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CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM

by

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On 20 September 1977, President Carter directed Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to conduct a "searching organizational review" which would include a thorough examination of "alternative reforms in organization, management, and decision processes in the Department of Defense."¹ This review focuses on three functional areas: the Defense Resource Management Structure, the Defense Management Structure, and the National Military Command Structure.

Although all have potential impact on the unified command system, the report on the National Military Command Structure (commonly referred to as the Steadman Report) specifically addresses the unified and specified commands.² The Presidential memorandum raised serious questions regarding the effectiveness of the command structure for the conduct of war, for peacetime activities, and for crisis management. It noted that "during the Vietnam War, the Pacific Command had to be restructured so that [it] could respond directly to Washington requirements." Concern was expressed regarding the capability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to provide guidance, to review contingency plans, and to resolve differences between commanders regarding forces.³

The Steadman Report recognized that events have occurred since the last comprehensive revision of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) in June 1975 that may cause changes to be desirable. Among these

are the Panama Canal treaties, which impact on command arrangements for Latin America, and the Army reductions in Korea, which require a review of command structures and relations in the Pacific. Also, the support required for US unilateral contingencies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf raises issues relating to the current boundaries of the European Command (USEUCOM). Recent Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa has focused the attention of senior defense officials there and has raised concerns regarding the ability of the current unified command structure to respond effectively to the region's problems.

Finally, an event that occurred after the Steadman Report was published—the recognition of the People's Republic of China—will result in the disestablishment of the Taiwan Defense Command (TDC), a subelement of the Pacific Command, on 30 April 1979.

These changes to the strategic environment, as well as internal policy and organizational shortcomings, were considered by the Steadman study group. For example, their report offers recommendations in two general categories: (1) organization and warfighting and (2) policy, planning, and advice as they relate to the National Military Command Structure. Some of these recommendations directly relate to the unified command structure.

The Steadman Report recommendations that are of interest generally favor retaining the status quo in USEUCOM, Atlantic

Command (LANTCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The study group, however, did recognize the need to be flexible and to conduct periodic reviews to determine when the strategic environment has changed significantly enough to require further changes to the UCP. The report does not advocate any changes to the current organization in the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the Military Airlift Command (MAC), or the Aerospace Defense Command (ADC).

It does, however, favor an enhancement of the US Readiness Command (USREDCOM) role in coordinating the "day-to-day aspects of mobilization/deployment planning" of the unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs), especially "lift requirements and detailed follow-through during major reinforcement." The Steadman Report also envisions a more active role for the Navy, Marines, and Air Force in the development of joint doctrine and in participation in joint exercises as elements of USREDCOM.⁴

The Steadman Report is a well-researched study which demands serious consideration by anyone contemplating changing the UCP. But before any changes are made, the conceptual basis of the unified command system, as well as the constraints that limit the scope of possible change, should be understood.

CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM

Early in World War II, General George C. Marshall realized that the complexity of modern 20th-century warfare demanded that there should be one man in command of all air, ground, and naval forces in an entire theater—that we could no longer manage by cooperation alone. The concept of placing the operational forces of two or more services under a single commander was further dictated by the disastrous, dramatic failure of interservice coordination at Pearl Harbor in 1941, and this concept was subsequently validated by the success of joint (US multiservice) and combined (US and other

nations) operations during the rest of World War II.⁵

Unified command worked best in the European Theater of Operations, where the US services had to act in concert in dealing with the British. Things did not work quite so well in the Pacific Theater, where this common interservice bond did not exist; in fact, the Pacific Theater was never unified under a single commander. Even the impending amphibious invasion of Japan could not bring the Army or the Navy to accept a unified command arrangement. The JCS chose to organize along component command lines for the planned invasion of Japan, appointing General Douglas MacArthur to lead the land campaign and Admiral Chester Nimitz to assume responsibility for the sea battle. The strategic bombing campaign conducted by the Army Air Corps against Japan in the final months of the war further complicated the organizational picture. Despite the circumvention of the unified command concept in the Pacific, it emerged from the war as basic US military doctrine, replacing the prewar concept of "mutual cooperation."

The major military order of business after World War II was to institutionalize the unified command concept. This required unification—but unification did not come easily.⁶ The Army favored a strong unification plan, believing it would fare

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
better in a centralized defense establishment than it would were it required to compete against the more "glamorous" services with the Congress and the public. The Air Corps was also in favor of centralization because it would at long last achieve independent status. The Navy, however, resisted, principally because it feared control of the fleet by unified commanders of the other services who might not understand seapower. It also feared the loss of its air arm to the fledgling, independent Air Force, and, to a lesser degree, the loss of the Marine Corps to the Army. In effect, the Navy was already unified, with its own organic air force and army. For its part, Congress feared that unification would result in an undesired "prussianization" of the armed forces.⁷

What resulted from the National Security Act of 1947, which is the legal basis for the unified command concept, was federation rather than unification. The

subsequent amendments to the act have generally been attempts to deal with the problems that resulted from this compromise.

The thrust of the changes to the act and to the unified command concept throughout the years has been in the direction of centralization. The early legislative amendments consolidated power in the hands of the Secretary of Defense on the civilian side and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on the military side. Since 1958, the changes have been administrative rather than legislative, and have tended to dilute the power of the CJCS vis-à-vis the Secretary of Defense.⁸ However, these changes did not fundamentally alter the unified command system, which is essentially the same system that emerged from World War II.

As the map shows, there are currently five unified commands and three specified commands. Both unified and specified commands are combatant organizations with area or functional responsibilities. Each has a



broad, continuing mission and is established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, after receiving the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The difference between a unified command and a specified command is simply that a unified command is composed of forces from two or more military services and a specified command is usually composed of forces from a single military service. A unified commander (CINC) usually has a component commander from each service assigned who reports to him. These component commanders respond to the CINC on operational matters, but to their respective military departments on matters of personnel and material resources.

By law, the CINCs are responsible to the President, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. They exercise operational command over all forces assigned to them. Operational command is defined as the exercise of those functions of command over assigned forces involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It does not include such things as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, which fall within the purview of the component commanders. However, the unified commander does have "directive authority" for logistics, which means that under wartime conditions the CINC has the authority to use all of the resources of his assigned forces to accomplish the mission.

Generally, the functions described above are inherent when a unified commander is assigned a geographical or functional area for "normal operations." Normal operations, paraphrased from JCS Pub 1, include: planning for and execution of operations in contingencies; limited war and general war; and cold war and military assistance activities.

This is the unified command system that must meet the dynamic demands of the emerging international order.

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

In view of President Carter's fresh look at

the organization of the national security establishment, it is appropriate to compare the strategic environment of today with that of 30 years ago when the unified command system evolved from World War II.

During World War II, the military objective was clear: to defeat the armed forces of Germany, Italy, and Japan to cause their unconditional surrender. The continental United States (CONUS) was the main base from which US unified forces would be projected against the Axis Powers. In order to more effectively apply US and Allied military power, intermediate bases were established in Great Britain and North Africa. Later, Sicily, Italy, and France became intermediate power projection centers along the two major avenues of approach into central Europe. An Allied combined command and its associated US unified command were established on each of these approaches. In the Pacific, three similar power centers—Hawaii, Australia, and China—resulted in three unified commands under the leadership of Nimitz, MacArthur, and Joseph Stilwell, all centered on the defeat of Japan.

Following the defeat of the Axis Powers, the geographic focus of the residual US military power in Europe remained centered on Berlin, albeit now against the Soviet military threat. But with the defeat of Japan, and in view of the relative weakness of China and the Soviet Union in the Far East, the US strategic focus in the Pacific became diffused, lacking both a specific and a credible threat. Therefore, it is no accident that the unified commands bordering the North Atlantic have always been less complicated than those in the Pacific.

There are other important changes in the strategic environment. The international system has drifted toward multipolarity in its political, economic, and military dimensions. Advances in weapons technology, both nuclear and conventional, make this a much more dangerous world than it was a generation ago. The global proliferation of modern weapons has serious implications for US security assistance policy. Although politically monolithic, Communism has been fragmented by the defection of Yugoslavia,

the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Eurocommunism, and the USSR has so increased its military strength that today it claims strategic parity with the United States. The anticolonial revolutionary struggles seem to have peaked, but the West is now plagued by the pernicious political policies of the resource-rich developing countries of the Southern Hemisphere. The stability of the Third World is further endangered by the Soviet use of "proxy warfare." All of these changes, as well as other compelling trends which will be discussed shortly, are straining a unified command structure that was created in a less equivocal era.

The increasing complexity of the strategic environment has resulted in a broadening of the military missions assigned to unified commanders. They can no longer be concerned with only one aspect of operations against a single enemy (i.e., Nimitz generally fought the sea war against Japan, while MacArthur, from a different geographical perspective, fought the large-scale land campaigns). Now the unified commander must be prepared to operate throughout the entire spectrum of conflict, from emergency evacuation of US nationals to the launching of nuclear weapons. Most importantly, however, US military commanders now defend the status quo, whereas three decades ago their political objective was to overturn the Axis Powers. Today's US military commander emphasizes defense and deterrence; yesterday's oriented on offense and warfighting. In sum, today's security environment is much more dangerous, diffused, and subtle than was ever envisioned when the unified command system was adopted almost without debate after World War II.

COMPELLING TRENDS

In addition to changes in the strategic environment, two compelling trends have influenced postwar military organization—diffusion and centralization. The original unified or combined commands in World War II were not diffused with regard either to objective or threat. Each had a narrowly

specified objective, a clear geographic course of action to achieve that objective, and an unambiguous signal when that objective was achieved. General Eisenhower was instructed to defeat the German armies by conducting military operations directed at the heart of Germany. It was understood that his objective would be achieved when Germany capitulated unconditionally. The Allied combined command to achieve that end was relatively simple by today's standards—as was the US unified command that was its nucleus.

Today, however, neither the objectives nor the threat can be so clear and so direct; therefore, a unified commander must maintain both the flexibility and the capability to orchestrate warfare throughout the conflict spectrum. The Commander, USEUCOM must contemplate action from the North Cape to the eastern border of Iran; be able to operate throughout the Mediterranean littoral; and even concern himself about US security assistance matters in Sub-Saharan Africa. Not only is he involved throughout the entire spectrum of warfare, but he must also consider a wide range of potential threat scenarios, as well as myriad US political objectives. Commanders in the Pacific face problems that are no less diffused.

Centralization can best be illustrated by considering the original rationale for creating unified commands and comparing it with the recent US experience during crisis situations. The following statement appeared in the first Report of the Secretary of Defense in 1948:

It was the policy to set up unified commands in selected areas containing elements of two or more services where possible hostile action might require such a single commander to react tactically to a threat without awaiting guidance or decisions from Washington. [emphasis added]⁹

The original postwar idea was to decentralize execution of unified military operations. How has this notion worked in practice? The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, appointed by President Nixon in 1970 to

review defense organization, provided the answer when it noted that:

Without exception, every crisis within the last decade that has involved the movement of forces has required both an ad hoc organizational rearrangement and ad hoc planning. [Vietnam, Cuba Missile Crisis (1962), Panama Riots (1964), Tonkin Gulf Crisis (1964), Congo Rescue Mission (1964), Dominican Republic Crisis (1965), Arab-Israeli War (1967).]¹⁰

Since that appraisal was made, nothing has happened to challenge the conclusion that, far from decentralizing command execution of broad policy guidelines, the unified command has become the conduit for centralized ad hoc control from Washington over even the most minute aspect of tactical execution. If anything, recent experience—the Arab-Israeli War (1973), the *Mayaguez* Incident (1975), the Korean Tree-Cutting Incident (1976), the Lebanon Evacuation (1977), and the Ethiopian Evacuation (1977)—has served to corroborate the Blue Ribbon Panel's conclusion. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that in future crises command and control will be exercised from the National Command Authority (NCA) to the commander in the field, regardless of the intermediate institutional command echelons. This factor must weigh heavily in any analysis of change to the unified command system.

In retrospect, it seems inevitable that operational centralization would follow administrative and logistical centralization as soon as communications would permit the NCA to effectively control forward-deployed military forces. The system has evolved (or devolved) from one in which the World War II unified commanders had maximum latitude in conducting military operations into one in which President Ford, during the *Mayaguez* Incident, reportedly made a decision that a particular pilot should not fire on a particular boat.¹¹ Today, the command system is best described as one which allows centralized management of common

functions and permits joint planning, but demands unified execution, often under the direct control of the NCA.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

It is clear that the international conditions that existed when the unified command system was developed no longer exist, although the need for centralized management, joint planning, and unified execution is still valid. While change to the unified command system is indicated, its precise nature is not readily apparent. In addition to the shift to multipolarity in the international strategic environment and in the way that Presidents choose to command and control military forces during times of crises, there are other significant factors to consider. Among the more important of these are domestic political factors, international treaty commitments, fiscal and legal considerations, regional geostrategic environment, technological and institutional constraints, and various strategic factors. Let us examine each of these constraining factors in more detail.

Both the functions and organization of the unified commands are constrained by the domestic US political environment. Any reorganization that could be perceived as increasing the probability of US intervention in Africa, South Asia, or Latin America would probably be unacceptable. It would raise the specter of the United States returning to what many may perceive to be an undesirable role as a world policeman or reverting to the cold war doctrine of containment.

International treaty arrangements, the perceptions of foreign governments, and world opinion all serve to influence US command arrangements. In some instances, changes cannot be easily made since they would require changes in alliance structure. As Michael Howard points out:

NATO strategy and the NATO force structure has taken so much labor to construct—it is the result of such agonizing disagreements, such precarious

compromises—that no senior NATO official cares even to contemplate proposals for its alteration. Even to suggest them is to be branded as irresponsible.¹²

It is difficult even to deploy US forces from an alliance area to support a unilateral US contingency, as the experience of the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 indicates.

A constrained budget and congressional concern for the “tooth-to-tail” ratio result in a requirement to provide overriding and compelling rationale for any change that increases the size or number of headquarters. At the same time, organizational changes which decrease either cost or manpower would probably be quickly accepted. Thus, there is a danger that the drive to constrain current budgets will be pursued without adequate regard for potential organizational deficiencies.

The unified command must be compatible with the regional strategic environment in which it exists. The regional strategic environment includes such things as the geostrategic importance of the region, its military geography, and the existence of US security commitments there, as well as the general political stability of the area. This latter aspect is especially important. For example, when Sub-Saharan Africa was relatively stable under colonial rule, US strategists were not too concerned with the region. However, independence was predictably accompanied by political instability, leading to an increased awareness of and interest in the area by military planners. When the Soviet Union began to expand into Africa, US interest became even greater. This interest obviously creates a potential for military involvement, which in turn generates a possible command and control requirement.

It is axiomatic that a military organization must orient on the terrain and the threat.

The organization, strategy, and structure of a given force is a reflection of the nature of the terrain and the threat which it faces. Organization is, therefore, largely influenced

by the nature and scope of military operations that it may be called upon to perform. The difference between USEUCOM, which must be prepared to fight predominantly on land, and LANTCOM, which is almost exclusively a naval command, is apparent. The requirements of coalition warfare, with which US military planners are slowly coming to grips, further impact on military strategy and unified commands.

Enhancing the trend toward centralization are the technological advances in communications and data processing of the past 25 years that have not only enabled commanders and military managers to control geographically separated units, but which have also increased their ability to control multifunctional organizations. Furthermore, the continued evolution of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) has permitted the NCA to cross command boundaries or to bypass intervening commands. This capability will continue to have a significant impact upon traditional military command doctrine. Moreover, the basic security interests of the United States require that command and control be exercised from the highest levels to insure that international crises do not escalate uncontrollably in the nuclear era. At the same time, the possibility of simultaneous crises overloading the centralized decisionmaking authority requires the continued existence of decentralized commands.

In considering more indirect or creative approaches to organization, one is often constrained by bureaucratic inertia. Bureaucracies are based on stability and routine and resist innovation and change. Organizational changes, like strategic concepts, are usually compromise positions—lowest common denominators—to which all interested agencies can agree. Because of this bias for consensus, these changes often do not go far enough. Historically, within the military bureaucracy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been reluctant to open up the Unified Command Plan to change because of his concern that it might result in dysfunctional battles between the services. Only role and mission battles are

more divisive. Certainly, suggestions for bold innovative changes will not only encounter the normal bureaucratic resistance, but will also be subject to highly emotional, however well-meaning, attacks by the military hierarchy. Of even more concern is the fact that it will be difficult to differentiate between valid criticism and criticism based on a desire to protect parochial or bureaucratic interests.

It is enlightening to note that in the postwar history of the unified command system it is an aberration whenever significant forces of the Navy are "chopped" (passed for operational command) to unified commands that are commanded by officers of another service. Nor has the Army wholly escaped this bias. Separate or subordinate unified commands under Army command are organized whenever significant Army forces are committed in a Navy theater of operations. Also, arrangements are often developed which will allow an Army subunified commander direct access to the JCS, effectively bypassing the Navy unified command. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was an example.¹³ While the Air Force at first seems free from this inclination, closer examination reveals that it jealously guards its strategic nuclear forces from command by other services. It has been willing to "chop" tactical forces to Army and Navy unified commanders, but it reserves its strategic mission to itself, thus providing the principal rationale for maintaining the Air Force as an independent service.

CHANGE IN THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM

That the unified command system has problems is clear. Originally unified commands were established to wage war in a distinct geographical area, focused on a clear threat, with a finite objective. Today's strategic environment is more complex than that. The twin forces of diffusion and centralization have significance for any reorganizational proposal, as do the several constraints which affect unified

organizations and delimit the viable alternatives. The problem boils down to a choice between a total overhaul, with all its political liabilities and organizational dissension, or a continual process of incremental changes to the current organization.

While a comprehensive solution might be more satisfying in the long run, pragmatically it appears that only marginal or incremental changes will be possible. The obscurity accorded the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel in 1970 attests to the validity of this view. Although some of the suggestions considered below may appear to be too far-reaching to be accomplished in a single step, they do establish organizational goals for the future which can be attained incrementally. These changes will be discussed under three major categories: centralized management, joint planning, and unified execution.

Centralized Management

Over 20 years ago, the Hoover Commission recommended centralized management of military traffic and transportation. The Blue Ribbon Panel recommended the creation of a Logistics Command which would include both the Military Airlift Command and the Military Sea Transportation Command, as well as the traffic and terminal management functions now performed by the Military Traffic Management Command, the Military Sea Transportation System, and the Theater Traffic Management agencies.¹⁴ The persistency of this idea virtually insures that it will resurface whenever the unified command system is reconsidered. Perhaps its time has come. If it has, an extension to include deployment planning would appear logical. However, this proposal would face stiff opposition from the service departments, particularly from the Navy and Air Force, which can be expected to guard against incursions into their last remaining powerful instrument of bureaucratic influence, that of resource allocation.

The security assistance function should be centralized in a CONUS-based agency,

reporting through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. The Defense Security Assistance Agency, removed from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, could provide the nucleus of the new agency. The character of security assistance has changed over the years. It has been reoriented to emphasize foreign military sales and has been increasingly centralized at DOD level, resulting in a degradation of the military input into security assistance decisions. Such an agency, reporting through the JCS, with cells established and collocated with each appropriate unified command, would be able to respond more effectively to the demands of security assistance.

Joint Planning

One recurring UCP argument is whether or not it is necessary or desirable that every region of the world fall within the geographical limits of some unified command. Most of the regions of the world are now assigned to some geographical unified command for "normal operations."

In considering the unassigned regions, the diffusion of responsibility—the lack of a single focal point for US military interests—is undesirable. However, many of the functions included under normal operations are unnecessary. Therefore, a new category termed "overwatch" could be developed to establish the degree of proponency desired. Commanders assigned this type of responsibility for a region (in lieu of normal operations) would provide high-level attention and joint planning capabilities in much the same manner that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) currently does for South Asia. To align the unified command system with the current and projected realities of the strategic environment, US Readiness Command (USREDCOM) could be assigned overwatch responsibility for currently unassigned areas.

The establishment of joint planning cells for contingency operations at USREDCOM for each unassigned region would be included in the overwatch concept for unassigned areas. Plans would be submitted to the JCS for approval. These joint planning cells could

provide the nucleus of a Joint Task Force (JTF) staff, if it were ever necessary to conduct military operations in an unassigned area.

The new treaties and separate agreements with Panama allow a three- to five-year transition period for transferring the facilities and responsibilities of the canal to the Republic of Panama. It would probably be best not to change the current unified command relationships during this period. However, a Panama Defense Command could be established to execute residual US security interests regarding the canal, and overwatch responsibility for the rest of Central America and South America could be assigned to USREDCOM.

Because of the recent Soviet political and military involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the Horn of Africa (with Cuban proxies), some continuous high-level attention should be directed toward that troubled region. Overwatch by USREDCOM might be one solution. Another could be the establishment of a new unified command—South Atlantic—which would embrace Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and the critical sea lines of communication from the Persian Gulf to Europe and North America.

Unified Execution

Unified execution demands unified commands in those areas of the world in which the United States is committed to a formal military alliance (i.e., NATO and Korea). These commands should be narrowly focused on the mission of the alliance. For example, USEUCOM should be given geographical responsibility only for those areas which fall within NATO's boundaries. A case can also be made for assigning the northern-tier NATO countries to LANTCOM because in war they would be more involved in the naval battle of the North Atlantic than in operations on the central front, although there is obviously a linkage between the two battles. USREDCOM would be given the responsibility for normal operations in any programmed contingency outside of NATO.

The establishment of a combined

command in Korea in 1978 indicates the need for an alliance arrangement similar to NATO. However, the perceived vastness of the Pacific, the need to view the *entire* Pacific Basin as a strategic entity, and the regional political relationships between the Republic of Korea and Japan preclude the immediate adoption of a separate or subordinate unified command for Northeast Asia.

Although there may be wartime linkages between NATO and the Persian Gulf/Middle East, recent events in Iran demonstrate that the peacetime linkages are less clear. The abortive Anglo-French/Israeli operation in the Suez in 1956 and the strains put on NATO by the OPEC oil embargo that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli war point to the need for some US unified command other than EUCOM to have the peacetime responsibility for contingencies in this region. Again, USREDCOM could be given that responsibility. Another alternative, although less desirable, would be to establish a South West Pacific Command to handle US contingencies in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area. It appears certain that any contingency in the Persian Gulf area would be directed and supported from the United States. Because of European political sensitivities, the military forces would not come from US assets in Europe, so assigning the area to USREDCOM for normal operations in a non-NATO contingency would seem most appropriate.

Another Blue Ribbon Panel recommendation whose time may have come is the formation of a Strategic Command. Naval strategic nuclear forces might be merged with the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to form such a command, acknowledging the need for a single command authority and channel to control all strategic retaliatory forces.

Any changes in the unified command system relating to the execution of unified military operations must allow for the direction of even low-level military contingencies by the National Command Authority. It is a matter of importance that the organization, communications, and doctrine to support this type of command relationship be formally created.

Changes to the unified command system such as have been discussed here must be embodied in formal changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP). It is recognized that no Chairman of the JCS ever really desires to open up the UCP to change because of the concern that it will trigger major parochial battles among the services. Whether the liabilities of such battles in a period of transition and uncertainty are exceeded by the advantages accruing from the changes is a decision that can only be made after very serious consideration by the senior military leadership.

NOTES

The expert assistance of Colonel Lloyd D. Bryant and Mr. James E. Trinnaman is gratefully acknowledged. Both are assigned to the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Colonel Bryant as a Strategic Research Analyst and Study Group Coordinator, and Mr. Trinnaman as a Political Scientist.

1. Jimmy Carter, "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense," White House Memorandum No. 54276, 20 September 1977.

2. Richard C. Steadman, *Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure* (Washington: Department of Defense, July 1978).

3. F. Clifton Berry, "Reorganization In Vogue at Pentagon," *Armed Forces Journal International* (December 1977), 10-11.

4. Steadman, pp. 9-24.

5. When either or both of the following criteria apply generally to a situation, a unified command normally is required to secure the necessary unity of effort: (1) A broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more services, and necessitating single strategic direction. (2) Any combination of the following when significant forces of two or more services are involved: (a) A large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force. (b) A large geographic area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein. (c) Necessity for common utilization of limited logistic means. *Unified Action Armed Forces*, JCS Pub 2 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 45.

6. For an excellent discussion of the early history of service unification, see Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

7. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 373-74.

8. Theodore W. Bauer and Harry B. Yoshpe, *Defense Organization and Management* (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1971), pp. 23-52. Also Robert M. Whitaker, *A Functional Analysis of Administrative Power and Decision-Making in Defense* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1971), pp. 196-246. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the basic military document which delineates the responsibilities of unified and specified commands.

9. US Department of State, *First Report of the Secretary*

of Defense (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 82.

10. Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, *Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 53.

11. U. S. G. Sharp, *Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1977), p. 60.

12. Michael Howard, "NATO and 'The Year of Europe,'" *Round Table* (October 1973), 23.

13. Fitzhugh, pp. 45, 50-51.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

