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FORT APACHE OR EXECUTIVE SUITE?

THE US ARMY ENTERS THE 1980'S

by

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The history of the American military profession is a history of the tensions brought about by two contending and prescriptively divergent institutional models. These are characterized by Arthur Larson as "radical professionalism," and "pragmatic professionalism."¹ Normally these two models are associated with Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* and Morris Janowitz' *The Professional Soldier*, respectively. While both identify the military as a profession, they markedly differ in their prescriptions for the professional's role and relationship vis-à-vis the parent society.

Huntington views the professional soldier as primarily a manager of violence in the Lasswellian context, i.e., the primary goal of the soldier is to achieve a high degree of expertise within the narrowly defined parameters of that management function. The military professional becomes the technically proficient, politically neutral tool of the state. In order to achieve this goal, a divergent military—isolated from the larger, more liberal society—becomes a necessity.

Janowitz, on the other hand, views the military as a subsystem of the larger society. This leads him to reject the radical professional's isolation and to replace it with a military more congruent with the parent society, i.e., a pragmatic or "constabulary" force. Janowitz assumes that as the traditional uses of military power become altered by technological advances and a changing political environment, so also does the traditional dichotomy between war and peace. In its place stands the ambiguous

nature of limited conflict, where victory becomes an illusive goal. To operate effectively within such an environment, the constabulary officer corps must be cognizant of the nonmilitary factors which characterize modern international conflict (e.g., no clear win-lose solution, prolonged low-intensity efforts, and use of the least amount of force able to achieve national objectives). The officer corps needed to effect the pragmatic interpretation would obviously be different from Huntington's "radical professionals" in significant ways. In the words of Arthur Larson:

[It would] be broadly recruited, educated in political as well as military affairs, possess managerial and technical skills yet retain the 'warrior spirit,' cultivate a broad perspective on civilian and military, as well as domestic and international affairs, and be motivated by professional considerations.²

For the radical professional, the desired skills are necessarily limited to the management of violence.

The pragmatic professional, operating within the constabulary role, will need to acquire a wide variety of skills that will acquaint him with nonmilitary factors and "sensitize the military officer to the political and social consequences of military action."³ The acquisition of these skills, the appreciation of the more catholic factors, becomes a paramount problem for the pragmatic professional. The ability to appreciate the subtle nuances in political and

social issues is not a product of spontaneous enlightenment, but is acquired through continuous and ever-increasing exposure to such forces.

Obviously, the pragmatic model is not the antithesis of its radical counterpart; on the contrary, the pragmatist builds on a base of radical skills. Janowitz defines skills as those attributes and behaviors that a professional needs to possess in order to achieve organizational objectives.⁴ It follows then that the only consequences of skill utilization considered by the radical will be those relevant to his perceived organizational objective: battlefield violence. This perception results in the compartmentalization of military factors from nonmilitary factors in the radical professional's assessment of a situation and the use of the restrictive caveat "from the military point of view" on advice to political superiors. In such a divided world, the sociopolitical consequences of any action become exclusively the purview of the civilian leadership.

The reality or illusion of this division and the effects it will have on the US Army in the near future prompted this inquiry. Will the Army become isolated in its own little world (Fort Apache), or will it remain an active and concerned participant in the nonmilitary, sociopolitical affairs involving most of the other large American institutions (Executive Suite)? We have examined the US Army as we see it today and have derived some implications for its future direction both as an instrument of national policy and as a subculture. Our examination is based on our perception of the general atmosphere which prevails in today's Army and more specifically on the in-service school/training system which will inevitably affect the institutional leadership in the next few decades.

For the purposes of our analysis we have employed the following definitional structure. "Radical" and "pragmatic" professionalism will be used in the narrow Huntington and Janowitz traditions. The

radical professional is solely concerned with the management of violence, with little or no concern for the long-range consequences of actions or the incorporation of external factors. In short, our radical is a pseudo-Clausewitzian who eschews anything which does not directly contribute to closing with and destroying the enemy. The pragmatist, on the other hand, is more concerned with the utility of the military instrument in other than the pure battlefield context. Thus, he must be fully cognizant of the consequences of his actions and willing to look beyond fire and maneuver in defining his profession. "Convergence" is defined as the absorption of civilian (societal) values, while "divergence" is either the rejection or perversion of those skills or values.

Our findings are disturbing in that we envision an Army so sensitive to the shifting sands of public opinion that it will be unable to fully serve that public. The popular view of war has already encouraged the Army to divest itself of the skills associated with being an instrument of policy which can do more than simply destroy. Simultaneously, societal values are eroding those traditional military values which have thus far proven to be requisites to military cohesion and élan. The combination of narrowed interests and lessened internal cohesion will result in an Army which will become increasingly less utilitarian as an effective instrument of national policy in the remaining years of the 20th century.

RADICALISM TO PRAGMATISM

In between the poles of "radical" and "pragmatic" professionalism, the American military has historically attempted to develop its own identity and to define its relationships with the larger American society. Prior to the conclusion of the Second World War, American military professionalism was essentially "radical" in nature. This was the result of a peculiar set of American circumstances: a societal fear of a standing army that resulted in an attempt to maximize "objective civilian control"; a combination of geography and mission that isolated the

Army on the frontier; and a competitiveness within the profession that stemmed from the old militia system. These factors helped to mold the attitudes of the American military professional as the profession itself was evolving during the second half of the 19th century. It was not accidental that the Army's educational system (West Point, the Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College) solidified during this period. Through this in-service training system, the technical proficiency that epitomized Huntington's "radical professionals" was developed and perpetuated.⁵

Since 1945, as Donald Bletz, Janowitz, and others have noted, there has been a generally increased trend toward pragmatism and perceived convergency due to the changes in America's international position and the new military demands fostered by the cold war. No longer could the military and the political realms be compartmentalized even in theory. This broadening trend received its greatest impetus during the Kennedy-Johnson years, when there was an apparent perception, on the part of both administrations, that the military must utilize new skill structures more in the pragmatic mold. The ascendancy of Maxwell Taylor to the highest military position attests to this change, since Taylor was an outspoken advocate of the military's incorporating into

its thought processes considerations previously held to be nonmilitary.⁶

These shifts to a more pragmatic role on the part of the political leadership led to role confusion in the military profession during the 1960's. Terms such as "nation-building" and "political-military decisionmaking" became part of the vocabulary of the officer corps. As one colonel was overheard to comment rather apologetically, "We were all into nation-building during the 60's; it was the thing to do." The comment is typical of the American radical professional. Knowledge of the profession beyond his own "In" box being superfluous, he doesn't know that the military forces of most extant societies have been, are now, and will continue to be thoroughly involved in socially useful activities.

The fact that the US Army had been "into nation-building" since its inception had no effect on the perceptions of many in the military, since the radicals had never considered knowledge of the past as requisite to being a professional. The same was true of most of the skills and subject areas which we will refer to later as "convergent." It was the armies of the past which first mastered the techniques for organization and management of masses of men and material. Armies were the first big business in history, despite the fact that most of the modern "professionals" had been trained (radically) to view themselves as the descendants of Attila the Hun rather than Sun Tzu or Napoleon.

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The apparently changed institutional thrust of the Army in the 1960's was exemplified by the expansion of Special Forces and the incorporation of pragmatic skills into the curricula of the Army school system. In particular, this impacted heavily on the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth. Because of CGSC's mid-career student body and its role as the Army's senior tactical school, it may be viewed as a weather vane for determining the direction of professionalism and operational doctrine. By the early 1960's, the college was offering such seemingly convergent civilian skills as data processing and resources management. As the involvement in Southeast Asia increased, so did the perceived need for pragmatic military skills, although with no discernible lessening of the radical skill needs. Counterinsurgency studies increased from 26 hours in 1962-63 to 88 hours in 1966-67. Similarly, strategic studies increased from 24 hours to 95 hours during the same time period.⁸

The shift toward the acquisition of convergent skills and pragmatic professionalism undoubtedly had its effects on the officers corps' perception of its role in a changing world. While some continued to assert the traditional delineation of the profession along radical lines, others espoused pragmatism.⁹ One especially eloquent call for pragmatism was made by then-Lieutenant Colonel Zeb Bradford (USA) and Major James Murphy (USAF) in the February 1969 edition of *Army* magazine. In their article, Bradford and Murphy considered Huntington's approach to military professionalism inadequate in that such narrowness would lead to the profession forfeiting its responsibility to the nation:

One thing has been clearly established in recent years: there is no 'purely military' sphere in security policy. The military has a responsibility for participation in both the formulation and the execution of policy. At the same time, there is a continuing effort to integrate at all levels, in both formulation and execution, every aspect of policy—economic, political and military. If he is to

be termed a professional and entitled to a place in the councils of government . . . the soldier's horizons must be broad enough to encompass all of these factors as they apply to national security policy. . . . The narrow concept of the profession described by Dr. Huntington . . . fails to encourage the career officer to develop his knowledge in fields such as economics and politics which give meaning and purpose to the use of military power.¹⁰

RADICAL TRAINING VERSUS PRAGMATIC EDUCATION

The pragmatically skilled officer for whom Bradford and Murphy called could only be produced by an increased amount of education as opposed to radical training. In an expansion of this theme, Bradford, in conjunction with Lieutenant Colonel Frederic Brown, suggested that military curricula be balanced between training and education, and that CGSC and the War College modify their courses to "improve understanding of current social problems."¹¹ Our analysis of the titles of instructional hours at CGSC reveals an apparent growing awareness of the value of pragmatism during the late 1960's and early 1970's. It was recognized that one could not "train" an officer to participate in the multitude of sociopolitical activities involved in internal conflict and nation-building. Despite these apparent realities, the Army school system maintained its training orientation to a great extent. As late as 1972, a former Commandant of CGSC, while reviewing proposed changes in curriculum, noted that "In essence, it [the change] will convert the CGSC from a vocationally oriented school to a true educational institution."¹² Why the lag of almost a decade before the implementation of the needs identified in the early 1960's?

In part, the lag resulted from the inertia of traditional radicals. While some officers fully believed in the importance of this new pragmatic approach, for many it was "the thing to do" in order to "make it" within the system. Despite the proliferation of sociopolitical "buzzwords" in the 1960's,

most of the Army's operational leadership still considered conventional skills and attitudes to be the means by which we would reach a final solution in Vietnam.

By 1965-66, these attitudes had become institutionalized in terms of career patterns. The place to serve was not with the Vietnamese forces but with US units. Bright young men who had flocked to Special Forces and advisory assignments three years earlier now responded to the radical resurgence by flocking back to line units so as not to miss being at the magic "right place at the right time." Career assignment officers were frequently acting as their counterparts had done in Europe in 1914 or in Washington in 1861 by hurrying their energetic charges along before the war was over and branch "X" or service "Y" had missed out on the glory—and the subsequent promotions.

So long as the "old pros" reacted to the "buzzwords" of an increasingly pragmatic role as just that—"buzzwords," a temporary fad imposed from the outside—one could hardly expect the Army's educational system to react with anything but a superficial bow to expediency.

Even as the US Army moved hesitatingly toward convergence and the internalization of pragmatic skills, the dynamics that would force the profession to reverse this process were at work. Three important factors led to this reversal: the unsolvable Vietnam War, the Volunteer Army, and the unfettering of the technomanagers. Of these, the war left the most profound impression on the officer corps and supplied much of the rationale for the return to the perceived "safety" of radical professionalism.

For many officers, the outcome of the Vietnam conflict merely confirmed what they had known all along: the absurdity of fighting limited, protracted war. To these men, war by its very nature was a zero-sum game which must be executed with all the means at one's disposal. More importantly, the Army was thrust into a sociopolitical role

for which many in the officer corps felt unprepared, a role with which they could not identify, and one which they strongly resented. For these officers, the lesson of Vietnam was that the Army should return to doing what it did best: managing violence. "Soldiers should be soldiers and not sociologists." This position was officially articulated in 1976 by General Fred C. Weyand. In a 1976 article, the then-Chief of Staff identified as one of the great mistakes of the war the Army being called on to perform nonmilitary tasks that were "beyond its capability." The implied solution for the future was for the military to concentrate on killing tasks to the exclusion of others. These killing tasks apparently would be those traditional military skills identified with the radical role.¹³

As a corollary to the Army's reaffirmation of radicalism, there was a heightened appreciation for the linkage that exists between societal will and military capabilities. Professor Sam Sarkesian, in a 1976 study of professionalism, noted:

The fact that society declared no more Vietnams does not necessarily suggest that the professional should not study counter-insurgency. But what it requires is a shift of professional emphasis to those [attitudes and techniques] compatible with society.¹⁴

As a result of the prolonged, unresolved Vietnam conflict, the military clearly perceived itself as alienated from American society. Lieutenant Colonel John Moellering, in a 1972 study of the attitudes of Army officers, found that 85 percent viewed the press as biased against them and over two-thirds felt that the public's view of the Army's involvement in the war was negative.¹⁵ In some ways, the US Army professionals returning from Vietnam resembled the German Army of 1919, looking at the press and the anti-war elements in society as the perpetrators of a stab in the back.¹⁶ Under such circumstances, it was quite natural that the Army should manifest concern for the question of public support in future military operations.

The overall question of the wisdom of the Army's reaction to the heightened awareness of the need for popular support in an increasingly pluralistic society is beyond the scope of our inquiry. There is, however, one aspect which is at least peripherally relevant. Should the Army—or more properly the Department of Defense (DOD)—react to public opinion or attempt to influence it? Should the military profession model itself after McKinley—who was dragged into a war by public passion—or mimic Franklin Roosevelt—who conditioned the society for World War II in advance of the fact? While we (the authors) lean toward a more lively dialogue between the Army and other interest groups in the society, it appears that society and the Army as an institution have chosen to follow the example of McKinley. This trend can in part be identified in the military's encouraging our culturally conditioned faith in technology to cure any ill and to provide us with the means to make war without any Americans getting hurt. This "technology *uber alles*" atmosphere also fosters the view that if the public wants destruction, turn us loose and don't restrict our actions—"Let us do our thing." It is reasonable to assume that General Weyand was at least implicitly supporting the latter view when he referred to the Army's sociopolitical role in Vietnam as a mistake.¹⁷

It is interesting to note how frequently military spokesmen (service members and civilians) refer to the roles involving anything other than the perpetration of maximum slaughter as "mistakes" and how few mention the institutional inability to meet the challenges of the more subtle (pragmatic) roles.¹⁸ One could even go further and argue that, in fact, during the period the US military held major responsibility for the fighting in Vietnam (1965-72), it adopted a "radical" firepower posture rather than really focusing on low-intensity conflict. The blame for failure was later placed on the latter rather than the former. It could be that the strains of the pragmatic roles on organizational cohesion (in the traditional sense) are so great that some military leaders subconsciously place organizational survival above ultimate national utility.

WIN THE FIRST BATTLE

Aside from organizational cohesion, one must not underestimate bureaucratic survival as a strong motive for the Army's opposition to future Vietnams. While we recognize that bureaucratic considerations are not limited to the Army, a departmental interaction and analysis of political actions in national security decisionmaking is well beyond the scope of this effort. We, therefore, treat only those bureaucratic considerations which are clearly Army-specific. In a milieu in which the Army's role is under question, it must provide a *raison d'être* in terms of threat and societal values. A successful rationalization in these terms will no doubt prove fiscally advantageous. Under these circumstances, Europe becomes the primary geographic area in which massive conventional military operations can reasonably be considered. By virtue of historical ties, public support would be assured, and military operations would rely wholly on traditional professional skills. In this light, it is not illogical for the new capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, to emphasize a European scenario to the virtual exclusion of other potential locales:

The US Army may find itself at war in any of a variety of places and situations, fighting opponents which could vary from the highly modern mechanized forces of the Warsaw Pact to light, irregular units in a remote part of the less developed world. Wherever the battle begins, the US Army is equipped, organized, and trained to undertake appropriate military missions. The purpose of military operations, and the focus of this manual, is to describe how the US Army destroys enemy military forces and secures or defends important geographic objectives.

Battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw Pact is the most demanding mission the US Army could be assigned. Because the US Army is structured primarily for that contingency and has large forces deployed in that area, this manual is designed mainly to deal with the realities of such operations. The principles set forth in this manual, however, apply also to military

operations anywhere in the world. Furthermore, the US Army retains substantial capabilities in its airborne, airmobile, and infantry divisions for successful operations in other theaters of war against other forces.¹⁹

The danger encompassed in the questionable syllogism that a European-oriented high-technology military may be successfully transplanted to other environments is at best peripheral to this inquiry. What concerns us here is the long-range impact on the profession of the Army's new doctrinal slogan "Win the First Battle." Simply stated, this means that if the Army does not win the first battle in Europe, there won't be a second one, because the Warsaw Pact forces will have overrun Western Europe. This concept is based on the conclusion that the Army will have to fight outnumbered and win. We are by no means attacking the validity of such an approach to a European war, nor are we questioning the importance of the defense of Western Europe. Of import to this study is the fact that the new tactical doctrine seems to have become the rationalization for the Army.

In order for the US Army to win the now-famous European first battle and win it outnumbered, it is imperative that the forces-in-being be at a nearly superhuman state of operational effectiveness. Field Manual 100-5 correctly points out that such a result can only be achieved through a tremendous and continuing training effort. Such emphasis on training and readiness will naturally force the military to live closer to the post, which in turn will lead to higher degrees of isolation from the ambient society. As Bletz and Taylor noted several years ago:

The military services are increasingly closing themselves into self-contained military ghettos—albeit comfortable ghettos—which foster physical isolation from the civilian community. The problem is that physical isolation leads to cultural isolation.²⁰

This tendency will be reinforced by the

Volunteer Army.²¹ Additionally, the prerequisite level of preparedness places a premium on popularly perceived radical technical military skills.

In an environment where to kill is the end and not simply one means to the end of causing compliance with US policies, we can anticipate radical skill emphasis. The more amorphous and temporarily discredited sociopolitical skills will be de-emphasized. Obviously, to support this approach would require a redirection in the Army's school system, which by 1972-73 had hesitatingly moved toward pragmatism. In its place has emerged a training-oriented system in which all schools are to be made into "training factories." This is the expressed goal and desire of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).²²

This shift in the thrust of the Army education system has grown from the belief that the officer corps needs to be trained exclusively in a more radically-based skill structure. Once the officer corps, accurately or not, began to identify the acquisition of pragmatic skills and their implementation as a causal factor in the failure in Vietnam, it followed that those bodies of knowledge would have to be carefully exorcised from the school curricula. Ironically, this point was made by Colonels Bradford and Brown in an article last year:

A shift away from higher-level and political-military subjects is well under way. We are becoming more narrowly professional in our approach. *This is long overdue.* [emphasis added]²³

This dramatic and complete reversal by two articulate professional soldiers reflects either the career pressures to be "in with the 'in'" or the effects of an equally complete reversal in the thinking of the Army leadership.

For Bradford and Brown, the real professional is now concerned not with the pragmatic skills of Janowitz which they espoused in 1968 but with the radical skills of Huntington. Just as Leavenworth, again serving as our weather vane, reflected faint movements toward pragmatism during the early 1970's, it reflects the shift away from

pragmatism in the mid-1970's. Most revealing has been the change in the college's mission. During the 1975-76 school year the mission of the Command and General Staff College was:

To improve and broaden the professional competence of selected commissioned officers, to prepare them for command and staff positions of greater responsibility, and to provide them with a firm foundation for continued professional growth.

The new mission statement for the college is:

To provide instruction for officers of the Active Army and Reserve Components, worldwide, so as to prepare officers for duty as field grade commanders and principal staff officers at brigade and higher echelon.

The change is a profound one. The 1975-76 mission statement allowed for a certain amount of education in the pragmatic skills. The new mission statement has implicitly removed this function. If we accept the premise that the more education to which an officer is exposed the less radical (absolute) he is, then it follows that the less education he gets the more radical (absolutist) he will be. If that is true, then the recent reversal in the school system would logically lead to a more divergent stance.²⁴

The rationalization for the restructuring of the Army school system has within it a certain amount of irony. As noted earlier, much of the rationale comes from the belief that pragmatic skills are essentially dysfunctional, as exhibited in Vietnam. This was one of the major themes that General Weyand emphasized. Yet, in the same article, he recognized that military power is not assessed in a vacuum:

All wars are 'total wars' in a sense that they have political, economic, and psychological dimensions that may be equally as important as the military dimension.²⁵

If that is correct, then the military should have an understanding of those other

dimensions in order to function more effectively in any conflict. However, a few sentences later, General Weyand said:

War—and even rivalry and competition—requires a coordinated and orchestrated national effort, with the military concentrating on military tasks, while other agencies of the federal government take on the political, economic, and psychological tasks.²⁶

It is reasonable to conclude that General Weyand recognized the need for pragmatism, but that he opted for a radical approach. In a larger context, the Army has also opted to do that which it fancies itself doing best—utilitarian or not. This decision can be classified as convergent in that the Army is doing about what the public appears, for the moment, to want it to do. It can also be classified as divergent in that the action will lead to increased physical, intellectual, and ethical isolation.

THE MANAGERIAL ETHOS

The divergency which we see following from the new doctrine is essentially antithetical to the professional philosophy of mid-level career officers. Moellering, in 1972, and the authors of this paper, in 1977, sampled the attitudes of student officers at CGSC. Both studies resulted in overwhelming support for the proposition that the US Army *should* be moving in a convergent direction.²⁷ We suggest that this finding could be a residue from the late 1960's and early 1970's. Exposure to sociopolitical realities sensitized the then-junior officers (now mid-career CGSC students), making them more pragmatic and thus perceiving a need to be convergent. Today these sensitized officers are mostly majors and lieutenant colonels in the middle of the hierarchical pyramid. This middle group has developed distinctly different views from the top (colonels and general officers) and, to a lesser degree, from the base (lieutenants and captains) of the pyramid. Such disparity is not uncommon in industry; the Army, however, has

traditionally assumed that uniformity of perception increased in direct proportion to grade elevation and service length.²⁸

While the officers sampled in our study clearly indicated in what direction they believed the Army should be moving, they exhibited confusion in attempting to determine the Army's present direction.²⁹ The reason for the confusion is the emergence of a new form of convergency, coexisting with the radical skills emphasized by the new doctrine. Such coexistence was predicted in 1971 by Charles Moskos in his examination of a pluralistic military.³⁰ The new convergency has carefully expunged the pragmatic sociopolitical concerns that marked the late 1960's and replaced them with an intense form of managerialism which has become completely identified with the new "professionalism."

The degree to which this new professionalism has absorbed the managerial ethos, or vice versa, is frighteningly highlighted in the following extract on ethics for lieutenants from an Army leadership monograph:

- Recognizes the need to be punctual, discrete, fair, and honest in dealing with people.
- Practices good personal hygiene.
- Recognizes the impact of role modeling.³¹

The fact that junior Army officers will be expected to view punctuality and personal hygiene as ethical considerations and that these two attributes constitute nearly half of their ethical requirements (according to the monograph) causes us to question whether ethics should be more concerned with corporate image or moral socialization. The profession of arms is unique in human society in that it calls on its members to kill and be killed. To address the ethics of this profession in the same context as those of industry is disturbing if not socially dangerous. Furthermore, such excessive concern for corporate image and institutional self-preservation can only lead to an introverted value system which encourages bureaucratic behavior.

The position of managerialism in the symbology of modern leadership is demonstrated by the previously referenced Army leadership monograph, which develops a "matrix of organizational leadership dimension."³² In this new study, managerial and planning skills are deemed essential for high-level executive positions, i.e., general officer. Of particular interest to this paper is the monograph's analysis of the executive's planning function, which it labels as "one of the most important dimensions of the managerial or leadership role."³³ In order to effectively articulate the planning function, the executive is required to have conceptual ability which:

Enables one to understand the relationship between the organization and the larger community, specifically political, economic, and social forces. Because this skill facilitates critical decisions affecting production, control, finance, and research, it impacts upon both the present 'tone' set by the organization and the future direction it takes. Involved in conceptual skill is a degree of creative ability which facilitates the coordination of all organizational activities and interest toward a common objective, thereby affording long-term planning to meet future contingencies. The importance of conceptual skill cannot be understated; its effectiveness depends upon its natural integration into the individual's makeup.

The absence or weakness of such skills may jeopardize "the success of the entire organization;"³⁴ and such an approach cannot be relegated to quantification because the long-range strategic plans required at this level of management must "consider the political climate, the constraints of social responsibility, and human limitations—all of which cannot be quantified."³⁵

Ironically, the very skills that the Army demands of its senior officers are not being taught at the lower-level Army schools. The rationale for this apparent contradiction is that junior officers do not need these high-level managerial skills, but instead need only a high degree of technical proficiency.³⁶ While the need to develop technical skills is

undisputed, the question which arises is how does the officer acquire the high-level managerial skills that are demanded as he moves up in rank? This question is further complicated by the fact that, as the Army's leadership monograph notes, "It is unreasonable to expect a person to develop conceptual skills once he reaches an executive position."³⁷

In 1962, Continental Army Command (CONARC), the predecessor of TRADOC, defined education as "formal instruction and study leading to intellectual development." Training, on the other hand, was considered to be "instruction and supervised practice toward acquisition of a skill."³⁸ Since these are still generally acceptable definitions, they will suffice as a basis for further examination of the current educational environment.

We have previously noted the Army's recognition of the need for "conceptual skills." Also noted was the avowed intent to train in technical (radical) skills, to the virtual exclusion of conceptual experience. The inadequacies of such an educational environment have been abundantly demonstrated in our recent history.

In such an apparently simple task as determining relative power, the obvious criteria (those which the "highly trained" officers of the day examined) were not adequate. In 1941, the best estimate from the "best" people in Washington (civilian and military) was that the USSR would succumb to Nazi Germany in three weeks. The "professional" analyses of the early 1950's showed the United States as being overwhelmingly more powerful than North Korea or China or both together. A decade later, a new generation of "highly trained" functionaries concluded that North Vietnam had no chance against the power of the United States. Obviously, pure military and economic indicators, no matter how alluringly quantifiable they may be, do not reveal the entire picture.

THE PERCEPTUAL WEAKNESSES

In Vietnam, military dysfunctions were

never attributable to widespread training deficiencies in tactics or logistics. The failures were perceptual (educational) weaknesses. For example, inaccurate—even mendacious—reporting, which was so commonplace and cost us so dearly, was not attributable to untrained reporters but to the failure to perceive that which was important to measure (an educational shortcoming), or to organizational imperatives (such as the "body count") necessary to demonstrate success. Highly trained measurers then established by fiat the importance of that which could be measured, thereby reacting to their training in the absence of educational experiences which would have caused them to reevaluate in light of unfamiliar conditions.

The paradox is heightened when the Army's managerial "new look" is examined in context. An entire management vocabulary (zero defects, PET, PACE, organizational effectiveness, etc.) is being superimposed on the Army's traditional jargon. Business can ultimately judge individual performance or organizational effectiveness by the profit which results. The Army, having no profit to prove its efficiency, risks having its management techniques become ends in themselves. Thus Army management in the 80's could become analogous to some of the early Soviet five-year plans, wherein the plan took on a life of its own with resource allocations as well as career rewards and punishments tied directly to it and not to the utility of the product.

Why has the Army, having just extricated itself from a less-than-gloriously-successful conflict which was fought using all the techniques of systems analysis, turned more completely to it and the attendant managerialism? We submit that there are two general categories of motivation. The first, and by far the most dangerous, is cultural. We (the Army) still suffer from the World War II "loafer" image. Frenetic activity has become the weapon of choice to dispel that image. Effort and change have become articles of faith for the US Army, devoid of inhibitions based on their utility. What does one do with an Army

of compulsive activists when they cannot perform what is by their own definition their only trick (fight a war)? You let them reduce their tensions by reorganizing each other, thus managing by activity. Since this compulsion to “do” is an American trait and not just an American military variant, the society looks on approvingly while the Army works 10- to 15-hour days taking itself apart and reordering the pieces. “Management” has become the rubric to legitimize activity for its own sake. This is particularly irritating to the members of the profession, since some of the “managers” disregard those aspects of management which address organizational behavior and human motivation (roughly 50 percent of the total management pie).

The second category is the perceived need to converge with the civilian society, thus to be better equipped for battle in the DOD arena. The Army may not seem so alien to the public if it is acting like and communicating in the same terms as IBM.³⁹ Theoretically, since the Army will be more like every other organization in society, there will be less chance for misunderstanding and fear bred of differentness. If this is accurate, support should be more easily generated and the culturally conditioned need to be loved more fully satisfied in the new environment.


The above rationale fails to take cognizance of the public’s esteem for altruistic service-oriented organizations. We hasten to add that esteem does not necessarily lead to willingness to serve in service-oriented organizations. One of the reasons the Army, as an institution, survived Vietnam as well as it did was the popular perception of the Army as a selfless profession.⁴⁰

NARROW EDUCATION CREATES NARROW MINDS

One possible outcome of Army managerialism will be the creation of another informal elite group. The Army already suffers from the incompatibility of our national equalitarian values and the necessity of operating a meritocracy. Institutional inability to identify and use widely-accepted discriminators has led to multiple *sub rosa* informal techniques to define merit and

reward it (i.e., certain jobs are reserved for elite candidates—these jobs then become prerequisites to prestigious rewards). The management game heightens the awareness of the system’s internal needs, thus encouraging the selection of compliant candidates rather than seeking out and nurturing genius. Even today, the Army cannot use most of the talent which it recruits because of the system’s demands for uniformity. A less bountiful recruiting environment coupled with greater emphasis on systemic cohesion can have only one result—fewer gifted people and more functionaries. Our future leaders will be increasingly able to manage problems rather than analyze and solve them.

When applied to the Army’s educational system, the combination of overemphasis on “radical” skills and managerial techniques will further skew the preparation of top-level commanders and staff officers. Using Robert L. Katz’ classic skill mix for organizational management, we have indicated in the following diagram the rough Army grade equivalencies and, by the dotted lines, the anticipated result of current Army educational policies.⁴¹



An educational system reflected in this modified diagram will greatly narrow the base from which higher leaders and staffs should, theoretically, be chosen. We will have more technicians, with fewer officers skilled in the broader aspects of national strategy and conceptual thinking. Since both of the latter skills are universally accepted as being progressively more necessary as one moves up the organizational ladder, those selected for the ascent will have to be identified earlier (e.g., based on performance as lieutenants) and there will be far fewer people available for substitution or horizontal entry in the elite

channels beyond the 10th year of service. In the extreme, we might find the dual army envisioned by some military scholars of the early 1970's.⁴² The duality will not be a support services "womb," protecting the combat elements from the debilitating effects of society, as the earlier commentators proposed. The duality will be vertical and informal, with the managerial elite interacting with the society (convergency) while simultaneously keeping their uninitiated associates isolated from the society (divergency) in the finest "Do as I say, not as I do" tradition.

The narrowing of the educational system is essentially a convergent trend insofar as US civil education is also narrowing the scopes of learning in an effort to produce marketable skills rather than the "educated" person of the past. The effects, however, will encourage greater divergency as training in the radical skills narrows the intellectual horizons of the Army officer. As techniques become more isolated from value considerations—a phenomenon which might be labeled Eichmannism (value-free technician)—we could find that the Army will be increasingly unable to gain public confidence. In the extreme case, the Army could find itself too technically proficient for its ability to use the skill, à la *The Bedford Incident*. In that novel, the ship captain honed his weapons systems to a fine edge but brought disaster on ship, crew, and—by implication—the nation, through his lack of knowledge of both the human operators of those systems and when to use the systems.

Such an extreme situation is highly unlikely, at least for the foreseeable future. The Army as an institution cannot change completely in a short time (five years or so). Examples of incomplete change are numerous. One current aspect is the hierarchy's inability to fully accept their new management tools when the findings run counter to their preconceptions. For example, one senior Army officer, speaking to a leadership symposium at Fort Sill, commented on survey results concerning perceptions of

systemic encouragement of "goofing-off" in the Army. When he noted two grades where the respondents did not support his contention, he indicated that those grade incumbents were "out to lunch."⁴³ A true manager would have attempted to ascertain the "why" of the inconsistency.

Another hindrance to the complete acceptance of convergency is the "occupation versus calling" question.⁴⁴ If the Army moves toward the occupation end of the spectrum, it will erode the commitment and the perceived self-sacrificing nature of the profession, which is so important for organizational cohesion. This point was emphatically made in a joint statement before Congress by Secretary of the Army Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., and Army Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers. They stated that "The profession of arms is not simply a job—it is a way of life."

Many elements create the military environment: the post with its housing, medical facilities, chapels, educational and recreational activities; the unit, where the soldier belongs and forms, with other soldiers, a cohesive force: the satisfaction derived from service, as well as the perceived worth that society places on that service—all these and many more elements are part of the military environment necessary to an effective army.⁴⁵

It appears that in order for the Army to create this image of a "way of life," the military will of necessity have to further isolate itself from the surrounding society. Despite our pluralistic social philosophies, Americans are not supportive of deviant subcultures, as attested to by the fate of the police, fire, educational, and medical functions in the last decade. These functions also displayed some of the characteristics of social service callings until unionization, strikes, and slowdowns placed them in the job category just like everyone else's economic activity.

A DOOMSDAY MACHINE?

By 1980, we see a disturbing melange of

trends both internal to the Army and with reference to the Army's relationship to the parent society.

Internally, there will be a narrowing of the definition of professionalism to the pseudo-Clausewitzian management of violence. Concurrently, there will be a loss of higher-order military skills resulting in (1) the surrender of any military contribution to national strategy and (2) dependency on the "miraculous" development of higher management skills, since the service school system will not train officers for the demands that the system is placing on them. The Army will, by pandering to popular misconceptions of human conflict, become more introverted and more concerned with institutional preservation than with its own utility as an instrument of policy.

On the social level, the modified value system needed for a "calling" to produce Plato's protectors will not be tolerated. The mere existence of an Army is a constant reminder that we have been unable to perfect man. Society can hardly be expected to continue to devote resources and "quality" people for the maintenance of an embarrassing monument to its own failure. The effects of shrinking resources (human and material) and ever more limited uses will feed on each other, making the Army smaller and more destructive, hence less utilitarian, as the years progress.

Huntington establishes three pillars for his definition of professionalism: expertise, corporate value system, and responsibility.⁴⁶ Given the continual interaction of the trends we have attempted to identify, by 1990, the first two criteria will negate the third. The US Army will be expert in the narrow skills associated with a doomsday machine—so destructive that it can't be used. Its corporate value system will force introversion, thus further isolating it from society, making it less useful and hence less responsible.

We cannot predict whether Fort Apache (an isolated world of its own) or Executive Suite (an institution like all others) will be the

more accurate label to apply to our future Army. It is, however, not impossible that—in the worst case—by 1990, the US Army could become an expensive and useless artifact, a tribute to the folly of a policy designed to develop uhlans from the products of a super-industrial society.

NOTES

1. Arthur Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 2 (Spring 1974), 63.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
3. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 424.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 426.
5. Russell Weigley, *Towards an American Army* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 38-53, 100-26. Also see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 222-70.
6. Interview with General Taylor, January 1975. General Taylor noted that when he arrived as Chief of Staff, he firmly believed in the traditional attitudes that an officer should only look at things from the military point of view. By the end of his tour, he realized that this was absurd. See Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959) and Maxwell D. Taylor, "Military Advice—Its Use in Government," *Vital Speeches*, 15 March 1964, pp. 336-39.
7. This comment was overheard in a conversation between several senior Army officers. While it is nonattributable, we suggest that it may validly reflect the attitudes of many officers in the Army today.
8. Robert Doughty, "The Command and General Staff College in Transition: 1946-1976" (unpublished student special study project, Ft. Leavenworth, 1976), p. 33.
9. Donald B. Vought, "Soldiers Must Be Statesmen," *Military Review*, 48 (October 1968), 79-84.
10. Zeb B. Bradford and James Murphy, "A New Look at the Military Profession," *Army* (February 1969), 61-62. This awareness of the necessity of pragmatism was not exclusively an Army phenomenon. See Jack Miles, "The Fusion of Military and Political Considerations: Threat or Challenge," *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 1968), 22-29, and (September 1968), 44-52.
11. Zeb B. Bradford and Frederic J. Brown, *The United States Army in Transition* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 230.
12. Doughty, p. 49. Quoted is retired LTG Garrison H. Davidson, Commandant from 1954-56.
13. Fred C. Weyand and Harry G. Summers, "Vietnam Myths and American Realities," *Commanders Call* (July-August 1976), 5.
14. Sam C. Sarkesian, "An Empirical Re-assessment of Military Professionalism" (unpublished paper presented at the 1976 regional meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Maxwell AFB), p. 9.
15. John Moellering, "Future Civil-Military Relations," *Military Review*, 53 (July 1973), 79-80.
16. Sarkesian, p. 27. Moellering found 40 percent of the students at CGSC blamed the civilian leadership for getting the Army into a war it didn't want to fight. Also see Franklin D. Margiotta, "A Military Elite in Transition: Air Force Leaders in the 1980's," *Armed Forces and Society*, 2 (Winter 1976), 155-84.

17. Weyand and Summers, p. 6.
18. Donald B. Vought, "Preparing for the Wrong War," *Military Review*, 57 (May 1977), elaborates on this theme. It is interesting to note that the institution has noted its inability to deal with pragmatic involvements. In an article published in the *Kansas City Star*, 15 August 1976, then-LTG Donn Starry noted the following: "After getting out of Vietnam, . . . the Army looked around and realized it should not try to fight that kind of war again." GEN Starry now commands TRADOC.
19. US Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 1-2. Note destruction of "enemy military forces and securing or defending important geographic objectives" are offered as the purpose of military operations. It is apparent that this manual confirms the pseudo-Clausewitzian resurgence in the thinking of the US Army hierarchy.
20. William Taylor and Donald Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education" (unpublished paper presented at the 1973 biannual conference, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago), p. 25.
21. The potentially divergent nature of the Volunteer Army in the post-Vietnam era was noted by Morris Janowitz, "The Emergent Military" and Charles Moskos, "The New Estrangement: Armed Forces and American Society," in *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*, ed. Charles Moskos (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 255-94.
22. Doughty, p. 102. Also see Vought, "Preparing for the Wrong War," for the impact of this approach on other TRADOC institutions.
23. Zeb B. Bradford and Frederic J. Brown, "Implications of the Modern Battlefield," *Military Review*, 57 (July 1977), 10.
24. Raoul Alcalá, "Education and Officer Attitudes," in *The System for Educating Military Officers in the US*, International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 9, ed. Larry Korb (Pittsburgh: International Studies Assn., 1976). Also see Taylor and Bletz, as well as William Taylor and Sam C. Sarkesian, "A Case for Civilian Graduate Education for Professional Officers," *Armed Forces and Society*, 1 (Winter 1975), 251-620.
25. Weyand and Summers, p. 7.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
27. Moellering, p. 81. In his study, 74.2 percent of the officers questioned opted for convergency; in our study, the figure was 66 percent.
28. This, in effect, could constitute a military "lost generation," an area which the authors feel warrants more study.
29. Of the 36 respondents who felt that the Army should be heading in a more divergent pattern, 26 felt that the Army was convergent right now; of the 65 who felt that the Army should be convergent, 33 perceived the Army as divergent at the present. We suggest this strange reversal in perception is a product of the confusion brought about by contending institutional desires for both convergency and divergency.
30. Charles Moskos, "The Emergent Military: Civilianized, Traditional, or Pluralistic?" (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1971).
31. Stephen Clement and Donna Ayres, "Monograph No. 8: A Matrix of Organizational Leadership Dimensions," *Leadership Monograph Series* (US Army Administration Center, 1976), Fig. 15 (foldout). This monograph is a continuation and evolution of ideas out of the CONARC Leadership Studies of the early 1970's.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 62. Managerial creep is not limited to the Army. Note the wording of the following extract from a State Department Award for Valor nomination: "The successful operation was in large measure due to management, patience, personal leadership skills and, above all, courage . . ." "Six Foreign Service Men Cited for Valor," *Department of State Newsletter*, No. 187 (February 1977), 17.
33. Clement and Ayres, p. 64.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-48.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
38. Doughty, p. 101.
39. Clement and Ayres, p. 70. Interestingly, this monograph describes the following: "The leadership role expects a professional profile which calls for an exchange. In return for responsibility and appropriate conduct, the professional finds that his 'clients' place their trust and confidence in his competence and allow him much latitude to apply his judgment and skills."
40. David R. Segal and John D. Blair, "Public Confidence in the U.S. Military," *Armed Forces and Society*, 3 (Fall 1976), 6.
41. Robert L. Katz, "Skills of an Effective Administration," *Harvard Business Review* (January-February 1955), 33-42.
42. Bradford and Brown, *The United States Army in Transition*, p. 230; William Hauser, *America's Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 203.
43. Paul F. Gorman, "The Exercise of Command in Training Management," speech at Officers' Leadership Symposium, Field Artillery School, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, 30 November 1976.
44. Charles Moskos, "The All-Volunteer Army: Calling, Profession, or Occupation?" *Parameters*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (1977), 2-9.
45. US Congress, joint statement before committees of the Senate and House, *The Posture of the Army and Department of the Army Budget Estimate for Fiscal Year 1978*, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1977, p. 32.
46. Huntington, pp. 7-18.

