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William E. Griffith

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**THE
USSR
IN
POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVE**

by

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH

Perhaps I should begin by saying that Winston Churchill was certainly right when he remarked on the difficulty of forecasting Russian action: "It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." We are dealing with the Soviet state, which is even more of an autocracy than was the Russian Empire. In the conspiratorial tradition of the Soviet Union, secrecy is an enormous virtue; and the struggles over policy, which in Washington go on in the glare of the TV lights, in Moscow are rarely, if ever, seen above the surface.

To study Soviet foreign and domestic policy is something like trying to study the part of the iceberg below the surface by looking at the part above. You know the part below is much larger, and you know that it is different from the part above, but you do not know how much. You only know that the part above is an unrepresentative sample. Therefore you start with the problems of what people in the trade call "the decipherment of esoteric communications" (otherwise known as reading between the lines). One has to do this, and usually there is no other way, yet by long experience and training one can still discover a very considerable amount of information. Essentially, what you do is watch the "batting averages" of the Kremlinologists and choose the one that is doing the best at the moment.

So much for the problems of methodology. They are very serious, and opinions among experts differ very much.

THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP

Let me begin with a few words about Russian history. Russia is an enormous country with no natural boundaries to the west, and to the east the boundary is the Pacific Ocean. Throughout its history it has suffered invasion after invasion, of which the

worst have been that of the Mongols, who conquered Russia for almost two centuries, and the two German invasions, which in World War II, for example, killed 25 million Soviet citizens and nearly wrecked the industry of the country. To think, therefore, that after all this the Russian people—or even the Russian leadership—would want a general war is to neglect the horrible damage the Soviet Union has suffered throughout history.

On the other hand, it is important to note that the Soviet Union, like the Russian Empire before it, has always had military force as its primary power, and both inside and outside of its own boundaries—if it saw little risk—it has always been willing to use it. Another important point is that far more than any other major state in the world, the Soviet Union—like the Russian Empire—is a multinational state. The next Soviet census will in all probability show that more than half of the people of the Soviet Union are not Great Russians; that is to say, they are people whose native language is not Russian.

Other nations of the Soviet Union encircle the Great Russians, so to speak, on the south and the west, from Soviet central Asia to the Baltic States. The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union have given these nations great amounts of education and economic development, which of course usually create rather than destroy nationalism. It therefore seems likely that the great domestic problem of the Soviet Union in the rest of this century and beyond will be the nationalism of these “other nations,” for like the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union is ruled by Great Russians. Except for a few “Russianized” Ukrainians, the non-Great Russians have little or nothing to say, and the other nations are in many respects mere colonies of the Great Russians.

Indeed, were democracy to be introduced in the Soviet Union (highly unlikely, since it has no tradition of it), it would almost surely mean the disintegration of the Soviet Union, for sooner or later, the Ukrainians would probably want to be a separate state. After all, if Upper Volta can be, why not the Ukraine? Of course, very few Great Russians would want this, for it could well mean the end of the Soviet Union as a superpower.

What are the changes between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union? First of all, there has been an enormous increase in industrial development, in education, and in military power. Secondly, there is the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, which has been in Soviet history essentially an ideology which created rapid force, economic development, and upward social mobility, and which justified the continuation of autocratic rule. The Soviet Union is a self-renewing autocracy and oligarchy; in it the opinions of those below—the various interest groups—are taken into account by leaders who, contrary to Stalin, use incentives rather than terror as the primary motivator of Russian economic growth. And yet, the ideology within the Soviet Union is not doing very well.

Marxism-Leninism is essentially an ideology for rapid economic growth from underdevelopment to development; it is not an ideology which is very effective economically, technologically, or culturally in an advanced industrial society, and—as practiced in the Soviet Union—it is remarkably hypocritical. It teaches, for example, the equality of all nations within the Soviet Union, but in practice the USSR is dominated by the Great Russians.

It is an ideology which talks of freedom and practices tyranny, and this kind of hypocrisy—which, along with massive corruption, is among the major characteristics of Soviet society—tends to erode, to rot away, the ideology. As practiced in the Soviet Union, it is an ideology which employs an extremely centralized system of economics and industrial operations and forced collectivization of agriculture. The centralized planning system in economics becomes increasingly inefficient the more the society develops. The forced collectivization of agriculture is efficient only in guaranteeing the political control of the peasantry by the regime, but it is an extremely inefficient method of agricultural production. Agricultural productivity in the Soviet Union today is probably one-tenth that of America, and although Russia was a major exporter of grain before World War I, today it is from time to time almost wholly dependent on

imports of grain from the United States and Canada—an indication of the decline in agricultural productivity.

IN TODAY'S LIGHT

What does all this mean for Soviet foreign policy? The first point to make, I think, is that the Soviet Union, like the Russian Empire before it, is a relatively young and dynamic imperial power. For an analogy, think of imperial Germany before World War I. I am not arguing that this means that there will be a war with the Soviet Union; atomic weapons make that, in my opinion, most unlikely. I am arguing that what the Soviet Union wants is what Kaiser Wilhelm II said that imperial Germany wanted: "A place in the sun."

The history of modern Russia has been in part the history of an attempt to overcome its inferiority complexes toward the West by catching up with and, if possible, surpassing the economic achievements and the military power of the West. This would probably have happened were Russia monarchist, capitalist, Communist, or whatever. Indeed, it may well be that the inefficiencies of Soviet rule I have been describing make it less dangerous to us than it would be if it were capitalist. But it is Communist, and it is highly likely to remain so. The dissident movement of which we hear so much is like the dissident movement throughout most of the 19th century: idealistic, noble, self-sacrificing, tormented, and politically largely impotent. The Soviet system is likely to remain for the near—indeed, the foreseeable—future rather like it is. And the same is true of Soviet rule over the key parts of Eastern Europe, as Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and of the Prague Spring in 1968 have shown.

But to go back to the general principles of Soviet foreign policy, it is like the Russian Empire in that when it sees opportunities, when it sees power vacuums, it tends like any imperial power to expand into them. Like all imperial powers, it wishes to expand its power and influence. But it is different from some other imperial powers in the

instruments it tends to use. If one looks, for example, at Western Europe or Japan today (and indeed, much of the Third World as well) one will see that the appeal of the Soviet model has drastically declined. Who in Paris or Rome or Tokyo today would really be very attracted to the Soviet bureaucratic, oligarchic system of politics; to its dull, socialist, realist system of culture; to an economy which is technologically backward, and which seems unable to overcome or bridge the increasing technological gap between it and the West?

What, then, is left? It appears that what remains is what was left in imperial Russia, which also did not appeal to the West or the Third World, for it seemed then—as it seems now—a dull, inefficient, and, in many respects, a revolting form of tyranny. What appeals—what creates not emulation, not enthusiasm, but fear and respect—is military force.

The Russian Empire in the 19th century seemed to most Europeans and most Americans a tyranny whose repulsiveness was exceeded only by its danger. The same, I would argue, is true for the Soviet Union today. It is difficult to imagine, particularly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, that there can be any enthusiasm for the Soviet

William E. Griffith is a Professor of Political Science and a Research Associate and Director of the International Communism Project at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Griffith is also a Professor of Soviet Diplomacy at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. A graduate of Hamilton College, he earned the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at Harvard University. Dr. Griffith is the author of *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (1963), *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (1964), and *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-65* (1967); he is the editor of *Communism in Europe* (Vol. 1, 1964; Vol. 2, 1966), *The World and The Great Power Triangles* (1975), and *The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente* (1976). Dr. Griffith has also contributed to numerous journals, including *The New Republic*, *Problems of Communism*, *Daedalus*, and *Foreign Affairs*.



model, or for Soviet domination, or for Soviet ideology left in Western or Eastern Europe. Also, in the Muslim world, the revival of fundamentalist Islam is bound, in the long run, to hurt the Soviet Union, perhaps most of all among the 40 million Muslims in Soviet central Asia. There are very few areas of the world, indeed, where the Soviet Union is viewed favorably, and usually these are areas where other enemies seem more dangerous: the Turks to the Armenians, the Chinese to the Mongols—but it is difficult to think of many more.

So the power of the Soviet Union abroad is a function solely of its military strength. It is the power of a nation whose land army strength—for example, in tanks and tactical aircraft on the central front in Europe—has enormously increased; a nation which is building a seven-ocean, blue-water navy; a nation which has a strategic nuclear force that is apparently in a state of rough parity with that of the United States; a nation which is so much more powerful militarily than all of Western Europe and Japan put together that both of those areas—were it not for American military presence and guarantees—would be very rapidly “Finlandized,” and Finland itself then would not be “Finlandized,” it would be a satellite of the Soviet Union. This is an entirely new situation in world history. Never before has a nation in the region where Russia is located had such awesome military power. Never before have the great nations of Western Europe been so weak. Never before has Japan been so vulnerable.

On the other hand, never in modern history has China been potentially so strong and so hostile to the Soviet Union. This is the first time in history that a strong Russia and a strong China, both strong at the same time, have faced each other across their enormous border.

SINCE WORLD WAR II: A CHANGING SCENE

That brings me to the major changes in the world which have influenced foreign policy in the Soviet Union since World War II.

The first, of course, was internal in the Soviet Union: Stalin’s overcoming of the weakness and destruction which World War II had brought and particularly his development of thermonuclear weapons, a power base without which the forward thrust, the outward reach, of Khrushchev and Brezhnev would have been impossible. Stalin killed, or had killed, 20 million people. He was at times the victim of the most obscurantist paranoia; but then so were several Roman emperors, and Ivan the Terrible was no Thomas Jefferson. And most Russians, for whom the glory of Russia is the principal aim, must look at Stalin, with all his slaughter, as the man who for the first time in the history of Russia created a state and a military force which has now become as powerful as that of its principal competitor, the United States. This equality was probably best stated by Foreign Minister Gromyko several years ago when he said, “No major problem of international politics can now be solved without the full participation of the Soviet Union.” This is the achievement of the dream of hundreds of years of Russian history.

The next development which I think continues primarily to characterize Soviet foreign policy in international politics is the cold war. There is much argument in this country and elsewhere why it began, how it went on, and whether it has ended. I personally feel that the power vacuum in central Europe in 1945 was so complete, and the differences between the American and Soviet systems so diverse, that hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union was inevitable. It fundamentally remains so. The competition, the political conflict between Moscow and Washington, is structural and highly likely to persist. Indeed, Winston Churchill thought that only atomic weapons held this competition in check when he called them “the terror and the guarantee of peace in our times.” Were it not for atomic weapons, there would probably have been a Russo-American war about Berlin in the last 30 years. That did not happen, and a kind of stalemate was reached in Europe by the time Stalin died in 1953.

Hereafter, his successors—and particularly Khrushchev—decided on what they called “peaceful coexistence,” what we called “detente.” The Soviet view of this policy was, at least until recently, little understood in this country; once known, disillusionment about what the Soviets really meant has been one of the major reasons for the worsening of Soviet-American relations. What is the Soviet view of the policy of peaceful coexistence? It was perhaps put most authoritatively by Khrushchev around 1960, when he said, “Peaceful coexistence is the intensification of the international class struggle by all means other than inter-state war.” What does that mean translated into English?

It means that it is a policy to lower the risk of general or nuclear war, particularly by accident or miscalculation; to increase economic contacts with the West and Japan, primarily for the purpose of speeding up Soviet economic, and therefore military, development; and, at the same time, to adopt a more forward strategy, a more active policy, toward whatever areas of the underdeveloped world seem available for the increase of Soviet influence. It is the policy, in other words, of active competition with the West and Japan, based upon the assumption that there is not, cannot be, and should not be a status quo in the world. The Soviet and Marxist view of the world is that it is in the process of dynamic change in the direction of revolution. Therefore, when Nixon and Kissinger talked about a stable structure of peace, it was a mixture of illusion and campaign oratory. The Soviets do not believe in stability. They do not believe the world is stable or should be stable or can be stable. They believe that it is changing, that revolution—that is to say, Marxism-Leninism—which they equate largely with their own influence, will eventually “win” and that it is their duty to speed it up without running a major risk of general war.

That, then, is the Soviet definition of peaceful coexistence, and I would suggest that we would be wise to adopt it ourselves, since we can hardly agree with them on any other. It does not mean that they are planning

a general war; it does not mean that there will be a general war. It does mean that competition, particularly in the underdeveloped world, will probably continue and intensify, the more so because whatever Marx and Lenin may have said, much of the underdeveloped world is indeed unstable, and is indeed in the process of rapid change, although not necessarily toward revolution, and certainly not necessarily toward Marxist-Leninist revolution. But anyone who thinks that the Middle East and Indochina and Southern Africa are likely to become stable can believe anything.

In this sense, the Soviet analysis of the world—and therefore Soviet policy prescriptions for it—is often more realistic than our own, since we are still dreaming of the forgotten stability of the Victorian Age. But Queen Victoria is dead. It is in this sense, I would argue, that the Soviet view of the world and therefore their foreign policy is probably more adapted to the changing reality—to its speed, to its unpredictability—than often is American policy.

Another major event which emerged in large part out of and has profoundly influenced Soviet policy has been the Sino-Soviet split. This has created something like a “two-and-a-half superpower” world. It has produced a situation which is not just a triangle of political and military power, but one in which the sides of the triangle are unequal in a key fashion; that is, the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union and China are far better than are the relations of the Soviet Union and China with each other. In the classical rules of Bismarckian *realpolitik*, this gives the United States a considerable advantage. And, beginning with that disciple of Bismarck, Henry Kissinger, we have gotten considerable profit out of it. Without talking too much about it, one should say of this what the great French statesman, Leon Gambetta, said about Alsace-Lorraine after it had been lost to the Germans: “Think of it always, speak of it never.”

I would argue that the Sino-Soviet split was

probably not inevitable and that it was in large part the result of the Soviet Union being unwilling to recognize China as an equal ally—in international politics in general and in the Communist world in particular. But then, the Pope and the Byzantine emperor were not willing to recognize each other as equals in 1067, when the Catholics and the Orthodox split, and as far as I last heard, that split has not been healed yet. Indeed, the Sino-Soviet split has elements in it of the religious war.

It is a complex story with many causes. I will not go into it here, except to say that in my view the prospect of its healing in the near future is most unlikely. The Soviet attitude toward it prohibits such a recovery for a number of reasons: because of the memory of the Mongols; because of the ideological and party organizational issues involved; because Moscow considers itself indeed the third Rome, as the czars did, and refuses to think that Peking can be another Vatican; and because of all these reasons on the differences of national interests and territory. It is an issue which, for the Soviet leadership, and indeed for most of the Soviet population, carries with it an emotional depth and intensity which by now the Soviet rivalry with the United States does not. Put another way, I think the Soviet leadership almost surely considers the United States its most powerful enemy, but the People's Republic of China its most dangerous one.

THE SOVIET WORLD VIEW

The issues and conflicts with the United States at the present are far more easily subject to compromise for Moscow than are its differences with China. The Sino-Soviet split having occurred, another problem became more important for the Soviet Union in foreign policy: That was and is the rising economic and technological power of Western Europe and Japan, and in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, its rising ground military power. This factor, coupled with the continuing hostility of the United States, and the inability and indeed probably the lack of desire of the Soviet Union to come

to anything close to an alliance with either Western Europe or Japan, has activated in the mind of the Soviet leaders what is probably their ultimate fear in foreign policy—that they will be encircled by all their actual and potential enemies.

Look at the world from Moscow today. There is another atomic superpower, the United States, with which they would like to come to better terms than they have, but with which relations are in fact somewhat worse than they were. The Chinese appear to be inveterately hostile, and they are attempting to ally with Japan and Western Europe and with the United States to develop themselves economically and militarily. The Soviet Union's relations with Japan are at a new low, largely due to the Soviets' obstinate refusal to return the four southern Kuril Islands. The result has been the Sino-Japanese treaty, a most important development. It means that Japan will help to develop China—not Siberia—and that while Japan's primary alliance relationship will remain with the United States, her secondary relationship will be with China.

Meanwhile Western European power, and particularly West German power, is steadily increasing. And the Chinese are cultivating it. Last autumn an article in a German newspaper noted that one of the three leading West German banks is forming a consortium to loan China \$28 billion to build steel mills. Well, steel can produce various things, and for the Soviet Union, this is more fuel for their fear of encirclement.

When I was in Moscow last June, Brzezinski had just returned from Peking, and I had a long conversation with a high Soviet official. He was highly excited about this turn of events, and he said to me with great emotion, "You have formed a semi-alliance with the Chinese to encircle us." I said, "I think that is a great exaggeration of what we have done, but if you continue what you are doing, particularly in Africa, it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy." This is probably the principal dilemma of Soviet foreign policy today. At a time when their military strength is unparalleled—although not as great as many people think, and

equally not as small as many people think—and at a time when their gains in Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Angola are significant, I would argue that their gains are still outweighed by their losses in Japan, in India, and most of all in the Middle East.

For all these reasons, the Soviet Union is in the paradox of having never been stronger and potentially never having been in greater danger. And, this is occurring at a time when the current leadership—perhaps the greatest living autocracy, now that Mao is dead—is bound to pass from the scene in the next five years. Brezhnev is 72, and his health is clearly not good. His probable successor, Kirilenko, is three months older than Brezhnev. Suslov is 76. Kosygin is 74. We do not know who will succeed, but we do know that the struggle for the succession and the subsequent struggle which must follow in the consolidation of power are likely to diminish somewhat the decisiveness of Soviet foreign policy. Of course, it might equally and unpredictably lead to rash, adventurous decisions of the sort that Khrushchev occasionally mentioned before he was near supreme power. In any case, that is also a problem for the Soviet leadership.

INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD

So far, I have basically been talking about Soviet policy with respect to the developed world. Let me turn now to the problems of the Soviet Union in the underdeveloped world. It was not Khrushchev who first was concerned with advancing Soviet influence in the underdeveloped world; it was Lenin. You know that, of course, if you have heard of his remark, "The road to Paris goes through Calcutta and Peking." Well, that road has not, thus far, gone through either. Still, the Soviets have a recurrent dream of outflanking their stalemate in Europe by gaining power and influence in what they see as the most important potentially revolutionary areas of the Third World. This recurrent dream seems in a rather active state at the moment, particularly in Africa. It is

encouraged by what the Soviet Union correctly sees as the increasing instability of these areas. Included, certainly, are areas where colonialism in effect still exists, and the Soviet Union is thus active in white-dominated states in Southern Africa. Also included are many of the areas which have become independent, where the Soviet Union in recent years sees or hopes it sees a revival of revolutionary regimes. Again, this has been particularly true in Africa, in such countries as Benin, Madagascar, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, and so forth. These countries have witnessed regimes which at least call themselves Marxist-Leninist, in part probably in order to get more Soviet arms, but also in part out of a genuine, if confused, view of Marxism-Leninism as a method of rapid economic development.

I mentioned Soviet arms, and it seems clear to me that the principal Soviet weapon in the Third World has been the supply of arms. The second weapon, although much less effective, has been economic aid. This arms and aid policy is one which Khrushchev began in 1955 with the first sale of Czechoslovak arms to Nasser. It is, by the way, a policy which was carried on simultaneously with the first summit conference at Geneva, and which symbolizes the fact noted earlier that for the Soviet Union detente means the relaxation of superpower tension, plus the intensification of Soviet efforts to increase their influence in the underdeveloped world.

The Soviet Union's record in the Third World has been spotty. In many areas, it has in effect wasted billions of dollars. However, most of this was in terms of surplus arms anyway, and the Soviet Union is certainly not the only power which has wasted billions of dollars in the Third World. The underdeveloped nations of the world seem to have a limitless capacity for absorption in that regard.

The Soviet Union has clearly had catastrophic losses in Indonesia, in Egypt, in the Sudan, and in some other countries. It has made major gains in India and has acquired, of course, major and

onorous responsibilities thereby; yet at the moment India is attempting to improve its relations with China. China is reciprocating this, and the Soviet Union is deeply concerned about it but can do little to stop it.

Yet, is it legitimate to argue as many people have, particularly with respect to Africa, that we need not fear Soviet advances because they will lose out in the end? This argument presents a view which may be correct—or which may not be correct. One does not know. I would prefer not to run the risk. In any case, something which many experts on Africa and other parts of the Third World forget is this: The picture that the world has, and on which it acts, of the power and influence of the Soviet Union and of the United States is the sum of their perception of American and Soviet military, political, economic, technological, and financial power, and of American and Soviet gains and losses. And nations adjust accordingly. If the Soviets are right, as I think they are, in arguing that there is no such thing as stability in international relations, then our power is constantly rising or falling, as is Soviet power, and as is the perception of this power in the rest of the world. It is in this sense, it seems to me, that whatever may happen over the long run, what happens with Soviet power in the present tense is and should be of concern to the United States.

For example, the world has seen that the Soviet Union, with great Cuban assistance, has established itself in Angola and Ethiopia. In my view, the United States made a series of blunders in regard to Angola and ended up doing nothing. In the case of Ethiopia, I am reminded of a Latin verse meaning, "The mountain labored and gave birth to a mouse." The totality of our response to what the Soviets have done in the Horn of Africa was to suspend the Indian Ocean negotiations, and even if one assumes that it was wise to begin them—which I do not think is necessarily true—their suspension is like the pushing of a pin into an elephant, or, rather, a bear. It is this lack of response, the result of what someone looking at the United States from the moon might call the paralysis of imperial will, that must inevitably lead the

Soviet leadership to feel that they can run somewhat more risks elsewhere.

Therefore, I would think that the increasing instability probable in much of the Third World will encourage the Soviet Union to continue the policies it has been following while guarding against a major military confrontation with the United States; that the American people and the American Congress, and even the American administration, will become increasingly concerned with them; and that this will be a continuing irritation to Soviet-American detente. The Soviet Union does not want to end detente. On the contrary, it wishes to deepen it while guarding its possibilities of Third World conquests, and the general state of Soviet-American relations will be made more difficult as a result.

THE SOVIET-AMERICAN MILITARY BALANCE

Let me finally turn to the military relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviets view this relationship with genuine concern for two reasons. The first, already noted, is the fact that Soviet power and influence today more than ever before rests primarily—one sometimes thinks almost exclusively—on its military force and the respect and indeed fear which the Soviets gain from it. The second reason for Soviet concern is their fear of encirclement, a fear which one should not assume is simply a nightmare that obsesses the Kremlin. There is, after all, considerable possibility for this, and it is very clearly the objective of the new Chinese leadership.

Of course, the Soviet Union has had military advances, and I assume that the reader is fairly familiar with those. It is as important not to understate them as it is not to overstate them, and there are plenty of people in this country who have every reason to do one or the other. But for the moment I want to concentrate on their problems, and there is a third reason for current Soviet concern which is very important. In the strategic field, and I think to a considerable extent in the conventional field, the Soviet

Union fears a renewed American drive for superiority. I am not referring, of course, to the situation as it is, but to the situation as I think the Soviet leadership thinks it is.

In the Soviets' perceptions, the American technological developments in the military field in the last few years—MIRVs, PGMs, cruise missiles, etc.—are a part of a conscious American drive to talk arms control but practice the recovery of military superiority. They are even more concerned about this because they see this as the latest development in the long history of Soviet military quantity being leaped over, being surpassed, by Western military quality, and they fear that this asymmetry is increasing. They also fear, of course, what they see as the revival in this country of the cold-warriors: anybody ranging from Senator Jackson to his right, and there are some, and there are some to his left as well. This I think is a very serious concern to the Soviet Union because it is for them difficult to see in the immediate future how they can compensate for it. They are not going to obtain this level of military technology from the United States, and there is no other source where they can get it. It involves, essentially, American advances in achieving extremely high accuracy in delivery capability. The Soviet Union will meet these achievements, probably, but they fear that by then the United States will have developed something else.

Whether this is a correct perception of the situation is of course another matter. Even if it is so, it would be very difficult to draw up an accurate balance sheet when the other side of the ledger shows the enormous increase in Soviet conventional weapons, in the throw-weight of Soviet missiles and the number of Soviet launchers, and in Soviet accuracy and delivery capability.

With regard to the intentions of their competitor, the Soviets spend little energy wondering; they assume that the world is a world of conflict, that there are the forces of socialism and the forces against socialism. This view of the world is somewhat complicated by the fact that the Chinese by

definition are against them and yet are self-defined socialists. However, the Soviets get around this by declaring that socialism has collapsed in China, just as the Chinese declare that capitalism has been restored in the Soviet Union.

But these are theological incantations about which we need not concern ourselves too much. The point to be made is that the military balance, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, is far from exclusively favorable. This is likely to urge them on to greater efforts to change the balance so that in their perception it will be more favorable to the Soviet Union. Yet I would warn you against the view which seems to be reviving in this country that the Soviet Union is devoted to achieving the kind of nuclear superiority which would enable it to carry out a first strike. In my view, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is to the contrary.

Nevertheless, the very nature of the technological competition in nuclear and conventional weapons—entirely apart from the intentions of the Soviet Union and of the United States—is objectively destabilizing. The gap between quality and quantity, the Soviet advantages in quantity, the American advantages in quality, the rapid leap forward of technology in the arms race—all of this makes a stable arms balance by definition more difficult and therefore objectively requires the Soviet Union and the United States to carry on the competition and to make more efforts to try to limit its political effects. It is therefore not surprising, in my view, that the Soviet Union wishes to have SALT II, and that so does the American Government. The agreement will not stop or much limit the arms race, nor will it limit Soviet operations and competition with the United States in the Third World. Both of these will go on for an indefinite period. However, the agreement will have an important positive effect: It will emphasize that part of peaceful coexistence which decreases the chances of nuclear war.