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Flag flying over the Strength and Wisdom statue, a gift from the class of 2014, capturing the mission, spirit, and history of Carlisle Barracks (photo by Laura A. Wackwitz, Ph.D.).

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The Pakistan-China relationship has matured into a comprehensive strategic partnership. Internal stability, however remains a critical enabler for national security, foreign investment, and economic growth. Pakistan must demonstrate progress toward a more stable internal environment or risk becoming a dysfunctional liability for the Chinese. This essay identifies key areas of mutual interest, highlights economic and improved security opportunities, and notes potential perils and vulnerabilities. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location offers a safe and secure alternate access to resources and global markets. A “way forward” for building and maintaining the Pakistan-China relationship is advanced; one that benefits both countries and the region at large.

Keywords: Geo-strategic location of Pakistan, Chinese access to western seas, Trade Corridor to Central Asia

The Pakistan-China relationship evolved in the bi-polar environment of the Cold War with India perceived as a common threat.¹ Two key elements in this relationship were Pakistan’s support of China in United Nations forums and Pakistan’s central role in facilitating the United States—Sino rapprochement.² For its part, China supported Pakistan in its wars with India and assisted in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program when the U.S. re-imposed sanctions in 1989.³ In the last six decades, the Pakistan-China relationship has matured into a comprehensive strategic partnership.⁴ The relationship is crucially important for Pakistan’s national security, and is of near equal value to Beijing’s regional security considerations.

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³ Ibid., 3-5.
Emerging economic viability is a key 21st century enabler for national power and security. In Pakistan-China relations, trade and commerce serves as the soft underbelly of an otherwise close relationship. Mutual cooperation is reinforced, in part, by the current geo-political environment and by Pakistan’s strategic location which offers China appealing economic opportunities and westward access. Pakistan’s future likely depends on the careful management of the China-Pakistan relationship while Pakistan continues navigating through treacherous regional and global challenges.

This essay examines the Chinese-Pakistan relationship within a regional and global context, identifies key areas of mutual interest, highlights economic and security opportunities, and notes potential perils and vulnerabilities. A “way forward” for building and maintaining this important relationship for the benefit of both countries and the region at large is recommended.

**Strategic Context**

The 21st century is characterized by a growing connectivity between and within state and non-state actors enabled primarily by information technology and economic interdependence. In many respects, globalization (the free exchange of ideas, commodities, and populace), has undermined the ability of a single state to control its internal socio-political environment. This new “megatrend” can also act as a constraint (such as increased vulnerability to subversion and terrorism) and requires cooperation with key external nation states. Notwithstanding a trend toward interdependence, future conflict between nation states is likely to be due to the need for assured access to natural resources essential for rapid growth and increasing global competitiveness. In this context China, the Asia-Pacific Region, and India are likely to increasingly shape the geo-political environment for the remainder of the century. Importantly, the Asia-Pacific Region, Africa, Central Asia, and Russia are emerging areas where the U.S., China, Europe, and India are competing for natural resources.

Within the global milieu, the U.S. currently leads the world order as the primary power and will likely do so for the next two to three decades. Thus, the U.S. has considerably more interest in maintaining the current stability of the international order than do emerging powers. China’s rapid economic growth and aspirations for increased influence threaten several Southeast Asian countries.
and poses a strategic challenge to current U.S. hegemony. U.S. efforts to rebalance to the Pacific are perceived by many as countering Beijing’s aspirations for increased regional and global influence.\[^{15}\]

Prosperity and security are important pillars of the modern political system, driving current economic and defense alliances such as: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), Association of South East Asian Nations, Trans Pacific Partnership, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).\[^{16}\] Growing multinational alliances reflect a continuing transition toward a more multi-polar world order.\[^{17}\] At present, China and Russia are competitive “global status seekers,” but their collusion during the Security Council vote on Syria may suggest a possible growing convergence of Russian and Chinese interests.\[^{18}\]

The Gulf States are also key actors in regional and global dynamics. The Arab Spring has profoundly influenced nearly every country in the Middle East and the situation remains extremely volatile. Unfortunately, pro-democratic movements have descended into ethnic and sectarian turmoil that continue to plague the region. Importantly, the Gulf region as a global oil market continues to hold significant strategic value for the U.S. and China. The U.S. censure of autocratic rule in the Gulf States and pressure on the respective governments to address their social unrest may actually foster instability. An additional complicating factor to the political and social volatility in the region is the Gulf States fear of Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Correspondingly, the Gulf States are wary of the recent U.S.-Iran rapprochement efforts and the U.S.’s apparent acceptance of Iran’s programs.\[^{19}\] Together these regional issues indirectly place the global oil market at risk and affect the behavior of both China and the United States.

The environment in South Asia also remains tense based upon a complex mix of bilateral and multilateral interactions. The U.S., China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan all play major roles in shaping the environment. China has a growing presence in South Asia, has close strategic relations with Pakistan and is the biggest competitor of the U.S. and India at global and regional levels. Perhaps the most serious regional challenge is the conflict-prone relationship between the two regional nuclear rivals: Pakistan and India. Additionally, the growing U.S.-India strategic partnership may further aggravate Sino-Indian relations in the mid- to long-term and increase tensions. Likewise, Chinese overt support to Pakistan is viewed by the Indians as an indirect Chinese strategy to counterbalance India’s regional influence. Also, contributing to the uncertainty facing South Asia is the prospect of instability in Afghanistan following the U.S. drawdown. U.S. priorities in South Asia include: (1) expanding economic relations with India and promoting its role as a counterbalance to China, (2) eliminating extremism and improving the internal stability in Pakistan while preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and (3) facilitating the peaceful transition of security operations within Afghanistan while preventing it from devolving into a failed state.\[^{20}\]

Complicating this array of traditional nation-state interrelationships is the emergence of a host of 21st century global concerns.\[^{21}\] The character of the threat has transformed into multifaceted nontraditional dimensions including: terrorism, insurgencies, civil wars, tolerance or support of

\[^{19}\] Lamb, Hameed, and Mixon, South Asia Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns, 9, 30-31.
\[^{20}\] Ibid., 11-15.
\[^{21}\] Ibid., 9.
terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation, asymmetric warfare and cyber-attacks—all capable of disrupting governance and commerce. Of these, transnational terrorism and the proliferation and employment of WMDs pose the most serious challenges to regional security, stability, and prosperity in South Asia.

Strategic Appraisal: China’s Perspective

China’s 21st century rise is fueled primarily by the economic growth transforming China in an unprecedented manner and at impressive speed. For the first time the Middle Kingdom appears to be reaching across oceans to redefine its identity within a global context. The current world order—viewed by the Chinese as a consequence of the global power struggle of the late 20th century—will change only if China improves its global standing. China is pursuing a more balanced multi-polar world order, seeking to reduce U.S. dominance while simultaneously recognizing that Chinese progress depends upon cooperation with and exploitation of U.S. markets. Thus, China avoids antagonizing the U.S. in the short- to mid-term while challenging U.S. influence in the long-term.

China’s policies since Deng Xiaoping reflect a change in its political outlook. China is willing to demonstrate a more flexible approach to the tenets of the liberal world order but its progress remains firmly grounded in a Chinese cultural framework and its “five principles of peaceful co-existence.” These principles emphasize non-interference in the internal affairs of others and promote engagements for mutual benefit. By and large, China has pursued peaceful development, expanded trade and economic relations, and is regarded as one of the largest global trading partners as measured by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In effect, China has assumed a central role in the multi-nodal globalized world as the second largest economy and is likely to surpass the U.S. to become the economic world leader by 2025. With China’s rise comes new challenges, however.

China is confronted with diverse neighbors constituting a unique tri-polar regional environment and is pursuing opportunities to exploit nascent regions. Southeast Asia is currently the most sought after region for expanding Chinese direct influence and trade. In the west, Central Asia provides future opportunities for increasing markets and obtaining natural resources. Northeast Asia is regarded as an area of risk and tension due to the competing interests from Japan and South Korea. Concurrently, China’s budding relationships with Africa and Latin America are based on coincident interests, exploiting emerging markets, and accessing and developing natural resources.

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23 Lamb, Hameed, and Mixon, South Asia Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns, 31.
25 Ibid., 51.
26 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 122.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
China today faces significant challenges in achieving its global aspirations. Its economy is critically dependent on the procurement of energy resources abroad. Eighty percent of its imported oil travels through the Strait of Malacca. The on-going territorial disputes in the South China Sea together with U.S. naval dominance makes Chinese shipping lanes vulnerable to disruption and interdiction. China’s dependency on oil imports and its reliance on vulnerable sea lanes is termed the “Malacca Dilemma.” To address this vulnerability and assure the flow of energy, China has adopted a “New Silk Road Strategy.” The strategy has two components: first it aims to transform the old Silk Road routes into a modern infrastructure network that includes pipelines, roads and rail designed to avoid the perils of sea transport; second, China is modernizing its naval forces from a coastal defense navy into a “blue water” (what China terms “far seas defense”) navy capable of protecting its maritime interests from the Persian Gulf to the Pacific. For the foreseeable future, however, the Chinese military will be unable to challenge U.S. naval dominance.

China recognizes market access and the steady flow of energy resources as key economic drivers. Currently, China is the largest trading partner with the U.S. and European Union (EU) and has important interests in Africa and the Middle East. In 2012, China became the world’s largest importer of oil and, since 2009, receives 33% of its imported oil from Africa. By 2020, China is likely to import 65% of its oil from Africa. China’s geographic proximity to oil rich Central Asia and Russia also affords opportunities. Currently, an oil pipeline links western Kazakhstan and China. In 2005 China National Petroleum Corporation purchased Petro-Kazakhstan Inc. a Canadian oil producing company that has given China access to an additional 550 million barrels of oil. The completed oil pipeline to Russia has improved bilateral relations with Russia and has helped to secure China’s oil supply while reducing its dependence on sea transport.

China regards the Middle East as an important strategic region linking Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Middle East serves as a logistics and trade center to access European and African markets and is also another source of energy. Significantly, China imports approximately 47% (2010) of its oil from Middle East sources. Moreover, the U.S. rebalance to the Pacific has caused China to seek strategic economic depth with increased influence in the Middle East, especially in the post-Arab Spring environment.

The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is regarded as an effort to contain the growing Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

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36 Ibid., 10, 11, and 14.

37 Ibid.


40 Ibid.

41 Lin, *China’s Strategic Shift towards the Region of the Four Seas*, 2.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.


45 See Dai Xu, C-xing baowei; neiyou waihuan xia de zhongguo tuwei [C-Shaped Encirclement: China’s Breakout of Encirclement from Internal and External Threats] (Shanghai: Wenhui Press, 2010).
in the East and South China Seas infringes on its core interests.\textsuperscript{46} In the evolving sensitive environment of the Asia-Pacific, the U.S.-India nuclear deal and Indian-Japanese economic and military engagements further threaten China. India has also begun to position itself as the primary competitor in countering growing Chinese influence; so much so that even increasing trade between China and India may not be able to reduce the coming rivalry.\textsuperscript{47}

China considers its east bounded by anti-China pacts supported by the U.S.\textsuperscript{48} Consequently, China has started improving its coalitions with non-western aligned states and has successfully used the SCO to extend its influence in Central Eurasia, especially in the last decade. China is also solidifying its relations with key states in the Caspian, Mediterranean, Black and Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf, with an emphasis on Turkey, Syria, Iran, Pakistan, and recently Egypt. Notably, these countries possess 70\% of the proven energy reserves and are not closely aligned with the United States. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan are especially important because: (1) Turkey is an important member of NATO and SCO; its current Islamic government is inclined to look east, making it predisposed towards China thereby extending China’s influence to Eurasia;\textsuperscript{49} (2) If China and Russia maintain relations with Iran it would provide a small counterbalance\textsuperscript{50} on the eastern flank of the Gulf, preventing the possible disruption of China’s oil supply caused by conflict over Taiwan; and (3) According to President Hu Jintao, “China-Pakistan traditional strategic partnership would remain intact under all circumstances.”\textsuperscript{51} In geo-economic terms, a close China-Pakistan relationship secures for China an alternative strategic corridor through Pakistan.\textsuperscript{52}

Despite the disaffection in rural areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang, China’s economic progress has spread across the country and affected nearly every domain. The military, for instance, is being modernized and is increasingly assertive in protecting its interests through the projection of power at regional and global levels.\textsuperscript{53} Correspondingly, China is likely to contest any threat to its influence and sovereignty in East Asia while increasingly asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{54}

China’s National Interests

Faced with a rising tide of perceived strategic challenges and newly empowered by economic prosperity and growth, China appears to have four major interests: (1) Sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national reunification,\textsuperscript{55} (2) A peaceful rise through economic development,\textsuperscript{56} promotion of equally beneficial international cooperation,\textsuperscript{57} and a preferred policy of non-

\textsuperscript{46} Mahmood, “Pakistan China Relationship,” 11.
\textsuperscript{47} Rizwan Zeb, Pakistan-China Relations: Where They Go From Here, UNISCI Discussion papers, No. 29, (Madrid, Spain: UNISCI, May 2012), 56, \url{http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/797/76724487004.pdf} (accessed December 8, 2013).
\textsuperscript{48} Lin, China’s Strategic Shift towards the Region of the Four Seas, 16.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{51} Zeb, Pakistan-China Relations: Where They Go From Here, 51.
\textsuperscript{53} Lin, China’s Strategic Shift towards the Region of the Four Seas, 10.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 20 and 21.
\textsuperscript{57} Tong, “Analysis of China’s National Interests,” 133.
confrontation and non-interference; 58 (3) The comprehensive engagement with Asia-Pacific stakeholders to contest U.S. containment efforts and to secure routes for the uninterrupted flow of energy supplies to China; 59 and (4) Cooperation with all nations to counter terrorism, piracy, transnational crime, and participate in disaster response 60 to promote stability. 61

Strategic Appraisal: Pakistan’s Perspective

Pakistan’s strategic location, while important, is also a liability due primarily to the associated countervailing interests of regional stakeholders and global powers. 62 Pakistan, for instance, is literally in a perpetual state of conflict with India over the Kashmir issue, lacks internal stability, and is still reeling from two major international events: the 1977 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. 63 Thus, although the geo-strategic location of Pakistan offers economic opportunities for the U.S., China, Russia, and India, 64 stability remains an important issue for these stakeholders. 65 Securing economic opportunities requires a stable regional environment that depends on four major dynamics: (1) The maintenance of strategic equilibrium between India and Pakistan; (2) Stabilizing fragile U.S. relationships with Asia, particularly with China, Iran, and Muslim nations; (3) The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its effects on Pakistan; and (4) Maintaining the internal stability and security of Pakistan. 66

The current Pakistan-India adversarial relationship is based on a relatively brief but violent history following partition in 1947 and is fueled by the current unresolved Kashmir issue. 67 The inability of either side to achieve their political objectives through the use of force helped establish relative stability up to 1998. 68 This was followed by the development of nuclear weapons by both parties that has served to deter major conflict post-1998. Under the existing nuclear deterrence umbrella, the Pakistan-India relationship started showing signs of improvement in 2004 when both countries agreed on “composite dialogue” to resolve outstanding issues. 69 The 2008 Mumbai attack, however, derailed the “dialog” and threatened war. 70

The terrorist attack within the Indian city of Mumbai left 174 people dead, including 26 foreigners and 9 terrorists, 71 and led to a series of events that both threatened regional stability and helped defuse the crisis. For its part, the Pakistan government denounced the incident and took concrete measures that were acknowledged by New Delhi and also recognized by the U.S. as

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58 Ibid., 100-104.
59 Lin, China's Strategic Shift towards the Region of the Four Seas, 16-17.
60 Farer, Sisk, and Zhao, China-U.S. Relations in the New Global Context, 6.
63 Ibid., 205.
70 Ibid., 11.
71 Ibid., 1-2.
“important and great steps.” Unlike previous crises, both the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi demonstrated patience and resolve and refused to let the situation escalate. Nevertheless, counter-allegations and blame assignments continued. India continued to press Pakistan to eliminate alleged anti-Indian terrorist elements in Pakistan and accused Pakistan of directly supporting these groups. Conversely, Pakistan viewed India’s accusations as opportunistic and as a means to marshal international opposition against Pakistan and warned India against resorting to “blame game and knee-jerk reactions.” Although animosity has subsided, the incident has left an indelible scar that continues to hamper improved relations.

Pakistan also views many of India’s activities—including India’s expansive arms procurement program, its new provocative military Cold Start doctrine, and the U.S.-India nuclear deal and Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver—as being provocative and designed to upset the tenuous regional strategic equilibrium. Similarly, recent U.S. engagements with India, ostensibly to counter China’s influence, have strained U.S.-Pakistan relations. Significantly, relations between India and Pakistan have begun to warm and both nations are cautiously optimistic. Dialog resumed between the countries beginning in 2011, after a two-year pause, with several key initiatives. The two countries: established a “terror hotline” between their ministries; agreed to several measures to improve transparency on both conventional and nuclear weapons programs; expanded trade and travel across the line-of-control in Kashmir; liberalized some bilateral trade restrictions; signed an India-Pakistan pact to build an 1,100-mile natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan; and Pakistan considered extending the Most-Favored Nation status to India. Despite these positive steps, tension and distrust between India and Pakistan continues and Pakistan remains distrustful of growing U.S.-India cooperation.

These trends have affected Pakistani public opinion and external relations. For instance, eighty percent of the Pakistani population regards China as a friend as opposed to nine percent who view the U.S. as a partner. According to Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, “China and Pakistan were, are, and will forever be good neighbors, good friends, good partners and good brothers.” Moreover, China has always stood by Pakistan and provided strong support, especially when Pakistan confronted intense U.S. pressure in 2011 after the assassination of Osama Bin Laden. Similarly, Pakistan has always supported China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet in all international forums. Pakistan also continues to act as a bridge between China and the Muslim World.

The Kashmir dispute remains a major security concern. The China-India border dispute in the north, Aksai Chin, explicitly includes China in the Kashmir issue as a fourth party (besides Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris). An agreement among these four stakeholders could dramatically lead the

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72 Ibid., 11-18.
73 Kronstadt, Terrorist Attack in Mumbai, 8-10.
75 Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, 41-43.
79 Ibid., 83.
80 Ibid., 85.
region towards improved stability and increased prosperity. Resolution of this issue could enable each of these stakeholders to dedicate significantly more military forces and resources towards countering terrorism thus further improving internal security. A rising China with stronger ties with both India and Pakistan and a growing stake in a favorable outcome could play a pivotal role in brokering a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue; a role that the U.S. has avoided. For a Chinese led negotiation effort “the upside is phenomenal, the downside negligible.”

Pakistan-Iran relations have always been episodic but Iran has generally supported Pakistan during difficult times. In post 9/11, Pakistan-Iran relations cooled due to the U.S. imposed sanctions on Iran that were supported by Pakistan. Conversely, Iran’s sponsorship of the Shia community, its covert support of Shia sects in Afghanistan, and improved Indo-Iran cooperation undermines the Iran-Pakistan relationship. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the dynamics in the Pakistan-Iran relationship could either disrupt or help stabilize the region. Iran’s inclination towards India in post-U.S. Afghanistan could affect Pakistan-Iran cooperation and increase regional tensions.

Historically, Pakistan and Afghanistan have maintained an uneasy peace. In the last decade, both have been accused of meddling in the other’s domestic affairs. Afghanistan blames Pakistan for supporting militancy in Afghanistan and intervening to establish a pro-Pakistan government. Pakistan believes Afghanistan is supporting and harboring “Baloch” terrorist elements and allowing India to use Afghan soil for anti-Pakistan activities. Significantly, the Afghan government has recently shown a more open posture with its neighbors with Pakistan reciprocating. Continued cooperation between the two countries may be the critical link in ensuring regional stability following the U.S. withdrawal.

Likewise, increased economic cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan is an important factor in improving regional stability and prosperity. There are numerous actions that can lead to long-term economic prosperity and others which may derail progress. A key friction point is the Indian influence within Afghanistan that is viewed by Pakistan as a direct threat to its security. Conversely, a long-term U.S. commitment ensuring a smooth transition and stable post-withdrawal environment could help prevent civil war and help stabilize the region. Notably, it is unlikely that peace in Afghanistan could be achieved without some concessions to the Taliban. Moreover, a stable and peaceful Afghanistan requires the cooperation and support of the regional stakeholders.

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82 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 2.
88 Ibid., 10.
90 Sial, Pak-Afghan Relations Emerging Trends and Future Prospects, 12.
92 Ibid., 4.
Pakistan depends upon stable and friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. Beside traditional religious linkages, Pakistan continues to depend on Saudi Arabia for oil supplies, deferred payments and other financial support.\textsuperscript{93} Saudi Arabia also influences the domestic affairs of Pakistan but the nature of this relationship has changed in the last decade as Saudi Arabia expanded its strategic outlook. The Saudis are now more focused on developing regional and global relationships to guard against threats from Iran and limit the rising sectarianism in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{94} Saudi Arabia has also backed off from its unqualified support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and increased engagement with India.\textsuperscript{95} Pakistan’s economy can no longer depend on Saudi largesse and the relationship is likely to continue mainly on a reciprocal basis. Pakistan’s intent to pursue the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, over U.S. objections, is likely to affect the Saudi-Pakistan relationship. A political cost will need to be weighed against economic benefits.

The recent improvement of the bilateral relationship between Russia and Pakistan also affects regional stability.\textsuperscript{96} Russia believes that a stable Pakistan can help Afghanistan curtail the spread of terrorism into the Central Asian Republics.\textsuperscript{97} Growing Indo-Russian relations, however, could well emerge as an impediment to improved Pakistan-Russia relations. Conversely, the improved relationship between the U.S. and India will likely impair Russia-India cooperation and indirectly help Russia-Pakistan engagements.\textsuperscript{98} The inclusion of Pakistan in SCO as a regular member could also boost Pakistan-Russia relations.

Pakistan-U.S. relations can best be described as pragmatic and transactional due, in part, to its oscillating nature. A large segment of Pakistani society believes that the U.S. is neither a dependable nor a long-term ally.\textsuperscript{99} The recent and repeated U.S. violations of Pakistani sovereignty have further alienated the general populace and turned them against the United States. Notwithstanding this tenuous relationship, the U.S. requires Pakistan’s assistance and support to avoid a perilous exit from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{100} Pakistan is also concerned that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could destabilize the region and be inimical to Pakistan’s interests.\textsuperscript{101}

Another important impediment in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is the inability of the U.S. to appreciate the gravity of the Indian threat to Pakistan\textsuperscript{102} as exemplified by the extension of the preferential U.S.-India nuclear agreement. Pakistan understands that the U.S. will avoid involvement in resolving the Kashmir issue and will not openly accept nor welcome Pakistan as a nuclear power. Nonetheless, Pakistan has already acquired a de-facto nuclear status that does not require the U.S.

\textsuperscript{93} Akram, “Reversing Strategic Shrinkage,” 301.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Khan, “The Pakistan-Russia Relationship,” 126.
or other international ratification. In the context of maintaining stability in South Asia, the U.S. should consider the following potential consequences: (1) U.S. engagement with India intended to curtail Chinese influence could invoke a provocative Chinese counter response; (2) Promoting Indian regional hegemony in South Asia could further destabilize the region with severe unintended consequences; (3) The U.S., China, Europe and Russia are in a better position than India to promote a peaceful and enduring economic environment in South Asia; and (4) A positive and long term Pakistan-U.S. relationship is in Pakistan’s interests and should not be affected by Pakistan’s close relations with China. Both the U.S. and Pakistan have mutual interests in eliminating terrorism in the region, seeking stability, and exploiting mutual economic opportunities.

Pakistan’s National Security Interests

Pakistan’s vital national interests are: (1) Sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) National integration and internal security; (3) Socio-economic development; (4) Peaceful relations with neighbors, the international community and growing strategic relations with China; and (5) The peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue.

Prospects and Challenges for Pakistan-China Strategic Relations

Prospects

Gwadar port, located on the southwest coast of Pakistan, is only 2500 kilometers from Xinjiang compared to 4500 kilometers from Xinjiang to China’s east coast. The shorter distance and overland security amplifies the importance of this route to western China. Options available to China include: (1) Construct an oil pipe line from Gwadar to Xinjiang; (2) Join the Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline; and (3) Build a separate undersea pipeline from Oman to Pakistan (Gwadar) and then link to an overland pipeline. The existing Karakorum highway (between Pakistan and China) can also serve as an expanded trade corridor from China to Gwadar, Afghanistan, or Central Asia. Most significantly, the Gwadar port, along with the improved trade corridor, can assist China in avoiding the Malacca choke point, improving access to Central Asia and Europe and circumventing U.S. encirclement. Implementation of the Gwadar port project is expected to generate $60 billion in annual revenues for Pakistan from the transit charges alone for the next two decades.

Pakistan-China economic engagement started improving in 2000. The overall volume of trade between Pakistan and China oscillates between $7 to 10 billion, and is likely to increase to 15 billion by 2015. At present, approximately 13,000 Chinese experts and workers representing 120

\(^{103}\) Akram, “Reversing Strategic Shrinkage,” 293.
\(^{104}\) Ibid., 303.
\(^{105}\) Ibid.
\(^{106}\) Ibid.
\(^{107}\) Mullick, Pakistan’s Security Paradox, 7.
\(^{109}\) Ibid.
\(^{110}\) Ibid.
\(^{111}\) Mahmood, “Pakistan China Strategic Relations,” 13.
\(^{112}\) Reidel and Singh, “U.S. China Relations,” 7.
\(^{113}\) Zeb, “Pakistan China Relations,” 57.
\(^{114}\) Dumbaugh, Exploring the China-Pakistan Relationship, 9-10.
\(^{115}\) Zeb, “Pakistan China Relations,” 52.
companies are managing 250 projects in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{117} Beside multiple ongoing projects in mining, telecom, and power generation sectors, some other economic and trade prospects include: road construction, agriculture projects, financial institutions, and exclusive economic zones. By exploiting Pakistan’s geo-strategic location and natural resources with Chinese technology and financial investments, both countries can prosper.

China has also played a pivotal role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional power generation programs even through difficult periods of western imposed sanctions.\textsuperscript{118} With Chinese assistance, two nuclear power plants for electricity generation have been completed at Chasma and two more are under construction.\textsuperscript{119} Similarly, in the hydro power sector, China contracted for projects worth $700 million to construct twelve small to medium dams.\textsuperscript{120} Currently, Chinese laborers and engineers are working on Neelum Jhelum project in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. China’s continued assistance in improving Pakistan’s power generation capacity is critical to Pakistan’s economic development.\textsuperscript{121}

Defense cooperation is perhaps the strongest aspect of the Pakistan-China relationship. China’s assistance was essential in establishing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and indigenous industrial defense production capability.\textsuperscript{122} Some of the major strategic joint defense projects include: JF-17 third generation fighter aircraft, K-8 fighter trainer aircraft, main battle tank MBT-2000, airborne warning and air control systems and cruise missiles.\textsuperscript{123} A $600 million deal for construction of four frigates\textsuperscript{124} is underway and China is also supplying its most advanced J-10 fighter to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{125} Pakistan-China joint defense production also has the potential to capture a large proportion of the Muslim nations market and enable China to avoid an EU-like embargo that was imposed following the Tiananmen Square incident.\textsuperscript{126}

Despite differences, China and India are engaged in building economic relations designed to increase trade,\textsuperscript{127} yet China-Pakistan relations appear to be largely unaffected by this engagement.\textsuperscript{128} In contrast, the U.S. tilt towards India has raised concerns for both China and Pakistan\textsuperscript{129} and has served to further strengthen the China-Pakistan relationship.\textsuperscript{130} The 2005 China-Pakistan “Treaty of Friendship”\textsuperscript{131} and the Chinese decision to continue assisting Pakistan in development of civilian nuclear projects\textsuperscript{132} illustrate the strong and growing Sino-Pak relationship.

**Challenges**

Over the past few years the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a terrorist organization, has been active in the Xinjiang\textsuperscript{133} and evidence indicates that its members received training in the...
Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Responding to China’s concerns, Pakistan took aggressive actions to prevent any further activities by the ETIM within Pakistan. But the fact that the terrorist threat to China emanated from within Pakistan reflects negatively on internal stability and, as such, threatens foreign investments in Pakistan.

Approximately, 13,000 Chinese nationals are working on various projects in Pakistan. Unfortunately, some of these nationals have been subjected to terrorist attacks. Chinese expertise and their skilled work force are critical to ongoing projects and future development. Aggressive Pakistani law enforcement is essential to provide a safe and secure working environment.

People-to-people contact remains the weakest link in Pakistan-China relations. The increase in economic, social, and political exchanges should stimulate the masses in both countries toward more pragmatic interactions—and hopefully with much less troublesome rhetoric. Despite religious, cultural, and social differences, both populations should initiate additional measures to increase positive activities leading to improved toleration, greater acceptance, and mutual cooperation.

**Recommended Strategy**

The proposed strategy reflects the Chinese expression of “Niu Dai” (Tie, Link, and Bond). The goal is to enhance Chinese-Pakistani economic opportunities by exploiting Pakistan’s geo-strategic location. Elements of the strategy include: (1) Supplying assistance to China in accessing western seas, Central and West Asia through extension of the traditional Silk Route; (2) Providing access to Pakistan’s untapped natural resources; (3) Developing Pakistan as a manufacturing source for China by introducing exclusive economic zones; and (4) Improving defense cooperation to strengthen Pakistan’s military capability while helping to open military hardware markets for other Muslim nations. The strategy will include a combination of diplomatic, informational, military and economic measures with emphasis on diplomatic and economic engagement.

**Diplomatic Measures**

Pakistan must remain cognizant of China’s interests and address areas of maximum possible convergence while maintaining a high level of political interaction and coordination at international forums. First and foremost, Pakistan must maintain a high level of political interaction with China. Good relations with Beijing, however, should not be at the exclusion of other important regional allies and global partners. Full disclosure and transparency with China over sometimes competing national interests should increase mutual trust and confidence. Importantly, Pakistan should continue to seek cooperation with regional stakeholders to thwart extremism while improving internal security, stability, and prosperity.

**Informational Measures**

Both countries should relax visa requirements while promoting more travel and cultural interaction. An expanded student exchange and visiting university professor program could help improve cross-cultural understanding now and well into the future. The Pakistan government should both seek and fund more scholarships for Pakistani students to study at Chinese universities. China Central Television is the only Chinese channel broadcast in Pakistan and has a very limited viewership along with limited Chinese print media. Both countries should improve the quality, number, and access to Chinese/Pakistani program offerings. Pakistan should increase its media

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134 Ibid., 9.
coverage of China while at the same time attracting Chinese electronic and print media in order to communicate Pakistani cultural and societal perspectives to the Chinese populace.

Military Measures

Pakistan should pursue strong military-to-military relations with China to further improve Pakistan’s defense industry and continue the transfer of related technology. Chinese assistance should also be sought in space technology, cyber warfare, unarmed aerial vehicles, early warning systems, anti-satellite weapons, and improved air defenses. By leveraging favorable relationships with Muslim countries, Pakistan should act as a bridge for extending Pakistan-China joint defense projects to Muslim nations and thereby help China avoid possible EU embargos.

Economic Measures

Security and stability are the essential engines for economic growth. Pakistan must provide a safe, secure, and stable environment to encourage foreign investment. Concurrently, it should seek to promote internal development and provide essential services that enable economic growth and serve to reduce motivational contexts that encourage extremism and terrorism.

Pakistan must increase its strategic relevance for China by offering multimodal strategic arteries (road, rail, pipelines, and fiber optics) from Xinjiang to Gwadar port, Karachi, Iran, and Afghanistan. Important components of the strategic network include the upgrading of the Karakorum highway, construction of Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, and inclusion of China in both projects.

Pakistan should vigorously act to resolve its energy crisis through the development of a comprehensive power generation and distribution system that capitalizes on Chinese hydropower construction capabilities while also developing alternate energy sources (solar/wind). Other efforts should focus on developing Pakistan’s vast coal reserves, expanding the energy distribution infrastructure, and soliciting Chinese expertise to develop efficient coal power and additional nuclear power plants.

Finally, Pakistan should concurrently (a) encourage Chinese investment and make unilateral trade concessions that stimulate reciprocal measures by China and other trading partners; (b) provide government incentives, when appropriate, to stimulate the development of natural resources, increase manufacturing, and fuel the consumption of Pakistani goods and services; (c) create and utilize exclusive industrial zones and improved security measures to attract and incentivize Chinese automobile, computer, and communication industries to build factories within Pakistan; (d) capitalize on Chinese agricultural expertise to improve the quality and diversity of crops, increase food production, and attain self-sufficiency; and (e) develop provincial technical training institutes to provide the education required of a modernized industrial base.

Conclusion

Since its inception, Pakistan has confronted regional turbulence and faced threats to its national security. As a result of an unstable external environment and inconsistent domestic policies, Pakistan today faces political instability, economic fragility, and a constant threat of terrorism. Despite these liabilities, China has been a reliable friend and loyal partner. China has consistently provided aid and support without conditions or interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. Moreover, China is a steady supporter at international forums: defending Pakistan when and where it can. Pakistan has returned that support in kind. China’s role in the world is changing rapidly along with its interests and ambitions. Pakistan, along with other world actors, must recognize this change and adjust expectations accordingly. Perhaps the greatest challenge to the Pakistan-China relationship is
Pakistan’s fragile political stability and volatile internal security. Political stability and internal security must be assured.

During the relatively brief history of the China-Pakistan relationship, the leadership of both countries have pursued novel political paths. Drawn together first by India as a common threat, the relationship has expanded across diplomatic, defense, and economic domains. Efforts must be made to continue this progress, deepen existing bonds, and create new, even stronger, ones. An important challenge is the continued pursuit of economic cooperation for the benefit of both partners. The key may lie in Pakistan-China history along the ancient “Silk Route.” The expansion and improvement of the “Corridor to the West” provides compelling opportunities for China to access an alternate route to world markets while bypassing vulnerable sea-lanes. By building this strategic corridor, Pakistan will solidify its relevance within Pakistan-China strategic relationship well into the 21st century.
American grand strategy in the post-Cold War era is ill-defined and largely ineffective. Is grand strategy still relevant and necessary, especially for a great power? Is there an “American way” of grand strategy, and if so, is it working? Does the United States have a grand strategy? What are the current challenges to the development of grand strategy? Can the process be better led, informed, communicated, and executed? Clearly, a need for a grand strategy exists, but defining and executing it is problematic. Current requirements must be brought into balance with a vision for the future that balances competing domestic and international interests.

Keywords: National Security Strategy, Grand Strategy Challenges, National Power

America is now at that historical point at which a great nation is in danger of losing its perspective on what exactly is within the realm of its power and what is beyond it.

—Senator J. William Fulbright

When Senator Fulbright acknowledged the limits of power in 1966, the United States was in the midst of a great debate as to how to strike a balance between foreign and domestic priorities. The Senator’s greatest fear was that the nation’s habit for foreign intervention was becoming overreaching, and belied what he characterized as an “arrogance of power.” Similar warnings of hubris have sounded over the past decade in response to what appear to be elective wars, initiated during periods of great domestic challenge. Senator Fulbright called for a different approach and voiced the need to strike a better balance. Many contemporary scholars, politicians, and pundits echo that call. The constant tension between foreign and domestic pursuits, challenges, and interests lies at the heart of crafting a balanced grand strategic vision.

This essay examines American grand strategy in the post-Cold War era—both as a creative art and as a guiding principle for great power politics—to answer several questions: What is grand strategy? Is grand strategy still relevant and necessary, especially for a great power? Is there an “American way” of grand strategy, and if so, is it unique? Does the United States have a grand strategy? And, finally, what are the current challenges in grand strategic development?

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What is Grand Strategy?

Defining and executing grand strategy is problematic. B. H. Liddell Hart is often credited with introducing the term “grand strategy” in the modern era. Strategic thought in policy, statecraft, and war, however, can be traced through Jomini, Clausewitz, Machiavelli to as early as Thucydides. The essence of grand strategy for Liddell Hart was “to look beyond war to the subsequent peace.” He believed this higher form of strategy was necessary to “coordinate and direct the resources of a nation. . . . towards the attainment of the political object of the war.” 

Primarily limited to the conduct of war, Liddell Hart’s definition and interpretation of grand strategy emphasized the need to craft a policy and approach that marshaled a state’s energy, will, and influence, not just to defeat the enemy but to win a “better peace.”

Liddell Hart’s development of a grand strategic concept while useful, is limited in scope, reflecting the general thinking of the time. As British historian Michael Howard observed,

Grand strategy in the first half of the twentieth century consisted basically in the mobilization and deployment of national resources of wealth, manpower and industrial capacity, together with the enlistment of those of allied and, when feasible, of neutral powers, for the purpose of achieving the goals of national policy in wartime. 

Hew Strachan critiques early definitions and descriptions of grand strategy as “a conflation of policy and strategy.” He views strategy as linking military aims with political ends. Strategy serves to “make war useable by the state, so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfill its political objectives.” While useful, this clarification is incomplete, failing to address a higher, unifying purpose of grand strategy short of war. Other modern definitions provide a fuller description. Josef Joffe’s realist interpretation is that of a “design that relates means, and not just military ones, to ends, and ambitions to outcomes.” This view of grand strategy is essentially about a nation getting what it wants, or keeping what it has. Christopher Layne goes deeper, seeing grand strategy as “determining a state’s vital security interests; identifying the threats to those interests; and deciding how best to employ the state’s political, military, and economic resources to protect those interests.” Layne’s emphasis on identifying vital national interests, and threats to those interests, is an essential point of grand strategy that has been used inappropriately—sometimes stretched and sometimes omitted—by U.S. strategists and policy-makers.

A related phenomenon in the identification of interests lies with the level of specificity. Hew Strachan refers to grand strategy “as much a way of thinking as a way of doing,” with “goals which are more visionary and aspirational than pragmatic and immediate.” This dichotomy between vision and action is a persistent source of tension, and is intermittently related to an inability or unwillingness to define and prioritize vital interests. Interest identification and prioritization are critical to turning grand strategic aspirations into actionable policy. American vision flows through its big three foundational policy documents: the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy. These documents address and balance specific
requirements using an ends-ways-means approach underpinned by ongoing risk assessment. This process brings together all elements of power and considers both internal and external stakeholders so as to “preserve[e] and enhance the nation’s long-term (wartime and peacetime) best interests.”

Some argue that grand strategy is only the purview of great powers, and that the United States is in need of such a strategy. Williamson Murray maintains that great states must pursue grand strategies in order to balance risks in the areas of resources, will, and interests. Colin Dueck refers to grand strategy as “both a conceptual road map . . . and a set of policy prescriptions [which in] its essence is the attempted reconciliation of ends and means.” In this way, grand strategy allows great state leaders to set a course and direction from current challenges to a desired future endstate, and disciplines leaders to look beyond the present toward the longer view. Ultimately, a state’s grand strategic vision is informed by and a reflection of its leadership, history, culture, ideology, geography, socio-economic conditions, alliances, and global standing.

All states make choices, and given America’s global reach and position of influence and power, our choices must be both circumspect and informed. The first challenge is to distill broad core national interests into a narrowed set of prioritized and achievable ends (objectives), informed by judiciously applying increasingly-constrained means (resources). The ends-means balance is the critical output from the national strategy planning process, but is wholly reliant upon a detailed strategic vision. Even those who can conceive a grand strategic vision risk becoming reactive when consumed by the crisis of the moment. The pull of seemingly never-ending crisis management diverts resources from long term goals, often leading to ad hoc solutions crafted for near-term problems without apt consideration of second and third-order effects. Grand strategy, however, rises above the challenges of the day by “providing a coherent framework of purpose and direction in which random, and not so random, events can be interpreted, given meaning, and then responded to as required.” A great power needs a grand strategy if it expects to achieve larger national purposes in support of vital, enduring interests. State actors must ensure judicious pursuit of the state’s interests or risk depleting important strategic reservoirs of influence and power.

**U.S. Grand Strategic History**

The term “grand strategy” does not appear in either the U.S. Declaration of Independence or the U.S. Constitution. Yet failure to consider the early strategic ambitions of the United States would be a mistake. The two themes of expansionism and exceptionalism—akin to Arnold Wolfer’s description

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of a state’s “possessions and milieu” goals—were both prevalent in our early history. Expansionist “possessions” goals, representing physical and economic security interests, were pursued vigorously via the Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, and the Open Door Policy. The United States slowed expansionism once its geopolitical position stabilized. The exceptionalist “milieu” goals, however, representing value interests, initiated at the Declaration of Independence remain strong. Described by Walter Russell Mead as a “quality that a Clausewitz would find disturbing: a messianic dimension,” the spread of the American “interest” values of democratization is a coherent thread throughout the grand strategic journey of the United States. America has exported its goods and its values, not always in equal measure and often through less than subtle ways.

To assume that Cold War policies of containment, preponderance, and deterrence reflected continuity in U.S. grand strategy for more than three decades is an overly simplistic interpretation of history, and a misunderstanding of grand strategic thought in application. The Soviet Union with its nuclear arsenal served as the primary threat around which the United States aligned elements of power, but it was not the only threat. The policy of containment marked a new era in U.S. national security strategy, blurring the lines between national and global security, a conflation directly attributable to the new nuclear threat and competition. Each administration had to navigate domestic issues and politics while confronting unique international crises. Evidence suggests each administration sought “regular, repeated, and successful efforts to change course” from that set by the preceding administration, and that containment simply was an enduring thread woven through divergent policies and strategies. George Kennan, reflecting on U.S. 20th century foreign policy efforts through the end of Cold War period, summed up U.S. performance as follows:

Perhaps our diplomacy of the first five decades of this century, and our reactions to the very different problems that have assailed us since 1950, both reflect realities much deeper than our specific responses of either period: namely, the lack of any enduring doctrine for relating military strength to political policy, and a persistent tendency to fashion our policy towards others with a view to feeding a pleasing image of ourselves rather than achieving real, and desperately needed, results in our relations with others.

Kennan’s critique supports the view that the Cold War was a period of policy trial and error, and certainly not an overarching vision carried through nine very different administrations. Specific strategies and policies are, by their nature, temporal, formed by the circumstances, declarations, and issues of the day. As Raymond Aron observed: “Strategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose.”

The post-Cold War era challenged most nations, but especially the United States. This period, described as a “unipolar moment” and an “end of history,” signaled a new era of U.S. preeminence.

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19 The historian John Lewis Gaddis has termed NSC 68 poor strategy and “cheap hawkery,” that severely limited strategy and policy options. See Ernest R. May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston: St. Martin’s, 1993), 146.
The Clinton administration expanded its strategic scope, seizing the opportunity to expand economic influence and security throughout the world in a hub and spoke fashion. This led to a grand strategy of “engagement and enlargement” laid out in the February 1996 National Security Strategy.\(^\text{24}\) Harnessing both soft and hard power, the U.S. attempted to reshape the world through economic trade agreements, international institution-building efforts, and increased military intervention.\(^\text{25}\) This posture was reflected in former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s assertion that, “We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.”\(^\text{26}\)

President George W. Bush came into office, like Clinton, promising more emphasis on domestic issues and a less activist foreign policy. This approach quickly changed following the attacks of September 11, 2001. From that point forward the United States entered a long period of unilateralism, influenced heavily by neoconservative and realist policymakers, while embracing the Thucydidean triad of “fear, honor, and interest.” The fear of ideologically-based terrorism, coupled with a desire to regain lost honor and credibility, led to the pursuit of a number of interests, some more peripheral than vital. Equally troubling, the level of strategic policy planning was turned on its head, and for national security policymakers tactics trumped strategy with regard to thought, practice, and effort.\(^\text{27}\) The Clinton and Bush administrations can be viewed along a continuum described by Josef Joffe as moving from “intermittent intervention” to “permanent entanglement.”\(^\text{28}\)

President Obama arrived in the White House intent on closing out two inherited wars, rebuilding international credibility, and strengthening partnerships with key states and allies. These foreign policy concerns, however, ran second to an eroding domestic financial situation with serious, global impacts. His first term was characterized by bargaining and containment, and a rejection of democratization as foreign policy—strategies described as “multilateral retrenchment” and “counter-punching.”\(^\text{29}\) He recognized global power shifts were underway, new “centers of influence” were forming, and that only America stood ready to provide essential leadership in the era of globalization.\(^\text{30}\) His administration demonstrated a more pragmatic approach, much like that of the Nixon era, with a shift from the exceptionalism of his predecessors.\(^\text{31}\) Obama, Nixon, and Eisenhower have recently been described as “retrenchment” presidents. All were occupied by sweeping up the detritus left by overreaching predecessors, and by course correcting from aggressive and adventurist policies.\(^\text{32}\) This cyclic nature of national strategy, moving between the poles of retrenchment and overstretch continues to be problematic.


\(^{25}\) Laura Neack, \textit{The New Foreign Policy: Complex Interactions, Competing Interests}, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 159-160. These activities describe a strategy referred to as “liberal internationalism,” or more critically as “liberal interventionism.”


\(^{31}\) See Stephan Sestanovitch, \textit{Maximalist}, for a new interpretation of post-WWII foreign policy, and a discussion of “maximalist” and “retrenchment” presidential approaches.
The current administration has balanced pragmatism with a measure of internationalism. The decision to take a back seat in the Libya action, and to table military action in the Syrian civil war and in the Ukrainian crisis (as of this writing), demonstrate an unwillingness or inability to act unilaterally. Some critics have described this seemingly risky aversion approach as “leading from behind.” Historian Niall Ferguson believes the Obama administration not only fails to prioritize foreign policy concerns and approaches, but fails “to recognize the need to do so.” This same critique, failure to prioritize objectives along an overarching strategic direction, could be leveled at any of the post-Cold War administrations.

Even so, this critique may be warranted in light of the current so-called “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region. The strategy does not present anything substantively new, but reiterates “support for our longstanding principles and values of governance, free and open access to commerce, a just international order that upholds the rule of law, open access to all domains, and the peaceful resolution of disputes,” all essentially restated core national interests. This policy has U.S. friends and allies in other regions, particularly Europe and the Middle East, concerned about security guarantees and future U.S. commitments. Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s remarks at the Munich Security Conference referring to placing “greater strategic emphasis on working with our allies and partners,” and “engag[ing] European allies to collaborate more closely” signals increased U.S. efforts to reassure allies. A risk of words-deeds mismatch is at play here, however. The shift in policy focus from west to east while crises bubble in Syria and Ukraine telegraphs as incoherent policy in pursuit of undefined interests. Actions by the administration signal a prioritization of sorts. Where and how the United States chooses not to apply its power, if indeed it acts at all, is a strong indicator of the priority of U.S. interests.

America must decide how to employ its power in addressing multiple near-term concerns. New international power balances are emerging. The United States must outline a vision for the future and of the future that addresses core national interests while effectively shaping the great power relationships to come. The findings of the Hart-Rudman Commission, released months before the events of 9-11, still hold true today:

While the likelihood of major conflicts between powerful states will decrease, conflict itself will likely increase. The world that lies in store for us over the next 25 years will surely challenge our received wisdom about how to protect American interests and advance American values. In such an environment the United States needs a sure understanding of its objectives, and a coherent strategy to deal with both the dangers and the opportunities ahead.

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The United States must dampen the exceptionalist zeal driving the largely unwelcome application of overwhelming power on behalf of a “global democratization project.” In the end a U.S. grand strategy for the 21st century should be balanced, prudent, principled, purposive, and sustainable.

**Grand Strategic Alternatives**

Many options are available to U.S. national security strategists, but few are politically feasible, economically sound, adequately leverage all elements of national power, and address the uniquely American need to express its values. Various strategies can be loosely aggregated into three categories: Retrench (Isolationism, Offshore Balancing), Engage (Internationalism, Concert-Balancing), and Entangle (Primacy, Preemption). The groupings, although incomplete and imprecise provide a useful starting point for addressing three core concerns: security, economics, and values.

A natural dynamic and tension exists between the Innenpolitik (domestic/"butter") and Realpolitik (geopolitical power/"guns") aspects of grand strategy. The review of presidential administrations highlighted the tendency for strategic course adjustment from one administration to the next. Three related factors help explain this phenomena. First, many administrations pursued strategies in an either-or fashion, and gravitated toward extremes. Policy extremism, operating on either end of the grand strategic spectrum, erodes strategic reserves of will, credibility, legitimacy, and trust which underpin the entire structure. Second, oftentimes a major issue or crisis, sometimes as unexpected and devastating as 9-11, leads the national security team to tilt the strategic teeter-totter strongly in reaction. Third, the U.S. public gets a vote. Literally. Recent polling data highlights the importance in public perception of, or dissatisfaction for, strategies and policies that swing too far to extremes.

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45 For polling results that highlight public dissatisfaction with U.S. military over-commitment and perceived detrimental impacts on foreign opinion of the U.S., see "U.S. Foreign Policy Performance Ratings and Priority Rankings,"
The Obama administration has opted for a more balanced approach to meet the needs of both “guns and butter” camps, but the consistent failure to effectively articulate a coherent strategy leaves the administration open to criticism. President Obama’s pragmatism reflects the challenges inherent in crafting a grand strategic vision that balances foreign policy aspirations with the very real demands of domestic policy, particularly in a representative democracy. Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz observed that “good policy requires good politics,” harkening back to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s claim that “80% of the job of foreign policy was management of your domestic ability to have a policy.” The dynamic tensions and interplay between the domestic political requirements of the unique form of American government, and the international requirements and duties incumbent on a great power, are represented in a fresh strategy model detailed in Figure 1.

In the center of the model is the “sun” which represents the national vision or grand strategy. As previously highlighted, grand strategic vision is derived from and informed by the national character and ethos, as well as enduring, core interests. American core values of liberty, democracy, equality, justice, tolerance, humility, and faith (Wolfers’ “milieu goals”) define the nation, its people, and its view of and in the world. Values form the basis for a unique American vision or perspective, just as any state forms a unique perspective based on its history, culture, and character. The challenge for any state lies with balancing its values with those of other actors while avoiding the inclination to become self-righteous. In short, the state must practice “moral modesty” or “strategic humility,” tenets of the ethical realism espoused by Kennan, Morgenthau and Neibuhr.

Grand strategy exists in a symbiotic relationship between domestic constraints and international politics and concerns. A strategy seldom finds perfect equilibrium in this milieu, but is pulled toward one side or the other based on present realities (i.e., shifting geopolitical power relationships, foreign or domestic crises, and the sway of vested interests). Two points are key. First, U.S. leaders must remain true to core interests without becoming seduced by the siren’s call of American exceptionalism, and moving to act in extremis. Moreover, imparting a more balanced strategy can help mitigate the inevitable tendency towards interest creep that accompanies ill-defined priorities. As Gary Hart once noted, the United States must be careful to avoid “applying power in opposition of principles.” The nation has demonstrated the tendency to choose interest, vital or not, over principle when the two are in conflict. Second, a state has to achieve a balanced posture, neither messianic nor Manichean. A failure to act responsibly depletes both domestic and international strategic reservoirs.

Four levers of national power surround the strategic environment in the Figure 1 model, and represent the available means for achieving desired the ends. The material elements of power are not explicitly depicted, yet they underpin all other elements. Power levers are applied in unequal measure to translate interests and ends into specific policies and actions. Moises Naim has recently postulated that traditional forms of power are in decay, leading to an erosion of the state’s power, authority and

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ability to provide stability and security. Naim’s claims are compelling, but, in fact, power has not eroded but has simply become more diffused and nuanced. For now the elements of national power still hold sway in the state-centric international arena, with the emerging impacts of information and cyber technologies/power (represented as a cloud in the model) in evidence, but yet to be seen.

The last factors depicted are the four strategic reservoirs of domestic and international influence: legitimacy, credibility, trust, and will. These reservoirs are impacted by the pursuit of a nation’s strategy and politics/policy, just as they influence the decisions and abilities of national leaders to act. The immediate aftermath of 9-11 provides an example of an event and time where many of these reservoirs, domestic and international, increased due mostly to unifying, supportive and positive reactions nationally and worldwide. These levels were sustained through the initial invasion into Afghanistan, but began to diminish, some dramatically and others more slowly, in the wake of the invasion and subsequent long war in Iraq. Seminal trigger events like 9-11 and Pearl Harbor provide obvious examples of this dynamic in action. The impacts of longer-term domestic and foreign policies and strategies, and the impacts of other slow boil events at home and around the world, are harder to detect, but must be considered in the development of future strategies.

Figure 1: U.S. Strategy Model

The challenge is to craft a strategy that provides an acceptable, realistic vision for the nation without operating at the extremes that often lead to even greater international or domestic challenges. Events beyond the ken of strategic leaders will magnify any inherited issues, as Bismark knew well when he said, “man cannot create the current of events. He can only float with it and steer.” Pursuing a grand strategy that acknowledges the certainty of uncertainty better enables future administrations to retain greater strategic flexibility for operating in an uncertain, complex, and dangerous world.

Challenges in Developing U.S. Grand Strategy

National Power Imbalances

America must re-incorporate discipline into its national security system. The framework is there, as are the tools. Strategy development, however, is increasingly viewed through a military lens. To some extent this tendency may be due to larger-than-life military leaders, Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs), who apply defense and security levers of power and influence across the globe on behalf of the U.S. They bring many more resources to bear than can individual ambassadors. GCCs are seemingly analogous to the proconsuls of past empires. Future strategy initiatives must address this State-Defense “global partnership gap” if the United States expects to pursue a less militarized foreign policy.52

The large standing military, very much a legacy of the last half of the 20th century, may also be part of the problem and a source of tension and “strategic indiscipline.”53 In many ways our current military posture is a relic of the Cold War, and the requirement for a conventional deterrent to counter that provided by nuclear weapons. A large and exceedingly capable military leads to questions such as the one posed by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (to then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell) when she asked with frustration, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”54 America is at a point where threats are less existential and resources increasingly constrained. This provides an opportune time to engage in serious debate about the size, scope, and role of a future U.S. military.55

Serious debate must be part of a larger and even more important discussion about all the national elements of power, and how they are applied to address clearly-defined interests and the strategic endstate. Hew Strachan warned of the “danger of militarizing issues that would be best not militarized, of creating wars when there do not need to be wars, and of taking hammers to drive in screws.”56 This hard power approach to problem-solving lends itself to the convenient solution of employing the U.S. tool of choice, the hammer. The military element of national power has been well exercised in the post-Cold War era. But is this because military power is the right and most appropriate tool, or simply a move to justify its enormous cost and size, or a means of sending a powerful statement to the world? Or does the trend to militarize foreign policy simply reflect a lack of imagination on the part of the U.S. national security leadership? President Dwight Eisenhower warned against the “grave implications” of long-term militarization on American society, a portent that many agree has arrived.57

The military-centric power dynamic is firmly embedded in U.S. strategy and policy, though the Obama administration appears to be more judicious in applying that power lever. An alternate way to view national power interrelationships is provided in the model at Figure 2 below. This model is a

variation on concepts introduced by Hans Morgenthau over a half-century ago, though still relevant today.\textsuperscript{58} At the center of the model are the material power elements, primarily composed of geography and natural resources. These elements define the state geopolitically, and directly inform and influence other power dynamics. America is the prime example of a state blessed with both riches in natural resources and a strategically-significant geographic position in the world. Where a state sits matters, as does its ability to sustain itself and grow through wide-ranging resource requirements. These core elements of power have been, and will continue to be, critical sources of strength for the United States. They are also sources of global tension and state conflict. Leaders must remain mindful that while power is a means to an end, and not an end unto itself, the importance of material factors endures.

The next power cog represents the economic and military elements, directly driven by the core material power elements. These elements translate material power into action, and provide the greatest means for strategic leaders. The last cog is the softer power elements, characterized as human factors. These include a state’s population, character, culture, and morale, and are its \textit{raison d’etre}. This also includes diplomacy, although diplomacy per se may be viewed as less a separate element of national power than a conduit through which power and influence flows. Lastly, all elements of power reside in the cloud of the modern information environment. Enhancing and manipulating the information environment will change the dynamic more than any other in the coming decade.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{dynamics_of_national_power.png}
\caption{Dynamics of National Power}
\end{figure}

\section*{National Interests}

In the modern era, should war be viewed as either an extension or a failure of policy, especially for the United States? The U.S. has no current existential threats and enjoys a multitude of options short of war for dealing with almost any contingency.\textsuperscript{59} America must now stop searching for a state-based enemy and acknowledge this practice as a legacy of the past. The quest for an existential threat


blinds policymakers to a restricted set of potential options. Leaders must be more discerning in the differentiation of threats. Threats to security interests should, of course, trump threats to national values. The United States sometimes goes astray, however, and is prone to Paul Kennedy’s caution against “overstretch[ing]” when in pursuit of values-laden interests. Physical and economic security must be the priority. Everything after that should be negotiable and open to compromise. Leaders must balance their state’s liabilities and vulnerabilities against its strengths and assets. America’s debt and ongoing financial crisis, for example, can be counterbalanced by strategies and policies that maximize the overall strength of the U.S. economic “brand” and potential for innovation. Leaders must distinguish between what is desirable and what is essential, recognizing limitations on power, capacity, will, and credibility, and then acting accordingly.

A threat-based mindset can also inform word choices that are not helpful, especially when rivals/competitors are characterized as adversaries/foes. Words carry meaning, intentionally or otherwise. America must be cognizant of the perception of a mismatch between words and deeds. United States citizens and the global community are easily confused by the seemingly contrarian positions taken in the pursuit of foreign policy. While President Obama, for example, never claimed Libya was a U.S. strategic interest, he did stress that events there threatened “our common humanity and common security” and that we were committed to working with allies “to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by all.” These types of statements and proclamations highlight the seeming disconnectedness in strategy and policy, words and deeds. Stephen Biddle adds that this “combination of ambition and ambiguity creates important but unresolved tensions in American strategy.” A lack of grand strategy, combined with vaguely-defined ends and peripheral interests, creates the appearance, real or perceived, of dissonant strategy and policy.

U.S. Grand and National Security Strategy

U.S. grand strategy must exist at a level above the noise and chatter of current events, news reports, election cycles, and beyond the influence of special interests. Grand strategy must focus less on seeking conflict and more on setting conditions to mitigate the wellsprings of global conflict. These are very aspirational, some would argue unachievable, conditions on which to construct a national vision. But the world is transitioning to a new period in history, one in which “American political leaders must manage public expectations and help the nation accept that it has less control over the world than it once did. . . .” transitioning from the “old wartime mentality, [to] develop new concepts of statecraft and security, [and prepare for] a world that is neither at peace nor at war.” This new reality must be met by a grand strategy that provides a vision for the preferred U.S. role in global leadership.

Changing the old mentality may require significant renovation of the national security infrastructure. The establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947 was part of a

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significant transition in U.S. national strategic processes, and marked a period of grand, sweeping change in the scope and role of America in the world. The role of the NSC in strategic planning quickly devolved following the Eisenhower administration. Currently the NCS is the president’s crisis management team, led by the National Security Advisor (NSA). The effectiveness and impact of the NSC and NSA are very dependent on personalities and relationships, particularly between the president and his NSA. A number of reports and studies highlight the lack of strategic planning capability and emphasis in the NSC, as well as the need for reform and refocus. Little has changed, however, and it is unlikely that new structures alone will engender new thinking and fresh perspectives. What is required, according to the 9/11 Commission, is to “routiniz[e], even bureaucratiz[e], the exercise of imagination” in strategic planning processes.

The lack of an “integrated planning process from which to derive vital strategic guidance” is a significant part of the current challenge, but so too is the lack of a strategic roadmap. A balanced approach to grand strategy will focus on identifying and ordering principles capable of increasing dialogue, stimulating growth and economic activity, enhancing the security of states and the global commons, and respect the very basic rights and dignities of all peoples. This approach, as described by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, is intended “to strengthen alliances, build new partnerships, and forge coalitions of common interest that help resolve problems and, hopefully, prevent conflict.” In short, it is a strategy of “management by walking around” writ large, with a renewed emphasis and focus on ordering principles and mechanisms.

**Conclusion**

Any future strategy must be based on a realistic assessment of possible threats and requirements. Political rhetoric and policies that alienate other mid- and rising powers (like China and Russia) erode consensus on shared state threats. Therefore, U.S. leaders must first focus on areas of wide agreement: WMD proliferation, free and open access to the global commons, economic prosperity, conflict reduction/avoidance, and reduction of disease and pandemic threats. More contentious key threat areas include: environmental stewardship and climate change, resource issues (energy, water, rare earth elements), human rights, rule of law, and open and transparent government. Consideration of key threat areas must be the starting point as national security strategists begin ends-ways-means analysis. A U.S.-led international effort to mitigate threats and increase opportunities, while focused on “providing global public goods,” will ease the natural tensions and frictions involved in achieving both domestic and international consensus.

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For a new U.S. grand strategy to take hold, four critical conditions must be met. First, there must be an event or shock that triggers a significant change in how grand strategy is approached. Second, the strategy must be internationally feasible, so as not to deplete U.S. credibility and legitimacy. Third, the strategy must have “influential advocates” on the domestic scene, including the president. Lastly, the strategy must be “culturally resonant” with the American public.74

The question, then, is not \textit{if} America needs a grand strategy, but \textit{what} that strategy should entail. Crafting the next U.S. grand strategy will be a challenging task that cannot be tackled in half-measures. The key is to pursue a balanced approach with a reduced dependency on military hard power. Domestic realities and geopolitical power dynamics must be gauged and informed by political pragmatism that accommodates both strategic flexibility and strategic humility. Strategic leaders must resist being consumed by the “tyranny of the immediate commitment,”75 and retain focus on the future while addressing the needs of the present.

The Resurrection of Adaptive Planning

Colonel Jon C. Wilkinson

The revolution in adaptive planning, initiated in 2003, has yet to succeed. The disappointing results of this initiative are due to flawed assumptions anchoring the planning community in a tactical mentality that is misapplied at the operational level of warfare. This essay analyzes major assumptions undergirding the planning process, exposes their flaws, and proposes an alternative planning process to better support adaptive planning at the operational level of warfare.

Keywords: OPLAN, TPFDD, Force Flow, Design, Mission Command, Logistics

The revolution in adaptive planning, initiated in 2003, is failing. Spanning over a decade, costing over $10 million, and shepherded by four Secretaries of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld’s effort to implement the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) has yet to succeed.1 Ironically, the planning community’s unfulfilled promises to reduce development of Operational Plans (OPLAN) from 24 to 6 months, while making these enormous plans more flexible, is due to the inability to properly define the problem, uncritical acceptance of flawed assumptions, and a desire to simply accelerate an already inadequate process. The adaptive planning initiative more closely resembles a failed coup than a revolution.

Anchoring the planning community in a process that is misapplied at the operational level, current OPLAN development is based on five flawed assumptions: (1) Planning processes used at the tactical and operational levels are equivalent; (2) The process for crisis action planning is identical to deliberate planning, just executed on a shorter timeline; (3) The more dynamic the environment, the more important a detailed plan becomes; (4) OPLAN development is compatible with mission command; and (5) Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) specialists create the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) after planners write the plan and determine the requirements. This essay analyzes these flawed assumptions and proposes a revised planning process based on new assumptions that better support adaptive plans at the operational level.

Flawed Assumption #1: Tactical and operational level planning processes are equivalent

The tactical and operational levels of warfare are inherently different. A different planning process is required for each. A majority of planners, however, gain the bulk of their experience at the tactical level and are both inclined toward and anchored to tactical processes which make adapting to higher levels of warfare difficult. A single, joint planning process for all levels of joint warfare fails to recognize these differences.

Service components, functional components, and combatant commands have some overlap in the level of warfare at which they operate and in the focus of their activities. The service component commands and functional component commands, however, generally focus on activities in a single domain. The combatant command or joint force command in a joint task force are concerned with multiple domains and their combinations. At the operational level, the Combatant Commander (CCDR) or Joint Force Commander (JFC) is responsible for creating a coherent whole. Faced with linking the abstractions of the conceptual strategic level with the details of the concrete tactical level, the commander must keep “one hand on the ceiling and one on the floor.” CCDR/JFCs combine multiple single-domain events from the tactical level to create synergistic combined-arms and whole-of-government campaigns at the operational level designed to achieve strategic national aims. The operational level is the nexus of ends (strategic aim), ways (tactical actions), and means (capabilities in each domain) that creates its own complex campaign system based on the interaction of individual tactical activities. The focus at the operational level is well beyond that of the tactical level.

The fusion of the conceptual strategic level with the concrete tactical level creates a tension between the two anchors at the operational level. This tension thrusts planners on the horns of a dilemma as they seek to establish a “controlled disequilibrium” between concept and detail. The imbalance of this tension is evident in the inadequacies of current OPLANs that are incredibly detailed in order to ensure tactical feasibility but characteristically lack the needed flexibility to adapt to dynamic changes in the operational or strategic environment. Infusing a tactical orientation at the operational level creates OPLANs with detailed, tactical feasibility occupying one extreme, essentially restricting the flexibility needed at the other end the spectrum—precisely the problem with JOPES, APEX, and the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP). The methods they employ are tactical-level processes inappropriate to and misapplied at the operational level, resulting in plans that are highly detailed and inflexible. The imbalance at the operational level between the feasibility of detailed, tactical planning and the flexibility of conceptual, strategic planning creates a chasm that leaves the joint force stranded on the tactical side of the divide richly and rigidly entombed in detail. The planning community needs to break free from a tactical bias, to recognize and embrace the complexities associated with essential planning requirements necessary at the operational level.

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2. The Military Decision Making Process (MDPM) used by the US Army, the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP), and the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) used by the Joint force are basically the same process with only minor variations.
Flawed Assumption #2: The process for crisis action planning is identical to deliberate planning, just executed on a shorter timeline

The degree of uncertainty in a changing environment is directly related to the length of the time between plan creation and implementation. As the planning timeline decreases, the length of time required to make a decision, develop a plan, and put that plan into action decreases such that, in a dynamic environment, insufficient time remains to accommodate significant change. Indeed, in this situation the environment appears stable relative to the length of time before plan execution. This period of relative stability, when the plan remains aligned with a dynamic environment long enough to complete detailed planning and execution, can be termed detailed planning’s uncertainty horizon (see Figure 1). When the environment is below this horizon, operant conditions are sufficiently stable to complete detailed planning with little risk that the environment will change significantly before plan execution. Longer timelines associated with deliberate plans present more opportunities for change and introduce more uncertainty; shorter timelines associated with crisis action plans present less opportunity for change and introduce less uncertainty.

Arbitrarily assuming that the environment is below the uncertainty horizon and developing the plan in detail fails to recognize that the plan only aligns with a snapshot of the environment taken at the time the plan was written. As time passes, the environment changes but the plan-to-environment alignment does not. The plan, therefore, cannot survive initial contact with reality. To better incorporate contingencies, options, and details into plans as implementation draws near, the planning community needs a new approach.

![Figure 1. Uncertainty Horizon for Detailed Planning](image-url)

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Flawed Assumption #3: The more dynamic the environment, the more important a detailed plan becomes

Detailed plans are best suited to relatively stable situations which make possible accurate prediction of the behavior of systems and control effects that support the strategy.9 War, however, is waged in the realm of chance against a real enemy in which events seldom unfold as anticipated and in which the environment cannot always be controlled.10 Leaders often rely on detailed plans to increase predictability, but when plans are inflexible and fail to align with an infinitely complex, dynamic environment, planners seek more control by deepening the degree of formalization and widening the extent of comprehensiveness.11 Ironically, detailed planning is inherently a centralizing process whose very purpose is to reduce flexibility—not encourage it.12 Detailed plans, by their very nature, do not respond effectively to sudden change or surprise since they provide a preplanned response to every foreseeable contingency. Detailed plans are an ineffective means of seeking to impose control over events in an unpredictable world where cause and effect cannot be known in advance.13

To create stability in a dynamic environment, the objective is not prediction focused on knowing what the adversary is going to do ahead of time in order to control the environment before it changes. Instead, the objective of creating stability is recovery focused on flexibility needed to adapt to the environment as it changes.14 Francis Bacon theorized that nature is extraordinarily complicated, generally exceeding the human capacity to comprehend it. He believed that humans tend to over-interpret data into unreliable patterns and then leap to faulty conclusions.15 Attempts to control a complex environment likewise violate Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety: one system cannot control another system whose complexity or sophistication is superior to its own.16 Rather than obsess over predicting the unpredictable, planners should accept that the environment will change and develop plans designed to accommodate rather than prevent change.17

Rigidity and control reduce flexibility and adaptability as detail is added to a plan. In many ways detailed planning is flexibility’s graveyard. The 19th-century Prussian Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke believed that diversity and rapid change made it impossible to lay down binding rules for waging war since “prearranged designs collapse.”18 The choice between control or adaptability is best made after considering not if detailed plans are necessary, but when detailed plans are necessary. If time-to-execution extends beyond the uncertainty horizon and enough time exists for a dynamic environment to change significantly, then detailed planning is premature. Plans will become misaligned with a changing environment and ultimately will not survive first contact. A more adaptive approach in a dynamic environment is to execute John Boyd’s observe-orient-decide-act

11 Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, 149.
12 Ibid., 173, 202.
14 Ibid., 223.
16 Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, 349.
17 Ibid., 103.
18 Meir Finkel, On Flexibility, 107.
(OODA) loop faster than an adversary and thereby remain aligned with a changing environment while empowering subordinates to exploit emerging opportunities.\textsuperscript{19}

If planning is centered on an overall purpose or vision and on a commitment to a set of principles, then those closest to the action can use that compass and their own expertise and judgment to make decisions and take actions. If you focus on principles, you empower everyone who understands those principles to act without constant monitoring, evaluating, correcting, or controlling.\textsuperscript{20}

The planning community needs to adopt a new approach that reduces an OPLAN’s level of detail and control while increasing focus upon guiding principles and warfighter empowerment.

**Flawed Assumption #4: OPLAN development is compatible with mission command**

In 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) established mission command as the preferred method for command and control of the joint force. The recommendation is to build a relationship between subordinates and commanders based on common understanding and mutual trust. Mission command assumes the subordinates’ freedom to act on disciplined initiative will provide friendly forces with a competitive advantage in an increasingly complex, uncertain, and competitive environment. Rather than controlling subordinates, mission command empowers them to take action and respond more quickly than an opponent.\textsuperscript{21} Prior to WWII, German strategists came to a similar conclusion and developed a highly successful method of conducting military operations, known as Auftragstaktik, which laid the foundation for mission command. They endorsed the Clausewitzian dictum that “uncertainty is an element of war and can best be mastered through the free initiative of commanders and subordinates at all levels.”\textsuperscript{22} Initiative, or “doing the right thing without being told,” when combined with a shared superior-subordinate understanding of the complex environment, enables a subordinate to adapt to a changing environment, take action quickly, and do so without direction.\textsuperscript{23} Centralized control, on the other hand, inhibits adaptability and violates the tenets of mission command (see Figure 2).

In 2003, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfeld launched the Adaptive Planning initiative to produce military plans on a shorter timeline so that they could more easily adapt to environmental changes. Foremost among the initiative’s essential elements was the imperative for clear strategic guidance and frequent commander-subordinate dialogue in order to promote common understanding.\textsuperscript{24} The guidance and dialogue envisioned by Secretary Rumsfeld were initially consistent with the tenets of mission command, but adaptive planning today has degenerated into a formal in-process review (IPR) that tends to control planning rather than empower it.

The IPR has morphed into an unwieldy beast that devours adaptive planning. Although a CCDR answers directly to the SecDef, the civilian bureaucracy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requires each IPR to be approved by the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense (DASD) and then the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) before it can be presented to the SecDef. Surprisingly, while the IPR is progressing up the OSD ladder for approval by the SecDef, it is running

\textsuperscript{22} Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), X-36.
\textsuperscript{23} Elbert Hubbard, "Message to Garcia," 1899, [http://www.birdsnest.com/garcia.htm](http://www.birdsnest.com/garcia.htm) (accessed August 31, 2013);
\textsuperscript{24} Mark A. Bucknam, "Planning is Everything," *Joint Force Quarterly,* 62 (3d Quarter 2011): 55.
a similar gauntlet in the Joint Staff through J5 on its way to the CJCS who also wants to exert a measure of control on the developing plan before it moves to the SecDef for approval. The objective of the civilian control is to ensure that military leaders understand and adhere to the priorities and policies of the administration and incorporate them in their military planning.\textsuperscript{25} The effort to ensure strategic consistency is often overshadowed by action officers who become mired in the details of the developing plan as they attempt to feed OSD’s and Joint Staff’s insatiable hunger for information. The planning process ultimately gets bogged down in the bureaucratic muck that generates different versions of expanded briefings presented to the DASD, USDP, Joint Staff, and SecDef levels. Often, the SecDef’s subordinates and action officers ask for more IPRs than the SecDef requires. Each IPR can take several weeks to several months to complete and slows the planning process significantly. The final IPR briefing eventually delivered to the SecDef is typically a strategic-level conversation well above the level of the detailed power point slides and background papers required by the OSD staff.

Planners universally accept the obligation to ensure their plans support OSD policy and priorities, but the bureaucratic method OSD employs to achieve that harmony essentially restricts planning rather than empowering it. This ultimately extends the process while decreasing adaptability. The SecDef and CJCS could initiate a more adaptive planning process by seeking to establish clear intent through a common understanding with CCDRs before starting the planning process, and then granting CCDRs the freedom of action to apply their disciplined initiative to create plans on a shorter timeline.

The planning community needs to eliminate the cumbersome IPR gauntlet to align OSD, Joint Staff, and CCDRs after the planning is underway. A more useful and functional process would establish clear commander’s intent while accommodating freedom of action at the start.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 56.

Figure 2. Subordinate-Based Command Scenarios
Flawed Assumption #5: JOPES specialists create the TPFDD after planners write the plan and determine the requirements

The current sequence of TPFDD development culminates three disjointed steps that create cognitive gaps in movement planning and increase the risk to successful OPLAN execution. Movement planning begins at the operational level: Big arrows on a map graphically depict the joint force’s general scheme of engagement (see Figure 3). Next, at the tactical level, supporting plans flesh out detailed movements of individual units. Detailed tactical-level plans designate the combat forces and critical enablers required for successful operations. The output of the tactical-level planning then serves as the starting point for the strategic movement plan that ultimately converts force flow planning into the TPFDD. Strategic movement planning is conducted through a series of TPFDD conferences after the operational and tactical-level plans are complete. These conferences integrate extremely detailed logistics and sustainment information into combat force requirements in order to determine the total force flow requirements. The conference participants prioritize and deconflict the deployment, bed-down, operating locations, and sustainment of the forces from each service.

Because the TPFDD is finalized after the base plan and service components’ supporting plans are already written, cognitive gaps between individual service component’s force flow expectations and the reality of what the joint force can provide are common. USTRANSCOM’s computer modeling often reveals overloaded operating bases, critical transportation-hub choke points, and arrival time of combat forces weeks later than anticipated. By the time these cognitive strategic movement gaps are identified near the end of the two-year OPLAN process, leaders often acknowledge increased risk yet reluctantly approve a flawed plan rather than restart the arduous sequential planning process to resolve such issues.
An extremely detailed TPFDD inhibits OPLAN flexibility and is caused by planners’ lack of expertise with force flow operations. Each military service provides planning schools that formally train officers to think strategically and plan combat operations, but these schools offer little instruction on force flow planning. Hundreds of books on strategy and tactics have been written for every treatise on logistics, but they offer little guidance on force flow planning. Joint publication 5.0 is no exception: it provides 107 pages of detailed instruction about exactly how to conduct operational design and the joint operational planning process (JOPP). Yet, it provides only a six-page overview of what force flow planning needs to accomplish and no detailed instruction on how to do it. The JOPES Volume I manual provides slightly more detail, but focuses primarily on the administrative TPFDD aspects of the JOPES database. Lack of instruction on how to conduct force flow planning induces planners to view the force flow development process as a task for which they are not responsible. Although trained planners may attend or even preside at TPFDD conferences, the details of the process are left to specialists who are familiar with the JOPES database. This planning methodology further separates the individuals developing the base and supporting plans from those developing the force flow plans. Lack of detailed understanding of force flow planning by the typical planner stands in stark contrast to their detailed immersion in other areas of JOPP.

In general, the commander’s planning team lacks sufficient intuition and/or expertise to make force flow decisions. They do have, however, a general knowledge of combat capabilities based on years of operational experience. This experience enables them to exercise automated expertise: the ability to make quick, intuitive generalizations of combat capability that can be refined later through more detailed analysis. Experiential learning facilitates the commander’s coup d’oeil, as described by Clausewitz. With this capability, planners comprehend a situation at a glance, see complex things simply, and recognize the details or science of individual tactical events. They then incorporate this quick comprehension into an operational context and develop the initial design for a synergistic campaign. The planning team’s coup d’oeil, however, frequently does not include force flow operations. The result? They do not have the automated expertise to make intuitive force flow generalizations that could inform planning early in the process and avoid planning gaps in strategic movement before they develop. Instead, the planning team tends to revert to an inadequate tactical-level planning system which assumes combat and sustainment forces are in place and ready for action, without considering how or when they will arrive. Force flow details are left to be worked out by someone else during the TPFDD conferences at the end of the development process. Lack of force flow planning at the start results in movement conflicts between service components, in basing and operating location conflicts, and in other strategic movement gaps that ultimately increase OPLAN risk.

Another side effect of planners’ lack of general familiarity with force flow planning: planners seek more and more detail in an effort to understand the final solution at the conclusion of the process. This emphasis on tactical-level detail yields an incredibly detailed TPFDD that binds the OPLAN to a single snap shot of a dynamic environment and greatly inhibits adaptability (see Figure 4).

Lack of force flow understanding positions planners for failure during future, large-scale deployments. In order to free OPLANS from binding TPFDD detail, some planners suggest jumping to the flexibility side of the feasibility-flexibility chasm by abandoning force flow planning altogether—replacing it with a just-in-time request for forces (RFF) process through the joint

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capabilities requirements manager (JCRM) system. However, a decade of low-intensity conflict in the Middle East during which rotational deployment schedules were known long in advance cannot be used as the benchmark for future deployments in response to a short-notice crisis. The RFF process in general and the JCRM system in particular simply cannot provide the through-put capacity to deliver forces needed to meet the response timelines depicted in major OPLANs. Some OPLANs are orders of magnitude larger than any deployment in the past decade. If the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command is correct, the crises these plans are designed to address will have a very short “flash to bang.” If there is any validity to the adage “amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics,” then cadres of experts at the tactical level run the risk of being a gaggle of amateurs at the operational level should they fail to understand force flow operations.

Rather than abandoning TPFDD and detailed force flow planning, the planning community needs to adopt a new system that emphasizes increased planner understanding of force flow in order to more effectively incorporate force flow planning at the beginning of the planning process. Doing so will eliminate excessive TPFDD detail at the end of the planning process, which necessarily binds an OPLAN to one version of the future.

A Planning Process Proposed

The heart and soul of operational level planning must be based on a revised concept of operational design that provides sufficient detail to guide future tactical-level planning actions while remaining adaptable and not getting bogged down in tactical-level detail. By continuing a design dialogue between the CCDR, subordinates, and superiors even after the OPLAN is approved, the conceptual framework of the plan will keep the OPLAN aligned with the environment, thereby paving the way for additional strategic options. When the framework is eventually fleshed out, added details will be based on more current events. The entire plan will remain aligned with the environment: adaptable rather than irrelevant.

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The purpose of this on-going design is to frame an understanding of the environmental system, the problem it presents, and a solution in the form of a conceptual, systemic operational approach throughout the execution of the plan. John Boyd described this process as destruction and creation wherein the elements of a bounded system are unbounded (destruction) in order to understand them in isolation, and then rebounded (creation) into the constructs of a new system that renders them relevant and provides general understanding. Destructive and creative aspects of design lead to a conceptual solution for the operational problem. The design dialogue should not merely constitute the first step in a sequential planning process. Rather, it must continue throughout execution, guiding adjustments to the plan so that it adapts as it unfolds and remains aligned with a dynamic environment. As the actions directed by the first iteration of the operational design are carried out, they stimulate the environmental system and trigger its reaction, which changes the system. The plan must continually frame the solution in order to remain aligned with the changed environment system (see Figure 5). This iterative cycle of destruction and creation, as John Boyd described it, acts, assesses, and adapts as long as the campaign is being executed. Planning must embrace the certainty of uncertainty; it must assume that surprise will occur. An adaptive OPLAN must plan for change rather than plan to prevent change. Rigid detail may then be added in an iterative manner to flesh out the plan as it closes within the uncertainty horizon.

The on-going design dialogue requires that an OPLAN not be regarded merely as a branch to a Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) that will be executed only if a crisis situation continues to deteriorate into conflict. Rather, Phase Zero of an OPLAN is on-going, so the design dialogue must be on-going as well to keep it aligned with the environment and retained as the source of additional strategic options for resolving the crisis. The scope of operational design, therefore, must be expanded to provide some degree of overlap with the execution of the TCP. Alternatively, the TCP must be expanded beyond its traditional focus on security cooperation and theater posture so that both plans overlap the Phase Zero crisis portion.

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A flexible planning process cannot exist if the commander’s and staff’s thinking is not flexible as well. The commander’s and staff’s on-going, strategic thinking and design dialogue must be conceptual and adaptive to avoid adding binding tactical-level detail to the plan until the environment comes within the uncertainty horizon. Determining exactly when the environment has moved within this horizon will remain a challenge. Successful determination may rely mostly on a commander’s judgment, rather than on any quantifiable parameter. Nevertheless, until that point is reached, the OPLAN need only provide the framework to guide and synchronize tactical-level action which is planned in detail in service and/or functional component supporting plans but is not written into the OPLAN annexes. The initial drafting of the OPLAN should be influenced and refined by component supporting plans and the TPFDD. In order to keep the plan flexible, tactical-level detail must not be written into the plan until closer to execution and the environment becomes relatively static.

The iterative cycle of assessment and adaptation required to keep the design dialogue aligned with the environment requires a robust relationship between a combatant command’s J5 and J3 directorates. The J5 planning team, which provides the intellectual capital to create the design in the first place, is most familiar with the design and must be responsible for the on-going assessment and iterative operational design process even as the plan is executed. The J5 team must ensure the combatant command is doing the correct things during execution to achieve the strategic aim. The J3 team primarily ensures the command is doing those things correctly.

The lines between traditional operational design, mission analysis, and initial COA development must blur. The automated expertise required to artfully combine tactical events into a campaign concept must provide sufficient detail to describe in macro terms feasible COAs that simultaneously consider force flow with combat operations during expanded operational design. As the plan is executed, the TPFDD does not simply flow forces into the area of operations as if it were one huge movement. Rather, it flows in much smaller chunks of data that span a few days at a time, based on the actual force requirements and availability at the time of execution. The planned TPFDD is thus used as a starting point to bound the actual force flow process during execution. In reality the actual force flow is re-created in chunks spanning several days, using the planned TPFDD as a guide. Although the TPFDD is created with excruciating detail during planning, it merely serves as a template during execution. The force flow data at the operational level only needs to be sufficiently refined to: (1) create a template of the movement of mission-capable building blocks synchronized across the entire force, (2) communicate the priority of movement by phase, and (3) communicate each service’s lift allocation by phase. In order to accomplish these tasks, planners must have a working knowledge of the lift required, the lift available, and the CCDR’s priority by phase for the arrival of forces.

The Way Forward

The legitimacy of the current planning regime is fading, and begs the question “what is to be done?” The way forward lies in abandoning the problematic assumptions outlined above in favor of a new foundation—one based on realistic practices that more effectively address operational level planning needs.

First, planners cannot dogmatically apply a tactical-level planning process to the operational level; the purpose and nature of each level is different. Operational planning addresses the nexus of ends, ways, and means; it must capitalize on the CCDR’s operational art by facilitating an expanded

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design dialogue that generates strategic options to avoid conflict and an operational approach for follow-on OPLAN development in the event conflict cannot be averted.

Second, operational plans should not be encumbered with the inflexibility of tactical-level details. OPLAN development should focus on achieving the strategic aim by clearly conveying the commander's intent, by establishing common understanding, and by synchronizing tactical action rather than obsessing over the binding details of tactical-level annexes and TPFDD. The new approach must enable planners to find a middle ground that bridges the flexibility-feasibility chasm by supporting the development of OPLANs that are sufficiently detailed and flexible, not extremely detailed or flexible.

Third, detailed planning is adaptability’s graveyard. The OPLAN development process must incorporate detail into a plan based on the uncertainty horizon, not based on an arbitrary snapshot of reality that is virtually guaranteed to change before the plan is executed. The design dialogue is very capable of adapting to a dynamic environment and the developing plan should remain at this level until the environment is sufficiently stable for detailed planning to continue.

Fourth, planners must simultaneously conduct force flow planning and combat planning in general terms at the beginning, not in a disjointed fashion at the end of planning after the base plan and supporting plans are already written. At that time, it is too late to make changes. In order to do this, planners, not JOPES database specialists, must develop automated expertise that they can apply during COA development. Armed with the foundation of automated expertise in force flow operations, planners can then incorporate the CCDR’s priorities for movement, a general understanding of the lift available, and the lift required for the situation at hand. This enables planners to simultaneously synchronize initial force flow planning with initial combat planning so that cognitive gaps are bridged before they propagate and increase OPLAN risk.

Fifth, although it may appear counter intuitive, the ultimate stability of an operational campaign system is increased in an unpredictable environment by replacing the rigidity of top-down control with the adaptability of individual freedom of action and initiative bounded by a common understanding of the environment and guiding principles of action. This concept applies directly at the CCDR's level and below. It promotes the design dialogue. It also applies at the level between the CCDR and the SecDef. Rather than impose cumbersome IPRs, leaders above the CCDR should establish a more frequent, yet less formal, dialogue during operational design. This dialogue should focus on establishing a common understanding at the inception of planning, not in the middle of it. Doing so would empower CCDRs with the trust and freedom of action necessary to apply disciplined initiative while developing acceptable options throughout the remainder of the planning process.

The 2003 Adaptive Planning initiative failed to deliver because the process it champions is based on a flawed set of assumptions. The planning community must now abandon its old way of thinking and embrace new approaches to creating adaptive OPLANs—approaches that fulfill the promise of the adaptive planning initiative. In order to create adaptive OPLANs that fulfill the promise of the adaptive planning initiative, the planning community must recognize systemic flaws and work together to create a more flexible, adaptive, and inclusive system.
Hacking Back: Active Cyber Defense

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Mancino

The Sony Pictures Hack brought cyber espionage to the forefront of the American media consciousness late in 2014, sparking debate over appropriate responses to and effective means of deterring cyber espionage. As it now stands, companies and private citizens can do little to protect themselves beyond tightening their own cyber security. Hackers, however, are seldom deterred by such measures. Active cyber defense—hacking back—may be the most effective, if not only, recourse. Unfortunately, hacking back is illegal under current U.S. law.

Currently, one of the greatest threats to U.S. cyber security comes from China. Chinese citizen hackers are conducting an effective cyber espionage campaign against the United States. By perpetrating “… the greatest transfer of wealth in history,” this campaign is effectively advancing China’s strategic positional advantage—shi—and, as such, is a threat to U.S. security and welfare that must be addressed. Allowing U.S. citizens limited authorization to engage in active cyber defense would afford protection while simultaneously increasing political pressure on China to curtail the activities of its state-sanctioned citizen hackers. The U.S., in other words, has the opportunity to essentially create an all-volunteer cyberforce.

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1 The term ‘active cyber defense’ refers to a broad range of potential offensive activities, such as utilizing a hacker’s own malware against him. It is distinguished from ‘passive cyber defenses’, such as maintaining current software patches, and utilizing secure passwords. See Thomas M. Chen, An Assessment of the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, The Letort Papers (n.p.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 14-16, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1170 (accessed October 3, 2013).
2 While China represents the largest sponsor of state supported cyber espionage, they are not alone. For instance, recent activities such as North Korea’s ordered cyberattack against Sony, show that the problem is not restricted to China alone. See David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony.” New York Times Online, December 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/us-links-north-korea-to-sony-hacking.html (accessed March 9, 2015).
Threat Assessment

Two recent reports have essentially mischaracterized Chinese hackers. The first aligns them very closely with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), while the second characterizes them as “hackers for hire.” In order to deter Chinese citizen hackers their relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) must be accurately assessed. If they are not direct agents of the State, are they pirates or privateers? Historically speaking, pirates and privateers are quite different. Pirates operate outside national structures and boundaries. They have no direct connections to nation states and usually exist entirely outside conventional society, operating primarily for personal gain. In the absence of a central authority with which to negotiate, piracy must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis—usually by force. In contrast, privateers were captains of private vessels, awarded a license from the state, or a “Letter of Marque and Repraisal,” to seize enemy ships as “prizes.” Issuance of such letters proved to be an economically effective way of subsidizing state sanctioned initiatives on the cheap. Without legal authority and state oversight, such activities would be regarded as piracy. Privateers were used by all the major Western powers until the Declaration of Paris in 1856, when increasing political pressure led the major European powers to end the practice entirely. In effect, privateers provide a de facto military capacity at minimal cost to the state in response to assorted political, economic, or military exigencies.

Riding the digital seas, Chinese citizen hackers are closer to modern day cyber privateers. Given the level of state control over the Internet in China, citizen hackers would be hard-pressed to operate entirely independent of the state. It seems likely, therefore, that they operate within Chinese society with the tacit, if not active, knowledge and support of the PLA. Citizen hackers and quasi-official PLA cyber units such as 61398 maintain a symbiotic relationship, much like that which existed in earlier times between privateers and the nation states that sponsored them. Citizen hackers are neither synonymous with the PLA nor strictly hackers for hire. Rather they seem to occupy a strategically advantageous middle ground—a position of shi. Instead of sailing in search of ships carrying lightly protected cargo, they surf the Internet in search of minimally secure servers containing modern booty such as intellectual property or state secrets. What they lack in a formal letter of marque, may be offset by state support and secure protection from prosecution.

As privateers, they are subject only to political pressure as may be applied by their national sponsors. China uses these cyber privateers not just for access to more experienced hackers, or as cheap labor, but to provide something of inestimable value to the state: plausible deniability. As a Chinese Defense minister has aptly noted, “cyber-attacks have transnational and anonymous

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8 The U.S. is not a signatory to the Declaration of Paris, but has not used privateers since it was enacted, see Ibid., 244-51.
11 For a detailed dossier on PLA unit 61398, see Mandiant, APT1, 7-19.
characteristics.\textsuperscript{13} Chinese leaders go to great lengths to protect the plausible deniability of their privateers.\textsuperscript{14} One tactic they employ is a coordinated informational campaign centered on discrediting any “unreasonable and unprofessional” allegations made against them.\textsuperscript{15} Such anonymity allows China to deny accountability for the actions of its cyber privateers, while reaping the benefits of their ability to secure virtual information.

**Deterrence Strategies**

Cyber espionage activities violate U.S. domestic law, but international law is somewhat different.\textsuperscript{16} U.S. law enforcement, not the Department of Defense (DoD), is responsible for deterrence and prosecution of cyber espionage cases because, unlike other forms of cyber-attack, cyber espionage alone is not a clear act of war. To pursue a criminal case, U.S. law requires stringent attribution and the identification of perpetrators beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, law enforcement is regularly frustrated in their efforts to track down and prosecute cyber privateers. China claims no knowledge of or ability to control non-state actors, wielding plausible deniability as a shield both to prosecution and diplomacy. Even when the denial seems less than credible, the statements alone are sufficient to frustrate Western law enforcement and render diplomatic efforts, if any, mute.

The United States must find an effective means to link Chinese cyber privateering to the state in a way that massess increased Western political pressure and is compatible with security and classification constraints. China is unlikely to curtail cyber espionage by citizens until the associated political costs are higher than the economic rewards. A political solution to Chinese cyber privateering may be available, therefore, but only by changing China’s strategic calculus will we be able to alter their current strategy.

To date, the only effective means of deterring Chinese cyber privateering, even momentarily, has been when private security firms issue public reports “naming and shaming” Chinese cyber privateers and outing their ties to the PLA.\textsuperscript{17} Unfortunately, other than making a few overly broad and general comments, the DoD and other U.S. governmental agencies have been unable to take a similar approach for fear of revealing classified U.S. sources and techniques.\textsuperscript{18} Instead, classified information is shared with a very limited number of cleared defense industry partners, under the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CS/IA) program, part of Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s portfolio.\textsuperscript{19} With the government unable to publicly out Chinese cyber privateers, alternate strategies are needed. Some pundits are calling for the U.S. to issue its


\textsuperscript{14} Of course the use of plausible deniability is not strictly a Chinese tactic. While North Korea has officially denied involvement with the Sony hack, they have left open the possibility that it was the result of “righteous deed of supporters and sympathizers.” See Sanger and Perlroth, U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack.


own Letters of Marque, in order to allow private U.S. companies to act as de facto privateers.\textsuperscript{20} While such an approach may be constitutional,\textsuperscript{21} it would constitute poor policy and would lead to escalation and potential negative consequences at present unforeseen. A new strategy is needed: privateering.

Create and support the modern equivalent of armed merchantmen—cyber privateers who can engage the Chinese as they threaten our digital boundary waters. The historical embodiment of this concept was the “East Indianmen,” heavily armed merchantmen designed to protect British East Indian shipping lanes from pirates.\textsuperscript{22} Unlike privateer vessels, whose main purpose was the seizure of prizes, armed merchantmen were commercial vessels, armed only for self-defense.

Creation of the modern equivalent of the armed merchantmen would allow companies being victimized by Chinese cyber privateers a \textbf{limited} right to engage in active cyber defense and to “hack back.” Unlike their namesake predecessors, these new privateers would be denied the expansive right to initiate actions against potential hackers under a modern Letter of Marque regime, regulated by law in terms of time, scope, and proportionality.\textsuperscript{23} Imposition of limits would reduce risk of escalation, minimize threat to innocent third parties, and facilitate the prime policy objective: penetrate Chinese plausible deniability. Recent research has established that software vulnerabilities in commonly used Remote Access Terminals (RATs) could allow victims to “hack back” in order to recover, destroy, or obfuscate stolen data on third party staging servers prior to hacked data being exfiltrated into Chinese hands.\textsuperscript{24}

\section*{Legal Implications}

While legal debate is afoot,\textsuperscript{25} current U.S. law does not allow for any tacitly sanctioned cyber self-defense measures. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),\textsuperscript{26} for example, is essentially a "computer trespass statute.”\textsuperscript{27} As such, it serves primarily to bar one party from trespassing or hacking into the computer of another without authorization. CFAA prohibits any hacking back that involves unauthorized access of another computer, even when such access might be for the purpose of recovering one’s own stolen data.

Recently proposed legislation, such as the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA),\textsuperscript{28} has sought to provide some immunity for limited hacking back initiatives. Even though CISPA is primarily an information sharing law, an exemption clause would grant criminal and civil immunity for “decisions” made in good faith and information acquired during hacking activities.\textsuperscript{29} At present, however, CISPA provides no redress for any wronged and innocent third parties.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Enshrined in the Constitution is the enumerated power of Congress “to declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.” U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sect. 8.
\item For a discussion of these three factors, known as the “Caroline Test”, see Chen, \textit{An Assessment of the Department of Defense Strategy}, 33.
\item 18 USCS 1030
\item Backer, \textit{The Hackback Debate}.
\item See sec. 3(b)(3) Exemption from liability. Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
A statutory safe harbor is needed that allows victimized companies to implement limited active cyber defenses in order to trace, recover, destroy, or obfuscate stolen data. One approach would be to amend the CFAA to allow for a limited “presumptive authorization” for self-help efforts that recover stolen data. In return for immunity for good faith hacking back efforts, victimized companies should be required to register all intrusions, pertinent threat information, and their active responses to a public information clearing house, similar to that maintained for the DIB CS/IA program. Data reporting requirements would have to be sufficient to tie cyber privateering activity back to their sponsors, if any.

In order to have the desired long-term policy effect, active cyber defense operations must be widespread and sustained. Repeated penetration of the Chinese plausible deniability shield should allow the U.S. government sufficient open source material to “name and shame” the Chinese into withdrawing support for cyber privateers. Only efforts on a large scale, like those enabled by enacting active cyber defense legislation will provide the type of solid and verifiable evidence needed to prompt a Chinese policy change.

To protect innocent third parties, legislation creating a right of active cyber defense must include provisions for third party redress. Historically, privateers were forced to take captured ships to a “prize court” for adjudication in order to avoid unnecessary harm to innocent third parties. A similar process should be established for modern day cyber privateers. Allowing third parties in “hack back” operations to file claims for civil damages in U.S. courts would both allow for redress and serve to curtail deleterious hacking back maneuvers.

Conclusion

While cyber privateers might appear to be the supermen of state sponsored Chinese cyber strategy, they are not omnipotent. Removing plausible deniability is essential. Allowing limited active cyber defense by U.S. citizens and corporate entities could provide the evidence necessary to generate political pressure for China to reduce, if not cease, its support for state sponsored cyber privateering. Without covert state sponsorship, Chinese privateers who continue to hack U.S. cyber assets will, functionally, become pirates. As non-state supported cyber criminals, they will be more easily subject to prosecution.

Faced with the inability of U.S. agencies to publicly share classified information about hackers and hacks, the time has come to loosen the restrictions and authorize limited hacking back by U.S. citizens and corporate interests. To work, authorized twenty-first century U.S. cyber privateering will need both public and diplomatic support. In the absence of an effective U.S. strategy for confronting cyber privateers, increased anger over the growing scale of intrusions and intellectual property theft may eventually tip the scales toward either politically imposed economic sanctions, or large scale rebellion in the form of unauthorized hacking back, or both. With or without economic sanctions, it would be far better to have a U.S. force with limited authorization for hacking back, than one dominated by undocumented digital pirates operating outside the law without regard for international diplomacy.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{30}}\text{ Such rights are more limited than allowing all conceivable forms of active cyber defense, and are designed to balance the risk of harm to innocent third parties with the right of companies to defend themselves.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{31}}\text{ Backer, The Hackback Debate.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{32}}\text{ Anderson and Adam, “Privateering and the Private Production of Naval Power,” 109-12.}\]
The Safest Path: Landmines

Colonel Christopher J. Barron

The Improvised Explosive Device (IED)—the most influential weapon used against U.S. forces in the last 10 years—is unmatched in strategic, tactical, and operational impact. Strategically, the IED provoked a tremendously expensive yet not always effective U.S. response. Tactically, IEDs strangled movement and maneuver while maiming and killing thousands. Operationally, they stymied campaign plans reliant upon close interaction with host-nation populations. Typically little more than a crudely assembled landmine, the IED’s impact is remarkably outsized in comparison with its cost. Despite the post-Cold War promises of a new kind of combat through net-centric warfare, precision munitions and information dominance, the greatest weapon to emerge has changed little in over 70 years. The fruit of the Devil’s gardens returned and again demonstrated the value of lethal counter-mobility.

Low manufacturing costs, ease of employment, and devastating effects on man and materiel make the IED a highly effective weapon. For decades, combatants have successfully used landmines against foes across the capability spectrum, to include lavishly funded and well-equipped modern armies.\(^1\) The reemergence of the landmine, therefore, is not surprising. What is surprising, however, is that while the low-tech landmine has repeatedly proven its worth on the battlefield, much of the world—including the U.S. and its closest allies—has declared the use of conventional anti-personnel landmines (APLs) to be both ineffective and immoral. Relentless pressure on the U.S. to comply with the 1999 Ottawa “Convention on The Prohibition of The Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and On Their Destruction” has continued for 15 years, despite U.S. actions that satisfy nearly all of the Convention’s requirements.\(^2\)

Acquiescing to that pressure is both shortsighted and wrong. The U.S. should not accept the Ottawa Convention for three key reasons: (1) military justifications for landmines are compelling; (2) concerns over conscience and morality are overstated; and (3) the convention itself is little more than a waypoint on the path toward a larger ban on all landmines and cluster munitions. The U.S. should step back from the Ottawa Convention and maintain robust lethal counter-mobility capabilities, including the traditional “dumb” landmines of today and their technologically sophisticated replacements of the future. Eventually, “smart” or networked munitions will provide the same tactical and operational effects with an ability to discriminate targets from non-targets, thereby increasing control and effectiveness while significantly reducing risk to innocents. Lethal counter-mobility works. Its’ devastating power—so frequently and effectively used against the U.S.


and its allies—can and should remain a viable option for protection from and defeat of enemy forces. If the enemy attacks, they too should feel the demoralizing fear and crippling consequence that comes from selecting the wrong path.

**Ottawa’s Flawed Assumptions**

The 1999 establishment of the Ottawa Convention was the culmination of an international campaign to ban APLs, spearheaded by a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public figures and several key members of the Canadian government. Signatories to the convention must, among many tasks, destroy all of their APLs, foreswear future use and refuse to assist any nation that employs APLs. Much of the U.S. objection to the Convention was long based on the concept of mine warfare as integral to meeting the United States’ global security requirements, including defensive operations on the Korean peninsula. This position was embraced by the Clinton and Bush administrations, and initially sustained under the Obama administration. In late 2014, however, the U.S. announced that it would move even closer to the 1999 Ottawa Convention by agreeing to not use APLs anywhere outside the Korean peninsula and to cease manufacture of APLs.

Most of the heavy-lifting in support of the Ottawa Convention has been at the hands of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which, broadly speaking, is a coalition of NGOs that grew frustrated with the pace of United Nations efforts to address landmines. The main argument championed by the ICBL and its supporting partners centers on two key ideas: that dangers posed to civilians by long-abandoned APLs have created humanitarian crises, and that landmines in general are not effective—and therefore unnecessary—to military operations. This latter concept is counter-intuitive and, despite the ICBL’s claims, is fundamentally flawed.

The ICBL cites an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study that purports the futility of using mines, despite their presence in virtually every significant conflict since WWII. Although the ICRC study effectively illustrates some challenges and dangers of landmine use, the conclusions it reports are ultimately flawed. Inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and large blind spots—most glaringly the failure to consider the entire IED experience of the last decade—render the study ineffective, if not downright dangerous. For example, from 1967-1968 alone, over 10,000 U.S. casualties in Vietnam came from mines and other explosive booby traps. Yet the study brushes aside the damage done by Vietcong APL minefields, despite clear evidence that in some U.S. units, Vietcong APLs accounted for nearly half of all casualties. The Red Cross claims that APLs are ineffective because mass infantry assaults can eventually penetrate minefields. History, however, tells a different story. Human wave attacks generate high casualty rates and minefields are rarely expected to fully block an attack. The APL prohibition fails to acknowledge the essential military utility of minefields: the invaluable benefit of delaying or disrupting an enemy attack long enough to target it with accurate fires. The ICRC also minimizes U.S. and South Korean reliance on minefields as a key component of their defense against possible attack from North Korea by claiming that a well-trained force can breach a minefield with only 1-3% casualties. This assessment differs greatly from

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5 *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction* (Ottawa: International Campaign to Ban Landmines, March, 1999)


7 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Anti-personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe?* (Geneva, August, 1997), 40.


experiences at U.S. Combat Training Centers (CTCs), where breaching operations typically result in the destruction of a large portion of the attacker’s combat vehicles and personnel.\(^9\)

Interestingly, the anti-APL community seemingly suggests that landmines are more of a problem for the emplacer than they are for the enemy. Longstanding ICBL claims that 34% of the U.S. casualties in the Persian Gulf War were caused by U.S. mines are simply false.\(^10\) Analysis from the U.S. Government Accounting Office shows that only 6% of U.S. casualties were from landmines, and none of the landmines were of U.S. origin.\(^11\) Certainly, no weapon is perfect and despite the modern insistence on mistake-free warfare, landmines can pose threats to friendly forces. This risk, however, can be reduced by accurate marking, recording, and reporting. Trends at U.S. CTCs have shown recording and reporting to be a challenge, likely due to infrequent and low-quality training.\(^12\) Clearly, the claims made against the use of APLs are highly questionable, if not suspect.

The second rationale behind the APL ban rests on the moral case. 1990s estimates placed deaths and injuries due to APLs at over 20,000 per year.\(^13\) Few would disagree that abandoned landmines (and other unexploded ordnance) have been devastating to civilians in dozens of countries. In an act of monstrous cruelty, the Soviet military indiscriminately scattered millions of small APLs across Afghanistan. All three factions during Yugoslavia’s civil war routinely emplaced landmines along what became the Zone of Separation, and the Khmer Rouge repeatedly mined Cambodia’s populated and traveled areas with no attempt to record locations.\(^14\) Many of these mines remain, awaiting unsuspecting victims.

Although the U.S. once manufactured large quantities of landmines—some of which were used irresponsibly by allies or third parties—the sale or transfer of APLs from the U.S. ended in 1992.\(^15\) Since then, the U.S. has played a leading role in humanitarian demining efforts, devoting nearly two billion dollars over the last 20 years to training, equipping, and funding demining personnel.\(^16\) This level of commitment is unmatched globally. Yet, by not ratifying the convention, the U.S. is viewed by many as indifferent to human suffering. The U.S., in fact, is addressing not only its own responsibilities but is addressing and solving the problems largely created by others. Despite pressure to the contrary, the U.S. must forthrightly address the crisis and APL issues while maintaining the right to use APLs responsibly.

The U.S. should not deny an essential military capability simply because it has been used irresponsibly in the past. The landmine is not inherently evil, nor are its effects much different than that of the bullet, grenade, or rocket: all have the capacity to wound, maim, and kill. User’s intent and an assumption of responsible targeting, however, provide cover for bullets, grenades, and rockets not routinely applied to APLs. The difference of course is that the landmine is persistent, while the others typically are not. In fact, landmines are not so inherently dangerous that safe usage is impossible. When Soldiers and Marines are committed to ground combat, the U.S. must weigh present certain risk against unknown future risk. War is fraught with ethical challenges. More than a touch of hypocrisy exists in a national position that embraces the right to kill remotely via unmanned platforms and maintains preemptive, first-strike nuclear weapons policies, yet somehow finds the use of landmines morally unacceptable.

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\(^9\) Author’s personal experience while assigned to Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA.


\(^12\) Author’s personal experience.

\(^13\) ICRC, *Anti-personnel Landmines*, 0.


\(^15\) United States Department of State (DoS), *To Walk the Earth in Safety* (Washington, DC, August, 2013), 28.

The Path Ahead

So what position should the U.S. take vis-à-vis the landmine? Is there room for compromise with the Ottawa Convention? Answering these questions honestly and directly requires acknowledgment that the U.S. must place its national interests and the lives of its service members above international pressures. The U.S. should embrace the concept of lethal counter-mobility. The landmine is still the best available provider of that capability. In 2009, for example, a small U.S. outpost in eastern Afghanistan was attacked by hundreds of enemy fighters; eventually the attack was defeated, but the perimeter was breached in three places and eight U.S. soldiers were killed. Afterward, a U.S. Central Command investigation found that there was an “inadequate use of Claymore mines for perimeter security.” If soldiers at that outpost had the ability and authority to employ large numbers of APLs or similar munitions, the perimeter might not have been breached. Landmines could have saved U.S. lives.

This argument and logic does not apply solely to small combat outposts in relatively mature theaters. Indeed, lethal counter-mobility will become increasingly more critical as the U.S. military continues to draw down in end-strength and contract toward North American basing. Forces executing rapid deployments to secure key installations, conduct airfields or port seizures, or establish intermediate staging bases will find themselves in tenuous positions. The ability to shape terrain with lethal counter-mobility is a tremendous force multiplier. To assume that an enemy will never again maneuver against a U.S. force or would somehow be interdicted or destroyed by joint fires alone, borders on unrealistic, if not magical, thinking. The responsible employment of landmines in predictable scenarios represents no more risk to non-combatants than they already face from unexploded ordnance, errors in targeting, and the general fog of war.

Can there be compromise with the Ottawa Convention? Probably not. A full ratification by the U.S. would likely result in a dangerous re-energizing of the movement to ban all cluster munitions and landmines, whether “dumb” or “smart.” Such a ban would be disastrous for U.S. forces. The U.S., therefore, should continue to address Ottawa’s underlying themes, namely legitimate concerns regarding landmines’ inherent persistence and indiscriminate nature. To prevent irresponsible use by others, the U.S. should continue to ban the sale of APLs. U.S. funding for humanitarian demining at or near its traditional rate should continue unabated and concerned parties and nations should be encouraged to actively assist in demining efforts. Simultaneously, the U.S. should continue research and development on smart and networked munitions that automatically self-destruct (or deactivate), differentiate between targets, and/or put a person-in-the-loop as part of the firing process. The Spider, a networked munition that controls grenades linked to sensors, offers a possible model for future development. These systems could satisfy Ottawa-type concerns while continuing to deliver traditional landmine capabilities essential to military operations.

The abandonment of landmines, whether anti-personnel or anti-vehicle, should come only after a proven replacement solution is fielded to the force. Until then, landmines must remain in the U.S. inventory—for use anytime, anywhere. The recent decision to further restrict the use of landmines takes the United States farther down a dangerous path. Lethal counter-mobility offers a true capability that simply cannot be replaced. To knowingly sacrifice that capability needlessly exposes U.S. forces to risk, and if there is one thing upon which the past and future agree, it’s that risk is never in short supply.

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