by posing a series of questions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff about postwar German government, economy, and partition. He emphasized: "On the answers to these, and to many other kindred questions, long-term planning depends." He reminded the chiefs that "the problem is not one that can be handled piecemeal or a solution extemporized hurriedly in the last stage of the operation."⁶ Events 60 years later proved him correct.

Within months of D-Day, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces had to grapple with the practical problems of conducting postwar operations before a policy existed to govern such operations. On September 18, 1944, following the Allied capture of the first German town, Eisenhower issued a proclamation announcing that "Allied Military Government is established in the theater under my command to exercise in occupied German territory the supreme . . . authority vested in me as Supreme Commander . . ."⁷ Small military government detachments would travel immediately behind the lead elements of advancing forces and begin the process of political and physical reconstruction under the direction of division, corps, and army commanders executing Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces directives.⁸

Although many saw victory in Europe as imminent by December 1944 (at least prior to the German's Ardennes offensive), the U.S. Government still did not have a coherent postwar policy, nor had it worked out the ways or means that it would require in the postwar period. At the initiative of new Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy formed the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to consider postwar policy.⁹ This committee's deliberations and policy recommendations were instrumental in preparing Roosevelt for Yalta in January 1945, where the Soviets, British, and Americans proclaimed their "inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the

peace of the world." To do so, they intended to oversee the complete disarmament, demilitarization, and denazification of Germany.¹⁰

In May 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) finally issued JCS 1067, the first formal national guidance for the conduct of postwar operations, to Eisenhower in his capacity as Commander, U.S. Forces European Theater. By its provisions, the U.S. Army would occupy Germany and treat the Germans as a defeated enemy. Occupation forces would exercise limited control over the economy and limit the distribution of goods and foodstuffs to levels necessary to prevent disease and unrest. Orders strictly forbade fraternization between soldiers and Germans, while the troops oversaw the thorough extirpation of Nazism and militarism. As General Lucius Clay, later military governor, observed, "there was no doubt that JCS 1067 contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in Germany during the early months of occupation."¹¹

With the ends that the government aimed to pursue finally articulated, the ways available to achieve those ends had received little or no assessment. After North Africa, the U.S. Army explicitly received primary responsibility for planning and conducting postwar operations.¹² There was little interaction with other potential players such as State and Treasury; there assuredly was no interagency process beyond general policy discussions in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to coordinate the application of various approaches to accomplishing strategic ends. The one-dimensional nature of postwar planning was clear in the case of General Clay. In early 1945, Eisenhower had selected Clay to oversee military government operations as his deputy.¹³ Before departing for Europe, Clay met with the President, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall to receive instructions. He did not meet with anyone from the State Department. He later recalled: "As I look back, I find it amazing that I did not visit the State Department or talk with any of its officials. . . No one at that time advised me of the role of the State Department in occupation matters or of its relationship to military government, and I am inclined to believe that no one had thought it out."¹⁴

Despite its instrumental role, the army remained uncomfortable with postwar operations as a long-term mission. After V-E Day, the

War Department immediately began pressing for an early transition from military to civil government in occupied Germany. According to Clay, Eisenhower sought to create an "organization which could be transferred to civilian control on 24-hours notice." Marshall, who had experienced the short-lived occupation of Germany in 1919 at first hand, was especially sensitive to the possibility that a public clamor to "bring the boys home" would curtail postwar operations.¹⁵ Eisenhower sent a memorandum to Stimson setting a target date for the transition to civil control by June 1, 1946. The new President, Harry Truman, approved this objective without consulting Secretary of State James Byrnes. Byrnes, believing adamantly that his department was a policymaking organization, not an operational entity, deftly maneuvered behind the scenes to forestall State's assumption of primary responsibility for the occupation.¹⁶ As a result, the June 1, 1946, date for transition came and went without remark, while the War Department retained responsibility for governing Germany until 1949.¹⁷

With the ends settled and the ways defined as residing solely with the military instrument of power, it remained for the military to plan, coordinate, and execute the application of means to achieve strategic and political objectives. This effort had begun in March 1943, despite the policy void, as prudent military planning when the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) to draft contingency plans for a sudden German collapse or surrender. The result was Operation RANKIN.¹⁸ RANKIN assumed an unopposed occupation of Germany and avoided discussing administration of the occupied territory by either civil or military authorities.¹⁹ After completion of RANKIN, a postwar planning cell continued to develop staff studies and papers that served to advance thinking about post-hostilities operations and raise relevant questions and issues to policy-makers.²⁰

As D-Day approached, planning shifted from preparations for a sudden Nazi collapse to considerations for the period after a military campaign that resulted in the occupation of Germany. In this environment, there was an explosion of postwar planning by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces staff that resulted in a new plan in October 1944, TALISMAN. TALISMAN

addressed disarmament, disposal of war material, control of German prisoners of war, care of Allied prisoners of war, and denazification as the major postwar tasks.²¹ Conspicuously missing was specific guidance on how the Allies would administer occupied Germany, by whom, and what fate awaited the defeated state. Soon after completion of the plan, SHAEF, believing its codeword had been compromised, renamed it ECLIPSE.²²

The ECLIPSE Plan consisted of two phases. The primary phase focused on physical occupation and would occur simultaneously with the terminal combat operations of OVERLORD. In the second phase, ECLIPSE would stand alone as the Allies solidified their control of occupied areas, disarmed the *Wehrmacht*, enforced surrender terms, established law and order, and redeployed Allied forces into defined national zones of responsibility. ECLIPSE also directed commanders to “complete establishment of Military Government throughout the sector.”²³ Attached memoranda provided detailed guidance on surrender procedures, labor policies, procedures for handling Allied prisoners of war and displaced civilians, mechanisms for disarming the German armed forces, and guidance for establishing military government.²⁴

The military possessed ample means to execute these tasks. On V-E Day, 61 U.S. Army divisions were in Germany and available to execute ECLIPSE. This made the security mission relatively simple: Units dispersed and assumed responsibility for assigned areas. The territory that a division might receive the mission of covering could be extensive. The 78th Infantry Division, for example, was responsible for an area of 3,600 square miles, while the 70th Infantry Division covered 2,500 square miles.²⁵ Commanders usually decentralized command and control down to companies and assigned them to guard frontiers, key installations, bridges, banks, and utilities, and to provide reaction forces to respond to disturbances, looting, or criminal activity. U.S. forces performed various other special security functions. For instance, the 26th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division guarded the prisoners and proceedings at the Nuremberg Trials for a year, while a tank battalion and infantry regiment guarded the huge treasure trove of Nazi-looted items found in a mine near Merkers.²⁶

The troops also implemented ECLIPSE plans to secure prisoners of war, demobilize the German Army and dispose of war materiel. This was a huge task. By April 15, 30,000 German soldiers were surrendering daily to the western allies; by early May, more than five million German prisoners of war were in Allied hands. Because plans had anticipated only 900,000 prisoners by the end of June, there were significant shortfalls in logistics, facilities, and guards. As an example of what this could mean at the tactical level, a first lieutenant commanding 300 troops found himself charged with guarding 37,000 Germans at Bad Kreuznach.²⁷ More daunting than security were the logistics challenges of dealing with this many prisoners, especially providing them rations. Seven million rations were required daily in Germany to feed U.S. soldiers and prisoners of war; this rate of consumption could not be supported. SHAEF cut rations for Allied personnel by 10 percent. It also authorized a distinction between “prisoners of war” who had surrendered prior to V-E Day and “disarmed” German military forces who had surrendered after May 9. This allowed circumvention of the Geneva Convention requirement that prisoners of war receive the same rations as their captors; disarmed Germans were given less than Allied soldiers.

To deal with the problem and provide manpower to assist in restoring essential services, SHAEF ordered the discharge of German prisoners of war who were coal miners, transportation and utility workers, police, and farmers on the condition that they had no SS connections and posed no security risk. The units charged with running the prisoner of war compounds seized on this order “to discharge as many as possible, as fast as possible, without a great deal of attention to categories,” according to one G-1 inspection report. To aid this process, local commanders established discharge centers and reception points at railheads, and transported prisoners of war to the areas from which they had been inducted.²⁸ Remaining prisoners were organized into labor companies and assigned to American commands to assist in reconstruction efforts ranging from clearing rubble, to burying the dead, to removing wire obstacles and minefields. This was done under the “labor reparation policy” whereby the Allies determined to use German labor to assist in rebuilding devastated areas of Europe.²⁹

The other significant task involved in disbanding the German armed forces was disposing of the equipment and munitions that littered battlefields, collected at depots, and filled bunkers and production facilities throughout Europe. Only souvenir hunters had paid attention to captured enemy equipment before V-E Day, except in the case of new technology for technical intelligence exploitation. After the German surrender, the ECLIPSE plan charged Army quartermasters at all levels with recovering and disposing of German war materiel. They initially gave priority to destruction of enemy chemical and munitions stocks.³⁰ According to the Third Army history of the occupation, "Large quantities of explosives were crated and dispatched to the port of Bremerhaven where they were disposed of by being dumped into the sea, while other shipments of ammunition were distributed among Allied Nations as a form of reparation."³¹ For captured weapons and equipment, they applied the model used by the U.S. Army for disposal of surplus war materiel. Ordnance units established huge depots to receive the collected materiel; one near Wurzburg contained up to 17,000 vehicles. Each piece of equipment required inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and processing before it could be sold, shipped, or destroyed. The total effort to dispose of materiel and munitions placed further stress on increasingly scarce resources of personnel as demobilization gathered pace.³²

Perhaps the most politically sensitive and in sheer scope the largest task was that of caring for and assisting millions of displaced persons to return to their homes throughout Europe. Agreements reached at the Yalta Conference required military commanders "to employ all practicable means to transport United Nations displaced persons to agreed locations where they could be transferred to national authorities."³³ U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of displaced persons they faced: There were an estimated 2.3 million in American occupied areas on V-E Day. This represented but a portion of the "unprecedented mass migration of civilians and soldiers" that was taking place in Europe. In addition to seven million displaced persons throughout Germany, there were 12 to 14 million refugees and hundreds of thousands of German soldiers from eastern Germany fleeing the Soviets.³⁴ Units encountered large

and small groups of refugees daily as they advanced into Germany. Commanders initially emphasized caring for the almost universally malnourished and ill they found. They arranged housing for them in former German barracks, prisoner of war camps, schools, and private residences (unsympathetic American troops forced out the German owners, if necessary), and they issued them food from captured stores, supplemented by U.S. military rations. Army medical teams conducted an intense public health campaign among the displaced persons to contain feared outbreaks of typhus and other communicable diseases. Third Army Chief of Staff General Hobart Gay captured this concern in his journal on April 10, 1945: "The situation reference displaced persons continues to be aggravated Most of them are like animals, or worse, and unless force can be used on them to ensure reasonable sanitary measures, it would appear that disease, perhaps something bordering on a plague, is in the offing."³⁵ Among other actions, the Twelfth Army Group established a "*cordon sanitaire* on the Rhine" to dust displaced persons with DDT before they left Germany.³⁶ U.S. forces slowly sorted displaced persons by nationality and moved them into camps to facilitate the process of repatriation. Tactical units provided logistical and security support to the UN Refugee Relief Administration (UNRRA) which administered these facilities. These displaced persons represented a serious threat to order. Accounts of the occupation are replete with reports of drunkenness, looting, arson, rape, and murder by displaced persons celebrating their freedom and seeking to exact revenge on the Germans.³⁷ By October 1945, over 2,000,000 displaced persons had been repatriated out of the American zone.

Allied occupation forces also faced an enormous challenge to organize reconstruction efforts to restore basic services and prevent a humanitarian disaster resulting from famine, epidemic, or exposure. Engineer units rebuilt and repaired roads, bridges, electric plants, sewage treatment facilities, and waterworks. When Bonn was captured, for instance, virtually all public services were nonfunctional. Within days, gas, water, and electric service had been restored to parts of the city, and within months, street cars were again operating.³⁸ Elsewhere water purification units provided safe drinking water. Engineers also demolished German fortifications,

gun emplacements, bunkers, and minefields. Construction units worked to improve living conditions of occupation forces by winterizing billets and building recreational facilities.³⁹

Military commanders also were responsible initially for establishing political authority, implementing denazification, and directing reconstruction. At the strategic level, denazification had perhaps the greatest political interest. The Allies were determined to stamp out any vestige of the Nazi Party in Germany. Eisenhower signaled the importance attached to this effort in a speech in the fall of 1945, when he stated: "The success or failure of this occupation will be judged by the character of the Germans 50 years from now. Proof will come when they begin to run a democracy of their own and we are going to give the Germans a chance to do that, in time."⁴⁰

The primary instruments for executing this policy were the military government detachments charged with finding acceptable non-Nazi public officials and the Counter Intelligence Corps soldiers whose mission it was to find and arrest Nazis. An immediate problem the occupation faced was how to define "Nazi." Was it related to length of membership, rank, or did it apply to every party member regardless of activity? Guidance was unclear initially. The Counter Intelligence Corps, according to one special agent, was "given orders to arrest all Nazis from *Ortsgruppenleiter* on up, all *Gestapo*, all SD, all SS from *Gefreiter* up."⁴¹ Military government detachments, desperate to find qualified personnel to assume responsibility for running German cities, counties, and states tended to be more forgiving. Historian Earl Ziemke, who participated in the occupation, observed: "Competent non-Nazis were among the rarest commodities everywhere in Germany . . . ; in the managerial and professional groups they were practically nonexistent."⁴² It was difficult enough to find someone with requisite skills to undertake administrative responsibility for a town; the problem was complicated infinitely by the need to identify a politically untainted qualified applicant. This fundamental difference in orientation could lead to conflict. The daily report from one military government detachment read: "Having trouble with CIC. Do not believe security threatened so have concentrated on assuring food, proper administration, and property protection on the assumption these will prevent unrest. Have done these at the expense of looking into past activities of present civil servants."⁴³ Candidates were vetted

against black-white-gray lists prepared by the Office of Strategic Services and investigated by Counter Intelligence Corps agents.⁴⁴

When the glare of media attention was turned on the occupation, it became politically intolerable to be perceived as “coddling” Nazis, and policy hardened. At the direction of Eisenhower, military government personnel made an intense effort to screen all Germans seeking employment or assistance from the occupation forces. Military government detachments administered a questionnaire (the *Fragebogen*) to all Germans seeking employment or assistance from the occupation forces. Effectively, this amounted to the entire adult population of the American zone, or some 13,000,000 Germans, creating an immense administrative burden. The chief historian of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany observed: “The assignment of going over the 13 million completed forms, investigating the validity of the data furnished, and deciding on the action to be taken in each individual case was positively overwhelming.”⁴⁵

While specialized military government detachments existed to assist in executing this task, by April 1945 the area of occupied territory exceeded their capability, and army commanders formed provisional detachments using antiaircraft, field artillery, and signal troops.⁴⁶ Soldiers were transferred from other duties and assigned to assist the military government detachments. Even with this augmentation, little headway could be made in reducing the backlog. Ultimately, 1.65 million *Fragebogen* were screened before General Clay succeeded in passing responsibility for this task to newly constituted German courts. Of the 1.65 million questionnaires screened, U.S. officials judged 300,000 to be Nazis, eligible only for employment as common labor.⁴⁷ Eisenhower was willing to accept diminished administrative efficiency in return for thorough denazification. Military Government Law Number 8, effective in September 1945, “made it mandatory to dismiss anyone who had ever been a member of the Nazi party for whatever reason from any position save one of ordinary labor.”⁴⁸ Patton’s well-documented clashes with Eisenhower on this issue resulted in Patton’s removal from command of Third Army in October 1945. Patton recorded in his diary on September 29, 1945, the result of a meeting with Eisenhower in which they discussed the presence of Nazis in the government of Bavaria: “So I called Harkins at 0630 and told him to

remove Schaeffer, Lange, and Rattenhuber and all members of their ministries in any way tainted with Nazism regardless of the setback it would give to the administration of Bavaria and the resultant cold and hunger it would produce—not only for the Germans but also for the DP's. This seemed to make everyone happy except myself."⁴⁹

What stands out in an examination of postwar planning and operations in Germany are the time and resources that were devoted to it. Although policy decisions defining political ends were slow to emerge from politicians preeminently concerned with holding together a wartime coalition, British and American military commanders in Europe realized their likely role in postwar operations early on (although they may not have liked it), and even developed an appreciation for the fact that postwar tasks might coexist uncomfortably with combat operations.⁵⁰ Military leaders took prudent measures to supply the means for postwar operations during the war by fielding specialized postwar units, military government detachments, and providing them expert training, doctrine, and organizations. ECLIPSE planners, given a considerable period to refine their estimates, generally anticipated requirements accurately. Worst-case scenarios of a Nazi resistance movement failed to develop and the magnitude of destruction and population turmoil were understated in the plans. But the ECLIPSE plan ignored no significant tasks that emerged in the postwar period. There is no evidence the ECLIPSE plan made assumptions that wished away postwar problems in order to redeploy forces rapidly to the Pacific or quickly return them to the United States for demobilization, despite the obvious political and military benefits that would accrue from such actions. Ends, ways, and means were aligned to support a prolonged postwar operation in Germany to secure a long-term peace.

OPERATION ECLIPSE II

Nearly 60 years after ECLIPSE, American political and military leaders again confronted the requirement to define ends, identify ways, and assemble the means to advance national objectives beyond the short-term one of "regime change." American soldiers again found themselves responsible for the practical problems

arising from their position as the most available means for waging peace and maintaining order in the wake of combat.⁵¹

On March 19, 2003, after months of military preparations, political maneuvering in Congress and the Security Council, and alternating Iraqi acts of defiance and compliance, the American-led coalition launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. When announcing the beginning of hostilities, President George W. Bush defined the coalition's objectives in the following terms: "To disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger."⁵² With diplomacy exhausted and economic sanctions a demonstrable failure, the President settled on the military "to apply decisive force" to achieve his ends. Significantly, the President also had articulated a postwar vision for Iraq; in a speech on February 26, 2003, he declared America's objective to be a "free and peaceful Iraq." He noted that achieving this would not be easy and pledged the "sustained commitment" of the United States to the effort. Harkening back to 1945, the President recalled that:

After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments. We established an atmosphere of safety, in which responsible, reform-minded local leaders could build lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home.⁵³

Not burdened by the requirement to hold together a disparate wartime alliance that Roosevelt had confronted, Bush went to war with clearly articulated ends.

Before the war, the President also designated the instrument he would employ to secure his policy objective of a secure, prosperous, reconstructed, and democratic Iraq. On January 20, 2003, he issued National Security Presidential Directive 24 and explicitly assigned responsibility for the conduct of postwar operations to the Defense Department. Although such efforts ostensibly were to be interagency in approach, under Pentagon leadership, the military instrument of power became the chosen way through which the President proposed to achieve his strategic ends, just as it had for Roosevelt. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quickly established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under the leadership of retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner.

Garner put together a team of 200 former military, foreign service, academic, and corporate personnel and began developing plans.⁵⁴ Despite requirements to reestablish a political system, provide aid and assistance, create a sound banking system, and a multitude of other tasks that touched expertise across the expanse of the U.S. Government, Rumsfeld refused to allow the effort to reach out from the Pentagon.⁵⁵ As a result, ORHA did not integrate work done by the State Department in its “Future of Iraq” project that began in March 2002, nor did it pay any attention to wargames conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the summer before.⁵⁶ Garner’s organization was where the various instruments of national power were supposed to come together and function in a coordinated fashion in the few short weeks before combat operations began. It did not happen. Its work on humanitarian assistance was extensive, reflecting concerns aroused by U.N. predictions of thousands of refugees and widespread shortages of food and water in the wake of serious fighting.⁵⁷ Planning for civil administration and reconstruction, however, remained vague. In late February, ORHA conducted a rehearsal at Fort McNair. One observer reported “I got the sense that the humanitarian stuff was pretty well in place, but the rest of it was flying blind.”⁵⁸

In the absence of a coherent interagency approach, the military made its own preparations based on a doctrinal appreciation that planning must address postwar requirements, just as the Army had done in 1942.⁵⁹ Military planning for what became Operation IRAQI FREEDOM reportedly began in earnest in summer 2002 at the President’s direction. Commander of the U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks tasked Combined Forces Land Component Commander Lieutenant General David McKiernan and his staff to prepare plans for ground operations, including conflict termination operations. Their planning initially focused on the tough questions of assembling the military force to topple the regime, building the support structure to sustain operations, and synchronizing the effects of joint fires and maneuver to achieve a rapid, decisive victory. Phase IV (postwar stability and support operations) received less attention as it depended more on national policy decisions, was less critical for decisive combat operations, and remained outside

the “comfort zone” of most military decisionmakers.⁶⁰ Policy guidance to shape Phase IV emerged only gradually from the office of Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith. According to an after action review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that was leaked, this guidance failed to reflect any interagency planning between the Defense and State Departments.⁶¹ Indeed, Feith’s efforts remained tightly contained within a small circle in the Pentagon, because of the political sensitivity of planning for the war against Iraq and, perhaps, because of a widely reported rift between Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell over Iraq policy.⁶²

With the military instrument of power established as the means of achieving the administration’s ends, DoD began assembling forces for implementation. Central to this process were several assumptions that soon became unquestionable within the Pentagon. Principal among these was the belief within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that the Iraqis would view the coalition as a liberating force. They then would rise up to hasten the collapse of the regime and assume responsibility for sustaining public safety, administration, and basic services. According to dismissed Army Secretary Thomas E. White, Feith “had the mind-set that this would be a relatively straightforward manageable task because this would be a war of liberation, and therefore the reconstruction would be short-lived.”⁶³ Similarly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Collins stated in late February 2003: “We’re not coming in to punish or to occupy Iraq. We’re coming in to liberate the country and create the conditions where the Iraqis can create a highly functioning democracy on their own.”⁶⁴ The Pentagon thus based force planning and deployments on assumptions that military operations could accomplish this aim rapidly once Saddam and Ba’athist party apparatchiks were deposed, by building on existing Iraqi governmental and security structures.

Initial responsibility for postwar operations would necessarily fall to the military, which would need to begin addressing postwar tasks from the moment U.S. forces crossed into Iraq. However, significant military power was not available immediately to conduct stability and support operations designed to avert humanitarian disaster, restore critical infrastructure, and provide the environment

for creation of a free, democratic Iraq. Admittedly a major effort did occur at the outset to preserve the Iraqi oil fields. Only after combat operations were complete could the efforts of the four coalition divisions and three combat brigades, together with large numbers of theater and corps support units, focus on postwar tasks.

DoD had shaped this force to achieve success in bringing down Saddam's regime, not for postwar efforts. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz dismissed estimates that the army would need more troops for postwar operations than combat operations as "outlandish." He went on to say that "It's hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army. Hard to imagine."⁶⁵ Yet, when confronted by the anarchy that occurred in the wake of Saddam's collapse, American troops were stretched too thinly to respond in a timely manner to contain the violence and destruction.

Former CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni, who had expressed concern before the war that the new plans called for two fewer divisions than plans he had developed, observed in testimony to Congress that "The reason we had those two extra divisions was the security situation. Revenge killings, crime, chaos—this was all foreseeable."⁶⁶ The perspective of historian John Gaddis is illuminating, offering perhaps the best critique of the administration's approach not only to Iraq, but the wider war on terrorism. He argued that the President, in pursuing a decisive battle, another "Agincourt" in his war on terror, could secure victory. He warned of the risks, however: "The trouble with Agincourts . . . is the arrogance they can encourage, along with the illusion that victory itself is enough and that no follow-up is required." The Bush strategy, Gaddis asserted, ultimately relied "on getting cheered, not shot at."⁶⁷

The Pentagon assembled the means for implementing the President's vision of a democratic and stable Iraq under two principal headquarters: ORHA and Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) until it transitioned to a Combined Joint Task Force as planned in June. However, according to participants in the planning effort at CFLCC, there was virtually no contact between

military planners and the ORHA, despite the latter organization's supposed subordination to Central Command. Matters did not improve when Garner and his staff deployed to Kuwait on March 16, 3 days before the war began. Rather than accepting facilities on the same installation as the CFLCC, Garner leased a hotel in Kuwait City, which given travel restrictions might have been in another country. The divide continued to widen.⁶⁸ The CFLCC saw the contributions of the ORHA as coming too late to be helpful in shaping plans, while they viewed its headquarters and staff as isolated from the realities of combat operations. The ORHA, for its part, felt marginalized by the military and without necessary resources. There was neither unity of effort nor unity of command in implementing a postwar strategy. Unlike Eisenhower, Franks does not appear to have involved himself directly in planning or executing postwar operations.

The arrival of Garner and his team in Iraq weeks after coalition forces had occupied Baghdad further exacerbated problems in transition to postwar operations. ORHA was then glacially slow in getting organized. In fairness, the conditions they faced were daunting. The convention center in which Garner's team established operations was covered in dust and debris; the small ORHA staff had to clean it themselves and set-up operations from the ground-up with little assistance from military forces. Nonetheless, it did not convey a message to Iraqis, the insurgents, the international community, military commanders on the ground, or the American public that anyone had a firm grip on the situation. There were no military government detachments following combat troops into Iraq as they had in Germany; civil affairs units in the country were too few and lacked the detailed preparation that had characterized their predecessors in Germany.

Garner appeared increasingly hapless in the face of mounting reconstruction tasks and a deteriorating security situation. In his defense, the damage to the infrastructure was much greater than anticipated, in part due to widespread looting and the wholesale collapse of Iraqi civil institutions, including the ministries that ORHA was counting on to accomplish day-to-day administration.⁶⁹ The Bush administration therefore accelerated the timeline to replace Garner, and in May the President appointed Ambassador

Paul Bremer to head ORHA's successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority, to "oversee Coalition reconstruction efforts and the process by which the Iraqi people build the institutions and governing structures that will guide their futures."⁷⁰ While Bremer continued to report to Secretary Rumsfeld, he also had the status of special assistant to the President.

With looting, blackouts, insurgent activity, and the organizational disarray of security and reconstruction efforts, Iraqis were uncertain whether the Coalition had a plan, much less was executing one. The result was a loss of momentum, the appearance of flawed planning and preparation, and the frittering away of the psychological impact gained through decisive combat operations by indecisive, disorganized, and unsure postwar operations. The effects that the speed and precision which had destroyed the regime might have inspired instead dissipated in what many observers, Iraqi, American, and international, viewed as a bungled transition to peace operations. Iraqis soon were suspicious that such ineptitude could only be deliberate, an excuse to lengthen the occupation. One Iraqi told Robert Stefanicki, a Polish journalist, that "Americans took over Iraq in 3 weeks but they have not been able to restore the electricity in 3 months. What kind of power is that? They promised us democracy, but where is the government . . . After the war with Kuwait, Saddam rebuilt Iraq in 4 months." Stefanicki concluded: "Three months after the end of the war, Iraqis express a growing sense of disappointment in the new American order—or, to be more precise, the lack of order. There is no dictatorship, but there is also no electricity, work, safety, or government."⁷¹

The administration answered its critics by arguing in effect that things could have been a lot worse. Wolfowitz, when asked by the interviewer if there was anything he would have done differently in the prewar planning for the postwar, responded: "You mean all this terrible planning that prevented oil fields from being destroyed, that prevented humanitarian crises, that prevented fortress Baghdad, that prevented weapons from being used against Israel . . . I get a little tired of all these things we didn't plan for when there was so much good planning that prevented all these thing that these critics predicted."⁷²

With the complete collapse of domestic Iraqi institutions, the first priority for postwar reconstruction was creation of an “atmosphere of safety.” This has proved problematic for coalition forces and has had a significant impact on the pace, costs, and perceptions of progress. Flawed assumptions that overestimated the coalition’s ability to destroy pro-regime forces quickly came into play, as potential sources of resistance melted into the population in the face of the speed and firepower of the coalition offensive. Equally troubling was the impression of widespread anarchy in the streets of Baghdad created by widespread looting in the wake of the regime’s disintegration.⁷³ The coalition served as a lightning rod, attracting radical Islamic fighters from throughout the region, exacerbating the security problem. The porous borders with Syria and Iran readily allowed al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to join the fight. According to commander of ground forces in Iraq Lieutenant General Richard Sanchez, “We did not expect instability before we arrived here. We did not expect the old Iraqi army to disappear and the political and economic structures to shut down. That was clearly a surprise.”⁷⁴ Faced with what appears to be a protracted insurgency, Dod has been compelled to extend tours and maintain high numbers of troops in Iraq, while casting about for more international assistance and accelerating formation of Iraqi police and military forces.

Perhaps most emblematic of the problems the coalition faced in Iraq was that of reconstruction. As part of its postwar preparations, the administration let a \$680 million contract with Bechtel for reconstruction projects, \$230 million of which was earmarked for restoration of the electric grid. The plan assumed that precision bombing would limit damage and allow relatively rapid restoration of essential services. Planners failed to take into account the depths to which Iraq’s infrastructure had fallen after years of mismanagement, underinvestment, and a decade of international sanctions. Bomb damage, although relatively slight, proved difficult to repair; and looting in the wake of the fall of Baghdad decimated an already fragile infrastructure. The collapse of the power grid serving Baghdad and much of the rest of Iraq became a symbol of the failure of the reconstruction effort. Despite concerted coalition efforts to restore power, prewar levels of electrical production were

not reached until October. The blackout apparently was caused by a massive power surge when American forces accidentally severed high-voltage lines near Baghdad International airport.⁷⁵

The Bush administration's request to Congress for funds to rebuild Iraq recognized the magnitude of the problem by asking for over \$12 billion for reconstruction projects alone. Also, \$5.7 billion was requested "to rehabilitate and upgrade Iraq's electric power infrastructure." In addition, \$3.7 billion was requested for water and sewer system projects, \$2.1 billion to modernize the oil industry, and over \$700 million for projects to rebuild and improve transportation networks.⁷⁶ Iraq continues to consume many more resources—time, manpower, and financial—than initially estimated, largely due to the decrepit state of the infrastructure and the stultifying effects of 3 decades of fear, brutality, statism, and inefficiency on the Iraqi people, factors undermining their initiative and sense of individual power.

OPERATIONS ECLIPSE AND ECLIPSE II—A COMPARISON

There are obvious differences in the conditions that existed in Germany and Iraq as the victors implemented the Operation ECLIPSE plans for postwar military operations. The first ECLIPSE operation occurred amid the total destruction of the Nazi regime and the utter devastation and prostration of Germany. There was no fight left in the German people after nearly 6 years of virtually total war—and any inclination to resist was extinguished quickly by the presence of millions of Allied soldiers on the soil of Germany (and for those in the western zones of occupation the specter of Soviet occupation always held out a worse fate). No insurgency emerged under these conditions. As a result, security operations for the American occupation forces largely involved law enforcement tasks, especially since the constituted German police first had to be denazified. Politically, Germany comprised a homogeneous population and the occupation did not have to deal with different ethnic and religious factions vying for power. The chief challenge for the western allies was the permanent and complete eradication of all vestiges and manifestations of the Nazi Party, no matter how

much more difficult that might make day-to-day administration of occupied Germany. The democratization process was aided because Germany was familiar with the basic processes of democracy from its experiences in the Weimar republic and in late imperial Germany, as well as a rich cultural heritage of local representative governments; democratization did not represent a cultural leap.

There were some in the west, however, who wondered if “Teutons” were capable of democracy. The most dramatic condition that faced the occupation was the sheer magnitude of the destruction and dislocation that had occurred in the course of 6 years of total war. A large percentage of the European population had been displaced; millions were homeless; the specter of famine was real; infrastructure throughout the continent was in shambles; financial and legal institutions were shells; and industry was flattened or given over to wartime production. Great cities lay in ruins and abject desperation characterized the conquered German population. The German people were self-reliant, industrious, well-educated, and inspired by desperation; they took the rebuilding of their country on their shoulders and willingly supplied the labor to clear rubble and restore infrastructure. National Socialism had not sapped the initiative from people or stifled the spirit of entrepreneurship.

Dramatically different conditions pertained in Operation ECLIPSE II. Precision weapons and a lightning campaign did not flatten the country in the way that years of mass bomber attacks, unrestricted urban warfare, and massive artillery barrages had leveled Germany. Instead, Iraq suffered from a more insidious deterioration arising from years of neglect, the effects of a years of international economic sanctions, and the systematic pillaging of the country by those who benefited from Ba’ath Party rule. Decades of colonialism followed by nearly a half-century of despotic abuse had deprived the people of belief in their capabilities to effect their own futures. Moreover, Iraq was the invention of post-World War I imperial gerrymandering, incorporating disparate peoples within the geographic borders of a 20th century ideal of ancient Mesopotamia. Sunni Muslims lived tensely amidst the peoples and shrines of the rival Shi’ia faith; while the Kurds, losers in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, existed uneasily stateless at the confluence of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. This

cultural heterogeneity was not leavened by a shared ideological commitment to liberal ideals of compromise, federalism, or personal rights; but represented instead a real source of friction and a potential source of fissure.

The rapid overthrow of the regime without the attendant death and destruction of its adherents, as was the case with Nazi Germany, defined the conditions that would shape execution of Operation ECLIPSE II. First, it allowed the nucleus for a resistance to survive. The pampered class, the Ba'ath Party faithful, had nothing to lose once ousted from power and so undertook armed opposition to both the Coalition occupation and Iraqi supporters of a new political order in the country. Coalition policy underscored their exile from power by the announced program of de-baathification. Their only option then was resistance, either passive or active. When the Ba'ath loyalists were joined by an influx of Islamist militants from throughout the Muslim world seeking to engage the Americans, the primary problem faced by those conducting Operation ECLIPSE II quickly became security. The reconstruction challenge, while daunting, is manageable, especially with the resources the Bush administration and international donors have made available, but it is greatly complicated by the difficult security situation. The Coalition's inability to conduct an orderly demobilization of the military and get control of weapons and explosives in the wake of fighting further exacerbated the problem. Other issues that challenged ECLIPSE operations in Germany, such as displaced persons and the potential for famine and disease did not arise in Iraq to any great extent, in part because of preparation and planning, but more because of the rapidity of operations and lack of collateral damage that would cause an exodus of refugees from cities.

Perhaps the most significant condition that pertained in both cases was that each operation occurred within a broader context, both emerging as defining battles in wider struggles: Germany in the Cold War, and Iraq in the Global War on Terrorism. Both places assumed tremendous symbolic importance and represented the centerpieces of long-term strategies to confront totalitarian and nihilistic ideologies. "Losing" the postwar peace was unthinkable in either situation and justified immense expenditure of resources and effort sustained over time.

IMPLICATIONS FOR WAGING PEACE

The ECLIPSE experiences indicate that the United States possesses outstanding capabilities for waging war, but U.S. postwar operations over the past 2 decades have had an ad hoc nature that is fundamentally inefficient, costly, and open-ended. The challenge for policy makers is not only to articulate strategic ends, identify appropriate ways, and allocate sufficient means, but also to link ends, ways, and means to produce a coherent strategy. If the policy objectives (the ends) are unclear or undefined, the strategy may well define the policy—for better or worse. Conversely, if the strategy is flawed, the attainment of policy goals will be threatened. Clausewitz argued “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”⁷⁷ He also urged statesmen not to take the first step toward war without considering the last, to ensure that they had a coherent strategy to link ends and means.

Operation ECLIPSE and the planning for the occupation of Germany present the case of a military strategy seeking policy. Allied military leaders planned for and resourced postwar operations in the absence of a policy defining what such operations would be asked to accomplish. In Iraq, the situation was reversed. The policy was established in some detail before initiation of hostilities. The President publicly laid out his postwar objectives on several occasions. However, the strategy to achieve the policy was hampered severely by flawed planning assumptions, the failure of the U.S. Government to apply sufficient resources to the task to ensure decisive results, the limited time for integrated planning, and a lack of interagency coordination. The latter deficit points out a common failing in both ECLIPSE operations, a failure to identify and apply all appropriate ways to achieve the desired ends.

For American military officers, the centrality of planning in this process seems self-evident. Military officers learn carefully defined decisionmaking processes; daily operations and exercises then reinforce that instruction. It is axiomatic to military personnel that these planning techniques are universally relevant to all situations. It often comes as a professional shock for them to learn

that policymakers do not necessarily share the same confidence in planning as a means of preparing for the future. Winston Churchill wrote his Foreign Secretary in 1942: "As you know, I am very doubtful about the utility of attempts to plan the peace before we have won the war."⁷⁸ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld apparently shares Churchill's reservations about the limits of planning. According to Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, Rumsfeld's "big strategic theme is uncertainty The inability to predict the future. The limits on our knowledge and the limits on our intelligence." Feith related that as a result if someone told Rumsfeld, "'Let me tell you what something's going to look like in the future,' you wouldn't get to your next sentence!"⁷⁹

This reluctance to predict the future conflicts with the imperative for careful planning that under girds highly complex military operations. As General Bedell Smith warned during the ECLIPSE planning, "The problem is not one that can be handled piecemeal or a solution extemporized hurriedly in the last stage of the operation."⁸⁰ Yet this is precisely the approach policymakers, who want maximum flexibility to react to changing domestic and international considerations, often prefer. By 1943, with the United States well in the war, Churchill overcame his doubts about planning the peace, as he astutely initiated operations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere with a clear eye on the future and the need to posture the British Empire to deal with threats that might emerge in the wake of the defeat of the Third Reich. The magnitude of the task of winning the war and the necessity of holding together the coalition, however, limited the public enunciation of postwar goals by the Big Three until 1945, creating opportunities for military leaders to prepare plans and build organizations that could then implement policy decisions. Sufficient ways and means were present in the context of total war to achieve postwar objectives as they emerged.

In general terms, the Bush administration also recognized what it wanted to accomplish in undertaking to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. It marshaled sufficient ways and means to gain an overwhelming military victory in a limited war but, in trying to minimize forces committed to the operation, it failed to provide adequate ways and means to wage peace successfully. Political

considerations limited the scope of postwar planning, shaped assumptions that downplayed resources required to achieve stated objectives, and failed to establish either unity of command or unity of effort to link military operations with political, economic, and informational operations to achieve a rapid decision in the wake of fighting.

The experiences of ECLIPSE I and II also suggest that postwar operations are complex civil-military endeavors that require clear lines of authority. In postwar Germany, Eisenhower received undisputed command of the U.S. occupation. He exercised this authority through Clay, whom he purposefully endowed with the title "Deputy Commander" to connote the level of responsibility he was giving him. While Eisenhower reported through the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, he had sole responsibility for the conduct of postwar operations. This is in stark contrast to the confused state of affairs that exists in ECLIPSE II. DoD separated responsibility for postwar operations just weeks before the initiation of combat operations in a way seemingly calculated to sow confusion and cause a lack of unity of effort. Secretary Rumsfeld quickly formed the ORHA to oversee reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and the transition of Iraq to a representative form of government under the rule of law. Garner, however, did not have the power or stature to pull things together quickly; and Franks failed to exercise powers as a theater commander to impose order on disjointed postwar efforts.⁸¹

At a tactical level, the ECLIPSE experiences indicate that the military means necessary to achieve decisive postwar results may not be equivalent to the means required to prevail on the battlefield. In Germany, as in Iraq, the force that began executing postwar operations was largely the same as that which conducted the war. In World War II, the presence of 61 divisions, augmented by specialized military government detachments, meant that sufficient means were available in Europe to dominate both the combat and postwar battlefields, but the Pentagon, in conducting the war in Iraq, made a conscious decision to move away from an overwhelming force model.⁸² Given advances in technology, the forces needed to gain decisive results in the combat phase may be inadequate to wage

peace decisively. Smaller maneuver forces can fight and win with precision fires and timely, accurate intelligence.

However, this lethal combination is vulnerable when the mission shifts to peace operations with their demand for presence, human intelligence, civil affairs, and information operations. Waging peace requires an overwhelming force on the ground, especially in its early phases.⁸³ Numbers matter, because it takes soldiers conducting patrols in neighborhoods and responding rapidly to unrest to achieve security and stability; precision fires cannot substitute for troop presence. In addition to taking and holding terrain, information dominance becomes critical in the postwar period, not just for its military utility in providing information to support force protection and security, but for its ability to shape public opinion, disseminate information to the populace, counter enemy propaganda, and build cultural and political awareness in the occupying force to gauge effects of actions. Finally, economic and political means from other government agencies necessarily become more critical given the objectives of most postwar operations—economic sufficiency and political stability.⁸⁴

This is perhaps the most important lesson of ECLIPSE: postwar operations do not fall just within the purview of DoD. The decision to go to war involves a calculus that the application of force will set the conditions that allow the nation to achieve its policy aims. Statesmen must link the first step, going to war, to the last step, ordering the resulting peace to ensure the achievement of policy objectives.⁸⁵ This requires the wielding of all instruments of national power in a coordinated campaign on a battlefield where force is not the primary determinant of success.⁸⁶ Such an integrated effort did not occur in either ECLIPSE operation.

After ECLIPSE, policymakers sought to institutionalize the informal consultations that had developed in various subcommittees and in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee through the National Security Act of 1947 that created the National Security Council. ECLIPSE II exposed an interagency planning process that continues fundamentally to be flawed. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24 made DoD the lead agency for postwar operations, but that seems to have translated into a perception by

other agencies that Iraq is the Pentagon's show; actions by various members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense appear to have reinforced that belief. As a result, other than the CIA's active involvement in all aspects of the war (especially the search for weapons of mass destruction) and the Agency for International Development's actions to posture American and international aid efforts to forestall a potential humanitarian disaster in the wake of fighting, other key agencies in the government were conspicuously absent from planning and execution of postwar missions.⁸⁷ The National Security Council (NSC) system failed to act forcefully as an effective vehicle for interagency cooperation, and when the National Security Advisor attempted to carve out such a role for herself and the NSC staff, a strong Secretary of Defense quickly quashed the attempt.⁸⁸

The state of the current national security structure is reminiscent of DoD prior to Goldwater-Nichols. It is time for wholesale changes in the culture of government to inculcate an interagency spirit that transcends departmental parochialism. Interagency training, a common doctrine for planning and management, and removal of barriers to information and communication are essential to build mechanisms for interagency cooperation and truly joint planning and operations. The time is ripe for a revision of the National Security Act of 1947, itself a product of the realization of the need for interagency coordination exposed by World War II, to create an organizational structure and culture able to seamlessly and simultaneously bring all instruments of power to bear at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.⁸⁹ In order to do so, the means must be adequate to the task. Only in this way can policy and strategy be linked to ensure that the nation wages peace with the same focused intensity as it wages war.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. Directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force from Combined Chiefs of Staff, February 12, 1944, N-15823, "Summary of Directives," archival collection, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

2. The Allies established the European Advisory Commission, (EAC) in December 1943 as a result of an understanding reached at the Moscow Conference.

The EAC was directed to look at postwar issues and make “recommendations to the three governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities.” Despite its charter, the group did not prove useful as a policy-forming body; however, its discussions provided a forum for the Allies to probe each other’s objectives and draft language for such matters as the surrender document, occupation zone protocol, and coalition control machinery. The American representative, Ambassador John Winant, was disturbed by what he viewed as the group’s impotence in defining larger policy matters. U.S. Army, “Planning for the Occupation,” Frankfurt, Germany, 1946; reprinted as Special Text 41-10-62, U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, GA, n.d., pp. 33-35; and Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, *United States Army in World War II*, Special Studies, Washington, DC, 1975, p. 131.

3. Gullion to Jenkins, February 6, 1943, quoted in Harry A. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, *United States Army in World War II*, Special Studies, Washington, DC, 1964, p. 27.

4. Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., “Planning for the Treatment of Postwar Germany, 1943-1946,” unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Kansas, 1972, p. 14.

5. Cochran, p. 23.

6. Letter to CCS from Chief of Staff, SHAEF, February 10, 1944, Civil Affairs Division Decimal File 380.7—Germany; quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 42.

7. Gerhard von Glahn, *The Occupation of Enemy Territory . . . A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation*, Minneapolis, MN, 1957, pp. 42-44.

8. These were designated as “H” or “I” detachments. They “advanced with the front line troops posting proclamations, removing Nazi officials, and replacing them with non-Nazis, frequently in six or seven localities a day.” Earl F. Ziemke, “Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany,” Robert Wolfe, ed., *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, Carbondale, IL, 1984, p. 56. See also Harold Zink, *American Military Government in Germany*, New York, 1947, pp. 58-59, for a discussion of the organization of civil affairs detachments. Over 7,000 officers and men were assigned to the European Civil Affairs Division and organized in three provisional regiments of 10 companies each. Two of the regiments were designated to occupy Germany, the other one to provide civil affairs teams to assist local governments in liberated areas. Merle Faisod, “The Development of American Military Government Policy during World War II,” Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*, New York, 1948, pp. 23-41. Hajo Holborn, *American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies*, Washington, DC, 1947, pp. 7-10; Ziemke, *Army in the Occupation of Germany*, pp. 3, 68-70. On the scenes of destruction that met Allied commanders and their efforts to impose order and establish security, see Harold Zink, *American Military Government in Germany*, New York, 1947, pp. 40, 170-172; John Gimbel, *A German Community under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-1952*, Stanford, CA, 1961, pp. 37, 68.

9 Historians have argued that SWNCC was the forerunner of the National Security Council. Its formation was a tangible indication that key cabinet secretaries recognized that formulation of postwar policies was inherently an interagency problem. According to Alexander Cochran, SWNCC “represented the first formal acknowledgement by the military and civilian departments that the planning for the treatment of postwar Germany was a joint problem which had to be conducted in a coordinated manner with agreed upon responsibilities.” Cochran, p. 100. Interestingly, for the National Security Council parallel, SWNCC had a joint secretariat, affording it a mechanism to coordinate actions with the JCS and other governmental departments. The working group was formed by departmental deputies like James C. Dunn of the State Department’s Post War Programs Committee and Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, and included General John Hilldring, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff—veterans of the ad hoc planning groups that had come before. Cochran, p. 102.

10. The Big Three also announced their intent to extract reparations. See the Tripartite Agreements of the Yalta Conference in Appendix A of Diane Shaver Clemons, *Yalta*, New York, 1970, pp. 295-296. At Potsdam, following V-E Day, the Allies got more specific in the “Protocol on Proceedings,” agreeing that the goals of occupation were “The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the destruction of the Nazi party, in order to convince the German people of its total defeat and prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis.” The Protocol also called for decentralization of German economic power, with emphasis on fostering agriculture and “peaceful domestic industries.” Cochran, p. 129.

11. Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, Westport, CT, 1950, p. 19. The history of JCS 1067 [“Directive to the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post Defeat)”] is long and complex. The first version was sent to Eisenhower on September 24, 1944. It was presented to the European Advisory Committee in January 1945 as the American proposal for a policy for occupied Germany. Following Yalta, the directive underwent a number of revisions and was ultimately issued to Eisenhower in his capacity as Commander, U.S. Forces Europe on May 14, 1945, as JCS 1067/8. Ziemke, pp. 101-102, 208-214. The text of JCS 1067/8 is printed in Holborn, pp. 157-172.

12. In North Africa, the State Department was given responsibility for civil administration of occupied territories. State established the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations and the Office of Foreign Territories to conduct the operation. Political questions and disputes over priority of shipping and supplies created numerous points of friction between civil administrators and General Eisenhower. Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, Commander of Army Service Forces, observed in April 1943 that, “We have had the opportunity to learn a real lesson from North Africa which lesson to me is that you cannot separate the handling of civil affairs from military operations in areas in which military

operations are under way, and that an attempt to do so in a hostile country would be disastrous." Somervell to McCloy, April 3, 1943, quoted in Cole and Weinberg, p. 65. As a result, at the urging of Secretary of War Stimson, President Roosevelt directed that the Army become the lead agency in civil administration of liberated and occupied territories. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall told a subordinate that the State Department and other civilian agencies "were very unhappy about the fact that the Army, and not they, were going to have this problem in the wake of battle . . ." He also stated that only the bad experience Eisenhower had in North Africa in the wake of Operation TORCH with all the civilian agencies that had flowed in and competed for scarce resources had convinced Roosevelt that military government would be necessary.

The President himself had come to this conclusion without any pressures at all by the War Department . . . but . . . nobody else in the cabinet, except perhaps Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox, had any sympathy with the President's decision, and . . . some cabinet members . . . had great doubts about the wisdom of giving to soldiers the amount of political power and influence to be exerted by [the Civil Affairs Division of the Army General Staff] in the years ahead."

Hilldring interview, March 30, 1959, quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945*, New York, 1973, pp. 457-458. See also Ziemke, pp. 10-13; and Holborn, pp. 12-13. Despite this decision, the Army continued to attempt to place limits on the mission. General Hilldring assured Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson in late 1943 that:

The Army is not a welfare organization. It is a military machine whose mission is to defeat the enemy on the field of battle. Its interest and activities in military government and civil affairs administration are incidental to the accomplishment of the military mission. Nevertheless, these activities are of paramount importance, as any lack of a condition of social stability in an occupied area would be prejudicial to the success of the military effort.

Hilldring to Acheson, November 9, 1943, quoted in Coles and Weinberg, p. 153.

13. John McCloy had written to Eisenhower in late 1944 telling him that the War Department was recommending "that the government of Germany should be instituted on a military basis . . . [with] single, undivided responsibility in the military commander." McCloy made it clear that the commander would be Eisenhower. He went on to state that he intended to suggest the appointment of Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson to act as a civilian advisor to assist Eisenhower in administering the peace. Secretary of War Stimson convinced Roosevelt, however, that Patterson was too important to the War Department to lose at this time. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Supreme Commander: the War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower*, Garden City, NY, 1970, p. 602. In March 1945, with no one yet appointed to supervise the day-to-day operations of the occupation government, Eisenhower wrote the Army's G-1 telling him that he had "heard

a rumor that Lucius Clay may become available for assignment to a theater. If it should develop that this is so, I have a very urgent need for him . . . My idea is that he would be the Herbert Hoover of this war and would have the job of handling civil affairs in Germany." Eisenhower to Somervell, March 14, 1945, in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, the War Years*, Vol. 4, Baltimore, MD, 1970, p. 2528. Clay, an Army engineer, had been detailed early in the war to serve as the War Department's representative to the War Production Board and Office of Lend Lease. Ultimately, he had become the deputy to Director of War Mobilization James F. Byrnes. Clay thus was positioned admirably to be selected for assignment as the Deputy Military Governor of Germany. As he later recalled, "I was considered in the War Department to have had perhaps as much experience dealing with civilian agencies of the government as anybody in the military establishment." The later ascension of Byrnes to Secretary of State made the choice especially fortuitous for smoothing coordination between State and War. Cochran, p. 122.

14. Clay, p. 6.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 56. Forrest Pogue, Marshall's biographer, concluded:

Letters between Marshall and Eisenhower and memoranda between Stimson and Marshall about the approaching postwar situation reflected the fact that they thought in terms of 1919—that American public opinion would demand a recall of troops from abroad, that a demand would be made for a sharp cutback in the armed forces, that a resurgence of isolationism would bring a revulsion against stationing American troops abroad to be caught up in Europe's quarrels, and that final arrangements would be made at a peace conference.

Pogue, p. 574.

16. James Dunn, voiced State's position at the time: "The Department of State is a policy organism of the Government and is therefore not equipped to carry out operations certainly not on such large scale as would be required in dealing with the German problem." Cochran, p. 141.

17. Byrnes accomplished this co-opting of the military by appointing the chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff as Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas to develop occupation policy, and leveraging his own strong personal relationship with Truman. Cochran, p. 141. See also John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan*, Stanford, 1976, p. 26; and Gimbel, "Governing the American Zone of Germany," Robert Wolfe, ed., *Americans as Proconsuls*, pp. 92-93. Byrnes' relationship with General Clay from the days when Clay was his deputy in the War Mobilization Office also afforded him valuable entree into the Office of Military Government. Cochran, p. 122.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 34. A structure for postwar planning was created in the Army staff and in combined headquarters. The War Department had formed a Civil Affairs Division in the Army in 1942 and established a school for military government in Charlottesville, VA. Then in March 1943, General Marshall

directed the formation of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff, an initiative stemming largely from his own experiences with occupation duty in the Philippines in 1902 and in Europe after World War I. See Pogue, pp. 455-457. In Europe, General Morgan, Chief of Staff of COSSAC, created the European Civil Affairs Division (ELAD). With the establishment of SHAEF in February 1944, ECAD became the G-5 Division. Within the Operations Section of the G-5, separate civil affairs sections for each country in the area of operations prepared plans for occupation or liberation, as appropriate. The German Country Unit (GCU), formed in March 1944, was the principal postwar planning organization in G-5. The GCU was manned by 150 British and American officers, bringing a combined perspective to their postwar deliberations, something that was missing at the national level. The GCU drafted plans to assume responsibility for governing Germany at national, regional, and local levels. This served as a mechanism for training military government detachments for the specific tasks that they would have to perform. According to Harold Zink, the official historian for the U.S. High Commissioner of Germany, the GCU "actually succeeded in drafting a series of plans which had a considerable bearing on the actual occupation of Germany." Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955*, New York, 1957, p. 20. Zink apparently was a member of the German Country Unit at one time, his book, *American Military Government in Germany*, is dedicated to "Brother Officers on the Board of Editors, German Country Unit, SHAEF").

19. Planners addressed three "cases" under which RANKIN might be executed: a rapid collapse of resistance; a sudden German decision to retreat to pre-war borders; and unconditional surrender. The latter, labeled RANKIN-C, was viewed as the most likely scenario and was finalized at the end of October 1943. "Planning for the Occupation," pp. 21-24. On October 30, 1943, the RANKIN-C draft was issued as a planning directive to the U.S. First Army Group and the British Twenty-First Army Group. Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953*, Frankfurt, Germany, 1953, p. 189.

20. Most importantly, the RANKIN planning began to build the staff organizations capable of undertaking the work of planning the peace. For example, Major General C. A. West, Deputy G-3 of COSSAC, told his staff, "We cannot wait for policy to be laid down by the United Nations. It is essential that we should prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems," listing armistice terms, disarmament, displaced persons, prisoners of war, martial law, disposal of captured war material, and coordination of movement and transportation. Major General C. A. West, Memorandum, January 14, 1944, subject: "Operation RANKIN-C," quoted in Frederiksen, p. 36.

21. TALISMAN also went into much greater detail than RANKIN in assigning specific missions to various commands and detailing force movement and positioning. See note 24 below. "Planning for the Occupation," pp. 60-61.

22. RANKIN-C called for 25 divisions; TALISMAN increased the requirement to over 39. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-67, 69.

23. Once resistance ended, plans called for the Twenty-First Army Group (UK) to assume responsibility for the designated British zone of occupation in the north, and the Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups (U.S.) for the American zone of occupation in the south. The army groups were to establish four military districts in each zone to set the conditions for transition to Tripartite Control. The Supreme Commander would preside over Berlin as a separate district. The plan also anticipated a requirement for redeployment of "surplus U.S. and British forces not required for occupational duties in Germany" from ports in France. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Operation ECLIPSE: Appreciation and Outline Plan, Section I, paragraphs 67-70, 10 November 1944. See also ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan, Section VI, Task 6.

24. Eight of these accompanied the ECLIPSE Outline Plan; SHAEF published the rest as they were completed and approved. The first memorandum contained the "Instrument of Surrender" or instructions to surrendering German forces to implement the terms agreed to by the Allies. These were general in nature, directing disarmament of all German armed forces, authorized activities of German military personnel, and procedures for safeguarding materiel, records, equipment, and facilities. It also mandated German cooperation and assistance in removing obstacles to land, sea, and air movement. Appendices to the memorandum contained special orders to German military commanders requiring them to furnish the Allies specific information and admonishing them to cooperate and protect facilities and equipment pending disposition instructions. Appendix H provided for sanctions against violators of the terms of surrender. These included military measures, judicial and police measures, and "repressive" measures such as destruction of property and hostages. Only the Supreme Commander could authorize "repressive" measures, with the exception that Allied forces could force "civilian or military persons to accompany military parties into buildings or areas suspected of being mined or booby trapped, or on trains and other forms of transportation liable to be damaged by sabotage . . ." Memorandum Number 1, "Instrument of Surrender; Orders to German Military Authorities to Supplement Instrument; Sanctions in Event of Delinquency," November 25, 1944, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

Memorandum 5 established rules governing labor in the postwar period and instructed army group commanders to use German labor as available, including disarmed German military and paramilitary personnel. Memorandum Number 5, "Labor," March 2, 1945, revised April 28, 1945, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

Memorandum 8 assigned army group commanders "responsibility for the safety, recovery, care, maintenance, administration, and evacuation of all United Nations Prisoners of War . . . in their respective zones of operation." The SHAEF G1 was designated as the Supreme Commander's executive agent on prisoner of war matters and the memorandum directed him to attach personnel to the army groups to assist them in executing this task. The memorandum also established policies and procedures for the army groups to follow to deal with these liberated

prisoners. Memorandum Number 8, "The Care and Evacuation of Prisoners of War in Greater Germany under 'ECLIPSE' Conditions," March 25, 1945, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan. Memorandum 14 addressed control of displaced persons (DPs). It estimated that there would be 3,685,000 DPs in the American and British zones, with another 3,405,000 in the Russian zone. The memorandum reminded commanders that "The care of these people and their ultimate disposition is an international problem of the first magnitude, affecting in varying degrees the governments of nineteen countries." It instructed them to employ "all available resources at the disposal" of the Allies forces to ensure the DPs were cared for properly. The memorandum further directed commanders to establish assembly centers to control movement of displaced persons and establish border controls. It further instructed them to ensure separation of German refugees from Allied displaced persons. Memorandum Number 14, "Control of Displaced Persons," ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan. The estimates of DPs in the plan were fairly accurate. By October 1945, 2.3 million DPs had been repatriated from the American zone. Frederiksen, p. 75.

Memoranda 9 through 11 addressed disarmament of German ground, air, and naval forces respectively. The local Allied commander was tasked to safeguard and control German war materiel. Annexes to the memoranda delineated specific materials that the Allies would confiscate and identified those materials that the Germans could retain, including ambulances, trucks, (one per 100 soldiers for supply), horse-drawn vehicles, draft animals, and their harnesses. Memorandum Number 9, "Primary Disarmament of the German Land Forces and Short Term Disposal of Surrendered War Material," November 25, 1944; Memorandum Number 10, "Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces Opposing Us and Short Term Disposal of Surrendered War Material"; and Memorandum Number 11, "Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces, Short Term Disposal of Surrendered Naval War Material and Naval Demolitions," January 5, 1945, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

Memoranda 12 and 13 provided instructions on civil affairs operations in liberated countries and military government operations in Germany respectively. Civil affairs guidance was provided on each country. Military government was designated as the responsibility of the Supreme Commander, with the army group commanders acting as his agents in their zones of responsibility. He would exercise "supreme legislative, executive and judicial rights of an occupying power, subject to the rules of International Law." The tasks identified for military government were substantial. They were to enforce the terms of surrender, establish and maintain law and order, and apprehend war criminals. Additionally, it had the mission to "care, control, and repatriate" displaced citizens of the United Nations while providing "minimum care necessary to effect control of enemy refugees and displaced persons." Military government was also charged with elimination of Nazism, fascism, and militarism. Military government detachments were empowered to retain "and establish suitable civil administration to the extent required to accomplish the above objectives." Specific procedures for military

government were contained in the Military Government Handbook published by the SHAEF G-5. Significantly, units were reminded:

Military government of Germany is a command responsibility. In the initial stages of the advance into Germany military government will be carried out on an *ad hoc* basis in accordance with the tactical areas of command. As the situation stabilizes it will be possible to establish Military Districts, which will correspond in general with German administrative boundaries.

Memorandum Number 12, "Digest of Civil Affairs Considerations in Liberated Countries," December 28, 1944; and Memorandum Number 13, "Digest for Military Government and Occupation of Germany," December 28, 1944, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

25. Ziemke, p. 320.

26. Third Army, "Mission Accomplished: Third United States Army Occupation of Germany," Frankfurt, Germany, 1947, p. 25. According to historian Earl Ziemke, "The company was widely viewed as the ideal unit for independent deployment because billets were easy to find and the hauls from the billets to guard posts and checkpoints would not be excessively long." Ziemke, pp. 229, 320.

27. Ziemke, pp. 241-243. SHAEF addressed the shortfall in guards by assigning 13 antiaircraft battalions to provide security. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., *Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against Falsehood*, Baton Rouge, LA, 1992, p. 9.

28. Ziemke, pp. 293-294; Frederiksen, pp. 89-90.

29. Brian Loring Villa, "The Diplomatic and Political Context of the POW Camps Tragedy," in Bischof and Ambrose, eds., *Eisenhower and the German POWs*, p. 69; Frederiksen, p. 53; Ziemke, p. 294.

30. Frederiksen, p. 86.

31. Third Army, p. 61.

32. Julian Bach, Jr., *America's Germany: An Account of the Occupation*, New York, 1946, p. 41; Third Army, pp. 61-62.

33. Frederiksen, pp. 73-75.

34. See Bischof and Ambrose, pp. 2-6, for an excellent discussion of this situation.

35. Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers, 1940-1945*, Boston, 1974, p. 682.

36. Ziemke, pp. 195, 286.

37. *Ibid*, pp. 61, 75, 205, 236-237, 252. In Marburg,

Displaced persons continued to loot after military government arrived because German police lacked jurisdiction over them and

because some local unit commanders apparently sanctioned it. Military authorities stepped in only after the displaced persons began to threaten the security of the local area by robberies and murders. They stopped looting by putting the displaced persons into camps where they could be observed, controlled, and then processed for repatriation.

Gimbel, pp. 37, 61. See also Frederiksen, p. 11.

38. Eugene Davidson, *The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation*, New York, 1959, p. 50.

39. Third Army, pp. 52-53.

40. Stephen E. Ambrose, "Eisenhower and the Germans," in Bischof and Ambrose, eds, *Eisenhower and the German POWs*, p. 35.

41. Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, *America's Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps*, New York, 1989, p. 225.

42. Ziemke, p. 182.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

44. See also Zink, p. 170; and William B. Dallas, "The Role of Counterintelligence in the European Theater of Operations during World War II," Master of Military Arts Thesis, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1993, p. 75.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

46. Ziemke, pp. 194, 236. In the absence of military government troops, responsibility for military government often rested in the hands of tactical commanders such as a lieutenant who, after his tanks occupied a town, reported that he "selected me a mayor who lived in that big house yonder—and he's doing all right." Davidson, p. 49. Tactical troops posted the occupation ordinances and the SHAEF proclamation, established population control measures such as roadblocks and curfews, and conducted security patrols. When Leipzig fell on April 19, 1945, V Corps designated the commander of the 190th Field Artillery Group to take control of the city of one million inhabitants and gave him 3 field artillery battalions, 4 security guard detachments, and a provisional military government detachment, 16 officers, 24 enlisted men, to administer the city and provide security. Frederiksen, p. 10.

47. Davidson, p. 130.

48. Clay, p. 69.

49. Quoted in Blumenson, p. 785.

50. Talk about ECLIPSE conditions.

51. Nadia Schadlow argues persuasively that "Civilian leaders supported the Army's leadership over governance operations largely because of a lack of alternatives. Political leaders realized that the Army was the only agency capable

of accomplishing reconstruction in the midst of and aftermath of combat." Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," *Parameters*, Autumn 2003, p. 88.

52. President George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation," March 19, 2003; available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html, Internet, accessed October 15, 2003.

53. President George W. Bush, Speech to American Enterprise Institute, February 26, 2003; available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/iraq/20030226-11.html>, Internet, accessed October 17, 2003. After the war, in his speech on the USS *Lincoln*, the President sounded the same themes:

We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous. We're pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to account for their crimes. We've begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons . . . We're helping to rebuild Iraq, . . . And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort.

Bush, "Address on USS *Lincoln*," May 1, 2003; available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html, Internet, accessed September 15, 2003.

54. As the *New York Times* put it, Garner was "in charge of everything the American military is not: feeding the country, fixing the infrastructure and creating . . . a democratic government." Jane Perlez, "Nucleus of a Postwar Government Forms in Kuwait," *New York Times*, April 4 2003, reprinted in *International Herald Tribune*; available at <http://www.ihf.com/articles/92109.html>, Internet, accessed September 11, 2003. The composition of the leadership team at ORHA represented various backgrounds. Tim Carney, former ambassador to the Sudan was named to head the Ministry of Interior; Kenneth Keith, former ambassador to Qatar, would lead the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Robin Raphael, former ambassador to Tunisia, would direct the Ministry of Trade. In addition, regional supervisors were named to direct regional humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. These were directed by General (Ret.) Bruce Moore in the North; General (Ret.) Buck Walters in the South; and Barbara Bodine, former ambassador to Yemen in the central part of Iraq, including Baghdad. James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," *The Atlantic*, January/February 2004, p. 65.

55. Journalist George Packer noted the enormous political sensitivity of negotiations in the United Nations in January-February 2003, and quotes one ORHA official, Drew Erdmann: "How much diplomacy would there have been at the U.N. if people had said, 'The President is pulling people out of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce to take over the whole Iraqi state?' That's the political logic that works against advance planning." George Packer, "Letter From Baghdad: War After the War—What Washington Doesn't See in Iraq," *The New Yorker*, November 24, 2003, p. 64.

56. Many have argued that Secretary Rumsfeld and Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith systematically blocked dissenting voices from ORHA, whatever their level of expertise. For example, Packer states that contact with Thomas Warrick, the director of the "Future of Iraq" project, was specifically forbidden by Secretary Rumsfeld, who intimated that he was acting at the request of the Vice President. Packer, p. 62. James Fallows has an extensive account of the detailed planning that was done in the Future of Iraq project beginning in March 2002, a year before ORHA was formed. In addition he describes a CIA-sponsored war game in May 2002 to consider post-Saddam scenarios. The exercises reportedly highlighted the risk of disorder in the wake of the collapse of the regime, the complexity of the WMD hunt, and the difficulty of creating a workable Iraqi government given "that rivalries in Iraq were so deep, and the political culture so shallow." Fallows reports that "Representatives from the Defense Department were among those who participated in the first of these CIA war-game sessions. When their Pentagon superiors at the Office of the Secretary of Defense found out about this, in early summer, the representatives were reprimanded and told not to participate further." Fallows, pp. 56-58. In another case, a meeting between a retired Air Force colonel who had conducted an extensive study of Iraq's infrastructure and Deputy Assistant Undersecretary of Defense Joseph Collins was abruptly and unexplainably cancelled. The officer concluded: "It became clear that what I was really arguing was that we had to delay the war . . . I was saying 'We aren't ready, and in just 6 or 8 weeks, there is no way to get ready for everything we need to do.'" *Ibid.*, p. 70.

57. ORHA administrator Jay Garner was selected principally because of his experience in humanitarian operations. In the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, then Lieutenant General Garner commanded Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to resettle Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq and provide them humanitarian assistance. In this task, "he combined vision with a practical ability to get things done." Adam Curtis, "Iraq's interim administrator," BBC News Online; available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/Americas/2924201.stm>, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. MSNBC reported on April 24, 2003, that "Garner is expected to repeat what he pulled off for the Kurds, namely restoring law and order to a region where chaos reigns." Rachel Elbaum, "Iraq meets the new boss," MSNBC; available at <http://www.msnbc.com/news/900794.asp?cp1=1>, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. For humanitarian response, see also Andrew Natsios, USAID Administrator, "Special State Department Briefing on Iraq Reconstruction," March 25, 2003; available at <http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/Transcripts/20030328.htm>, Internet, accessed January 16, 2004.

58. Packer, p. 62.

59. Joint doctrine states that "military plans and operations must focus both on achieving the political objectives and on establishing the military conditions necessary to sustain the objectives following cessation of military operations. This calls for planning based on the desired end state, ensuring that the longer-term postconflict environment called for by U.S. political objectives is preserved

following conclusion of military involvement. Military plans at all levels should include consideration of conditions under which conflict termination and termination of military involvement can be executed." Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," *Joint Publication 1*, April 13, 1995, II-5. Current joint doctrine also directs its readers to "View conflict termination not just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new posthostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems." Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning," *Joint Publication 5-00.1*, January 25, 2002, p. II-5.

60. This focus on combat operations is not unique to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. General Maxwell Thurman related that when he became commander of U.S. SOUTHCOM a few months before Operation JUST CAUSE: "I did not even spend 5 minutes on Blind Logic [the post-conflict plan]." As he reflected back on the events leading up to JUST CAUSE he concluded, "The least of my problems at the time was Blind Logic We put together the campaign for JUST CAUSE and probably did not spend enough time on the restoration." Quoted in William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters*, Autumn 2003, p. 108.

61. Rowan Scarborough, "U.S. Rushed Post-Saddam Planning," *Washington Times*, September 3, 2003, p. 1. Feith established a highly compartmented Office of Special Plans to prepare postwar plans and policy. According to one Air Force officer who worked in the Near East/South Asia Bureau of Feith's Policy office in OSD, "She and her colleagues were allowed little contact with the Office of Special Plans and often were told by the officials who ran it to ignore the State Department's concerns and views." Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel, "Lack of Planning Contributed to Chaos in Iraq," *Knight Ridder Newspapers*; available at <http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/6285256.htm>, Internet, accessed September 11, 2003.

62. Packer, p. 62.

63. *Ibid.*

64. Quoted by Bob Kemper, "Bush Sees Wide Post-War Peace: Iraq Defeat Would Open Door to Democracy in Region, He Says," *Chicago Tribune*, February 27, 2003; available from www.voy.com/134586/9.html, Internet, accessed September 11 2003. Vice-President Cheney echoed the same view in an interview with Tim Russert just before the war: ". . . I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators . . . The road we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but what they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that." Quoted in Fallows, p. 65.

65. Packer, p. 63; Fallows, pp. 65, 72-73.

66. Zinni's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 11, 2003, is a masterful review of the complexity of postwar operations and a strong pitch for an integrated interagency approach. He noted that he had directed a planning effort to address postwar considerations when he was in command: "Not only to identify the problems or what had to be done, but I

didn't want the military to be stuck with this problem, as is always the case. We did that. I must say with mixed results. I can't say I had enthusiastic support from all agencies, but I did from some and it helped us identify some of the problems." Anthony Zinni, "Statement of Gen. Anthony Zinni," Transcript of Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 11, 2003; available at <http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Hearings/Preparedstatements/sfrc-021103.htm#AZ>, Internet, accessed October 24, 2003.

67. John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy*, No. 133, November/December 2002; reprinted in Volume I, Readings, Course 2: "War, National Security Policy and Strategy," August 27-October 24, 2003, U.S. Army War College, p. 373.

68. ORHA officials reportedly drafted a list of key sites in Baghdad that would require security when the city fell. Although they submitted this list to CFLCC, it was lost in the press of managing combat operations; and in the absence of personal relationships among planners, there was no follow-up by ORHA. Packer, p. 64.

69. A retired Air Force colonel, Sam Gardiner, presented results of his study of the Iraqi infrastructure to a Rand Corporation forum in January 2003. He concluded that, despite precision bombing, the fragile water, sewage, electrical, and public health systems would collapse as a result of any war or its aftermath. Fallows, p. 70.

70. Ari Fleischer, Statement by Press Secretary, May 6, 2003; available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030506-5.html>, Internet, accessed September 15, 2003.

71. Another Iraqi asserted, "Americans are withholding gas and electricity on purpose. They want to break us, so we'll accept any government. But we will not let that happen. Iraq is not Afghanistan. Our patience is running out." Robert Stefanicki, "Iraq, Three Months After the War," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Warsaw, Poland, July 10, 2003, available at *World Press Review*, <http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/1361.cfm>, Internet, accessed September 11, 2003.

72. For an administration view, see Paul Wolfowitz, "Building a Free and Democratic Iraq is Going to be a Huge Victory in the War on Terror," *Jerusalem Post*, September 26, 2003, available at <http://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep2003/e20030930220472.html>, Internet, accessed September 30, 2003.

73. *Time* reported:

To cope with the mounting lawlessness—which threatens to turn into a free-for-all for armed gangs, and an orgy of retributive violence against those associated with the regime . . . , the U.S. has called for the Iraqi bureaucrats who previously policed the city and ran its basic services to come forward and help restore order. Soldiers have been ordered to stop looting where possible, but their primary focus remains securing the city from hostile combatants.

Tony Karon, "Anarchy in Baghdad," *Time*, April 11, 2003; available at <http://www.time.com/time/world/printout/0,8816,442987,00.html>, Internet, accessed September 15, 2003.

74. Richard Lloyd Parry, "Frankness in Coalition Front Line," *London Times*, September 17, 2003, available at www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep2003/earlyBirdHome/html, Internet, accessed September 18, 2003. The intensity of the security challenge may be gauged in part by the fact that in the 4th Infantry Division Sector, U.S. troops killed 600 and arrested 2,500 guerrillas by early October. Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning of the Tide?" *Washington Post*, October 7, 2003, p. 25, available at www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Oct2003/earlyBirdHome/html, Internet, accessed October 8, 2003.

75. Rajjiv Chandrasekaran, "Crossed Wires Kept Power Off in Iraq: Prewar Planning Failed to Assess State of Infrastructure," *Washington Post*, September 25, 2003, p. 1.

76. Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Tells How Billions of Dollars Would Rebuild Iraq," *Washington Post*, September 25, 2003, p. 25.

77. Clausewitz, *On War*, Book I, Chapter I, p. 99. It is important to note, as Michael Howard has, that Clausewitz' principle is "honored more often in the breach than in the observance. Normally the priorities are reversed. In spite of himself the strategist finds that his plans are being shaped by immediate military and political necessities, which cumulatively shape the object of the war." Michael Howard, "British Grand Strategy in World War I," in Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, New Haven, CT, 1991, p. 31.

78. Michael D. Pearlman, *Warmaking and American Democracy: the Struggle over Military Strategy, 1700 to Present*, Lawrence, KS, 1999, p. 9.

79. Fallows, p. 53.

80. Letter to CCS from Chief of Staff, SHAEF, February 10, 1944, Civil Affairs Division Decimal File 380.7—Germany; quoted in Cochran, "Planning for the Treatment of Postwar Germany," p. 42.

81. The naming of Ambassador Paul Bremer to head the Coalition Provisional Authority with the rank of Presidential Envoy reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense did little to unify the effort. The CENTCOM Commander, General Abizaid, now directs stability and security operations in Iraq through a Combined Joint Task Force organized around V Corps headquarters; Ambassador Bremer has no direct authority over these forces, and there is not an effective mechanism for coordinating the activities of the CPA and the CJTF.

82. The regime would be toppled by about 130,000 coalition troops in total. This was accomplished not by seizing and holding territory—at least until the Third Infantry Division reached Baghdad—but by decisive maneuver, information superiority, and precision strike throughout the battlefield. In effect, IRAQI FREEDOM brought to life *Joint Vision 2020* which calls for "full spectrum dominance—achieved through the interdependent application

of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimensional protection." No one can deny that the force assembled for the fight met the requirements for achieving decisive combat effects, but this force proved incapable of achieving "full spectrum dominance" once major combat operations had ended. The debate that occurred between Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki and senior leaders of the Defense Department, most stridently, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, underscored the conflict over planning assumptions and force-sizing for postwar operations. Clearly Wolfowitz, speaking for Secretary Rumsfeld, prevailed in asserting a view that U.S. and coalition forces could shift responsibility for security quickly to extant Iraqi police and elements of the Iraqi army that would reject Saddam Hussein and refuse to resist coalition military operations. These assumptions proved invalid when, rather than standing and fighting, elements of the Iraqi Army most loyal to the regime, notably the Special Republican Guard and the Saddam Fedayeen, melted into the population and constituted the basis for insurgent operations. "I suppose on reflection the thing that probably surprised me the most is the ability that the so-called Fedayeen Saddam people had to terrorize and frighten the rest of the Iraqi people and cause them to not come over to the other side," Rumsfeld said in answer to a question from the audience. Associated Press, "Rumsfeld Surprised by Saddam Loyalists," October 10, 2003; available at http://start.earthlink.net/newsarticle?cat=9&aid=D7U3KUF02_story, Internet, accessed October 10, 2003. In part, their ability to do so may have been a result of the refusal of Turkey to grant transit rights to the 4th Infantry Division, Mechanized, forestalling rapid occupation of northern Iraq, especially the area around Tikrit. The assumptions about postwar manpower requirements also proved invalid when Iraq fell into anarchy in the wake of the sudden collapse of authority and in the absence of a countervailing authority. And they proved invalid when the infrastructure, carefully preserved by precision engagements, proved so decrepit and fragile that it collapsed under the strain of looting, stress, and lack of maintenance. As Anthony Cordesman observed, "The same strategy designed to deliver a carefully focused attack on the regime did not provide enough manpower to simultaneously occupy and secure the areas that the Coalition liberated and fell short of the manpower necessary to occupy the country." Anthony Cordesman, "Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerrilla War?" Washington, DC, July 28, 2003, p. 8, available at http://www.csis.org/features/Iraq_ConflictTerm.pdf, Internet, accessed October 24, 2003.

83. A comparison of the two ECLIPSE operations indicate that there is a window of opportunity in the wake of major combat operations to establish security and control quickly. After total war, when an enemy state has been so thoroughly defeated that there is no fight left in its army or people, this window is broad. It is relatively narrow after a limited war pursued for limited ends, when a regime collapse may leave an undestroyed will to resist in the population as a whole or in significant parts of the society. Dr. Conrad Crane, of the Army War College faculty, told a reporter that "insights from successful occupations suggest that it is best to go in real heavy and then draw down fast." Fallows, p. 65. Crane

and Dr. Andrew Terrill presciently observed in their prewar study on postwar Iraq that,

Initial Iraqi gratitude for the destruction of the Saddam dictatorship is likely under most circumstances, but many Iraqis will nevertheless assume that the U.S. intervened for its own purposes and not primarily to help them. U.S. forces therefore need to complete occupation tasks as quickly as possible and must also help improve the daily life of ordinary Iraqis before popular goodwill dissipates. Even the most benevolent occupation will confront increasing Arab nationalist and religious concerns as time passes.

Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2003, p. 2. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrates that an inadequately resourced, poorly planned and executed conflict termination operation can threaten to undermine a decisive military victory. A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study of nation-building concluded that "Few national undertakings are as complex, costly, and time consuming as reconstructing the governing institutions of foreign societies. Even a combination of unsurpassed military power and abundant wealth does not guarantee success, let alone quick results." Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, "Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2003; available at <http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/P.PDF>, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. The Army must reexamine force structure, training, and doctrine in light of the need to not only fight and win wars, but also to wage decisive peace operations to secure the policy objectives for which the war was undertaken.

84 Former CENTCOM Commander, Anthony Zinni called for "flooding" Iraq "with civilian administrators," stating "I think you need a Bremer and a Bremer-like team at every provincial level You need a political, economic, security, humanitarian piece at every level." Quoted in David Gergen, "The Fierce Urgency of Iraq," *U.S. News and World Report*, October 13, 2003.

85. Clausewitz emphasized that "the first step" in war not be taken "without considering the last." Clausewitz, Book 8, Chapter 3A, p. 706.

86. As a Center for Strategic and International Studies white paper observed in March 2002, "Given the sheer complexity of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, developing a clear strategic plan of action at the outset is critical to success Developing a common set of objectives across the U.S. Government is of paramount importance to creating unity of effort." Michele Flournoy, "Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction," Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 27, 2002, available at <http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/strategy.pdf>, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003.

87. In 1997, President Clinton, responding to similar shortcomings in Bosnia and Kosovo, had signed PDD 56, directing that State, Defense, CIA, Treasury, and

other agencies take tangible steps to improve “the planning and management of complex contingency operations.” Among other things, PDD-56 mandated establishment of a training regime, a mechanism for capturing lessons learned, interagency rehearsals, and implementation of interagency planning procedures. Specifically, it directed “that a political-military implementation plan . . . be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. Government actions in a complex contingency operation.” “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive, May 1997,” White Paper; available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. PDD-56 failed to live up to its promise, however. A Rand Corporation study concluded “only the military is likely to hold up its end.” The study also noted that “Civilian departments have often confused plans with schedules, and think plans are not worth the effort. Moreover, some officers in the State Department have an aversion to plans, which they see as impediments to the ambiguity and flexibility required for successful negotiations.” Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Barnard, and Matthew Waxman, *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations*, Rand Corporation, 2000, Chapter 8, p. 3, available at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1185.ch8.pdf>, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. See also William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, “Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 2000, p. 96. See also Rowan Scarborough, “Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Missions,” *Washington Times*, December 6, 1999, available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pddd/991206-pdd.htm>, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. Other governmental agencies lacked the structure, resources and culture that the military brings to planning. PDD 56 was widely ignored and then quietly scrapped by President Bush when he took office.

88. The Bush administration announcement in October 2003 of plans to create the Iraq Stabilization Group in the National Security Council to provide improved postwar interagency planning and coordination died in the wake of opposition from Secretary Rumsfeld, but it represented an appreciation at the highest levels of the lack of interagency coordination. The *Washington Post* reported that,

The new group . . . is intended to remove a bottleneck in decision-making by identifying and resolving problems faced by the U.S.-led occupation “It is to facilitate Bremer and to get him what he needs, whether it’s policy guidance, whether it is to fix a problem in Washington between . . . two agencies that are not in sync and he can’t fix it from the field,” a senior administration official said.

Peter Slevin and Mike Allen, “New Group to Intended to Speed Iraq Efforts,” *Washington Post*, October 7, 2003, p. 1. See also William R. Hawkins, “Cheap Hawks and Weak Brigades,” *Washington Times*, October 8, 2003, p. 17; Joseph L. Galloway, “A Tough Assignment for Rice,” *Miami Herald*, October 9, 2003; David Ignatius, “. . . and the Infighting,” *Washington Post*, October 10, 2003, p. 27. Anthony Cordesman concluded in July 2003 that among the reasons that

conflict termination failed was the lack of “a coordinated interagency approach to planning and executing peacemaking and nation-building before and during the war: as The National Security Council failed to perform its mission.” The NSC, he observed, “acted largely in an advisory role and did not force effective interagency coordination.” Cordesman, p. 11.

89. The author recognizes the many problems inherent in this proposal. Standing in the way of either a Goldwater-Nichols type reform of the interagency or a new National Security Act are bureaucratic, cultural, constitutional, and institutional barriers. Interagency programs that drain scarce manpower and funds from what State, Treasury, Commerce, and other departments perceive as their core missions engender bureaucratic inertia that blocks effective action. Masters of the bureaucratic process know how to give the appearance of cooperation without committing limited resources to make it reality, especially when their agency does not directly benefit. Congress, moreover, is often loath to direct the executive in specifics of how he directs national security operations, choosing instead to exercise oversight through multiple committees that do not themselves possess a coherent unified national security perspective. Nonetheless, there has been a gradually increasing pressure for reform. The Scowcroft Commission urged in 2000 that steps be taken to invigorate the interagency process. See John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft, “Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process,” in *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future*, Cambridge, MA, 2000, pp. 265-284. This call has been echoed in a recent CSIS Study entitled “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols.” See Clark A. Murdock, Michele A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt M. Campbell, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era,” March 2004. Senate Bill 2127, introduced on February 25, 2004, by Senators Lugar and Biden represents an initial effort at legislation to make the interagency process more potent. After decrying the *ad hoc* nature of governmental responses to nation-building requirements, Senator Lugar argued in presenting the bill that, in an environment of “sustained instability,” it is imperative that the United States “have the right structures, personnel, and resources in place when an emergency occurs.” He noted that “the military has led post-conflict operations primarily because it is the only agency capable of mobilizing large amounts of people and resources for these tasks.” His legislation proposes to change that by: 1) creating a Stabilization and Reconstruction Coordinating Committee in the National Security Council chaired by the National Security Advisor with representatives from State, USAID, Commerce, Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, and Defense; 2) establishing an Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction in the State Department under a Coordinator appointed by the President and reporting directly to the Secretary of State; 3) authorizing the Secretary of State to establish a Response Readiness Corps with both active and reserve elements that he can mobilize rapidly; and 4) urging the Foreign Service Institute to work with National Defense University and the Army War College to establish an educational and training program for civilian and military personnel to develop competencies and shared procedures for conducting stability and reconstruction operations. If this legislation was accompanied by funding for new positions and organizations in

the State Department, an all-important first step would be taken. With a cadre in the State Department directly sharing equity in post-conflict operations with DoD, a venue for meaningful interagency cooperation and planning would be in place.

CHAPTER 7

THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: HAS IT BEEN ABUSED IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR?

Colonel George A. Brinegar

We have all seen the world change, and change with an intensity and rapidity that an earlier generation might not have believed. This change has brought us challenges and opportunities. As a Nation, we must grasp these challenges and seize these opportunities.

General Creighton Abrams¹
Chief of Staff of the Army, 1974

Creighton Abrams' statement did not occur in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, but in the turmoil of the last days of the Vietnam War. Abrams, the chief of staff of the Army, provided these words in his "Posture of the Army Statement" before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, in 1974. However, these same words seem equally appropriate in the midst of the Global War on Terror and the instabilities of the 21st century. Abrams clearly understood the critical mistake of his war and time, but, more importantly, he also had a clear vision for victory in future wars.

In the final days of the Vietnam War, Abrams initiated a strategy whereby the U.S. Army would never go to war without substantial mobilization of the reserve component. This strategy has become widely accepted as the Abrams Doctrine. Now the United States finds itself in another potentially long war, the Global War on Terror. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has executed a "partial mobilization" of soldiers from the reserve component to meet the demands of this war. In the third year of the Global War on Terror, has the Department of Defense (DoD) abused the Abrams Doctrine to the extent that too many reserve soldiers have mobilized? This chapter examines the genesis of the Abrams Doctrine, analyzes current mobilization trends of the Army Guard and Army Reserve, and describes the effects of this current "partial mobilization" on

employers, families, recruiting, and retention. Finally, it makes recommendations and observations for the future.

THE DIFFICULT YEARS PRECEDING THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: 1960S

Lyndon Johnson astounded the Defense Establishment with his refusal to call up the reserves . . .

Lewis Sorley²
Historian, 1991

To understand the rationale for the Abrams Doctrine, one must take a step back to the 1960s and the early years of the U. S. intervention in the Vietnam War, where American leaders made decisions that “set the course” for failure. In 1965,

Lyndon Johnson astounded the Defense Establishment by his refusal to call up the reserves to support expansion of the war in Vietnam, perhaps the most fateful decision of the entire conflict. Johnson’s refusal was apparently motivated in part by reluctance to spread the effects of the war through the population – certainly many more families and virtually every town and city would be affected by a call-up of any proportion, with a much different class cross-section and much greater political impact than draft calls affecting only those who could not engineer a deferment.³

The second-and third-order effects of the President’s refusal to utilize the reserves in this war were disastrous. First, as the Army was trying valiantly to expand to meet the demands of the war, the “pool” of reserve leaders and soldiers was “off limits.” To fill this void, active duty officers and NCOs, receiving premature promotions, could expect numerous rotations to the combat zone. Second, the reserve component, not a part of the deploying Army team, soon became demoralized and bitter. As understood now, it would take years to restore reserve component morale. In effect, the government told devoted reservists and guardsmen, who for years had trained for mobilization, to stay home with absolutely no expectation for combat. Further, to make a bad situation worse, the reserves quietly watched much of their equipment go out the back

door for cross-leveling to satisfy the demands of the active Army trying to prosecute a war without disturbing the American public.⁴ There is no doubt that the decision not to mobilize the reserves drastically impacted the entire Army.

Arguably, the most disastrous effect of not mobilizing the reserves was the perception that nobody cared in "Hometown America." Lewis Sorely, clearly states the nature of the problem:

Lyndon Johnson's policy of trying to fight the war on the cheap, on the sly almost, and without involving the larger community [reserve component], meant that the general populace had no stake in it, and hence no motivation to ensure that the sacrifices of those who did serve were in some way validated by the eventual outcome.⁵

Equally disastrous was the unknown number of individuals joining the reserves with only one desire: to avoid military conscription and probable deployment to Southeast Asia. Lacking motivation for military service, many of these soldiers and officers did nothing but "bide their time," awaiting the end of their initial enlistment and subsequent discharge. With no "callup" of the reserves by the President, reserve units were quickly filling with members of less than full dedication to professional military training and service.

To complicate an already complex situation Army-wide, standards in the reserves began to falter drastically as the likelihood of mobilization and deployment significantly decreased. So at this point, collectively, both the active and reserve components' readiness and motivation for service was deteriorating at an overwhelming rate. Even worse, resentment between those on the active side, with near term deployment to war as a guarantee, and the reserve members, with no fear of future deployment, festered.

Lack of utilization of the reserves was spoiling the entire Army and would take decades to overcome. In fact, this huge divide between the active and reserves, those going to war and not going to war, grew to such an extent, that even today, 30 years later, it is a key issue in the 2004 presidential election. Sadly, erasing the memories of this ugly divide will take several more years and possibly another decade.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF AN ARMY IN CRISIS: 1972-1974

The Nation and its well-being must be kept foremost, and must not be hazarded by purely parochial concerns.

General Creighton Abrams⁶
Chief of Staff of the Army, 1974

On October 12, 1972, General Creighton W. Abrams became the 26th chief of staff of the U. S. Army. An officer who had seen combat in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam was now the point man for an Army in crisis. Abrams clearly knew his Army was in deep trouble. General Frank Mildren, who had been a division, corps, and land forces commander, provides a clear glimpse of this period: "The image of the Army was at an all time low. The public had no confidence in the Army. They blamed the Army for all our ills . . . The morale was probably lower than its been for many years in the active Army."⁷

This situation was no surprise to the new chief. He had commanded at all levels from troop to corps, to army staff level, and was no stranger to the Washington bureaucracy. Moreover, to his credit, he knew the reserves through his time as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for the Reserve Component in the late 1950s. Now his new position would require superb leadership for an Army in the "final death throes" of its ugly experience in the Vietnam War.

To understand Creighton Abrams fully, one must look beyond his illustrious military record. His keen insight into the American people, in combination with his superior military skills and understanding of force structure, led to his strong belief in the importance of utilization of the reserve component. Several situations provide a glimpse inside the man, and one of these is his action prior to assuming the duties as Chief of Staff of the Army, while awaiting Senate confirmation. According to Major General D. C. Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff for Information-Army Staff, Abrams and his family went on a vacation to "drive the country." Abrams delighted in conversations with all who would talk to him, from gas station workers to shop attendants. He had a great faith and respect for the common people and American society. He sincerely believed

the Army was a part of that society. During this trip, he confirmed in his own mind the essential strength of this country and the common sense and wisdom of the average American.⁸ Abrams understood both the importance and strength of the “will” of the public. This factor would quietly, but consciously, play an important role in his thoughts in regard to mobilizing the reserve during time of crisis.

THE INTENT AND EMERGENCE OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: THE 1970S

They're not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves.

General Creighton Abrams⁹
as heard by General John Vessey

Abrams had survived the most difficult years and was now in a position to affect the Army's future. Lieutenant General Donn Starry provided an interesting insight into Abrams, the strategic leader, during an interview for the U.S. Army Oral History Program. He explained that although Abrams was not a political scientist, he was a soldier and a realistic leader who uniquely understood the Army's mission and the military's relation to the Nation.¹⁰ In 1972, Abrams brought a new and refreshing perspective as the Army's chief. This was easily enhanced by his in-depth knowledge of both the Army's active and reserve components. He quietly began to build a strategy for the “Total Army” (Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard).

His strategy for the future “Total Army” relied heavily on the entire Army (active and reserve). In fact, he boldly made the following assertion during his “Posture of the Army Statement” in 1974 in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives:

We consider the Total Force structure, both active and reserve components, in developing requirements for initial reinforcement and for mobilization. Obviously, we rely heavily on reserve component forces. We can make no plans to fight in a major conflict without considering their early mobilization and commitment.¹¹

Thus, the Abrams Doctrine that provides for the utilization of the reserve as an important component in Army capabilities was born.

Abrams' methodology was twofold. First, his increased reliance on the reserve could quickly increase the Army's strength. Abrams committed himself to increasing the Army from a 13-division structure to a 16-division structure, while maintaining the 785,000 active duty endstrength. Utilization of the reserves allowed the Army to reach this goal.¹² Second, reliance on the reserves also enabled Abrams to capitalize on an intangible Clausewitzian factor, the "will" of the American people, which he deeply understood. General John Vessey, who would later become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked the following about Abrams' feeling toward the American people:

He thought about that [appreciation for the kind of a nation America was] an awful lot, and concluded that whatever we're going to do we ought to do right as we are a Nation. Let's not build an Army off here in the corner someplace. The Armed Forces are an expression of the Nation. If you take them out of the national context, you are likely to screw them up. That was his lesson from Vietnam. He wasn't going to leave them in that position ever again. And part and parcel of that was that you couldn't go to war without calling up the reserves.¹³

Thus, in August of 1974, Abrams signed a memorandum to the Army leadership providing his direct guidance: "We [with the full support of the Secretary of Defense] are committed firmly to the essential task of bolstering the readiness and responsiveness of the reserve components, integrating them fully into the Total Force."¹⁴ The Army was to entrench maximum utilization of the reserves deeply into the strategy for future war. Today, there is no doubt that the Army relies heavily on the expertise, leadership, and sheer numbers provided by the reserves.

APPLICATION OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: MOBILIZATION OF THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Today [March 19, 2003], we are in the midst of one of the longest periods of mobilization in our history...As we prepare to give the Nation

more options in the Global War on Terror, additional Guardsmen and Reservists are being mobilized.

Thomas Hall¹⁵
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, 2003

It is now almost 30 years since General Creighton Abrams was the Chief. Nevertheless the Abrams Doctrine continues to live in U.S. military strategy. In fact, in 2001, the United States found itself again involved in another possibly long and costly war. However, the lessons and hardships of the Vietnam War are still vividly clear for DoD and particularly the Army. One of the lessons learned, maximum utilization of the reserves, remains a significant part of military strategy. In the Global War On Terror, the application of the Abrams Doctrine, with regard to the “partial mobilization” of the reserves, has continued at a feverish pace since September 11, 2001. In fact, using the authority of Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 12302, “partial mobilization,” the President can activate up to one million reservists (all services) for up to 2 years. The President issued Executive Order 13223 on September 14, 2001, authorizing “partial mobilization,” in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th. This Executive Order remains in effect today.


In the third year into the Global War On Terror, however, has the United States overly relied on the Abrams Doctrine, specifically within the Army? Has the mobilization of so much of the reserve component impacted negatively on recruiting and retention for years to come? What are the effects on civilian employers and the reserve component families? These questions are essential to understand the future of reserve forces in national strategy.

THE CURRENT PACE AND TREND OF MOBILIZATION

America’s part-time troops will shoulder a much larger share of the front-line burden in Iraq next year [2004] than they do now, according to a troop-rotation plan announced Thursday [November 6, 2003] by the Pentagon.

Dave Moniz¹⁶
Journalist, 2003

Limited mobilization occurred during the Vietnam War. In fact, approximately 5,000 soldiers (42 units) were mobilized from the Army Reserve. Likewise, Executive Order 11406 federalized up to 24,500 soldiers (12,234 actually activated) in the Army Guard. Even though the 1967 Army Reserve endstrength was 261,000 (418,000 for the Army Guard), the vast majority of this large manpower pool never mobilized for combat in Vietnam. In order to put this in context for today, Figure 1 depicts the current breakdown of the Total Army which is composed of 47 percent active duty Army soldiers, 33.1 percent Army Guard soldiers, and 19.9 percent Army Reserve soldiers.



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Figure 1. Fiscal Year 2003, Total Army.


The number of reserve soldiers mobilized for the Vietnam War pales in comparison to the current mobilization pace for the Global War on Terror. This appears in the numbers as reported by the Department of Defense. Since “Partial Mobilization Authority” on September 14, 2001, (as of February 9, 2004), the Department of Defense has mobilized over 238,000 Army reserve soldiers.¹⁷ Some critics’ claim that a large number of these soldiers have mobilized multiple times, a claim widely believed. As of February 2004, this was simply not true. In fact, less than 3 percent of the Army reserve soldiers mobilized have been mobilized multiple times in the Global War on Terror.¹⁸ Table 1 depicts the number of soldiers mobilized and the number of soldiers mobilized multiple times.

	ARNG	USAR	TOTAL
Mobilized as of February 2004	141,765	96,790	238,555
Multiple Activations	4,465	1,850	6,315

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Table 1. Soldiers Mobilized Since September 14, 2001.

Figure 2 depicts a significant trend of utilization of reservists from September 2001 to October 2003. Heavy reliance on the reservists in the Global War on Terror is quite apparent. The Pentagon’s chief spokes-person Lawrence DiRita highlighted this reliance in reference to Iraq, in November 2003. He explained that by spring 2004, reservists will represent 37 percent of the Total Force in Iraq compared to 22 percent in November 2003. This equates to 39,000 reserve soldiers, many of whom serve in the three National Guard brigades that will be on duty in Iraq by spring 2004.¹⁹ Simply stated, the reserve of the Army has been and will continue to be a key player in the Global War on Terror.



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Figure 2. Recent Mobilization Trend.

MOBILIZATION AND THE EFFECT ON THE EMPLOYER

It's a dilemma, by the way, that we've faced since the founding of our Country. When the winds of war were stirring in 1776, John Adams, a lawyer in Boston wrote to a minister in Boston, 'we must all be soldiers now'.

Paul Wolfowitz²⁰

Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2002

DoD must counter the effects of mobilization on the employers of reservists, if the United States intends to maintain a strong and flexible reserve force. America's reserve system requires traditional training of 1 weekend per month and 15 consecutive days of training per year. Reserve soldiers rely on their civilian occupation for the remaining 326 days a year. Thus, the Army is not the reserve soldier's primary source of income. Of course, with every mobilization, soldiers demobilize and return to civilian jobs. In general terms, satisfaction of the employer weighs heavily on the mind of the reservist.

As the nation pursues the Global War On Terror and the Army's execution of the Abrams Doctrine, what is the employer's perspective? Consider two sets of data: first, the most comprehensive study is the "Reserve Employer Survey," a study conducted by DoD between 1999 and 2000. Although the survey occurred prior to the Global War On Terror, most would agree that it provides the greatest insight into the 21st century reserve soldier/employer relationship. The second source of data is the "Status of Force Surveys" initially conducted in May 2003. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness directed these surveys (conducted three times per year) to gather information with regard to current and critical issues. Both sources provide DoD and the Army leadership with critical information so that mobilization decisions will not rest on generalizations or widespread misconceptions.

The "Reserve Employer Survey" rested on interviews conducted with 2,037 large and small employers nationwide. Employers used in the survey came from two sources: a representative list of U.S. employers and a list of employers provided by DoD's seven military reserve components.²¹ The survey yielded the following findings:

- 93 percent of employers expressed favorable attitude toward reserve service.
- 96 percent of employers were satisfied with their reservist-employee.
- 92 percent of employers have flexible policies to accommodate absences.²²

However, tougher issues arise with long-term reservists' absences from the workplace. Consider these findings:

- A majority of employers indicated that absence due to military obligations were too long.
- Nearly 50 percent felt that absences over 14 days caused problems [in the workplace].
- 80 percent of employers were affected by absence of more than 30 days.
- The impact was greater on smaller businesses; the most serious effect was increased workload on co-workers.
- More than one-third felt that increased reliance on the reserve component will cause problems in the workplace in the future.²³

As the Army continues to exercise the Abrams Doctrine, it cannot afford to neglect the interests of the employers. It is no surprise that this survey provided these simple but critically important requests from employers to lessen problems in the workplace. The top three requests were:

1. Receive copies of reservist's orders.
2. Receive official notification from the military service.
3. Receive longer notification times (with rationale for deployment and likely duration, which provides improved workload planning for employers, possible lower costs and decreased resentment).²⁴

DoD designs the "Status of Force Surveys" as concise, web-based questionnaires to gather critical information regarding current issues (health care, employer support, activation process, intent to

reenlist, etc.). These surveys, integral to DoD's Human Resources Strategic Plan, are intent at improving both policy and practice. This random internet survey in May 2003 elicited over 25,000 responses. Nearly half of those responding were reservists (all services) activated within the previous 24 months.²⁵ Their responses to the survey questions below provide considerable insight. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the percentage of Army National Guard (ARNG) or U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers responding in the respective category.

Q.10.f. In your opinion, how does your civilian supervisor view your participation in the National Guard/Reserve?

Very-Somewhat Favorable: (56percent ARNG)/(58percent USAR)

Somewhat-Very Unfavorably: (10percent ARNG)/(12percent USAR)

Q.159.a. For your most recent activation, how much of a problem was employer support at the beginning of the activation for you or your family?

Not a Problem-Slight Problem: (79percent ARNG)/(76percent USAR)

Serious-Very Serious Problem: (7percent ARNG)/(9percent USAR)

Q.159.b. For your most recent activation, how much of a problem was getting the same job back after returning for you or your family?

Not a Problem-Slight Problem: (86percent ARNG)/(84percent USAR)

Serious-Very Serious Problem: (8percent ARNG)/(8percent USAR)

Q.159.d. For your most recent activation, how much of a problem was loss of civilian job after returning for you or your family?

Not a Problem-Slight Problem: (91percent ARNG)/(92percent USAR)

Serious-Very Serious Problem: (6percent ARNG)/(4percent USAR)²⁶

Both of these sources fail to express a significant problem in the reservist/employer relationship, but the surveys also suggest that this relationship is delicate. DoD must consider employers in the current and future execution of the Abrams Doctrine because reservist

morale and livelihood depend on this sensitive relationship. As the data also suggests, efficiently organized and executed mobilizations can mitigate many of the challenges faced by these employers and their employees. DoD and the Army must minimize the sacrifices made by reservists' employers through efficient communication and predictability (i.e., military orders, expected time-line, etc.).

Even though "only 6 percent of all businesses in the United States employ reservists,"²⁷ this relationship between employer and employee is critical to the ability to execute the Abrams Doctrine and for its continued prosecution of the current Global War on Terror. So far DoD has not yet abused the Abrams Doctrine according to employers. However, DoD and the Army leadership must dedicate themselves to forming and nurturing a strong "Total Army/ Employer Team." If either member of this team loses credibility, successful execution of the mobilization process will become problematic. More importantly, the result will jeopardize the Army's ability to prosecute the Global War On Terror.

MOBILIZATION AND THE EFFECT ON THE RESERVE COMPONENT FAMILY

We cannot continue to rely on our reservists who now comprise approximately half our force [all services], if their families are not ready for the stresses and strains of separations and long deployments.

COL James Scott II²⁸
Director of Family Policy
OASD-RA, 2003

The execution of the Abrams Doctrine directly affects reservists' families. Of course, the execution of the "partial mobilization" in the Global War on Terror has directly impacted the lives of thousands of Guard and Reserve spouses and children. In order to determine if DoD has gone too far in the magnitude of current mobilization, this author used the most current and comprehensive spousal assessment, the "2002 Survey of Spouses of Activated National Guard and Reserve Component Members," commissioned by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA).²⁹

Caliber Associates conducted this mail survey from August through November 2002. Spouses of 4,002 soldiers, activated for scheduled or unscheduled mobilization periods, responded to the survey. All mobilizations came after September 11, 2001. Listed below is a summary of the key issues identified by this survey.

- Although [family] support is strong for many units, all families are not being reached.
- Loss of income can be a factor during mobilization, but not all families suffer financial hardship. In fact, many families make more money during mobilization.
- Some “high risk” families are more likely to need support, but may be the least likely to seek support. These families are newly married, with young children, and often isolated.
- Strong [family] programs at the unit level are most effective.³⁰

Close scrutiny of these issues leads to three observations that indirectly effect the successful execution of mobilization. First, many families have seen an increase in income with mobilization (55 percent of families in Army Reserve received an increase; 65 percent of Army Guard families received an increase). As a result, the generalization that all mobilizations are a detriment to family income is simply not true. Second, “high risk” soldiers/families exist and their identification prior to mobilization is critical. The challenge is to assist the soldier in overcoming the problem prior to mobilization, in order to avoid discharge due to an inability to deploy. Third, despite widespread media comments, many families of reservists are “working through” the challenges of mobilization and doing well. In fact, survey wide, 61 percent of the spouses said they were either coping well or very well. Again, another widespread generalization is simply not true, that is, not all families suffer tremendous and highly significant trauma with the mobilization of an immediate family member.³¹

Reliance on the Abrams Doctrine requires the Army’s commitment to building readiness at the unit level in the Army reserves. The data cited in this survey indicates there are many dedicated and devoted

families coping with both scheduled and unscheduled mobilizations in a commendable manner. Although there are challenges in reservists' family readiness, the data from this survey does not support the generalization that current mobilizations collectively abuse the families of Army reservists.

MOBILIZATION AND THE EFFECT ON RECRUITING AND RETENTION

The National Guard sees no indication that the homeland security mission or the War on Terrorism is having any serious impact on recruiting.

LTG Steven Blum³²
Chief National Guard Bureau, 2003

The author utilized the most current data available, fiscal year-end 2003 results, to address the impact on recruiting and retention in the midst of a "partial mobilization." Both the Army Guard and Reserve met endstrength for 2003, staying below the attrition ceiling, as depicted in Table 2. In fact, the Army Guard has met endstrength requirements for the past seven consecutive years.

Component	Authorized	Actual	Number +/-	% Authorized	Attr Rate Ceiling	Actual Attrition Rate
ARNG	350,000	351,091	1,091	100.30%	18.00%	17.20%
USAR	205,000	211,890	6,890	103.40%	28.60%	20.60%

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

Table 2. Army Reserve Component Retention, Fiscal Year 2003.

Endstrength is critical, but attrition may be just as important. Figure 3 depicts the recent attrition history (Fiscal Year 93-Fiscal Year 03) for both the Army Guard and Army Reserve. Figure 3 indicates Army Guard attrition negatively increased in 2001 and 2002, with positive and significant decreases in 2003. Army Reserve attrition has been on a consistent and positive decline since 2001 and that trend continues through 2003.




Figure 3. Army Reserve Component Attrition, Fiscal Years 1993-2003.

Initial indications reveal that the Army is not abusing the Abrams Doctrine to the extent of reaching a “point of diminishing return” in reserve recruiting and retention. However, this positive news must not encourage complacency. Several underlying issues deserve consideration. First, are soldiers staying in the reserve component “willingly” or staying because of “stop loss” orders? The reserve “stop loss” policy is much different than that used by the active Army. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower/ Reserve Affairs) has approved reserve component “stop loss” effective with unit alert for mobilization through 90 days following demobilization.

Second, how many reservists are currently deployed, but will not re-enlist following demobilization? The only indicator of such disenchantment is a survey commissioned by DoD of 40,000 reservists (all services) in Iraq, July 2003. Defense under Secretary for Personnel David Chu explained the results of the survey to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives on November 5, 2003. Referring to the survey data, he explained

that 66 percent of the 40,000 reservists in Iraq had intentions of re-enlisting.³³

Third, the Global War on Terror continues with no end in the near term. As a result, meeting endstrength in 2003 provides no guarantees for 2004 or 2005. Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brown provides insight into the future of retention in the reserve component. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, in November 2003, Brown indicated no problems in retaining soldiers in the reserves, but indicated that it still may be too early to realize the effects.³⁴ Republican Senator from Arizona John McCain countered, "They're not ready to stay in at this kind of deployment schedule, [and] might as well be in the Regular Army."³⁵

The initial indication is that men and women will continue to enlist and reservists will continue to re-enlist during this large-scale execution of the Abrams Doctrine in the Global War on Terror. Thus, the Army is not abusing the Abrams Doctrine, and recruiting and retention goals continue to be met.

Overall, the current status of the reserve of the Army is positive. On the other hand, DoD and the Army cannot afford to "bask in the sun" of initial good news. Fortunately, the Secretary of Defense has identified several challenges related to mobilization issues identified with employers, family, and the reserve soldiers themselves. Given the feverish pace of the current mobilization, DoD and the Army must work quickly to identify fixes and viable alternatives to achieve a healthy Army reserve component for the 21st century.

2004 AND BEYOND: THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE

Reserves and Guardsmen were called up three or four months before they were needed, to find out they were not needed, and many were given only five days' notice, rather than the goal of thirty days, which really isn't fair to them. And it's not fair to their families or their employers. And that's not right. . . . We need to fix it, and we're in the process of getting it fixed.

Donald Rumsfeld³⁶
Secretary of Defense, 2003

The Secretary of Defense admits there are several problems that require correction in the mobilization process. This especially is significant to maintain the reserves as a healthy and key player in the "Total Army." To this point in the Global War on Terror, the Abrams Doctrine has not been abused. But, all must acknowledge the existence of a sensitive relationship among the reserve unit, citizen soldier, their families, and their employers. Accordingly, this author's purpose in the following paragraphs is to suggest both recommendations and observations for the future to avoid reaching a point of "diminishing return" in the nation's investment in their reservists.

Mobilizations Must Be More Efficient and Better Communicated.

Maximizing technology for efficiency and organization is critical to improving the mobilization process. The combatant commander must receive the reserve soldier without delay, while providing predictability for the family and employer. An example of capitalizing this technology is the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS). One critical asset of this system is the ability to query mobilization data. Chief Information Officer for National Guard Bureau Maureen Lischke explains that a recent test of this system dramatically increased the speed and efficiency of unit mobilizations. With further improvements, mobilization-processing time can be decreased by 60 percent.³⁷

Is the RCAS the answer? The evidence is not clear, but the potential exists to leverage "state of the art" technology so that the reserves can be mobilized quickly and efficiently. During peacetime, at least a portion of the DoD budget must be invested into the mobilization process. All agree that the United States is without a peer in regard to weaponry, but is the technology to get the reserve soldier to the "fight" the best the 21st century technology has to offer? The answer is clearly "No!" DoD must dedicate effort, time, and dollars toward an efficient and timely mobilization process.

Equally important is the timely communication of accurate and organized information from DoD and the Army to the reserve soldier, family, and employer. This information is crucial and has

direct impact on decisions in the workplace and home. An alert notice that advises the soldier, family, and employer of the possibility for near-term mobilization, must be accurate, timely, and clear. The subsequent “mobilization order” must articulate the situation, benefits, requirements, and likely duration of the mobilization. As a critical information tool for the spouse and first line supervisor at the work place, this mobilization order cannot consist of endless acronyms for the military bureaucratic system. Communicating a team building attitude at the beginning equates to long-term success for all; the Army, soldier, family, and employer. Most importantly, an inclusive attitude of professionalism and sincere concern by the Army exhibits a dedication to the Abrams Doctrine and the reserve force.

Employers, Predictability, and the Reserve System.

The Nation should assume that employers, although dedicated Americans, must consistently maintain a profit in order to stay active in their respective business. With the continued reliance and current trend of utilization of the reserves, the time has come for the political leadership to advocate a form of tax credit for those employers who hire members of the reserve component. This tax credit would provide a direct compensation from the U.S. Government to employers to offset the cost of temporary employees, additional training, and increased workload in the absence of mobilized employees. No one questions the loyalty and dedication of American employers, but this tax credit could significantly offset the cost of this loyalty and dedication while most importantly decreasing resentment between the reserve soldier (employee), employer, and the federal government. This is a delicate balance, but one that is crucial to national security. As a result, this tax credit for employers can be considered an investment in the defense of the nation.

Predictability for the reserve soldier, employer, and family is paramount. Furthermore, mobilizing a reservist for more than 2 years in a 6-year time frame may be counterproductive. The key is developing a rotational system to maximize both predictability and

fairness. This rotational system must identify specific reserve units, for a specified time frame with a priority for mobilization. Examples of a rotational system already exist across the U.S. Military. These examples include “Air and Space Expeditionary Force rotations” and Army division/brigade rotations for the Balkans. Adapting these examples to build an Army reserve component rotational model must become reality. When units are not on the priority list for mobilization, units should focus on military education and continued individual/collective soldier skills qualification. Granted, this rotational system may not work for all units, but it could easily incorporate the Guard/Reserve battalions, brigades, and divisions.

DoD and the Army now must examine sincerely the relationship between recruiting and retention on the one hand, and the reserve soldier’s deployability on the other. It is no longer a question of “if” the reserve soldier will be mobilized, but “when.” Indeed, the increasing likelihood of mobilization could contribute to a decrease in recruiting and retention. Furthermore, the Army reserve component must review its current personnel realistically to identify soldiers who are a higher risk than normal of not having the ability to mobilize. This review of personnel will impact retention directly. On the other hand, discharging the soldier prior to mobilization due to a family or an employment issue will avoid the waste of precious time during an actual activation for long-term service. Although such dismissals are harsh, these problems typically do not improve with time. Subsequently, at the point of mobilization, the soldier cannot mobilize. Worst of all, the reserve soldier does not reach the combatant commander.

What Next after the Enhanced Brigades Are Used.

In support of DoD and the Department of the Army, the National Guard Bureau established 15 priority combat brigades. These “enhanced brigades” have received priority in overall resources, training, and equipment, as compared to other guard combat forces. Thus, they maintain a higher rate of readiness. Of course, these units and soldiers should expect to deploy in relation to a higher state of readiness in time of conflict.

On the other hand, the lesser priority guard combat units primarily make up eight National Guard divisions. These units perceive a less likelihood for mobilization due to less modern equipment, limited funding, and increased amount of train-up time following mobilization but prior to deployment for actual combat. But, surprisingly, before the enhanced brigades and prior to September 11, 2001, parts of these divisions mobilized for “military operations other than war,” and deployed to the Balkans. In fact, the 49th Armored Division, Texas Army National Guard, was the first guard division headquarters to mobilize and deploy since the Korean War, with a 9-month deployment to Bosnia in 2000. Since then, several other Guard divisions have completed rotations in the Balkans.

Now, in 2004, and after prosecution of a manpower intensive struggle in the Global War on Terror, DoD and the Department of the Army are reaching a key decision point. Elements of the vast majority of all the enhanced brigades now have been mobilized and deployed since 1999 for service in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Sinai, Bosnia, Kosovo, and global force protection missions or will deploy in the very near term. At a higher state of readiness, these units and soldiers should have expected to deploy.

But what reserve combat units are next to mobilize for the Global War on Terror? The Guard divisions are the only remaining option. Were these units expecting to mobilize for combat, short of World War III? Were their family members and employers expecting them to mobilize for war? Although these questions cannot be analytically answered, the decision has been made. In fact the Headquarters of a Guard division, the 42nd Infantry Division, New York National Guard, will deploy as a part of Operation IRAQ FREEDOM, rotation 3, in late 2004 along with the 256th (Louisiana) and 116th (Idaho) Enhanced Separate Brigades and the 278th (Tennessee) Enhanced Armored Cavalry Regiment. Additionally, elements of Guard divisions will deploy to “plus up” this rotation in Iraq, with the potential of a Guard division to Afghanistan in the near term.

Thus, DoD has set the precedent for the potential mobilization of any and all reserve units enhanced or otherwise, for peacekeeping, limited, and full-scale war. In other words, and regardless of resourcing levels, the question has become “when” will the reserve

unit mobilize, not “if.” In the very near term, this will be the true test of the Abrams Doctrine. This requires an even closer scrutiny of the reaction of the employers, family members, and the overall reserve system. How much stress can this sensitive equation of support at home (family plus employer) sustain before permanent damage occurs to the overall reserve system in the form of declining retention, readiness, and overall support of the American people for their hometown reserve unit? At present, this author cannot answer these critical questions in full, but guarantees that the answers are critical to the future execution of the Abrams Doctrine and, more importantly, the overall readiness of the Army’s reserve.

America’s Aversion to Reserve Component Casualties.

One must assume with the execution of the Abrams Doctrine, the reserve of the Army will have casualties. In actuality, these casualties in the reserves, both wounds and death are occurring now in the Global War on Terror. This leads to the question, “In the eyes of the American public, is there a difference in a casualty from the active duty ranks and a casualty from the reserve ranks?” This author provides an unquantifiable “yes.” A casualty from the reserves is not seen as a regular Army soldier by his community. For example, prior to mobilization, the reserve soldier was the hometown banker, high school math teacher, or the downtown policeman. Although mobilized and deployed to a combat zone, this reserve soldier still is perceived by his fellow township as a member of the local community, not a soldier or a warrior. The leadership of both DoD and the Army must be aware of the risk of casualties and the public perception when executing the Abrams Doctrine.

Next comes the question, “How many casualties can a hometown guard unit take before it becomes unacceptable to the conscience of the local community?” Qualifiedly, this question cannot be answered, but the lesson is that there is a significant risk with the execution of the Abrams Doctrine. One must only go back 13 years to Operation DESERT STORM, where during a missile attack, a comparatively large number of reservists became casualties from one specific geographical location of the United States. Although the war ended soon after this incident, the caution still remains just

as valid: The Abrams Doctrine does not come risk free today in the Global War on Terror or in the future.

Department of Defense Strategy for the Way Ahead in Utilization of the Reserves.

DoD has begun to develop a new strategy for the use of reserve forces in the future. The beginning of this new strategy is a result of the formal "Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense," in December 2002.³⁸ As a follow-up, each U.S. military service is to re-evaluate force structure, utilizing the Secretary of Defense's new planning metrics in his July 9, 2003, memorandum, "Rebalancing Forces." The new metrics are twofold: reduce the need for involuntary mobilization during the early stages of a rapid response (the initial 15 days) and limit involuntary mobilization to reasonable, sustainable rates (not more than 1 year in every 6).³⁹

In response to these new metrics and the organization of a new strategy for the use of reserve forces, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs prepared a lengthy report, "Rebalancing Forces, Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve," in early 2004. This report provides a review of each service's rebalancing initiatives, within the intent and new metrics per the Secretary of Defense. Overall, the services' rebalancing of force structure is based upon a three-fold approach: resolve stressed career fields in the reserve component (i.e., civil affairs, police, intelligence, air crews, special forces); employ innovative management practices in the reserve component; and enhance early responsiveness in the reserve component.⁴⁰ As per the executive summary of this report, "It has become evident that the [current] balance of capabilities in the active and reserve components is not the best for the future. There is a need for rebalancing to improve the responsiveness of the force and to help ease stress on units and individuals with skills in high demand."⁴¹

CONCLUSION

Although this rebalancing strategy has a well-meaning intent, it is important to remember that many of these processes and structural

changes require legislative action and years of fiscal planning and spending to result in execution. The intent to increase predictability and reduce stress on the reserves is an ambitious goal during this manpower intensive endeavor of Global War on Terror. So, is this new strategy and method of executing the Abrams Doctrine practical in 2004 or 2005? No, but it does begin to modify the Abrams Doctrine for the new demands of the 21st century and not just a strategy to reorganize the same assets and limited funding of the past. Have the real core challenges and stresses of the reserves in the post-Cold War era been identified clearly? Before development of a new strategy for utilization of the reserves, DoD must undertake a thorough analysis of the current Abrams Doctrine "in action." The modifications must be for the new era and not forged from Cold War mentality.

DoD's current relook at the reserve force in regard to manning and management must be more unique for the future war fight. Current restructuring initiatives cannot rest on old solutions and only for execution in full-scale war. Forming new units of reserve soldiers willing to participate in specific reserve units with a higher than normal readiness rate and expectation for early deployment is another generation of the enhanced brigades. In contrast, other initiatives appear to address the real issues: simpler approval processes which equate to increased predictability, judicious and prudent use of the reserves, and linking duration of a mobilization period in relation to effectiveness. Again, these are admirable initiatives, but most importantly, they require earnest commitment to the reserve forces by DoD in the form of sincere effort and a significant portion of the Defense budget.

The Army reserve component system has a critical role in national security. The intent is to provide trained and ready reserve soldiers/units to the civilian authority and combatant commander to achieve required objectives. For this reason, the United States maintains a professional reserve force. This is why sincere analysis and improvements must be periodically made in regard to the Abrams Doctrine and the overall mobilization process of the reserve of the Army. As of now, in the Global War on Terror, collectively there is not a significant overall negative effect on recruiting, retention, family, or employer. However, research also shows that the citizen-soldier concept is fragile, requiring special care, and modification for

a new era. This Nation's Army reserve component force has no peer in the world, but requires continuous analysis.

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CHAPTER 8

THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: TOTAL FORCE FOUNDATION OR ENDURING FALLACY?

Colonel Brian D. Jones

In December 2002, following the successful completion of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated that the “Total Force” policy (e.g., the existing active component/reserve component force balance) was “hampering his ability to deploy forces” and suggested that he would seek changes.¹ The primary issue of force balance revolves around the necessity of activating specific capabilities that reside in the reserve component to enable the active component to conduct combat operations. Structurally, active component forces cannot deploy to combat without activating key reserve component capabilities, a sometimes cumbersome and politically overt act. Following a similarly frustrating experience in the subsequent planning and execution of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Rumsfeld issued a memorandum on July 9, 2003, requesting a review of the composition of the active and reserve components.

Addressed to the secretaries of the individual service departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries of Defense, the memorandum tasked the respective addressees to review the force balance with a view towards structuring each to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to the operation); to structure forces to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one every 6 years; to establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements to ensure appropriate force structure; to validate requests for forces to provide timely notice of mobilization; and to make mobilization and demobilization more efficient.² Although much of the requested review deals with reserve mobilization procedures, the request to structure each component (e.g., the active component and the reserve component)

to “reduce the need for involuntary mobilization” caused quite a stir in the reserve community.³ Although the primary intent of the proposed rebalancing was purportedly to allow quicker responses to international crises, reserve advocates saw it as a threat to the foundations of the Laird “Total Force” policy and commensurately as a threat to their relevance, resourcing, recruitment, and retention.⁴

The Laird “Total Force” policy, referred to informally as the “Abrams Doctrine,” has just exceeded 30 years as a fundamental basis for the Department of Defense’s (DoD) force structure and manning policy. During this period it has become institutionalized in doctrine and accepted as the unquestioned foundation of the active-reserve balance of forces.⁵ The Abrams Doctrine has principally rested on force structure considerations and constraints that General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff in the early 1970s, confronted in the post-Vietnam era. Abrams’ actual intention in advocating this policy represented an attempt both to save force structure and resource reserve forces adequately.

Despite that fact, the two perceptions most often associated today with the “Total Force” policy are the necessity of gaining popular support for committing U.S. forces to combat, and a hidden intent in the active-reserve force structure to limit presidential powers. The necessity of gaining popular support has resulted in two interrelated beliefs: that it is necessary to mobilize the reserves to obtain popular support for military action; and conversely, that the President must obtain popular support *before* mobilizing the reserves. The second perception is that the “Total Force” policy aimed expressly with “malice aforethought” to limit the powers of the president.⁶ Various constituencies have adopted these perceptions *after the fact*, and they are actually fallacies. At the same time, a third function—that of limiting prolonged combat—*was* a desired outcome.

The impacts that a protracted war on terror imposes on the reserve force structure are difficult to predict. Yet, the present situation requires, and the current Abrams Doctrine provides, both a convenient and a necessary starting point. In arriving at a future “Abrams” Doctrine, compromise, the main component in achieving a solution in the past, provides a remarkable and applicable ingredient for a future solution.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is correct that some aspects of the Abrams Doctrine need discarding, but it is important to retain the essential core in formulating a new “Total Force” policy. Any new “Abrams” Doctrine must arrive at a force structure appropriate to today’s threat, while ensuring the continued relevance of the reserve component. At the same time, a new “Abrams” Doctrine must continue to perform the “conflict limiting” function that it now provides.

ARRIVING AT THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: THE INTENT

The principle architect of the army’s portion of the “Total Force” policy that evolved from the nation’s Vietnam experience was Abrams.⁷ A well-respected, highly decorated soldier, Abrams was as gruff personally as he was shrewd politically. His tour of duty, tragically cut short by cancer, coincided with several separate political forces that allowed him to shape the post-war army to match his vision of the desirable future force. These political forces were both international and domestic, and together they provided Abrams with a near-perfect window of opportunity.

Internationally, the United States was seeking support from its allies to share the burden of containing the Soviets—especially on the ground in Central Europe. Coincidentally, the economic and political recovery of Western Europe made it a more practical time for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies to assume a larger portion of alliance defense, especially in areas related to this area of interest.⁸ Additional host nation support capabilities for traditional military police duties, transportation support requirements, and general rear area roles would facilitate a reduction of active American combat service and combat service support units without a loss of combat capability. For Abrams, additional host nation support translated to allowing the total number of U.S. soldiers in Europe to remain constant, while the number of combat units expanded as personnel spaces previously required for combat support and combat service support forces declined.

Domestically, legislative pressure to reduce the size of active forces and to reinvigorate the role of the reserves increased significantly following Vietnam.⁹ Budgetary reductions, together

with the increased costs of fielding an all-volunteer army and predictable post-war pressures to reduce the military seemed to justify cutting the active duty force structure. Abrams, however, thought that reductions in active duty forces were the last thing the Army needed, as it shifted its focus back to Europe and the Soviet threat. Fortunately, newly appointed Secretary of the Defense James Schlesinger supported Abrams' desires to resist pressures to downsize the Army. He was willing even to expand the number of combat divisions *provided* Abrams did not raise the total end strength of the active Army. Significantly, these two also agreed that the Army's reserve forces would again resource and train in conjunction and coordination with active forces.¹⁰

This led to the formulation of the "Round Out" concept, which aligned reserve combat and combat support/combat service support elements with active divisional combat units and thereby preserved active component manpower spaces for expanding combat forces. Coupled with personnel space savings from host nation support overseas, this innovative concept allowed Abrams to carve out three more division headquarters and their associated combat elements from current end strength.¹¹

Abrams' recommended solution to the seemingly divergent requirements of the active and reserve constituencies was both simple and brilliant. He expanded the active structure to provide more combat divisions by relying on the reserve forces to provide unit-level fill. This allowed him to expand and then maintain the combat strength of the active army at 16 divisions and also promised the Army could resource those specific "round-out" reserve force units in a fashion comparable to their active brethren.¹² Additionally, he moved the remaining bulk of the Army's combat support and combat service support units into the reserves. Thus, the active Army would rely on alliance members for such support before reserve forces could arrive for a conflict in Europe. Again, this approach ensured that these particular reserve forces would receive resources appropriate to their deployment timelines.

There was, however, a "catch" associated with this approach. The combined results of these actions meant that, in order to fight a lengthy or serious conflict with active forces, especially outside of

Europe, the President would have to call up the combat support/ combat service support assets from the reserves. As an example, theater support infrastructure—such as the transportation terminal brigades and battalions needed to provide the military interface at commercial seaports of embarkation, deployment support brigades to assist with loading the equipment on commercial transportation, and port security companies to provide security at military ocean terminals—now existed only in the reserve structure.¹³ Since upwards of 95 percent of the Army deploys to large scale contingency operations by sea, such deployment support units must mobilize early to support the movement of the active heavy combat forces.¹⁴

Despite the assertions of some critics, Abrams' motivation primarily to preserve a large regular Army should not be a matter of historical debate. Dr. Conrad Crane points out, that on assuming the position of chief of staff of the Army as it returned from Vietnam, Abrams commanded a force undergoing a traumatic transition.

Facing a significant drawdown, the shift to an all-volunteer armed force, and a desire for ethical reform from the rank and file of an officer corps who believed the Vietnam war had weakened service integrity, Abrams' primary goals were to establish an active force structure that maintained 16 division flags while increasing the readiness of the reserve components.¹⁵

Retaining, even increasing, divisions was more important than any other consideration for Abrams. At that time, divisions were the accepted metric for discussing, funding, and opposing the similarly constructed Soviet threat in Europe. To achieve the number of divisions in the structure he desired, he had to reinvigorate the reserve forces. This was realistic and a political necessity based on the domestic environment.

A second intended outcome of the "Total Force" policy was for selected elements of the reserves to be resourced in a manner commensurate with and in consonance with the active forces. The Cold War forced the Army's components into a symbiotic relationship, since "the Cold War was partly responsible for this increased reliance because the Soviet threat appeared overwhelming and the cost of maintaining large active forces was prohibitive."¹⁶ The

nature of the Soviet threat provided relevance and a focus that was difficult to deny. By tying reserve resources to the active components' ability to meet and defeat this threat, the Abrams Doctrine provided the former a mission focus that imparted credibility to their resource arguments and enabled the successful execution of their retention and recruitment efforts. The Abrams Doctrine provided the reserves with relevancy, and it is from that relevancy that the remaining three "Rs" draw their support.¹⁷ Such relevancy is a fundamental necessity for the reserve components and a source of continuing debate in the post-Cold War era.

The Abrams Doctrine seemingly addressed each constituency's most serious needs. For Abrams and the active component, it allowed the manning of more pure combat formations, while keeping the costs associated with that force relatively low. For the reserves, it provided relevance for political and bureaucratic leverage, promised access to resources, and resulted in retention and recruiting advantages. Thus, it was a politically crafted compromise solution to structuring the force, which continued to operate long after the conditions that necessitated its inception had changed dramatically. Of course, as with many intended policy outcomes crafted by governments, there have been unintended consequences as well.

THE POLITICS OF MEANING: THE ASSOCIATED PERCEPTIONS

Although designed to address "programmatic" issues, the Abrams Doctrine became associated with some significantly different perceptions over the intervening years. In fact, one of the disconcerting aspects of the Abrams Doctrine is that each of its constituencies has developed its own largely unchallenged interpretation of the doctrine. Academics, buttressed by the arguments of a number of authors, see the policy as an attempt to limit presidential powers. Some of these as well as others, including military officers, see the Abrams Doctrine as an argument for obtaining popular support prior to mobilization. Still others, particularly members of the reserve components—specifically the National Guard and its many supporters—have interpreted it as a necessary precursor to military action:

The Total Force policy of 1973 was designed to gain popular support for military operations from the American public by mobilizing the National Guard from its thousands of locations across the United States when needed.¹⁸

In popularizing this interpretation they have helped legitimize this sentiment, and subsequently raised the linkage between mobilization and popular support to near canonical status. Likewise, some associate the active component, fairly or unfairly, with a supposedly subtle attempt to limit presidential powers by promulgating a dependence that lies at the heart of the Abrams Doctrine.¹⁹ The restrictive interpretations on American military interventions associated with both the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines allegedly have their lineage in the structural limitations conceived by Abrams.²⁰ Yet, curiously, nowhere in Abrams' contemporary papers, nor in public statements made at that time, is there a single hint that Abrams' intended obtaining popular support or of imposing incidental constraints on the powers on the executive branch as outcomes of the new "Total Force" policy.²¹ Nonetheless, each of these articulated beliefs about the Abrams Doctrine retains a significant number of adherents and therefore warrants a closer examination.

Mobilization and its Relationship to Popular Support.

That there is a linkage between mobilizing the reserves and committing and maintaining the will of the people in support of a war remains a generally accepted belief. Advocates of this line of thinking make either or both of two arguments: first, that mobilization of the reserve forces results in obtaining or increasing popular support for an intended military action; and, second, conversely, that the President must first obtain the support of the people in order to mobilize the reserves. It represents a somewhat confusing tautology. Theoretically, its roots rest on the writings of Prussian theorist, Carl von Clausewitz.

Clausewitz posits that there exists a remarkable trinity in war composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity; the play of chance; and the interaction of policy. Specifically, he states that

these three aspects mainly concern the people, the commander and his army, and the government.²² He describes the requirement for leaders in war to keep these three “aspects” balanced so the policies pursued in regards to one do not occur without regard for their effects on the others. In effect, he admonishes governments for trying to go to war without the support of the people. Most probably the result of his own and Prussia’s experience in the Napoleonic wars, the application of his theoretical construct to a modern democratic government still merits consideration. Although Clausewitz does not guarantee that the preparation and thoughtful orchestration of all three elements to draw forth and appropriately direct the maximum power of a nation will guarantee victory, he implies that failing to manage the relationship of the trinity properly will lead to defeat.²³

More so than the current all-volunteer force, the reserves, providing representation from numerous small communities across the country, seem to represent the mechanical linkage that integrates the key Clausewitzian trinity of the people with the other two elements. In fact, Colonel Harry Summers’ book, *On Strategy, A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, presents a powerful argument that the U.S. government ignored the “remarkable trinity” (and other Clausewitzian theory) and suffered defeat in Vietnam as the will of the people drifted from the policy of the government and the actions of its army. As Summers argues, someone

. . . needed to tell him [the President] that it would be an obvious fallacy to commit the Army without first committing the American people. Such a commitment would require battlefield competence and clear-cut objectives to be sustained, but without the commitment of the American people, the commitment of the Army to prolonged combat was impossible.²⁴

In this belief, Summers was not alone. Many defense analysts and military leaders agreed that President Lyndon Johnson’s decision was fateful. In fact, it has become a common and oft- repeated rationale for the defeat in Vietnam.

The lesson learned by the American military in Vietnam involves the third leg of Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity,” the people. The consensus, particularly acute among Army officers, seems to suggest

that the American people have a duty and a role in the authorization of force beyond that delegated to their elected representatives in Congress and the President. This conviction can be summed up by the statement that war is a shared responsibility between the people, the government, and the military.²⁵

Abrams' belief was that the direct result of Johnson's decision not to mobilize the reserve forces led not only to defeat, but to serious damage to each of the Army's structural components. Many observers thus assert that Abrams' chief legacy is that he and his colleagues became committed to an early mobilization of the reserves.

Does Mobilization Ensure Popular Support?

The objective of ensuring popular support for future wars was not in any of General Abrams' writings at the time that the "Total Force" policy came into effect. Ensuring that the passions of the people became engaged and remained focused on the outcome of a conflict as a result of this structural forcing function apparently arose through interviews and writings after the fact. Lewis Sorley was one of the first authors to discuss this objective in depth in his 1992 biography of Abrams. Summers makes a similar argument in his book offering a Clausewitzian analysis of the Vietnam War. Although he does not cite Abrams or the Abrams Doctrine, Summers asserts that for most of U.S. history, the support of the American people was imbedded deeply into the very force structure of the American military.²⁶ He stresses the necessity of mobilizing the reserves by citing the theoretical basis of Clausewitz's trinity. However, there are critics who would argue that Summers' application of the trinity is too broad in nature; and that "the concept of the "remarkable trinity" is a basis for the practical political-military analysis of particular wars, not a description of the social structures—which may alter over time—that support war."²⁷ By raising the tendencies of the trinity to dogmatic status, Summers' interpretation is certainly open to criticism.²⁸

Regardless of the views concerning the validity of the theoretical linkage between reserve mobilization and obtaining popular support, the question remains: Is mobilization of the reserve component

an effective methodology for ensuring support of the war effort? A review of the effect of mobilizing and deploying reserve forces since Vietnam indicates that obtaining and maintaining popular support rests on a number of factors. In regards to the mobilization prior to the Gulf War and its impact on popular support, one author suggests:

Although the public rallied behind President Bush in August when he announced the American military intervention, popular support for his Persian Gulf policies soon fell sharply. The mobilization of large numbers of guardsmen and reservists had no impact on that precipitous drop in public support. Opinion polls showed that the American people's support for Bush's Persian Gulf policy was not restored until U.S. forces began combat operations.²⁹

A similar trend occurred during the air war over Kosovo. In fact, popular support has more to do with the results than with the type of components involved.

The truth is remarkably simple. When the U.S. achieves victory in a just cause, the public applauds the use of force. When it loses—worse, still, when America is defeated or runs away (as in Somalia or Vietnam)—the public reasonably says the use of the military was a mistake.³⁰

In hindsight, the fact that the United States remained heavily engaged in Vietnam for 9 years (with a belief that achieving victory was possible for at least 6 of those years) before withdrawing seems to support such a contention. Also in hindsight, it is now apparent that such conditional support is not peculiar to democracies. Gunther Lewy concluded in his review of Vietnam that a mixture of propaganda and compulsion offers a totalitarian regime an advantage in a war for limited objectives.³¹ However, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan illustrates that any unsuccessful war that drags on for a long time will inevitably lose the backing essential for its successful pursuit.³²

A review of peacekeeping missions from this same time frame reveals similar results with respect to support and mobilization. Although his work focuses specifically on the influence of casualties on public policy, James Burk concludes from an examination of peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon and Somalia that public support

was neither as unsteady, nor as critically contingent on the absence of casualties as many have claimed.³³ Interestingly enough, Burk's conclusions are that public approval or disapproval for such missions largely is set *before* casualties are incurred. This is significant in that he asserts that the political leadership is more responsible for popular support of military operations than other factors. He bases this assertion upon a study that concludes that public support for military deployments rests heavily on consensus (or its absence) among political leaders.³⁴ Max Boot concurs that the public is willing to "go along," if the elites in government and the media remain favorably disposed.³⁵ In fact, the belief that activating the reserve component *ensures* the support of the people may be nothing more than a well-propagated myth. Accepting, then, that mobilization does not equate to popular support, the question remains: To what degree is popular support necessary prior to mobilization?

Mobilization as a Prerequisite?

A variant of the popular support argument is that the president must first gain the popular support of the people prior to initiating military operations. However, popular support cannot be a limiting factor, and to make such support a prerequisite for action would be to paralyze the political leadership. One commentator agrees:

As for explaining its failures or half-successes since World War II, even thoughtful general officers declared that to have victories, you must have the political will—and that means the will of the administration, the congress, and the American people. All must be united in a desire for action. If accepted, such an extreme pre-condition—a unity that has escaped the United States in every major war except the World Wars—means that the civilians will always disappoint the military and the soldiers will always have an excuse.³⁶

In the history of American arms, popular support rarely has occurred before hand, and certainly has not been a guarantee after the action begins. Were it a prerequisite to action, the United States would have engaged in few, if any, of the wars that have made it a great power. This is so in limited conflicts, in peacekeeping operations, or in "crusades."

The quest to obtain the ever-elusive goal of popular support for military action will not result necessarily from any single event and cannot be guaranteed under most circumstances. Mobilization does not result in obtaining popular support. Popular support is not a prerequisite to military action. There are too many variables in the dynamic equation that determines the relationship of mobilization, presidential decisions, and making popular support to assign outcomes with any degree of certainty.³⁷ The supposedly irrefutable argument of the role of reserves as a linkage among the trinity, although politically attractive, remains both dubious and unproven. Effective political leaders able to reach a policy consensus, or at least able to maintain consensus long enough to initiate action on favorable terms, possess power sufficient to take the nation to war, including mobilization of reserve forces. Hence, the belief that a cause and effect relationship exists between mobilizing the reserves and ensuring popular support possesses little validity, just as the idea that popular support is necessary prior to acting is equally without basis. To continue to accept either of these arguments serves no purpose in formulating a future policy.

Tying the President's Hands?

Related to the argument that the President must gain popular support prior to mobilizing the reserve component is one that the active dependence on reserve mobilization came about specifically from a desire to limit the President's ability to commit the nation to war. Lewis Sorley, based on an interview he conducted with then General (Retired) John Vessey in 1988, argues that the general was the originator of the characterization of the Abrams Doctrine as being designed with "malice aforethought."³⁸ He details what in Vessey's belief was an unmistakable effort on the part of Abrams to tie deployment of active forces to the mobilization of the reserves not in order to gain popular support, but to force the President to seek approval prior to acting. It is tough to argue with an authority like Vessey, although Crane raises doubts based on the time elapsed, the lack of any contemporary documents to support the assertion, the seriousness of formulating and disguising the intent of such an act,

and the characterization of Abrams' service made by Schlesinger.³⁹ Correctly, Crane points out that "interpretations that the true motivation for the new force structure was purposefully concealed from civilian decisionmakers or that the justification was only created after the fact to preserve current policy are both troubling."⁴⁰

Regardless of the intent, it appears that most presidents have not been constrained in their actions, with or without this supposed influence of the Abrams Doctrine. Other attempts at restraining executive branch power, such as the Weinberger or Powell Doctrines or the War Powers Resolution have had little impact on the exercise of presidential discretion. As Jeffrey Record points out

. . . with the exception of Jimmy Carter, they [recent Presidents] have displayed a greater propensity to intervene in foreign civil wars than did their pre-Vietnam predecessors. Reagan sent U.S. forces into Lebanon and Grenada. Bush intervened in Panama, the Philippines, and Somalia. And Clinton has intervened in Haiti and Bosnia. In none of these instances were fundamental U.S. security interests at stake or was a White House full-court press mounted to mobilize congressional and public opinion on behalf of intervention.⁴¹

The question of whether the Abrams Doctrine aimed at curtailing executive branch powers is actually moot. It clearly does not. It is nothing more than an inconvenience, which is one reason the current Secretary of Defense is trying to change it. In fact, the lore associated with its design may be more harmful than it is worth, as Elliot Cohen (among other scholars) has noted: "This was, nonetheless an extraordinary effort by the military to limit the choices available to their civilian masters, to tie the hands of policymakers through the seemingly technical manipulation of organizational structures."⁴² It is only natural that the civilian leadership would interpret such an effort to undermine civil-military relations as extremely disingenuous. However, the evidence would indicate that the accepted belief of a malice aforethought simply is not accurate.

THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE'S TRUE LEGACY!

Abrams' intent is being misinterpreted and others have obscured its true legacy. The unseen and often overlooked brilliance of the more

subtle, associated outcome of the Abrams Doctrine is not that it uses the reserves as a forcing function in limiting the active component's commitment *in* an action, but in its clever method of leveraging the reserves to get the active component *out* of an action. The use of the reserves does not cause the President to reconsider the commitment of forces when weighing matters of national security. Nonetheless, with its presence in 2,700 communities across all 54 states and territories, the mobilized and committed reserve components bring the political pressure of their elected representatives to bear to *end* a crisis that appears to be unsuccessful.⁴³ This effect may be even more necessary with an all-volunteer force than it was with a draftee force.

Abrams witnessed the death and debilitating effects on both the nation and on the Army through 9 years of feckless action in Vietnam. His World War II experiences assisted him a great deal in realizing the impact of failing to introduce reserve forces on ending the Vietnam War. In fact, Abrams' legacy is not in preventing the United States from going into another Vietnam, but in ensuring that its military actions do not remain indecisive for prolonged periods as a result of congressional inaction. His design ensured that a mobilized reserve component would generate the political focus on future wars reflective of the mobilized reserves' representative community basing.

This interpretation would change Summers' assertion that "*without* the commitment of the American people, the commitment of the Army to prolonged combat was impossible" to "*with* the commitment of the American people, the commitment of the Army to prolonged combat was impossible."⁴⁴ The misperception that Abrams sought to undermine the executive's constitutional authority is ironic. In fact, his design strengthened the constitutional role of Congress. Additionally, by removing doubts about the motives associated with this policy, it reinforces Schlesinger's characterization of Abrams as the epitome of a "good servant."⁴⁵ If there is a forcing function imbedded in the design of the force structure instituted by the Abrams Doctrine, the conflict curtailing function may be it.

THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE

Current international and domestic political pressures differ markedly from those of 30 years ago, and although they may be more familiar, they are no less pressing. Internationally, the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the continued decline in the defense budgets of traditional allies, the public opposition to U.S. policies by numerous international and nongovernmental actors, the rise of transnational terrorism, and the hesitance of other nations to provide forces and access to assist the U.S. form a different context for force planning.⁴⁶ The sometimes-public resentment of what former allies now choose to interpret as unilateral or hegemonic actions by the United States is also causing a decrease in host nation and allied force support. These international tensions are both lessened and exacerbated by domestic realities. Given these changes in the threat and in the international and domestic environments, the future direction of the Abrams Doctrine requires careful deliberation.

Although improbable, it remains possible that the compromise Abrams conceived has no future. The impacts that a protracted war on terror will have on the reserve force structure are difficult to predict. Yet change is necessary, and the current Abrams Doctrine provides both a convenient and a necessary starting point. The actual intent, central to Abrams' compromise then and to any compromise now, focuses on ensuring reserve component relevance and on an active-reserve force balance within a constrained end-strength. While maintaining relevance is vital, equally critical is the balancing of force capabilities across the range of military operations and in consonance with overseas, homeland defense, and homeland security missions. In attaining this balance, it is likely that only a future "conflict curtailing" function merits retention from the design of the current active-reserve force. Nonetheless, it is possible that the hardest question surrounding the future direction of the Abrams Doctrine is the one Rumsfeld did not ask: Is balancing the force really all that is required? In arriving at a future "Abrams" Doctrine, compromise, the main component in achieving a solution in the past, provides a remarkable and applicable ingredient for a future solution.

THE FUTURE AND RESERVE COMPONENT RELEVANCE

Without the specter of a Soviet invasion of Europe, and following the failure of reserve combat units to be employed during Operation DESERT STORM, the relevance of portions of the reserve forces came into question. This was highlighted in 1997 when the *Quadrennial Defense Review* did not even mention the specific utilization, integration, or modernization of the reserves.

This was due primarily to the active component view of the National Guard combat units as a strategic reserve. In other words, the two major theater war scenario involved only the active component divisions. National Guard combat units would only be called upon in such a scenario if the conflict was not resolved within a specified time frame, or if active forces were required to redeploy to another conflict. Based on existing deployment practices, National Guard combat units would deploy to theater 45-60 days after mobilization, and would be committed only when the situation was under control. Basically, the National Guard was viewed as less "relevant" to future war fighting requirements.⁴⁷

Largely driven by budgetary requirements, reserve supporters allege that the active forces attempted to relegate the reserve combat unit contributions to post-combat periods in an effort to avoid modernization costs.⁴⁸ This is a practical demonstration of how relevance translates to resources for the reserve forces, and this rift developed into a fraternal bureaucratic fight of such particular ferocity that both the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the National Defense Panel commented adversely.⁴⁹ Clearly, this type of infighting weakens the symbiotic relationship and reserve relevance once born and nurtured by the Soviet threat.

Relevance remains a concept that even the active force wrestles with openly. The recently appointed Army Chief of Staff adopted the motto of "Relevant and Ready" as the theme of his tenure. Relevance for the reserves, and the resources, retention, and recruiting that are its downstream effects remain a foundation of the future Abrams Doctrine. The United States can obtain structural relevance by linking reserve component units to complementary active capabilities, by including unique supplementary capabilities in the reserves, or by assigning homeland defense or homeland

security roles to the reserves. Whatever missions or roles assigned to the reserves, it is imperative that they be linked to the “Total Force,” and be related directly to the capabilities required to face the current threat. Relegating a sizable portion of the reserves to unrealistic missions or seldom-used functions will destroy their relevance. The destruction of their relevance will only serve to destroy the subtle curtailing function they provide, as unnecessary or seldom-used capabilities do not require mobilization. The relevance of the reserve forces, a foundation of the future force design, cannot be jeopardized. However, retaining relevance without building a balanced force is meaningless as well.

THE FUTURE AND FORCE BALANCE

Several factors now influencing the balancing debate do not align as easily as those that faced Abrams in 1973. The advent and success of the all-volunteer force now acts as a huge impediment towards any near-term or future growth of the active component. Regardless of critics of a “poverty draft” or of questions surrounding the future availability of a sufficiently qualified recruiting pool, the all-volunteer force is providing the necessary human raw material to fill the military’s force structure.⁵⁰ In fact, the largest argument against the all-volunteer force and a tremendous dampening factor in expanding the active component is its cost. Recruiting, training, retaining, and supporting the retirement of an active duty service member is expensive when considered in the context of other DoD costs.

As defense budgets decline, personnel costs compete with modernization costs in each service’s budget. Modernization costs continue to rise all too quickly, prompting one defense industry executive to joke that by 2054, it will require the entire defense budget to purchase a single aircraft.⁵¹ This competition for defense dollars explains why the Secretary of Defense examined the reduction of the active Army to just eight divisions as recently as 2001.⁵² He initially envisioned a division of labor between the active and reserve forces that maintained the current modernization direction by reducing the size of the active force and increasing the utilization of the reserve

force. In effect, he rebalanced the force to assign more missions requiring mobilization to the reserves to preserve modernization for the active force.

This approach explains why the Army and DoD's leadership remain opposed to recent congressional efforts to raise the size of the Army's active component by two divisions without a reasonable guarantee that Congress will sustain the additional funding for such an increase in force levels for the foreseeable future.⁵³ Neither Congress nor the Army seems willing to reduce procurement funding. Nonetheless, the impacts of the budgetary pressures to reduce the active forces led to a commensurate reliance on the manpower of the reserves. Interestingly, while the active forces declined from 18 to 10 divisions, the reserve forces retained all 8 of their divisions, not counting 15 enhanced separate brigades. Critics maintain that, in an effort to preserve the current 10 divisions at all costs, the active forces focused modernization funds on the "core competency" of fighting and winning a conventional war and encouraged an increased role in stability and support operations for the reserves as necessitated by the requirements of the National Security Strategy and the emerging threat environment.⁵⁴

The renewed threat of transnational terror organizations and the emerging necessities of first responder duties as part of homeland security missions for the reserve forces make the balancing debate even more complex. In the past, the selected transfer of what the military terms military operations other than war critical active forces to the reserves (e.g., civil affairs, military police, and engineer vertical construction assets) had little noticeable effect or impact domestically.⁵⁵ However, as the deployment requirements for reserve forces compete with both disaster response and anticipated homeland defense requirements, tensions experienced throughout the active and reserve force structure are reflected among state-level political leadership.⁵⁶ For example, skills now required by the active forces may not be replaced in reserve formations or be replaced by skills that are not as easily recruited, retained, or utilized by the states' leadership. The transfer of military police, medical, vertical construction, or civil affairs specialties (i.e., those required for first responder duties) now is much noticed. As a result, when

the senior leadership of the Army openly discusses the possibility of transferring nearly 125,000 manpower spaces with many of the aforementioned skills back into the active forces to fulfill the Secretary of Defense's rebalancing tasking, it only serves to heighten these tensions.⁵⁷ Couple these pressures with those now being voiced over the extended and repetitive deployment of reserve forces and the higher casualty rates these forces are experiencing in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM's stability and support operations, and the pressures to reexamine the reserve's role in overseas deployments in regards to homeland defense and security missions grow even more.⁵⁸

Balancing active and reserve structure and capabilities between the current international and domestic environments in consideration of the National Security Strategy admittedly is a difficult proposition. An active force supported by a three-tiered reserve (including units earmarked, recruited, and retained specifically for expeditionary actions, homeland defense, and homeland security) is one proposed concept.⁵⁹ However, any action to limit employment of portions of the reserve force to hostile environs overseas may undermine the conflict curtailing function that mobilization provides. Such steps require a careful balancing of district representation among the reserve forces earmarked for deployment to preserve this vital function. Clearly, the active component must accomplish its *immediate* missions without reliance on the reserves. Just as clearly, the reserves require a degree of redundancy of active force capabilities that are complementary, supplementary, and neither too expensive nor too specific to retain in the active forces. This new total force structure cannot be skewed towards combat operations, but requires capabilities that address the entire spectrum of conflict distributed prudently across each component. Balancing the force is a complicated and politically delicate act indeed.

Regardless of the force balancing solution derived, the new Abrams Doctrine must preserve the existence of complementary and supplementary capabilities resident in both active and reserve forces in case changes in the strategic environment require an unforeseen and rapid expansion of the defense capabilities of the nation. The multiple defense challenges reflected in the attacks on the World

Trade Center, the Anthrax scare, and in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM provide excellent examples of just how diverse a force structure the United States requires.

THE SPIRIT OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: THE WAY AHEAD

Retention of the Abrams Doctrine as originally designed and now executed is no longer feasible, but incremental modification is preferable to discarding a policy that retains desired qualities at this point in time. Whether divisions or brigade combat teams become the “coin of the realm” for measuring the size of the active forces is not as important as ensuring that the capabilities required to project, sustain, and conduct combat operations sufficient to defeat the most likely enemies balance properly amongst the components. The combat curtailing function provided by ensuring that the congressional representatives of the mobilized reserves scrutinize the actions of committed forces remains a key quality that necessitates retention in any future force structure. Americans would ignore this function, not understood fully in the aftermath of the bitter defeat of Vietnam, at considerable peril in the future. Integral to designing the future force balance is redefining the desired role of the reserves in direct support of the active forces overseas, in support of homeland defense requirements, and in support of homeland security requirements. In accomplishing this, the relevance of the Army’s reserve component in performing the diverse military missions envisioned by the original Abrams Doctrine remains essential to recruit, retain, and resource the reserve force.

Just as modifying the current Abrams Doctrine necessitates the retention of key qualities, so too does it require the elimination of several associated perceptions. The perception that structurally tying the deployment of the active force to the mobilization of the reserves creates or ensures a degree of popular support is a myth. It should be discounted. Structurally tying mobilization of the reserve component to employment of the active force has little, if any, demonstrated effect on presidential decisionmaking. Since there is little supporting evidence to justify this belief, the Army should refute loudly the “malice aforethought” claims related to its

supposedly nefarious attempt to restrain presidential power through structural design. When crafting the new “Abrams” Doctrine, all concerned should take particular care that the motivations, intent, and processes are visible and “transparent,” thereby avoiding the types of negative connotations that gain the military an array of academic and political critics for no sound reason.

Possibly, the larger question is the one Secretary Rumsfeld did not ask: What is the fundamental relationship of the reserves to the active force in the future? Rather than merely examining the balance, perhaps the entire reserve-active force relationship needs revisiting. Depending on how one views the current war on terror (e.g., as a relatively short-term operation or as an open-ended commitment that may last 50-100 years), the solution to this question may require a structural adjustment more far reaching than a mere rebalancing of the force. A long-term requirement for continually mobilizing reserve forces may not be possible with the all-volunteer force. In all likelihood, the reserve forces possess a “tipping point” which extended deployments will trigger that will either compel soldiers to choose a nondeployable arm of the future reserve force, or cause them to opt not to serve. Neither option bodes well for a viable active-reserve relationship to continue in anything close to its present form. Even if DoD modifies the reserve force to include the three-tiered framework cited above, the challenges in designing a single force that could perform the diverse roles of homeland security, homeland defense, and providing relevant augmentation to the active combat forces are incredible. The global war on terror, which began by the physical destruction of the twin towers, may have wrecked conceptually the active-reserve relationship that has endured for decades. If nothing else, it revealed that the active-reserve compromise forged in the 1970s is no longer applicable to today’s threat environment, and hints that rebalancing the force may not solve the problem in its entirety. What, then, is the way ahead?

The Army consumes a vast amount of internal leadership and bureaucratic energy fighting battles over roles and missions once defined by an ingenious compromise. That DoD and Army leadership has allowed this landmark compromise, known as the Abrams Doctrine, to exist in name only for the past 12 years is understandable,

given the changing nature of the international security environment. The current Secretary of Defense appears to be examining options for a solution to this problem. But a solution requires willingness to compromise by all parties; and the fundamentally political nature of this dilemma means that compromise remains the main ingredient in formulating a solution to the rebalancing effort. Compromise will be possible only if the final goal is kept fully in mind, and only when all those creating other subordinate goals, developing personal agendas, or inserting personal priorities remember that “an army’s function is not to serve itself, but its society.”⁶⁰ Even if compromise is achieved in revising the current Abrams Doctrine, there remains a lingering sense that this is but the first step in redefining the active-reserve relationship required in the future security environment.

Secretary Rumsfeld is correct that some aspects of the Abrams Doctrine need discarding, but it is important to retain the essential core in formulating a new “Total Force” policy. Any new “Abrams” Doctrine must arrive at a force structure appropriate to today’s threat while ensuring the continued relevance of the reserve component. At the same time, a new “Abrams” Doctrine must continue to perform the “conflict limiting” function that it now provides.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Bruce Jacobs, “Lessons Lost?” *National Guard Magazine Online*, March 2003. Jacobs is one of several authors from the National Guard Association of the United States that are attacking Rumsfeld’s policy initiative. He offers a vigorous argument relying on his own, and Lewis Sorley’s) summation of the post-Vietnam events that led to the establishment of the Abrams Doctrine.

2. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Rebalancing Forces,” memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries of Defense, Washington, DC, The Pentagon, July 9, 2003.

3. Jacobs, p. 5.

4. Randy Pullen, “Keep The Reserves In The Fight,” *Strategic Studies Institute Newsletter*, October 2003; and Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime,” *Parameters*, Summer, 1991, pp. 35-50. Both offer a general summary of the benefits gained by the reserve component forces based on the Abrams Doctrine.

5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning,” *Joint Pub 4-05*, Washington, DC, Joint Staff, June 22, 1995, pp. 14-16. This publication

illustrates the acceptance of the Abrams Doctrine. It states that the "Total Force Policy is one fundamental premise on which our military force structure is built. It was institutionalized in 1973 and caused a shift of substantial military roles and missions to the Reserve Component along with resources necessary to maintain high levels of readiness, especially in units that are needed early in a crisis." Additionally, Lewis Sorley, in "Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime," p. 48, reflects that after the passage of years, the active component came to depend on the reserves "so much so that it became an *article of faith*—as Abrams had planned—[that] the Army could not go to war without them." [Emphasis added]

6. Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime," p. 45.

7. Technically, the complete "Total Force" policy was officially named for the then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Over the years, perhaps because it had the greatest impact on and implications for the Army, it has become more common to simply refer to it as the "Abrams Doctrine."

8. Simon Lunn, "Burden Sharing in NATO," Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Chatham House Papers #18*, London, 1983, p. 15. Lunn discusses the potential advantages to the United States of the then resurging post-war Western European economies.

9. Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of his Times*, New York, 1992, p. 365. Sorley provides an excellent summary of the political environment facing Abrams at the time. See also Richard Lock-Pullen, "An Inward Looking Time: The United States Army, 1973-1976," *The Journal of Military History*, No. 67, April 2003, pp. 483-512.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

11. Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime," pp. 45-47. Sorley cites an interview he conducted with General William DePuy, U.S. Army retired, where DePuy claimed to have conceived the "roundout" concept.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

13. *Joint Pub 4-05*, p. IV-8.

14. The statistics concerning the Army's deployment by sea are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's lecture series, U.S. Army War College, AY 2004.

15. Conrad C. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, p. 5. Dr. Crane bases his findings upon the contemporary sources located in Abrams' personal papers stored at the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

16. Charles E. Heller, *Total Force: Federal Reserves And State National Guards*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, p. 1.

17. Pullen, "Keep The Reserves In The Fight," p. 2. Pullen discusses the necessity of relevancy in rebuilding, and indirectly, in maintaining) the reserve forces. Heller's *Total Force* also covers this topic extensively on pp. 30-35.

18. *National Guard Posture Statement, FY 2000, Appendix B: "Constitutional Charter of the Guard,"* p. 3, as quoted in Spencer W. Robinson, *The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century; Peacekeeping Vs. Homeland Security*, Monterey, 2002, p. 18.

19. Elliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*, New York, 2002, p. 186.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 204. Additionally, see F. G. Hoffman, *Decisive Force, The New American Way of War*, Westport, CT, 1996, pp. 100-101; and Max Boot, *Savage Wars Of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, New York, 2002, pp. 318-335.

21. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam*, pp. 5-6. Crane states that, although Abrams' subordinates later claimed he also had a long-term vision to ensure that no president could ever fight another Vietnam without mobilization, that claim is neither clarified nor supported by available documents.

22. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, 1976, p. 89.

23. James O. Kievit and Thomas P. Murray, "Citizen Soldiers in a 21st Century Army At War," *Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper*, Vol. 09-03, October 2003.

24. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982, p. 13.

25. Hoffman, *Decisive Force*, p. 30.

26. Summers, *On Strategy*, p. 13.

27. Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity," *Parameters*, Autumn, 1995.

28. In fact, Bassford and Villacres continue (on page 5) by suggesting that Summers' advocacy of a "social" trinity formed by the people, the government, and the army is such an alteration of Clausewitz's initial concept as to recommend it be referred to as the "Summersian trinity."

29. Charles J. Gross, *American Military Aviation in the 20th Century: The Indispensable Arm*, College Station, TX, 2002, p. 260. Although such sentiment is forgotten now, Gross cites numerous sources to support the assertion that the first Gulf War was a contentious and divisive issue until hostilities commenced.

30. Humphrey Taylor, "Win in Kosovo And The Public Will Approve," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 1999, p. A26.

31. Guenter Lewy, *America In Vietnam*, New York, 1978, p. 43.

32. Hoffman, *Decisive Force*, p. 32.

33. James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 114, No. 1, Spring 1999.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 12. He summarizes Eric V. Larsen's argument from *Casualties and Consensus*, Santa Monica, 1996. See also Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace*, pp. 327-330.

35. Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace*, p. 329.

36. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, p. 204.

37. If nothing else, Alan Beyerchen's discussion of Clausewitz's writings with respect to nonlinearity illustrates these points rather adeptly. See Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 59-90.

38. Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime," p. 45.

39. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam*, pp. 5, 21.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 20-21.

41. Jeffrey Record, *The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, p. 10.

42. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, p. 186.

43. Robinson, *The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century*, p. 19. Robinson is used to cite the number of communities and states/territories. See also Victor Davis Hanson, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*, New York, 2001, p. 442, for his discussion of constant political audit.

44. Summers, *On Strategy*, p. 13.

45. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam*, p. 5.

46. This is predominantly general knowledge, but these ideas are themes gathered from the in-class discussions of Seminar 7, U.S. Army War College, during Academic Year 2004.

47. Robinson, *The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century*, p. 49.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

50. Claire Shaeffer-Duffy, "Uncle Sam Hustles to Keep the Ranks Filled," *National Catholic Review Online*, December 30, 2003.

51. Stan Crock, "Less Bang from the Pentagon's Bucks" *Business Week Online*, March 29, 2002. Crock cites a comment attributed to Norman R. Augustine, referred to anecdotally as "Augustine's Law." It states that in 1983, Lockheed Martin Chairman and CEO Augustine looked at the trajectory of per-unit costs for jet fighters and the trajectory of increases in the defense budget and formulated something he dubbed "the First Law of Impending Doom or the Final Law of Economic Disarmament." He [Augustine] wrote back then: "In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3 1/2 days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day."

52. David Pyne, "New Army Brigade Plan is Dangerous," *Military.Com*, November 5, 2003.

53. Jim Garamone, "Army Chief 'Adamantly Opposes' Added End Strength," *Defense Link*, January 29, 2004. Garamone, writing for the Armed Force Information Service, was one of many who cited the Army's concern with Congress giving the "military an unfunded order—meaning that the service must take the money from other areas to fund the requirement."

54. Robinson, *The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century*, pp. 57-59.

55. Record, *The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning*, p. 21.

56. As an example, see Mike Madden, "Mobilization for Iraq Hits W. Va., Kentucky Hard" *The Herald Dispatch*, February 27, 2003.

57. This comment is based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series, AY 2004.

58. Robert Burns, "Most U.S. Iraq Deaths Are Reservists." *Comcast News*, January 1, 2004.

59. Philip Gold and Erin Solaro, "Wrecking . . . and fixing the Reserves." *Washington Times*, October 15, 2003.

60. Cincinnatu, *Self Destruction: The Disintegration And Decay Of The United States Army During The Vietnam Era*, New York, 1981, p. 44. This book, because its views represent a distinctly different perspective of the Army as an institution and of the officer corps in Vietnam, should be required reading for every officer.

CHAPTER 9

SECURE THE VICTORY: IS IT TIME FOR A STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND?

Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Ashworth

Take up the White man's burden—
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard.

Kipling

Why is the U.S. Army so reluctant to change? Have past victories made leaders fearful of disrupting a good thing? Unfortunately, history is full of examples of military organizations that were victorious one day but defeated the next. The current transformation of the U.S. Army into a leaner, lethal and more rapidly deployable force is impressive. However, is this effort developing the appropriate force to solve the current and future national requirements? According to *Joint Vision 2020*, the ultimate goal of the U.S. military is to achieve “full spectrum dominance—the ability of U.S. forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.”¹ This dominance requires the ability to conduct military operations in both combat and noncombat situations.²

The military operations that destroyed the Iraqi Army in two Persian Gulf Wars have demonstrated the dominant combat capabilities of the United States. On the other hand, the tragic outcome of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Mogadishu and the current instability in Iraq creates doubt as to whether the United States dominates military operations other than war. In light of this disparity, why would any adversary develop forces to attack America's strength—direct combat. This is especially true since the U.S. military appears to find it difficult to defeat opponents that

prefer to fight with asymmetric responses. To better fight both types of conflict, a proposal has been made to establish a Stability and Reconstruction Joint Command.³ Considerable debate has occurred whether a new command is the proper solution. The purpose of this chapter is to review the strategic environment the United States confronts, discuss the options the nation has in controlling all phases of conflict within this strategic environment, and suggest the benefits that a new force structure including a Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command would provide the Army in achieving a ready and relevant “full spectrum” force.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

After the overwhelming success of the American-led coalition against Iraq in Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM, the likelihood that an enemy would challenge the United States in direct combat has decreased significantly. Max Boot, an historian of military operations other than war, claims that, “The United States is so far ahead of any rival in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological, or geopolitical that scholars describe the international scene as unipolar.”⁴ With the strength of the economy and the rapid advances in technology in American society, the gap between the U.S. military and its nearest competitor seems to be increasing. This gap makes direct combat less likely or at least provides the nation with significant warning of an emerging military competitor. However, technological and economic advantages do not guarantee peace nor do they ensure that the United States will not confront enemies that will find other means to attack the nation. Two obvious threats to national interests have emerged.

The first threat is the proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states or nonstate actors, such as terrorist organizations. According to the National Security Strategy, “. . . the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make

today's security environment more complex and dangerous."⁵ U.S. nuclear retaliation will not deter such actors because they claim no particular sovereignty and view their cause as a greater concern than the population they supposedly represent. These organizations increasingly have become more difficult to find and target.

The second threat, terrorist attacks against American and allied citizens, similar to September 11, 2001, provides an example of the use of unconventional means that overcomes an opponent's inability to meet the U.S. military on the battlefield. Boot reminds us, "It is likely that the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are only a taste of what America can expect in the future."⁶ Terrorism is an inexpensive but effective weapon to adversaries having minimal training and military capabilities.

Although much of the world disapproves of such methods, terrorist organizations will continue to use these means to attack the citizens of the United States and their economy that depends on stable markets and world trade. Section IV of the *U.S. National Security Strategy* stresses the importance of free markets and free trade to America's prosperity.⁷ Producing chaos and disrupting international stability hinders American prosperity and therefore provides a potential means to defeat the United States indirectly or at least force America to leave a particular region. To protect the country from these threats within the nation's borders, the current administration created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and expanded its intelligence agencies. What has the military done to meet such threats beyond America's borders?

TRANSFORMATION VERSUS THE EXPECTED THREAT

The military is attempting to transform to meet these threats and develop the forces required for future combat. According to *Joint Vision 2020*, the goal is "the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations—persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict."⁸ Therefore, to dominate across the full spectrum of conflict, the Army must always be trained, rapidly deployable, and capable of operating in all four phases of joint campaigns—deter (phase I), seize initiative (phase

II), decisive operations (phase III), and transition to civil control (phase IV). These phases exist whether the military operation involves combat or military operations other than war. The current transformation programs are designed to produce a modular and more rapidly deployable force. This will greatly improve the U.S. military's ability to tailor appropriate forces and deliver them into a theater faster. However, will military leaders produce a force trained to operate in both combat and noncombat situations?

MILITARY MISSION AND FORCE STRUCTURE MATCH

If the military is responsible for fighting the nation's wars, then its force structure should meet the requirements associated with all phases of operations. Phase IV operations require skill sets to handle stability and reconstruction operations. Both are different from the standard tasks of closing with the enemy and securing objectives by force, that are more realistic in Phases II and III. If the United States is unable to handle all phases concurrently, should America consider itself a global hegemony? Any future adversary would logically focus its efforts on defeating the United States in the phase that it has the least capabilities.

Comparing the Army force structure against tasks in all campaign phases, the Army has forces that excel during the first three phases, while it attempts to jerry-rig forces to meet Phase IV requirements. Special Operations Command forces and forward deployed forces provide the nation with strong capabilities to deter (phase I) potential enemies. By infiltrating into unstable regions and living with the people, Special Operations Command's soldiers provide intelligence needed prior to conflict. Training in language, regional traditions, and cultures assist Special Forces in carrying out this mission. In fact, special operations teams often stabilize hostile situations before combat occurs, and thus save the United States the expense of armed conflict.⁹ If conflict is unavoidable, the costs of training these operatives and their limited numbers make it impractical to use them in long, direct combat with the enemy. However, these specialists continue to assist in a supporting role as combat forces enter into the theater. Forward deployed combat

forces have a stabilizing influence on the world as demonstrated by the years of peace in Europe after World War II, on the Korean peninsula since 1953, and currently in Afghanistan.

As recent history has shown, the U.S. military handles Phase II and III operations quickly and decisively. Military forces now have the capability to deploy and defeat the enemy in a matter of weeks. This is a dramatic improvement over past wars that took several months just to prepare for combat. However, as Frederick Kagan points out, "The Rumsfeld vision of military transformation, therefore, is completely unbalanced. It will provide the U.S. with armed forces that do one thing only, even if they do it superbly well. They will be able to identify, track, and destroy enemy targets from thousands of miles away and at little or no risk to themselves."¹⁰

However, the Army currently has no designated force to transition (Phase IV) from combat into civilian control. It attempts to adapt itself into the peacekeeping role upon completion of combat operations, claiming that soldiers are adaptable and have the flexibility to switch mindsets. But soldiers typically have little experience or training for both types of missions. One academician argues that the United States has experienced trouble in the past by its ". . . failure to create the capability to address the immediate aftermath of serious conflicts [that] undermine our ability to convert military victory into lasting success."¹¹ To achieve lasting success, post-conflict operations take time. These operations are key to securing the victory. Military forces that remain in the area after the conflict has terminated visually represent to the indigenous population America's resolve and stabilize the new government. The military also provides security to nongovernmental agencies that are critical to reestablishing humanitarian services.¹² Therefore, is the transformation effort eliminating an American vulnerability or improving capabilities where it already has an overwhelming advantage?

A dilemma occurs when other commitments require the United States to pull its military forces from a region before true change has occurred. The administration continues to place additional tasks on the military, "Today America faces equivalent tasks—battling terrorists, narco-traffickers, and weapon proliferators, and

ensuring open access to not only the oceans, but also the skies and space."¹³ Even with multiple missions and the open-ended tasks of post-conflict operations, the military still seems to be reluctant to improve capabilities to conduct Phase IV operations. High-intensity warfare happens in a matter of days or weeks, while reconstruction and stability operations involve decades. This has made it difficult to stabilize one region and reconstitute military forces for future combat missions.

This phenomenon is neither new nor unique. The U.S. military found itself involved in Phase IV operations after the Mexican War in 1847, after the Civil War, in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, in Europe after the two World Wars, and in the numerous small scale contingencies since the end of the Cold War.¹⁴ Nor can the United States expect a decrease in post-conflict operations anytime soon. "Looking ahead, the possibilities for more U. S. intervention of some kind are well known: a chaotic post-Castro Cuba, a collapsing North Korea, and disintegration in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola. . . . Haiti remains a failed state."¹⁵ Because of the global American economy that depends on stability for future growth, most of these areas will require an American presence to stabilize the political situation.

OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Since the strategic environment predicts that the American military will continue to conduct stability and reconstruction operations after combat and support peace operations when national interests dictate, what options are available? The first option is to continue with the status quo. Generally, this would keep the focus on training combat skills with a short, roughly "90-day" training cycle for military operations other than war just prior to a deployable unit entering into theater. A second option would be to adjust the mission essential task lists for combat units to incorporate a balance of noncombat and combat tasks to prepare the unit to handle both types of missions. The third option would be to create a new force specifically tailored to handle all military operations other than war missions, while leaving the remaining forces to train and

execute combat.

Some may argue another option exists where the military would transfer these missions to the United Nations, contractors, or other government agencies. However, the United States cannot rely on any of these organizations, and therefore this is an infeasible option. The United Nations has shown its inability to develop consensus in policy and execution of peace operations, as in Mogadishu, or its unwillingness to operate in potential unstable environments, such as witnessed in Iraq. Outside sources or other government agencies do not possess security elements sufficient to protect their employees adequately. Therefore, the military appears to be the best means available to handle peace and Phase IV operations.¹⁶

FOCUS ON COMBAT WITH 90-DAY TRAINING CYCLES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Many believe the current approach most effectively utilizes the forces available. However, this concept relies largely on the ability of the American soldier to adapt to changing mission requirements. Although modern-day soldiers are adaptable, should young Americans confront dangerous situations where they have had limited prior training? If this is true, why train at all? Leaders owe soldiers the maximum amount of time possible to prepare for deployments and the training resources to rehearse effectively their expected missions.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Walsh conducted research in 1998 to determine the impact that military operations other than war had on combat readiness. His overall findings were that units preparing for such missions were training less for their combat mission.¹⁷ These findings were typical of all units requiring training on tasks not performed during normal training cycles. His results also discovered other weaknesses in the current approach.

This approach affects the noncommissioned officer. Are future Army noncommissioned officers going to be the experts of their military occupational specialty or the jack-of-all-trades? They cannot become experts if they are doing combat training one day and providing humanitarian support the next. Combat skills are

too perishable. When one adds the rapid changes in computer software and advancements in military equipment, every day away from training for combat makes noncommissioned officers less proficient in preparing their soldiers and their unit for combat. Often, units must leave their primary weapon systems at home and conduct operations in high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to carry out peace operations. Being away from their combat equipment hinders their ability to train for even basic preventive maintenance and conduct weapons qualification.

Much of the dilemma of conducting peace operations and training is the manpower required to execute military operations other than war tasks and the differences between these two missions. There is not sufficient time to complete all the peace operation tasks and train at the same time for combat. Warfighting deals with destruction and killing. Peace operations usually focus more on rebuilding, stability, and diplomacy. When combat forces deploy for combat, the opposite effect occurs as 100 percent of the time is spent on improving combat skills. Therefore, if the two missions are incompatible, why is the Army willing to degrade its combat force accomplishing noncombat tasks?

More detrimental to warfighting skills is that often the soldier does not realize the importance of the tasks he is required to perform. Walsh's survey concluded that the majority of leaders surveyed were "willing to neglect 20 percent of their METL [mission essential task list] tasks to train for military operations other than war tasks."¹⁸ The latter has become so commonplace that leaders feel these skills are more important than combat tasks. This view probably indicates that these soldiers felt they had a greater opportunity to deploy for noncombat rather than combat missions, and thus they should train accordingly. This mindset could lead to an unprepared Army for future wars.

Recovery time is also an issue. The survey concluded "at least 7.5 weeks to 13 weeks as the reconstitution time necessary to recover the training element of readiness."¹⁹ This is time a unit needs to be fully operational to conduct its primary combat mission after returning from a deployment. If the same combat unit conducts multiple noncombat missions, the reconstitution time would

most likely increase as a greater percentage of combat trained leaders would have departed the unit since solid combat training had occurred. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Cherry, in a strategic research paper published in 2000, determined that total time lost to a combat unit's warfighting training was closer to a year after its return from deployment away from home station. As a result, extended peace operations affected the combat proficiency of three units—the recovering unit, the deployed unit, and the unit preparing for deployment.²⁰

Finally, are the soldiers executing the jobs they were recruited for or even trained on during basic training? Soldiers enter the service expecting to defend their nation in combat. However, the nation is increasingly asking them to conduct peace operations. Lieutenant Colonel Colleen McGuire's strategic research paper in 2001 stresses the difference, "Soldiers admit that operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were not the life they expected when they joined the Army or graduated from their entrance training into the service. They expected to be ready for battle—not escorting children to school. Many were not trained to handle domestic disputes among foreign civilian populations."²¹

BALANCE MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LISTS TO COVER COMBAT AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR TASKS

Since rapid train-ups for peace operations are disruptive to combat readiness, others have suggested that the best solution is to balance unit METLs between combat and noncombat tasks. Colonel Lloyd Miles, in his 2002 strategic research paper, claimed that, historically, constabulary forces that spent the majority of their time conducting stability operations could not maintain their warfighting ability. They would prove ineffective if there was an increase in hostilities in the region.²² But does training for combat, then deploying for peace operations do any better in a unit's preparation for combat? Units deployed for military operations other than war prior to conducting combat training center rotations were noticeably weaker at combat tasks. "According to a former National Training Center

observer/controller and opposing force commander, observers at the training center are noticing an absence of fundamental skills and abilities at every level. Many believe the only solution is to increase the frequency of training."²³ Balancing unit METLs would reduce combat training, not increase it.

In McGuire's paper, a considerable number of former battalion commanders and staff officers believed that training for peace operations negatively impacted combat readiness.²⁴ Several of the Army's field manuals stress the importance of training to maintain the force capable of deploying to fight the nation's wars. Never can the Army afford not to train and maintain the highest levels of readiness. With a focus towards combat preparedness, would peace operation tasks ever receive sufficient priority in training these tasks sufficiently? Walsh raises the additional point that, "much of the Army doctrine and Joint doctrine indicates that [military] operations other than war are difficult and challenging and that they require skills beyond those developed in our normal training tasks."²⁵ With a different mindset—killing versus peaceful diplomacy—and the incompatibility of tasks between combat and peace operations, this option becomes less attractive, unless the unit's tasks were similar to begin with.²⁶ This is not the case with the majority of combat forces.

DEVELOP A NEW FORCE WITH PRIMARY MISSION TO HANDLE MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Numerous documents discuss the option of creating a separate military force tailored to handle peace and Phase IV operations. In 1998, Colonel Don Snider built a case on returning a constabulary force to the U.S. Army. He proposed that the Army "create a constabulary force using roughly 15,000 active duty structure spaces . . . [which] would have roughly the combat equivalent of three MP brigades."²⁷ This new force would perform most of the noncombat operations, allowing the majority of the Army to focus on the combat mission.

Cherry proposed the creation of a U.S.-based, corps-sized engagement force to handle small-scaled contingencies. This corps would support peace operations and allow the rest of the Army to focus on warfighting. It would become the nation's expert in civil-

military, multinational, and information operations. Along with small-scaled contingency deployments, it would provide a school to train soldiers on peace operations.²⁸ Two authors from the National Defense University recently published a joint planning document, "Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations," that recommended the creation of the Stability and Reconstruction Joint Command as a method to adjust today's military structure to better handle stability and reconstruction operations.²⁹

Opponents of the formation of such a command often state the concern that the Army has about increased end strength. However, is end strength the critical factor in the Army's reluctance to form the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command? Most of those in favor of this new command claim this structure could come from current forces, thus eliminating concerns about increased end strength. Certainly today's force restructuring to "units of action" aims at identifying spaces that the Army potentially can eliminate. But even if military leaders proposed an increase in active duty personnel, the present end strength is still 300,000 less than the Army had at the end of the Cold War. Increases of 30-50,000 would more than provide adequate force manning for this joint command and still maintain the Army at a strength less than the Cold War Army. One could certainly justify increased costs to the country, if this new force structure better served the nation's vital interests than what is available now.

The 1999 Congressional Budget paper, "Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of the U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations," concluded that peace operations affected combat readiness and proposed an increase of 20,000 soldiers to handle military operations other than war missions.³⁰ In late January 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld used emergency powers to authorize an increase of 30,000 soldiers to temporarily cover shortfalls created by stability and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries.³¹ Although this is only a temporary measure, legislators do not seem to be upset over this increase in Army end strength. Thus, the opportunity may exist to fund an increase in the military personnel in response to the new demands created by the war on terror.³²

Opponents have suggested that having two forces within the

Army is inefficient.³³ Listed above were several reasons why one force attempting to do both missions does not represent the most effective means of conducting peace operations while preparing for future combat. On the other hand, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command would still be a military force, and assigned soldiers would have to maintain the same standards as the rest of the Army, the only difference being its emphasis on training and conducting post-conflict and peace operations. Operations in Kosovo provided examples where soldiers specifically trained in peace operations deployed faster and performed considerably better than combat forces. Given the political sensitivity of such missions, America must have its best trained soldiers executing these missions.³⁴ If the Army expects infantrymen to maintain skills different from those of a supply clerk, why should it look on forces specifically designated to handle peace operations differently than combat units? In this high operating temp (OPTEMPO) environment the military is experiencing, the United States cannot afford, “. . . a mind-set characterized by one civilian Pentagon official as ‘We just do combat, and stability ops is a sideline’.”³⁵

SKILLS REQUIRED FOR STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

“Secure the Victory” is the motto of the Civil-Affairs branch of the U.S. Army, and this is exactly what peace operations accomplish for America.³⁶ Throughout history, soldiers have stabilized regions as countries transform their form of government.³⁷ No matter how technologically advanced the military becomes, transition requires a visible deterrent to reduce the violence as the new government develops.³⁸ In today’s rapid and decisive combat environment, this visible post-conflict presence may be even more important since a large portion of the adversary’s population may not have witnessed the defeat of their own conventional military forces or personally experienced the effects of war.³⁹

Public opinion also affects peace operations and therefore requires soldiers who understand the importance of maintaining positive public support. The globalization of the world economy, along with America’s views towards human rights, will continue to keep

the United States involved in regional conflicts.⁴⁰ The Army needs soldiers who possess the skills found in Joint Pub 3-07.3 and Army FM 3-07 to execute peace and phase IV operations effectively.⁴¹

Soldiers in stabilization and reconstruction units must have persistence. Nation-building takes time and enemies must understand America's resolve.⁴² Soldiers must be comfortable working with the population, even if this produces a greater risk of casualties.⁴³ Force protection measures typically restrict American soldiers from integrating with the local community. Combat forces tend to look at the population as dangerous and fear that locals support the enemy. This philosophy handicaps success in nation-building.⁴⁴

Another reason why combat forces cannot maintain the expertise required for peace operations is that not all such operations are the same. FM 100-23 lists three types of peacekeeping operations: "support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. In simple terms, support to diplomacy seeks to prevent conflict; peacekeeping attempts to maintain the peace; and peace enforcement attempts to establish peace."⁴⁵ Because of the unique requirements of each mission, it is unrealistic to believe that combat forces training for war would gain the experience to handle the complexities of these peace operations.

USING THE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND

If the military created the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command, this new command would receive the mission for all peace operations, including Phase IV operations in campaigns involving combat. This shift in responsibilities would allow combat forces to focus totally on training or executing combat. As Snider states, "The Army's mission for the foreseeable future is as clear as it is daunting: to be prepared simultaneously at both ends of the conflict spectrum—high-intensity power projection operations in regional theater war and constabulary operations of extended duration."⁴⁶ This new command would provide strategic leaders the ability to manage both "ends of the conflict spectrum" and never lose focus of providing the nation a well trained combat force.

Examples of Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command

responsibilities would include the majority of the military forward presence forces. For example, this unified command would include all units currently in Korea. These forces would not have the combat power of the 2nd Infantry Division. However, they would have the capability to rapidly receive and sustain combat forces onto the Korean Peninsula, should war start. The command's mission of deterrence and demonstrating America's resolve would continue to force adversaries to decide whether negotiating settlements peacefully were in their best interests instead of facing the combat capabilities of the United States. Should increased violence become the enemy's choice, then combat forces would rapidly enter into the theater, engage the enemy until successful mission completion, and depart the theater to refit for future combat. While in theater, this new command would support the joint task force commander by securing lines of supplies and communications, and continue to work with the local population in areas no longer requiring combat forces. When combat forces depart, this new headquarters would receive command of the units in the area to continue Phase IV and other peace operations. Stability and reconstruction units would remain in theater until either the United Nations assumes command of the rebuilding mission or stability returns to the point that the new government assumes responsibility for its own security efforts. Bradley Graham, a *Washington Post* correspondent, notes, "The idea is that the stabilization and reconstruction force would serve as a kind of bridge between the end of major combat operations and the point at which a civilian-led, nation-building effort is up and running. . . ."47

Using the current IRAQI FREEDOM scenario with this new command, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command would have become involved from the beginning of planning best to execute transition operations. The command would have deployed into theater as a supporting command to the Combined Forces Land Component Commander. Deployment phasing considerations would include sufficient Stabilization and Reconstruction Command structure to assume responsibility for occupied territory as coalition forces moved towards and secured Baghdad. Once all combat forces had completed their deployment into theater, remaining stabilization and reconstruction forces would finish their deployment. By May

2003, this new command would have received most of the security responsibilities of southern Iraq and Mosel areas, with a much smaller combat force required to focus on the counterinsurgency mission in the Sunni Triangle.⁴⁸ The military would have redeployed the majority of three combat divisions back to the United States and refit these divisions for future combat operations. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command would publish annual rotation schedules, with the majority of these follow on units mobilized from the reserve component.

As ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM required the U.S. military to extend the transition phase, it raises a question to the nation—How long can America afford to keep combat forces tied up in post-combat operations? While executing this mission, is America preparing these forces for its next adversary? Adjusting force structure to create a unified command with the direct responsibility of post-combat operations seems a more efficient means to prepare for both operations in the future.

IMPLEMENTING THE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND INTO CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE

How large should the new Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command force structure be? The Army should first decide the required size force and the type of units needed for expected future combat scenarios. If IRAQI FREEDOM were the standard, then a combat force of approximately four divisions reinforced with required artillery, logistics, and communications units attached should be the size of the force. The military can afford to maintain such a small combat force due to transformation efforts that continually improves its rapid deployment capabilities and its ability to execute modern warfare quickly and decisively. To plan for unexpected contingencies, possibly another similar corps using a mix of active and reserve component divisions should more than cover any remote situation where two wars occur near simultaneously. These forces train at the combat training centers and maintain their equipment in a high state of readiness because when called, they execute! The military would direct additional reserve units for combat missions if

world events presented an increased need for combat forces. Special Operations Command force structure would increase to provide each geographical component commander sufficient soldiers to keep a forward presence, collect vital intelligence towards potential adversaries, and support the training of friendly militaries in their area of operations.

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command would command all other forces. This headquarters should recommend the force structure required to meet its missions, but in general, this command would be the largest part of the Army. A key component to this new force structure is the development of the joint headquarters directing noncombat operations. Although the Army will provide the majority of personnel within this unified command, this headquarters must plan and coordinate with all services to best utilize limited resources.⁴⁹

Along with this new headquarters, Chapters 3-5 of “Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations” provides a detailed list of the required forces and how to create this stabilization and reconstruction capability.⁵⁰ This document recommends a force of two division-equivalents, with at least one being from the active component. This force would have the ability to grow larger by incorporating additional reserve component units if events required an expanding American military presence. This new command must have active duty forces capable of immediate deployment as well as a large reserve component to cover potential increases in mission requirements and to provide for the rotation of initial entry forces. These forces would be modular, reducing the need to deploy entire divisions if a smaller force is sufficient. The command should be able to forecast rotation schedules well in advance, aiding to predictability for many reservists.

Adjustments will have to be made to ensure the correct mix of civil affairs, military police, psychological operations, and other key post-conflict military operation skills are available in the active duty component. “Overwhelmingly, civil affairs soldiers are reservists. Their real-world job experience gives them an edge in performing Army tasks,” said Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Commanding General, Army Reserves. “Hands-on nation-builders,

they focus on infrastructure improvements: getting utilities up and running, working with contractors and overseeing the bureaucracy that distributes food, clothing, and water to civilians.”⁵¹ Active duty units must develop these skill sets to provide immediate support to the civilian population after combat has degraded existing infrastructure. This support aids in securing the victory as much as defeating enemy conventional forces. Homeland defense requirements would also be the responsibility of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command. Local National Guard units would handle the majority of these operations; however, the new command could reinforce them with active component units if the threat expands.

A transformation of this magnitude is not unprecedented. Frederick Kagan, reminds us, “In the mid-1970s the U.S. abandoned the draft and recruited an all-volunteer professional military.”⁵² The nation questioned this sociological transformation but executed it with great success. “The shift should echo President John F. Kennedy’s establishment of the Peace Corps at the height of the Cold War, with the ring of new responsibilities for the U.S. and our determination to fulfill them.”⁵³

DEVELOPING A STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION FORCE INSTITUTE

When not deployed, stability and reconstruction personnel should be gaining expertise in post-conflict operations through education. The U.S. military should create a Stability and Reconstruction Institute where experts would educate future leaders in the art of Phase IV and peace operations, and offer lessons learned to American allies. Students would master regional expertise, customs, and language skills, all key capabilities for military operations other than war. According to Colonel Miles, “At this school, lessons learned could be taught to a large number of trainees, and doctrine could be established. It is realistic to believe that the UN would also support such a university with skills obtained by other countries.”⁵⁴ The institute would consolidate expertise from the international community to develop viable solutions to improve noncombat

operations.

The institute could also support the development of Phase IV military operations plans. Over a period of time the institute would, “. . . create an institutional cadre of highly skilled and motivated experts, adequately trained and financed, whose careers will be devoted to operating in politically chaotic situations. The American people do not desire to remain in these countries any longer than required, but no one should underestimate the time necessary to establish a transition to stability.”⁵⁵ The institute would provide senior strategic leaders with more realistic time tables and critical event checklists to better plan exit strategies.

CONCLUSION

America is new to the role of global hegemony. However, being new to this role has not reduced the goals of the United States. According to the National Security Strategy, “. . . the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”⁵⁶ With such an aggressive foreign policy, the military can expect to become involved in numerous regional conflicts as our nation attempts to learn and administer the duties as the global policeman.

History indicates that whatever program America adopts to transform its armed forces, her enemies will react to level the playing field. Kagan states,

The search for an indefinite American “asymmetrical advantage,” requires not merely a revolution in military affairs: it also requires a fundamental revolution in human affairs of a sort never seen before. It requires that America continue to change her armed forces so rapidly and successfully that no other state can ever catch up—indeed, that no other state in the world would try.”⁵⁷

The current transformation program relies on maintaining an overwhelming advantage in a single area of conflict—direct combat. A more beneficial goal of transforming America’s national defense is to achieve full spectrum dominance by creating a force structure

capable of achieving superiority in war and peace. The concept of a Joint Stabilization and Reconstruction Command is a feasible option to solve America's reluctance to engage in the increasing number of military operations other than war missions without degrading combat proficiency. If the military ever wanted to change, the time to act has never been better.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Henry H. Shelton, "Joint Vision 2020, America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow," Washington, DC, June 2000, p. 6.

2. The use of the U.S. military for missions other than direct combat has led to the creation of many terms that are similar but not exactly alike. Listed below are several of the terms and their definition that are used in this chapter and the quoted references:

Constabulary Operations: Term used to describe post-conflict nation-building operations in Japan and Germany after World War II. Military forces were assigned the mission to provide security and law enforcement during the reconstruction process of these two nations.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW): "The use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war." *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publications 3-07*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 16, 1995, p. GL-3.

Noncombat Operations: Term with an identical meaning as MOOTW. Includes "all aspects of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace." *Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publications 3-0*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2001, p. I-3. The four goals of noncombat operations include deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support U.S. civil authorities. *Ibid.*, p. I-2.

Peace Operations: "Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace." *Ibid.*, p. GL-15.

Phase IV Operations: Final phase of a standard joint campaign. This phase "enables the Joint Forces Commander to focus on synchronizing and integrating joint force activities to bring operations to a successful conclusion, typically characterized by self-sustaining peace and establishment of the rule of law. Part of this phase may be to ensure the threat is not able to resurrect itself . . . and transfer control to civilian authorities." *Ibid.*, p. III-21. Often this phase is called the *Transition Phase*.

Post-Conflict Operations: Often called *Posthostilities Operations*. Includes all activities required to stabilize the region and transfer control to the national government after major combat has ended. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, Joint Publications 3-07.3*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 12, 1999, pp. 17-19.

Reconstruction Operations: A subset of tasks performed during post-conflict operations that focus on the rebuilding of a nation-state after the removal of that state's previous form of government. Reconstruction may include the political, economic, judicial, and military means of the country.

Smaller Scale Contingency: "A regionally centered crisis based on a less compelling national interest or threat than those involved in a Major Theater of War. Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare . . ." *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000, JFSC Publication 1*, Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff College, 2000, p. G-72.

Stabilization Operations: "The promotion and protection of US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis." The goal is to sustain regional and global stability. *Stability Operations and Support Operations, Field Manual 3-07*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 20, 2003, pp. 1-2.

3. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., "Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations," Washington, DC, November 12, 2003, pp. 1-122.

4. Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, New York, 2002, p. 349.

5. George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Washington, DC, September 2002, p. 13.

6. Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, p. 348.

7. The *National Security Strategy* makes it clear that,

A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty.

We will promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America's shores. . . . We will use our economic engagement with other countries to underscore the benefits of policies that generate higher productivity and sustained economic growth.

Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," p. 17.

8. Shelton, "Joint Vision 2020," p. 1. Also the military is looking to become more expeditionary. "No longer do U.S. war plans envision slow buildups and prolonged fighting. Instead, as the invasion of Iraq demonstrated, the Pentagon is counting on rapid preparation and swift victory, with fewer combat troops needed as a result of advances in technology and improved coordination among the military services." Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," *Washington Post*, November 24, 2003, p. 16.

9. The introduction of *U.S. Special Operations Command Pub 1* provides an excellent summary of the many missions special operations forces are prepared to execute. Specially supportive of military operations other than war, "SOF can assist a nation in creating the conditions for stable development—thereby reducing the risk of or precluding armed conflict. . . . SOF works closely with the host nation government, military forces, and population to assist them in solving their own problems. . . ." *USSOCOM Pub 1: Special Operations in Peace and War*, MacDill AFB, FL: HQ, U.S. Special Operations Command, January 25, 1996, pp. iv-v.

10. Frederick W. Kagan, "Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War," *New Criterion*, Vol. 22 No. 3, November 2003, p. 9.

11. Jeffery E. Garten, "Urgent: The U.S. Needs to Create a Colonial Service," *Foreign Policy*, September-October 2003, p. 63.

12. "Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chance for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. As a part of Peace Operations . . . the military may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflict." Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations," p. I-3.

13. Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, p. 349.

14. Colleen L. McGuire, "Constabulary Training for a Full-Spectrum Force," Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 9, 2001, pp. 4-5.

15. Garten, "Urgent: The U.S. Needs to Create a Colonial Service," p. 64.

16. "For combat units, the skills required for peace operations are oftentimes not those required for combat. Training and execution of such operations detract from combat training, and consequently from warfighting skills. Nevertheless, these operations constitute a critical, proactive component of national security activities, and the Army is best suited to conduct them." Louis Caldera and Dennis Reimer, "A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 2000," Washington, DC, February 1999, p. xv.

17. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Walsh, U.S. Army War College, conducted a survey of former tactical unit commanders from the 1997 and 1998 U.S. Army War College classes and found that "the trend indicates that units in the field are doing less preparation for their primary warfighting mission. . . . Also, less time

is being allocated to METL skills, while the special [M]OOTW ramp-up training is increasing dramatically." Michael J. Walsh, "Operations Other Than War and Its Impact on Combat Training Readiness," Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 20, 1998, p. 11.

The same study found most leaders felt preparation for MOOTW missions helped the unit but could not cover all the key tasks they would be required to execute. During the noncombat deployment, combat training was degraded further. The survey showed "more than 60% of the respondents stated that compared to home station the training opportunities while deployed were less to non-existent. Since METL related training is very perishable and must be maintained and sustained, . . . this information indicates a much greater training effort is required to achieve full METL capability." *Ibid.*, p. 12. More often, unit training primarily focused on individual skills like weapons qualification, common skills training, and physical fitness. Collective tasks were minimal at best. Degradation of skills was particularly noticeable above the platoon level of operations. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

20. "Predictably, while units train for and execute small-scale contingencies, warfighting skills atrophy and combat proficiency declines. More importantly, while units are caught in the cycle of preparing for, executing, and recovering from small-scale contingencies, they are essentially unavailable for major theater wars. This recent phenomenon threatens the Army's ability to successfully accomplish its primary mission—fighting and winning two near simultaneous major theater wars." Timothy D. Cherry, "Engagement Force: A Solution to our Readiness Dilemma," Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 20, 2000, p. 2.

Lieutenant Colonel Cherry also included a study conducted by the U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned on the effects of peace operations on combat unit readiness. Time requirements for peace operations go well beyond the actual deployment. Units tend to stop training on their warfighting mission when they are designated for peace operations. This is often from 2 to 6 months in advance and usually required up to 6 months upon return to home station to recover equipment, complete personnel changes, and begin to train back on the normal training cycle. Therefore a combat unit loses a majority of the year beyond the designated deployment period. Deployments affect three units, the deployed unit, the unit returning from deployment, and the unit training as a replacement unit. Also affected are stay-behind units who often must add fillers in personnel and equipment, reducing their combat capabilities. "The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness," Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned, February 1996, p. A7.

21. McGuire, "Constabulary Training for a Full-Spectrum Force," p. 3.

22. Colonel Lloyd Miles agrees that currently U.S. military forces are not trained to effectively handle peace operations. However, establishing constabulary forces

(units specifically assigned the mission to provide security and law enforcement during the reconstruction process) is not the solution to the problem. He proposes that current military forces add more peace operations tasks to unit mission essential task lists, and redistribute active component and reserve component force structure because the U.S. Army does not have the end strength to man two specialized organizations. He also claims that constabulary forces cannot maintain their warfighting ability, thus creating a situation where they could not handle a rapid increase in hostilities in an unstable region. Lloyd Miles, "Back to the Future: Constabulary Forces Revisited," Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 3, 2002, pp. 14-16.

23. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Cherry discusses in his strategic research paper how the standard training cycle for combat units has declined since the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Units that trained for combat are now disrupted by expanding peacekeeping operations, and the long deployments away from training areas such as the combat training centers are reducing the expertise soldiers and units have in fighting as members of a combined arms team. Cherry, "Engagement Force: A Solution to our Readiness Dilemma," pp. 4-5.

24. McGuire, "Constabulary Training for a Full-Spectrum Force," p. 11.

25. Walsh, "Operations Other Than War and Its Impact on Combat Training Readiness," p. 2.

26. Lieutenant Colonel Cherry provides details on the difficulties experienced with the warrior mindset conducting peace operations. He does a great job listing the differences in warfighting tasks versus tasks covered in smaller-scaled contingencies. Cherry, "Engagement Force: A Solution to our Readiness Dilemma," pp. 7-8.

27. Don M. Snider, "Let the Debate Begin: The Case for a Constabulary Force," *Army Magazine*, June 1998, p. 14.

28. Cherry, "Engagement Force: A Solution to our Readiness Dilemma," p. 11.

29. Their overall conclusions recommended "creating two joint military headquarters to organize units critical to the stabilization and reconstruction mission and source them with two division-equivalents of joint assets to execute these missions. . . . The first division-equivalent should be mostly active personnel; the second division-equivalent can include a large component of reserve personnel. . . . Each division would . . . be flexible, modular, scalable, and rapidly deployable with four brigade sized S&R Groups that include military police, civil affairs, engineers, medical, and PSYOPS supported by a tactical combat capability. . . . These forces would be America's experts in coordinating with multiagency civilian response teams, international organizations, and UN Peacekeeping Forces. Binnendijk, "Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations," pp. 121-122.

30. "Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of the U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations," Washington, DC: U.S. Congress Congressional Budget Office, December 1999, p. 9.

31. Pauline Jelinek. "Surprise: Rumsfeld Authorizes 30,000 more Soldiers." *The Sentinel*, Carlisle, PA, January 30, 2004, p. A4.

32. Many legislators believed ". . . on the ruins of the U.S.S.R., American defense officials and civilian experts were already talking of the 'strategic pause' and the 'peace dividend' that were supposed to follow that epochal event. Defense budgets dwindled and efficiency became the watchword in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill." Kagan, "Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War," p. 7. The military's transformation effort was based on "efforts to reduce the defense budget in the 1990s in order to expand the 'peace dividend.'" . . . The goal was to make the Pentagon more efficient and to use the funds recouped by the efficiency to support transformation." *Ibid.* Adding to force structure does not reduce costs, and therefore the military had a reluctance to ask for additional troops to handle peace operations.

33. Such a proposal comes in the face of traditional U.S. Army opposition to the idea of establishing forces focused on peacekeeping. Army officials have argued that combat troops can be used for peacekeeping when necessary and that traditional units with recovery-related skills can be cobbled onto combat divisions to meet postwar demands. . . . In the past, Army authorities have argued that they do not have enough troops to maintain separate combat and peacekeeping forces. They also have worried that units focused on postwar policing would be viewed as stepchildren of the main Army, leading to morale and performance problems. Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," p. 16.

34. Lieutenant Colonel McGuire provides an example of how a military police battalion was able to deploy to Kosovo effectively with 12 days of notice. Their training was similar to the situation they faced in Kosovo. Therefore, soldier's morale remained high as they were performing the mission they were trained for. On the other hand, an infantry battalion deploying to the same region was extremely ill prepared and performed poorly in Kosovo. Soldiers were demoralized, confused about their mission, and potentially damaged the political environment they were sent to improve. McGuire, "Constabulary Training for a Full-Spectrum Force," pp. 7-8.

35. Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," p. 16.

36. "Without their work, a battlefield triumph may amount to little. Hence the civil affairs motto: 'Secure the Victory'." Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, p. 333. No administration would send service members into combat if they knew the same force would have to return to fight again in the future. Post-conflict operations ensure that the political goals achieved by combat remain in place, and new methods of government and law enforcement have the opportunity to develop.

37. "In fact, occupation duty is generally necessary after a big war in order to impose the victor's will on the vanquished. . . . Only boots on the ground can guarantee a lasting peace." Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, p. 338. Boot also

reminds us, by historical example, that claiming victory and departing the area prior to effective change taking place only means you will be required to face the problem again. "Successful state building starts by imposing the rule of law . . . as a precondition for economic development and the eventual emergence of democracy. Merely holding an election and leaving is likely to achieve little, as the U.S. discovered in Haiti after 1994." *Ibid.*, p. 346.

38. Kagan makes a good point why the ground soldier must be present before a nation can successfully end the conflict. "If the enemy knows that all he will face is a barrage of precision-guided munitions, he will find countermeasures—digging too deeply for the weapons to penetrate, jamming or blinding U.S. reconnaissance assets, etc. . . . This type of warfare was ineffective in the German strategic bombing of Great Britain in World War I and II and the strategic bombing campaigns of North Vietnam." Kagan, "Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War," pp. 15-16. Ground forces restore the peace over a country that has seen its government and military overthrown. "Even in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, ground forces or the threat of their use played the decisive role in bringing the enemy to surrender." *Ibid.*, p. 16. This has worked in the past and little seems to have changed in human conditioning to think this phenomenon will change anytime soon. ". . . Only ground forces can execute the peacemaking, peacekeeping, and reconstruction activities that have been essential to success in most of the wars America has fought in the past 100 years." *Ibid.*

39. "But today's rapid decisive operations use relatively small forces in quick campaigns, as shown in this year's march to Baghdad. Yet the very haste of that battlefield victory has led to uncertainty as U.S. troops struggle to restore stability in the vacuum left by the toppling of Dictator Saddam Hussein." Vince Crawley, "DoD Advised to Form Two Multiservice Postwar Units," *Army Times*, December 15, 2003, p. 10.

40. Many Americans feel we have an obligation as the world's most prosperous nation to aid others in need. "The American public . . . understands that the United States can and must share with allies the burden of policing selected conflicts in regions of mutual interests." Snider, "Let the Debate Begin: The Case for a Constabulary Force," p. 15. It is this public moral position that plays into many of the decisions to get involved in conflicts like Somalia, Kosovo, and Haiti. "It is usually the moral component—in this case, Iraqi atrocities against Kuwaitis—that convinces Americans to take up arms." Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, p. 340.

41. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations," and U.S. Department of the Army, "Stability Operations and Support Operations." There are other manuals that provide information on these topics; however, these two specifically focus on the differences in peace operations (peacekeeping vs. peace enforcement), stability requirements (such as dealing with insurgencies, handling displaced civilians, terrorism, and establishing humanitarian operations), and reconstruction (reestablishing law, creating judicial means to support law enforcement, military-civil affairs, coordinating with international actors, establishing legitimacy to new local governments, and transfer of power to that government).

“Winning the Peace Act,” a bill developed by the 2003 House of Representatives provides key skill sets that the nation’s strategic leaders believe are important to stability and reconstruction operations. “Any person involved in reconstruction efforts of such a state must have extensive cross-cultural training and the ability to communicate effectively in the language of that state. . . . Reconstruction Services include security and public safety, establishing justice systems, establishing governance and participation, and economic and social well-being.” U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Bill, “Winning the Peace Act of 2003,” 108th Congress, 1st Session, May 16, 2003, pp. 3-4.

42. Boot stresses the importance of American resolve if the nation ever expects to influence change in small-scale contingencies. “Short-term occupations . . . are unlikely to fundamentally alter the nature of a society.” Boot, p. 345. He claims if the country’s support is strong enough to get involved in the conflict, then support should remain, even if casualties occur. This resolve tends to make Americans less of a target. “If foreign enemies know that killing a few Americans will drive the U.S. out of their country, they are far more likely to target American soldiers or civilians.” *Ibid.*, p. 328.

43. Peace operations deal with getting the population to establish trust in the military presence. Max Boot provides a great example where U.S. forces missed the point.

In the aftermath of the bombing campaign, a multinational peacekeeping force was sent to occupy Kosovo, including a U.S. contingent . . . [the] U.S. Army risk-adverse mentality impeded attempts to establish a durable peace. American troopers seldom ventured outside their fortified compound, Camp Bondsteel, while wearing their forbidding “battle rattle”—body armor, Kevlar helmets, the works. This impeded their ability to interact with local civilians, gather intelligence, and spread goodwill—prerequisites for a successful occupation. British soldiers, by contrast, looked more confident and approachable in their berets and rolled-up sleeves.

Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, p. 327. Boot raises another point when considering risk and casualty avoidance. “No one expects a big city police department to win the ‘war on crime.’ The police are considered successful if they reduce disorder, keep the criminal element at bay, and allow decent people a chance to live their lives in peace. In the process a few cops are likely to die, and, while this is a tragedy to be mourned, no one suggests that as a result the police should go home and leave gangsters to run the streets.” *Ibid.*, p. 346. It is therefore imperative that police forces are formed, trained, and supervised to control local crime. However, until this force is created, crime reduction and citizen security is a critical mission of the stability and reconstruction force.

44. William S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare,” January 15, 2004, states:

One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people. Unfortunately, the American doctrine of “force protection” works against integration and generally hurts us badly. Here’s a quote from the minutes of the seminar: “There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and the population protects you.” The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives. What “wins” at the tactical and physical levels may lose at the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where Fourth Generation Warfare is decided. Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than it has inflicted. This is something the Second Generation American military has great trouble grasping, because it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates.

Available from <http://www.antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702>.

45. *Peace Operations. Field Manual 100-23*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, December 30, 1994, p. 2.

46. Snider, “Let the Debate Begin: The Case for a Constabulary Force,” p. 15.

47. Graham, “Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces,” p. 16.

48. “More than 75 percent of the violent incidents and sabotage have taken place in only four of the 18 provinces,” General John Abizaid said. “His plan is to disengage our forces from stabilized areas and turn security in those areas over to U.S.-trained Iraqi forces.” Vince Crawley, “U.S. Troops Go on Offensive in Troubled Iraqi Provinces,” *Army Times*, October 6, 2003, p. 20.

49. This “... new force would have its own headquarters to help ensure postwar operations are not overlooked in prewar planning.” Graham, “Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces,” p. 16. Just as stability and reconstruction force structure covers the current inefficient post-conflict operations, so will the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command headquarters, ensuring all plans have adequate details during phase IV of the operation.

50. Binnendijk, “Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” pp. 39-84. Binnendijk and Johnson propose the transformation of the military to create units with the specific focus on stability and reconstruction missions. These forces would have two joint commands with one primarily in the active component directing current stabilization and reconstruction operations, while a second (primarily reserve component) organizing and coordinating future and follow-on stability and reconstruction operations. The military could deploy such forces to provide a forward presence and allow the enemy the opportunity to negotiate a settlement prior to United States sending combat units into the

region. Along with being a visible deterrent, units assigned to this new command would establish logistics bases that may provide combat forces an early advantage should they be forced to deploy into the theater. Their proposal used historical and Rand Corporation studies to determine the number of peace operations the United States could expect in the future and therefore design a force capable of executing all these missions without requesting support from combat forces. Their research determined the two active duty divisions force (roughly 18,000 soldiers each) was the best sized force to handle expected contingencies with little or no increase to end strength. “. . . a brigade-sized force is a bare minimum but will be too small if tomorrow’s world is as turbulent as today’s. A corps-sized force is close to ideal, but may be more than the traffic would bear. A two division-equivalent force would provide a solid range of capabilities and a relatively high level of insurance, including a capacity for medium S&R missions in two major theaters of war.” *Ibid.*, p. 51.

51. Jane McHugh, “Reserve Chief: Civil Affairs Not Suited for Regular Army,” *Army Times*, October 20, 2003, p. 31.

52. Kagan, “Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War,” p. 5.

53. Garten, “Urgent: The U.S. Needs to Create a Colonial Service,” p. 65. Once the decision is made to implement, the Army should aggressively determine the required changes and execute. Along with the mentioned Kennedy’s initiative, Garten adds, “The magnitude of the change in national direction should be equivalent to when President Harry S. Truman launched . . . large-scale foreign aid and technical assistance programs to Greece and Turkey in the face of new communist threats.” *Ibid.*, p. 65.

54. Miles, “Back to the Future: Constabulary Forces Revisited,” p. 3. The goal would be to improve coalition peace operations, and this institute would be a meeting ground for international expertise to discuss issues. Students would be primarily Americans. However, allies would attend, as they do most U.S. universities. Rumsfeld said, “I think it would be a good thing if our country was to provide some leadership for training of other countries’ citizens who would like to participate in peacekeeping.” Graham, “Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces,” p. 16.

55. Garten, “Urgent: The U.S. Needs to Create a Colonial Service,” p. 65.

56. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Introduction.

57. Kagan, “Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War,” p. 12.

CHAPTER 10

NATION BUILDING: A BAD IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME?

Lieutenant Colonel Burt K. Thompson

Our military requires more than good treatment. It needs the rallying point of a defining mission and that mission is to deter wars—and win wars when deterrence fails. Sending our military on vague, aimless and endless deployments is the swift solvent of morale. We will not be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not our strength or our calling.¹

Governor George W. Bush,
September 1999

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board Task Force addressing the transition to and from hostilities . . . Our military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursions in the global war on terrorism.²

It appears that the United States has once again come full circle in regards to the use of military force in support of national objectives, in this case specifically nation-building. During the last presidential campaign, then Governor George W. Bush's line was "an explicit condemnation of Clinton/Gore foreign policy—specifically that the White House had stretched the military too thin with peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans."³ Bush argued that President William Clinton had failed to understand that the primary mission of the military was deterrence, combat, and winning the nation's wars. The "'Let me tell you what else I'm worried about' line proved to be among the most popular in his stump speech, guaranteed to evoke an eruption of applause from the conservatives who packed Bush's campaign rallies."⁴

But, it seems now that the Bush administration has come face-to-face with the challenges presented by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Thus it has adopted a more realistic set of objectives. The 2002 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) describes this new world where America is threatened less by conquering states

than by failing ones, and where conflict is more likely to occur within countries than between them.⁵ The strategy recognizes that threats can suddenly emerge as state weakness, rather than strength, spreads conflict and chaos. It argues that an environment of failed states, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and political chaos may have outgrown Cold War institutions and policies designed to deter, fight, and win against a different set of dangers.⁶

For over 50 years, the U.S. military has focused on fighting major wars and the ability to mass the required land, sea, and air power to engage a global adversary. But times have changed and as the NSS states, “it is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength.”⁷ Ironically, while preparing for a conventional war, the United States has routinely engaged its forces in smaller-scale operations. The military combated terrorism, fought insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, conducted non-combatant evacuations from war zones, strengthened friendly governments, provided humanitarian assistance, and executed countless peacekeeping operations. But as retired Marine General Anthony Zinni argues, “still trying to fight our kind of war—be it World War II or DESERT STORM—we ignore the real warfighting requirements of today. My generation has not been well-prepared for this future, because we resisted the idea.”⁸ President Bush has acknowledged the recent trends as well and points out that “operations other than war” have moved from the sidelines to center court and in the process have raised legitimate questions about the structure and roles of America’s armed forces.

A recent memorandum from Acting Under Secretary of Defense Michael W. Wynne further illustrates that operations other than war have truly left the sidelines. He has directed that a Defense Science Board Task Force be formed to look at the issue of transitions to and from hostilities. The memorandum states that U.S. armed forces are capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military victory. However, “we Americans will encounter significant challenges following conventional military success as we seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights, and a productive economy.”⁹

The purpose of this chapter is to address issues associated with an NSS that have increased the likelihood that the United States will

involve its military in post-conflict operations, to include nation-building. The chapter will examine current policies regarding stability operations, provide a brief survey of America's historical experiences in nation-building and their relevance today, and examine issues specifically associated with the use of conventional forces in nation-building. Finally, it will examine options and make recommendations that could enhance the potential for success in such operations in the future.

WE DON'T DO OCCUPATIONS? LESSONS FROM THE PAST

Every time they do a post-war occupation, they do it like it's the first time, and they also do it like it's the last time they'll ever have to do it. We can't change the mistakes we made of Iraq, but we can try to avoid them in the future.¹⁰

Although nation-building is not new to the Army, it has always been a controversial mission for the American military, especially over the past 3 decades. "The United States military has engaged in these non-traditional operations throughout its history, far more often than it has waged conventional warfare."¹¹ The Army has directly supervised the creation of new governments in many beaten states, while performing countless nonviolent and nonmilitary tasks and missions. What is remarkable are the similarities between nation-building efforts in these contingencies. Two of the most familiar success stories are Germany and Japan at the end of World War II. There are, however, other cases that get less attention, such as the Mexican War, reconstruction at the close of the Civil War, the Spanish American War, and World War I. Recent interventions that included governance responsibilities in the post-conflict phase took place during the Cold War as well. They include the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, as well as Somalia in 1993, Haiti in 1994, and the Balkans in 1995. More recent examples that deserve considerable scrutiny include operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, in over 13 instances since the 1800s, soldiers, under the theater commander's operational control, have supervised and implemented political and economic reconstitution.¹²

A short historical review of the relevant operations illustrates the scale and frequency of post-conflict and occupation operations

as well as the level of exposure and experience the U.S. military has had in such operations. One can easily distinguish recurring themes and lessons—temporary government, population control in general, suppression of residual resistance, resettlement of displaced noncombatants, rejuvenation of supply and distribution systems, infrastructure repair and institutional reform.¹³

The Spanish American War illustrates several themes that resonate today. The Army conducted the Spanish American War with little preparation for post-conflict operations. In performing administration duties, the Army learned the limitations of its operational doctrine and the requirement for political compromise. In post-hostility operations the military had to deal with the full range of modern politico-military problems: political intelligence, control of guerrilla forces, military government, the arming of indigenous forces, and their terms of political settlement.¹⁴

Although the Spanish American War consisted of rather quick and decisive combat operations, the post-conflict operations were long and complex. This early act of nation-building has many similarities to the conditions that U.S. military forces are facing in Iraq today. To illustrate the point, the following description of the events in Cuba following the Spanish American War could be used to illustrate post-conflict operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) today.

The close of the war with Spain did not settle the Cuba problem. As a result of years of rule and fighting, conditions in the island were in a deplorable state when the fighting ended . . . [T]he United States was committed to turning Cuba over to its people. But to have withdrawn before economic and political stability was established would have been both folly and evasion of responsibility. A provisional government supported by an army of occupation therefore was set up. It began at once the many tasks involved in the tremendous job of rehabilitation and reform: feeding and clothing the starving; care of the sick; cleaning up the accumulated filth of centuries in the cities; restoring agricultural and commercial activity; disbanding the Cuban Army and paying its veterans; organizing municipal governments, local guards, and courts; building roads and other public works; establishing schools; and in general, preparing the people for self-government.¹⁵

Additional lessons that are relevant today include transition operations occurring simultaneously with combat operations, command decisions required of military leaders, the necessity to have U.S. soldiers fulfilling civil affairs responsibilities, the requirement to establish effective relationships with a multitude of ethnic groups, and the necessity for a balanced approach between force and restraint in dealing with the populations.¹⁶

The constabulary operations in Germany at the end of World War II provides an excellent example of the Army's ability, in a relatively short period of time, to establish and train a force with specialized skills that can execute post-conflict operations. Planning began early to determine the best way to accomplish the occupation duties in both Europe and Japan. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who understood the importance of the occupation, approved the establishment of a Military District Constabulary in the two Military Districts in Germany.¹⁷ The Army established a School of Military Government to assist in the preparation of officers and enlisted men to ensure that American soldiers were not falling into operations where they were forced to learn on the fly.¹⁸

One can draw many parallels in comparing the experiences of the U.S. military through World War II with what is occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq today. Both involved similar noncombat tasks that required highly trained and disciplined forces, extensive interaction with local officials and civilians, decentralized operations, different leader and staff skill sets, relationships with governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations, and restraint through the minimum use of force. It would be beneficial to reexamine the constabulary operations in postwar Germany and Japan for applicability in today's post-conflict operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Postwar success in both Germany and Japan obviously owed much to the highly developed economies of both nations. However, nation-building is not principally about economic reconstruction. It must have a significant aim of political transformation as well, which only serves to confirm the U.S. inability to install viable democracies in Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan.¹⁹

Although one could write volumes about operations in Panama,

Somalia, Haiti, and in the Balkans, this chapter presents only a few observations. One of the most apparent observations is that each subsequent operation by the United States has been larger in scope and more ambitious than its predecessor. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq confirm the trend. Themes common to these operations include tactically oriented planners and commanders unprepared for the chaos of Phase IV operations; the campaign plans lacked details on Phase IV operations, and the plan was distributed after hostilities began; difficulties in balancing humanitarian/peacekeeping roles; difficulties of transitions; mission expansion into nation-building; importance of long-term commitment; a “top-down” approach to the reconstruction; and the absolute necessity for interagency planning.²⁰

In Iraq the United States “has taken on a task with a scope comparable to the transformational attempts still under way in Bosnia and Kosovo and a scale comparable only to the United States occupations of Germany and Japan.”²¹ A statement made by a former member of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) illustrates the challenge U.S. forces face in Iraq, “The Messiah could not have organized a sufficient relief, reconstruction, or humanitarian effort in that short a time.”²²

Most observers agree that planning for the reconstruction phase in OIF was not as advanced as the planning undertaken by Central Command for the first three phases of the war. Although one could attribute this to Carl von Clausewitz’s fog or friction, it more likely represents a lack of acceptance or realization of the importance of the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq as an integral part of the war or use of faulty assumptions in the planning phase.²³

THEMES/LESSONS

If there is any lesson to be learned from our “post-conflict” involvement in Iraq to date, it is that we have failed to adequately learn the lessons from previous such experiences.²⁴

The American experience with post-conflict and occupation operations is so extensive that one can easily distinguish recurring themes. Listed in this section are some of the common themes and

the salient lessons of the past. Obviously the list is not inclusive, but it emphasizes many of the issues discussed above. A review of after action reports from each operation suggests that these should not be new lessons. The themes and lessons break down into the following categories:

- Planning:
 - Limitations of phased planning and a plan predominantly focused on combat operations.
 - Faulty planning assumptions.
 - Planners avoiding the “Phase IV dilemma”.
 - Inadequate planning for Phase IV operations.
 - Failure to clearly identify who is responsible for winning the peace.
 - Underestimating post-conflict security requirements.
- Preparation:
 - Failure to institutionalize knowledge gained in stability operations.
 - Failure to integrate salient lessons into our doctrine, our training, and our future planning for future operations.²⁵
 - Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities resulting in agencies being inhibited and not making the proper investments needed to do these tasks better.
 - Failure to regard soldiers with experience in the field of post-conflict operations as national assets, to be retained, rewarded for service, trained further, and placed in positions to utilize their skills.²⁶
 - Understanding historical/cultural contexts.
- Execution:
 - “Mission creep”—expansion of the mission into nation-building.
 - Active Component/Reserve Component mismatches.
 - Combat Support/Combat Service Support shortages.
 - Difficulty with transition to civilian agencies.
 - Infrastructure repair and institutional reform.
 - Force protection during transition.
 - Reestablishing the rule of law.
 - Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure.

These lessons and many others from recent post-conflict reconstruction operations highlight the consistent mistakes that can and must be avoided. A clear lesson is the importance of pre-conflict planning, preparation, communication, and coordination. Anticipating and preparing for the countless tasks required in countries emerging from conflict is onerous, but must be undertaken *before* the fighting starts if post-conflict reconstruction efforts are to be effective once the hostilities cease. Simply “noting” lessons is not enough; we must “learn” from these lessons. The United States and the international community must commit the resources, military might, manpower, and time required in Iraq. The United States faces a “Phase IV dilemma” in Iraq; it cannot stay forever, it cannot leave, and it cannot afford to fail! What makes success in these types of operations even more critical is that America’s international credibility is on the line.²⁷

SUPERPOWERS DON’T DO WINDOWS

It’s the most difficult leadership experience I have ever had. Nothing quite prepares you for this.²⁸

General Eric K. Shinseki

Since the attacks on September 11, many Republicans have come to view stability operations as even more relevant to American national security. In fact, based on the number of soldiers engaged in peacekeeping, it has become the fastest-growing mission for the U.S. military. “We could take or leave peacekeeping operations in the 1990s as witnesses by our hasty departure from both Haiti and Somalia. The sense was that although pulling out might be regrettable in terms of local conditions it was justifiable because the two countries were not seen as a security threat to the United States.”²⁹ It has become obvious now that failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan are potential havens for terrorists, and even though the United States has significant forces engaged in peacekeeping operations, there may be more in the future.

General Eric Shinseki’s observations about his preparation for a peacekeeping operation is a common one. Peacekeeping

operations in general, and post-conflict operations in particular, are controversial missions, and the Army has done little to prepare for them. To make matters worse, the institutional resistance in both the State and Defense Departments has been significant as neither department considers nation-building among its core missions. There is significant cultural resistance in the military to any tasks that are not combat related. As the Stability Force (SFOR) commander, Shinseki felt that he confronted a “cultural bias” in the military and specifically in the Army. Army doctrine-based training prepared him for warfighting and leadership, but “there was not a clear doctrine for post conflict stability operations.”³⁰ This absence of a doctrine for an institution that is doctrine-based presents a challenge when you walk into in peacekeeping environment. You are in a kind of “roll-your-own situation.” This is a revealing statement from a senior army general. The most remarkable fact, however, is that he is not alone in his opinion; other senior officers who served in Bosnia made similar assessments.³¹

Although the Army’s performance in Bosnia is generally considered an overwhelming success, many senior officers believe that they were not prepared for the experiences they encountered in Bosnia. Were they trained? The answer is yes, but the training predominately encompassed the art of warfighting and high-intensity conflict. But after the initial deployment in Bosnia and after the prospects of conventional warfare had faded, it became increasingly obvious that the skills acquired by individual soldiers up to general officers were not adequate for the challenges confronted in Bosnia.³²

The most significant shortfall in a training strategy that predominately focuses on preparation for major combat operations with little regard for post hostility operations is in the area of readiness. Arguably, the capability of U.S. armed forces to support and accomplish America’s national security requirements is the ultimate measure of readiness.³³

TRAINING READINESS: JUST ENOUGH AND JUST IN TIME

It is undeniable that training is an essential prerequisite for effective military operations. The same is true for post-conflict stability operations. The U.S. military can no longer afford to train

for war and adapt for peace. The military must stay prepared to fight and win the nations wars, and retain the “capacity” to execute peace operations when called upon to do so.³⁴ It would not be a stretch to say that the Army’s actions in preparing for and executing peacekeeping operations adhere to the following model: “Train for war adapt for peace, with just enough and just in time!”

In reality, like combat operations,

. . . the U.S. has learned that the key elements of successful stability operations are well trained and disciplined soldiers under the command of skilled and competent leaders. Although American soldiers are highly trained and possess combat skills that are easily transferable to the needs of post-conflict operations they still require the time to adapt to the nature of the operation, its rules of engagement and its terms of reference.³⁵

Another factor that impacts on training readiness is the duration of the stability operation. Lengthy involvement in peacekeeping operations degrades combat skills and has a significant impact on combat readiness. As a result, the trend is that combat troops are used for peacekeeping only when necessary and those additional units, with post-conflict related skills, are “cobbled” onto combat divisions as required to meet postwar demands.³⁶ However, in most cases, armed forces ill-prepared for the job at hand quickly adapted, figured out what they had to do, and did it with great success.³⁷ Although it is admirable that U.S. troops and leaders are agile and can “figure it out,” they should be put in that position only by exception.

Morale problems stemming from prolonged deployments, equipment that wears out too quickly, and decreased combat training levels, increase when troops execute noncombat operations. Further exacerbating the military’s declining readiness is the tendency to pull troops with high demand special skills from nondeployed units. A mission may affect nondeployed units as well because they will not be able to train properly due to critical skill shortages.³⁸ The concept of training readiness is well-understood in the U.S. Army, but as Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, readiness for what happens after the fighting stops is just as important.³⁹

If military training for post hostilities is just enough and just in time, is Army doctrine any better? The Army is a doctrine-driven

institution, but the one area of doctrine it lacks is in post-conflict operations. In Bosnia, Army doctrine was largely inadequate in an environment where American commanders had to wrestle with the political, diplomatic, and military demands of stability operations. Almost from the inception of Implementation Force operations, commanders found themselves in uncharted waters. Major General William Nash described the problem as an “inner ear problem.” Having trained for 30 years to read a battlefield, the general officers were now asked to read a “peacefield.”⁴⁰ The requirement to train and develop senior leaders to read the “peacefield” and participation in stability operations has largely escaped consideration.

The Army must place greater emphasis on the education of its officer corps. Education must begin at the officer basic course and continue at all levels of the Professional Military Education system. Officers at all grades will benefit from a focus on post-conflict stability operations. Today’s officers are likely to be involved in other than war operations on multiple occasions throughout their service. Geopolitical and cultural training should also represent a significant educational effort, and all officers should maintain proficiency in a foreign language throughout their careers.

General officers interviewed in a 1999 study conducted by the U.S. Institute of Peace singled out senior service colleges as the place where leadership training for stability operations should occur and where the most curriculum development is needed. These institutions must place greater emphasis on operations other than war, geopolitical issues, and cultural awareness.⁴¹

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) must embrace the entire training effort for stability operations, and the Army must incorporate these skills in its training base for captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. A doctrinal set of principles for the conduct of post-conflict operations deserves attention. Along with the doctrine, the training must crystallize the fundamentals of this new skill set.

Clearly, there is a need to strike a balance. The United States cannot afford to win the war but lose the peace. To win both the war and the peace will require that the Army must review its institutional training base and build on this foundation without significantly

reducing conventional training, while at the same time integrating new training aimed at supporting 21st century peace operations.⁴²

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

We have to stop making nation-building a political football and recognize that it's a national competency we need to foster that we're not going to be able to avoid these kinds of activities.⁴³

So, how does the Army handle this political football called nation-building? According to Max Boot, the Army must *deal* with the task of "imperial" policing. He states that, though it is not a popular duty, it is vital to safeguarding U.S. interests in the long run, as are the more conventional warfighting skills. "The Army brass should realize that battlefield victories in places like Afghanistan and Iraq can easily be squandered if they do not do enough to win the peace."⁴⁴

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Joseph J. Collins provides another perspective. Collins states that there is a "strong notion that the military exists to deter, fight, and win wars, that's it, and any other use of the military is some kind of borderline abuse." He points out that war and recovery are inseparable and occur almost simultaneously. "People in the military have to realize that this is part of the strategic environment. And you do not get to pick your strategic environment. You don't always have the choice to play the game the way you would like to play it. You have to adapt to the situation."⁴⁵

The United States has yet to discover a workable stabilization strategy for use against large populations that avoids significant troop commitments. Several countries have proposed personnel policies that seek to avoid the painful arithmetic of large deployments. They conduct extended tours of duty using deployed forces built around short-service conscripts or volunteers. This may be a viable option, but so far most Western countries have chosen to rely on their professional armies, and the United States is no different.⁴⁶ Although there are many possible force structure options to deal with post-hostilities operations, this chapter will look at three alternatives that warrant consideration. The three options are the steady state option, the specialized peacekeeping force, and the adaptable multi-purpose unit options.

If It's Not Broke, Don't Fix It.

The steady state option is straightforward and varies little from the Army's current mode of operation in dealing with post-conflict and peacekeeping operations. In essence, the Army would continue to be a "switch hitter." Many in the Army feel that what the Army is doing now is working, that there is no need for change and that soldiers must continue to train for the high end of the spectrum. Generally those in favor of the status quo realize that operations other than war with their associated challenges will require significant pre-deployment training.

The military has demonstrated that it can adapt to operations other than war while ramping up for deployment. However, the challenges experienced during the deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq have rendered the "just enough training, just in time" option obsolete. There is not ample time prior to deployment to train soldiers and leaders in the skills sets required for nation-building operations. So, if the status quo is not acceptable what are the options available? The remainder of this section will focus on the two options that are getting the most attention by the Department of Defense (DoD): specialized peacekeeping forces and multi-purpose units.

Specialized Peacekeeping Units.

During speaking engagements in 2003-04 at the U.S. Army War College, three senior level general officers responded to the following question: Is it time for the Army to establish specialized peacekeeping units or commands to respond to post hostility challenges? They all felt strongly that this was not a good idea for the following reasons: The Army would lose deterrence value; there would not be enough specialized forces; and those forces that existed would be overworked. All stated that the Army must improve in both its effectiveness and efficiency, but they were not proponents of specialized peacekeeping forces.⁴⁷

Interestingly, in a *Washington Post* article titled "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," Bradley Graham argued that the Pentagon is looking at creating dedicated military

forces that could be dispatched to trouble spots around the globe to conduct peacekeeping and reconstruction after conflicts. "The idea is to forge deployable brigades or a whole division out of engineers, military police, civil affairs officers, and other specialists critical to postwar operations."⁴⁸ The new stabilization and reconstruction force would bridge the gap between the end of decisive combat and the point at which a civilian-led, nation-building effort is up and running.

The force would be distinct from a proposed NATO rapid-response force and apart from the United Nations (UN). The standing constabulary force would consist of troops from a range of countries—but led and trained by the United States.⁴⁹ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that "it would be good for the United States to provide leadership to train other countries who desire to participate in peacekeeping. The result would be a cadre of people who are trained, equipped, organized and ready to work with each other."⁵⁰

Defense officials note that Secretary Rumsfeld's proposal is consistent with the aim of limiting U.S. military overseas deployments. Though it would specialize a small number of American troops in peacekeeping, it would also seek to enlist other countries to contribute the majority of troops, with the promise of training by the United States. Creating a standing international peacekeeping force led and trained by the United States would also allow the Pentagon to exert considerably more control over peacekeeping than in the past. This proposal has attracted significant opposition from senior Army leaders.

Another proponent of permanent constabulary forces is retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the head of the DoD Transformation effort. He argues that the United States needs a permanent post-conflict stabilization force, but it must be on an equal footing with combat units. Although many of the elements that would make up a post-conflict force such as engineers and military police are already found within the military, their mere existence does not necessarily constitute a post-conflict capability without proper organization and command and control.⁵¹

During a conference in December 2003, the Fletcher Center for Technology and National Security Policy looked at the issues

associated with Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations and addressed the idea of standing peacekeeping forces. The attendees made the following proposals:⁵²

- Create two standing Joint Stabilization and Reconstruction Commands, one active component and one reserve component division equivalents.
- Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command plans, trains, exercises, develops doctrine and deploys to areas of responsibility (AOR).
- Maximize jointness with Army lead.
- The forces should be:
 - Capable of operating in hostile environments.
 - Capable of operating under a Joint Command or as a separate Joint Task Force.
 - Modular, scalable, tailorable for mission, embedded interagency.
- Provide link to nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and contractors to hand off to civilian leadership for nation-building.

Although the option of using specialized forces explicitly for post-conflict operations is attractive, it is not the most optimal solution. As Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, troops that are proficient in their warfighting skills are essential in both the decisive operations and stabilization stage. As we are discovering in Iraq, without security peace will not follow and progress will not be made. Based on current trends, it is unlikely that a specialized peacekeeping force could meet the future demands of post-conflict operations. There simply would not be enough of the specialized forces to go around, once again resulting in cobbling forces together at the last minute. Another option is the adoption of multipurpose units.

Multipurpose Units.

Considering the future realities the Army will certainly face, multipurpose units make sense. Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Schoomaker's unit of action initiatives are more relevant to a multipurpose versus a specialized approach to stability operations.

The multipurpose units would maintain agility by mixing and matching subordinate forces according to the needs of the mission resulting in a modular plug and play, multicapable outfit. The multipurpose units appear to be a valid option for the force the Chief of Staff of the Army envisions. This multipurpose unit option allows more emphasis on focused training at all levels, including the leadership. The concept requires that a set of key nation-building tasks be identified, guidance provided to units, and these essential tasks be added to unit Mission Essential Task Lists (METL).

Adding noncombat focused tasks to unit METL challenges the conventional wisdom, and many feel that it will shift the primary focus of training away from warfighting. Combined with the multipurpose unit approach, the ability to plug and play and identify the essential post-conflict tasks would ensure that the U.S. Army would be postured to meet National Security Strategy (NSS) demands to provide ready and trained units to execute missions across the full-spectrum of conflict. Dr. Conrad Crane provides an excellent list of recommendations that may assist the Army in better preparing itself to operate in “a future of continuous and cumulative SSCs [small scale contingencies].”⁵³

- Create truly multicapable units structured, trained, and committed to both winning in Major Theaters of War and handling the stability portion of contingencies.
- Increase the ability of units at all levels to train for, plan, and execute stabilization phase tasks.
- Ensure adequate focus on the planning and execution of stabilization phase tasks at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.
- Conduct a complete review of the Army’s overall combat support/combat service support force structure and based on the review realign force structure between active and reserve components.⁵⁴

Although the list is certainly not all inclusive, the failure to address any of the issues will have significant implications for the Army. Regardless of the force structure strategy, the Army selects the essential task to improve and sustain the combat proficiency of our Army and its capability to execute critical stability tasks. “One

thing is certain, the post-conflict mission is too important and too hard to rely on cobbling forces together enroute to the objective."⁵⁵

CONCLUSION

Our primary mission is not to fight and win the nation's wars, though that's our most important mission. We exist to serve the nation, however, the nation wants us to serve wherever and whenever we are needed.⁵⁶

General Kevin P. Burns

General Byrnes sums it up best. Ultimately the armed forces will do what the nation wants and will serve whenever and wherever they are needed. However, the objective "is not to ignore post-conflict challenges—shrinking from intervention, ousting regimes without consideration for their replacement, or performing only half-hearted reconstruction planning."⁵⁷

The challenges of preparing the armed forces to fight in major regional conflicts and other military operations will require flexible and adaptive doctrine and a force structure that can meet the dangers of a post-9/11 world. The basic tenets of our military policy and force structure focus should remain conventional land warfare. The United States clearly needs the capabilities that come with well-trained and equipped land forces. As long as it is the policy of this nation to respond to the types of operations the Army is currently engaged in, it should build forces of sufficient size and with the capability to operate across the full spectrum.⁵⁸

The multipurpose force approach will provide the flexible, adaptive doctrine and force structure required in the increasingly complex post-conflict environment. As this chapter illustrates, the specialized force approach to post-conflict and nation-building operations is not the most optimal solution. It is unlikely that a specialized force could meet the future demands of stability operations. However, multipurpose forces that are trained, equipped, with leaders who are committed to both winning in Major Theaters of War and handling the stabilization phase of small scale contingencies will ensure progress towards U.S. security goals.

Recently the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness told a group of defense correspondents that, in order to prevent future wars, the U.S. military is in the nation-building business to stay, and it seems unlikely that the Army will not continue to play a significant role in the future.⁵⁹ Like the Cold War, the global war on terror and its increased requirement for post-conflict intervention is likely to preoccupy the United States for decades, and we must be prepared.

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CHAPTER 11

SEABASING AND SHIP-TO-OBJECTIVE MANEUVER AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

Lieutenant Colonel Stuart L. Dickey

The developing concept of “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver” within the U.S. Marine Corps relates to parent concepts—“Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare,” “Operational Maneuver From the Sea,” and “Sea Based Logistics.” Specifically, recent studies focus on determining the operational reach capabilities of U.S. Marine expeditionary units and expeditionary brigades in the 2015 timeframe. This represents the projected date for the fielding of multiple systems, vessels/vehicles, and equipment necessary for implementation of these concepts. The objective then is to: Analyze the operational reach of ship-to-objective maneuver as determined by recent studies; determine what the Marine Corps aims at achieving with this capability; determine what the naval services need to do for ship-to-objective maneuver to become an operational reality; and, determine what this capability offers national leadership and joint force commanders.

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps published a White Paper in the early 1990s entitled “Forward . . . From the Sea.” It signaled a significant shift for the U.S. Navy away from traditional blue water operations to addressing growing threats in the littorals. It also signaled a closer doctrinal relationship to the U.S. Marine Corps, which has always focused on the littorals. The foundation of the Marine Corps has been its expeditionary capabilities, coupled with an institutionalized expeditionary mindset, culture, and structure. Its relationship with, and dependence on, the Navy makes “Forward . . . From the Sea” even more significant in its focus on closer cooperation between the two services to maximize capabilities and develop new approaches to meet current and future threats.

In 1997, the U.S. Marine Corps developed the concept of operational maneuver from the sea. This applied the tenets of

maneuver warfare to sea space. This concept views the sea as maneuver space, not an obstacle. Naval amphibious forces have use of the sea for positional advantage, thus preventing the enemy from dictating the location of attack. The concept aims at creating dilemmas that force the enemy to defend the length of his coast or littoral area and at the same time provide American naval forces the option to strike at the time and place of their choosing.¹ The principles of operational maneuver from the sea are:

- A focus on operational objectives.
- The use of the sea as maneuver space.
- The generation of overwhelming tempo and momentum.
- The pitting of strengths against weaknesses.
- The emphasis of intelligence, deception, and flexibility.
- The integration of all organic, joint, and combined assets.²

The Marine Corps developed the concept of expeditionary maneuver warfare subsequent to operational maneuver from the sea. It represents the Corps' overarching warfighting doctrine encompassing the tenets of operational maneuver from the sea, while refining and expanding them. The Marine Corps considers expeditionary maneuver warfare its capstone concept that supports its direction for the 21st century. It sees expeditionary maneuver warfare as the union of its core competencies, maneuver warfare philosophy, expeditionary heritage, and the concepts by which it will organize, deploy, and employ forces.³ Imbedded within these concepts are the concepts of seabasing, ship-to-objective maneuver, and sustained operations ashore.

Seabasing represents the enabling concept of expeditionary maneuver warfare and operational maneuver from the sea and, specifically, ship-to-objective maneuver. It is integral to "Sea Power 21," the Navy's vision for the 21st century.⁴ Its fundamental basis is the creation of vessels, systems, and capabilities that allow for prolonged sustainment of forces ashore from floating logistics bases at sea. Such an approach eliminates the need for an operational pause, while logistic support is delivered to shore. This logistics sea base would have its location over the horizon. Seabasing is more than just logistics, however. It is the projection platform from which forces are

launched, commanded, sustained, reconstituted, and transported. It cannot be a single ship or capability. Rather, it must be a system of systems built on capabilities in the maritime prepositioning forces, future, navy amphibious ships, and other capabilities. The tenets of seabasing are:

- Primacy of the sea base: over the horizon positioning, reduced or eliminated footprint ashore.
- Reduced demand: sea based support, technology improvements, lighter forces ashore.
- In-stride sustainment: network-based, automated logistics for maneuver units.
- Adaptive response and joint operations: expanded missions, joint support.
- Force closure and reconstitution at sea: building and restoring combat power.⁵

The most significant capabilities that seabasing enables are assured access and rapid force projection. Seabasing is dependent on neither host nation support nor benign deep-water ports. As the chief enabler of expeditionary maneuver warfare and ship-to-objective maneuver, it also addresses the problems raised by antiaccess defenses by allowing maneuver forces to avoid them. If such defenses prove robust, then seabasing supports forcible-entry, antiaccess operations as well as joint follow-on forces.⁶

Maritime prepositioning force, future, is to seabasing what seabasing is to expeditionary maneuver warfare and ship-to-objective maneuver. It represents the fundamental capability that makes them work. Of all the capabilities under development to support “Marine Strategy 21,” “Sea Power 21,” and the “Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations,” it is the closest to being truly transformational. Its ships will have the capability for at-sea arrival and assembly of units, direct support of the assault echelon of the amphibious task force, now known as the expeditionary strike group, long-term sea-based sustainment for the landing force, and at-sea reconstitution and redeployment of the force. A number of new technologies are under development to support seabasing: selective on-load and off-load, internal ships systems (i.e., automated warehousing,

item/pallet/container operations, roll-on/roll-off systems, and flow patterns), external ship systems (i.e., ramps, lighterage, and other craft interfaces), modular system/sub-system concepts, and aircraft interface technology.⁷ The ability for a Marine expeditionary brigade to be operational from the sea base within 7 to 10 days from initial deployment could alter significantly the initial conditions of a conflict.⁸ This is the operational objective of ship-to-objective maneuver as enabled by seabasing.

Ship-to-objective maneuver is the tactical extension of operational maneuver from the sea. It projects forces ashore in fighting formation without the need for a beach lodgment. It treats the sea as maneuver space and uses it as a protective barrier as well as a high-speed avenue of approach. It places forces ashore and inland at multiple points, thus creating a dilemma for the enemy and expanding the tactical and operational options for the joint forces or Marine air ground task force commander. Its forces will move via surface and air lift to objectives inland. Maneuver units take only minimum essential logistics support and rely on resupply from the sea base. The joint force can expand the logistical footprint ashore as the mission requires, particularly if sustained operations ashore occur. The intent aims at providing “the joint force commander with forces optimized for forward presence, engagement, crisis response, and warfighting that will achieve his operational objectives.”⁹

APPLICATION¹⁰

The Marine Corps currently has the capability to conduct limited ship-to-objective maneuver operations. Task Force 58’s performance during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is the most recent example. Analysis conducted by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command entitled “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations” addresses future ship-to-objective maneuver operational capabilities.¹¹ The basis for this study derives from the “Defense Planning Guidance.” Planning and execution of the scenario within established parameters achieved the following results:

- Forces operated from a sea base located 25 nautical miles over the horizon.

- This sea base consisted of six amphibious ships and six ships in the maritime prepositioning force, future; six high speed vessels; organic heavy surface lift; and 28 aircraft operating spots.¹²
- The two smaller marine air/ground task forces organized into a surface lift task force and a vertical lift task force. Each consisted of two reinforced infantry battalions. The surface force was mechanized. The vertical lift task force consisted of light infantry with light armored vehicles.
- Day 1 put 4,861 personnel and 558 vehicles ashore. Day 2 put the reserve battalion ashore, for a total of 6,753 personnel and 886 vehicles at surface task force and vertical task force objectives.
- The vertical assault executed in four waves and carried personnel, equipment, supplies, and the combat service support detachment. During one period of darkness (7 hours and 45 minutes), 195 sorties of MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and 76 sorties of CH-53E heavy lift helicopters delivered 2,153 marines, 25 light armored vehicles, 170 vehicles, and supporting equipment to an objective located 85 miles inland (a total of 110 nautical miles from the sea base). Fifty-three sorties of AH-1/UH-1 attack and utility helicopters and 32 joint strike fighter sorties supported this effort by providing escort support, command and control, close air support, and naval surface fire support direction.
- The surface lift task force conducted forcible entry operations during the hours of darkness in a mined environment using four lanes per battalion. The surface assault consisted of three cycles and a total of 76 expeditionary fighting vehicles, 30 landing craft air cushion, and 18 landing craft utility (replacement) sorties. It landed the following personnel and equipment at its objective during one period of darkness:
 - 2,708 Marines
 - 76 expeditionary fighting vehicles¹³
 - 50 light armored vehicles
 - 22 M1A1 tanks

- 2 assault breacher vehicles¹⁴
 - 8 expeditionary fire support systems¹⁵
 - 6 lightweight 155mm howitzers
 - 180 HMMWVs
 - 26 medium tactical vehicle replacements.
- The Marine expeditionary brigade closed a force of over 13,000 Marines within a 7-day period, using multidimensional strategic lift assets that included:¹⁶
 - Self-deploying aircraft: 30 joint strike fighter (short take-off, vertical landing version), 48 MV-22s, 5 EA-6Bs or its future replacement, 12 KC-130s, and 314 personnel.
 - Commercial airlift: 22 747s transporting a total of 9,094 personnel.
 - Strategic lift: 48 C-17s carrying 20 CH-53s, 9 UH-1s, 18 AH-1s, aviation ground support equipment, critical low-density/high-demand cargo and 182 personnel. This force completed at-sea arrival and assembly with the sea base using MV-22s and high-speed vessels.¹⁷

A second study, entitled “Mission Area Analysis, Operational Reach-2015,” has analyzed the ability of a Marine expeditionary force-sized Marine air/ground task force to project combat power ashore. While the study incorporated surface lift capabilities, its primary focus was vertical lift capabilities and limitations in a ship-to-objective maneuver scenario, using MV-22 and CH-53E platforms with accompanying escort aircraft. The purpose of the landing was to ensure a rapid, orderly, and tactical build up of combat power ashore. These characteristics become critical when assessing the effectiveness of the plan as ranges extended. The study analyzed distances from 25 to 200 nautical miles to answer the questions “how much, how far, and how fast.”¹⁸ This study’s primary focus is vertical assault capabilities. It also confirms, however, that sufficient current and projected surface lift capabilities exist to conduct ship-to-objective maneuver related surface assaults.¹⁹

This scenario used 78 MV-22s and 28 CH-53Es for the vertical assault portion of the base landing plan.²⁰ A total of 732 sorties

would land the entire force at a vertical assault objective located 95 miles from the sea base (397 sorties for the assault forces, 205 sorties for the combat trains, and 130 sorties for the combat service support detachment). This put 3,823 marines and sailors, plus 479 vehicles or pieces of equipment, ashore in a 2-day period. This included 4,000 gallons of fuel and the artillery battalion's basic load of ammunition, plus 1 day of allowance.²¹

These two studies confirm that the Marine Corps will be capable of projecting large mechanized forces ashore via surface lift platforms from sea bases located approximately 25 nautical miles over the horizon. It is the ability to project and sustain forces over the horizon from a sea base that differentiates current capabilities from future ones. These studies also calculate that the operational range of regimental-sized vertical assault forces culminates at 110 nautical miles from the sea base. Since it is the vertical assault that comprises true ship-to-objective maneuver capabilities, the following study analyzed the capabilities of a smaller force by looking at extended range operations for the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU (SOC)].²²

The results of this study, entitled "MEU (SOC) Extended Range Operations," suggest that a reinforced infantry company-sized force package has an operational range of 200 nautical miles from the sea base, 90 more nautical miles than the regimental-sized forces in the previous two studies. The risk factors identified in this study focus on conditions that could prevent its successful operation: weather conditions, availability of aircraft, availability of appropriate type ships, deck management issues such as sufficient deck spots and rotations, and embarkation issues. This study concluded that, while such missions are possible, they have an almost zero percent margin of error, particularly in terms of aircraft operational readiness. This type of mission depends on two KC-130J aerial refueling platforms, a distinguishing factor between it and other studies. According to the maintenance and readiness parameters used for this study, vertical assault aircraft meet mission requirements 80 percent of the time, while fixed-wing aircraft meet requirements 50 percent of the time.²³

This last study focused on Marine expeditionary brigade seabasing and thus is entitled "Seabasing Concept of Operations."

It rests on the classified version of “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations,” but extended the campaign to 22 days and stressed logistics to determine overall requirements.²⁴ It represents the fourth in a series of sea-based operations in-process reviews and builds on the conclusions of the previous three. It supports the findings and conclusions of ship-to-objective maneuver concept of operations, while identifying additional areas that require further refinement. This study organized its findings in three main areas: movement conclusions, sustainment conclusions, and overall “take-aways.”

The movement conclusions validated that initial assaults are feasible within periods of darkness. Vertical assaults took 7.4 hours to complete and surface assaults took 6.6 hours to complete. Embarkation management and configuration is critical to the assault and directly related to deck spot utilization. Additionally, the synergistic effect of the combined capabilities of the expeditionary strike group and the maritime prepositioning group significantly enhanced rapid buildup ashore.²⁵ Both vertical and surface assaults were challenging, but supportable.²⁶

Sustainment conclusions indicate that forces ashore can be sufficiently resupplied by air. Intermodal packaging—one of the critical capabilities provided by the future ship designs in the maritime prepositioning force, future—is essential. It would allow for improved packaging, greater quantities, and better visibility of all items, particularly the smaller items that tend to get lost in the mass of supplies that are critical for embarkation and logistics, i.e., slings, nets, drums, etc. This future capability would improve seaborne warehousing, retrieval, and loading capabilities significantly, and is one of the critical elements of sea based logistics. It directly relates to embarkation efficiency and deckspace management.²⁷

The most significant findings in this section concern fuel consumption and identified that problem as the biggest logistical challenge of ship-to-objective maneuver. It applies to both the platforms used to project forces ashore and the forces themselves. Due to substantial vertical and surface lift requirements, lift platforms use more fuel than forces ashore.²⁸

Thus, the major insights from this Marine expeditionary brigade seabasing analysis are:

- Ship-to-objective maneuver concept of operations is basically sound, but it is a work in progress that requires continuous updating.
- One-hundred-ten mile ship-to-objective maneuver is supportable.
- Embarkation is the key to the assault.
- Intermodal packaging and slings are critical enablers that require accurate warehousing visibility.
- Synergism between expeditionary strike groups and the maritime prepositioning group represents a critical requirement.

ANALYSIS

The Marine Corps' stated objective is for the "sea base to develop to the point where it is able to support fully a Marine expeditionary brigade with an air-delivered and sustained battalion-size maneuver unit out to 200 nautical miles from the sea base with some elements to 240 nautical miles. Small tailored units could be supported at ranges greater than 240 nautical miles to the full range of naval supporting fires, air and missile defense, within limits of logistics reach."²⁹ The distances depend on the projected operational ranges of the MV-22 Osprey and the expeditionary fighting vehicle.³⁰ The results of the studies, however, fall somewhat short of these ranges, but nonetheless demonstrate a considerable capability for a joint force commander.

Essentially, ship-to-objective maneuver is a precision strike capability on a large scale. In line with the Department of Defense's focus on long-range precision attack operations, it is heavily dependent on improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities across all three spectrums of warfare—tactical, operational, and strategic. While the Marine Corps controls most aspects of its own tactical and operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements, it has no control of the military and intergovernmental agencies that provide the highest levels of strategic intelligence. The planning assumption that these agencies will not only be able to provide the high resolution of intelligence required, but will also be fully dedicated and focused

on providing that intelligence “real time” to naval forces involved in ship-to-objective maneuver operations is tenuous. This potentially could debilitate the ability to make sound planning assumptions; in other words, not to assume away enemy capabilities or create friendly ones that do not exist. It remains to be seen how this affects the ultimate operability of ship-to-objective maneuver.³¹

High-volume naval surface fire support also is essential in ship-to-objective maneuver. It may be even more critical than in conventional amphibious operations because some trade-off in ground-based fire support may be necessary for vertical assault forces and their need for operational level fire support. The logistical footprint and sustainment requirements of ground-based fires also present a challenge.³² The Marine Corps’ development of the lightweight 155mm howitzer and the expeditionary fire support system represent attempts to address this problem. The Navy is developing the advanced gun system for its next generation destroyer, the DD(X), to support ship-to-objective maneuver forces at the ranges and distances required.³³

Fundamental changes in logistics support and organization may be among the most significant issues related to ship-to-objective maneuver. The Marine Corps is approaching this problem from two directions. One approach involves increased efficiency and effectiveness through internal restructuring. The other rests on the actual reduction of requirements ashore. The development of integrated logistics consolidates maintenance and logistics functions at higher echelons to reduce combat requirements. Future combat service support aims at shifting many logistics functions and responsibilities from the units to the Marine air/ground task force combat service support element, minus aircraft maintenance. This would allow unit logistics officers to focus on requests and coordination with the combat service support element instead of focusing on internal logistics support. Conceptually, this potentially reduces the logistics section of an infantry battalion from 50 to 10 marines.³⁴ Such a reduction in personnel ashore would result from reduction in demand resulting from future technologies that allow for more efficient vehicles, and increased visibility of logistic and maintenance requirements. The hope is to reduce the Marine expeditionary brigade sea-based flow-in-echelon table of equipment

by more than 50 percent. If sustained operations ashore require more support, then it is phased gradually into theater and ashore.

Opponents of the integrated logistics concept argue that ground combat is about effectiveness, not efficiency. They contend that combat demands redundancy at all levels—personnel, equipment, supplies, and maintenance capabilities. This is a greater concern for the motorized and mechanized units that have larger logistical and maintenance requirements. And while this concept may be appropriate, even necessary, for a vertical assault task force, it eventually may result in problems for surface assault task forces comprised of heavier units (expeditionary fighting vehicles, tanks, trucks, artillery, light armored vehicles). How the Marine Corps resolves and incorporates these issues into future ship-to-objective maneuver operations will be critical to their sustainability and overall success.

Naval countermine capabilities are essential for littoral operations. Amphibious forces must be able to clear lanes through the shallow water zones (10 to 40 feet depth), as well as the surf zone/craft landing zone (0 to 10 feet depth). Such capabilities must allow for in-stride breaching without disrupting the momentum of the surface assault. The goal is to create four transit lanes per battalion and eight littoral penetration points per regiment.³⁵ The joint force commander and the Navy have responsibility for the sea area from the sea base to the beach exits. The Marine Corps has it from the beach to the objective. This concept requires all landing craft air cushion, expeditionary fighting vehicles, and landing craft utility (replacement) to have a common tactical picture that electronically displays cleared lanes through the breached areas, backed-up by visual markings. “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations” states that “negotiating a marine minefield in a GPS [global positioning system]-denied environment at night in Sea State III could be challenging.”³⁶ This may be the greatest understatement ever written in a military publication.

It further states that the Marine expeditionary brigade must have the capability of conducting reconnaissance on 32 potential littoral penetration points, even though as few as eight may eventually be used.³⁷ Littoral penetration points can be 500 meters apart. Littoral

penetration sites are notionally five kilometers wide and separated by approximately three kilometers. This equates to over four-and-a-half miles of shoreline. This is a daunting requirement even with the combined assets of navy seal and marine force reconnaissance teams.

Operation DESERT STORM exposed U.S. countermine capabilities as lacking, and these capabilities have not improved sufficiently since then. “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations” suggests that “technological advances will *likely* [emphasis added] support remote clandestine detection, classification, identification, marking, and monitoring of mines and obstacles at sea and ashore.”³⁸ A recent U.S. Government Accounting Office (USGAO) report states that current forces “are not effectively capable of breaching and clearing mines in very shallow water near the shore.”³⁹ The Navy’s mine warfare section, N752, identifies the area between the surf zone and the craft landing zone as being the most deficient—not necessarily the very shallow water zone as the USGAO report suggests. This happens to be the area where responsibilities for countermine operations shift from the Navy to the Marine Corps, tactically referred to as a seam. It is also the area that allows for less expensive mines to have greater antiaccess potential. The impact of this has not gone unnoticed by either the Marine Corps or the Navy. Part of the problem relates to money and resource priorities, while the other relates to science and technology. This is a critical vulnerability for surface assault forces in ship-to-objective maneuver operations. Finding an affordable solution that the Marine Corps agrees with, and the Navy supports, is critical.

Strategic airlift, military and civilian, remains essential in expeditionary maneuver warfare and ship-to-objective maneuver operations to transport personnel and equipment to advance bases. Even with multiple means of force projection, including self-deploying aircraft, high speed vessels, and Navy amphibious shipping, the scenario in “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations” requires 22 747s and 49 C-17s to rapidly transport required personnel to the advance base. There, they get on high-speed “connectors” for transport to the sea base. This is not an exorbitant amount of aircraft if U.S. Transportation Command is not supporting

multiple concurrent strategic lift missions. It might become a fight for resources, however, during a large-scale time-phased force deployment contingency. And, as the Army is reorganizing into a more modular expeditionary force, it puts even more emphasis on strategic lift requirements to get forces into theater. This situation may not be different from current joint requirements, but it is worth exploring from a joint perspective.

The one glaringly obvious fact about ship-to-objective maneuver operations is their absolute reliance on significant amounts of vertical lift assets and capabilities, much more so than either current ground or amphibious operations require. Ship-to-objective maneuver, as envisioned, depends on the capabilities of the MV-22 and the CH-53E (service life extension program) and the ability to conduct continuous large-scale air assault operations, exponentially larger than anything the Marine Corps is currently capable of performing. The studies analyzed in this chapter provide specific and accurate data on lift requirements for initial assaults and subsequent resupply flights, but do not consider sustained operations ashore in a high casualty environment. Even though surface lift will transport many casualties, considering the myriad combat scenarios possible, it is realistic to expect that the majority of casualties will require vertical lift to get from the objective to casualty collection points to await surface lift to the sea base. The worst-case scenario would entail concurrent assault insertions with multiple casualty missions and stretch already thinly stretched lift assets even further.

Increased reliance on all Marine air platforms makes the Marine Corps air component even more integral to the Marine air/ground task force concept. The Marine Corps defends its aviation arm on a regular basis against both military and political critics who see it as a redundant asset. Critics argue that it runs contradictory to joint concepts and intent for the Marine Corps to have its own airspace and, specifically, fixed-wing aircraft. The Marine Corps has been successful so far, but as jointness continues to permeate the services and the U.S. Congress, it may become a more tenuous position. Ship-to-objective maneuver adds strength to the argument for the Marine Corps. But in order to carry the necessary weight to win the argument, ship-to-objective maneuver must prove itself not only successful, but also vital to joint operations.

Surface lighterage is another lift asset critical to ship-to-objective maneuver. Current capabilities will not meet future requirements. Even with the purchase of more high speed vessels, the service life extension of the landing craft air cushion, and the introduction of the landing craft utility (replacement), more and better types of lighterage must be purchased or produced in order to meet the full range of requirements, especially logistical. These vessels require the capability to marry-up to maritime prepositioning force, future, ships and conduct in-stride replenishment in sea state III conditions. Ship-to-objective maneuver is as dependent on these types of surface lift assets as it is on vertical lift assets. And as increased reliance on air makes the Marine air wing more integral to the Marine Corps and its Marine air/ground task force concept, increased reliance on navy surface lift has the same effect on the Navy-Marine Corps relationship. In fact, it is one of the few areas in the military that begins to achieve the joint objective of *dependence* rather than *interoperability*.

At the moment, however, there is a disconnect between the two services. While lighterage to support ship-to-objective maneuver operations is a priority for the Marine Corps, the Navy has several acquisition project priorities, and surface lift is not at the top of that list. The Navy must put more emphasis in this area if it is to see the realization of "Sea Strike" as laid out in its "Naval Transformation Roadmap."⁴⁰

Over-the-horizon and long range communication is essential for ship-to-objective maneuver operations. This is a recognized critical capability and is proving to be one of the most challenging. It requires aerial retransmission platforms with wide and narrow band satellite communication capability. MV-22s equipped with the joint tactical radio system can communicate via narrow band ultra high frequency satellite communications. Both vertical and surface assault forces require wide area and local area network capabilities in order to receive the current operational and tactical pictures. The intent is for situational awareness at all levels to be achieved through battlefield visualization made possible by the current operational and tactical pictures. The increased command and control and intelligence requirements of ship-to-objective maneuver

make it essential that these are always available. Database backups and redundant communication systems supposedly ensure this happens.⁴¹ Intelligence is dependent on “unprecedented amounts of detailed and accurate information” which it achieves through reachback connections to joint and national agencies and which requires their cooperation.⁴² Ship-to-objective maneuver requires vast communications pathways to make this happen. Even with FORCEnet, there is still a chance for competing requirements to impact command and control, communication, and intelligence capabilities.⁴³ In this regard, ship-to-objective maneuver makes itself dependent on the same amount of “exquisite intelligence” that Network-centric warfare does in a number of circumstances. It is arguable whether such levels of intelligence are achievable. Even if they are, dependence on such information provides a cautionary warning. There is a difference between developing these capabilities and maximizing their effectiveness, and developing operational concepts that are too dependent on them.

IMPLICATIONS

Current studies demonstrate that a Marine expeditionary brigade-sized force will be capable of conducting ship-to-objective maneuver operations out to 110 nautical miles from a sea base located 25 miles over the horizon. While ship-to-objective maneuver operations consist of both surface and vertical assault forces, it is only the vertical assault force that is capable of achieving this 110 nautical mile range during the first period of darkness. Both forces consist of two infantry battalions. The surface assault force is mechanized, and the vertical assault is infantry-pure. Naval surface fire support, air assets, and inherent mortar and artillery capabilities provide fire support for both. Both forces are capable of logistical sustainment from the sea base, although continued sustainment of the vertical assault force by air assets alone will prove challenging, but feasible. Extended range operations beyond this 110 nautical mile limit are possible with smaller forces. A reinforced company of approximately 250 Marines is capable of conducting vertical assault operations out to 200 nautical miles from the sea base.

The Marine Corps considers seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver transformational capabilities, but it provides its own perspective on the nature of transformation. The Marine Corps considers something transformational if it invents a new capability that did not exist, or it makes an existing capability better by orders of magnitude. It identifies four pillars of transformation: operational change, institutional agility, leap-ahead technology, and acquisition and business reform.⁴⁴ In this context, seabasing is certainly a transformational capability. Whether or not ship-to-objective maneuver meets these parameters is arguable. Regardless, the capability to project and sustain elements of a Marine expeditionary brigade-sized force or a reinforced company from a sea base as far as 110 or 200 nautical miles, respectively, provides joint force commanders multiple operational and tactical options that do not currently exist.

How significant is it that current projections fall short of the stated 200-240 nautical mile ranges? It is not significant at this point. It would be another matter if the Army and Marine Corps were developing similar capabilities and were involved in a bidding war over which one had the greater operational reach capability. But they are not, nor is this within the realm of Army roles and functions. Besides, the Army is busy enough trying to make itself modular so that it can task organize much along Marine Corps lines. And as this concept matures, real operational data and tactics, techniques, and procedures no doubt will expand operational reach. It will take trial and error, combined with technological modifications and ingenuity, to overcome the design limitations that currently limit lift ranges. In the interim, providing combatant commanders with innovative capabilities to prevent hostilities before they begin, gaining decisive tactical results that have operational and even strategic impact, and laying the foundation for further operational expansion are the objectives.

The critical capabilities required to make seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver realities are the current technologies being developed (or not) to support it. The previous analysis discusses these technologies, along with strengths, weaknesses, and additional requirements. Transformational capabilities begin as concepts

that equipment and doctrine then are developed to support, not the other way around. Seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver identified the need for capabilities provided by such vehicles as the MV-22 and expeditionary fighting vehicle, just as amphibious operations identified the need for amphibious tractors and new classes of amphibious ships prior to World War II. The issues of sufficient additional lighterage, naval surface fire support, and mine countermeasure capabilities remain questionable, if not contentious, and must be resolved for seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver to realize full operational effectiveness. Despite this, the cooperation between the Marine Corps and Navy in this endeavor is almost unprecedented, not only between themselves but also among the services as a whole. The massively expensive acquisition programs of both services in support of seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver provide proof of this.

Is it worth it? The naval services seem to think so, especially the Marine Corps. It appears to be betting the farm on it, considering the price tags of the MV-22 Osprey and the expeditionary fighting vehicle (which costs more than an M1A1). But does this mean that the Marine Corps envisions itself conducting only ship-to-objective operations from over-the-horizon sea bases? The answer is no, but it does believe that the ability to do this exponentially enhances current capabilities that will continue to be available to combatant commanders and national decisionmakers.

A larger question is what, exactly, a Marine expeditionary brigade-sized unit conducting ship-to-objective maneuver operations at these distances can accomplish. This question must be kept in context. The concept of seabasing allows not only for initial ship-to-objective maneuver operations, but also, and perhaps more importantly, for the follow-on expansion into sustained operations ashore if required. The capabilities discussed herein offer little beyond an operational or tactical raid, even at the expeditionary brigade level. This would be true if an operation consisted solely of initial assault forces with limited sustainment and without the ability to be reinforced. But the concept of ship-to-objective maneuver operations aligns very much with the Marine Corps building block concept of Marine air/ground task forces. That is, Marine expeditionary units can be built into

expeditionary brigades that can become expeditionary forces as the situation develops. So, too, are surface and assault forces capable of being supplied and reinforced from the sea base which, in turn, is capable of being replenished from its reachback sea and air lines of communication. The entire system of systems allows for incremental build up and sustainment of forces ashore if sustained operations ashore become necessary. If used properly and in a timely manner, however, the real intent of ship-to-objective maneuver is to prevent the situation from growing into sustained land combat, or, as previously stated, to “significantly alter the initial conditions of a conflict.”⁴⁵ Forces of this size, flexibility, and reach inserted at the right place and time should be able to do this and more.

As previously stated, seabasing is a potentially transformational capability that extends beyond logistical sustainment from a sea base. It is a floating command and control and power projection system comprised of disparate, but interconnected, components dispersed over potentially hundreds of miles of ocean, and reaching back thousands of miles to the continental United States. It could allow for strategic, operational, and tactical flexibility heretofore unseen in warfare. There is much to be done in order for this capability to be fully realized, but all things must have a beginning. What must be emphasized is the importance of this concept to the entirety of the U.S. military and national decisionmakers, not just the Navy and Marine Corps. As the U.S. military moves towards more expeditionary-type forces and fewer permanent overseas bases, the ability to project, sustain, and command forces from the sea will take on even greater significance for all the Services.

In order for seabasing to realize this level of inter-service capability, all of the services must be involved in its development. The Navy and Marine Corps will develop seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver over the next few decades to operationally and tactically useable levels. And these will have joint applicability, particularly seabasing. Special operations units, Army, and even Air Force and allied/coalition partners will be able to leverage these capabilities. But, with only two services contributing monetarily to the development of these concepts, they may not realize their full potential across the joint spectrum.

Prepositioning programs and vessel design is the critical nexus for comprehensive joint seabasing operations. The requirement is not for service chiefs to refocus all of their efforts and budgets on seabasing compatibility. This is unnecessary and unrealistic. Prepositioning compatibility is the most important critical enabler. If the other services would partner now with the naval services, they could develop future maritime prepositioning ships and capabilities that meet their service-specific requirements for expeditionary seabasing operations. Such prepositioning forces could create a joint sea base from which to project, sustain, and command air, land, and sea forces without the restrictions of excessive land-based assets and requirements. These forces would retain flexibility across all three levels of warfare at levels currently unknown. Such capabilities do not preclude traditional land-based sustained operations ashore when needed. These forces will have multi-role capabilities. But if seabasing can be developed to the level that such operations are not necessary, or at least to the point that two-thirds of all forces can operate and sustain themselves from the sea base, why put them ashore?

Is this hyperbole, political naivete, or both? Hopefully, none of the above. The realities of service budget battles, priorities, and parochialism are understood. The future is unknown, as is the size of future defense budgets. Day-to-day realities and political agendas get in the way of good ideas, even visionary ones sometimes. Selling this idea is no easy task, but neither was moving beyond horses, sails, and prop-driven airplanes. Seabasing is not a panacea, but it offers one of the best options to future force projection, forward presence, and warfighting challenges. Of all the concepts currently being developed by the services, it is the most far-sighted and applicable to joint warfighting enhancement.

Chapter Five of the *National Security Strategy* states that, in order to support preemptive options, America must continue to transform its military forces to ensure the ability to conduct "rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results."⁴⁶ Expeditionary maneuver warfare, operational maneuver from the sea, seabasing, and ship-to-objective maneuver support this directive perhaps better than any other current capability or initiative among the services or within

the Department of Defense. And, as the concept and technologies mature into reality, the applications for the joint force commander and for all the services increase.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. Colonel Arthur J. Corbett, "The Family of Concepts," *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2003, p. 20.

2. U.S. Marine Corps, "Operational Maneuver From The Sea," Marine Corps Concepts Paper, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, January 1, 1997, p. 20.

3. U.S. Marine Corps, "Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare," Marine Corps Capstone Concept, Marine Corps Concepts Paper, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, November 10, 2001, p. 1.

4. Corbett, "The Family of Concepts," p. 20.

5. U.S. Marine Corps, "Seabased Logistics," Marine Corps Concepts Paper, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, June 3, 1998, p. 1.

6. Corbett, "Family of Concepts," p. 20.

7. U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003," Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2003, p. 50.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

9. U.S. Marine Corps, "Ship-To-Objective-Maneuver (STOM) Concepts of Operations (CONOPS)," Marine Corps Concepts Paper, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, March 3, 2003, pp. iii, 1-2, 1-3.

10. This section discusses the results of four studies on ship-to-objective maneuver and seabasing conducted by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. It also contains information obtained from the Navy's N75 Section, Director, Expeditionary Warfare. These studies examine the projected capabilities, limitations, and operational reach of Marine expeditionary brigade and Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)-sized Marine air-ground task forces using technology, equipment, vessels, and vehicles both in operation today and intended to be operational by 2015.

11. The force disposition and composition derive from a baseline 2015 Marine expeditionary brigade formed using a nonstandard organizational construct consisting of two separate, smaller Marine air/ground task forces within a larger

Marine air/ground task force (a similar construct was used by TF-58 in OEF). It consists of two expeditionary strike groups carrying two Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable) and a flow-in echelon (a new term connected to these concepts) of one infantry regiment, one air component element, and one brigade service support group. All arrive in theater within seven days of notification and are ready to execute at D+5. Ship-to-objective maneuver operations do not commence until D+8. Expeditionary strike groups have replaced amphibious ready groups and consist of amphibious ships, surface combatants, and an attack submarine. This makes it a self-contained strike force instead of the previous three-ship amphibious lift force. The first expeditionary strike group is currently in work-up and is commanded by a Marine. U.S. Marine Corps, "Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations," pp. iii, 1-3, V.

12. The Australians have built the prototype high speed vessel. It is a catamaran design, capable of speeds over 40 knots, and ranges of 1,200 nautical miles fully loaded and 3,000 nautical miles empty. It carries a significant numbers of personnel and rolling stock, but it has no berthing facilities for troops. Modifications are being explored to make it capable of carrying helicopters and heavier land vehicles (tanks). The landing craft air cushion has been in service since 1986. It carries 60-plus tons at 40 knots for 200 nautical miles. There are currently 74 in operational status, with 10 in reduced operational/nonoperational status. They are about to enter a service life extension program that will significantly increase the vessel's capabilities and will extend its expected service life another 30 years. This is vital to the success of ship-to-objective maneuver. Additionally, a heavy lift landing craft air cushion is being studied to meet over-the-horizon surface lift requirements. This vehicle could have a 100 percent increase in lift capacity for armored vehicles, internal capacity for 75-100 troops, and the capacity for 400 troops with personnel transport modules. The landing craft utility (replacement) will be a significant improvement over the current slow and limited ship-to-shore version. It will be an over-the-horizon capable craft that can carry 160 to 200 long tons at ranges of approximately 1,000 miles and will be capable of speeds in excess of 11 knots in Sea State 3. These lighterage platforms are critical for the implementation of ship-to-objective maneuver. Department of the Navy, "Naval Expeditionary Warfare, Naval Amphibious Warfare Plan, Decisive Power . . . Global Reach," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Expeditionary Warfare Division, June 1, 2002, pp. 58, 59, 61, 62.

13. The expeditionary fighting vehicle, formerly know as the advanced amphibious assault vehicle, is the replacement for the Marine Corps' current fleet of amphibious assault vehicles. Its water planing design gives it waters speeds up to 20 knots, with extended range capabilities either at sea or on land. It can transit 25 nautical miles over water, and then range approximately 250 miles on land at speeds up to 45 miles per hour. It carries a Mk 44 Mod 1 30mm automatic gun and a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. It carries 17 combat equipped Marines or 5,000 pounds of cargo. Department of the Navy, "Decisive Power . . . Global Reach," p. 33. The Marine Corps plan is to procure 1,013 expeditionary fighting

vehicles, but this is currently under consideration. The program's milestones are for low-rate initial production in FY 2005, initial operational capability in FY 2008, and full operational capability in FY 2018. This will occur sooner if the decision is made to procure fewer vehicles. U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003," p. 112.

14. The assault breacher vehicle is a full-tracked, armored engineer vehicle designed to conduct in-stride breaching of minefields and complex obstacle. It is built on a modified IPM1 tank chassis and includes a full width mine plow, two-line demolition charges, ground marking system, remote control kit, and a weapons station. Procurement is anticipated to begin during FY 2006. U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003," p. 115.

15. The expeditionary fire support system is still in the conceptual stage. It will become the final system of the fire support triad consisting of the lightweight 155mm howitzer and the high mobility artillery rocket system. It will be the primary indirect fire support system for the vertical assault element in ship-to-objective maneuver and will be transportable by tiltrotor aircraft or helicopter. The best guess at this point is that it might look something like a modernized 120mm mortar system. However, the integrated production team is currently conducting studies and market research of potential material solutions. U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003," p. 117.

16. The Marine expeditionary brigade forms an element of the expeditionary strike force. This strike force consists of a carrier strike group, expeditionary strike group, and the maritime prepositioning group. U.S. Navy warships include two nuclear-powered carriers (CVN), five cruisers (CG), two destroyers (DDX), two nuclear attack submarines reconfigured to carry 154 tactical land attack missiles and modifications for special forces units (changing the classification from SSBN to SSGN), two attack submarines (SSN), two amphibious assault ships, multipurpose (LHD), two amphibious transport dock ships (LPD), and two dock landing ships (LSD). These forces form the entirety of the sea base from which naval power is projected, supported, and sustained. It closes into the joint objective area within a seven-day period. U.S. Marine Corps, "Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations," p. 2, conclusion.

17. *Ibid.*, pp 1- 2, conclusion.

18. The scenario includes three regimental landing team objectives, two surface assault (Objectives A and C) and one vertical assault (Objective B). The initial distances from the sea base to the objectives are 37 (Objective A), 86 (Objective B), and 31 (Objective C) nautical miles. An additional nine nautical miles are factored into Objective B for evasive maneuvers and obstacle avoidance, making the total distance 95 nautical miles for vertical assault forces. U.S. Marine Corps, "Mission Area Analysis, Operational Reach—2015, Final Report," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, June 2, 2000, pp. 3, 7.

19. The scenario lands five infantry battalions (three mechanized and two truck-mobile), four tank companies, four light armored reconnaissance companies,

three artillery battalions, two combat engineer companies, and four low altitude air defense platoons at Objectives A and C within one period of darkness. Combat trains and combat service support detachments land the next day. This accounts for a total of 11,162 Marines and 3,498 vehicles and pieces of equipment between the two objectives. (U.S. Marine Corps, "Operational Reach—2015," pp. 1-5) Surface assaults are an integral component of expeditionary maneuver warfare and ship-to-objective maneuver. And, while future capabilities like the expeditionary fighting vehicle, high speed vessel, landing craft air cushion (service life extension program), and landing craft utility (replacement) greatly enhance this capability by making over-the-horizon operations possible, the fact remains that surface assaults do not provide the capability to conduct pure ship-to-objective maneuver operations as envisioned by the Marines Corps' future concept. Only vertical assault capabilities attain the power projection and operational reach distances envisioned by ship-to-objective maneuver, which is why this study focuses on them.

20. The Marine Corps is buying 360 MV-22s based on its operational requirements document. These 72 aircraft represent 20 percent of the fleet. It is currently planned for the Air Force to buy 50 and the Navy to buy 48, although the Marine Corps is fielding them much earlier than the other two. Nonetheless, the eventual fielding of these additional aircraft should potentially expand the options available for ship-to-objective maneuver and other operations in the joint environment. Concerning the CH-53E (service life extension program), recent decisions occurring after the publications of these studies have changed this plan. A new aircraft, not a rebuild, will replace the current CH-53E fleet. It will look much like the current aircraft and will probably be called the CH-53F. However, since this is not yet definitive, it will continue to be called the CH-53E (service life extension program) in this chapter. It will be a one-for-one replacement of the current "echo" fleet which is a total of 154 aircraft. These 28 aircraft represent 18 percent of the fleet. Brigadier General Granville R. Amos, USMC (ret), Aviation Requirements, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, telephone interview by author, January 14, 2004.

21. U.S. Marine Corps, "Operational Reach—2015," p. 5.

22. In this scenario, the MEU(SOC) supports special operations forces conducting direct strike operations. A reinforced company conducts a raid to seize a blocking position in support of the main effort. The force package includes 253 marines (includes four HMMWVs, crew-served and anti-tank weapons, and 60mm mortars), 12 MV-22s, 6 joint strike fighters, 4 CH-53E (service life extension program) heavy lift helicopters, 4 AH-1Z attack helicopters, 3 UH-1Y utility helicopters, and 2 KC-130J aerial refueling planes. The inclusion of aerial refueling capabilities distinguishes this study from the previous one. The "Operational Reach—2015" scenario uses only inherent aircraft ranges and ground refueling for helicopters where possible. Major Robert J. Stevenson, USMC, Mission and Analysis Branch, Studies and Analysis Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, "Mission Area Analysis, MEU (SOC) Extended Range

Operations, Executive Summary,” results of study presented in brief format to Brigadier General S. T. Helland, Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, November 13, 2003, slides 14, 15.

23. *Ibid*, slide 31.

24. U.S. Marine Corps, “Mission Area Analysis, MEB Sea Basing, IPR #4, Revised Base Case,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, November 20, 2003, p. 4.

25. *Ibid*, p. 46.

26. This section supports use of the landing craft air cushion as the maritime repositioning force, future, landing craft because it proved to get the job done by almost 1.5 hours quicker than the other two future technologies used for this study. Twenty percent of this is due to landing constraints on displacement craft, and 80 percent is due to the greater speed of the landing craft air cushion. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

28. In this extended scenario with its continuous lift and resupply requirements, the expeditionary strike group runs out of fuel at S+12 (S day is the commencement of ship-to-objective maneuver operations). The reachback capability of the sea base allows for the expeditionary strike group to be resupplied, and there are other sources of fuel, specifically the maritime reposition group. While this does not shut down ship-to-objective maneuver operations, it does highlight their additional logistical considerations, the importance of accurate logistical planning, and the requirement for sea lines of communication to be fully operational to adequately support extended over-the-horizon ship-to-objective-maneuver operations. *Ibid.*, pp. 64, 68.

29. Draft, “Seabasing Concept of Operations,” Department of the Navy, Expeditionary Warfare Division, U.S. Marine Corps, Expeditionary Force Development, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, January 30, 2003, p. 3.3.

30. Major Robert J. Stephenson, Mission Area Analysis Branch, Studies and Analysis Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, interviewed by author, December 9, 2003, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA.

31. Recent events in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM highlight this problem. “The division’s ability to influence the theater and national intelligence collection activity was limited. A shortage of theater collection platforms was aggravated by the use of these collectors for deep missions at the expense of maneuver units. . . . On the high-tempo battlefield, the highly centralized theater intelligence architecture proved too slow and cumbersome to be tactically relevant.” Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Groen, 1st Marine Division G-2, “Blue Diamond Intelligence: Division-Level Intelligence Operations During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2004, p. 25.

32. U.S. Marine Corps, "Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations," pp. 1-9.

33. The future destroyer, DD(X), will carry two 155mm advanced gun systems. This will fire the long range land attack projectile, a boost-glide GPS-guided round that provides a high degree of accuracy but is not considered a precision-guided munition. The maximum range of this round is classified. The advanced gun system fires 10 rounds a minute and the DD(X) will have a 600-round magazine which may be increased to 1,000 rounds. The plan is to build 24 DD(X)s, with two per expeditionary strike group. The first one should be operational in FY13. The advanced gun system also has counterbattery radar capability. An interim round, the extended range munition, is being developed to meet current requirements until the advanced gun system and long-range land attack projectile are fielded. It is fired from 5"/62 naval guns. This program is currently experiencing difficulties and is behind fielding schedule. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are conducting long-term research on electromagnetic energy to fire both ship and land vehicle weapons systems. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Seng, USMC, N753G, NSFS Requirements, Expeditionary Warfare Branch, U.S. Navy, interview by author, December 15, 2003, Headquarters, U.S. Navy, Washington, DC.

34. U.S. Marine Corps, "Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations," pp. 1-12.

35. New amphibious control measure terms are used for operational maneuver from the sea and ship-to-objective maneuver operations. Littoral penetration areas are possible geographic objective areas along a coastline, potentially separated by hundreds of miles. The intent is to provide options for the strike group or joint force commander while increasing the dilemma for the enemy. Littoral penetration zones divide a littoral penetration area into several axes of advance. Littoral penetration sites are segments of coastline within the littoral penetration zone that vertical or surface assault forces cross en route to their objectives (in amphibious assault terms, it is the point where they go "feet dry"). Littoral penetration points are points within the littoral penetration sites where surface assault vehicles transition from waterborne to landborne movement. These can accommodate a single craft or a unit in column. If terrain allows, these are expanded to allow units to pass through in tactical formation.

36. U.S. Marine Corps, "Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations," pp. 11-5.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-10.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-15.

39. Navy Acquisitions, Improved Littoral War-Fighting Capabilities Needed, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, October 2003, obtained from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Strategic Initiatives Group website <http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/PP&O/SIG/TopSight/tsfin.htm>; accessed November 14, 2003.

40. These differing priorities are highlighted in the statements made in March of 2003 before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Service Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. The U.S. Marine Corps statement refers to its 3.0 Marine expeditionary brigade amphibious lift requirement, the sea-basing concept, and the need for “new” *lighterage to support it* [emphasis added], the need to integrate amphibious lift with maritime propositioning forces, “Sea Strike,” LPD-17, and the LHD-8 (the new retrofit referred to as the “plug-plus”). The U.S. Navy statement refers to none of these. It refers to “Sea Power 21” only twice, both times in rather general terms. It also makes no mention of “Naval Power 21,” the document that speaks to Navy/Marine future concepts, vision, and cooperation. The U.S. Marine Corps statement does not specifically mention “Naval Power 21” either, but its concepts run throughout the document.

41. U.S. Marine Corps, “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations,” pp. 1-9.

42. *Ibid*, pp. 6-9.

43. FORCEnet seeks to digitally integrate Navy and Marine Corps communications systems, sensors, weapons, and platforms, including ships, airplanes, and land vehicles. It will be a WEB-enabled network intended to be the umbrella under which the naval services operate. Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor, “FORCEnet is Navy’s Future: Information-sharing, From Seabed to Space,” *Armed Forces Journal*, December 2003, pp. 50, 51.

44. Lieutenant Colonel Rich Webster, USMC, Transformation Branch, Futures Warfighting Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Marine Corps Transformation,” briefing slide 5, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 18, 2003.

45. U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003,” p. 21.

46. George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, p. 16.

CHAPTER 12

IS THE AIR COMPONENT COORDINATION ELEMENT (ACCE) EMBEDDED IN THE COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND (CFLCC) HQ A MODEL FOR FUTURE CONFLICT?

Colonel Byron H. Risner

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan changed the Air Force “foot-print around the world . . . substantially,” said Roche. The service set up “new bases and renewed relationships” and proved “remarkably flexible in adapting to these new demands.” Roche said that “teamwork and trust” made Gulf War II a coordinated “warfighting effort from planning to execution.” One example was the joint planning effort of the Air Force and Army to iron out air-ground coordination problems that surfaced during Operation Enduring Freedom. As a result, USAF placed an air component coordinating element—led by then Major General Daniel P. Leaf—with the land component commander for Gulf War II.

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WHAT IS THE CFLCC-ACCE?

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was the first conflict where the Combined Force Air and Space Component Commander (CFACC) created air component coordination elements within the component headquarters and each of the functional counterparts (land, maritime, and special operations). As part of other operations, the Air Component Commander had air component coordination elements embedded in Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF)-180 and CJTF-Horn of Africa. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Coalition Force Land Component Commander-Air Component Coordination Element (CFLCC-ACCE) deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait, and formed a part of the coalition forces land component commander staff.

At the headquarters in Kuwait, an Air Force Major General led the air component coordination element. Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley, CFACC during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, selected Major General Dan Leaf to serve as the air component coordination element director to the

land component staff. At the time, Leaf was working at the Pentagon as Air Force’s Director of Operational Capability Requirements. He received clear guidance regarding command relationships as well as roles and missions for his position. Leaf attended orientation at Shaw Air Force Base in late January 2003 where he was briefed on Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM plans. At the same time, Leaf assembled a core staff of ten officers and two enlisted personnel for deployment to Camp Doha.¹

Figure 1 depicts the various command and coordination relationships between the ACCE and other elements in theater. It is important to note that the ACCE Director remained under operational control to the Coalition Forces Air Component Commander during all operations.




Figure 1. Surface Commander, CFACC, ACCE, and AFFOR Command and Coordination Relationships²

MISSION AND INTENT

The mission and intent of the ACCE was defined in the November 2002 U.S. Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF) Concept of Operations as follows: The Air Component Coordination Element is the primary facilitating authority between the surface commander and the CFACC. It facilitates the interaction of the surface commander’s and air component commander’s functions within standard operating procedures (SOPs),

and in the absence of SOPs, aids in establishing cross-communication between the functionals. The ACCE will serve as a conduit of information flow and will facilitate coordination between the Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC) and the headquarters' functionals. The ACCE will also provide airpower expertise to support mission planning and execution. It is important to note that the ACCE does not and will not replace, replicate, and/or circumvent normal request mechanisms already in place in the surface commander's staff.³

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the CFACC's concept also intended to insert representation at a level commensurate to staff principals on the CFLCC staff. With the ACCE mission statement as a guideline, the Kuwait CFLCC-ACCE developed its own mission statement: "Provide command-to-command level presence in the CFLCC. Provide operational level assessment and coordination of CFLCC planning and execution to ensure integration with the Air Component Commander's air operation plan and operational intent to meet Joint Force Commander guidance."⁴

Major General Leaf further provided more specific guidance to members of the ACCE in a Director's intent statement:

The CFLCC-ACCE Director's intent is to provide a continuous flow of effective, operational level communication between the CFACC and CFLCC. This requires CFLCC-ACCE team participation in all aspects of CFLCC's planning and execution cycles to represent the CFACC's operational vision and intent. Essential planning and execution cycles include long-range plans, future operations, Deep Operations Coordination Cell, intelligence, and fire support element. The team will keep the CFLCC-ACCE Director informed of key issues that may impact combined/joint operations at the theater operational level and provide input during CFLCC working group meetings to ensure CFACC/CFLCC coordination. Additionally, the team will support at least one position on the Coalition Operations and Intelligence Center floor as the CFACC representative."⁵

The CFLCC-ACCE had mission statements and directives that clearly defined the role the ACCE would play in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM while supporting Lieutenant General McKiernan and his staff. At the time there was no Joint or Air Force doctrine that defined the ACCE to those who did not have the USCENTAF ACCE concept of operations.

The CFLCC-ACCE deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait, on February 4, 2003. Leaf's 10-person team fell in on the Air Force element that had

been in place at McKiernan’s Headquarters since December 2003. This four-person element was part of the normal 90-day Air Expeditionary Force rotation that provided the CFLCC staff with support for sustained operations in the defense of Kuwait. Organization and manning for Leaf’s ACCE reflected the USCENTAF concept of operations with the ten person increase required when combat operations are likely. Table 1 displays the manning for the CFLCC-ACCE.⁶

Headquarters Element:		
#	Grade	Position
1	O-8	ACCE Director
1	O-4/O-3	Executive Officer
1	E-6/E-5	Info Management Specialist
1	E-4	Personnel Security Officer
Plans/Ops/Intel Element:		
#	Grade	Position
3	O-4/O-3	Air Ops Planners (Strike, Mobility, Airspace)
3	O-4/O-3	Intel

Table 1. AFLCC-ACCE Manning.

One of the key components of the CFLCC-ACCE was that for the first time the Director was to be a general officer with equal rank to key staff principals on the CFLCC staff. Major General Leaf modified the actual rank structure of the CFLCC-ACCE during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He personally selected his staff to include two colonels (one as Deputy Director), three lieutenant colonels, and two majors. Although not an original manning requirement, the ACCE Director selected a space/information operations expert as part of his staff. This member worked all aspects of space, information operations, and counter command and control activities. This selection reaped significant dividends as the ACCE received positive feedback from both the CFLCC information operations and space cells. A key factor was that the individual had experience with multiple counter C2 systems and special access programs, as well as experience working with the Army.⁷

The CFLCC-ACCE initially set up to operate and support CFLCC’s prewar battle rhythm. Once the war began, the Army’s combat

rhythm immediately demanded a 24-hour operational presence for ACCE members and the need to be immediately available. This required the senior ACCE staff to move into the CFLCC “War Room” as well as additional presence in the operations center. The CFLCC-ACCE went from one person manning the CFLCC Operations floor to two and three during combat operations. The ACCE worked in this configuration until redeployment on April 20, 2003.⁸

CFLCC-ACCE: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ISSUES.

The ACCE quickly established its relevance and value to McKiernan’s staff, breaking down existing institutional barriers. In accordance with the ACCE concept of operations, the organization’s manning did not include representatives of sister services or coalition partners. As operations progressed, the ACCE quickly became an element that reflected the coalition/joint operation it supported. During the course of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the CFLCC-ACCE absorbed Navy, Marine, and coalition personnel to provide critical liaison with the CFLCC staff. Some of these personnel already were attached to the CFLCC staff but migrated to the ACCE during the conflict.

CFLCC and ACCE staff members felt that the arrival and standup of the ACCE occurred late in the planning cycle. Once established at Camp Doha, ACCE personnel had to spend valuable time in order to understand CFLCC’s ground plan. Members who deployed in January missed the final planning stages of the ground plan, as well as the last exercise prior to combat operations. Thus, the ACCE arrived at a critical transition period where CFLCC was preparing for combat operations, one that was less than optimal for both staffs. In addition, some ACCE members had not been “read in” on higher classified portions of both CFACC and CFLCC plans. This delayed them from understanding fully the IRAQI FREEDOM operational ground and air plans. Moreover, ACCE members did not have the opportunity to review the Master Air Attack Plan or meet and interface with key members of the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Prince Sultan Airbase, Saudi Arabia. Members of the ACCE required briefings on CFACC plans as well as interface with members of combat operations, combat plans, airlift, space, intelligence, and battlefield coordination detachment elements. It is from these key air operations center elements that the ACCE receives and communicates vital CFACC/CFLCC information. The CFLCC-ACCE required a single point of contact in the air operations center to facilitate proper routing of ACCE queries, information

requests, and important issues. CFACC remedied this difficulty in early March 2003, when he established an ACCE help desk at the Prince Sultan air operations center.⁹

Information exchange between the ACCE and CFLCC Future Operations Cell and the Deep Operations Coordination Cell was critical during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The coordination between the ACCE and these two cells was key to ensuring synchronization between CFLCC and CFACC planning. Early on, members of the Deep Operations Coordination Cell, the Future Operations Cell, and CFLCC staff were unfamiliar with the wartime ACCE and initially expected the ACCE to be a "battlefield coordination detachment in reverse."¹⁰

Joint Publication 3-30 defines the battlefield coordination detachment as:

The Army component commander establishes a battlefield coordination detachment to act as the interface between the component commander and the JFACC. The BCD is collocated with the JFACC's staff in the joint air operations center. The battlefield coordination detachment processes land force requests for air support, monitors and interprets the land battle situation in the joint air operation center, and provides the necessary interface for the exchange of current operational and intelligence data. The battlefield coordination detachment expedites the exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with elements in the joint air operations center, and coordinates air defense and airspace control matters. Immediate and emergency airlift requests are passed to the battlefield coordination detachment via the airlift advanced notification/coordination net by theater airlift liaison officers. The battlefield coordination detachment is organized into sections which are incorporated throughout the joint air operations center (e.g., plans, intelligence, operations, fusion, air defense artillery and Army management, and airlift).¹¹

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3 (Counterland) defines the battlefield coordination detachment as:

The senior Army liaison element to the Theatre Air Control System and is located in the air operations center. The battlefield coordination detachment processes the land component's air support requests, to include air interdiction target nominations and requests for preplanned close air support. The battlefield coordination detachment processes the ground component's target nominations and acts throughout planning

and execution to ensure proper representation of ground component priorities in the overall process. The battlefield coordination detachment acts as the primary conduit for real-time and near real-time requests for air interdiction targeting from the ground component. Such requests flow up the Army chain of command to the highest echelon, then flow to the air operations center via the battlefield coordination detachment. It is also the battlefield coordination detachment's responsibility to inform the various ground commanders of which nominated targets were or were not included on the target list for incorporation into the air tasking order and the approval status of preplanned close air support requests. This feedback loop is critical, as ground commanders must know which requested targets did or did not meet the joint force commander's priority requirements for air attack. During the execution process, the battlefield coordination detachment provides current ground picture information to the air operations center on both friendly and enemy ground forces.¹²

Since the ACCE and the air operations center battlefield coordination detachment had little initial interface to define clearly each element's function and responsibility, there was some confusion on the part of both the staffs regarding who to use as the source for CFLCC/CFACC interface. This caused friction in the CFLCC staff when the ACCE would not have certain information the staff thought it should possess. The ACCE felt that CFLCC could have obtained this information through the battlefield coordination detachment. At times, this caused the ACCE to be consumed with issues that drew them away from their primary duties. In turn, members of the battlefield coordination detachment suffered similar frustrations when the ACCE would call to get information from them that it should have obtained from the air operations center staff. The Operations Chief of the air operations center battlefield coordination detachment finally had to instruct his staff to stop answering information requests from the ACCE and informed the ACCE to contact the appropriate air operations center staff section.¹³ This clearly highlights the importance of the ACCE and battlefield coordination detachment staffs coordinating early to clearly define and deconflict the roles and responsibilities of each element. Once they have established roles they must communicate that information to the CFLCC and combined air operations center staffs to avoid confusion. Because the battlefield coordination detachment and ACCE did not possess sufficient manning, and little coordination between the elements had occurred prior to the conflict, difficulties were exacerbated. The less than optimal manning of the battlefield coordination detachment was an issue Lieutenant

General McKeirnan acknowledged as one that needed addressing in future contingencies.¹⁴

Command and Control (C2) systems interoperability and knowledge was a basic requirement for the CFLCC-ACCE team to function smoothly. C2 systems and databases were a concern for both staffs. The need for common joint C2 systems was apparent as their lack occasionally hampered operational level decision. Some systems were common to both CFACC and CFLCC, but the majority were not. The air operations center used Theater Battle Management Command Systems, while CFLCC utilized Command and Control Personal Computer and Automated Deep Operations Coordination Systems. The lack of a fully functional theater battle management command system in the Kuwait operations center was of particular concern for the deep operations coordination cell as it did not provide the deserved level of detail on the air tasking order.¹⁵ From the CFLCC-ACCE perspective, the digital collaboration tool system purchased by the Army and CENTCOM performed poorly. Less than 10 percent of the users actually utilized the tool; it was a large bandwidth consumer and frequently locked up. Access to and training in common operational and tactical pictures and chat instant messaging tools were essential to CFLCC-ACCE effectiveness. CFLCC and CFACC did not use the same chat systems or servers; CFACC used internet relay chat, Microsoft chat, and zircon chat, while CFLCC used Microsoft and internet relay chat. Lack of interoperability between those chat systems decreased functionality, reduced effectiveness, and increased workload. As an example, the ACCE intelligence section was not able to communicate in real time with the CFLCC intelligence staff or the battlefield coordination detachment at the air operations center.¹⁶

Since the ACCE works for the CFACC, equipment provided by the CFLCC was minimal. The CENTAF ACCE concept of operations assumed more host component support than was available. The ACCE members found that they lacked sufficient numbers of classified computers, web based common operational picture software for the air and ground picture, and equipment that allowed them to access weather information throughout the theater, as well as operating bases of coalition aircraft. The CFLCC-ACCE did not arrive with theater information sources such as telephone

directories and key web sites. The team had to invest a great deal of effort in building an information base during the initial stages of deployment.

Finally, parts of the CFLCC staff felt that the CFLCC-ACCE departed rather abruptly. The ACCE had no predefined exit strategy, and some CFLCC staff members felt there was no overlap for transition to Phase IV operations.¹⁷ Though several manning, training, and equipment shortfalls challenged the CFLCC-ACCE as a result of the quick activation and deployment, the ACCE and CFLCC staff adapted and responded quickly prior to and during combat operations. Equipment had to be improvised, processes needed to be established, and operating procedures had to be developed. In the end the ACCE was able to provide the Director with situational awareness and processes required to effectively represent the CFACC to CFLCC.

CFLCC-ACCE RECOMMENDATIONS

Lieutenant General [Ronald] Keys said an important innovation was creation in Kuwait of the Air Component Coordination Element headed by Major General Daniel P. Leaf. He served as personal representative of the Combined Force Air and Space Component Commander (CFACC)—USAF Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley—to the Coalition Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC), Army Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan.

Leaf's job, Keys said, was to "straighten out the special kinks that happen during a fast-moving war." In addition, he went on, "every major land force had an ACCE with them, and their job was, if their priorities weren't being looked at properly, or there was going to be a change to the ground scheme of maneuver, or there was something happening on the air side that the land force needed to know, they got that."

The position was crucial in the opening hours of the war, when the decision was made to launch the ground forces without a preceding air war. Air operations were supposed to start March 22. When timetables were advanced, communication between the CFACC and the CFLCC was critical. The new position "paid us big benefits because of the fluid nature of this war," said Keys.

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As Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations Lieutenant General Keys stated, the ACCE is a “key innovation” lauded by both Army and Air Force leaders. The following recommendations should be incorporated where applicable.

The ACCE has recently been included in Joint Doctrine. The current ACCE definition is in Joint Publication 3-09.3 (released November 2003):

Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE). The Air Force component commander establishes an ACCE to interface and provide liaison with the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or commander, Army forces. The ACCE is collocated with the JFLCC staff. The ACCE is the senior Air Force element assisting the JFLCC staff in planning air component supporting and supported requirements. The ACCE interface includes exchanging current intelligence and operational data, support requirements, coordinating the integration of AFFOR/JFACC requirements for airspace control measures, joint fire support coordinating measures, and CAS. The ACCE is organized with expertise in the following areas: plans, operations, intelligence, airspace management, and airlift. The ACCE is not an air support operations center or tactical air control party, but acts as the AFFOR/JFACC senior liaison element and can also perform many air support planning functions.¹⁸

Joint Publication 3-06.3 is the recently revised manual for Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS). While the document mentions the function of the ACCE, Joint Publication (JP) 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, does not. The ACCE definition does contain some overlap with duties of the battlefield coordination detachment; specifically when addressing the coordination of joint fire support control measures and close air support. The need for coordination between the ACCE and the battlefield coordination detachment prior to conflict is critical to prevent any confusion that may arise between the staffs. The ACCE, by definition, is much more than a coordinating element for close air support, and joint doctrine should reflect this fact. Thus, it should form a part of the CFACC organization in Chapter Two of the next revision of Joint Pub 3-30. The ACCE concept is so new that current Air Force and Army doctrine does not mention it. The Air Force is currently revising AFDD 2-1.3 (Counterland) to include the function and purpose of the ACCE.¹⁹ Army doctrine will need to include the ACCE in appropriate FM 100 series publications, specifically FM 100-13. The CENTAF ACCE concept of operations should be distributed and made available to CFLCC and other components that would

receive support from an ACCE. This would make the CFLCC staff and others aware of the ACCE mission and functions, as well as the expected support required for the ACCE.

In future operations, the Air Force should identify the ACCE Director as early as possible. This would allow him to select his team and allow it to prepare properly for deployment. Predeployment processing for the CFLCC-ACCE presented challenges that made an expedient departure difficult. Since they deployed late in the planning process, ACCE members had to spend valuable time “catching up.” Being familiar with the air and ground plan as well as coordination with the air operations center and the elements mentioned earlier are absolute necessities. CFLCC-ACCE personnel initially had difficulty establishing relationships with appropriate air operations center action officers as the air operations center action officers were not familiar with the ACCE mission. Since the ACCE relies heavily upon information from the air operations center, it is important the air operations center staff be ready to support the ACCE and the CFLCC mission. Early identification and notification would also facilitate determining equipment and security requirements. Chemical gear, cots, body armor, computers, and classified phones were equipment some ACCE members had to acquire once they arrived at Camp Doha. The ACCE needs support from either the closest air component installation or CFLCC. Doing so would allow the ACCE to begin operations with minimal lost time.²⁰

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM manning requirements for the CFLCC-ACCE require adjustment to take advantage of the full spectrum of air and space capabilities. Listed below are the desired base manning requirements for the CFLCC-ACCE identified in the CFLCC-ACCE After Action Report (AAR):

- Director—Brigadier General desired.
- Deputy Director (Rated)—Colonel.
- Chief of Staff—Lieutenant Colonel.
- Executive Officer (any AFSC)—Major/Lieutenant Colonel.
- Air Operations Center (AOC) functionality expertise (Rated)—Major/Lieutenant Colonel.

- Tactical air operations expertise tailored to the situation (Major-Lieutenant Colonel mix)
 - 1 Airlift
 - 1 Multi-role fighter/bomber
 - 1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
 - 1 Space/Information Operations
- Information Systems Officer (expert in COP/CTP management)—Captain/Major.
- Comm/Computer—Staff Sergeant/Captain.
- Intelligence Officer and NCO—Major/Technical Sergeant.
- Personal Security Officer (PSO) detail for Director.
- Administration—Technical Sergeant.

While the CFLCC-ACCE maintained a team approach and worked for the CFACC, it was necessary to assign ACCE team members to several CFLCC functional areas. Future CFLCC-ACCE teams may find it beneficial to assign individuals to the following responsibilities:²¹

- Plans:
 - Maintain visibility on all CFLCC long range planning.
 - Maintain contact with air operations center strategic planners and battlefield coordination detachment plans.
 - Ensure CFACC equities are represented.
 - Attend all CFLCC planning group meetings.
 - Inform the ACCE Director of potential conflicts, issues, and opportunities.
- Future Operations:
 - Maintain visibility on the 48-144 hour fight.
 - Maintain contact with air operations center plans chief and battlefield coordination detachment plans.
 - Attend all CFLCC planning team meetings.
 - Read all fragmentary orders and screen for CFACC issues.
 - Inform ACCE Director of potential conflicts, issues, and opportunities.
- Deep Operations Control Cell:
 - Maintain visibility on all targeting issues in the Deep Operations Control Cell.
 - Maintain contact with CAOC Guidance, Apportionment,

- and Targeting Chief, Master Air Attack Plan Chief and battlefield coordination detachment plans.
- Attend Combat Assessment Board, Daily Effects Board, and Effects Working Group.
 - Be aware of and coordinate all airspace coordination measures, including fire support coordination line, forward boundary, and joint special operations areas.
 - Be aware of the Time Sensitive Target process.
 - Inform the ACCE Director of potential conflicts, issues and opportunities.
 - Fire Support Element—Ops Floor Current Operations:
 - Conduct 24/7 operations on the CFLCC Ops floor.
 - Maintain contacts with air operations center Chief of Combat Ops, air operations center Fire Support Element, and battlefield coordination detachment operations.
 - Prepare products as necessary for battle updates.
 - Monitor Air Tasking Order execution for situational awareness.
 - Keep the ACCE Director informed of any current ops issues that require his attention.
 - Space and Information Operations.
 - Serve as a key CFACC interface with other service space and information operations agents.
 - Coordinate the functional capability of information operations systems used by the CFACC.
 - Interpret function and service of the information from our space systems.
 - Information Operations:
 - Work with local information management staff on connectivity.
 - Ensure that the systems required to build situational awareness are working.
 - Ensure the ACCE team is trained and able to utilize the information.
 - Coordinate with Component command C-6 section for service.

A member of an Army study that evaluated the operational and strategic conduct of CFLCC operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM recommended that the ACCE improve its focus on the processes within the air operations center system. There were times when information received by the CFLCC staff through the battlefield coordination detachment and other air operation center elements conflicted with information received through the ACCE.²² Proper coordination between the ACCE and battlefield coordination detachment and the robust manning structure mentioned above will allow the ACCE to better assist with the Army's planning process. ACCE members with functional area expertise placed in these areas will be able to jointly integrate Air Force kinetic and non-kinetic multipliers with proper connectivity and liaison with the air operations center.

CFLCC personnel should always strive to obtain information through established doctrinal processes and avoid shortcutting proper channels by using the ACCE for answers. Staff members must be cognizant of the fact that ACCE current operations officers do not have "action" or execution authority and avoid the tendency to make platform-based support requests rather than maintaining an effects focus. ACCE personnel must be well-informed as to the proper doctrinal channels for information flow and assist/guide the CFLCC staff. Additionally, they must rapidly learn the internal workings of the Army staff in order to understand unique terms of reference and be familiar with the internal operations center processes. LTG McKeirnan's staff continually sought quantitative portrayal of CFACC contribution to the fight. Presence of the ACCE may have amplified this desire as the ACCE struggled to balance providing that picture while focusing on future operations. The air component must improve capability to rapidly capture and distribute intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coverage, air tasking order sortie generation and battle damage assessment mission report data.²³ By having a well-coordinated communication path between the air operations center, the land component commander's staff, and the battlefield coordination detachment, the ACCE will be able to provide the Army with accurate and timely information on both kinetic and non-kinetic efforts of the air component.

Air Force and Army air to ground coordination during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a huge success. A joint close air support conference held at McKeirnan's headquarters prior to the start of

hostilities was critical in establishing common close air support procedures. The Operation IRAQI FREEDOM environment was particularly complicated in that the theater area contained multiple boundaries and command and control agencies. Close air support special instructions must be completed and distributed by the air component prior to the conference in order to allow ample time to review the execution level details at the conference. The kill box/ grid square method of deconflicting fires also worked well; the ACCE ensured that the Army staff fully understood the kill box concept. Buy in was complete at all levels by the end of offensive operations. The urban close air support construct for air operations in and around Baghdad demonstrated close coordination between the ACCE and CFLCC staffs. Coordination on zones, subsections, and key facility location was extremely important in developing this phase of the operation. The ACCE presence during planning and execution was a key factor in Army acceptance of using longitude and latitude gridlines when designating the fire support coordination line. Initially, phase lines oriented around geographical features marked this critical deconfliction tool. Due to the speed of the operation along with the wide use of global positioning systems, laptop mapping systems, and aircraft navigation systems, latitude and longitude gridlines were used as the approved method for designating the fire support coordination line. The ACCE recommends that all future joint training and exercises use this procedure.²⁴

CFLCC-ACCE: DID IT WORK?

CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan stated that the CFLCC-ACCE “worked very well” and viewed the ACCE as a valuable “plug-in” to his staff. He emphasized the importance of having both the permanent Joint Air Force billets on his staff as well as the ACCE available during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Although he frequently spoke directly to Lieutenant General Moseley on component commander issues during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, he felt the relationship between his staff and the ACCE was extremely beneficial and greatly added to the success of his ground forces.²⁵

To summarize, overwhelmingly, Army and Air Force members involved with the CFLCC-ACCE agreed that the concept is one that should continue and be improved upon for future operations. The ACCE is a valid entity and was a subtle but important contributor to CFLCC success during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The CENTAF concept of operations is sound, and the ACCE concept provides critical Army/Air Force linkage. General Leaf felt the CFLCC-ACCE provided two principal advantages: First, presence in the CFLCC headquarters and activities. Physically being present in the CFLCC headquarters diffused many issues before they became roadblocks to joint operations. By being present as ground plans and operations developed, his ACCE was able to convey the air perspective to CFACC personnel with greater clarity and understanding than an e-mail, briefing, or phone call. The ACCE provided this air perspective to McKiernan's staff without circumventing the battlefield coordination detachment process. On several occasions, Leaf's staff referred questions to the battlefield coordination detachment in order to exercise the proper doctrinal processes and communication channels. Likewise, the battlefield coordination detachment referred the ACCE to the air operations center for questions that should be addressed by that staff. It is clearly evident that prior coordination between the ACCE and the battlefield coordination detachment is crucial to prevent confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of each element.

Second was the unique perspective that presence provided. Embedding the ACCE within CFLCC gave the ACCE a unique perspective that required discipline to remain objective and retain the role of CFACC representative.²⁶ ACCE members need to be accessible and involved joint team players, while at the same time avoiding becoming de facto members of the CFLCC staff. This is an important balance; the ACCE cannot treat the Army staff as an adversary, but must firmly present the air component perspective and defend its methods and priorities. Two critical decisions were central to ACCE success: 1) Providing directors with sufficient rank to function as representatives for the CFACC; and 2) the related decision to have the ACCE Directors remain within the CFACC's chain of command as opposed to becoming part of the host component staff.²⁷

The ACCE concept should be used as a model for the future and be improved upon to make it an even more robust and viable element for the CFLCC staff. With a dedicated effort to address and solve the doctrine, manning, and equipment issues mentioned, the

ACCE will remain a relevant entity for joint warfighting success in the 21st century.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

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CHAPTER 13

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES: DEVELOPMENT OF GRAND STRATEGY

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Reilly

The fundamental purpose of national security strategy is to provide a comprehensive framework that balances the ends, ways, and means of the elements of national power to achieve national security and to protect, preserve and promote a way of life. When successful, this process results in the development of a grand (unifying) strategy that combines values and interests with a strategic appraisal that leads to a series of national policies articulated in a unifying strategy. This strategy then serves as a unifying document for the national government.¹

This chapter will examine the origins and development of national security strategy in the United States. It will examine the requirement and the content of the annual report the President and his advisors develop and submit to Congress, as mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This chapter will then outline and analyze the 1987, 1988, 1994, 1998, and 2002 *National Security Strategy* reports. The purpose is to determine whether or not they achieve the intent of Goldwater-Nichols by providing a unifying (grand) strategy for the nation. These five reports represent new or significant changes in the thinking and direction of U.S. national security strategy.

THE BACKGROUND: A HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE

One of the fundamental ways to achieve national security is to provide the required government institutions and mechanisms that organize the defense establishment, unify the armed forces, harness science to military purposes, mobilize military manpower, and distribute the cost of defense across the national economy.² For most Americans, the golden age of isolationism ended on December 7, 1941, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. With the end of World

War II came the realization that the United States and the world had entered a new era of global ideological competition.³ For the United States, this journey towards defining and refining a national security structure and strategy began during the Second World War. But the U.S. Government first formally articulated a national strategy in the National Security Act of 1947.

The end of the Second World War brought two fundamentally different political philosophies to the fore in the debate over the future course of American's role in the world. The first resulted from an older conservative political culture that feared that development of a strong national security state would endanger the basic values, principles, and institutions associated with American democracy. Inherent in this approach was a belief that a strong national security structure would waste resources, regiment the nation's youth, and concentrate too much authority in the national government, in particular the military. This group also feared that the creation of a strong executive branch would undermine the basic constitutional balance between the Congress and the executive branch.⁴

The second was a new philosophy of national security that believed the United States must pursue an active role in world events. This approach stressed that the United States had entered an era of total war and the new threats required a new degree of military vigilance and preparedness in which all of the nation's resources were mobilized for the defense of America. Furthermore, they believed it was not possible to separate the defense of American liberties from the defense of liberties everywhere in the world.⁵ "Peace and freedom were indivisible, so that American leadership had no choice but to safeguard the country's security by safeguarding the security of the free world in general."⁶

In the end, as in all political processes in a democratic society, the debate between these fundamentally different philosophies ended in a compromise. The formulation of strategy is not a rational and systemic process. In fact, it is an intensely political process from which national strategy emerges after protracted bargaining and compromise.⁷

The roots of the National Security Act of 1947 trace back to the preparations for and execution of military operations during the First and Second World Wars and battles between the executive and

legislative branches of government, as well as internal differences inside the War Department and between the War Department and the Department of the Navy.⁸ The primary fault lines were arguments between the Army and Navy over the role of airpower, the realization that the nation's security structure could no longer rest on one organizational structure for peace and a different one for war, interservice disagreements over postwar roles and missions, the collapse of the peacetime national security planning and decisionmaking structure, the lack of a true Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the fundamental need to unify the armed services under a single department of defense headed by a cabinet rank civilian secretary.⁹

In recognition of the need for greater unity, coordination, and integration for national defense, Congress enacted the National Security Act in July of 1947. This act established the modern American national security structure by creating a host of new agencies, including the National Security Council, National Security Resources Board, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰

It also created the National Military Establishment by merging the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. This new executive branch agency was to be headed by the Secretary of Defense, a cabinet rank civilian secretary. His offices would consist of three autonomous executive departments, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as several other staff and coordinating boards.¹¹

The 1947 National Security Act was not without controversy and political infighting, especially between the Army and Navy, which stood to lose autonomy and status, and the Congress, which stood to lose access and influence. While the Secretary of Defense was to be the principal assistant to the President on national security issues, Congress limited his authority, power, and the size of his staff.¹² The service secretaries retained their cabinet-level status, were full voting members of the National Security Council, and possessed direct access to the President.¹³ The net result was a weak Secretary of Defense and a less than efficient national defense structure.

The first major change to the National Security Act of 1947 was the codification of amendments into the National Security Act of 1947. These removed the service secretaries from the National Security Council, clarified their subordination to the Secretary of

Defense, and established the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would not possess command authority or the right to vote with the Joint Chiefs.¹⁴ The net result significantly strengthened the powers of the Secretary of Defense by making him “the central figure in coordinating the activities of the three services, who were to continue to be separately administered, but not merged.”¹⁵

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 continued the trend of unifying the armed services. It further refined the relationships between them and the Secretary of Defense. The military departments were to be “separately organized” rather than “administered,” and were placed under the “direction, authority, and control” of the Secretary of Defense.¹⁶ Congress also explicitly granted the Secretary of Defense the authority to reorganize the military departments, and defined the chain of command as running from the President through the Secretary of Defense to theater commanders. This act also authorized the creation of specified and combined or unified commands and provided the Chairman with voting power on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁷

THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is the most comprehensive defense reorganization package since the National Security Act of 1947. The act was the fourth major revision of the 1947 National Security Act and the third post-World War II reorganization of the Department of Defense. With this act, the 99th Congress sought to strengthen civilian control of the Department of Defense, improve military advice to civilian leadership, clarify the authority and responsibilities of the combatant commanders, improve strategy formulation and contingency planning, and provide for more efficient use of defense resources.¹⁸

One of the potentially far reaching changes contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act was the requirement for the President to submit an annual report to Congress that detailed the national security strategy of the United States.¹⁹ The report should provide a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

- The worldwide interest, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.
- The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.
- The proposed short-term and long-term uses of political, economic, military, and other elements of national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives of the United States.
- The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.
- Such other measures as may be helpful to inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.
- Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in both classified and unclassified form.²⁰

The intent of the 99th Congress was to focus discussions and debates on national security strategy by requiring the President to codify a grand strategy in terms of national interests, goals, objectives, and values; its coherence in terms of relating ends, ways, and means; the integration of the element of national power; and its time horizon.²¹ “In theory, at least to the reformers, a clearly written strategy would serve the Congress better on the needs for resources to execute the strategy, thus facilitating the annual authorization and appropriation processes, particularly for the Department of Defense.”²²

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The Reagan administration developed and published the first two national security strategy reports during its final 2 years. Both reports provided the world a uniquely American view on national security strategy. Since Congress did not pass the Goldwater-Nichols Act until late 1986, the *National Security Strategy* report of 1987 covered only a limited period of time and reflected current U.S. strategic thinking and direction.²³ This first report contained several fundamental components now considered integral to any discussion of U.S. national security strategy. The Reagan administration's first report contained sections that outlined the current thinking on American national security strategy. The sections were titled: An American Perspective; Fundamentals of U.S. National Security Strategy; U.S. Foreign Policy; U.S. Defense Policy; Executing the Strategy; and Looking Forward to the 1990s.

In "An American Perspective," the Reagan administration argued that it had already "laid the foundation for a more constructive and positive American role in world affairs by clarifying the essential elements of U.S. foreign and defense policy."²⁴ Furthermore, the administration suggested that it had also objectively reviewed and adjusted U.S. policies to reflect the "dynamics of a complex and ever-changing world."²⁵

In "Fundamentals of U.S. National Security Strategy," the administration highlighted the leadership role the United States had assumed following the Second World War and argued that this role would continue into the future. The 1987 report also established the now familiar concept of identifying and using national interests as a guiding principle of American strategy. It identified the five U.S. interests as: The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values and institutions intact; A healthy and growing U.S. economy; The growth of freedom, democratic institutions and free market economies throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system; A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests; and The health and vigor of U.S. alliance relationships.²⁶ The report

detailed five major objectives in support of the articulated national interests of the United States.²⁷ It identified the Soviet Union as the “most significant threat to U.S. security and national interests.”²⁸ It also recognized international terrorism as an additional threat, “which is particularly insidious in nature and growing in scope.”²⁹

This report also outlined three distinct elements of U.S. strategy aimed at containing the Soviet Union. The first, “U.S. Defense Policy,” involved the forward deployment of military forces required to deter and contain Soviet expansion. The second, “U.S. International Economic Policy,” involved economic recovery programs for Western Europe and Japan and established U.S. leadership in establishing and managing the international monetary system, while encouraging regional and global free-trade agreements. The final element, “U.S. Policy Toward the Third World,” included both economic and security assistance to counter Soviet efforts to establish Marxist-Leninist regimes.³⁰

The section on U.S. Foreign Policy, described how in general terms, the United States worked to sustain its foreign policy goals by fostering the growth of democracy and global economic vitality. This section focused on the continuity of basic goals, instruments of foreign policy, international economic policy, and political and informational elements of power. It also included a sub-section describing America’s regional policies; however, these were focused on the contributions of the military instrument of power.³¹

The largest section of the 1987 report, “U.S. Defense Policy,” detailed the administration’s strategy for the military containment of the Soviet Union. The tenets of the then current U.S. defense strategy included taking advantage of U.S. strengths and Soviet weaknesses, maintenance of strategic deterrence, arms control, maintenance of conventional deterrence, space support of national security, intelligence support of national security, and low intensity conflict. Taken together, the sections detailing foreign policy and defense policy demonstrated the administration’s strong emphasis on military power for achieving U.S. goals and objectives and protecting national interests.³²

The 1987 Report concluded by restating the reasoning behind identifying the Soviet Union as the principal threat to the United States as well as global peace and stability. It clearly and succinctly

highlighted the fundamental differences in economic, social, and political beliefs, the Soviet expansionist policies, the unprecedented Soviet military build-up and its threat to the United States and its allies, and the link between the Soviet Union and the growth of global terrorism. While the report also briefly warned that the United States must not neglect other destabilizing international threats and problems which could seriously damage U.S. interests, it failed to detail specific regions, nations, or threats.³³

The first *National Security Strategy* provided a clear view of current American strategic thinking. The report described how the United States viewed itself in the world. It contained a comprehensive description of U.S. national interests, goals, and objectives and provided a description of U.S. foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and the national defense capabilities required for the United States to the Soviets. While it provided a comprehensive description of both the short-term and long-term uses of military of power, it failed to articulate a methodology for integrating other elements of national power into a comprehensive strategy.

This report reflected the Reagan administration's strong emphasis on the military, almost to the exclusion of the other instruments. Taken as a whole, it detailed a comprehensive strategic approach towards containing the Soviet Union. However, it failed to fully integrate the other elements of national power into the strategic equation and also failed to provide a true global perspective. Therefore, the 1987 Report did not meet the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of providing a grand strategy for the United States.

The 1988 *National Security Strategy* report represented the first true grand strategy submitted to the Congress as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. With the dual challenges of the federal budget and international trade deficits on the political agenda,³⁴ the Reagan administration made two major changes in the 1987 report. The first was to emphasize the role of all elements of national power into a national strategy.³⁵ The second was to develop and present separate strategies for each region.³⁶ This report consisted of five sections: Historical Dimensions of U.S. National Security Strategy; Fundamentals of U.S. National Security Strategy; Power, Policy, and Strategy; Integrating Elements of

Power into National Security Strategy; and Executing the Strategy.³⁷ Nevertheless, the overarching strategy still rested on continuing the policy of containing the Soviets.³⁸

In “Historical Dimensions of U.S. National Security Strategy,” the administration argued that U.S. security strategy had changed little since World War II. It argued that U.S. core interests and objectives had remained consistent and that the combination of the elements of national power had always been important contributors to the nation’s past, present, and future security.³⁹

“Fundamentals of U.S. National Security Strategy” contained five national interests.⁴⁰ While the report made slight modifications of the 1987 report, the national interests articulated in the two documents remained basically identical. This report also articulated a set of five major objectives in support of stated American interests, and these objectives also remained fundamentally the same as those contained in the 1987 Report.⁴¹

The 1988 report also identified the Soviet Union as the principal threat to United States and to global security interests. The report did acknowledge that as a result of changes in leadership style, the Soviet Union had succeeded in projecting a more favorable international image and that proposed domestic reforms and foreign policy initiatives had given rise to hopes for fundamental changes in Soviet behavior. The report acknowledged that threats to American and international interests also existed in the Middle East, Central and South America, and Southeast Asia, as well as the continuing threat created by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.⁴²

The 1988 report contained two major additions. The first was an emphasis on the elements of national power to provide an integrated strategy.⁴³ In “Power, Policy, and Strategy,” the administration provided a clear vision of how the nation could use the elements of American national power to protect and further national interests. This section also described how U.S. diplomatic, defense, and economic policies could also contribute to achieving U.S. goals and objectives.⁴⁴ The second major addition was to outline a set of separate strategies for each region of the world. In the section on integrating elements of power into national security strategy, the administration provided a concept for integrating the elements of

U.S. national power into a strategy designed to achieve U.S. goals and objectives on a regional basis.⁴⁵

The second *National Security Strategy* report provided a clear and comprehensive U.S. strategy. It contained the basic framework of values, interests, and national security objectives still in use today. It described how the United States intended to use the elements of national power to achieve its stated security goals. Most significantly, it provided integrated strategies for achieving and sustaining global goals and objectives. In the final analysis, the 1988 Report met the intent of Goldwater-Nichols by providing the Congress a grand strategy for the United States.

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

The Clinton administration published its first national security report in June 1994, nearly 18 months into its first term.⁴⁶ This report represented the first true post-Cold War concept of U.S. security strategy and was the first significant change in American security strategy since 1987. It reflected a radically altered global landscape, the organization of the executive branch under the Clinton administration, and the existing political climate in Washington, DC, and the nation.⁴⁷

The 1994 *National Security Strategy* report contained four sections: Introduction; Advancing Our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement; Integrated Regional Approaches; and Conclusions. It reflected a clear change in the direction and thinking of how the United States should work to achieve its national security goals and objectives. It also established three central goals, which were to be in all seven Clinton administration *National Security Strategy* Reports: to sustain American security with military forces that are ready to fight; bolster America's economic revitalization; and promote democracy abroad.⁴⁸

In the introductory section, the new administration acknowledged that a new era had dawned. The "end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire brought about a radically transformed security environment" and a "corresponding period of great promise, but also great uncertainty."⁴⁹ It articulated

that the United States was the preeminent global power and that its leadership in the world had never been more important. This section also highlighted the rise of transnational terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth, and refugee flows as threats to global and U.S. security.⁵⁰

The largest and arguably most important section of the 1994 report was “Advancing Our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement.” This part of the strategy detailed the administration’s direction and strategic thinking. It stressed the need to use preventive diplomacy and selected engagement as the primary tools for achieving U.S. goals and objectives. This section also contained a sub-section highlighting the administration’s tangible accomplishments over its first 17 months in office.⁵¹ This report also reflected a much broader definition of “security” than used by earlier administrations. With the new strategic environment and the lack of clear military threats to the nation’s physical security, the administration defined security as “protecting our people, our territory, and our way of life.”⁵² The strategy aimed at taking advantage of the “opportunities to make the nation more safe and prosperous, as well as protecting it from a new class of security threats.”⁵³

The 1994 report contained only three fundamental national security goals: enhancing U.S. security; promoting prosperity at home; and promoting democracy.⁵⁴ “There is a simple elegance in using only three national security goals to integrate all of the governments efforts to advance U.S. interests.”⁵⁵ “Integrated Regional Approaches” highlighted the administration’s approach towards the world’s regions by providing broad regional objectives. It articulated that U.S. policy toward each of the “world’s regions reflects our overall strategy tailored to its unique challenges and opportunities.” This section highlighted the application of U.S. strategy to each of the world’s regions—“our broad objectives and thrust, rather than an exhaustive list of all our policies and interests.”⁵⁶ This approach failed to provide a detailed strategy for integrating the elements of national power required to secure regional U.S. goals and objectives.

The 1994 *National Security Strategy* Report reflected a major shift in U.S. security thinking and direction. It contained a comprehensive

description of the national security interests, goals, and objectives of the United States and provided a description of the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities necessary to deter near-term and long-term threats. It also provided a thorough description of the short-term and long-term uses of the elements of national power to protect and promote American interests. Finally, it described the necessary balance between the elements of national power required to achieve U.S. security goals and objectives. In the final analysis, through the dual strategy of preventive diplomacy and selective engagement, the 1994 *National Security Strategy* report met the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act by providing a grand strategy.

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY

The Clinton administration published its second *National Security Strategy* report in October 1998. This report reflected the administration's recognition of increased global economic interdependence, the Balanced Budget Agreement, the results of the 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review*, and an increasing awareness of the challenges presented by domestic terrorism.⁵⁷ It contains four basic sections: Introduction; Advancing U.S. National Interests; Integrated Regional Approaches; and Conclusions.⁵⁸ The 1998 report was similar in both structure and substance to the 1997 *National Security Strategy* report and retained the three core U.S. objectives of enhancing U.S. security, bolstering America's economic prosperity, and promoting democracy abroad.⁵⁹ In general, differences between the two reports were of matters of emphasis and degree.⁶⁰

In the introductory section, the Clinton administration clearly established the national and international security environments which have and will continue to undergo significant changes. "The security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncertain, replete with a host of threats and challenges that have the potential to grow more deadly, but also offer unprecedented opportunities to avert those threats and advance our interests."⁶¹ It described the challenges and opportunities of globalization, highlighted the importance of continued U.S. engagement, and outlined how the

administration would implement the strategy to achieve the three core objectives of U.S. national security.

“Advancing U.S. National Interests” is the most important and far reaching section of the report. The overall strategy remained based on three national objectives: enhancing security; bolstering economic prosperity; and promoting democracy abroad.⁶² It also established the precedence for categorizing U.S. national interests as either vital interests, important national interests, or humanitarian and other interests.⁶³ This section also outlined current and future threats to U.S. interests: regional or state-centered threats; transnational threats; spread of dangerous technologies; foreign intelligence collection; and failed states.⁶⁴ Finally, it highlighted the Clinton administration’s continued focus on strategy implementation built around the concepts of shaping the international environment, responding to threats and crises, preparing now for an uncertain future, and promoting prosperity.⁶⁵ Each of these areas contained an array of policy tools and objectives designed to achieve U.S. national security.

Similar to the 1994 Report, the section on integrating regional approaches highlighted the administration’s approach towards the world’s regions by providing broad regional objectives. However, this report provided a more coherent approach to attaining and maintaining U.S. goals by outlining the administration’s strategy of enhancing security, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy in each region.⁶⁶

The 1998 *National Security Strategy* report reflected the continuing trend of major shifts in U.S. national security thinking. This report contained a comprehensive description of U.S. national security interest, goals, and objectives. This included categorizing U.S. interests as vital, important, or humanitarian and other. It provided a detailed description of the foreign policy, national defense capabilities, and worldwide commitments necessary to achieve U.S. goals and objectives. It demonstrated a more focused and integrated regional approach when compared to the 1994 report and, in the final analysis, provided Congress a grand strategy for the United States.

A NEW AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The Bush administration published its 2002 *National Security Strategy* report in September 2002. It clearly reflected the new administration's views on U.S. national security, unparalleled U.S. power, the changing strategic environment, and the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. This report contained nine sections⁶⁷ that outline the administration's national security strategy. It represented a fundamental break with the strategic thinking and direction of the United States. This strategy seeks to increase security and economic development by using unrivaled U.S. power and influence to expand freedom and open societies around the world. The underlying theme of the strategy is clearly captured in Bush's introductory letter: "The United States will use this moment of opportunity to expand the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free market, and free trade to every corner of the world."⁶⁸

The 2002 report deviates from the precedence of articulating clear national interests as the guiding principle for U.S. strategy. Instead, it offers three goals for U.S. national security that are identified at the end of the following quote:

The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of the strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other nations, and respect for human dignity.⁶⁹

This report identifies rogue nations and transnational terrorist networks and their supporters as the principal threat to U.S. and global security interests. It outlines a strategy for defending the United States against these enemies and for defending and preserving peace on a global scale. This strategy is built on the foundation of strengthening, maintaining, and developing new alliances against rogue nations and global terrorism. It also recognizes that the United

States will be the lead nation in this campaign, and that it must and will shoulder this burden.

The section on “Working With Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts” argues that “concerned nations must remain actively engaged in critical regional disputes to avoid escalation and minimize human suffering” and “that since the United States is a concerned nation, it will be involved in regional disputes, along with friends and allies, to alleviate suffering and restore stability.”⁷⁰ It recognizes that the United States has finite resources and establishes two strategic principles for U.S. involvement. The first principle is “the United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge.” The second principle is “the United States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively.”⁷¹ This section identifies the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, South Asia, Indonesia, parts of Latin America, and Africa as areas of importance to U.S. and global security.

The section on “Igniting a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade” outlines the Bush administration’s strategy for enhancing a strong world economy. This strategy outlines seven policies designed to generate higher productivity and sustained economic growth and details the U.S. plan for enhancing global trade by providing a ten-point strategy for promoting free trade.⁷²

The 2002 *National Security Strategy* report is profoundly different from earlier reports in its tone. Two statements and one theme not only demonstrate this fundamental shift in U.S. strategic thinking and tone, but they are also frequently highlighted by segments of the world community who see the United States attempting to establish global hegemony. The two statements are contained in the document’s opening section, “Overview of America’s International Strategy.” The opening assertion that the “United States possesses unprecedented—and unequalled—strength and influence in the world”⁷³ frequently is combined with the statement that “the aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer, but better.”⁷⁴ When one views these two statements through the lens of the

international community and combined with recent and ongoing U.S. military operations, it is difficult to argue that the United States prefers multilateral over unilateral action.

A new emphasis on and broader definition of “preventive war” or “preemptive attack” remains the most controversial aspect of the report. The strategy proposes expanding the accepted concept of true preemption—striking first against an imminent, specific, and near certain attack—to the far broader concept of striking first to prevent a longer-term threat from even developing. (And in fact, the United States has conducted two major preventive military operations to date.) This broader definition of “preventive war” violates accepted international norms developed to prevent these destabilizing approaches to conflict resolution. It also runs the risk of establishing a new international precedent that other nations may adopt.

In broad terms, the current Bush administration strategy has a “reality versus rhetoric” mismatch that is unsustainable in its current form. Continued reliance on the military instrument of power, combined with the broader definition of “preemptive attack,” is simply unsustainable from economic, political, and especially military aspects. This current mismatch points to a potential lack of balance in the ends, ways, and means construct that enables the successful execution of a national security strategy.

The 2002 *National Security Strategy* report reflects another clear shift in U.S. security thinking and direction. This change was once again driven by the changing character of the threats facing the United States. While it is more descriptive than previous *National Security Strategy* reports, it does provide a comprehensive set of U.S. national interests, goals, and objectives. It provides a description of the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States required to deter near-term and long-term threats. This report also provides a description of the short-term and long-term uses of the elements of U.S. national power. It recognizes that the United States has limits to its national resources and provides a strategic balance between the various elements of national power in order to achieve U.S. security goals and objectives. In the end, while this report is different in form and

structure from past reports, it meets the intent of Goldwater-Nichols and provides a grand strategy to the Congress of the United States.

WHAT DOES THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ACCOMPLISH?

The *National Security Strategy* report serves three primary purposes. First, it serves as a strategic communications document; second, it is a unifying document for the executive branch; and third, it serves as the fundamental statement of the President's agenda.

As a strategic communications document, the *National Security Strategy* report fulfills two primary purposes. The first is to communicate a grand strategy to the Congress. This strategy should provide the basis for the development of a common understanding between the executive and legislative branches on the strategic environment, the administration's intent, the basis for determining the allocation of national resources, and the uses of the elements of national power to achieve U.S. goals and objectives.⁷⁵ Second, it communicates the direction of U.S. national policy to a wide range of international and domestic audiences. International audiences include allies, friends, and neutral nations, as well as existing and potential adversaries. Domestic audiences include political supporters and opponents, all of the various special interest groups, the defense and nondefense industrial base, as well as the American public.⁷⁶

As a unifying document for the executive branch, it aims at creating an internal consensus on foreign, defense, diplomatic, and economic strategy. "Every new and second-term administration faces this challenge as it transitions from campaign to governance, particularly if foreign policy has not been a major issue in the campaign."⁷⁷ This consensus theoretically is accomplished through the National Security Council and the interagency processes as the report is developed, staffed, and approved. As the fundamental statement of the president's overall agenda, the annual *National Security Strategy* report represent the cornerstone of an administration's strategic direction, encompassing the allocation of national resources and the uses of the elements of national power to protect U.S. national

interest and lead to the attainment of global and domestic U.S. goals and objectives.

While the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the submission of an annual *National Security Strategy* report, the track record is decidedly mixed. Arguments have been made to revise Goldwater-Nichols to require a biannual submission of the report during the second and fourth years of an administration.

Three trends become readily apparent when studying the various national security strategy reports and their development. First, incoming administrations have limited time to prepare their first report. This already difficult timeframe can be complicated further if the incoming President has not finalized his cabinet, or the Congress has yet to act on the incoming administration's nominations. Second, the intense iterative nature of the interagency process itself has resulted in significant delays in submitting the report to Congress. Finally, a biannual process would provide all participants involved in the process the time necessary to assess the effectiveness of the current national security strategy and study alternative approaches prior to restarting the current annual process. These points provide the basic evidence necessary to consider revising Goldwater-Nichols and requiring the submission of a biannual *National Security Strategy* report.

CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions about the development of U.S. national security strategy can be drawn from this chapter. First, there is no overarching consensus on the appropriate grand strategy for the United States. This is due to the necessary political processes and compromises resident in any democratic form of government. "After all, grand strategy is really the idea of allocating resources to create in both the short-term and long-term various instruments of power, instruments with which the nation then provides for its defense and the furtherance of its aims in the world."⁷⁸

Second, since the publication of the first *National Security Strategy* report in 1987, the United States has undergone several fundamental changes in strategic thinking and direction. These adjustments have been driven by changes in administrations as well as changes in

the international and national security environments. Third, while different administrations have made adjustments to U.S. goals and objectives, our national interests have stood the test of time and remain consistent, even in the face of radically different international and national security environments.

Finally, even though the “most evolved democracy in the world has the most cumbersome national security decisionmaking process, inefficiency is the price the founding fathers imposed for domestic accountability.”⁷⁹ This process has stood the test of time and protected U.S. national interests through some dramatic changes in the international and national landscapes.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

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CHAPTER 14

THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF TRANSFORMATION

Colonel Robert E. Scurlock, Jr.

War is a special activity, different and separate from any other pursued by man. This would still be true no matter how wide its scope, and though every able-bodied man in the nation were under arms. An army's military qualities are based on the individual who is steeped in the spirit and essence of this activity; who trains the capacities it demands, rouses them, and makes them his own; who applies his intelligence to every detail; who gains ease and confidence through practice, and who completely immerses his personality in the appointed task.

Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*

As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise, and the way we fight. We must transform not only our armed forces but also the Department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creative and prudent risk taking. We must promote an entrepreneurial approach to developing military capabilities, one which encourages people to be proactive, not reactive, and anticipates threats before they emerge.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Transformation Planning Guidance
April 2003

... the essential nature of war has not changed. Wars are fought by men, and there has been no discernible difference in the fundamental nature of man over the past five thousand years of recorded history. Because the nature of man has not changed, neither has his basic objective when he turns to war: the employment of lethal instruments to force his will upon other men with opposing points of view.

Colonel N.T. Dupuy,
Understanding War, 1987

The transformation of the U.S. military and the Department of Defense (DoD) represents a complex process which has been evolving since the end of the Cold War. Successful transformation will require a cultural change that focuses on producing forces that, when integrated with all elements of national power, will achieve desired effects to defeat any enemy's capabilities. The Army Transformation Roadmap suggests that the nation requires a joint force that can meet the strategic mandates established by the National Security Strategy (NSS) and further elaborated in the *Defense Planning Guidance*, the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the *Transformation Planning Guidance*, and the *Joint Operations Concepts*.¹ These documents provide the framework and concepts to determine the future path the military seeks, but it is the human dimension of transformation—the educated, well-trained, values-oriented service member—that will have the greatest impact on the transformation process. Technology is an enabler and a catalyst for change, but it is the practitioner of war that will determine how the technology will be employed to achieve desired effects and that will affect the cultural changes required to adapt to the changing security environment.

Transformation is commonly used to describe changes in organizations and equipment, but it has greater impact on the culture and members of the force. It is less important to change the things that forces use to make war than it is to change the way forces think about the effects they produce when using them. Transformation is an intellectual process and must begin with the mind of the leader. The leader must understand the emerging environment as projected in *Joint Vision 2020*, *Defense Planning Guidance*, and other assessments, and must comprehend the adjustments that will be required to operate effectively in that environment. If the services field new equipment and adopt new organizations but continue to think about the application of force in the old ways, then there is no material advantage. According to the DoD Planning Guidance:

Transformation is a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.²

Transformation is incomplete if the focus is primarily on technology or organizational change rather than leadership and service culture. The numerous transformation documents at DoD and Army level clearly articulate all the components required for change. How does the nation ensure transformation remains on course? What are the proper transformational concepts? The changes in the strategic environment in the post-Cold War era, the predominance of the information age, and the introduction of new technologies such as precision munitions, stealth aircraft, advanced sensors, and digitization of the battlefield demand that the joint force transform to meet potential capabilities of future adaptive enemies. The intent of this chapter is to examine transformation in terms of the human dimension, provide some recent examples of how the transformation concepts have evolved, and offer recommendations to ensure the transformation effort proceeds on a logical path.

Transformation is a strategic process that should rest on sound strategic theory and principles. Its concepts derive from historical lessons learned. When examining insights garnered from previous conflicts, it is difficult to isolate how military actions affected political objectives without a holistic view of the factors involved. Colin Gray, in his book, *Modern Strategy*, asserts that “there is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes.”³ Gray presents 17 dimensions of strategy that provide an excellent framework to understand past conflicts and their implications for transformation. The human dimension and strategic culture are essential to gaining an understanding of this process. Gray posits, “Tactical achievement has meaning only in terms of operational intention and strategic effect.”⁴ As statesmen and military leaders glean lessons learned from case studies as well as recent operations, they need to avoid focusing on tactical level successes and shortcomings. Instead, they need to evaluate case studies holistically and focus on the human dimension and strategic culture of both their forces and those of the enemy.

TRANSFORMATION CONCEPTS

Neither policies nor machines will determine the history of tomorrow. Man is the measure of all things . . . This, then, is the ultimate battlefield: the hearts and minds of men.

Hanson W. Baldwin

Joint Publication 3-16, p. III-1

The Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command, with input from the services, developed the *Joint Operations Concepts* to support the *Defense Planning Guidance*. The intent of this initiative was to provide the services with a series of concepts to form the framework for how joint forces might operate in the future. The *Joint Operating Concepts*, the joint functional concepts, and the enabling concepts attempt to refine this framework to guide the integration of a broad range of military capabilities. A kluge of services does not make a force joint. People make it joint by internalizing the joint concepts. These concepts represent an effort to link the “strategic guidance with the integrated application of joint force capabilities.”⁵ The major cultural shift in this concept is that the joint forces focus on defeating a broad range of potential enemy capabilities across the spectrum of military operations and not on any one specific threat. This conception of future combat operations requires a transformation in the fashion in which the United States conducts joint military operations. The continuous transformation process outlined in the *Joint Operations Concepts* is the tool the DoD will use to assess proposed systems, define required capabilities, and validate joint warfighting requirements. It has major implications on the “development and acquisition of future capabilities across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.”⁶

This concept is an attempt to overcome service parochialism and organizational culture in order to achieve the interdependence of joint forces. To defeat future potential capabilities that enemies might possess, this joint warfighting concept postulates that the future joint force must be fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, decision-superior, and lethal. By adapting the forces to counter potential enemy capabilities,

the concept envisions a force that can “achieve full spectrum dominance—the ability to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than any adversary in any situation.”⁷ Hence, the effectiveness of the joint force ultimately hinges on the human dimension which comprises the sensors, the decisionmakers, and the ones employing the capabilities to achieve the desired effects.

The Army’s transformation strategy is to transform the Army culture through leadership and adaptive institutions, develop capabilities by conducting experimentation, analysis, and capabilities assessments in collaboration with the other services and Joint Forces Command, and then build the transformational capabilities into the joint force through training, exercises, and simulations, as well as evaluating these capabilities in real world operations whenever possible.⁸ This approach requires a global joint expeditionary land force that is ready, deployable, and designed to fight as part of the joint force on land, so the Army must focus on how it will contribute to winning the joint warfight—not on moving the old force faster.⁹ This concept forces the services to depend on each other. These collaborative efforts enhance trust and cooperation. Both are part of the human dimension.

TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES

A transformed mindset is one that can handle the chaotic and uncertain situations created by the collapse of political, economic, and security systems. Leaders must be able to operate in countries that have no effective governments, where the enemy and front lines are not easily identifiable, and rules of engagement are conflicting. Our forces are expected to deal with terrorists, drug traffickers, warlords, militant fundamentalists, and paramilitary units—and still be able to overcome large maneuver formations and formidable defense systems.

Brigadier General (Ret) David L. Grange

In accordance with the *Joint Operations Concept*, the Army’s transformation plan is to develop modular brigade-sized force packages that can provide the combatant commander with a tailored force, supported with the required capabilities designed to produce

effects against enemy capabilities instead of a specific threat. These force packages are organized into maneuver and support units of action, with the command and control units of employment. These units are tailorable to allow the Joint Task Force Commander the capability to assemble and fight with powerful, lethal, agile units as part of a joint force to produce the desired effects against the enemy. This requires a balance of capabilities, resources, and risk. Hence, given the interdependency among the services, thinking “joint” is essential to mission success.

The concept of effects-based operations is an effort to provide a framework to achieve an effect on the human dimension of the enemy. According to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome, or effect, on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.”¹⁰ This approach recognizes that technology alone is not the driving force in campaigns. Only people can make EBO coherent.

Decision support tools such as the Operational Net Assessment and the Collaborative Information Environment serve as a ready source of information for the combat commanders and can assist staffs much like eavesdropping on radio nets to gain an understanding of what is happening on the battlefield to anticipate possible requirements of support without hindering operations of the element in the field. The same is true with joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts. These efforts must provide the commanders and staffs not in direct contact the ability to monitor, gain understanding of the situation, and anticipate requirements and changes to the plan without distracting the element in contact. Such tools allow the commander to gain situational awareness and visualize the battlefield without being obtrusive on the subordinate element engaged in the fight. Commanders must avoid centralized control “from afar” because this will have a detrimental effect on the immediate action and will undermine the initiative and confidence in the networked sensor system to assist the element in contact. The informational picture given does not present the full situation that the commander on the ground has since he is aware of the human

and psychological factors which interact with the force. It is the uncertainty and friction that he must overcome to defeat the enemy. Understanding the limitations of technology is a critical component of usage. Hence the leader is the centerpiece of the process because he/she must utilize the input from these decisionmaking tools and apply his/her experience, intuition, and understanding of the human dimensions to make a determination on what actions to take.

When today's technology is working properly, it allows the commander to maintain situational awareness and exercise battle command from great distances and while on the move. The commander's presence forward is still as critical to battlefield success as it was during the days of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Grant, Lee, and Patton, among others.¹¹ A senior commander in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM stated in a recent lecture that he felt he needed to meet face to face with his commanders routinely. He felt his "physical presence forward" was the best way to gain a "common view of the enemy," a personal assessment of the friendly situation on the ground, and to ensure his commanders had a clear understanding of his intent for future operations. More importantly, he stated he felt he could gain a better sense of the fatigue, morale, confidence, and other psychological factors that may have been affecting his commanders and soldiers.¹² Decision support tools and other technologies are enablers in the battle command process, but they cannot replace the importance of the physical presence of the commander on the battlefield or the value of human interaction in understanding and overcoming the psychological friction in war.

When the services introduce new technologies, they are rarely mature enough to exploit their full potential capability for the battlefield. User innovation in employing the new technology, providing feedback to refine the technology and its application, and the continued assessment and improvement of employment techniques provide the most dramatic results. A historical example of the innovative use of technology designed for one purpose effectively employed in another role is the German 88mm Air Defense Artillery gun, which the Germans employed as a field expedient anti-tank weapon throughout World War II. A recent example of such a development is the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)

now used to conduct precision fires. This new capability resulted from an innovative approach to employing the Global Positioning System, originally designed as a military navigational aid. The Air Force adapted it for use as a guidance system, matched with small, powerful computer chips and a moveable fin system that allowed the munitions to “fly” within three meters of the desired target in an all-weather environment.¹³ Once developed, the Air Force adapted it for use from multiple delivery systems. This innovative approach to use a “spin-off” technology to develop new capabilities, combined with the creative approach to maximize its employment, allowed forces to achieve effects with fewer rounds while causing less collateral damage.

The challenge in this process is to balance the capital investment directed toward the future force with the resources needed for the current force. Some technologies or concepts may provide the opportunity to advance capabilities for the current force. There are systems in place to devote valuable resources toward such “high-risk, high-payoff technologies” based on “urgency of warfighter needs and the maturity of enabling technologies.”¹⁴ A recent article based on a new report to Congress argued that, “the Pentagon is producing and even fielding billions of dollars’ worth of weapons that have not been adequately tested. . . .”¹⁵ Such large expenditures suggest the need for concern in maintaining a balance of resource expenditure for current technology versus testing, evaluating, and improving these systems to provide the capabilities required for future forces. The senior leadership uses judgment and counsel to determine the proper balance of what soldiers need today versus what capabilities future forces will need to provide for national security. The experienced, well-grounded professionals are what will make this process successful. Military leaders must constantly remind the defense community that technology is not a “golden key” to success at any level. Service personnel are the hedge against the friction and fog of war that prevails during a campaign.

LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE

In the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment we face for the foreseeable future, if we were to choose merely one advantage over our adversaries it would certainly be this: to be superior in the art of learning and adaptation. This is the imperative for a culture of innovation in the U.S. Army.

Brigadier General David A. Fastabend

To provide the combatant commander a cohesive modular force with the required capabilities, the Army must focus on its core competencies which are to train and equip soldiers, to grow leaders, and to provide relevant and ready land power capability to the combatant commander and the joint team.¹⁶ The Army already has initiated actions to transform its culture through actions such as force stabilization and unit manning initiatives. To avoid the formation of *ad hoc* units, the establishment of cohesive teams that work and train together is key. These initiatives will allow the core elements of the Army's modular force packages, the units of action, and units of employment to maintain cohesive teams with well-developed tactics, techniques, and procedures. These teams learn each others' strengths and weaknesses through tough, realistic training and exercises in order to maximize their strengths and minimize weaknesses. This will increase confidence in leaders, systems, and themselves to provide combatant commanders with capabilities required on the battlefield.

Leader development and joint professional military education are critical components in assuring the seamless integration of the joint force. Focusing on leader development is necessary to adjust to a volatile, complex, uncertain, changing environment and the possibility of rapidly adapting enemies that U.S. forces may face in the future. The educated and well-trained leader, whom the Army encouraged to be innovative and flexible, is a basic requirement to focus Army culture on defeating competent and adaptive enemies, while integrating his force's capabilities into the joint warfighting team. As Williamson Murray points out:

Perhaps the most important enabler of transformation and innovation in the past has been the culture of the military organizations that have grappled with an uncertain and ambiguous future, a future made more complex and difficult by tactical, operational, and technological changes, the impact of which are almost impossible to predict under peacetime conditions. . . . If the American military does not desire to repeat the mistakes of the past, then it needs to create a learning culture, where intellectual preparation is as prized as tactical preparation.¹⁷

This view is equally true today. An educated and learning culture is especially important as the Army works through organizational change, while confronting adaptive enemies. Soldiers are employing sophisticated equipment and are facing increasingly more complex tasks. They must be able to work with joint, interagency, and multinational partners across the spectrum of operations in a changing security environment. It is the human dimension—the educated, well-trained, values-oriented service member—in this process that will determine the success of transformation to meet these demands.

TRAINING, EXERCISES, WARGAMING AND SIMULATIONS

Everyone has now seen that we fight as a joint team. Therefore, how can we best go about improving upon our already existing training to further bring in the notion and the concepts of joint? Here is our ultimate end state of training transformation: no individual, no unit, no staff would ever deploy into combat without first having experienced the rigors and the stress of their joint responsibilities in a robust and realistic training environment.

Dr. Paul W. Mayberry
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness

The services conduct numerous exercises and simulations to hone their skills and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures. These events provide the opportunity to evaluate different forms of operations against a variety of enemy forces under a wide range of environments. Conducting tough, realistic training has been a hallmark of the U.S. military as well as a major contributor to

recent successes. The Combat Training Centers, with their aggressor forces and difficult terrain, provide a unique testing and training environment. Conducting joint training to “train as we fight” will be a critical factor in developing soldiers who can employ the capabilities required by future combatant commanders.

When examining the enemy and his potential capabilities, U.S. forces need to ensure that “Red teaming” provides a thinking, adapting adversary that resembles not only the enemy of today but those expected in the future. The Red forces must not be mirror images of U.S. forces with the same values and expected behaviors. Moreover, training should include a level of realism that forces soldiers to appreciate the impact of casualty evacuation, extended operations that press the limits of the maintenance and resupply systems, refugee control, large numbers of enemy prisoners of war, consequence management from exposure to a weapon of mass destruction, loss of critical assets, and the loss of key leadership. Forces should exercise these events so leaders can think through solutions and work through issues before having to perform these functions on the battlefield. Too often these events are omitted from training because they are time consuming and difficult. Additionally, weather extremes, harsh terrain, and complex and urban environments should be among the variables used in training to evaluate systems and concepts.

There are limits to how well simulations can replicate the human dimension involved in warfighting, but they provide for larger force involvement in a terrain and resource constrained environment. Simulations provide a method to work through various scenarios in a combination of live, constructive, or virtual environments to achieve training objectives. An example of this effort is the Joint National Training Capability, which will combine training at the various major service training areas. This will allow service components to fight as a joint team through networked systems and synchronized efforts, with the aim of achieving joint training objectives and testing various joint capabilities.¹⁸

There are new developments in the embedded training technology and automated teaching software systems known as intelligent tutoring systems. These technologies would either be

built into new systems or developed in stand-alone systems that replicate the equipment that soldiers use. These systems will allow training in various scenarios without major resource expenditure by using digital terrain representations. The goal for these new systems is to allow individual and collective mission planning and rehearsal.¹⁹ These systems allow for soldiers to progress at their own pace commensurate with their level of skill and experience. This contributes to providing a learning culture by giving soldiers the tools to hone their skills and prepare for future operations.

There is no substitute for actual maneuver and live-fire training to train forces and validate concepts and doctrine. The German experience in the interwar years prior to World War II provides a historical example commonly used to demonstrate effective transformation. The Versailles Treaty placed severe restrictions on German military manpower, equipment, and planning headquarters. Despite these restrictions, the Germans were able to develop a doctrine that incorporated mechanization and air power, and emphasized rapid operations. They also enhanced their ability to operate in a more decentralized fashion by placing radios in a large number of their tanks. They had superior training programs, conducted field exercises and maneuvers, and conducted war gaming. There was the full participation and open, honest sharing of ideas that encouraged innovation, and thorough evaluation of lessons learned that enabled their transformation to be successful at the tactical level.²⁰ They effectively adapted their tactics, techniques, and procedures based on lessons learned and validation of concepts in actual combat operations over the two years prior to their invasion of France and the Soviet Union. Had they used a framework similar to Gray's 17 dimensions to view their experiences holistically, they might have avoided strategic failure. The United States continually should assess and reassess both friendly and potential enemy capabilities and not lose focus on the strategic factors of transformation. Otherwise it may make the same mistakes as the Germans, who emphasized transformation at the tactical level but failed to put enough effort on the strategic implications of transformation.

CASE STUDIES THAT SUPPORT CURRENT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

The key organizational transformation for the Army is the construct of modular, brigade-sized units of action. These units are intended to be self-sufficient, highly-trained and skilled in their core competencies with the ability to leverage current technology, and adept at using emerging technology. This core element may require capabilities not resident in the unit of action. To minimize the negative effects of creating an *ad hoc* unit, the sooner the task organization can occur and the unit can train, rehearse, and operate together, the sooner the team can form up and prepare for combat. The team will perform much more effectively, if it can conduct situational training exercises to ensure its members know how to integrate their skills and capabilities into the effort, and can validate its tactics, techniques, and procedures.

An example of a capability not resident in a unit of action might be military dog teams. This capability proved valuable in Kosovo and Afghanistan for both explosive detection and crowd control. Linguistic and cultural expertise is another capability that is difficult to have resident in a unit of action. Prior to entering into a conflict, it is beneficial to conduct mission readiness exercises to prepare soldiers for the kinds of situations they might encounter. This helps familiarize them with language differences and how to deal with the local population. This proved of great value in Iraq, when intelligence initially identified a target at one location. Then after soldiers seized that target and questioned those at that location, they discovered the target was just a few houses away. Without the ability to communicate effectively with the local population, the mission could have failed completely. Instead, because of the quick thinking of the leader and the integration of the language capability, units achieved success.

The above incident highlights the need for effectively engaging and gaining the trust and confidence of the local population. In Kosovo, small units spent much time familiarizing themselves with the local population in small villages. Patrols immediately would recognize new people or trusted local inhabitants would point out

the “bad people” so units could preempt them. Many locals in Iraq have identified improvised explosive devices before they could harm U.S. soldiers or pointed out troublemakers before they could instigate further trouble. This trust must go both ways, as guerrillas may end up targeting those who are assisting U.S. forces, which has been happening in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Infusion of human interaction on the battlefield is crucial to strategic success.²¹

Additionally, the Army needs to conserve valuable resources by not trying to homogenize itself into a force with the most technological and expensive weapons now. Soldiers need the right weapons and equipment to provide sufficient capabilities required by the combatant commander, but there needs to be a balance of resources consumed in mass production now rather than waiting for technology to mature and the equipment refinement process to work. The slow fielding timelines and the long lag time required to produce new systems may cause a lack of adequate resources to field the force with updated equipment in the future.

The efforts to transform concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations need to remain flexible, adaptable, and versatile. These areas need to provide a broad range of capabilities that are rapidly developed, rigorously tested, experimented with, and evaluated by the users under realistic conditions. Capabilities should be modified to fix deficiencies and updated to incorporate any new technological improvements. If the Army can field these items to a small number of units of action and continually improve them when certain items need to be fielded in mass to deal with a future major crisis, then the Army could produce and field the best, most trusted, most advanced pieces of equipment available at the time.

An example is the current body armor. Units like the 75th Ranger Regiment started using ceramic body armor in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The initial versions had only a front ceramic plate and the vest came up high on the neck. After use in many training events and exercises, the rangers discovered they had difficulty firing their weapon in the prone position because of the way the armor cut into the neck. In addition, the rangers needed back plates to protect the vital areas of gunners in vehicles or those firing crew served

weapons, where their backs were exposed. Once Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began, U.S. forces were on the fourth or fifth generation of improvements. The large amounts of armor vests fielded today have the benefit of the iterative improvements which resulted from ranger-user input. This demonstrates the importance of involving the user, the human dimension, early and continually throughout the process.

There are numerous examples in recent operations that suggest how to adapt lessons learned into the current design of units of action. The initial deployment of forces into Kosovo for Operation JOINT GUARDIAN II contained elements of a mechanized brigade combat team, task organized with an airborne battalion. The command and control element, Task Force Falcon, combined a division staff element with the brigade combat team staff, and incorporated unit and individual augmentation, as well as unit liaisons from multinational units to fill various staff functions. Task Force Falcon coordinated the efforts of the numerous multinational forces by assigning forces to areas of operations best suited to their mobility, capabilities, and cultural compatibility. Troops from Russia, Poland, Greece, and Italy operated throughout the American sector. Russian and U.S. soldiers conducted joint patrols at the squad level on different occasions and built trust among the Serbian and Albanian civilian populations. This required technical and procedural interoperability considerations such as communications and battle drill rehearsals, so the units could function as a team in response to hostile actions. The human interaction and innovation of junior leaders assisted in identifying required capabilities to form a cohesive multinational team that produced the desired effects in this culturally diverse situation.

The battalion task forces that occupied the American-led sector were task organized with airborne and Bradley infantry companies, M1A1 equipped armor companies, Paladin-equipped artillery batteries, combat engineer companies, and various elements of combat support and combat service support elements based on requirements in their areas of operation. In addition, Task Force 1-26 Infantry established Camp Montieth out of a former Serbian artillery camp, which was a smaller base camp adjacent to Gnjilane, the largest city in that sector. Forces on Camp Montieth consisted of over

26 different units to include Navy Seabees, an Army, Navy, and Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal composite detachment, and a host of combat support and combat service support units with camp command and control under Task Force 1-26 Infantry. This *ad hoc* task force continued to change structure and rotate forces in and out throughout its 6-months tour. Units performed numerous functions which were not in their normal core competencies. Composite squads ensured that proper expertise was available to provide the manpower to maintain the presence patrols required to secure a safe and stable environment that would allow the United Nations and the numerous nongovernmental and humanitarian assistance organizations to complete their missions. This is similar to the techniques used to complete normal combat engineer functions with a limited number of engineers. For example, in normal operations a core of engineer subject matter experts guide and supervise other nonengineer soldiers in the execution of engineer-related tasks.

Additionally, 1-26th Infantry had just completed an organizational change and major weapons systems transitions while preparing for operations in Kosovo and while deployed to Kosovo. In early 1999, the battalion transitioned from M2A1 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to M2A2 enhanced Bradley Fighting Vehicles and converted to the Limited Conversion Division XXI (LCD XXI) configuration, which resulted in the loss of one maneuver company. The unit transitioned from the M60 machinegun to the new M240B machinegun in September of 1999, while conducting stability and support operations in Kosovo. The unit transitioned numerous senior leaders during the preparation, deployment, and initial execution of operations, to include the commander and all field grade officers. The flexibility and adaptability accompanied by intense training and lessons learned during initial execution of assigned missions helped elements of this diverse task force form into a cohesive team. The stabilization and unit manning initiatives that the Army is implementing today will mitigate the risks associated with turbulence in the manning, equipping, and organizing of a unit while preparing to deploy or while undergoing complex military operations.²²

Some of the nuances of this operation were the integration of live digital transmission from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flown out of Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia directly into the tactical

operations center of Task Force 1-26 Infantry. The rudimentary means to direct its flight once the UAV was airborne was by telephone to the operator in Macedonia. This new technology allowed the force to monitor more of the sector during the short flight times when the UAV was available. With significant improvement in UAV technology since its use in 1999, these systems have now become an integral source of technology in both Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. This unit also had a tactical local area network established within 10 days of establishing Camp Montieth. The networking of forces with the main base at Camp Bondsteel provided redundant communications to the limited radio reception that resulted from the mountainous terrain and extended distances the units operated in. The network allowed soldiers limited internet and electronic mail access as well. Although the network was established with emerging technology with limited bandwidth, it allowed the Army to develop capabilities into major innovations in how forces operate today. Ongoing operations now employ chat rooms, email, and net meeting capability to assist with command and control.

Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada provides an example of how organizations can ignore problems and overlook their failures to provide professed capabilities. Individuals, who wrote after action reports that presented a critical view of intelligence failures and portrayed the military in a negative light, were threatened with career-ending evaluations for presenting their negative perspectives.²³ In the age of Network-Centric warfare and the information age with use of the internet, young soldiers and leaders are conducting informal correspondence with other military members through email and unofficial chat rooms. They are able to pass on their valuable experiences and lessons learned in a more personal and immediate forum. Although there are dangers in propagating unsanctioned interpretations of lessons learned, it is important to get all members involved in the process to achieve the best results. The services need honest, constructive input on how to improve unit capabilities to achieve desired effects in the future.

An example of an existing standing joint task force headquarters that can provide lessons learned from previous operations and exercises is the forward deployed U.S. Army Southern European

Task Force in Vicenza, Italy. Although predominately an Army manned headquarters, it is structured to provide the European Command (EUCOM) commander with the Joint Task Force core that is prepared to accept joint and multinational elements as well as individual augmentees to fill critical positions when mobilized. The Southern European Task Force headquarters established the Southern European Task Force Infantry Brigade, and received the requirement to be prepared to provide a Joint Task Force headquarters deployable within 72 hours in January 1994. In August of 1994 it deployed and became the nucleus for the Joint Task Force for Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda. Since this initial deployment as the core of a Joint Task Force headquarters, Southern European Task Force has conducted annual Battle Command Training Program training exercises, in addition to numerous real-world deployments, integrating joint forces, and integrating augmentees which allowed them to develop tactics, techniques and procedures, and formulate relationships with joint and multinational units and organizations. The concept development for a Standing Joint Forces Headquarters can use the lessons learned from the numerous experiences of units like Southern European Task Force. The cohesive core staff element with the habitual relationships developed over time reduced the negative effect of building an *ad hoc* team to deal with a crisis situation.

CONCLUSION

The human dimension will have the greatest impact on the transformation process. Transformation is an intellectual process for which technology is an enabler and a catalyst for change. The practitioner of war is the one who innovates and determines how these technologies will be employed to produce the desired effects on enemy capabilities. The key to this cultural change required for transformation is in educating and training leaders, encouraging innovation and full participation in the process by all members of the services. The leadership with the experience, intuition, and understanding of the human dimension will make the systems of

war successful. It will require honest and realistic evaluation of organizational changes and doctrine, acceptance of new technologies, and adoption of new processes, while maintaining flexibility and adaptability to adjust to a changing environment and potentially changing enemy capabilities.

The Army appears to be moving in the right direction with the modular brigade construct that intends to form cohesive core teams, reduce *ad hoc* formations, and implement force stabilization and unit manning initiatives. Human interaction on the battlefield by interoperable forces using innovative approaches for achieving effects remains the key to success. People, organizations, and doctrine determine how the joint forces will transform. Those involved in the transformation process can learn valuable lessons from past conflicts. The evaluation of each case study should be viewed holistically, based on the framework of sound strategic theory and principles, so the correct lesson can be extracted from the complex context of specific events. Immature technologies and developing concepts presented in the above case studies demonstrate how user innovation and continual reassessment of lessons learned can evolve into future concepts and capabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

DoD should conduct continual reassessment of strategic aims; the technologies available to conduct the war; and the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to prosecute the war. More importantly, joint forces must be able to maintain the flexibility and agility to make timely changes to affect the outcome of the war. The United States needs to focus on learning the right lessons from its past conflicts by examining not only what went right, but also by examining what went wrong and what adjustments potential adversaries have made as a result of U.S. actions. The human dimension of transformation is the critical factor in this process. The institutional Army has developed effective educated, well-trained, values-oriented service members, and this must continue despite the high operational tempo. The services need to create a learning organizational culture that encourages innovation and the willingness to take prudent

risks. Forces need to be able to apply the required capabilities, at the right time and place to produce the required effects to defeat future enemy capabilities.

The joint force needs to invest more in the human dimension versus focusing on high-dollar platforms. It needs to find a way to reduce the weight and bulk of the soldiers' load since they are required to carry more high technology equipment, almost all of which requires batteries. It needs to develop effective hybrid fueled vehicles or some similar more fuel efficient variant. These vehicles need to be more durable and require less maintenance to reduce the logistics tail required to support their effort, which will assist in reducing the forward footprint. Forces need to identify capabilities not immediately required in the area of operations, bringing in only what is needed and calling forward resources as the situation requires, reducing force protection and sustainment requirements. This change in thinking requires the trust and confidence that engaged forces will receive the necessary capabilities and resources in time to produce the desired effects. The continued effort in training and operating as a joint force, with a focused effort in developing innovative solutions and encouraged by a military with a learning culture, will ensure this process remains on a logical path.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14

1. U.S. Army, "Transformation Roadmap 2003," p. ix.
2. Department of Defense, "Transformation Planning Guidance," April 2003, p. 3.
3. Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, (New York, 1999, p. 1. Gray elaborates on p. 9, ". . . [As] tactical forms of war alter with political, economic, social, and technological change, war and strategy retain their integrity as distinctive phenomena." Gray presents his 17 dimensions on p. 24, and he further argues, based on his analysis of Clausewitz and Michael Howard, that "strategy can be thought of usefully as having many broad, pervasive, and interpenetrating dimensions." He clusters his 17 dimensions into three categories: The first is "People and Politics," which comprises people, society, culture, politics, and ethics. The second category, "Preparation for War," includes economics and logistics, organization (including recruitment, training, and most aspects of armament), information and intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, and technology. The final category, "War Proper," composes of military operations, command (political and military),

geography, friction (including chance and uncertainty), the adversary, and time.” Gray demonstrates the importance of strategic culture on p. 25, stating

. . . while historical experience as interpreted by and for the present day is probably best considered in the (strategic) culture. For example, while U.S. strategy today can be said in part to be a product of American historical experience, that strategy is also the product of how Americans today choose to interpret their country’s historical experience.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

5. Department of Defense, *Joint Operations Concepts*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2003, p. 1. The *Joint Operating Concepts* are derived from the *Defense Planning Guidance* and “describe how a Joint Force Commander will plan, prepare, and execute joint operations across the full range of military operations.” *Joint Operating Concepts*, currently defined as Major Combat Operations (MCO), Stability Operations (SO), Homeland Security (HS), and Strategic Deterrence (SD), will

guide the development of joint tasks and ultimately desired joint capabilities required for success. These documents then further refine these concepts in joint functional concepts, currently defined as Command and Control, Battlespace awareness, Force application, Focused logistics, and Protection, that integrate related military tasks to attain capabilities required across the range of military operations. The Army structures transformation within the context of these joint concepts.

U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) Concept Primer*, October 2003, states,

Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) is a virtual aggregation of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess joint force operations and enable a commander to make decisions better and faster than the adversary.

U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) Concept Primer*, October 2003, states, “Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) is a net-centric approach to the management of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, aimed at supporting the demands of the joint war-fighter across all domains and all levels of war.” U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Concept Primer*, October 2003, states, “Operational Net Assessment (ONA) provides a methodology and framework used to develop a coherent, relevant, and common understanding of the operating environment, of the adversary as an adaptive entity within that environment, and of ourselves.”

6. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

7. U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) Concept Primer*, September 2003, p. 1.

8. U.S. Army, "Transformation Roadmap 2003," pp. ix-x.

9. Douglas A. Macgregor, *Transforming Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*, Westport, CT, 2003 p. 8.

10. U.S. Joint Forces Command Online Glossary, available from the internet at <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm>; Internet, accessed February 12, 2004. U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Draft Effects-Based Operations (EBO) Concept Primer*, September 2003, pp. 3-5, states, "Effects-Based Operations (EBO) has four components: knowledge superiority, an effects-based planning process, dynamic and adaptive execution, and accurate and timely effects-based assessment." Strategic effects describe the desired change in the enemy's behavior, often a coercion, deterrence, or stabilization. Operational-level effects describe changes in the enemy's ability to operate coherently, i.e., the denial of the enemy's ability to use key capabilities or elimination of the enemy's operational options. Tactical effects describe the way we [the United States] affect key enemy systems, i.e., the reduction of the enemy's integrated air defense systems to independent, uncoordinated, individual platforms through disrupted connections to target acquisition radars."

11. Gary B. Griffin, "The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command," Combat Studies Institute Report, 1985; available from <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Griffin/GRIFFIN.asp>; Internet, accessed March 8, 2004.

12. The experiences and ideas related in this paragraph are based on remarks made on January 7, 2004, by a senior leader who participated in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to the Advanced Strategic Arts Program students and a briefing given on Battle Command dated December 16, 2003. Van Creveld's statement reinforces this position,

. . . any given technology has very strict limits. Often the critical factor is less the type of hardware available than the way it is put to use . . . victory often depends not so much on having superior technology at hand as on understanding the limits of any given technology, and on finding a way of going around those limitations . . . dependence on technology inevitably creates vulnerabilities that an intelligent enemy will not be slow to exploit. The opportunities for doing so, moreover, increase rather than diminish with the complexity of the technology in use.

Martin van Creveld, *Command in War*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 231. Van Creveld cites the following source for this idea: P. T. Rhona, *Weapon Systems and Information War*, Seattle, WA, 1976, pp. 10-14.

13. Phil Craig, "The Technology That Changed War," Public Broadcasting System Online, Available from Internet, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/innovation/episode4_essay1.html. Accessed March 7, 2004.

14. U.S. Army, "Transformation Roadmap 2003," pp. 7-12.

15. David Wood, "Pentagon Regularly Shortcuts Operational Testing Of Weapons, Report Says," February 12, 2004; Newhouse News Service Online at www.Newhouse.com; available from <http://www.newhousenews.com/archive/wood021204.html>; Internet, accessed February 12, 2004.

16. The Army core competencies listed in the U.S. Army, "Transformation Roadmap, 2003," p. 1-1, are "train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders" and "provide relevant and ready land power capability to the combatant commander and the joint team."

17. Dr. Williamson Murray, "Transformation And Professional Military Education: Past As Prologue To The Future," *National Security Challenges for the 21st Century*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2003, pp. 16-17.

18. Dr. Paul W. Mayberry and interviewer Jordan Fuhr, "Training Transformation," *Military Training Technology Online*. Vol. 8, Issue 4, November 19, 2003. Available from Internet, http://www.mt2-kmi.com/archive_article.cfm?DocID=267. Accessed February 10, 2004, p. 3.

19. Patrick Chisholm, "Tutoring for Future Combat," *Military Training Technology Online*, Vol. 8, Issue 3, September 8, 2003: Available from http://www.mt2-kmi.com/archive_article.cfm?DocID=219; Internet, accessed February 10, 2004.

20. James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg*, Lawrence, KS, 1992, p. 198. "The evolution of German tactics depended largely on the success of the maneuvers and war games in which the Germans tried out the new concepts." Corum attributes the superior training programs for the German success at the beginning of the Second World War (p. 205).

21. These accounts of actions in Iraq are taken from electronic mail correspondence with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Russell, a battalion commander operating in Tikrit, Iraq.

22. These accounts are from my experience as the commander of 1-26 Infantry from June 29, 1999, to June 15, 2001, and from accounts recorded in the 1999 edition of the 1-26 Infantry Annual Historical Review, as part of the 1st Infantry Division Annual Historical Record.

23. This reference on after action reports and failure to allow critical reports after Operation URGENT FURY is from personal observations and conversations with participants in this operation.

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