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RATIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY

by

GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, (USA-RET)

(Editor's Note: *General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA Retired, visited Carlisle Barracks on 19 June 1972 to make his twenty-second appearance as a guest lecturer before the US Army War College faculty and students. As the Keynote Speaker for the Midcourse Resident Phase of the Nonresident Class of 1973, General Taylor asked that we question our view of national security today in a context which exceeds our traditional consideration of a military challenge by a*

military power which is conducted by military methods. Addressing strategic retaliatory forces, volunteer reaction forces and the internal threat, General Taylor outlined a program he feels the Nation should follow.

This superb address was so well received by the student body and faculty that the Commandant requested permission to publish it in Parameters so that more could benefit from this realistic approach.)

General Maxwell D. Taylor was born in Keytesville, Missouri on 26 August 1901. Following graduation from the US Military Academy in 1922 he served with the Corps of Engineers and the Field Artillery in a variety of assignments, and as an instructor at the Military Academy. He served with the 82d Airborne Division during the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. In 1944 he assumed command of the 101st Airborne Division. In 1945 he returned to the Military Academy where he served as Superintendent until 1949 when he became Chief of Staff of the European Command. In 1953 he became the Commanding General of Eighth US Army in Korea and rose to the position of Commander in Chief, Far East Command and United Nations Command in 1955. From 1955 until his retirement on 30 June 1959, General Taylor served as Chief of Staff, United States Army.

President Kennedy recalled him to active duty in 1961 and he served as the Military Representative to the President until 1962 when he was designated as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; he served in that position until 1964. Serving for President Johnson, he was the US Ambassador to South Vietnam during 1964-1965, after which he was a Special Presidential Consultant on Diplomatic and Military Affairs until 1969. Concurrently, he was the President, Institute for Defense Analyses in Washington; and a member, and later Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Although now retired, General Taylor is still vigorous in his interests and has just published a new book entitled *Swords and Plowshares*.




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General Davis and Gentlemen of the College:

It is always a pleasure to return to Carlisle and meet with the class, not for the purpose of hearing one's own voice reverberate in this very fine hall, but primarily for the discussion period which always follows. I confess in advance that I am going to make some rather broad statements in the course of my prepared remarks without taking the time to justify all their content; I expect you to cross-examine me if you find my statements need further justification.

I was reflecting, as I drove here this morning from Washington, how fortunate this class is to be assembled here on this day of Our Lord to start the summer course. I do not know of a time in our recent military or national history when there were more new factors bearing on our national security and providing food for thought for all of us who are involved in national defense and the Armed Forces. We see change on all sides in the readjustment of our relationships with some of our former enemies—in the outcome of the SALT talks, in the consequences which we now can perceive of our experience in Vietnam—all of which suggest the need for reexamination and revalidation of old concepts and procedures

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US ARMY

General Taylor shown in 1964, at a meeting in the Pentagon of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Secretary of Defense McNamara and Deputy Secretary Vance.

My topic this morning bears on this question of our national security, what it should mean to us, and how we should make provision for the problems related to it which lie ahead. I would divide my discussion in two parts: first, a brief discussion of our need for a new concept, a new understanding of what we mean by national security, feeling that the conventional one, the traditional one if you will, is no longer entirely adequate. Then, having decided what the new concept should be, we can undertake to outline the kind of defense program which is consistent with the concept. The latter is the second part of my talk.

Incidentally, I don't believe your Commandant warned you that I am not speaking for the Pentagon, or for the Army. As I often say, I am merely an indignant taxpayer, but one tremendously interested in our national security as well as in where my taxes go. So, if some of the statements I make are highly controversial, please bear in mind

that they are not indorsed by those who have the responsibility for making present day decisions in this field.

NEED FOR A NEW CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

With regard to our conventional concept of national security, I feel that it has become outmoded, at least since World War II. But since old habits linger long, I still find that men in authority often talk of national security as if it were still exclusively a question of military defense against military threats. Admiral Mahan said at the turn of the century, "Every danger of a military character to which the United States is exposed can be best met outside her territory at sea." That was a good statement at the time; nobody challenged it, and I think it remained essentially valid until World War II and its aftermath. But still we're inclined to think in archaic concepts and to view national security

as essentially the protection of our own people, of the national territory and of the sea-lanes from the military action of hostile nations.

Yet it takes only a moment of reflection to realize that such a formula does not describe what we really have to concern ourselves with today. We have far more to protect than a seagirt homeland. We are a great Nation with all the trappings of world power—prestige, alliances, bases, garrisons, investments, commercial and political undertakings, and relationships. We also share on a global basis many concerns with other great powers—concerns for such things as communications by ship, plane, and electronics. We share an interest in such things as oil, which has come to have enormous strategic and political importance for all industrial nations—ourselves included. Likewise, we have a global interest in the collection of intelligence. We don't often think about intelligence as being a foreign-based asset, but it is. We have many intelligence installations and systems abroad upon which we are critically dependent for the information which provides our decisionmakers with the basis for their judgments. I mention these things just to remind you of something we all know; namely, that we have a vast number of targets abroad which are vulnerable to attack, and which represent essential assets of a great power.

Not only do we have important exposed values abroad, but there are more troublemakers about nowadays than there used to be. One can almost feel a certain nostalgia for the days of the monolithic Sino-Soviet bloc, when all we had to do was to keep a steady eye on the great danger represented by the two great Communist powers in combination. Multipolarity is now the word we use to describe the new distribution of power centers about the world, and while it has indeed attenuated the concentration of power formerly represented by the Sino-Soviet bloc, multipolarity has also created new problems for us because we have to watch in many directions. We can no longer afford to be the Cyclops with a single eye in his forehead watching a single enemy;

we have to be more like Argus with his many eyes looking in all directions, multi-directional in our interests.

Not only are there more troublemakers to watch, but their tactics have changed and proliferated. We can no longer think only in terms of war as history has shown it in the past. We have to be prepared for violence in many forms: major war, limited war, Cold War, and covert or mini-aggressions. Examples of the latter are incidents such as those in which North Korea in 1968 shot down one of our reconnaissance airplanes, or when Ecuador seizes our fishing boats in international waters—incidents of the sort which Dean Rusk has called, "acts of tyranny of the weak."

We hear that with our new relationship to the USSR and China the Cold War is no more; but in fact, the Cold War describes a condition which can exist at any time with differing sets of participants. The Cold War came upon us as a surprise following World War II—we were not prepared for it. We thought that peace had come, but it had not. Now we see that the Cold War and its variant, the War of National Liberation, are forms of hostility which can be used by anybody against anybody—even against a great power such as the United States.

When John F. Kennedy became President, he was very much impressed with the danger of this kind of unconventional warfare. He had seen it in action in Southeast Asia on a visit a few years before becoming President; and as a result, upon becoming President he immediately energized all the agencies of government for the purpose of preparing to cope with these kinds of threats. However, I am sure that neither he nor any of his many assistants who helped him organize the counterinsurgency programs ever thought of the United States as a possible target for the techniques with which we were concerned. Today we are aware that we are indeed vulnerable to these tactics; that covert aggression can indeed occur in the United States, just as it has occurred elsewhere, and hence that subversive insurgency at home must be included among enemy tactics for which we must prepare.

Thus we see that in this period we are

confronted with the problem of numerous exposed targets, more troublemakers, varied enemy tactics. Unfortunately, we seem to be moving into this period in a condition of diminishing strength. The Vietnam syndrome is a term used to refer to the complex of doubts, inhibitions and psychoses which have grown out of our experience in South Vietnam. The evidence is strong that this syndrome is sapping the vigor that we have shown in the past—our willingness to undertake risks and our steadfastness under pressure. There are many indications that the sources of the strength upon which we have drawn in the past are drying up as we enter the present decade.

These are some of the reasons why, in my judgment, we must regard the threats to national security as something broader than a military challenge by military power carried out by military methods. The issue is not simply a matter of clarifying words, it is not merely a question of greater exactitude of language. Its importance is the need to stimulate appropriate adjustments of national behavior to a changing problem. As long as we think of national security primarily as protection against military action by military means, the average citizen will never feel that sense of personal involvement before the shooting starts. Furthermore, when our interests are threatened, we shall first think of the sword and then perhaps, reflecting upon the disastrous experience of Vietnam, we shall decide to do nothing. Just as in military strategy we need options between a tripwire defense and total nuclear war, in national strategy we need nonmilitary options available for possible use before resorting to military actions.

Perhaps it is because we have rarely thought of our diplomatic, economic and psychological resources as part of the arsenal of security that we have never learned to use these tools effectively, and hence have developed little confidence in them. If we came to view them as essential components of the national power available to advance our world interests in integration with military power, we would have taken a long step forward in reinforcing our security. In

"WE MUST REGARD THE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY AS SOMETHING BROADER THAN A MILITARY CHALLENGE BY MILITARY POWER CARRIED OUT BY MILITARY METHODS."

bringing a wider range of new situations under the rubric of national security we would, at the same time, broaden the circumstances requiring a standard of civic behavior reserved in the past for times of overt war—all of this to the benefit of our national unity.

Now I propose that we accept for a moment my thesis that some such broadened concept of national security is indeed essential and take it as the starting point for the construction of what I'm going to call "a rational national security program." If you are not satisfied with the broadened concept, we can return to it later.

CRITERIA FOR A NEW DEFENSE PROGRAM

Let's ask ourselves, "What would be the criteria of a defense program which would meet this expanded concept?" I would point to three or four conditions which I think our program would have to meet. First, it must make sense to our citizens who will have to pay for the program. They must be convinced that both the security concept and the resulting defense program make sense, and as a poor past performer in this field of explaining security to the public I will be the first to say that we have not done a good job in the past. Except in times of war, with an overt enemy on our doorstep, we have rarely been able to make our citizens understand the need to maintain large Armed Forces in a fighting posture. So one condition for our program is that it be easily explained, and be clearly sensible—no effort to fortify the moon or to protect the United States against every possible threat. Let us recognize publicly that

**"NOTHING BUT DISASTER CAN
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there is no such thing as absolute safety in this world, neither for us as individuals nor for us as a nation. Hence we should merely try to get reasonable protection for most of our important assets at a cost the country can afford, and will be willing to pay for during the long pull.

The next criterion of our program is to show that it relies upon the deterrence of war, particularly nuclear war, and has faith in deterrence. We talk a good deterrence game in the Pentagon but frequently we act in contradiction thereto. I refer primarily to the deterrence of strategic nuclear war—the use of nuclear weapons in major conflict. Nothing but disaster can result from the failure of strategic deterrence. We must be successful in constructing forces that will prevent the use of these weapons for fear of the consequences, otherwise we're lost. If deterrence fails, we've had it! Yet in practice we don't design our military programs, or haven't in the past, to show that we really accept that fact, and that we're putting all our money on deterrence when we design our strategic forces. If we did, long ago we would have eliminated or vastly reduced many of the hedges against the failure of deterrence which have been in past programs, and still are. I refer to such things as redundant strategic weapons systems, continental air defense, civil defense, stockpiling against post-strike damage, and the forces for deployment overseas after nuclear D-day. Those are some of the hedges upon which we've always spent vast sums of money. A program that I would consider convincing would take those facts into account, recognize past errors, and adjust the force structure accordingly to eliminate the hedges.

The third criterion for this program would be that it must assure some limited war option for the President. We must set up our forces so that it is possible for a President to have a military instrument to reinforce

national policy, and if necessary to wage limited war. This may not be a difficult point to make with a military audience, but I can assure you that its feasibility is one of the great questions arising from our experience in Vietnam.

Is limited war a truly feasible option for the President of this great democracy? Will not the next President be faced with the same dilemma which confronted Presidents Johnson and Kennedy? In case of minor provocations requiring a military response, are we going to run the danger of a prolonged Vietnam kind of war because we're timid and hesitant in the use of our power, or are we going to use our power decisively and quickly, and run the risk of escalation, perhaps even escalation into general war? Or frightened by those two unattractive alternatives, shall we do nothing? That, I call the three-horned dilemma of limited war, and our program must find some answers for it.

A fourth criterion is that our program must take into account the internal threat of which we are becoming aware. It is difficult to evaluate its dimensions at the present, but certainly it is a matter warranting very close attention.

The final requirement for our program is budgetary feasibility. All these things we are discussing will cost money. They all mean big budgets which have to be justified carefully. We must make every effort to find compensatory economies, and look for them in areas such as the hedges against the failure of deterrence, which I mentioned. Also there are costly overlapping service missions—we still have them. They've always been around. Our overseas deployments—are they all necessary? What about the role of our reserve forces? Many of you represent the reserve forces, and this is a field in which you can make a great contribution to the discussions at the War College. Finally, we should scrutinize our international commitments which are the basis for many of the fiscal requirements of national security. We have many of these about the world at the present time. Are they all justified or not?

In summary, the kind of defense program which I think would be consistent with our

modified concept of national security, would be adequate for our true needs, and furthermore would constitute a financial burden which we could bear over the long pull, would meet these points:

It would be designed to be readily explained and justified to the public.

It would maximize the deterrent effect of our strategic forces, put all our money on deterrence, and leave virtually nothing for the hedges against the failure of deterrence.

It would provide a limited war option for the President and also would take into account the need for nonmilitary and military means for dealing with the Cold War and with the internal threat.

SALIENT FEATURES OF A NEW DEFENSE PROGRAM

The remainder of my talk is simply to point out some of the salient features of a concrete program in consonance with the foregoing considerations.

I would think that our first step would be the review of commitments which I have suggested as being necessary. When I was Chief of Staff of the Army in the '50s I had a chart on the wall in my office which showed the globe and all the political commitments which our country had undertaken in the post-World War II period with potential military implications. There were 42 nations to whom we had made such commitments, and the very thought of the limitations of our military capabilities in that period always made my hair curl.

Gentlemen, we have essentially those same 42 commitments today. They haven't changed. In spite of Vietnam, in spite of the experience we have acquired, they are still on the books. It was a surprise to me that the Nixon Administration, when it came in, did not initiate a review of our commitments to revalidate them or to discard those which had outlived their usefulness. That kind of job has never been done. It remains to be done, and I would put it at the top of the actions to be taken, if indeed we are going to have a rational security program.

The second step would be to provide

security against plausible threats which our citizens can readily recognize. They are the threats of nuclear war; of limited war, both small and large; and Cold War, to include the internal threat previously mentioned.

Now just a few words regarding each one of these threats. What kind of strategic retaliatory forces should we have if our purpose is to maximize their deterrent effect, and to put all of our eggs in the basket of deterrence with little concern for what will happen if deterrence fails? I can visualize a strategic retaliatory force of maximized deterrence consisting of three components: weapons, leaders, and a command and control system. Its effectiveness would be derived not from size, not from numbers, but from excellence, quality, reliability, and above all, invulnerability. The force itself would be the very best force we could put together, finite in size, but thoroughly protected, with great attention paid to the survival of the command and control system—something we have never done in the past.

It is interesting to reflect on the meaning of deterrence. What are its elements? What goes into deterrence? It's something one cannot weigh or evaluate precisely. It is not something that can be worked out on a slide rule because of the many spiritual factors involved. But certainly you would think that the leaders of any hostile power would be deterred from attacking us if they knew that several hundred missiles which could be expected to hit their targets were concealed, hardened or dispersed on the ground, in the air, or in the sea, responsive to the command of potential leaders linked to their weapons by invulnerable communications. Of course, these leaders would have to be men of character obviously capable of pushing the button if they had to do it.

Now how to create that kind of deterrent image is a problem I'm raising with you: how to have a retaliatory force in which all of those factors of deterrence are maximized to the greatest degree possible. I think it could be done along the lines suggested above, although it has never been attempted.

So much on the concept of a deterrent retaliatory force. Next, how do we get the

limited war option which I have talked about?

I would begin by accepting the volunteer force concept—reluctant as I have been thus far to believe in its soundness, either from a military or social point of view. I would visualize forming from volunteers what I would call, for want of a better term, "an all-volunteer quick reaction force," which would be our general purpose reserve available to the President for limited military operations. It would be located principally in the United States, but also would include the forces which are permanently deployed overseas. I would hope that those deployments, as a result of our review of commitments, would be substantially reduced; in particular, the European deployment. The latter causes me problems for a number of reasons.

When President de Gaulle took France out of military NATO and forced us to roll up our line of communications across France, he really forced us back into the tripwire concept of the defense of Western Europe. I say that as the one who fought vigorously for years against the tripwire concept. But it is perfect nonsense today as all of you in uniform will recognize, I believe, to have a large army deployed in Europe with a line of communications parallel to its front, leading up to Bremerhaven, and no room for maneuver in depth. It is impossible to have a viable supply system, such as is required by a conventional military defense of Western Europe. Oddly, this is a point which has never been raised openly against our deployments to Europe, but it will be in time.

I say that because we saw in the last session of Congress how Senator Mansfield and many other respected senators were bent on reducing our deployments in Europe. We in uniform had better anticipate a renewal of their efforts, and had better accept the fact that a reduction is coming sooner or later and decide how to cope with it. I would take the position that our NATO deployment at the present moment is still justified for political reasons associated with the Germans and their future reactions and future behavior; and also by the possibility of negotiations which result

in a mutual withdrawal of forces in Western Europe. Until we see clearly how those two factors are to be accommodated, I would say we should retain our present deployments. But from a military point of view, for the reasons I have just stated, it makes no sense to have so many troops exposed in Europe as they are, and it is self-delusion to assume the possibility of reinforcing them and sustaining a conventional major conflict in Western Europe.

So before setting up this "quick reaction force" I would hope that we could reduce our fixed commitments overseas, and then try to have the best elite force we can put together from the three services available to the President to provide a clearly viable limited war option. But its capability would be limited. It could not undertake tasks which it could not carry out with its own forces, as there would be no plan for a rapid mobilization to raise additional forces. I shall return to this point in a moment.

That, in general terms, is the kind of quick reaction force which I would like to see us develop—elite, all-volunteer, with the best of equipment but limited in size by two factors: one, the ability to get high quality volunteers of the type we must insist upon; and second, the ability to get enough money to pay for such an expensive force. The need for this force would be justified not by the so-called NATO commitment, which is becoming rapidly invalid, but on the multiple contingencies worldwide which may arise without emphasizing any particular one.

You may ask what happens if this force embarks on something that appears to be a little brushfire and it doesn't turn out that way. How do we cope with an unexpectedly large contingency? My answer is that we will have a mobilization capability behind this quick reaction force, but we will accept the fact that mobilization cannot produce major forces for about a year. I don't think that concession is much of a liability because we have never been able to do better in the past; in fact we can't do better today. We have had many, many plans for the purpose of increasing the combat readiness of our reserve forces—reserve units have worked extremely

hard trying to reach these standards, but at no time in my experience have we had reserve forces ready to be deployed overseas into combat on the heels of the departing forces of the regular establishment. In another way, the fact that a major military effort will take time is not all bad. It may permit us to ponder the wisdom of a large scale military intervention and avoid another situation like Vietnam where our foreign policy outran popular support.

RISKS

Now let me just point out some of the risks which are contained in my proposals. There are some rather serious ones.

There is our reliance on deterrence and our refusal to hedge against its failure, I think, that makes a lot of sense, but maybe things won't turn out the way we visualize them in the outbreak of nuclear war. Then there is our dependence on volunteers. Perhaps we can't get enough volunteers at the price we're willing to pay.

Finally, there is my proposed reduction of levels of readiness of conventional forces. I have often reflected on how much money and effort we have expended in the Armed Forces over the years to try to attain an instant readiness capability which often was not needed and almost never attained. Now if we are willing to accept the fact that we are going to mobilize deliberately, we can plan realistically and avoid waste on unattainable objectives. Furthermore, we will avoid creating illusions in the minds of our civilian leaders as to the things we can do in a crisis.

I recall shortly after I reported for duty to President Kennedy in '61, just back from civil life, he made a speech in which the Army had suggested a paragraph saying that we were going to get National Guard divisions ready for deployment into combat with eight weeks of training. With all respect to the Guard it just could not have been done; you can't get even regular units ready at that rate. So we were fooling a new President. It was not intentional, but nonetheless the Army authorities were giving him misleading information which could have been a serious

disservice had the President ever acted in accordance with it.

COMPENSATIONS

So much for risks in our program. What are some of the compensations we would get from it? First, we will be putting our big money on deterrence where it belongs, and not on costly preparations to meet conditions following a firststrike. Next, we would be eliminating many of the personnel problems which have plagued the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, as a result of the draft. To get rid of the draft and of the unhappy or disloyal soldier would be of enormous value to us. I believe, as Gideon did, that I too would much rather have a few hundred reliable men rather than the 32,000 Gideon had at the outset of the Midianite Campaign, which included the fearful. The Armed Forces will be so much better off, both as a fighting force and as a social force, if they stand for quality and not for numbers.

By these means we have provided the President with an elite force available, not for major military operations, but for doing those things which are time-sensitive—crises which have to be met in a comparatively short period of time with limited forces. Being small and all-volunteer, it has a good chance to remain free from unreasonable Congressional restraints on Presidential authority as Commander-in-Chief.

These are real advantages, I believe, advantages which in my judgment would warrant the risks that we are running.

DEALING WITH THE INTERNAL THREAT

I still have one topic to discuss which I mentioned at the outset. I have held it back deliberately because it is the hardest to treat and I will not try to deal with it with any degree of thoroughness. What can be done about the matter of the internal threat, about the internal weaknesses we have perceived, the existence of which certainly has an enormous bearing upon our national security? What can we do about this threat?

In the first place, we know that the causes



WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL PHOTO

President Nixon with part of a "quick reaction force."

are highly complex, that they involve many things that fall outside the purview of bureaucratic means and methods. They include such intangibles as the ideals, the goals and the standards of our individual citizens, their outlook on government, on society, on life itself—all of which are beyond governmental influences and derive from heredity, environment, and formative institutions such as the home, the church, and the school.

While there is no government department charged with such matters as these there are, I believe, a few common-sense measures that can be taken, both by the government and by the Armed Forces, which may do some good. For one thing, the quality of government is susceptible to vast improvement. Many of the complaints of unhappy citizens arise from a feeling that our government is not working, that it is faced with problems of a breadth which exceeds the capability of our present procedures. They may even exceed the capability of our constitutional government in its present form.

A first improvement would be to get better men to Washington. You know the old army principle—if you complain about the mess, you get made mess officer. Well that principle can be turned against our citizens who complain about government. If they don't like their government, let them come to Washington and do something about it. Let them join the government, to the slogan "Let's get the best heads of America in the brass hats in Washington." We've never done that in the past.

Another practical measure would be to temper the impact of the arrival of a new administration. It scares the bejeezus out of you to see a new administration arrive in Washington—able men usually; but in fulfillment of tradition, they, the new rascals, proceed to throw the old rascals out, and the new rascals don't even know each other.

I saw this happen in the Kennedy period at the time of the Bay of Pigs, a disaster which was largely the result of just what I'm talking about—a lot of able people coming to town and taking on a very complex job without

"WE COULD IMPROVE NOT
ONLY OFFICIALS BUT ALSO
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knowing each other, not even knowing their telephone numbers. You can smile about it, but it is not amusing really, and there's no reason why we can't do better. If the much maligned military mind were asked for a solution, the President would have the key members of his new administration arrive in town three months early for a summer session at the National War College. There they would get acquainted with each other; learn the relation of their job to those of their associates and get some appreciation of the whole team of which they are a part. These are elementary things but they have never been done in our history. Unhappily, a new official seems to feel it weakens his standing to admit he doesn't know all about government the day he arrives. But this can be changed.

We could improve not only officials but also our procedures in government. Some of the justified complaints which we're hearing from segments of our citizenship are directed at the choice of national priorities—how we decide whether to spend a billion dollars to go to the moon, to build a housing project, or to design a new missile. We have no instrumentality in our federal government that provides a forum for the discussion of such competitive programs and which produces interdepartmental advice for the President who has to make the ultimate decision.

In the case of national security, we have the National Security Council (NSC), which has never been a perfect forum, but which provides a useful focal point for dealing with problems of foreign policy and national security. The existence of the NSC gives the impression to the advocates of competitive nonmilitary programs that national security issues enjoy a great advantage. That feeling is general throughout the country, the feeling that the little man with his local problem cannot compete with the priorities given to international and military projects. There is a

gap to be filled in our procedures to remove this apprehension.

The excellence of the Armed Forces themselves can be a contributing factor to restoring national unity and pride. If indeed we realize the kind of elite force which I have tried to portray in my brief discussion here, it can serve as a symbol of the quality of the men and institutions which protect us from our enemies, foreign and domestic.

I would like to think it possible to include in a program for strengthening ourselves at home, the development of some kind of code of conduct for the publicity media. It is easy to be critical of the media, but actually it is very difficult to decide what do we want done—do we want a free press or don't we? Do we want to have free criticism of government, or don't we? If we say, "Yes, we do, but we want criticism to be constructive," what does that mean? Although it is hard to state in specific terms what we'd like to have done, it is such an important matter that I feel we must make the effort. I would hope that the leaders of the media themselves should take the lead in self-reform in view of their heavy stake in the issue.

CONCLUSION

I would point out in closing our discussion of rational national security that it is a subject difficult to separate from our general welfare. We've tried to make that separation in the past. The Constitution talks about the common defense and the general welfare as if they were two separate functions of government. That situation has certainly radically changed today. Both the functions and the institutions involved in national security and those concerned with the general welfare draw their resources, their strength, from the same sources of national power. The protection of these sources of power requires an integrated national policy which is not arbitrarily divided. We cannot in the long run overcome at home and fail abroad, or succeed at home and succumb overseas. Perhaps what we need is a consolidated national program for security and welfare bound together by that same kind of rationality which we have tried this morning to inject into our security program by itself. □