U.S. PARTICIPATION IN IFOR:  
A MARATHON, NOT A SPRINT

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FOREWORD

The U.S. decision to join the Implementation Force (IFOR) for the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina (familiarly known as the Dayton Accords) marked a crucial milestone toward achieving the U.S. national objective of a lasting political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. Equally critical will be determining whether the United States will continue participating in IFOR beyond the currently established 12-month deadline.

Decisions of great import rarely entail simple cause and effect judgments. Thinking through the likely second and third order consequences of contemplated actions often defines success or failure as much as dealing with the issue of the moment. Such is the case for U.S. policy in Bosnia. In examining what form U.S. involvement in IFOR beyond the current deadline will take, we should recall that, while events inside Bosnia influenced the introduction of U.S. ground troops, wider U.S. interests in the Balkans, in Europe, and throughout the world proved more pivotal in the decisionmaking calculus. Likewise, a decision on whether to withdraw from or to extend IFOR also must encompass a similarly broad geo-strategic context. To that end, Dr. William Johnsen examines in this monograph the potential for creating suitable conditions for a lasting political settlement in Bosnia by December 1996, identifies possible outcomes of a U.S. withdrawal from IFOR, and assesses potential consequences for U.S. national objectives and interests within the Balkans, and beyond.

Dr. Johnsen's conclusions will not sit well with most in the United States and abroad who are weary of the Bosnian "problem" and would like to see it "wrapped up" by December. That it appears intractable on the civil side despite IFOR's quieting of the guns heightens the frustration. Yet, as this study illustrates, one has only to turn back the clock a year to realize the distance traveled to date toward not only ending the bloodshed in Bosnia, but also reducing the risks to broader U.S. interests. The issue today is not so much about following a time line for December withdrawal, but where that would leave us and our interests another year hence.

It is in that context that the Strategic Studies Institute offers this contribution to the upcoming national dialog concerning the future U.S. role in Bosnia.

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KEY JUDGMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Notwithstanding the cogent reasons behind the current December 1996 deadline for withdrawing U.S. ground forces from Bosnia, that policy must be reexamined in light of existing strategic conditions. A decision on whether to extend participation in the IFOR or to join in a successor organization will be neither easy nor insignificant. Nonetheless, it will have to be made, and in the not too distant future. Now, therefore, is the time to examine the issues that will determine whether the United States will continue to lead efforts to ensure a lasting political settlement in Bosnia.

While NATO forces and their partners in IFOR have played a critical and successful role in halting conflict in Bosnia and bringing stability to the region, military success in the short term does not necessarily lead to a long-term political settlement. Such a resolution depends primarily on resolving internal political, economic, and societal issues within Bosnia-Hercegovina. That having been said, establishing those conditions will depend to a significant degree on the ability of an outside military presence to sustain conditions that support the other elements of the process.

IFOR has created the basis for a secure environment, but that foundation is fragile, and much remains to be accomplished: arbitrate control of Brcko, resettle refugees, build political institutions, hold elections, restore the Bosnian economy, negotiate and implement arms control and confidence-building regimes, and implement the U.S. equip and train program. Whether this complex and demanding agenda can be completed prior to December 1996 is questionable.

If IFOR withdraws before conditions for a lasting political settlement are established, three general outcomes are possible: peaceful resolution, limited violence, and a return to war. Only a peaceful resolution is in U.S. national interests, but it is the least likely result. Indeed, if prevailing conditions are not sustained, the current hiatus in Bosnia-Hercegovina may represent little more than an operational pause before the factions resume fighting.

While damage to U.S. objectives in Bosnia from renewed conflict could be considerable, much more is at stake. NATO's credibility could be irrevocably damaged, and U.S. leadership in the Alliance could be called into question. Surrendering leadership in the Bosnian crisis also may be construed as another example of U.S. disengagement from Europe, leading perhaps to reduced European public support of NATO or a U.S. presence in Europe. Concomitantly, a perceived failure may diminish U.S. public support of NATO, of a U.S. forward military presence in
Europe, or for substantial U.S. engagement in international affairs, leading to an inward-looking and unilateralist U.S. attitude that further constrains U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, potential opponents may be emboldened to challenge the United States. The cumulative effect of these issues may result in a downward spiral of U.S. influence abroad.

These conclusions argue for a continued outside military presence to enforce the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. But the United States and NATO continue to adhere publicly to roughly a one-year time limit for IFOR's deployment. When examining potential options for a follow-on organization to oversee further implementation of the Dayton Agreement (e.g., U.N. Protection Force ("UNPROFOR II") or a coalition of European states under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Western European Union (WEU)), only a credible NATO-led force with a substantial U.S. ground component offers a significant likelihood of success.

The United States, therefore, cannot simply engage for 12 months and then withdraw from Bosnia. How long U.S. military forces should assist in implementing the peace agreement cannot be answered with certainty at this point. But one year will not be sufficient to establish the requisite conditions for a long-term political settlement. Instead, U.S. forces should be prepared to remain in IFOR or its successor until such time that U.S. national objectives are achieved or have been adapted to changed strategic conditions.

The time has come to examine whether the United States will continue to lead efforts to ensure a long-term political settlement in Bosnia that will further contribute to U.S. national objectives in Europe and globally. During these deliberations, participants must keep in mind that achieving U.S. objectives in Bosnia is more akin to running a marathon than a sprint. And, like a successful marathon runner, the United States must demonstrate determination, endurance, and the ability to withstand temporary pain.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The United States should base its decision on continued participation in the IFOR on whether U.S. national objectives and interests have been achieved, not on a rigid timetable.

• Should current trends continue, the United States should participate in IFOR, or some residual military mission, beyond December 1996.

• NATO must remain the regional security organization responsible for overseeing the military aspects of the peace
agreement. IFOR, or a residual force, must continue to operate through the NATO chain of command.

- The size and composition of IFOR should be adapted to the pace of compliance with the peace accords and conditions in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Given the anticipated size of an overall residual force (roughly two divisions) and assuming that the United States desires to retain a leadership role in that force:
  
  -- The U.S. ground contribution should consist of one maneuver brigade, an aviation brigade, and appropriate combat support and combat service support units.

  -- The United States may also wish to consider providing the core of a division headquarters.

  -- Additionally, the United States should be prepared to contribute unique capabilities (e.g., intelligence and surveillance, communications, aviation, civil affairs, and psychological operations), as required.

- Should the United States decide to extend its participation in IFOR, or alternative residual force, the U.S. Government must:

  -- Begin building now a bipartisan consensus in Congress to support operations beyond December 1996.

  -- Build consensus with NATO allies and partners currently participating in IFOR to reapportion responsibilities, as required.

  -- Ensure international and European organizations shoulder their responsibilities under the peace agreement.
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INTRODUCTION

Even before the main body of U.S. forces began moving into Bosnia-Hercegovina on December 20, 1995, as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR) for the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina (familiarly known as the Dayton Accords), U.S. policymakers had fixed a one-year time limit for U.S. participation in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR. For a number of important reasons, setting such a constraint initially was a good idea. Foremost, the firm deadline avoided the impression of an openended NATO and IFOR commitment, and it quickly set a benchmark, forcing the factions to resolve issues rather than allowing IFOR and international organizations to carry the burden of implementing the peace. This approach also compelled the entities to collaborate quickly, establishing precedents for future cooperation. It additionally pressured the parties to establish government institutions and processes that will contribute to a sense of normalcy that, hopefully, will accelerate the healing process. Finally, a strict time limit required the international community to act rapidly to assist in restoring Bosnian society.

These cogent reasons notwithstanding, the original December 1996 deadline for withdrawing U.S. ground forces from Bosnia must be reexamined in light of existing and emerging strategic conditions. Granted, implementing the military provisions of the accords is proceeding more smoothly than anticipated. But, short-term compliance with the military aspects of the agreement--while essential for overall success--does not ensure achievement by year's end of the overarching U.S. national objectives outlined in the President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement:

• Sustaining a political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future for all its peoples;

• Preventing the spread of the conflict into a broader Balkan war that could threaten both allies and the stability of new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe;

• Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the conflict;

• Halting the slaughter of innocents;

• Helping to support NATO's central role in Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security architecture.
Attaining these objectives hinges, to a large degree, on successfully implementing the civil elements of the peace agreement. But, as will be discussed below, fulfilling the civil provisions of the accords is not going as smoothly as the military effort. Whether the varied and difficult tasks of the civil portions of the agreement can be achieved before the existing deadline is an open question. But, even at this date, the general consensus is that one year is inadequate. Furthermore, current and anticipated trends indicate that an outside military presence capable of ensuring compliance with the military elements of the accords likely will be required if civil implementation efforts are to succeed. Thus, while only roughly halfway through IFOR's mandate, it is time to reassess the current deadline.

This conclusion does not imply that an immediate decision on extending U.S. participation in IFOR, or joining a successor organization, is required. Indeed, it may be counter-productive to make public such discussions, or even their consideration, at this time. But, because the requisite analysis and assessment of the implications of such a determination must occur prior to the decision, now is the time to examine the issues surrounding U.S. participation in military efforts to oversee the Dayton Accords beyond December 1996.

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to identify and analyze the salient issues inherent in the current U.S. intention to withdraw from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR and assess potential consequences for the United States. To this end, the study first identifies key provisions of the accords that must be accomplished if a durable political agreement is to emerge and briefly assesses if they can be accomplished before December 1996. It then identifies potential outcomes resulting from a scheduled U.S. departure and assesses their consequences for U.S. Bosnian policy. Repercussions beyond the immediate scope of Bosnia-Hercegovina are then assessed. The report then examines possible successors to IFOR, followed by an analysis of the potential military role in promoting an enduring political settlement in Bosnia should the United States continue its military effort to oversee the peace accords. The report closes with conclusions and recommendations.

WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?

Military Requirements. In the military sphere, IFOR has accomplished much in a short period. But enforcing the elements of the agreement is not a singular event. IFOR must continue the considerable requirements inherent in ensuring sustained compliance with the military provisions of the peace agreement:
supervising the zone of separation, monitoring the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, disarming armed civilian groups, monitoring and confirming the withdrawal of foreign forces, monitoring heavy weapons, supervising movement of forces and weapons to cantonment areas, monitoring holdings in those areas, overseeing the demobilization of "excess" personnel, monitoring mine removal, and ensuring freedom of movement.

Only in this manner can IFOR sustain a safe, secure atmosphere in which the other elements of the peace process can function. Without such an environment, progress toward a durable political arrangement will be slow and difficult, at best, prolonging the requirement for an outside military presence. At worst, the country can slide back into war.

Implementing the Civil Provisions of the General Framework Agreement. Success in implementing the military elements of the peace agreement has not been matched on the civil side. This conclusion is not intended to denigrate the efforts made or the progress that has occurred to date. But it is a recognition that, as the brief survey of the civil tasks that follows illustrates, much remains to be accomplished if stable political conditions are to be established prior to IFOR's scheduled departure.

Arbitrate control of Brcko and the Posavina Corridor. The city of Brcko and the Posavina Corridor lie astride vital lines of communication between the eastern and western portions of the Republika Srpska. Thus, Bosniac-Croatian Federation control of the area holds the potential to cleave Republika Srpska in two. Conversely, Brcko sits on the key north-south lines of communication that connect the heartland of Bosnia-Hercegovina with Central Europe and the lower Danube basin. Serb control of the areas could result in an economic stranglehold over the Bosniac-Croatian Confederation.

The area, then, represents vital strategic terrain for all sides, and none of the factions can be expected to give up control of the region without some safeguards. But these safeguards have not yet been identified because the arbitration process has not yet commenced. Moreover, negotiations promise to be long and complicated. Until an agreement is reached and results of the arbitration have been implemented, an outside military presence will be required to ensure that all factions abide by the interim provisions of the Dayton Agreement. Thereafter, an outside military presence may be needed to ensure compliance with the arbitration agreement until such time that conditions warrant a withdrawal from the area.

Return of refugees and displaced persons. Four years of war have dislocated Bosnian society and turned nearly half the pre-
war population of 4.4 million into refugees or displaced persons. To return and resettle such a volume of people will take time. How much time cannot be calculated with certitude, but one year seems inadequate, given the widespread destruction of housing, an absence of temporary shelter, and a shattered economy that offers few employment opportunities for returning citizens. Granted, international and state economic efforts are making headway in restoring Bosnia's economy, but those efforts are suffering fits and starts and are not likely to bear adequate fruit by December 1996.

The return and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons also depends on freedom of movement. Indeed, the long-term viability of the Dayton process may depend most upon the ability of families to return to and remain at peace in their homes. Despite IFOR's efforts, however, freedom of movement for ordinary citizens is not yet a reality. Nor, given current trends, is it likely to emerge in the near term. Neither is it possible to forecast with any accuracy how long it will take to establish the trust and confidence necessary to make freedom of movement possible.

These conditions do not argue for IFOR to escort or safeguard returnees--IFOR should not. The Dayton Agreement rightfully assigns responsibility for freedom of movement to the entities. That having been said, without some form of outside, more neutral presence for the foreseeable future to provide a generally safe environment that permits freedom of movement, a lasting political settlement will be difficult to construct. Indeed, absent such a force, one or more parties may revert to a policy of limiting movement within Bosnia. Such restrictions are likely to lead to de facto partition of the country, which is antithetical to U.S. objectives.

Build political institutions. A primary cause of this conflict was the fact that one ethnic entity was unwilling to live under the political control of another. These attitudes have hardened over the course of 4 years of vicious fighting. To build functioning political institutions will be a complex and potentially explosive task. It will require implementing constitutional provisions; registering voters, holding elections, and installing governments at the local, regional, entity, confederation, and federal levels; and establishing the necessary cooperation across entity boundaries that will lead to sufficient trust and confidence.

Consensus exists within military as well as civil bodies overseeing IFOR that an outside military presence will be required to ensure a secure environment for political campaigning and balloting. But, the timetable for holding the elections is already under strain. Elections have been pushed back to
September, and issues surrounding freedom of movement, return of
refugees, the many details concerning registering voters, campaign
funding, media access, and adequate time to campaign may lead to
further delays. If deferred much longer, winter will intervene, perhaps
precluding elections until Spring 1997.

While an important milestone toward a political arrangement, elections
alone are not sufficient to provide a durable solution. Additional, per-
haps considerable, time will be required to turn election results into
viable governmental institutions that can handle normal day-to-day
problems associated with running a country. But little in Bosnia is
normal, and the various governmental institutions will have to
struggle with an array of complex and daunting issues that could
reignite conflict and will take considerable time to resolve. To pro-
vide the stable and secure environment for new government institu-
tions to take root, grow, and assume competent responsibility may
require an extended outside military presence.

**Restore and develop Bosnia's economic system.** No one disputes
that the Bosnia economy is in dire straits, and that much outside
support will be necessary to restore it. How long it will take to
establish local economies, provide jobs, and rebuild the economic
infrastructure, much less root out the bad habits of 50 years of a
centralized, command economy cannot be forecast at this moment.
Unquestionably, it will not be accomplished by December 1996. But
at least a modicum of economic recovery must occur to provide
opportunities for demobilized soldiers, to stimulate local and
eventually regional economies that will help to integrate the country,
and to engender a perception of hope that will cumulatively provide
a disincentive to a return to conflict.

Equally certain is that restoring the economy is not IFOR's
responsibility. That having been said, IFOR or a successor can
provide critical support to Bosnia's economic recovery. While a
number of infrastructure restoration projects are helpful (e.g.,
bridges and roads), economic recovery hinges to a large degree on
freedom of movement within a safe environment. Without such
freedom of movement, people cannot return home or migrate to
employment; commerce cannot flow; and a downward cycle of poverty
is likely to sow the seeds of future conflict.

**Negotiate and implement arms control and confidence building
regimes.** Under the terms of the Framework Agreement, the parties
agreed to a program to promote regional stability. This regime,
to be carried out under the auspices of the OSCE, laid down a
number of confidence and security building measures within
Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as within the former Yugoslavia, as a
whole. The agreement also contained provisions for an arms
control and reductions regime modeled on the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces In Europe (CFE) that limits specific types of equipment. Together, these complementary initiatives would promote increased transparency in security matters and foster a stable regional balance that would contribute to a durable political settlement.

Remarkably, the parties quickly agreed to confidence and security building measures, and practice inspections have already taken place. Unfortunately, little progress has been observed in the arms control reductions portion of the agreement, and the 180-day deadline (June 11, 1996) for an agreement looms. Granted, the agreement contains provisions that automatically enter into force should the parties fail to reach agreement. But, as Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland, arms control expert at the U.S. Army War College, points out, these provisions may be difficult to enforce. Absent an outside military force to provide leverage, the likelihood of a successful arms reductions regime that contributes to regional stability is doubtful. The consequences of such a failure could be significant: the factions may engage in an arms race that could turn Bosnia, as well as the entire former Yugoslavia, into a tinderbox.

Implement the U.S. Equip and Train Program. While outside the Dayton Accords, the United States sees its initiative to equip and train the Bosniac-Croatian Federation military forces as a complement to the OSCE regional stabilization program. Designed to promote a regional balance of power (as well as satisfy domestic U.S. political pressure to arm the Muslims), the regime has run into considerable hurdles. European allies and partners are opposed to the program. Second, U.S. funding and assistance have been held up because of concerns about the presence of individual mujahideen fighters, as well as growing Iranian influence in Bosnia. Additionally, international funding--largely from Islamic nations--has stalled over fear that the Croatian portion of the Federation might eventually use their share of arms and equipment against their current partners. Indications are that, despite recent pledges, funding issues will not be resolved in the near term.

Nor is funding the only issue. Once resources are available, additional time will be required for civilian contractors that will conduct the training to survey requirements, develop training programs, and establish operations in Bosnia. Equipment and materiel will have to be transported to Bosnia, and Confederation soldiers trained on its use. This process will take considerable time, if adequate training is to occur. Time also will be needed to build the requisite trust between Bosniac and Croatian factions of the armed forces that will yield a military that contributes to, rather than detracts from, regional stability.
In light of the level of conflict and the extent of damage wrought by 4 years of war, efforts to implement the civil portions of Dayton have accomplished much in a short time. But, as the discussion above highlights, much remains to be done in an equally short time. Given the number and scope of outstanding issues, it is unlikely that the conditions for a durable settlement can be created, much less sustained, prior to the scheduled U.S. departure. Moreover, even if current trends continue, it is apparent that an outside presence will be required for the foreseeable future to oversee the military elements of the Agreement and to provide the general security needed for implementing the civil aspects of the Accords.

But the possibility of extending IFOR's current mandate or establishing a replacement force still is very much in doubt. In deliberating this issue, it is instructive to explore what may happen to the Dayton process absent an outside military force capable of overseeing the Accords. Obviously, a number of potential outcomes, each with considerable consequences for U.S. national policy objectives and interests, are possible.

**POTENTIAL OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. BOSNIAN POLICY IF THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAWS FROM BOSNIA**

**Peaceful Resolution and a Lasting Political Settlement.** On the one hand, the entities could take responsibility for implementing the Accords, their subsequent actions could largely conform to the provisions of the Agreement, and the peace process would remain on track. Under this outcome, the United States and its allies and partners could continue to use the current "carrot" approach that largely stresses incentives (mainly economic) to foster cooperation between the factions. At the same time, "sticks" (coercive measures, mostly in the form of withholding aid or economic assistance) may have to be applied. But, in the end, the parties fashion a long-term political arrangement, and a viable Bosnian state emerges. Obviously, such an outcome would meet current U.S. policy objectives.

Unfortunately, this scenario is unlikely. Despite successes in implementing the military provisions of the peace agreement, the underlying causes of war have not been redressed. Given the current levels of mistrust within Bosnia, the factions would hedge on continued compliance with the military provisions of the Agreement. Without an outside military presence to enforce these conditions, an increasing spiral of non-compliance could occur. At that point, any one or combination of friction points could spark a return to fighting. 37 In brief, an optimistic outcome is very doubtful. Far more likely is that the peace process would unravel in Spring or Summer 1997.
**Limited Violence.** In this case, implementation of the military and civil portions of the Agreement proceeds, but at a slow pace and with considerable fits and starts. Violence may recur, but at relatively low levels that the factions can survive and the international community can "tolerate." Such an outcome is likely to obstruct reconstruction of Bosnia's war-torn economy and economic infrastructure. More importantly, even limited violence will inhibit, if not preclude, freedom of movement and return of refugees, leading to de facto ethnic partition of the country. Such a result could lead, in turn, to a major confrontation among irredentist factions.

Absent major confrontations among the factions, the United States and its partners and allies may be able to continue to use "carrots" and occasional "sticks" to move the process along. Such sticks would be limited and would fall short of the use of force, and would rely largely on economic (e.g., denial or delay of aid packages, withdrawal from reconstruction efforts, or sanctions) and diplomatic (e.g., denial of active membership or participation in international and regional organizations) initiatives.

Occasional major flare-ups of violence might require a limited military response. Given a withdrawal of ground forces, such a reaction would have to rely on air power to bring the recalcitrant party(ies) into line. Given the past NATO experience with the use of air power--particularly the air strikes of August-September 1995--this option appears appealing. But the efficacy of this example may be overplayed. The rise of the Croatian Army and the growing proficiency of Bosniac forces that culminated in the Bosniac-Croatian summer offensives (1995) which overturned the existing strategic status quo in Bosnia, Serbia's refusal to intervene under pressure from international sanctions, deployment of the French and British Rapid Reaction Forces, and evidence of a NATO consensus to take decisive action may have been more compelling reasons that drove the factions to the bargaining table.

Moreover, resort to air power faces considerable hurdles. For example, European allies have long opposed reliance on the air power option. And, despite the apparent success of the August-September 1995 air strikes, intra-Alliance tensions were rising over the scope and duration of the bombing effort. Such frictions may reemerge, especially if the United States withdraws from IFOR against the wishes of allies and partners. Further, allies in the region might not grant the United States basing rights to conduct such operations. The sum of these obstacles may leave the United States unable to mount air operations in sufficient force to deter or terminate another round of fighting.
Finally, a return to even limited violence among the factions is not in U.S. national interests. Given existing animosities that likely would be fed by irredentist pressures in the event of de facto partition, the potential for conflict to escalate rapidly to large-scale violence will remain high for the foreseeable future. To halt any resulting violence may require the application of military force, which is likely to prove contentious within the Alliance. The better option, therefore, would be to prevent the return of violence in the first place by extending the IFOR deployment or establishing a credible successor force.

A Return To War. Should the factions resort to large-scale violence to achieve their objectives, the United States and its allies and partners would possess a number of policy options. These alternatives could be used individually, but more likely two or more of them would be combined to increase their efficacy. Thus, while the discussion below examines each option singly, policymakers would implement a comprehensive collection of actions.  

Containment. The United States and its allies and partners undoubtedly would attempt to resume a policy of "containing" the conflict to prevent its spread beyond Bosnia-Hercegovina. This minimalist approach seeks to preclude spillover into a wider Balkan war. U.S. allies and partners are likely to support such a policy because it is in keeping with the long-standing objectives of countries in the region.

Even should further fighting remain within the borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina, consequences of a renewed conflict could extend well beyond. For example, containing the conflict may not prevent another massive flow of refugees from fleeing the country and stressing an already taxed refugee assistance system in Europe. This would likely rankle U.S. allies and partners already struggling to cope with the existing refugee problem--particularly should European states blame the United States for the latest influx. Nor would containing the conflict prevent the probable "slaughter of innocents" any better than it did in the 4 years preceding Dayton.

Even if successful in the short term, a policy of containment alone may not succeed in the long term. Any number of scenarios could lead to a wider conflict within the former Yugoslavia, or within the Balkans as a whole. Thus, while containment is superficially attractive, a more preferable option is to pursue policies that inhibit a return to conflict in the first place.
Sanctions and Embargo. In conjunction with a policy of containment, the United States might seek to reimpose diplomatic and economic sanctions as a means of applying leverage to halt the fighting. Constructing such a regime might be difficult, particularly if NATO allies and IFOR partners perceive that U.S. actions contributed to the resumed fighting. Further, a number of difficult questions would have to be addressed:

- Would Europe or the international community be willing to impose sanctions on Croatia or Serbia if those states are perceived to be complying with provisions of the Agreement?
- Will the international community impose sanctions on the Bosniacs--who are widely perceived as the victims of this war?
- How does the international community impose sanctions on one or more violators of the Accords without punishing those acting only in self-defense?
- Should the June 1996 elections in Russia result in a more nationalist, hard-line government, would Moscow support sanctions?
- Given recent U.S. policy disputes with the People's Republic of China, would Beijing continue to cooperate in the U.N. Security Council?

Even if the United States successfully resolves these issues and reconstructs a sanctions regime, there is no guarantee that such a regime would be effective in a timely fashion. Indeed, in light of past experience in this conflict, the likelihood is small that sanctions would succeed in terminating a war before the belligerents suffered considerable casualties, generated a new and potentially massive flow of refugees, or the conflict expanded beyond Bosnia.

Limited Application of Military Force. Should diplomatic and economic initiatives fail to halt the fighting or there is significant potential of the conflict spreading, the United States may feel compelled to undertake limited military action. This option perforce would rely primarily on the use of air strikes against the offending party(ies). As the earlier discussion indicated, however, such an option may not be executed without considerable political cost and limited prospects for decisive results.

Permit a Military Solution. This option would allow the factions to pursue a military conclusion to the conflict that leads to the defeat of one or more entities. This course of action presents a high degree of risk. First, there is no guarantee that the conflict could be contained within the borders
of the former Yugoslavia, much less within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Second, the U.S.-sponsored equip and train program for the Bosniac-Croatian Confederation Army is not yet underway and is unlikely to produce an effective force by December 1996. Thus, an eventual "victor" acceptable to the United States and its allies cannot be assured. Third, there is no assurance that a viable Bosnian state would emerge from the fighting.

A supposedly "successful" military outcome might require the United States and Europe to endure a protracted conflict with its attendant casualties. Even in the event of a rapid military conclusion, the United States and Europe would have to countenance the retribution and resulting carnage that would likely result. They also would have to be willing to allow a precedent for the use of force, not only in international relations, but, more dangerously, for resolving ethnic issues.

**Reintroduction of Ground Forces.** If the United States concludes that containment will not be effective, or if fighting becomes too severe, national leaders may feel compelled to reintroduce ground troops. At best, such an option is highly problematic. In the first instance, generating support for it would be difficult, as policymakers may encounter significant domestic reaction. At the same time, gaining external support may be equally challenging. NATO allies may have been sufficiently disenchanted that they will be unwilling to reintroduce forces. Non-NATO partners may not be willing to provide forces or funds to support future operations. In short, if perceived as having precipitated the crisis by withdrawing from Bosnia, the United States may be unable to build a consensus to return.

Should the United States be able to achieve sufficient domestic and international consensus to reintroduce ground troops, redeploying those forces will be no easy task. Even if fighting has subsided, conditions are likely to be much less favorable than at present. And, if forces are required to intervene between combatants or on behalf of one or more factions, they may have to undertake full-scale air and ground combat operations and to suffer the casualties that will result. While those casualties may be relatively low, they may still be higher than those experienced to date in the ongoing IFOR operations or that could be expected under current trends.

As the discussion outlined above underscores, the more probable results of a U.S. withdrawal from IFOR or the absence of a credible replacement force would lead to resumed fighting, with a high potential for significant violence. Further, the outcomes clearly run counter to stated U.S. national objectives and interests and should be avoided. The best means to preclude such results may require an extended outside military presence in
REPERCUSSIONS BEYOND BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

The United States became involved in the conflict in the Balkans not only because of events in Bosnia, but because broader geo-strategic conditions impelled the United States to intervene. Without a lasting political settlement in Bosnia and stability in the region, those underlying circumstances will not have been eliminated. Indeed, a U.S. withdrawal is likely to exacerbate frictions within NATO and undercut U.S. influence in Europe and around the world. Such a decline cannot but have an adverse effect on U.S. global leadership and security policy, which will make it difficult, at best, and impossible, at worst, to achieve long-standing U.S. national interests and objectives. Thus, the repercussions of a U.S. withdrawal from IFOR would reverberate far beyond the borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Consequences for the United States and NATO. By intervening in Bosnia, NATO has placed its future credibility as the leading security organization in Europe at stake. A U.S. decision to withdraw from IFOR or its successor that resulted in renewed violence undoubtedly would diminish NATO's credibility. A failed peace may fatally undermine NATO's ability to remain the centerpiece of Europe's emerging security architecture.

U.S. standing within NATO also might be weakened. Even before U.S. intervention in the conflict, many allies within NATO criticized weak or absent U.S. leadership in the crisis. A U.S. withdrawal would likely spark further criticism, driving a wedge deeper between trans-Atlantic partners. Moreover, if an unraveling of the Dayton political agreement follows close on the heels of an IFOR withdrawal, the United States runs the risk of being blamed for "losing the peace." Thus, long-term U.S. political leadership in NATO could hinge directly on the U.S. decision to continue IFOR or to participate in a successor.

A reduced U.S. role in NATO, in turn, could affect adversely a number of significant U.S. initiatives that presently do not enjoy universal support within the Alliance. For example, the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), for which IFOR serves as a prototype, could be dealt a death blow if the United States is perceived to lack sufficient commitment to support difficult operations. An expanded role for Partnership for Peace (PfP) beyond its current programs could suffer if NATO allies are unwilling to underwrite the costs (political and economic) because of doubts about a U.S. commitment to NATO. Moreover, misgivings could reduce already hesitant support within NATO for enlargement.
The outcome of NATO's role in Bosnia also could affect the evolving relationship between the Alliance and France that has resulted from cooperative efforts in IFOR. As Christopher Bellamy of the Independent (London) noted, as a result of collaboration in NATO Bosnia policy and within IFOR, "... for the first time in 30 years the French now work in harmony with the Atlantic Alliance." This is no small accomplishment. Increased French cooperation within NATO, especially in the military structures of the Alliance, could hinge on the outcome of NATO's Bosnia mission. Undoubtedly, if the French perceive the peace agreement collapsed because of a U.S. withdrawal, the pace of French cooperation with the Alliance would be adversely affected. Paris also might accelerate its demands for "a restructuring of the Alliance" that would diminish U.S. influence within NATO. Cumulatively, these issues could result in a decreasing spiral of U.S. influence within the Alliance as a whole.

More broadly, a perceived "failure" in Bosnia because of a U.S. withdrawal could have consequences for European public support of NATO. In short, why pay for the expense of NATO if the United States is not prepared to support its allies? Why should Europeans not throw their support behind the WEU or another aspect of the "European Defense Pillar"? Similarly, will European publics continue to support a U.S. military presence? At the same time, U.S. public support of NATO or for a U.S. forward military presence in Europe might decline. A backlash also could diminish domestic backing for future vigorous foreign policy initiatives, as well as lead to reduced support for emerging democracies and purely humanitarian relief operations. Finally, the combined effect of an inward-looking and unilateralist U.S. attitude with weakened support for NATO could fragment the Atlantic Alliance, leading to the renationalization of European security agendas.

Taken together, these outcomes might result in a reduced U.S. military presence in Europe that would have a number of adverse consequences. On the one hand, past history indicates that forces removed from Europe tend to be eliminated from the force structure, as well. Moreover, the loss of forward stationed units and their logistics infrastructure undoubtedly would affect the U.S. ability to project power into Europe, the Mediterranean basin, and the Middle East. More importantly, a reduced U.S. presence in Europe or a complete withdrawal of forward stationed U.S. forces would adversely affect U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military influence on the continent. None of these outcomes serves the long-term interests of the United States, either in Europe or world-wide.

Broader Consequences in Europe. A U.S. withdrawal from IFOR, or a failure to participate in a successor force, may give the impression that the United States is uninterested in, or at least
gives a low priority to, ensuring a Balkan security order. Such an impression sends mixed signals to states in the region, as well as throughout Europe, about a prolonged U.S. commitment to security and stability. This puzzlement about U.S. intentions could greatly affect other, ongoing U.S. efforts in the region (e.g., Kosovo, mediation of tensions between Greece and Albania, ameliorating strained relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ensuring good relations between Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and efforts to defuse crises between Greece and Turkey) that have been successful, to date, in promoting stability.

Confusion about U.S. security aims has tremendous implications for Central and Eastern Europe as well, where a number of nations already perceive themselves caught in a security vacuum between Western Europe and Russia. U.S. actions in the Balkans may cause them draw their own conclusions on a U.S. commitment to a security arrangement for Central and Eastern Europe.

As a result, states may undertake policies (e.g., hard-line positions with neighboring governments that harbor ethnic brethren, renationalization of defense policies, increased spending on defense at the expense of domestic requirements, predominance of military over civil authorities, threats, or use of force, etc.) that undercut overarching U.S. objectives or interests.

Should war return to Bosnia-Hercegovina and conflict spill over into the rest of the Balkans, the consequences could be significant. For example, while the potential for the conflict to spread into Central Europe (via Hungary, perhaps because of the Hungarian minorities in the former Yugoslavia) is unlikely, it cannot be dismissed. More likely is the high potential for renewed conflict placing the stability and security of Southeastern Europe at risk. Plausible scenarios abound, ranging from ethnic strife in Kosovo to a worst case scenario, expansion of the fighting that brings Greece and Turkey--two NATO allies--into the conflict on opposite sides.

On a broader, pan-European level, resumed fighting could establish a precedent for using force to resolve political problems or change intra- or inter-state boundaries. Moreover, renewed conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina runs the risk of setting a precedent for establishing ethnically pure states. This model could have significant repercussions for states within Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe that confront their own ethnic issues.

Consequences for U.S. Global Security Interests. The inability of the United States to shape an enduring political arrangement in Bosnia and a resultant return to violence is
likely to have indirect consequences for U.S. global security interests, as well. Should nations question the depth of U.S. commitment to security and stability or its willingness to confront aggression, for example, U.S. influence might be diminished in key areas of the world.\textsuperscript{67} At the same time, potential opponents might perceive that they could challenge U.S. interests at low levels without fear of penalty. At the very least, subnational and transnational groups may draw the lesson that they have a fairly free hand to pursue their agendas in this new security order. In combination, these phenomena could contribute to a downward spiral of U.S. influence abroad. Eventually, the United States might find its deterrent capability eroded to the point that adversaries might directly confront major U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{68}

The potential damage that may be done to evolving NATO-Russian and U.S.-Russian relations is also significant, for Russian participation in IFOR has global implications. Throughout the IFOR deployment, relations with Russian forces have been excellent.\textsuperscript{69} But more critical is the growing trust being built between NATO, the United States, and Russia after 50 years of intense confrontation. How that trust might be affected by a U.S. withdrawal from Bosnia and a subsequent collapse of the Dayton Accords is not known. On the one hand, nationalist elements within the Duma, the government, and the military who have opposed Moscow's participation in IFOR might use a U.S. withdrawal to their political advantage at home.\textsuperscript{70} On the other hand, the absence of a strong U.S. presence in Bosnia might entice a more nationalist leadership, if one emerges, to intervene on the Serbian side of the crisis. In the event of renewed violence, U.S. support of the Bosniacs against Bosnian Serbs would set back gains made to date. At the very least, Russia could hamstring future efforts within the Contact Group to mediate a crisis.\textsuperscript{71}

Policymakers also must factor into their decisions the wider consequences of an IFOR withdrawal that creates a power vacuum in Bosnia. As the old saw goes, "power abhors a vacuum," and the most likely candidate to fill that void offers the United States little comfort. A U.S. withdrawal before the conditions for a more permanent political compromise have been achieved may give Sarajevo the impression that it has no choice but to turn to Iran for further assistance. An increased Iranian presence in the Balkans could destabilize the region, and certainly is not in the interests of either the United States or its European allies and partners who already oppose the limited Iranian presence in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{72} Moreover, such an increase in Iranian influence undoubtedly would have significant consequences for U.S. policy and interests not only in Europe, but throughout the Maghreb, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia.
The consequences of an IFOR withdrawal before the conditions for a durable political solution have been established could be severe, with U.S. policies (whether for Bosnia, the Balkans, NATO, Europe, or globally) suffering serious setbacks. Moreover, most potential outcomes of such an IFOR departure run counter to U.S. national interests. These conditions argue, therefore, either for extending IFOR's mission and adapting its structure to changed conditions or creating a follow-on force capable of implementing the Dayton Accords under anticipated circumstances. In developing either option, it would be prudent to begin by exploring potential alternatives for a force beyond December 1996.

**OPTIONS FOR A FOLLOW-ON FORCE**

While an eventual force obviously will depend upon the course of events over the coming months, it is possible to sketch, in broad terms, a number of alternatives. First, although the United States and other major coalition members continue to adhere to roughly a 12-month limit for participating in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR, continuing IFOR should not be dismissed out of hand. Much can happen before December. Should tensions rise over such issues as freedom of movement, return of refugees and displaced persons, collapse of the Bosniac-Croat Confederation (e.g., over Mostar), or hotly contested or postponed elections, compliance with the military aspects of Dayton could stall or be reversed, and violence could once again flare. Even if unlikely, this potential must be taken into account during deliberations.

A second option would be a peacekeeping effort under the United Nations. But, as Stanley Sloan of the Congressional Research Office points out, "There is absolutely no European desire to return to an UNPROFOR-type force that was limited by its military capabilities, its peacekeeping mandate, and U.N. operational control." Furthermore, given the perceived reputation of the United Nations in Bosnia, it is highly unlikely that some form of U.N. military mission would be welcome or successful in overseeing the peace agreement. In sum, a "U.N. solution" is not viable.

Another option cautiously being touted is for "Europe" to take on the responsibility for a follow-on force. This alternative faces significant obstacles. No European power or group of states has expressed a willingness to take on the formidable challenge of leading a European coalition. Nor do European security institutions represent a credible alternative to IFOR. The OSCE, for instance, lacks a military capability. The European Union (EU) with its military arm, the WEU, is the sole remaining organization remotely capable of mounting a similar operation. But earlier EU political efforts to defuse the Bosnian
crisis failed and may have fatally tainted the organization in the eyes of the factions. Moreover, the WEU has neither undertaken nor exercised such a major endeavor, and many Europeans express little confidence in the WEU's ability to manage an operation of such scope. And Jose Cutileiro, the WEU's Secretary General, has stated publicly that the WEU will not replace NATO in Bosnia.

The practical aspects of crafting a "coalition of the willing" under WEU leadership also present a number of daunting obstacles. First, the three major members of the WEU (France, Germany, and Britain) have stated repeatedly that they will not remain in Bosnia if the United States departs. Second, would PfP partners currently in IFOR contribute to a follow-on force absent a NATO imprimatur? Third, how would such a WEU-led coalition include Russian forces, which currently serve with the U.S. division under carefully crafted conditions? Fourth, how would the United States, which could be expected to provide key supporting elements (e.g., theater level communications, intelligence gathering and dissemination, strategic lift, and, possibly, a rapid reaction force), interface at the political level with a WEU-led force?

Even if the WEU could construct a coalition, several significant difficulties remain. For example, nations that could be expected to be major contributors to a WEU-led force also participated in UNPROFOR. Would the factions give a WEU coalition the same deference granted to IFOR, or would they see it merely as a new UNPROFOR? If the factions conclude the latter, then compliance with the military provisions of the Accords may slow or reverse. Factions might increasingly challenge the residual force, leading to new outbreaks of violence and a breakdown of the Dayton Agreement.

Finally, there is the question of whether a WEU-led coalition in Bosnia is in U.S. national interests. The United States has a considerable stake in the outcome of the Bosnian peace process, and relinquishing leadership of overseeing the Dayton Accords to the WEU undoubtedly would result in a loss of significant U.S. influence over what happens in Bosnia. Is the United States willing to surrender its ability to guide the course of operational events in Bosnia? If dissatisfied with conditions, will U.S. pressure to influence day-to-day operations create frictions similar to those that severely strained NATO in November-December 1994? More importantly, is the United States willing to relinquish its capacity to shape the overall political outcome in Bosnia, especially if conditions lead to outcomes (e.g., de facto partition) that are antithetical to U.S. policies?

On a broader scale, what effects might such an option have
on NATO? If a WEU-led effort fails, would NATO be blamed? If a WEU effort succeeds, what are the ramifications for NATO's long-term viability? In either event, the repercussions could adversely affect the stated U.S. goal of maintaining NATO's central role in Europe's security architecture? And, should NATO be undermined, will the United States be able to shape the European security environment? While answers to these questions are debatable, they are not likely to lead to the conclusion that a WEU-led coalition will best serve U.S. objectives and interests.

A final alternative is variously referred to as "NATO-minus," "IFOR Lite," or, more generally, "IFOR II." Essentially a pared down version of the current force, IFOR II would continue to operate under NATO control, but the size, structure, and composition of the residual force would be adapted to changed strategic and operational conditions. In tailoring the residual force, IFOR II could follow two branches: without or with substantial participation of U.S. ground troops.

The first instance suffers from drawbacks similar to the WEU-led coalition. For example, in light of the absence of significant U.S. combat troops (and potentially a number of other nations), would the factions in Bosnia view the residual force as IFOR II or UNPROFOR II? Granted, the expected environment would differ from the conditions under which UNPROFOR operated, but would circumstances be sufficiently changed to alter the perceptions of those who viewed UNPROFOR with disdain and generally ignored it? Moreover, should factions begin to challenge implementation, would the residual force have the requisite power to enforce the many and varied military provisions of the Dayton Accords? Or, might forces be reduced to the point that one or more factions perceive that they could cease compliance without fear of severe penalty? Should fighting resume, would a residual force have to resort to air strikes--while their forces are on the ground and U.S. troops are not--to quell the violence?

Answers to these questions are not possible at this time. But the number and complexity of these issues do not suggest a significant likelihood of a successful outcome. This judgment, therefore, argues for a more substantial IFOR II that includes a U.S. ground component of sufficient size and power to deter breaches of and, if required, to enforce the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement. In designing such a residual force, the critical first step is to examine the potential roles that it might be called upon to perform.

THE MILITARY ROLE IN UNDERWRITING A LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Near universal agreement exists that a long-term resolution
of the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina lies in the factions, assisted by the international community, implementing the civil portions of the peace agreement." The most difficult challenge may be in repairing the damage done by the war to the social fabric of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the individual and collective psyches of its populace. Fracture lines existed in Yugoslav society long before the outbreak of the conflict. In the 4 years of war, these cracks have become chasms, and full healing may require generations. Whether the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina can learn to live together in relative peace after these events is arguable under any circumstances." But absent successful implementation of the civil portions of the agreement, the final result is all too apparent.

These daunting challenges, for the most part, fall to civil authorities to implement. But that fact should not obscure the reality that, for the foreseeable future, IFOR or a successor ultimately holds the key to implementing effectively the civil elements of the Accords. Without NATO military forces and their partners to monitor the myriad and important provisions of the peace agreement, conflict will likely recur. Equally important, IFOR has established and continues to oversee a stable and secure environment that allows the civil government and international organizations to perform their missions. IFOR also provides opportunities for factions to work together, building the tenuous bonds of trust that over time may heal societal wounds. In short, with an outside military presence, there is a chance for an enduring political accommodation. Without such a force, little optimism exists for such an outcome.

The natural question that follows is what specific roles should IFOR (or its successor) perform? First, and foremost, military forces must continue the considerable and critical requirement to oversee enforcement of the military provisions of the peace agreement. As discussed earlier, each provision must be continuously monitored, reexamined, assessed, and enforced. Only in this manner can IFOR sustain a safe, secure environment in which the other elements of the peace process can function.

IFOR or a residual force also can play an important role beyond the strict enforcement of the military provisions of the Accords. IFOR currently provides a key deterrent to violence. Prolonged peace creates an inertia that inhibits the drive to return to war. IFOR additionally provides a clear example of how professional military forces execute their duties and sets the tone for military forces in the region. They highlight the subordination of military force to civil control. Use of Joint Military Commissions and military contacts also fosters military cooperation among the factions and contributes to the habit of using negotiation rather than force to resolve issues." IFOR also acts as an honest (or at least is perceived as the most honest)
broker in negotiations between the parties. IFOR has played and can continue to perform, therefore, a key role in building trust and confidence among the factions.

As part of building trust and confidence, IFOR can assist the OSCE in monitoring the regional stabilization portion of the framework agreement. While under the aegis of OSCE to negotiate and implement, most IFOR members have considerable experience in this arena as a result of their participation in OSCE's extensive confidence and security-building measures and the CFE Treaty. Further, as part of their responsibilities under the Dayton Accords, IFOR has already overseen the factions' withdrawal from the zone of separation, the establishment of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, the creation and enforcement of heavy weapons exclusion zones, the storage of air defense systems, the movement to and monitoring of forces in cantonment areas, and supervision of the demobilizations process. These skills and experiences naturally lend themselves to assisting the OSCE in data collection and confirmation, supervising destruction procedures, and monitoring overall verification of the provisions of an eventual arms control regime. A continued military presence also provides a strong incentive for the factions to comply with the agreements--particularly reduction and destruction provisions.

IFOR also can perform a number of actions beyond the scope of overseeing the military and arms control portions of the peace agreement. As envisaged at Dayton, IFOR is and can continue to:

. . . fulfill its [IFOR] supporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request, which include the following:

(a) to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections;

(b) to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions;

(c) to assist the UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions;

(d) to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person; and,

(e) to monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles.

While some observers and policymakers might object to IFOR
performing these support tasks, civil and military leaders must understand that strict adherence solely to overseeing the military provisions of the peace agreement is short-sighted and actually could prolong the need for an outside military presence.

This duality of military and civil support actions will require IFOR to hew to a fine line between its primary and secondary military functions. In this vein, a number of cautions deserve comment. In the short term, IFOR must ensure that support to civil operations does not detract from the ability to conduct military operations in support of the Accords. As indicated earlier, oversight of the military provisions of the agreement is a continuous and important process. But, as implementation proceeds, demands on military forces should be reduced, and IFOR (or its successor) should be able to shift safely to other issues.

In providing support to civil authorities, military and civil leaders must ensure that civil organizations, not military forces, take the lead in implementing the civil portions of the agreement and in conducting humanitarian operations. The underlying problems in Bosnia are essentially political, economic, and social in nature; military power alone cannot lead to an enduring political solution. Civil issues must be resolved by civil acts. Military forces can support the process, but civil organizations, particularly organs of the Bosnian government, must begin functioning and take on the difficult task of running their country and bringing peace to their land.

Policymakers need to devise, therefore, a complementary dual-track program that makes use of the special capabilities that the military can bring to conflict resolution, but which does not make a stable political understanding in Bosnia depend upon an outside military presence. In short, as designed in the Dayton Agreement, the factions are and must remain ultimately responsible for a peaceful resolution of the underlying causes of the conflict.

CONCLUSIONS

NATO military forces and their partners in IFOR have played a critical and successful role in halting conflict in Bosnia and bringing stability to the region. But, short-term military success does not lead necessarily to a long-term political arrangement. That having been said, the basis of a lasting settlement will depend to a significant degree on the ability of an outside military presence to sustain a secure environment that supports the other elements of the peace process.

While IFOR has established such conditions, that foundation is fragile. If prevailing circumstances are not sustained, the
current hiatus in Bosnia-Hercegovina may represent little more than an operational pause before the factions return to using force to achieve their goals. Such an outcome obviously would stymie U.S. national objectives in Bosnia.

But more than U.S. objectives in Bosnia are at stake. A failed U.S.-brokered and led agreement in Bosnia will have considerable repercussions for U.S. policy and national interests well beyond the Balkans. NATO's credibility could be irrevocably damaged. Certainly, U.S. leadership in the Alliance would be called into question. And, surrendering leadership in the Bosnian crisis may be construed as another example of U.S. disengagement from European, as well as global, security issues. Worse yet, a perceived foreign policy failure is likely to reduce U.S. public support for substantial engagement in international affairs, leading to an inward-looking and unilateralist U.S. attitude that further constrains U.S. foreign policy. The cumulative effect of these phenomena could contribute to a downward spiral of U.S. influence abroad.

The United States, therefore, cannot simply engage 12 months and then withdraw from Bosnia, leaving no adequate residual force to oversee the military provisions of the Dayton Accords. Instead, the United States must begin now to review its position on participating in IFOR or a successor beyond the scheduled December 1996 deadline. During this reexamination, policymakers should focus less on the narrow application of military power within a constrained time limit and more broadly on achieving U.S. policy objectives in Bosnia, the Balkans, Europe, and globally.

In their deliberations, policymakers should take into account a number of factors. If current trends hold, a smaller residual force may be adequate. While the exact size and composition of a such a force will be dictated by future events, the force must possess sufficient military capability to ensure continued adherence to the provisions of the various agreements. This would include the ability to inhibit violations of the agreement, to deter factions from violence, to provide rapid and violent response to any breaches of the ceasefire, to ensure force protection, and to provide sufficient reconnaissance and information acquisition capabilities to support operations.

These requirements argue for a coalition force that contains roughly 5-7 maneuver brigades (or, approximately one-half of the current IFOR commitment) attack helicopters, transport helicopters, intelligence collection, communications, and logistical support. At the same time, a need for Civil Affairs units, Psychological Operations personnel, Military Police, and Engineers that can perform dual tasks for military and civil operations may alter the proportion of combat versus combat
support and combat service support units required for a residual force. 

U.S. national interests, the course of events in the Balkans, and the absence of a viable alternative force, argue for continued NATO and, especially, U.S. leadership in further efforts to resolve the Bosnian crisis. The ability to lead subsequent efforts will, to a degree, be determined by the level of forces the United States is willing to provide. Given the size of an overall residual force, the U.S. ground contribution could consist of one maneuver brigade, an aviation brigade, and appropriate combat support and combat service support units. Additionally, the United States should provide unique capabilities essential for conduct of the mission (e.g., attack helicopters, intelligence, theater communications, civil affairs and psychological operations). The United States may also wish to offer the core of a division headquarters.

How long U.S. military forces should continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement cannot be forecast with confidence at this point. But it is apparent at the moment that one year will not be sufficient to establish conditions conducive to a long-range political solution in Bosnia-Hercegovina. At the same time, factions must be made aware that an extension of U.S. participation is not an openended commitment. In sum, U.S. forces should be prepared to remain in IFOR or its successor until such time that U.S. national objectives are achieved or have been adapted to changed strategic conditions.

Decisions surrounding continued U.S. participation in overseeing the peace agreement in Bosnia will be neither easy nor insignificant. Nonetheless, they will have to be made, and in the not too distant future. Now, therefore, is the time to examine the issues that will determine whether the United States will continue to lead efforts to ensure a long-term political settlement in Bosnia that will further contribute to U.S. national objectives and interests in Europe and globally. In these deliberations participants must keep in mind that achieving U.S. objectives in Bosnia is more akin to running a marathon than a sprint. And, like a successful marathon runner, the United States must demonstrate determination, endurance, and the ability to withstand temporary pain.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The United States should base its decision on continued participation in IFOR on whether U.S. national objectives and interests have been achieved, not on a rigid timetable.

• Should current trends continue, the United States should participate in IFOR, or some residual military mission, beyond
December 1996.

- NATO must remain the regional security organization responsible for overseeing the military aspects of the peace agreement.

- The size and composition of a follow-on force should be adapted to the pace of compliance with the peace accords and conditions in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Given the anticipated size of an overall residual force (roughly two divisions) and assuming that the United States desires to retain a leadership role in that force:

  -- The U.S. ground contribution should consist of one maneuver brigade, an aviation brigade, and appropriate combat support and combat service support units.

  -- The United States may also wish to consider providing the core of a division headquarters.

  -- Additionally, the United States should be prepared to contribute unique capabilities (e.g., attack helicopters, intelligence and surveillance, communications, aviation, civil affairs and PSYOP), as required.

  -- The United States should offer Russia the opportunity for continued association with U.S. forces.

- Should the United States decide to extend its participation in IFOR, or an alternative residual force, the U.S. Government must:

  -- Begin building now a bipartisan consensus in Congress to support operations beyond December 1996.

  -- Build consensus with NATO allies and partners currently participating in IFOR to reapportion responsibilities, as required.

  -- Ensure international and European organizations shoulder their responsibilities under the peace agreement.

ENDNOTES

1. Versions of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina [hereafter GFAP] may be found at a number of INTERNET sites. See, for example, Department of State--http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/www/current/bosnia/bosagreement.html; NATO Gopher--gopher://coa.shape.nato.int:70/11/bosnia or IFOR homepage--http://www.nato.int/for/gfa/gfa-home.html.

3. How the deadline is interpreted may be open to question. For example, one might conclude that the deadline meant that all forces would have to leave Bosnia before December 20, 1996. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Perry recently indicated that redeployment might commence about that time. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Exit Strategy," The New York Times, April 24, 1996, p. 21. Impediments to such a reassessment are considerable. The potential political risks of extending the deployment of U.S. forces are high. Key members of the Executive Branch have repeatedly reaffirmed a December withdrawal date, and a retreat from the current policy could have considerable domestic backlash. (See, for example, Jack Kelley, "Defense Chief Stands By Bosnia Plan," USA Today, April 1, 1996, pp. 1, 11; Bradley Graham, "Shalikashvili Again Endorses Bosnia Withdrawal Schedule," The Washington Post, April 3, 1996, p. 16; and Friedman, "Exit Strategy," p. 21.) Moreover, congressional support for an extension is questionable and increases political risks. Congressional support for the original deployment was tepid, at best, and often couched in terms of supporting the troops but not the decision to send them. (See, for example, Katharine Q. Seelye, "Some G.O.P. Senators Refusing to Back Dole on Bosnia Mission," The New York Times, December 7, 1995, p. 5; Ray Gugliotta, "House Freshmen Remain Skeptical of Bosnia Plan," The Washington Post, December 13, 1995, p. 35; and "Senate Proposal on Bosnia," The Washington Post, December 14, 1995, p. 39.) Nor is current support overwhelming. See, for instance, "Reports of Delay in Return of Troops Upset Rep. Gilman" [Chairman, House International Relations Committee], Baltimore Sun, April 27, 1996, p. 10; and Senator Arlen Spector's comment: "The American people and Congress are not going to be disposed to leaving our forces there beyond a year," in The Washington Times, March 28, 1996, p. 4.) That having been said, the strategic risks of a premature withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Bosnia outweigh the potential domestic consequences.


6. While it may seem early for such a discussion, the decision point is fast approaching. Leaders from the Executive Branch, Congress, and DOD adamantly reaffirm a U.S. departure will start in mid-December 1996. (See Friedman, "Exit Strategy," p. 21.) It took 65 days to complete deployment of U.S. forces into Bosnia-Hercegovina. Removing the personnel and materiel of a year-long build up will likely be more difficult and time consuming. (See Rick Atkinson, "Next Topic: Getting Out of Bosnia," The Washington Post, March 22, 1996, pp. 1, 27.) Considerable planning for a withdrawal would have to precede actual movement of forces and will have to commence in the not too distant future. Policy decisions necessary to guide those deliberations will have to be taken in advance of the actual military planning. Indeed, Carl Bildt, the High Representative, has indicated that such a decision must be made by June (Laura Silber and Bruce Clarke, "West Fearful For Post-IFOR Bosnia," The Financial Times, London, April 1, 1996, p. 3).

7. A public decision to remain may result in factions dragging their feet, and diminishing the impetus to work toward a
lasting political solution before IFOR departs. Conversely, a public announcement might provide more incentive to turn to the long-term demands of a settlement and a disincentive to prepare for resumed conflict if IFOR departs before the basis for a lasting settlement can be established.

8. While current focus has been on the presence of mujahideen forces, the provisions apply equally to ethnic Serbian and Croatian personnel that were required to leave Bosnia-Hercegovina. Given the proximity of these personnel and their ease of return to Bosnia, IFOR presence plays a role in monitoring this potential violation of the Accords should relations within Bosnia deteriorate.


11. For details of the arbitration provisions, see GFAP, Annex 2, Article V.


14. GAO, Briefing, "Peace Operations in Bosnia: Challenges to Sustainable Peace," n.d., p. 11, notes the following: 80 percent of the population relies on humanitarian food aid; annual per capita income of $500; industrial output at 5 percent of 1990 levels; and one-third of health facilities, one-half of school buildings, 80 percent of homes, and 40 percent of roads and bridges were damaged or destroyed during the war.

15. See, for instance, Christine Spolar, "Skimping By on the Wages of Peace," The Washington Post, April 26, 1996, p. 27; Edith M. Lederer, "'Urgency' Reported in Bosnia Aid Effort,"

17. While the focus of this section is on the elections and creation of government institutions, one cannot overlook additional and important efforts, such as establishing a functioning judicial system, creating police forces that the public perceives as legitimate, implementing constitutional procedures, and creating an environment that supports human rights. Each of these issues is complex and challenging in its own right, but when added together and combined with elections, they offer a formidable test.

18. For specific details, see Annexes 3-11 of GFAP.


22. For specific provisions, see GFAP, Annex 1B, Agreement on Regional Stabilization.


24. GFAP, Annex 1B, Agreement on Regional Stabilization, Article I.


26. For example, relative proportions of reductions, the verification of data, reductions, transfer of excess equipment, destruction mechanisms, inspection provisions, and enforcement provisions. For details, see ibid.


Additional examples of congressional pressure may be found in Senator Jesse Helms, "Don't Send Troops; Send Arms," The Los Angeles Times, December 13, 1995, p. 11; and Katharine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Gives Republicans Pledge on Arming Bosnians," The New York Times, December 13, 1995, p. 16. Moreover, the program may have been the key to getting the Bosniac faction to accept the Dayton Accords. See, for example, Srecko Latal, "U.S., Others Rearm Muslim-Croat Army; British, French Oppose Move," Philadelphia Inquirer, May 24, 1996, p. 6.


40. For earlier difficulties over use of air strikes, see,


42. The possible tenor of such tensions is reflected in the comments of an unnamed west European diplomat: "'We were killed and humiliated, while Washington, which had no soldiers on the ground could afford to be nice to the Bosnian Moslems and criticise Europe . . . We will not repeat this.'" Silber and Clarke, "West Fearful for Post-IFOR Bosnia." If, however, no allied or partner forces remain in Bosnia- Hercegovina, it may ease the use of the air power option. That having been said, generating the consensus necessary to resume NATO air strikes would be a formidable task. For European desires on a continued U.S. ground presence see, for example, Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR," p. 4.


44. Unless the United States is willing to employ a considerable portion of its naval air power.

45. For example, using the containment option in conjunction with the limited application of military force to halt the fighting may have dramatically different consequences then using containment and allowing a military solution to the conflict.

46. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 35; and NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-2(94)116, December 11, 1994, para 20. NATO containment is also evidenced by NATO Operations SHARP GUARD (enforcing the arms embargo of the former Yugoslavia) and DENY FLIGHT (enforcing the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia).

48. Both of these outcomes run counter to stated U.S. objectives in the Bosnian conflict. See A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 35.

49. Numerous scenarios outlining how events could spin out of control are possible. Renewed fighting could lead to a Bosnian Serb defeat, triggering a wider reaction. Croatia and Serbia could turn on the Bosniac portion of the Federation leading to a broader Balkan war. Spread of violence into Kosovo would undoubtedly draw Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey into conflict. Failure to resolve peacefully the return of Eastern Slavonia to Croatia could result in a Croat military operation that has the potential to draw Serbia into the conflict.

50. The U.S.-sponsored program suffers from a lack of support from U.S. NATO allies, as well as financial support from outside parties. See, for example, Landay, "US Plan for a Balance of Power in Bosnia Is Left Out of Kilter"; Chris Hedges, "U.S.-Led Aid for Bosnian Army in Jeopardy," The New York Times, March 22, 1996, p. 1, 3; and Couturier, "Bosnian-Croat Army Has Few Backers." Moreover, U.S. concerns over a residual Iranian presence in Bosnia has further slowed the program. See, for example, Smucker, "Disputes Delay Aid to Bosnia's Military."

51. For example, should the Bosniac-Croatian Federation defeat the forces of the Republika Srpska, Croatia could turn on Bosnia. Or, the ethnic Croatian minority could cleave off from Bosnia while Croatian military power denied an effective Bosniac response. Or, in a worst case scenario, Croatia and Serbia could be drawn into the conflict, leading to a division of Bosnia between those two states. While these outcomes are pessimistic, they are nonetheless possible. President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia has already indicated such a potential division of spoils. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Whose Balkan Menu?," The New York Times, September 27, 1995, p. 23.

52. Given congressional and public reaction to the initial deployment, it may be very difficult to garner support to reintroduce forces if the factions are perceived to have "lost the peace." For congressional and public attitudes toward the initial deployment of U.S. ground troops, see, for example, R.W. Apple, Jr., "Flimsy Bosnia Mandate," The New York Times, December 14, 1995, p. A1; Helen Dewar and Guy Gugliotta, "Senate Backs Troops to Bosnia; House Fails to Block Funding;" The Washington Post, December 14, 1995, p.1; and Guy Gugliotta, "House Freshmen Remain Skeptical on Bosnia Plan," The Washington Post, December 13, 1995, p. 35; and John E. Yang, "House Votes to Limit Role of


55. Which is a stated U.S. policy objective. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 35.


57. As French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette recently remarked: "It is important not to be obsessed with leaving as early as possible. The fundamental situation is more important than the timetable." Baudoin Bollaert, Le Figaro, March 25, 1996, p.5, in FBIS-WEU-96-059, March 26, 1996, p. 28. For reported splits within the Alliance over the withdrawal deadline, see Christopher Lockwood, "Atlantic Rift Over 'Chaos' Fear After NATO Quits Bosnia," The Daily Telegraph, London, April 2, 1996, p. 25; Silber and Clarke, "West Fearful for Post-IFOR Bosnia;" and Atkinson, "NATO Already Eyeing Exits."

58. Granted, other allies may be equally willing to depart in December, but the United States will not be able to escape criticism because, by declaring first, the others will be able to claim they were forced to withdraw because of the United States.


60. Internal NATO concerns about enlargement stem largely from fear of antagonizing Russia, and anxieties that enlargement
could lead to a "cold peace." Despite over 2 years of attempting to assuage Russian concerns, Moscow continues vehemently to oppose NATO expansion. See, for example, Deborah Seward, "U.S., Russia Remain Apart on NATO's Expansion Plans," The Washington Times, March 22, 1996. For an example of extreme Russian rhetoric which fuels such concerns, see Lee Hockstader, "Russian Warns of Attack If NATO Expands East," The Washington Post, February 16, 1996, p. A29. Secondary concerns focus on costs (fiscal and opportunity) associated with expanding the Alliance. See, for example, Theresa Hitchens, "Voices Rise for Slow NATO Growth," Defense News, April 22-28, 1996, p. 46. The larger issue is whether allies, potential allies, and partners will accept U.S. rhetoric supporting enlargement if the United States prematurely withdraws from Bosnia.


63. For example, the 3d Armored Division, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), VII Corps, and the considerable number of associated corps and theater support units.


65. For example, Croatian and Bosniac successes could bring in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. A number of scenarios that lead to a wider Balkan war long have been articulated.

66. For example, Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Serbia, and Romania. For other examples see William T. Johnsen, Pandora's
Box Reopened: Ethnic Conflict in Europe and Its Implications, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 23, 1994, especially Appendix A.

67. For instance, key allies within NATO might question the level of U.S. commitment to Europe. Or, ongoing peace efforts between Israel and Syria that may hinge on a U.S. military presence on the Golan Heights could go awry.


73. A number of alternatives have been posited in recent months. See, for example, Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR;"


75. Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR," p. 3.


78. Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR," p. 3.


81. Perhaps they would remain because many also desire EU membership, but the question still deserves reflection.

82. For example, France, Britain, the Netherlands.

84. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 35.

85. Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR," p. 4; Barry, "After IFOR," p. 4; Lockwood, "Atlantic Rift Over 'Chaos' Fear After NATO Quits Bosnia."

86. Europeans have expressed concern over these issues. Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR," p. 4.

87. Indications are that Britain and French, at least, are not willing to sanction such circumstances: 'We were killed and humiliated, while Washington, which had no soldiers on the ground could afford to be nice to the Bosnian Moslems and criticise Europe,' said one west European diplomat. 'We will not repeat this.'" Silber and Clarke, "West Fearful for Post-IFOR Bosnia."


89. This is not as far fetched as it appears at first glance. France and Germany have enjoyed 50 years of peace after a thousand years of conflict. Israel and the PLO are making slow, but steady progress. Reconciliation, therefore, is within the realm of the possible.

90. See, for example, Carlos Bongioanni, "Sowing the Seeds of Cooperation," Stars and Stripes (Europe), March 25, 1996, p. 5. Whether this habit will hold after an eventual IFOR withdrawal remains to be seen. Only the factions can determine whether the seed of cooperation falls on fertile ground.

91. The example of IFOR facilitating changes in the Inter-Entity Boundary Line is but one important example. For results of such negotiations, see, for example, IFOR Press Conference, May 9, 1996, gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int/70/00/yugo/iftr/0905.96.

92. GFAP, Annex 1B, Agreement on Regional Stabilization.

93. For example, NATO nations and partners have been involved in confidence and security building measures since Stockholm in 1986. This experience has greatly increased since the Vienna Document of 1990. More importantly, NATO members and
many PfP partners have extensive experience in the CFE Treaty, which served as the model of the arms control portions of the regional stabilization provisions.

94. GFAP, Annex 1-A, Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Article VI, paragraph 3.


96. NATO and IFOR have indicated that such shifts will commence shortly. See, for example, Karen Blakeman, "IFOR Now Turns to Helping Rebuild," Stars and Stripes (Europe), April 23, 1996, p. 4; Edith M. Lederer, "Rebuilding Bosnia Is Now a Mission for NATO Troops," The Washington Times, March 26, 1996, p. A11; IFOR AFSOUTH Transcript March 25, 1996, p. 2; and NATO Press Release (96) 60, April 29, 1996.

97. Specific tasks might include:

@ENDNOTESPACING = a. Continue to enforce the military elements of the GFAP (ZOS, IEBL, etc.).

@ENDNOTESPACING = b. Provide general secure environment.

@ENDNOTESPACING = c. Promote freedom of movement.

@ENDNOTESPACING = d. Provide reaction forces, "sticks" if necessary to ensure compliance.

@ENDNOTESPACING = e. Provide support (not take the lead) to civil agencies in implementing the civil portions of the GFAP. Civil and military efforts must proceed in tandem if the basis for a lasting political settlement is to be achieved, and U.S. national objectives are to be attained.

@ENDNOTESPACING = f. Assist in confidence building measures, overseeing the implementation of the arms control provisions as they are worked out.

@ENDNOTESPACING = g. Perhaps most importantly continue to
act as the (most) honest broker in arbitrating military, and, if necessary, civil issues concerning the implementation of the agreement.

@ENDNOTESPACING = h. Continue to serve as a deterrent force that prevents the factions from resuming the war.

98. General John Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated the United States may reapportion its force mix. Karen Blakeman, "NATO Won't Cut Bosnia Troops, but May Alter Mix, General Says," Stars and Stripes (Europe), April 24, 1996, p. 1.

99. In the post-Cold War era, a maneuver brigade has become the "coin of the realm" for participation and leadership in multinational formations.