Key Strategic Issues List Update No. 2

Antulio J. Echevarria Dr.
SSI

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials

Recommended Citation
Echevarria, Antulio J. Dr., "Key Strategic Issues List Update No. 2" (2012). Articles & Editorials. 145.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials/145

This KSIL Document is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Editorials by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.
1. North Korean SOF activities in the U.S./ROK rear-area during conflict.

2. Behavior of North Korean soldiers during battle: specifically, will North Korean units fight to the end or is there a chance for surrender? Is surrendering likely to be an individual decision, or are the units controlled too tightly from a psychological standpoint? Does this depend on the type of unit? What type of psychological preparation is given to North Korean soldiers in preparation for the possibility of war with the U.S./ROK?

3. Displaced Persons/Humanitarian Crisis following a conflict on peninsula: What are the likely actions/behaviors and condition of North Korean civilians following a conflict? How will China respond? Who will lead a humanitarian response effort? How is this synched with ongoing combat operations? What role, and when, will international organizations (and regional powers) play in such a response?

1. The Human Dimension:

   a. We believe organizational effectiveness increases when focusing on the human dimension. What are the top 5 S&T priorities for research and development to move the human dimension forward in support of the Army of 2020? Where do we focus limited resources to optimize human performance?
b. How can the human dimension enhance the Army’s ability to provide combat effective, adaptable, trained, and resilient ready forces to meet our Nation’s needs in 2020 while preserving the all volunteer force?

2. Air Ground Operations:

   a. How do we develop and implement a maneuver leader training strategy to develop agile, adaptive leaders who possess the knowledge, skills, abilities and attributes to effectively conduct Air-Ground Combined Arms Operations on complex battlefields?
   b. Assess the DOTMLPF gaps in the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to conduct Air Ground Operations.
   c. How does the joint community view of fixed, rotary, and unmanned vehicles fit into the Army strategy? How does the joint view integrate with our fires, sustainment, and maneuver strategy?

3. Robotics:

   a. Identify and assess the Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), and robotics requirements for the Army of 2020. How should organizations form to integrate these capabilities?
   b. Based on our description and analysis of future war and future combat, what adjustments should we make to combat development in the areas of UGS, UAV, and robotics? How do we accelerate progress and integrate across all DOTMLPF domains?

4. GCV:

   a. Examine the DOTMLPF implications of the capabilities requirements document for the future Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
   b. Based on our description and analysis of future war and future combat, is the current GCV design adequate? What are recommended adjustments?

5. Future Combined Arms Operations:

   a. Examine the future BCT ability across DOTMLPF to execute combined operations in future war and future combat. What Combined Arms Operations gaps exist in the BCT 2020?
   b. How do we develop and implement a maneuver leader training strategy to develop agile, adaptive leaders who possess the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attributes to train soldiers to be successful in future Combined Arms Operations?

6. Recon and Security:

   a. Do proposed changes to the BfSB incorporated in the current Reconnaissance and Surveillance Brigade (R&S BDE) force design update (FDU) address identified gaps properly?
b. Examine the impacts of BCT 2020 and Sustainment 2020 related to the following discussion points.

1) With BCT 2020 design and Sustainment 2020 concept, there are many competing demands on CSSB which have yet to be analyzed holistically. The FiB retains its BSB but with limited distribution capability, and still requires CSSB support. All functional brigades, including the MEB, no longer have BSBs and require CSSB support for all sustainment capability. With the removal of some sustainment capability within the BCTs to meet the 4,500 end-strength requirement, there are additional requirements for CSSB capabilities (IBCT troop transport, BCT fuel distribution and fuel system supply point, BCT water production, and some BCT distribution haul).

2) Force structure adjustments in the field artillery through TAA 14-18, as part of Army 2020, decreased EAB fires headquarters by 60 percent and more significantly, eliminated 100 percent of active component EAB cannon battalions, moving that capability to the reserve component and to that capability currently present in the BCTs.

3) Air Defense Artillery force structure decisions through TAA 14-18 have, as part of Army 2020: eliminated 100 percent of divisional SHORAD battalions; migrated Corps ADA BDEs to Theater; and eliminated 100 percent of active component Avenger battalions limiting ADA capability that is available to the BCTs.

4) Under the intelligence 2020 concept, the AC will have one E-MIB, one in the ARNG and two USAR with 12 total battalions which does not align well with supporting three corps and 18 divisions. Currently, as the E-MIB is “emerging growth,” it has been recommended by DA G-3/5/7 to be pushed into TAA 16-20.

7. Experimentation:
   
a. Assess the current Army experimentation program to determine capability gaps and opportunities to increase the combat effectiveness of the maneuver force.
   
b. Examine how FORSCOM interfaces with the institutional Army. Is FORSCOM satisfied with current experimentation cooperation with TRADOC? Does FORSCOM desire a larger role in the experimentation process? What is FORSCOM’s role in the experimentation process?

*****

The views expressed in this brief are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

*****

More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s programs may be found on the Institute’s homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.