

# The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

---

Volume 6  
Number 1 *Parameters* 1976

Article 9

---

7-4-1976

## CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY: 1945-1976

Reginald H. Roy

Follow this and additional works at: <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters>

---

### Recommended Citation

Reginald H. Roy, "CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY: 1945-1976," *Parameters* 6, no. 1 (1976), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.1086.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

# CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY, 1945 - 1976

by

DR. REGINALD H. ROY

**A**t the end of the Second World War, Canada stood fifth in military strength among the victorious Allied powers. Behind the shield of Great Britain, and later the Soviet Union and the United States, Canada had the twin advantages of both geographic isolation and time to build up its Armed Forces from a small nucleus of regulars to a very creditable size. At its peak Canada fielded 1,000,000 sailors, soldiers and airmen, and this out of a population in 1939 of about 11,500,000 people. Aside from providing men and women who fought primarily alongside their British and Commonwealth allies, Canadians began to produce the sinews of war in vast amounts ranging from machine guns to destroyers—all, incidentally, without the benefits of Lend Lease. Canada was fortunate in many ways; aside from a few Japanese shells landing near a remote lighthouse on the west coast, Canada was spared the destruction suffered by others from invasion, air bombardment, or even commando-type coastal raids. An occasional U-boat did some damage to shipping in the St. Lawrence, but basically its geographic isolation from the main theatres of war permitted Canada to concentrate on building its war economy with very little outside interference. It was this freedom, incidentally, which allowed Canada, under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, to train over 131,000 pilots, navigators, and other air crewmen from all parts of the Commonwealth for overseas operations.

In the immediate postwar years, Canada began to dismantle its machinery of war, to bring its troops back from overseas, to drastically reduce its Armed Forces and, in a word, to revert to a peacetime political, economic, and social status. Canada had no occupation duties, gained no territories, and demanded no reparations. The German and Japanese empires had collapsed, and the nation's attention was primarily directed towards the quiet reestablishment of servicemen back into civilian life, the shaping of the United Nations, and the Nuremberg trials. It was not until 1947 that the Minister of National Defence, the Honorable Brooke Claxton, announced the government's

long-term defence policy, which was to defend Canada against aggression, to assist the civil power, and to participate in collective action with allies or through the United Nations.

**C**laxton's statement evoked very little criticism either inside or outside parliament. The regular forces were to be small—a total of 50,000 in the three services—which would provide the core of a modest striking force available for immediate action at home or abroad. This could be quickly enlarged, if need be, by drawing upon the militia or the large reserve of young veterans whose experience would be very valuable. It was appreciated that it was most unlikely that Canada could continue to rely on Britain's strength as she had in former years. After more than six years of war, Britain was exhausted and her prestige was waning. There was no doubt that the traditional and historic ties of friendship would be maintained, but it would be more on a partnership basis. It was also generally accepted that Canada could no longer afford the luxury of withdrawing into semi-isolationism as it had during the 1930's. The world had grown too small. The best bet, it appeared, was to use such influence as Canada had at the United Nations and elsewhere to ensure peaceful alternatives to war. This continues to be a major plank in the Canadian foreign affairs platform. This influence, one might add, has not the power behind it Canadians might wish. Canadians have to "speak softly," but they do not have "the big stick" Teddy Roosevelt mentioned.

**W**hat about Canada's relations with the United States in defence matters? During the war a number of strong links were forged with the United States, most of which remain. The Ogdensburg Agreement of 17 July 1940—which established, among other things, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence—really laid the foundation for American-Canadian planning on defense matters. I need not recite here all the wartime cooperative ventures in which the two nations took part, ranging

from a joint American-Canadian attack on Kiska to the mutual use of ports, airfields, and training facilities when the occasion demanded it.

The wartime cooperation and friendship carried over into the postwar years, although as we shall see, time was to bring some questioning of what was considered an almost automatic attitude on both the diplomatic and defence front. In 1946 and 1947, however, there is no doubt that, if they had a choice, Canadians would have picked the USA as a next-door neighbour over almost any other nation on earth. Not only did the US pose no threat, but rather it was looked upon in somewhat the same way as Canada regarded Britain before the war, i.e., as a powerful nation which would come to Canada's defence should the need arise. It should be kept in mind, however, that having eased out of its status as a British colony during the 19th century, Canada had no intention of slipping back into a similar status under another country in the 20th century.

**I**n the 1948-50 period, Canada's defence policy underwent a dramatic change brought about by the action of the Soviet Union. The revelation of a Soviet spy network in Canada as early as 1945 had jolted many Canadians. The realization that the USSR had not dismantled its huge military force in the postwar period disturbed many more, but this was offset somewhat by the knowledge that the United States alone possessed the secret of the atomic bomb. Soviet-Canadian relations went from cool to frigid when such events in Europe as the Czechoslovakian coup and the Berlin blockade seemed to testify that the Communists were attempting to take over all of Europe and were constantly probing for any means of achieving their ends elsewhere. Then, in 1949, Russia acquired the atom bomb, and in the following year, Korea was attacked. The "Cold War" was well and truly launched and was warming up at the periphery.

The reaction in Canada was immediate. Canada was one of the charter members of NATO and when the vote was taken in the House of Commons to join that organization,

only two Quebec Members of Parliament voted against it. For the first time Canada had not only agreed to station Armed Forces overseas in peacetime, but also had committed herself to an alliance before war had been declared. Having done so, the government not only sent over sufficient surplus arms and equipment to outfit several divisions of NATO allies but started to build up its own forces to honour its obligations. Most of the Royal Canadian Navy based on the Atlantic was to be at NATO's disposal. An air division of 12 RCAF fighter squadrons was raised and sent to Europe. Finally, a brigade group—complete with infantry, armour, artillery, and similar support units—was sent to Germany, while sufficient troops were raised in Canada so that the brigade could be brought up to divisional strength in very short order.

While this was going on, Canada was raising a Special Force of brigade group size to serve with the Commonwealth Division in Korea. The first response had been to send over a small force of destroyers as well as offer the use of a transport squadron to help ease the strain a bit on flying UN personnel and equipment between Japan and Korea. Raising the Special Force took a longer time, but from the time it arrived at the front line until the cease-fire in 1953, over 22,000 Canadian troops served in Korea, and a further 7,000 served between then and the time when the Canadian force withdrew in 1955.

It should be noted that, both in the case of NATO and Korea, Canada allied itself with a group rather than any single nation, basing her action, as one wit said, on the premise that "The more people in bed, the less likely one was to get raped." Moreover, Canada made every effort, in the case of NATO, to widen the basis of cooperation among the members to include economic and social as well as defence measures.

As a result of these new commitments, Canada began to increase its Armed Forces at a rapid rate. By the end of 1952, for example, there were about 100,000 men in the regular forces and some 60,000 in the reserves. By the end of the 1950's, the regulars had increased to over 124,000, all ranks. Defence

expenditures had increased as well. By 1952-53, Canada was spending about 8 percent of its Gross National Product on defence, or well over \$2,000,000,000. Of this amount approximately 40 percent went to the Air Force, 27 percent to the Army and 14 percent to the Navy. This sum may not sound like very much in today's inflationary world, but it represented for Canada an eight-fold increase in a five-year period.

**O**ne of the consequences of the Russian threat was to focus attention on Canada's north. If war did occur, one could expect long-range Russian bombers armed with atomic bombs to attempt to reach targets in the United States by flying over Canada. During the 1950's, therefore, a great deal of time, effort, and money was spent by both nations to establish a series of radar lines stretching across Canada to warn about an approaching enemy. The radar sites, together with other sites established to assist in air navigation, were mutually beneficial. Canada also was now manufacturing the CF-100 to equip its fighter squadrons which, in cooperation with American squadrons, would help protect the continent from attack, whether the attack was aimed at cities or Strategic Air Command bases.

Jet aircraft, however, as well as the electronic equipment needed for the radar lines and elsewhere, were expensive items and resulted in the first reciprocal war material trade agreement between the two nations since the end of the war. Moreover, Canada's industrial capacity had grown steadily in size, complexity, and sophistication. Thus when Canada's airmen sought an improved jet fighter suitable for the special conditions in northern Canada, it was not unnatural that the job was given to the Canadian Avro company which began work on the CF-105 "Arrow" aircraft in this period. By the end of 1955, Canada had 41 squadrons of all types with a total of 3,076 aircraft, and by the time the Conservatives took power from the Liberals in 1957, the "Arrow" was shaping up as one of the best fighter aircraft in the world.

It was during Prime Minister Diefenbaker's six-year period of power that Canada's

defence policy began to change. At the outset everything seemed to be going well. The new Minister of National Defence, George R. Pearkes, was a former major general who was very aware of the need to maintain strong military forces. Despite his army background, he was a strong advocate of air power and had in the past suggested that even a greater proportion of the defence budget should be spent on the RCAF.<sup>1</sup> He had approved, when in the Opposition, of the millions of dollars going into the radar lines, and he had frequently spoken of the need for closer Canadian-American cooperation in defending North America. Thus, one of his first acts in 1957 was to approve of Canada's joining NORAD (North American Air Defense Command), an agreement which was formally concluded in the Spring of 1958. To Pearkes, the ultimate deterrence to any Soviet attack was Strategic Air Command, and as such, anything Canada could do to protect the United States should be done.

Meanwhile, there were other problems beginning to arise which were to cause a good deal of questioning about Canada's defence role. Mr. John Foster Dulles had made his speech about "massive retaliation" in 1954. A decision was also made to introduce tactical nuclear weapons into the NATO front line, and at that time the Canadian NATO Brigade was in the "bowling alley" of Europe where a Russian attack was most likely to occur. Weapons with atomic warheads ranging from torpedoes to air-to-air rockets were being manufactured, and Pearkes, old soldier that he was, wanted Canadian forces to be equipped with the most modern weapons available. The development of these weapons systems, however, indeed even of those with conventional warheads, was becoming extremely expensive, especially for a middle power such as Canada. Moreover, the nuclear club was expanding, and fears were increasing that even more nations might start manufacturing atomic bombs.

If I were to pick a second turning point in Canadian defence policy, it would be October 4th, 1957. During the day, the Avro company wheeled out for its first public display the Canadian-made CF-105 "Arrow" jet fighter in

which the government had thus far invested \$220,000,000. That evening, at a dinner given by the company, the Minister of Defence was told that the Russians had launched "Sputnik I," the first satellite to orbit in space.

The shock of this evidence of what then seemed to be a huge leap forward in Russian scientific technology reverberated throughout the Western World. There was much talk about a "missile gap," and great fears that the USSR would soon be able to threaten North America with ICBMs armed with atomic warheads. Journalists described the devastation which might occur in the cities, and plans were made for mass evacuations. Money to finance the research and development of a variety of American missiles became overnight almost embarrassingly plentiful, for in the mood of the time, missiles seemed to be just around the corner—or, more properly, over the horizon.

In Canada during the next several years, there was a great deal of painful soul-searching. The CF-105 "Arrow," upon which Canada has spent so much money and based so many hopes, was not only costing a great deal more than anticipated but looked as if it would be out-of-date by the time it was scheduled for production. Indeed, two years later, it had to be scrapped because of unit costs and Canadian inability to sell it to other NATO nations, who had their own aircraft industries to protect. Canada then opted to accept the American SAM missile, the Bomarc II, which came equipped with atomic warheads. A first-rate team of

Dr. Reginald H. Roy, C.D., B.A., M.A., Ph.D., F.R.Hist.S., is a Professor of Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia. During the Second World War, he served with the Cape Breton Highlanders, 5th Canadian Armoured Division, in Italy and in North Western Europe. After working at the Army Historical Section in Ottawa, he taught at Royal Roads Military College and later at the University of Victoria. He is the author of five books and some two dozen articles dealing with military and defence matters.



scientists and aircraft technicians at the Avro company were forced to seek jobs elsewhere—a number of them, incidentally, moving south of the border where their skills were put to good use building American missiles. Later, Canada agreed to purchase American F-101B “Voodoo” fighters for its squadrons at a lower cost per unit than the “Arrow,” but also at a cost in national pride.

Critics of the government’s defence policy began to wonder, at that stage, whether or not Canada had become obsolete as a military power. Year by year the bomber threat would probably lessen, yet Canada had poured over 40 percent of its defence budget into the Air Force. Canada had made one of the best jet fighters, especially for North American defence, but could not afford to produce it solely for the Canadian market. If, as it seemed, the nation had to rely on Americans for its sophisticated weapons, was Canada going to reassume the colonial status?

There was another problem as well. In 1959, the Honorable Howard C. Green became the Minister of External Affairs. A longtime Conservative and friend of the Prime Minister, Green was a staunch advocate of nonproliferation of atomic war capabilities. He thought Canada should stand up and speak out loudly against both vertical and horizontal proliferation, but at the same time he firmly believed that he could not do so if the Canadian government accepted American nuclear warheads for storage and potential use. Thus the Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, was faced with a dilemma which he never did resolve before his defeat in 1963. His defence minister demanded and purchased the best weaponry available, which required nuclear warheads to be effective. His external affairs minister, bent on a moral crusade which was very attractive both at home and abroad, damned all atomic weapons and threatened to resign if they were brought into Canada. It was not until the Liberals under Mr. Lester Pearson assumed power in 1963 that Canadian Bomarc II missiles and other weapons were properly armed.

It was in the late 50’s and early 60’s also that Canada began to participate in United Nations peacekeeping activities. One of the

first questions which might be asked is: Why Canada? It took part in these activities because it was asked to do so in the first place and because of the suitability of Canadian forces in the second. Canada has no record of political, geographic, or economic imperialism, and indeed, it may be that having emerged from being first a French and then a British colony, it was looked upon as being acceptable to the Third World. It is also basically true that in most local crisis situations, Canada is unlikely to have a major military or economic interest in the area. It seeks no overseas bases or commercial monopolies. Henry Morgenthau wrote that one of the necessary qualities of an international police force was that it “must be loyal to the political authorities and share their conceptions of law and justice.”<sup>2</sup> Canada does have a military tradition of respect and loyalty for political authority, and accordingly, again to quote Morgenthau, “a Canadian contingent may be a safe and trouble-free part of the force as far as the United Nations is concerned.”<sup>3</sup> Another feature that made Canada a suitable candidate for the role was its middle power status. As Lester Pearson put it:

They [the middle powers] are and will remain the backbone of the collective effort to keep the peace as long as there is fear and suspicion between the great power blocs. They have special responsibilities in this regard which they should be proud to exercise.<sup>4</sup>

So far, Canada has managed to retain the rather precarious role of being in NATO and yet being regarded as “unattached.”

**A**side from suitability, there is the question of capability. Canada’s first major contribution to UN peacekeeping duties came in 1956, when it was asked to contribute to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) whose task was to keep the Egyptians and Israelis from each others’ throats. Canada offered the 1st Battalion, The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada, as the infantry component, but this was declined by Nasser

owing to the regiment's name. (Presumably, if Canada had sent the Nova Scotia Regiment—if it had had one—this would have been acceptable!) In any event, Canada did send a variety of administrative troops, such as a signals squadron, a field workshop of engineers, two transport platoons, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, and an RCAF communications squadron. Within a few months, using the RCAF transport squadrons and the aircraft carrier HMCS *Magnificent*, over 1,000 Canadian servicemen were deployed to the Middle East. They maintained the vehicles and heavy equipment of the international force, drove jeeps and scout cars over the desert along the Israeli-Egyptian border, hauled supplies, provided a field hospital, and set up the communications system. All went well until 1967, when Nasser demanded the removal of the UN forces within 48 hours. Prime Minister Pearson was not amused by Nasser's demand, but the Canadians did withdraw, and with them went UNEF's air and logistic support.

The Congo was the next major effort. In 1960, Canada sent signallers and heavy equipment to that country, which was recovering from Belgian colonial control and was wracked internally by civil strife. Among other things, Canada could call upon many French-speaking servicemen for this task, which helped to overcome the language barrier. Cyprus was the next major UN commitment for Canada, and this particular task is still being performed. Normally, about 600 Canadians now take part in this operation on a six-month tour, although periodically, as in the recent Turkish invasion of Cyprus, this number is augmented by additional troops if the occasion demands. As with the UNEF force in the Gaza Strip, the Canadians are lightly armed and depend a great deal on common sense and diplomacy to separate the two contestants when incidents occur in the area where the Canadians are in charge. The fact that the two major disputants are also members of NATO makes this operation, now in its twelfth year, a particularly important one.

Since 1949, Canada has participated in more peacekeeping operations than any other

country. In size, these have varied from 8,000 men at the peak of the Korean War to a detachment of a dozen pilots and airmen serving in 1962-63 in West New Guinea. It is a service which few if any in Canada disapprove or criticize, for despite the costs and not infrequent disappointments involved, there is a general realization that any efforts made to lessen the chance of war should be supported to the hilt. Canada's willingness to take part in UN peacekeeping efforts has been recognized as one legitimate role among others in its defence policy, and as a result Canadian troops are given special training for the role and provide training for others. One commentator on Canadian peacekeeping summed up the country's attitude as follows:

Canada generally has been willing to contribute to United Nations forces . . . . Peacekeeping operations are troublesome, they can involve casualties, financial outlays, diplomatic difficulties, and domestic embarrassment. Very few countries are willing to expose themselves to these troubles. Canada has been, and this willingness is largely responsible for the continuing requests. All too often, however, there has been a tendency for Canadians—and this includes members of the government—to look on their peacekeeping role as qualifying them for international sainthood. In fact, however, it can be argued that Canada's efforts are eminently practical. Situated in the line of flight of Soviet and American ICBMs, Canada's only defence is peace.<sup>5</sup>

Let us leave peacekeeping and look at the 1960's—the "sour 60's," if I may use the term—and the changes brought about in Canadian defence policy from the time the Liberals assumed power in 1963.

During this decade, a considerable amount of thought was given to defence policy, and the resulting arguments generated a great deal of heat but little light. James M. Minifie, a well-known Canadian journalist, wrote a book called *Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey*, in which he stated that Canada should make a declaration of neutrality, withdraw from

NATO and NORAD, and annul the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. He felt Canada was little more than a satellite and by withdrawing from all alliances, Canadians would be better able to serve as peacemakers.<sup>6</sup> Leaders in the New Democratic Party were divided on defence policy. Most agreed that Canada should not "go nuclear"; all appeared happy with its peacekeeping role; but a good number were divided on the question of maintaining the NATO-NORAD connection.<sup>7</sup> In the early 60's, with Mr. Diefenbaker still sitting on the fence regarding the acceptance of nuclear weapons, the arguments waxed hotter and hotter. Late in 1962, a Gallup Poll taken of Canadian opinion respecting the arming of Canadian forces with nuclear weapons showed 54 percent of the people in favour, 37 percent against, and 9 percent undecided. There is no doubt that the indecision on defence matters helped to defeat the Conservatives and brought Mr. Pearson's Liberal Party back into power.

The Liberals, as we have seen, brought an end to the contentious argument about nuclear warheads by accepting them with the usual safeguards imposed by the United States. The Bomarc II missile sites were completed, the NORAD and NATO agreements were continued, and as one might expect from an internationalist like "Mike" Pearson, Canada continued to be on call to the UN. However, the Liberals brought with them a new Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, and he in turn brought with him a stubborn determination to integrate and unify the Armed Forces. This, he claimed, would result in savings of almost 25 percent of the defence budget, which would help alleviate the rising costs of arms and equipment at a time when too great a proportion of the budget was going towards personnel costs. The debate on unification and integration went on and on while Hellyer, step by step, imposed his ideas on the Armed Forces over all opposition.

When Pearson retired in 1968, his place was taken by Pierre Trudeau, a gentleman from Quebec who was to show his dominance of the Liberal Party in a remarkably short time.

Among other things, Mr. Trudeau favoured a "severe reassessment" of Canada's foreign and defence policies, a work which was started in 1969 and culminated in two "White Papers" in 1970 and 1971 respectively. In December 1968, a well-known Canadian journalist, Charles Lynch, was prophetic when he wrote: "Few of his advisers have ever shared [the Prime Minister's] attitude that Canada's options are broad, or his implied view that we can ever break out of our traditional diplomatic and military assignments and move onto new ground."<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, Trudeau was going to try, and as far as defence was concerned, he was to make it quite clear as time went on that he did not think it should be given the priority it had enjoyed since 1950. Statements by government officials indicating that the 10,000 Canadian soldiers and airmen in the NATO forces in Europe should be cut aroused a great deal of controversy. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, helped to undermine those advocating a complete withdrawal, but it seemed obvious even then which way the wind was blowing.

**T**he new Ministers of Defence (Cadioux) and External Affairs (Sharp) were not in agreement with Trudeau's opinion of NATO. Speaking in the House of Commons in December, 1968, Cadioux stated:

The major threat to the security of Canada and the Canadian people comes from the prospect of an intercontinental nuclear exchange arising out of a conflict of interest or of ideology between the superpowers. The forum where the superpowers' interests most clearly impinge on each other is Europe and hence Europe is the geographic region where Canada's security is most in jeopardy. Thus Canada's security is very closely interlocked with the security of Europe. These are inescapable facts of the world we live in . . . how we meet the challenge in the future is one of the very important considerations of the defence review. But I would ask you to remember this, the defence review cannot remove the challenge.



Meanwhile, a number of events were occurring which were having an impact on Canadian opinion. The war in Vietnam was going on interminably, and there were rising cries of protest against it. Canada was not involved, but factors such as the strident protest movement, the inflationary spiral brought on by the cost of the war, and the massive build-up of the atomic missile armoury were having an impact north of the border. Unwilling to increase the defence budget and, indeed, more anxious to cut it, the Canadian government was not unhappy to see the percentage of the GNP spent on defence slide from 8 percent to 5 percent and then slip even further to 2.7 percent.

It is tempting to quote from the range of opinion expressed in this period regarding Canada's defence role. There were those who proposed eliminating all defence measures and relying on the United States to protect Canada, as well as those demanding that more money be given to allow Canada to live up to its commitments. The former suggested that defence money would yield better returns if the millions went to assisting the emerging nations rather than being spent on arms which seemed to become obsolete almost overnight. Others were equally positive that Canada's contributions to NATO and NORAD were valid even in the face of a missile race in which it could take no part. It was not until his press conference on April 4th, 1969, that Trudeau finally announced that, although Canada repudiated neutralism and planned to remain in her alliances, the Canadian government intended to bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe. A week later, speaking in Calgary, the Prime Minister almost extemporaneously explained the reasons behind the "new look" in policy. He said in part:

It is important that we realize that the sixth of our national budget which is spent on defence is not an expenditure which is accepted as justifiable by a significant proportion of the Canadian people . . . . What we want to do with this \$1,800

million is to defend Canadian sovereignty and to contribute towards world peace. Why else would Canadians want to spend money on defence? We don't want to go to war with anybody . . . . It's in our national interest to reduce the tensions in the world . . . . This is the aim of our foreign policy . . . .

Turning to the recently made NATO decision, Trudeau said:

We have to remain free to decide our own foreign policy. And when we are told that we shouldn't be taking a free ride to peace in the world, when we are told that if we withdraw from NATO even in any degree this will lead other countries to withdraw from NATO, I don't admit this. I don't admit that Europeans or even Americans won't follow their own wisdom, that they don't have their own foreign policy . . . . And in our case, where our contribution to Europe, I repeat, is marginal, but where we still believe that NATO is an important force in the world, we are entitled, we have a right, to ask questions about our participation in NATO.

Twenty years after the formation of the alliance, the Prime Minister said:

We can't wait until all the problems of security have been settled before we tackle the political issues of peace in the world. And it so happened that NATO after 20 years, in our opinion, had developed too much into a military alliance and not enough into a political alliance, not enough into an alliance which is interested not only in keeping the balance of deterrence of tactical power in Europe, but into an alliance which is interested in arms control and de-escalation.

This was an extraordinary speech for a Canadian prime minister to make, but Trudeau kept on. He was afraid that NATO had in reality determined all of Canadian defence policy; the government had no defence policy, so to speak, except that of

NATO. And as Canadian defence policy had determined all of the country's foreign policy, Canada had no foreign policy of any importance except that which flowed from NATO. Trudeau felt that it was a false perspective for any country to have a military alliance determine its foreign policy; it should be foreign policy which determines military policy. The Prime Minister added:

So all we have done was to stand the pyramid on its base. It was standing on its head. We have decided to review our foreign policy and to have a defence policy flow from that, and from the defence policy to decide which alliances we want to belong to, and how our defences should be deployed.

As Charles Lynch wrote in the *Ottawa Citizen* on April 17:

This address is one of the most unusual ever made by a head of a government in a committed, highly-developed western nation. It reveals an almost complete rejection of the status quo in our international relations, and is an eloquent, if alarming, answer to critics who have charged that this is a do-nothing, conservatively-inclined government.

So it was.

Reaction to Trudeau's general statement of principle was strong throughout the following summer and sharpened that autumn when the government finally made its defence policy clear. The Canadian contribution to NATO was halved, the reserves reduced, and the regular forces were to be cut to 82,000, all ranks. The military budget was to remain fixed at a little under two billion dollars for about three years, and although inflation would take its toll, no further defence cuts were promised. Mr. Cadieux, the defence minister, had done his best to keep the forces intact, and there is little doubt that but for his stubborn stand, together with the sudden need for army personnel during the FLQ crisis in Quebec, the defence budget would have been cut even further. Cadieux left politics in

1970 to become the Canadian ambassador in Paris. He was succeeded by Donald S. MacDonald, who had been among the anti-NATO group in the cabinet and whose previous military experience had been as a corporal of cadets at Ashbury College.

**L**ate in 1971, the new minister released the long-awaited White Paper on Defence entitled *Defence in the '70s*. After stating that defence policy "must reflect and serve national interests" and "be closely related to foreign policy," it set out Canada's national aims and policy themes:

#### National Aims:

- Canada will continue secure as an independent political entity.
- Canada and all Canadians will enjoy enlarging prosperity in the widest possible sense.
- All Canadians will see in the life they have and the contribution they make to humanity something worthwhile preserving in identity and purpose.

#### Policy Themes:

- Foster economic growth.
- Safeguard sovereignty and independence.
- Work for peace and security.
- Promote social justice.
- Enhance the quality of life.
- Ensure a harmonious natural environment.

Given these aims and themes, the priorities for Canadian defence policy were summarized as follows:

- Surveillance of Canadian territory and coast-lines, i.e., the protection of sovereignty.
- Defence of North America in cooperation with US forces.
- Fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon.
- Performance of such international peacekeeping roles as are from time to time assumed.

Some scathing criticisms were made about the government's new stance outlined in this

White Paper, and as the strength of the Armed Forces diminished while their responsibilities remained the same, senior officers were forced to admit that the forces were overtaxed and undermanned. It was claimed that "unilateral Western cuts [in NATO's conventional forces] such as Canada's could necessitate the lowering of the nuclear threshold to the point where the re-adoption of the old, hazardous posture of massive [nuclear] retaliation would be the only possible course."<sup>9</sup> Others claimed, rightly so, that Canada's voice in foreign affairs would weaken.

Meanwhile, events beyond Canada were attracting more attention in the early 70's than the weakening of Canadian defence posture. This was the period when the Vietnam War was reaching its climax prior to the withdrawal of American troops. The SALT talks, coupled with hopes and expectations for detente, lulled many into thinking that perhaps the Soviets were becoming less aggressive. Pollution, participatory democracy, the "just society," bilingualism, nuclear proliferation, China, the growing energy crisis, campus unrest, inflation—these and similar topics kept the spotlight of public opinion in Canada, while the problems besetting the Armed Forces tended to be overlooked. By 1973, however, the government realized that it must increase the defence budget and, as a result, in the last three years the budget has increased by almost a third. A greater proportion of this money was and is to be used to modernize facilities and to purchase new equipment ranging from trucks to tanks to long-range patrol aircraft.

**B**asically, there has been no change in Canada's defence policies in the past five years. The NORAD agreement has been periodically renewed, Canada continues its NATO partnership, the shrinkage of the Armed Forces has stopped, and cooperation with main allies continues. The steady increase in the strength of the Warsaw Pact, especially in Russian naval strength, together with the more recent involvement of Cuban forces in Southern Africa and the Middle

East, has caused considerable apprehension among informed sources. So, too, has the lack of progress of any substantive achievements in arms control negotiations. It is all too obvious that the utility of Armed Forces to resolve problems is approved in many parts of the world, e.g., Lebanon, Angola, Israel, Timor, and Ireland. Canadians and others may wish for a peaceful world, but "wishing won't make it so." Instability, risk, and confrontation continue to be part of the international scene, and in conditions of crisis and tension among Canada's NATO partners in Europe, military weakness might induce a lack of resolution among the more exposed members.

Within the last year the Canadian government has reviewed its defence needs and, beginning in 1976, it has promised to increase the defence budget by 12 percent in real terms over the next five years. This decision has been long overdue. It will permit the purchase of the long-range patrol aircraft Canada needs (a billion dollar purchase is being negotiated at present) as well as new tanks and other equipment. It will presumably forestall any further reduction in the strength of the Armed Forces. Indeed, according to the Chief of the Defence Staff, it should allow the reserve forces to be increased to a considerable extent to reach a combined strength of about 100,000.

As we have seen, Canada is paying about 30 percent more on defences than it did at the beginning of this decade to maintain a force about 60 percent of the size it had in 1965. Even at that, it has allowed much of its weaponry to age. Comparisons may be odious, but a few statistics comparing Canadian costs per head and percentage of government expenditure on defence tell their own story. The figures given are for 1975.<sup>10</sup>

	\$ PER HEAD	% OF GOVT. EXPENDITURE	% OF GNP
Canada	\$129	11	2.
Britain	\$184	10.8	5.2
Australia	\$185 (Est)	12.8 (Est)	3.2
France	\$233	19.1	3.4
Sweden	\$298	10.5	3.6
USA	\$430	26.6	6.0

Considering Canada's wealth, the nation is not bearing an equal burden with its allies to maintain the security it enjoys. It is equally true that Canada has comparatively little influence in world councils, even though, geographically, it is in the line of fire between the two superpowers. Neutrality would be an impossible role for Canada in any future major war, and the major task for Canadians should be, perhaps, to do what they can to prevent war, to try to bring some reason into the armaments race, and to urge their own government to take a more realistic look at its defence needs under the light of Canadian commitments.

#### NOTES

1. It had been running between 40 and 45 percent.
2. H. G. Morgenthau, "The Political Conditions of an

International Police Force," *International Organization*, 17 (1963), 393.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

4. Lester B. Pearson, quoted in Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, No. 64/12, p. 13.

5. J. L. Granatstein, "Canada: PeaceKeeper: Survey of Canada's Peacekeeping Operations," *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Responses* (Toronto: CIIA, 1968), p. 181.

6. James M. Minifie, *Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960), passim.

7. John T. Saywell, ed., *The Canadian Annual Review for 1961* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), pp. 126-47.

8. Quoted in John T. Saywell, ed., *The Canadian Annual Review for 1968* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 222.

9. Murray Goldblatt, "Ottawa is Accused of Taking a Giant Step Toward Leaving the World Scene," *The Globe and Mail*, 17 March 1970, p. 11.

10. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1975-1976* (London: IISS, 1975), pp. 76-77.

