POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY CHANGES IN BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA, 1966-79

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by

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THE PROPER COMBINATION[1]

Among those who have been labeled the "attentive public"[2] and who are thus attuned to the course of political events beyond their village and nation-state, it is not difficult to demonstrate that the southern portion of the African Continent is attracting increased attention. The problem in approaching the study of Southern Africa is not to prove or even belabor the point that the region is significant, but rather how to devise an efficient and substantial line of inquiry that combines both the particular and the general. Such a line of inquiry will avoid the perils of trivialization and myopic attention to detail, on the one hand, and the sweeping and grandiose generalizations divorced from a sound empirical base, on the other.

With these pitfalls in mind, I have selected for scrutiny three neighboring countries in Southern Africa: the Republic of Botswana, the territory of Namibia (or South West Africa), and the Republic of South Africa. These three countries will suffice as an introduction to the more complex study of the intranational and international politics of a strategically important area of Africa. In addition, these three neighbors illustrate the different levels or kinds of conflicts involved in the decolonization process in Southern Africa.

The first step in this analysis will be to describe and explain the significance of some important trends in the political, economic, and security sectors of these three contiguous countries. Such an approach will attempt to meet the requirement of specificity noted earlier. The second step will be to suggest how these three countries are faced, to a greater or lesser degree, with problems which beset the Southern Africa region, the African Continent, and the developing nations of the world, thus linking this brief inquiry to some of the basic literature in the field of the politics of developing areas. Such a linkage should provide readers with the fundamental knowledge with which to undertake more sophisticated, as well as comparative, analysis, thereby avoiding some of the pitfalls associated with the case study approach to political and social science. Thus the second step will address itself to the requirement of generality noted at the outset.

All three neighbors are confronted with the problem of political participation, which is central to the study of African nationalism and the rhetorical as well as the actual practice of African majority rule. Additionally, all must confront the

difficulties involved in balancing the political demands as well as the political resources of the modern, industrialized, urban center with the agricultural periphery. Such a balancing act must take into account the vast network of African migratory labor flows within and between countries in the region, as well as the challenge of creating and maintaining labor-intensive economies which can cope with unemployment and underemployment among the teenage school dropout and his less-educated parents. Finally, all three, in their capacity as producers of primary products, must devise strategies to cope with fluctuating prices and terms of trade with the industrialized nations of Western and Eastern Europe. It should come as no surprise, then, that there are constraints on these countries in terms of economic development goals and that there is no one simple or efficacious route to the affluent, consumer-oriented society which bedazzles those who have imbibed much of contemporary Western economic thought and leisure styles.

BOTSWANA: AT THE INTERSECTION

Of the three countries in our Southern African sampler, Botswana was the last to come under Western—namely, British—rule (in 1885) and the first to emerge as a republic with African majority rule (in 1966) and to become a full-fledged member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Its attainment of independence within the global network of the Commonwealth of Nations was peaceful after an abbreviated period of self-government (1965-66), which followed the customary British practice elsewhere in Africa. It has diplomatic relations with both the Eastern and Western bloc members as well as with other African-ruled states on the continent which belong to the OAU, but it does not have diplomatic relations with neighboring Zimbabwe Rhodesia and South Africa or with the Republics of the Transkei and Bophuthatswana, both of which received formal independence from South Africa as part of the policy of separate development (neither of which, however, has yet been recognized by any sovereign state other than

South Africa). From an ethnic point of view, its peoples have the closest ties with the Tswana-speakers of South Africa and of Bophuthatswana, while the Herero people who reside in Western Botswana would be able to identify with the Hereros of Namibia, and the Bakalanga (Bakalaka) people in the northeastern part of Botswana are related to those in the Mashonaland area of Zimbabwe Rhodesia.[3]

It is well to remember that the colonial experience in Africa resulted in boundary demarcations which were often concerned with following lines of longitude and latitude (exemplified by the Botswana-Namibia frontier) and which split ethnic groups. Although the OAU has gone on record as legitimizing the post-imperial boundary demarcations, it comes as no surprise to students of international relations that conflicts have often arisen over irredentist boundary claims and have led to armed confrontations. There is little in the history of Botswana to suggest that its borders with its neighbors have been a root cause of conflict. Whatever else may have given rise to disputes between Botswana and its neighbors to the east (Zimbabwe Rhodesia), west (Namibia), and south (South Africa), it cannot be said that these conflicts have boundary or irredentist claims as their primary source. Yet it is true that the charter granted to the British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes appeared to provide an opening wedge for the possible incorporation of at least a portion of the Bechuanaland Protectorate (as pre-

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
independence Botswana was called) into the Republic of South Africa, and it is also historically correct to note that South Africa did engage in fruitless and desultory negotiations with the United Kingdom, the paramount power in Bechuanaland, regarding the possible incorporation of Bechuanaland.[4] Even though it can be argued that the threat of incorporation by Zimbabwe Rhodesia (then Southern Rhodesia) or South Africa may well have helped to shape contemporary African attitudes in Botswana regarding Zimbabwe Rhodesia and South Africa, it seems that the more proximate source of those attitudes is the mode of governance of the Africans by the regimes in Salisbury, Pretoria, and Windhoek. Systems of white hegemony, rather than possible idiosyncracies of boundary lines, were and are of decisive import in fashioning African opinions in the capital of Gaborone and in translating such opinions into distinct foreign and defense policies.

Because of its position, Botswana can be regarded as at the geopolitical intersection of the Southern African area. The declaration of the British protectorate over Bechuanaland in the last quarter of the 19th century was intended, on the one hand, to erect a barrier to German imperial expansion eastward from its foothold at what is now Lüderitz in Namibia and, on the other hand, to protect its access route to the northeast into present-day Zimbabwe Rhodesia along the so-called missionaries' road. After its defeat by the South African Republic (later called the Transvaal) in the brief war of 1880-81, the British Government was moved by the desire to curb territorial aggrandizement by independent groups of Afrikaners, such as those who proclaimed the short-lived miniature republics of Goshen and Stellaland in the western part of Transvaal. Thus, the historical evidence suggests that the underlying British policy was one of interdiction so far as its proclamation of a protectorate over Bechuanaland was concerned. Such a policy would seem to be a reflection of political and strategic interests, rather than of economic ones. Although gold had been discovered in the Tati area, which

borders on Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Bechuanaland in the 19th century was not much of an economic prize, especially after the gold strikes on the Witwatersrand (a ridge measuring about 23 by 62 miles, with Johannesburg near its center) and the development of the diamond mining industry in Kimberley in the neighboring Cape Province. Because of the climate and lack of water, most of Bechuanaland was of little interest to white farmers and ranchers. What agricultural and ranching potential the protectorate had was located, with the exception of Ghanzi in the west, along the southeastern rim of the protectorate. There were a number of whites who became permanent settlers in Ghanzi and in certain clearly demarcated blocs in the southeastern border areas.

Race relations among the protectorate Africans, the local white settlers, and the resident British officials were relatively amicable and unmarked by sanguinary African resistance which took place in neighboring Namibia and South Africa. This vast area was governed by a small number of British officials who coopted the principal African chiefs in the process of maintaining peace and order, thereby honoring the classic British precept of relieving the exchequer in London of the fiscal burden of empire.[5]

Following the inauguration of the Union of South Africa on 31 May 1910, the British Government operated on the assumption that Bechuanaland (along with Basutoland and Swaziland, the other two High Commission Territories that abutted on the Union) was to be held in trust or escrow for South Africa, and the South African constitution (which required legitimation by the British Parliament at the time) made provision for such a transfer at an unspecified future date. The parties most directly concerned, the Africans of the protectorate, were to be consulted by the British Government about their views, but consultation was not construed by the British to mean that the Africans had the implied right of veto. Even had it been so construed, the British would have reserved the right to override that veto.[6] The Africans nevertheless had an effective

AFRICA

Canary Is. (Sp.) · Morocco · Tunisia · Western Sahara · ALGERIA · LIBYA · EGYPT · Cape Verde · Mauritania · MALI · NIGER · CHAD · SUDAN · Djibouti · Senegal · Gambia · Guinea Bissau · Guinea · Sierra Leone · Liberia · Ivory Coast · Ghana · Upper Volta · Benin · Nigeria · Togo · Eq. Guinea · Cameroon · Central African Empire · ETHIOPIA · SOMALIA · Sao Tome & Principe · Gabon · Congo · ZAIRE · Rwanda · Uganda · Kenya · Burundi · Tanzania · Comoros · ANGOLA · ZAMBIA · Malawi · Zimbabwe Rhodesia · Mozambique · Namibia · Madagascar · South Africa (Walvis Bay) · Botswana · Swaziland · SOUTH AFRICA · Lesotho

0 500 1000 KILOMETERS
0 500 1000 MILES

blocking mechanism in terms of their easy access to British missionaries who were capable of arousing British public opinion on behalf of the Africans.[7] The missionaries, it could be said, were the gatekeepers to the influentials in Parliament. This access to the British public and Parliament is one of the most significant keys to understanding the changing nature of Botswana's relationship with South Africa and the United Kingdom in the years leading up to its independence in 1966.

Botswana's administrative headquarters was transferred from Mafeking (in the Cape Province) to Gaborone, where the Batlokwa people resided, as a prelude to elections for a legislative assembly to accompany the grant of self-government in early 1965. Botswana increasingly found itself at the intersection of forces of African nationalism in neighboring South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia, and what was once the missionaries' road became a conduit to Zambia and Tanzania for those who sought political asylum or who wished to join (or were recruited by) the fledgling liberation army units. Before the end of the year, the Smith Government had unilaterally declared its independence from the British crown and lapsed into a state of illegality in the eyes of the British authorities. The economic encirclement of Rhodesia in lieu of the use of British armed forces, which the Wilson Government ruled out, would spell great economic deprivation for the Bechuanaland Protectorate because its main economic artery, the Mafeking-Bulawayo railway, was neither owned nor operated by the protectorate. Instead it was a Rhodesian-owned utility, a portion of which was operated for a short while by the South Africans as sub-contractors.[8]

Because of its economic vulnerability to Rhodesian countermeasures, the government of President Seretse Khama was not able to exert appreciable leverage against Rhodesia, but successfully petitioned the United Nations to apply minimal sanctions indicating symbolic compliance as well as an intention to assure its citizens of their continued livelihood. The Rhodesians, in turn, completed a rail link via Beitbridge which allowed them direct access to South Africa via the Transvaal Province. Heretofore they had had to transit Botswana in order to ship their goods to and from South African harbors.[9] When Mozambique secured its independence and closed its borders with Rhodesia, Rhodesia's sole corridor to the sea lay through South Africa, with or without the Botswana connection.

After independence, the mining industry came of age with the discovery of diamond pipes at Orapa and Jwaneng and of copper southeast of the commercial town of Francistown. Such an industry seemed to portend a dramatic end to the age-old poverty of Botswana, promising to be (it was hoped) a stellar attraction to foreign private capital and to overseas public aid donors as well as the necessary catalyst for the development of

secondary and tertiary industries (as was the case with South Africa). Welcome though these discoveries were, they have not constituted any true economic miracle because the long-term economic vitality of the nation still depends on its renewable agricultural (and livestock) resources which were the principal mainstays of employment within the country.[10]

Botswana still needs to rely on the willingness of South African employers to hire many of its citizens on a contract, migratory basis, a practice almost as old as the protectorate itself.[11] In terms of manufacturing and light industries, it faces the nagging problem of securing labor-intensive, as opposed to capital-intensive, modes of employment, and in the mining sector there is the question of how widely and how quickly these skills can be acquired by the local Africans.[12] Access to mining skills has traditionally been limited to whites in South Africa and Namibia, and even in Zambia white miners could be regarded as the aristocrats of labor. This traditional pattern of differential access to mining skills, if not controlled and monitored, could have an unsalutary effect upon both race relations and industrial peace in Botswana.[13] Such harmony and tranquility are, of course, seen by the rulers of Botswana as the necessary ingredients of private (and public) investor confidence. A long-term and persistent challenge to the leaders in Gaborone will be to devise and implement strategies to alleviate rural poverty and to close the urban-rural economic gap.

Additional economic tasks will entail training enough technical staff to take over the operation of the railway within the boundaries of the country,[14] while devising some mechanisms whereby the Zimbabwe Rhodesian Government (which has yet to be recognized by Botswana) can be compensated for relinquishing its railway properties and rolling stock and warehouses.[15] In the short run, the most debilitating items on Botswana's economic and defense agendas concern the ingress of African refugees from Zimbabwe Rhodesia and the penetration of Botswana territory by regular or irregular components of the Zimbabwe Rhodesian

armed forces. Although it has steadfastly refused to allow its soil to be used as a forward base for liberation groups aimed at striking either Zimbabwe Rhodesian- or South African-held targets or military outposts, and although it has yet to contribute to the African Liberation Committee fund of the OAU,[16] Botswana, in its role as one of the so-called frontline states, has made no secret of its preference for African majority rule in Namibia and Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

It has taken its complaints against Zimbabwe Rhodesian hot pursuit to the United Nations Security Council,[17] and it has seen fit to develop its own armed forces in addition to the police force it inherited at independence. Given the length of its northern and eastern borders and the small size of its Defense Force,[18] it cannot effectively deter either guerrilla units in transit or the counter-strike units. Its defense weakness was most manifest when, in mid-April 1979, Zimbabwe Rhodesian forces disguised as Botswana Defense Force members were reported to have attacked and sunk the ferry that crossed the Chobe River at Kazungula connecting Botswana with Zambia.[19] Even though it may not have stemmed the infiltration of Zimbabwe liberation units into Zimbabwe Rhodesia from Zambia via some sort of Botswana pipeline, given the number of access points for guerrilla penetration of Zimbabwe Rhodesian soil it was a damaging blow to the Botswana transportation network. The Botswana Government had been able to build part of the road connecting the ferry crossing at Kazungula to the rail line at Francistown with funding from the United States as part of a regional aid program. For the immediate future, the most serious threat to Botswana's territorial integrity and its economic links with Africa north of the Zambesi River come from its eastern flank; the western and southern flanks appear free of chronic conflict and relatively secure.

NAMIBIA: HOW QUIET ON BOTSWANA'S WESTERN FRONT?

Less than three months before Botswana

ANGOLA

ZAMBIA

Zambezi R.

Kazungula

Salisbury

ZIMBABWE
RHODESIA

indefinite

Chobe R.

NAMIBIA
(SOUTH-WEST AFRICA)

Bulawayo

Mashonaland

Tati R.

MOZAMBIQUE

Ghanzi

Francistown

Beitbridge

Orapa

Swakopmund Windhoek

BOTSWANA

WALVIS BAY
(SOUTH AFRICA) Walvis Bay

Gaborone

TRANSVAAL

Mafeking

Pretoria

BOPHUTHATSWANA

Maputo

Johannesburg

Lüderitz

SWAZILAND

ORANGE
FREE STATE

Kimberley

NATAL

Bloemfontein

Maseru

LESOTHO

SOUTH AFRICA

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE

TRANSKEI

**BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA,
AND SOUTH AFRICA**

0   250 Kilometers

0   250 Miles

Cape Town

Simonstown

was scheduled to receive full-fledged independence from the United Kingdom and roughly eight months after the Smith Government unilaterally proclaimed its independence on 11 November 1965, the International Court of Justice at The Hague in the Netherlands announced its decision in the contentious dual cases of *Liberia* v. *South Africa* and *Ethiopia* v. *South Africa* with regard to South Africa's stewardship in what was then called South West Africa. By the narrowest of margins, the Court decided that neither plaintiff had sufficient legal standing in the suit, thus sidestepping the merits of the

case (concerning whether the practice of *apartheid*/separate development in the territory of Namibia by the defendant was a violation of the League of Nations mandate, which supposedly was still operative and binding on South Africa). The lengthy and seemingly convoluted legal battles at The Hague in 1950, 1955, 1956, and in 1960-66 produced three advisory opinions and one opinion which, while binding, created more problems than it solved (except for South Africa, which regarded its policies as vindicated). As the San Francisco Conference of 1945 receded in time and the late 1950's,

when African nationalism was reaching its apogee in English-speaking East and West Africa, drew nearer, it became more obvious that the international legal strategems[20] were but one facet of the drive for African decolonization.

African nationalism came late to both Botswana and Namibia, and the logical and closest source of inspiration, rhetoric, and expertise was the African nationalist movement in South Africa, which antedated World War I. The impact of African political refugees from South Africa and personal exposure, through the migrant labor system, to "the politics of inequality"[21] were mutually reinforcing in the case of Botswana, where there was much greater access to the imperial power (as pointed out earlier) and hence less need to seek a world forum than was the case with the Namibians. What Namibian nationalists called "the armed struggle" (read: the onset of guerrilla warfare) began in late August 1966 and provided the Republic of South Africa with ample grounds, so its supporters argued, for the passage of an extremely tough and retroactive internal security measure under the terms of which the captured insurgents were subsequently tried in Pretoria, rather than in Windhoek, the administrative seat of the territory.[22]

In the first decade of this century, the Germans encountered resistance from some of the African ethnic groups—the Nama and the Herero—and suppressed it with augmented colonial contingents, thus reasserting German hegemony throughout central and southern South West Africa. Counterinsurgency operations in the colony were followed by gradual reforms initiated by the Colonial Office in Berlin. The Imperial Government and the *Reichstag* were made aware, especially by members of the Social Democratic Party, of colonial maladministration and personal misconduct on the part of officials in the various German colonies.[23] At roughly the same time, the British in the Natal Province of what was to become the Union of South Africa were similarly engaged in suppressing insurgency among the Zulus, whom they had previously battled in 1879.[24]

Two aspects of long-range importance may be seen in these colonial wars: first, they demonstrated that some, if not all, Africans resorted to violence to protest what they regarded as white usurpation of their land and cattle, thus disrupting their traditional economy and living patterns; second, they provided paper ammunition for British publicists to develop and German publicists to refute the notion that the Germans had forfeited their right to belong to the select club of Western nations which was responsible (presumably only to themselves) for the management of the white man's burden. Colonies were, after all, prestigious possessions in the same way that battleships were for the Great Powers. Small European powers, for example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal, could enhance their standing by the fact that they held overseas real estate such as the Congo, the East Indies, Angola, and Mozambique.

In 1915, with South West Africa no longer an active military theater, the South African military units took possession of what they regarded as the spoils of war. At the close of hostilities, the British (who acted as brokers for the South Africans in some instances) had sought to justify the anticipated annexation of German colonies by the Allied Powers, ostensibly on the basis of the "German colonial guilt" thesis which was an adjunct to the general "war guilt" argument advanced by the Allies. The Germans attempted to expose the hypocrisy of the charges by issuing their own analysis of the British colonial record.[25] This public washing of dirty colonial linen had, one might argue, a long-term and perhaps unintended consequence. This consequence was that the attentive public did help, through the mechanism of the League of Nations mandates system, to set the minimum standards of behavior for those who would shoulder the burden of empire. The abuses of empire, in retrospect, seemed to have an air of self-denying prophecy about them: they led, in time, to an erosion of the legitimacy of the system of

colonial rule. The denial of such legitimacy was the vitalizing element of the process of decolonization, which was vigorously pursued by the United Nations General Assembly.

This change of international ambience from one which was "Eurocentric" and congenial to the aims, if not all the practices, of the colonial powers to one in which anticolonialism was both rhetoric and reality is especially crucial to the study of Namibian politics. The United Nations was ancillary to the decolonization process in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, but it was a vital part of political change in Namibia because it provided both a stage and an audience (which contained an increasing number of African delegations over time) for the airing of grievances against the authorities in Pretoria and Windhoek, particularly in the 1946-66 period before the African nationalists' resort to arms. By virtue of the League of Nations mandate agreement, which the General Assembly abrogated in the fall of 1966, four weeks after Botswana was granted independence, the United Nations assumed (on paper) the responsibility for supervising the governance of the yet-to-be-independent Namibia. South Africa, to be sure, had denied out of hand the propriety and legality of such supervision by an external organization, and its bureaucratic apparatus remained on the ground in Namibia.

When one surveys the course of political history in Namibia since 1946, when General Smuts' United Party was still in power, one notices certain clear trends. First, there is the picture of impressive economic growth in several sectors, particularly mining and deep-water fishing, thanks in part to private South African and Western investment. This picture stands in marked contrast to South West Africa on the eve of the Second World War, when it was primarily a ranching area and heavily subsidized by the white South African taxpayer.[26]

The second trend was the marked difference between Namibia and South Africa in terms of the growth of African nationalist movements, on the one hand, and the rapidity with which such movements were proscribed in South Africa but not in Namibia, on the other hand.[27] Although the Windhoek authorities did not outlaw the premier African nationalist group—the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)—or any of its close rivals, such as the South West African National Union, they were able to contain what they regarded as a potential security threat by dealing with individual party members as such. The South African police were not lacking in zeal when it came to the maintenance of internal security, but a number of Africans did become political refugees and fled the territory for havens in Botswana, Zambia, and independent Angola. Some of those who fled, understandably, would provide recruits for the guerrilla forces or assist the nationalist groups in other ways, such as serving as observers or accredited representatives to African continental organizations, thus building a network of diplomatic contacts which would embrace Africa, the Eastern bloc, the United Nations, and individual Western nations, particularly in Scandinavia.

Third, there was a tendency to impose policies on the territory that were essentially South African in their origin and in their doctrinal purity. The system of ethnic homelands (Bantustans), which were to replace ethnic heterogeneity with a tidy system of ethnic homogeneity in the rural areas of South Africa, was adapted for use in South West Africa. The underpinning logic was that ethnic propinquity facilitates and exacerbates ethnic hostility; therefore, the way of peace is the way of spatial separation. There already were reserves for Africans in the territory; indeed, they dated back to the German era. But until the Odendaal Plan (an encyclopedic scheme providing for accelerated economic growth, especially in the infrastructure, and for the creation of Bantustans in the territory), there was little overt policy to dilute African nationalism by encouraging ethnic nationalisms or sub-nationalisms, which were much less menacing to continuing white presence in the territory. The Odendaal Plan can be viewed, then, as an attempt to preserve white paramountcy by

providing potential fiefdoms for African traditionalists and by accentuating past ethnic cleavages which African nationalists sought to bridge by stressing the indivisibility of what later became known as Namibia. African hegemony rested upon the premise of a united, not a fragmented, Namibia.[28]

A fourth trend is discernible in the dwindling political power base of the resident white community. As external foes multiplied and became more menacing, governmental functions were transferred from the territorial Legislative Assembly to the Parliament in Cape Town, which began to include representatives from the white constituencies in South West Africa in 1949. The South Westers, as the whites in the territory called themselves, appeared to have lost considerable autonomy to the legislators in Cape Town and the civil servants in Pretoria; at the same time, there was an influx of civil servants and other government employees to help run an increasingly bureaucratized society. Perhaps as a response to this immigration from South Africa itself, the South Westers who had deep roots in the country began to develop a distinct sense of nationhood that was not noticeable at the end of the Second World War. This identity would facilitate a new approach to politics in the territory among many whites, coloreds (those of mixed ancestry), and some Africans who, although rejecting white supremacy, were not enamored of SWAPO, which regarded itself (and was so regarded by the OAU and the United Nations) as the authentic representative of the forthcoming state of Namibia and the sole heir of the Namibian political kingdom.

The fifth principal trend has been the willingness of the local white community, acting in concert with Pretoria, to initiate talks in Windhoek (known as the Turnhalle talks after the refurbished German gymnasium which accommodated the delegates) concerning the decolonization process in Namibia.[29] The belated discussions can be regarded as an attempt to practice what has been called "consociational democracy" by a distinguished student of Dutch politics, Professor Arend Lijphart.[30]

The Turnhalle agreements amounted to a limited form of internal settlement, lacking the international legitimacy which, for example, characterized the independence talks held in London regarding the granting of sovereignty to the forthcoming Republic of Botswana. SWAPO's guerrilla warfare, which was low-intensity and concentrated in those portions of the territory within easy striking distance from forward bases in Angola or Zambia, continued unabated. The South African Defense and Police Forces were able to meet the SWAPO challenge, but could not defeat the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the military force fielded by SWAPO.

Such a deadlock did not augur well for regional peace nor for what were thought to be Western interests in a peaceful, prosperous, and stable Namibia which could emulate the achievements of neighboring Botswana. The British, French, American, West German, and Canadian Governments, whose embassies in Pretoria could serve as forward diplomatic positions, cooperated as a so-called contact group to provide a bridge between the Pretoria Government and its Turnhalle conferees, on the one hand, and SWAPO, on the other. Three of the five Western states were permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, while Canada and West Germany served two-year terms as members of the Security Council. The contact group attempted to secure a rapprochement between the two principal forces, the South Africans and SWAPO, suggesting the classic diplomatic device of an internationally supervised election in which all political forces would be allowed to compete in a climate of peace and good order, which would be guaranteed by a United Nations Transition Group (UNTAG). Military neutralization and a verifiable end to armed hostilities were essential to the success of the conduct of elections. The United Nations Secretary General's representative, Martti Ahtisaari (the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia), was to secure the cooperation of the South Africans, represented by the Administrator-General of South West Africa, Justice M. T. Steyn, who

would be able to call upon the assistance of a 7500-man United Nations military force, 360 United Nations police officers, and as many as 1200 civilian experts. This United Nations electoral supervision and peacekeeping mission, estimated to last one year, was expected to cost as much as $300 million to sustain.[31] Botswana has indicated its willingness to assist UNTAG, and Ahtisaari has consulted with officials in Gaborone regarding the details of the electoral undertaking.[32]

It appears that the Pretoria authorities have become disenchanted with the pace of events in the territory and have taken an even dimmer view of SWAPO's willingness to effect a cease-fire and to turn from bullets to ballots. They defied the United Nations and held their own elections in Namibia in December 1978 and are thinking of using the momentum of those elections to proceed to Namibian independence in what appears to be a unilateral step.[33] At present, it would appear that UNTAG has become a phantom organization, although talks with the Western contact group have resumed, and the immediate difficulty in the territory concerns the factionalism within the white community centering on the scope and speed with which the legal framework of *apartheid* is dismantled. Recently the Rector of Rand Afrikaans University, Gerrit Viljoen, was named to replace Justice Steyn and, one hopes, to facilitate the negotiations that may eventually lead to an internationally recognized independence for Namibia.[34]

An especially nettlesome problem concerns the past, present, and future status of the Walvis Bay area of Namibia. Historically, it was part and parcel of the Cape Colony and remained so throughout the German tenure in South West Africa, thus depriving the Germans of an excellent deep-water port and forcing them to use nearby Swakopmund and Lüderitz Bay to the south. Walvis Bay, in due course, became the major gateway to the Atlantic for the territory, and considerable attention was devoted to the idea of extending its railway connections to Rhodesia through Botswana in order to transport cattle to the bay, thus eliminating the traverse through the Indian Ocean for Rhodesian beef bound for European markets. In addition to its economic utility as the turnstile for seaborne commerce for Namibia, it is a staging area for the South African Defense Force. It would not appear, however, to have as much utility to South African and foreign naval powers as Simonstown, located in the greater Cape Town area. The Pretoria regime currently insists that Walvis Bay still remains legally part of South African territory and is unwilling to negotiate its transfer to Namibia with the Western contact group, African nationalist groups in the territory, or even those political groupings in Namibia that are well to the right of SWAPO. In all likelihood, the Pretoria policy is best understood within an overall bargaining approach to the future of the territory, so that Walvis Bay can be regarded as a hostage or an important bargaining chip. Without Walvis Bay, independence for Namibia would be lacking in credibility.[35]

SOUTH AFRICA: VIEW
FROM PRETORIA

In strolling around the rim of the lovely Union Buildings, a misnomer for a single government structure designed by Sir Herbert Baker to serve the newly created Union of South Africa, one gets a superb view of Pretoria, the administrative capital of South Africa. Pretoria can be thought of as the commanding height of the southern third of the continent,[36] given the overwhelming strength of South Africa's police and armed forces, its mineral treasures, and the sheer size and vitality of its economy. According to almost all, if not all, the standard indices of power used by students of military and international affairs, the nation governed in Pretoria emerges in first place in the Southern African region.

That vast treasure house of power can help to determine how long and how costly the disengagement from Windhoek will be, and it alone in Southern Africa possesses the instruments of coercion and the enticements sufficient to influence the embattled white minority in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. At one

time, members of the South African Police Force assisted their Rhodesian counterparts in the Zambesi region in helping to combat Zimbabwe guerrilla activity, but later these South African units were withdrawn and the Rhodesians were left to cope with the insurgency as best they could. South Africa, moreover, provided the conduit for Rhodesian trade, thus helping the Smith Government evade United Nations sanctions. On the basis of the cordial reception given to the Machel Government in Maputo, Mozambique, there is reason to surmise that Pretoria would be able to accommodate itself to complete African majority rule in Zimbabwe Rhodesia even under the Patriotic Front of Messrs. Nkomo and Mugabe. Such accommodation would, however, be predicated on the assumption that there continues to be a vast imbalance of power between Pretoria and Salisbury in favor of the former.

The Southern African states which enjoy African majority rule, however, are keenly aware of their dependence upon Pretoria and are anxious to lessen that dependence by securing access to a wide variety of aid donors and markets for their primary goods. The English-speaking, African-ruled states of the area—Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana—have remained within the Commonwealth of Nations, with some evidence suggesting that the commonwealth connection might interest leaders of an independent Namibia.[37] Such a connection, if used in conjunction with Anglo-American, Canadian, West German, Scandinavian, and European Economic Community assistance similar to that afforded Botswana, could cushion the economic shock of South African disengagement (if it resembled the worst-case scenario of French withdrawal from Guinea-Conakry in 1958) and counterbalance whatever Sino-Soviet-Cuban influence might be found lurking behind SWAPO, assuming that SWAPO were the sole beneficiary of political independence.

In the two cases of Namibia and Botswana, the question for South African decisionmakers in Pretoria at the Foreign Office and Defense Headquarters is the cost-benefit analysis of further defense and internal security expenditures in Namibia, along with a sober appraisal of the deteriorating state of Botswana-Zimbabwe Rhodesian relations owing to the transit of guerrilla forces and the arrival of Zimbabwe Rhodesian refugees, some of whom may be genuinely apolitical and others of whom may be future recruits for the Patriotic Front insurgents. That which tends to undermine the Khama Government in Gaborone will be potentially destablizing for the Botha Government in Pretoria. As American foreign policymakers recognize full well, the growth of a substantial standing army in Botswana—necessary as it may be—is hardly the sort of policy that will enhance the democratic tradition of Botswana,[38] which is the only African-ruled state in Southern Africa esteemed for its multiparty political system and enviable record of civil liberties.[39] As students of military and African affairs know only too well, the praetorian impulse seems to thrive in the African Continent (as it does in other parts of the less-developed world).

Judging on the basis of events in Algeria and Lusophone Africa (Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau), it seems that the more protracted those wars generally categorized as colonial wars or wars of independence, the greater the probability that success for the African nationalists will entail greater access for the East European bloc. If this observation is correct, then there are grounds for considering the early termination of hostilities in Namibia using the good offices of the contact group of the five Western powers, which would be a very difficult assignment given the increasing animosity of Pretoria toward Washington. Perhaps the advent of the Thatcher Government in London and the Muzorewa Government in Salisbury, deficient though the latter may be in terms of international legitimacy, may signal to Pretoria some type of caretaker arrangement in Windhoek involving the Administrator-General. Such diplomacy may tend to short-circuit the United Nations, but such sidestepping is

hardly unique in the annals of post-World War II international politics. Taking the long view, it would seem that SWAPO would have much to gain by continuing what it terms "the armed struggle," whereas the South African Defense Force and the parents of the young white South African soldiers sent to the border or operational zone could well be the losers, especially if casualties are high.

South African resources, human and material, might better be spent improving the lot of its citizens within the borders of the republic and in assisting the Transkei and Bophuthatswana. That South Africa does not have unlimited wealth surely is demonstrated by its concern about the campaign waged in American corporate boardrooms and on American college campuses to stop American private investment in the South African economy.[40] The rationale for continued American investment in South Africa is that, among other things, it contributes to African employment opportunities in South African subsidiaries of United States parent corporations. Conversely, as foreign investment winds down, so too does African employment. This is not the place to debate the wisdom of continued investment or its opposite, divestment. What is appropriate to mention here is that the supporters of such continued investment would have a stronger case were South Africa to accede to Namibian independence. Even though this step probably would not placate the more determined of South Africa's foes in the affluent West, it at least would demonstrate that South Africa, upon sober reflection, decided to concur with the 1971 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice contending that its presence in Namibia was illegal and that members of the United Nations should refrain from legitimizing its presence there by maintaining consular posts or continuing investments. To date, the Pretoria authorities have not concurred with this advisory opinion.

This survey of three countries of Southern Africa has suggested some of the problems, policy options and constraints, and perils that face three

neighbors in the present and very near future. These states have yet to contend with the problems of the so-called post-industrial West, and hence there are elements of commonality among them in certain sectors, such as the proper mix of labor and capital in industry (especially in the African homelands, Bophuthatswana and the Transkei, which are heavily dependent upon South African budgetary aid), the need to humanize the system of migratory labor (especially in Namibia),[41] and the urgency of arresting the rural-to-urban exodus with its attendant problems of urban sprawl and the delivery of social and educational services to a rapidly growing population of urban Africans. Given the constancy of white political preferences in South Africa, it takes no great gift of prophecy to anticipate continued white South African resistance to African majority rule over the entire South African political domain. The Bantustan program may be a nostrum in the eyes of the African nationalists, but it has bought the South Africans time and has given them added room for maneuver, particularly against the ultra-right wing of Afrikanerdom. Yet the question still remains: Will white South Africans share their political power, their affluence, and their other statutory perquisites with the African majority? Rightly or wrongly, the white South African regards such a concession as a blueprint for racial self-destruction; politics for him thus becomes a life-or-death zero-sum game in which success for his opponent necessarily entails catastrophe for himself.

Until the terms of this zero-sum game can be radically altered, it seems unrealistic to think in terms of regional integration involving any diminution of sovereignty, a notion which seems more appropriate to the world of the late Jean Monnet than to the divergent worlds of African majority rule and of white hegemony. Geographical propinquity does not, in and of itself, give rise to cordial and friendly attitudes conducive to mutual problem sharing and solving.

NOTES

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2. The term is explained in Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 138.

3. These data on the Herero and Bakalanga are derived from Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part V, The High Commission Territories: Basutoland, The Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1953), pp. 23, 183.

4. For comprehensive studies based on archival sources, see Ronald Hyam, *The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908-1948* (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1972); and Martin Chanock, *Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1900-1945: The Unconsummated Union* (Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1977).

5. For a succinct overview of Botswana's history by a former British Resident Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, see Anthony Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History* (London: Methuen & Co., 1974).

6. On the semantic difficulties involved in the term "consultation," see Hyam, pp. 171, 191-92.

7. For example, see Q. Neil Parsons, "Three Botswana Chiefs in Britain, 1895" (unpublished thesis, Univ. of Edinburgh, 1967).

8. See J. E. Spence, "The Implications of the Rhodesia Issue for the Former High Commission Territories," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* (England), 7 (July 1969), 104-12.

9. Richard Dale, "Botswana and Rhodesia: An Analysis of a Dyadic Relationship, 1966-1975," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Association of Africanists, Denver, 1-3 May 1975.

10. Further details are given in Penelope Hartland-Thunberg, *Botswana: An African Growth Economy* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1978), chap. 5; David Jones, *Aid and Development in Southern Africa: British Aid to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland* (London: Croom Helm, 1977), chaps. 6-10; and Zbigniew A. Konczacki, *The Economics of Pastoralism: A Case Study of Sub-Saharan Africa* (London and Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1978), chap. 6.

11. See John Taylor, "Mine Labour Recruitment in the Bechuanaland Protectorate," in *Southern African Research in Progress: Collected Papers*, ed. Ann V. Akeroyd and Christopher R. Hill (York, England: Univ. of York, Center for Southern African Studies, 1979), IV, 115-30.

12. See Percy Selwyn, *Industries in the Southern African Periphery: A Study of Industrial Development in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), which should be read in conjunction with Michael F. Lofchie, ed., *The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Africa* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1971).

13. David Cooper, "The State, Mineworkers and Multinationals: The Selebi Phikwe Strike, Botswana, 1975," in *African Labor History*, ed. Peter C. W. Gutkind, Robin Cohen, and Jean Copas (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978), pp. 244-77.

14. "Botswana Railways Taking Shape," *Africa* (London) (August 1978), 116; and "Railwaymen Will Train in Kenya," *Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian* (Mafeking), 19 January 1979.

15. One cost projection ran $46 to $69 million, according to Deon du Plessis, "Botswana Faces Border Dilemma," *The Star* (Johannesburg), 26 May 1976.

16. Vincent B. Khapoya, "A Comparative Study of African Policies toward Liberation Movements in Southern and Colonized Africa," (unpublished dissertation, Univ. of Denver, 1974), pp. 77-78, 86.

17. Richard Dale, "The Challenges and Restraints of White Power for a Small African State: Botswana and Its Neighbors," *Africa Today*, 25 (July-September 1978), 7-23.

18. According to *The Europa Year Book, 1978: A World Survey* (London: Europa Publications, 1978), I, 1655, force levels were estimated to be 2000 men by 1978. Remarkably enough, the highly reliable source, *The Military Balance, 1978-1979* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), omits Botswana. The author is indebted to Thomas J. Cashore of Morris Library of Southern Illinois University of Carbondale for this data.

19. "We Didn't Try to Kill Nkomo—Gen Walls," *The Star*, 21 April 1979; and Trevor Grundy, "Rhodesia Tells Neighbors To Expect More Incursions," *The Washington Star*, 15 April 1979.

20. The most current analysis of the jurisprudence and politics of these cases is Gail-Maryse Cockram, *South West African Mandate* (Cape Town: Juta and Company, 1976).

21. This is the title of Professor Gwendolen M. Carter's classic study of South Africa (New York: Praeger, 1958).

22. See Mureil Horrell, compiler, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1967* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1968), pp. 59-65.

23. See Hemut Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule, 1894-1914*, trans. and ed. Hugh Ridley (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1971); as well as the more revisionist work, L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa, 1884-1914* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1977).

24. See Shula Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).

25. For a thoughtful, balanced account of this period, see William Roger Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, 1914-1919* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).

26. For an official account of the territory's economy, see South Africa Department of Foreign Affairs, *South West Africa Survey, 1974* (Pretoria and Cape Town: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1975), pp. 33-61.

27. A useful survey of the growth of African political movements in the territory may be found in J. H. P. Serfontein, *Namibia?* (Randburg, South Africa: Fokus Suid Publishers, 1976).

28. See Philip Mason, "Separate Development and South West Africa: Some Aspects of the Odendaal Report," *Race* (London), 5 (April 1964), 83-97.

29. The Turnhalle Conference is adequately covered in Serfontein, *passim*.

30. See Arendt Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (2d ed.; Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1975).

31. Richard Dale, "South Africa, the Western United Nations Security Council Members, and the Proposed Independence of Nambia: The Diplomacy of South African Disengagement," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Association of Africanists, Tempe, Arizona, 15-17 March 1979.

32. "Ahtisaari Here for Namibia Talks," *Daily News* (Gaborone), 7 February 1979; and "Botswana Offers Help," *Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 2 February 1979.

33. "New SWA Body 'Helps UN Peace Plan,'" and Kevin Jacobs, "Plan Breathes On—Just," *The Star*, 19 May 1979.

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34. See "Broeder Boss is New SWA Administrator," *The Star*, 4 August 1979; "Five's Envoy in SA for Crucial SWA Meetings," *The Star*, 11 August 1979; and "Govt Blocks Right Wingers," *The Star*, 18 August 1979.

35. For historical and legal background on Walvis Bay, consult Daan S. Prinsloo, *Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands: Background and Status*, Foreign Affairs Association Study Report no. 8 (Pretoria: Foreign Affairs Association, November 1977); and Pierre E. J. Brooks, "The Legal Status of Walvis Bay," in *South African Yearbook of International Law* (Pretoria: [n.p.], 1976), II, 187-91.

36. For complementary analyses of South African foreign policy in the post-World War II era, see Sam C. Nolutshungu, *South Africa in Africa: A Study in Ideology and Foreign Policy* (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1975); and James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973).

37. See Serfontein, pp. 397, 414.

38. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1980-81 (Part 6): Economic and Military Assistance Programs in Africa: Hearings and Markup*, before the Subcommittee on Africa, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979, pp. X-XI, XVI, 59, 81-83.

39. See John A. Wiseman's two studies: "Multi-Partyism in Africa: The Case of Botswana," *African Affairs* (London), 76 (January 1977), 70-79; and "The Opposition Parties of Botswana," in Akeroyd and Hill, IV, 183-93.

40. This topic is dispassionately analyzed in E. J. Kahn Jr., "Annals of International Trade: A Very Emotive Subject," *The New Yorker*, 14 May 1979, 117-18, 120-24, 126-48, 151-53.

41. See Robert J. Gordon, *Mines, Masters and Migrants: Life in a Namibian Mine Compound* (Braamfontein, South Africa: Ravan Press, 1977).