U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC PLANNING:
THE MISSING NEXUS

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the authors by calling Dr. Lovelace at commercial (717) 245-3010 or DSN 242-3010; or Dr. Young at commercial (717) 245-4058 or DSN 242-4058.
FOREWORD

This is the pilot in a series of reports on strategic planning conducted within the U.S. Department of Defense. It focuses on the strategic planning responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because planning at that level provides the critical nexus between the strategic direction provided by the National Command Authorities and its implementation by the unified combatant commands and military departments. The authors’ thorough understanding of the statutory requirements for strategic planning and the interactions between the Chairman’s complex strategic planning process and other key DOD planning systems enables them to explicate today’s strategic planning challenges and offer insightful recommendations.

Strategic planning in the post-Cold War era has proven to be exceptionally problematic. The plethora of national and international tensions that the east-west confrontation of the Cold War in large measure subdued combine now to create a world replete with diverse challenges to U.S. interests. Equally disturbing is the fact that these challenges are not as clearly defined and easily articulated as was the monolithic Soviet threat. The authors point out that the Cold War provided inherent stability in U.S. strategic planning and that the basic elements of a strategic military plan evolved over time. They go on to argue that the elimination of the National Military Strategy Document and the abandonment of the Base Case Global Family of Operation Plans amounted to rescission of the Chairman’s strategic plan, and that nothing has been developed to take its place.

In this thought-provoking study, the authors define a formal strategic plan: one that contains specific strategic objectives, offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives, illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized with the Future Years Defense Program. They discuss the reasons why a strategic plan is needed and the value it would have in coherently connecting the guidance provided by the National Command Authorities to the integrated activities of the unified commands, the Services, and other components of DoD. They conclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategic planning processes and to facilitate efficient development of strategic plans. They settle on a set of recommendations that they believe would comprehensively link the major elements of
current strategic planning, albeit modified in some cases, and establish a clearer military foundation for DoD resource decisions.

Thus, the National Military Strategic Plan, proposed by the authors, would stand as the centerpiece of a system incorporating:

- Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments;
- CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists;
- The new Chairman’s Program Recommendation;
- The Unified Command Plan;
- The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; and,
- Joint Military Net Assessments.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this report as a contribution to the ongoing defense planning debate.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. joined SSI in September 1994 on his retirement from active duty with the U.S. Army. His Army career included a combat tour in Vietnam and a number of command and staff assignments. While serving in the Plans, Concepts and Assessments Division and the War Plans Division of the Joint Staff, he collaborated in the development of documents such as the National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Joint Military Net Assessment, NSD 74, PDD 25, and others. He was also Director of Military Requirements and Capabilities Management at the U.S. Army War College. He is a contributor to The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. He holds a B.S. in aerospace management and an M.A. in business from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG has held the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College since 1992. From 1988 to 1992, he was a National Security Affairs Analyst at the Institute. Prior to this appointment, he was a country risk analyst for BERI, S.A., a Swiss-based consulting firm. Dr. Young received his Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland, and is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has published extensively on U.S. alliance issues with particular emphasis on Western Europe and the Southwest Pacific.
The development of strategic plans by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide the critical nexus in connecting the National Command Authorities’ strategic direction of the U.S. armed forces with the planning and operations conducted by the combatant commands and the support provided by the Services and defense agencies. Title 10, United States Code, establishes a structured hierarchy for strategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planning for the Department of Defense. The Chairman is responsible for assisting the National Command Authorities in their strategic direction endeavors, for preparing strategic plans, and for providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans. The absence of strategic plans in the post-Cold War era has precluded the identification and establishment of priorities for specific strategic objectives, inhibited planning for future military capabilities, and has not allowed for the integration of the operation planning and theater strategies of the combatant commands. Additionally, without strategic plans, there is a void in the underlying rationale for the assignment of service functions and the development of joint doctrine. This essay defines “strategic plans” and offers an approach to their development.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Chairman should develop a National Military Strategic Plan.

• The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan should continue in its current form, but the guidance, force apportionments, and taskings it provides should be based on the National Military Strategic Plan.

• The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should be reoriented so they evaluate, integrate, and prioritize the CINCs’ requirements.

• The JROC should be divested of its oversight responsibility for the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments reaffirming its original charter. Oversight of the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should become a Director of
the Joint Staff responsibility on behalf of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman.

• The Chairman’s Program Recommendation should be published as a product of the reoriented Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process.

• Assessment of force capabilities, strengths and deficiencies identified by the CINCs should be based on the National Military Strategic Plan.

• The evaluation, integration, and establishment of priorities for the CINCs’ requirements should be based upon the National Military Strategic Plan.

• DoD should discontinue use of Defense Planning Guidance scenarios in the development of service programs in favor of conformance to the National Military Strategic Plan.

(Note: The full set of recommendations derived from this study begins on page 31.)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC PLANNING: 
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Introduction.

Strategic planning is a challenging, but necessary, endeavor for any organization, small or large. For the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) it is a sacred responsibility to the Nation. President Eisenhower said in 1958, "No military task is of greater importance than the development of strategic plans which relate our revolutionary new weapons and force deployments to national security objectives." In spite of its attention to strategic planning, DoD has not enjoyed great success in this area. For example, in 1985, a congressional staff report characterized DoD’s strategic planning in the following manner:

Inattention to strategic planning has led to numerous deficiencies, including a lack of clarity of DoD’s strategic goals. The stated goals are vague and ambiguous. In an organization as large as DoD, the clear articulation of overall strategic goals can play an important role in achieving a coordinated effort toward these goals by the various components and individuals within them. Clarity of goals can enhance unity and integration. DoD loses the benefit of this unifying mechanism through its failure to clarify its strategic goals. To correct this problem and other strategic planning deficiencies, DoD needs to establish and maintain a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process.

Following up on this staff finding, Congress, in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), prescribed for DoD a hierarchical process for strategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planning for the U.S. Armed Forces. This process was designed to improve strategic planning by harmonizing strategic direction and planning with the development of defense programs that would enable DoD to achieve its strategic goals. It was also designed to integrate and rationalize the strategic and operational planning conducted by the combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). To these ends, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) was assigned key and specific responsibilities. Since passage of
the GNA, which is now codified in Title 10, United States Code (10 USC), the JCS and then the Chairman have developed, implemented, and revised specific processes for fulfilling most of these statutory responsibilities.

Enactment of the GNA notwithstanding, strategic planning currently conducted by the Joint Staff, on behalf of the Chairman, does not adequately establish and specify strategic objectives nor does it integrate and establish priorities for them. In short, current strategic planning for the U.S. Armed Forces is of limited use in planning for future military capabilities and integrating the planning conducted by the CINCs. It should ensure that both of these efforts conform to national military and security objectives. Equally disturbing, it does not provide sufficient underlying rationale for the review of service functions nor does it provide unequivocal and compelling bases for the development and implementation of joint doctrine.

This essay will describe and assess the strategic direction and planning processes used by the Chairman, identify and discuss difficulties with the extant processes, and assess potential solutions. It will focus on the strategic planning conducted at the Chairman’s level because that planning should provide the critical nexus between national security policy formulation and the execution of that policy by the CINCs. It should also serve as the critical link between the requirements of the CINCs and the programs designed by the Services to meet those requirements.

We recognize that substantial and ultimate responsibility for strategic direction and strategic planning resides with the Secretary of Defense and President, and that the processes they use and the products they produce affect the efforts of the Chairman. Therefore, this essay will also examine and assess aspects of the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) issued by the Secretary of Defense to initiate the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

To provide a foundation for analysis, this essay will first define “strategic plans” as used in the GNA and 10 USC. To frame more clearly and describe the strategic planning responsibilities of the Chairman, a brief review of the President’s and Secretary of Defense’s roles in this arena will be conducted. Next an
examination of the current Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) will be presented, followed by a discussion of many of the strategic planning initiatives implemented since passage of the GNA. Inadequacies within the current strategic planning processes which inhibit their utility in assisting the Chairman in providing integrated strategic advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA) will be identified and assessed to show that these deficiencies result from the absence of a comprehensive strategic plan. The current planning processes produce a plethora of documents designed to provide unified strategic direction to the Services, CINCs and defense agencies, and timely military advice to the National Command Authorities. However, assessments of those documents reveal significant inadequacies because the prime integrating document, a strategic plan, is absent. The essay concludes with recommendations for changes in the current strategic planning system.

**Strategic Planning Defined.**

At the outset, one must begin with a clear definition of strategic planning, particularly strategic planning at the Chairman’s level. Although 10 USC requires the Chairman to prepare strategic plans, it provides no convenient definition. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines a “strategic plan” simply as “the plan for the overall conduct of a war.” This definition is clearly deficient since it is not in consonance with the statutory references to strategic plans, nor does it allow for strategic planning, except for war. One can, however, arrive at a useful definition by determining the purposes for which strategic plans are intended. The intent of the legislation can be determined by a review of congressional action leading up to the passage of the GNA. Such a review shows that strategic plans should enumerate specific strategic objectives, identify fiscal and other constraints, offer strategy for securing objectives, and play a key role in determining force capability requirements.

An amalgamation of the various specific references to strategic plans within 10 USC provides a comprehensive definition. These plans:

- are to be prepared by the Chairman and should conform to the resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be
available for the periods during which the plans are to be effective;

• should be useful for assessing the capabilities of U.S. and allies’ armed forces versus potential adversaries;

• are differentiated from, and are a level above, contingency plans prepared by the CINCs; \(^{10}\)

• should serve as a standard against which force capability strengths and deficiencies are measured; \(^{11}\)

• should contain strategic priorities that can be used to assess contributions of service programs; \(^{12}\) and,

• should integrate the theater strategies and plans of the CINCs to ensure conformance to national military and security objectives. \(^{13}\)

From the above, one can distill a succinct definition of a strategic plan that is appropriate for the strategic planning requirements specified in 10 USC. It is a plan that specifies, in military terms, the national strategic objectives for the defense planning period under consideration (the Future Years Defense Program–FYDP period) and describes a strategy that rationalizes the resources expected to be available during the FYDP with the strategic objectives described in the plan. \(^{14}\)

To support further the intent of 10 USC, a strategic plan must be based on a global perspective and should also provide:

• a definitive statement of strategic priorities;

• a means of providing unified, strategic direction for the combatant commands;

• a template for formulating and assessing changes in the assignment of service functions; and,

• a basis for strategic concepts upon which joint doctrine should be based.

This definition and description of strategic plans are
crucial in understanding the strategic planning responsibilities specified in 10 USC and current imperfections in strategic planning at the Chairman’s level.

**Strategic Planning of the National Command Authorities.**

*The President.* Atop the strategic planning hierarchy presented in section 153 of 10 USC, rests the strategic planning responsibilities of the President and the Secretary of Defense. The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) requires the President to transmit to Congress each year, along with the budget for the next fiscal year, a comprehensive report on the U.S. national security strategy. The statute requires the national security strategy report (*National Security Strategy [NSS]*) to present the national security strategy of the United States and a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

- the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States;

- the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States;

- the proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to above;

- the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy; and,

- such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.\(^\text{16}\)

Traditionally, however, administrations to varying degrees
have been loath to use the NSS as the effective policy instrument envisaged by Congress. The most recent strategy, published in February 1995, is entitled A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.\(^\text{17}\) As much as 20 percent of the document is devoted to describing accomplishments of the current administration.\(^\text{18}\) (Although this is not a novel use of the NSS, there are more appropriate fora for reporting administration accomplishments.\(^\text{19}\)) While this NSS provides useful definitions of “vital,” important,” and “humanitarian” interests, a noteworthy improvement over its predecessors, it does not describe specific areas where those interests are at stake. Moreover, it does not offer policy guidance establishing clear priorities of national interests.\(^\text{20}\) In essence, therefore, the NSS generally describes what is to be accomplished, and to some extent how, but is not sufficient to translate general policy into executable strategy.\(^\text{21}\)

An assessment, therefore, of the NSS leads to the conclusion that, in general, it is not the “comprehensive description and discussion” required by the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended by the GNA).\(^\text{22}\) While this is an important finding, it is not damning with respect to the strategic planning for which the Chairman is responsible. The NSS provides useful guidance for the development of the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Chairman can develop the strategy in whatever degree of detail he desires so long as it does not contradict any of the general guidance contained in the NSS. The more general the NSS, the more flexibility the Chairman enjoys in designing the NMS. Continuing this logic a step further, one can conclude that the NSS would not inhibit the development of strategic plans by the Chairman; it is not sufficiently specific to have that effect.

The Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is an intended beneficiary, but not an author, of strategic plans.\(^\text{23}\) However, to complete an assessment of the policy guidance upon which the Chairman bases his strategic planning, two of the Secretary’s statutory responsibilities must be addressed. 10 USC requires the “Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [to] provide annually to the heads of the Department of Defense components written policy guidance for the preparation and review of program recommendations and budget proposals of their respective components, including guidance on:
national security objectives and policies;

- the priorities of military missions; and,

- the resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such recommendations and proposals are to be effective."

To fulfill this responsibility, the Secretary publishes the Defense Planning Guidance.25

It is a misperception that the strategic direction provided in the National Security Strategy travels along two branches within DoD, one to the Secretary of Defense who translates it into the DPG, and the other to the Chairman who uses it to develop the National Military Strategy. In actuality, the branching of strategic direction occurs at the Chairman’s level, and the DPG, although a Secretary of Defense document, is more directly influenced by the Chairman’s strategy than by the NSS.26 Given this relationship, it can be concluded that the DPG neither enhances nor inhibits the strategic planning of the Chairman. However, the Secretary of Defense must provide the Chairman with a realistic projection of the defense resource levels expected to be available for the planning period under consideration.27 The Chairman, in turn, is obliged to provide the Secretary of Defense with key recommendations resulting from his strategic planning which should inform the development of the DPG. The Chairman’s strategic planning provides the foundation for the first “P” in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.28

However, the very general nature of the National Military Strategy precludes its use as the vehicle for transmitting specific recommendations. The DPG, itself, is a much more comprehensive document than the National Military Strategy. It reflects a great deal of strategic decisionmaking. It provides some, but not necessarily clear, guidance on regional priorities as well as some overall priorities for force planning.29 It also provides general programming priorities and specific programming guidance.30 Since the DPG offers no further elaboration on the national security and military strategies than that contained in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, one could reasonably question the basis for the strategic planning and programming decisions it reflects. Absent the
influence of strategic plans, and since the National Military Strategy is not sufficiently specific to provide such a basis, the DPG features Illustrative Planning Scenarios (IPS).

The IPSs are interesting inventions. They postulate, for illustrative purposes, scenarios in which the United States, perhaps with allies, becomes embroiled in conflict with hypothetical adversaries. The scenarios are described in the Defense Planning Guidance as reflecting some of the military challenges anticipated over the Future Years Defence Program, but are neither predictive nor exhaustive regarding those challenges, and they are not intended to reflect policy decisions. These qualifiers notwithstanding, the scenarios purportedly illustrate the types of military capabilities needed, enable DoD components to perform detailed program planning, provide a basis for ensuring consistency among various DoD component programs, and serve as analytical tools for evaluating component programs after they are submitted.

From this analysis, one may conclude that DoD develops defense programs based on an incomplete set of capability determinants that do not presume to predict future conflicts and do not necessarily reflect current policy. Alternatively, a comprehensive strategic plan would derive from an actual assessment of the strategic environment over the Future Years Defense Program, establish a priority for specific strategic objectives achievable within that time frame, describe an executable strategy for achieving those objectives, and define the military capability required to effect the strategy. Rather than basing program planning on hypothetical scenarios, it should be based on tangible requirements distilled from the actual strategic plan DoD intends to implement over the Future Years Defense Program.

10 USC also requires the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, and after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “[to] provide annually to the Chairman written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans. Such guidance shall include guidance on the specific force levels and specific supporting resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such plans are to be effective.” The vehicle used by the Secretary of Defense to fulfill this responsibility is
entitled the *Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)*. The *CPG* is a close-hold, highly classified document that is significantly different in form and content from the *Defense Planning Guidance*. Assessment of the *CPG* is limited by its classification and restricted circulation. However, some observations concerning its relationship to strategic planning can be made. The *CPG* has limited direct impact on the Chairman’s strategic planning. There is no traceable flow of strategic direction from the *CPG* into the Chairman’s strategic planning process. Additionally, there is no formal process by which strategic planning conducted by the Chairman impacts the *Contingency Planning Guidance*. The *CPG* is published annually and, therefore, is a short range document. The annual policy adjustments contained in successive *CPGs* may combine to indicate the need for a renewed national military strategy but, presumably, that need would have already been identified through the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process. Also, the highly classified content of the *CPG* is directly translated into the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)* and is not used as input into the Chairman’s strategic planning process. Although the *CPG* does not directly affect the Chairman’s strategic planning, it is relevant in discerning the true nature of the *JSCP*.

The *JSCP* is the tool used by the Chairman to cause the CINCs to prepare operation plans. 10 USC assigns the Chairman the responsibility for “providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense” and “[p]reparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.” Policy set forth in the *Contingency Planning Guidance* reaches the CINCs via changes to, or republication of, the *JSCP*. The flow of strategic direction is from the *Contingency Planning Guidance* to the *JSCP*, ultimately resulting in new or revised operation plans.

After examining the significant National Command Authorities’ influences on the Chairman’s strategic planning, we find that while they may not provide comprehensive policy and strategy guidance, they are not unduly constraining. We move now to the crux of our assessment, the strategic planning conducted
by the Chairman.

**The Chairman’s Strategic Planning.**

During the period beginning with the passage of GNA in 1986 through the end of superpower confrontation in the early 1990s, a series of events combined to render ineffectual the strategic planning conducted at the Chairman’s level. Although the GNA sought to improve strategic planning, by 1990 formal strategic planning at the Chairman’s level was minimal.

The three principal strategic direction and planning responsibilities assigned to the Chairman by GNA (codified in 10 USC) are to:

- “. . . [assist] the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces;”

- “[prepare] strategic plans, including plans which conform to the resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective” and to “. . . [prepare] joint logistics and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistics and mobility plans;” and,

- “[conduct] net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of potential adversaries.”

Nominally, strategic planning at the Chairman’s level is conducted principally within the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

The Joint Strategic Planning System. The formal process established to assist the Chairman in strategic planning is the JSPS. At the time of passage of the GNA, the JSPS was defined by JCS Memorandum of Policy 84 (JCS MOP 84). This MOP, first published in 1952, survived until 1990 when it was replaced by CJCS MOP 7. The MOP 84 version of the JSPS was unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic and produced no less than 10 major documents every 2-year planning cycle. It was roundly criticized
by Congress and others. Nevertheless, planning under the provisions of MOP 84 produced the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) and the Base Case Global Family of Operation Plans, which collectively approached a strategic plan.

Although the 1990 version of the JSPS (CJCS MOP 7) sought to streamline the JSPS in order to make it more responsive “in a rapidly changing national security environment,” it did not survive a single planning cycle. This streamlined JSPS envisaged one strategic planning process and three primary products:

- Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process;
- National Military Strategy Document;
- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; and,
- Chairman’s Program Assessment.

The new Memorandum of Policy described a system that began with the Joint Strategy Review. The review was to determine if the National Military Strategy should be changed. The NMSD was to include the National Military Strategy, written and published by the Chairman, but approved by the President. Additionally, the NMSD was to contain recommended national military objectives; recommended fiscally constrained force levels; military strategy and force options; and a risk assessment of the recommended strategy, forces, and military options. The NMSD was also to feature functional annexes to supplement the base document. The annexes were to provide concise military taskings, priorities, requirements, or additional guidance. The NMSD was to serve as the Chairman’s advice to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the development of the Defense Planning Guidance. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, retained in CJCS MOP 7 as a key product of the Joint Strategic Planning System, continued to serve as the principal vehicle by which the CINCs were tasked to develop global and regional operation plans.

The final document prescribed by CJCS MOP 7 was the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). It was to provide the Chairman’s assessment of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) forces proposed by the Services. The CPA was to assist the Secretary of Defense in making decisions on the defense program
subsequent to receipt of the POMs from the military departments and other DoD components. It was to accomplish this in two ways. First, it was to contain the Chairman’s assessment of the extent to which the various service POMs conformed to the priorities established in strategic plans and for the priorities established for the CINCs’ requirements. Second, the CPA was to contain alternative program recommendations to achieve greater program conformance to established priorities. The 1990 version of the Joint Strategic Planning System was aborted before completion of the Joint Strategy Review, which led to yet another revision of the process.

In mid-1992, the Joint Staff began revising CJCS MOP 7 to make it more accurately reflect the manner in which joint strategic planning had been conducted during 1990 and 1991. The intent was to make it a less precise, more open-ended process that afforded the Chairman greater flexibility in forging the National Military Strategy. Feeling somewhat disenfranchised from the process that produced the 1992 version of that document, the Services and many of the CINCs resisted the Joint Staff’s efforts to dismantle the formal system. The compromise that resulted retained many of the original CJCS MOP 7 provisions, but also featured several important changes. The most significant change was elimination of the National Military Strategy Document in favor of an unclassified, generalized National Military Strategy. This, combined with the abandonment of the Base Case Global Family of OPLANs, effectively eliminated the elements that collectively served as a strategic plan. To date, nothing has filled this planning void.

to be national military doctrine, void of any specific strategic objectives and priorities. It is interesting to note that although the National Military Strategy, in its new form, lacks the specificity of the strategy set forth in the National Military Strategy Document, detailed operation planning guidance and tasks continue to be given to the CINCs via the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Hence, one might ask what is the basis for translating the National Military Strategy into the specific tasks and guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan?

The Joint Staff began implementation of CJCS MOP 7 (Revision 1), even before the revision was officially approved. A concerted effort was made to adhere to the established procedures and timelines as closely as possible. The Joint Strategy Review was initiated in the fall of 1992. By mid-summer 1993 a Joint Strategy Review report was provided to the Chairman and work subsequently began on a new National Military Strategy. However, a number of factors delayed publication of the new National Military Strategy until February 1995. Although more brightly colored and featuring some new lexicon, the 1995 National Military Strategy is of the same form and not substantially different from its predecessor.

The Chairman’s Strategic Plans: Current Lacunae.

Unified action of the armed forces is predicated upon unified direction. The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) states that “... it is the intent of Congress to ... provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces ...” In providing for the unified action and strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Chairman plays a critical role as the key military advisor to the National Command Authorities. His responsibilities in assisting the National Command Authorities in this regard hinge upon his ability to develop coherent strategic plans for the employment of the U.S. Armed Forces. Effective strategic planning on the part of the Chairman is a major determinant of the quality of the unified strategic direction provided to the CINCs and the service secretaries by the National Command Authorities.
Since the end of the Cold War, comprehensive strategic plans have not been developed. As a consequence, key planning documents have not been based upon strategic plans of global scope. Rather, they have been based upon ambiguous objectives and a near term outlook. However, this is not to suggest that this void in strategic planning be filled by a return to a global family of operation plans and a national military strategy document that contemplate global war. That is clearly inappropriate. What is needed is a new type of strategic plan that addresses the realities of the post-Cold War era.

For almost 50 years, the United States assumed the strategic defensive in dealing with the containment of the monolithic Soviet threat. Two generations of military strategic planners have passed through this defensive strategic planning paradigm. “Threat-based” planning became so inculcated into the military culture that it became universally regarded as the only type of military strategic planning that made sense. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military encountered great difficulty in breaking out of the threat-based planning paradigm and entering into a new era of objectives-based planning. The type of strategic plan advocated in this essay is a proactive plan that would enable the U.S. Armed Forces to contribute positively to the international environment to further U.S. interests and values. Such a proactive strategic plan would assist the Chairman in fulfilling several of his statutory responsibilities.

The following analysis of current institutional tools for achieving unified strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forces shows that their full potential must rest upon the Chairman’s formulation of strategic plans.

**Unified Command Plan (UCP).** 10 USC requires the Chairman to “. . . review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each combatant command; and . . . recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any changes to such missions, responsibilities, and force structures as may be necessary.” The UCP establishes the broad missions, responsibilities, force structure, and geographic areas of responsibility of the CINCs. The missions assigned by the UCP are significantly more general than the specific tasks the Chairman assigns the CINCs in the
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.\textsuperscript{66} Like the National Military Strategy, the UCP is a relatively general document while the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is quite specific. The Chairman’s task is to take the general strategic foundations and principles presented in the National Military Strategy, translate them into the broad CINC responsibilities presented in the UCP, and then to further translate them into specific tasks to focus the regionally oriented strategic and operational planning conducted by the CINCs.\textsuperscript{67} The Chairman’s strategic planning should point to the most appropriate combatant command structure; to include assignment of geographic and functional areas of responsibility, enduring missions, and forces. In doing so, this planning would enable the Chairman to assist in providing globally integrated, strategic direction to the CINCs. However, such direction cannot be logically derived from discrete assessments of each region, but must be based on a strategic plan of global scope. As stated earlier, given the current and projected national security environments, the strategic plan would not necessarily contemplate global war, but would provide overarching rationale for the most appropriate unified command structure.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Chairman is responsible for ensuring that the deliberate operation plans of the CINCs are integrated at the national level to effect the policy guidance promulgated by the National Command Authorities.\textsuperscript{68} Through the JSCP, the Chairman causes the CINCs to prepare contingency (operation) plans in support of national objectives.\textsuperscript{69} The JSCP contains a précis of the National Military Strategy, general planning guidance to the CINCs, Armed Services and the Defense agencies, specific planning tasks for each CINC, a listing and apportionment (for planning) of the forces expected to be available at the beginning of the plans’ effective period, an intelligence estimate for planning, and other forms of specific planning guidance.\textsuperscript{70} A close comparison of the National Military Strategy to the JSCP reveals that a tremendous amount of interpretation of the National Military Strategy is required to translate this very general document into one which is much more specific. One might ask how this interpretation of the National Military Strategy is accomplished and where it is documented. Without an overarching strategic plan, the basis for this translation of the National Military Strategy into specific JSCP guidance and tasks is unclear.
The Joint Staff has asserted that the JSCP, as its name implies, is a strategic plan. However, it does not satisfy the 10 USC description of a strategic plan. According to the Joint Strategic Planning System (as described in CJCS MOP 7), the purpose of the JSCP is to “[provide] strategic guidance, including apportionment of resources, to the CINCs and the Chiefs of the Services, to accomplish assigned strategic tasks based on military capabilities existing at the beginning of the planning period . . . [it is] the principal vehicle by which the CINCs are tasked to develop global and regional OPLANs.”  

In revising CJCS MOP 7 in 1993, the Joint Staff made no substantive changes in the declared purpose of the JSCP, but added a provision that the JSCP “fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility to ‘. . . prepare strategic plans’ specified in 10 USC 153.” There was no such claim made in the original CJCS MOP 7, nor in its predecessor, JCS MOP 84.  

In the JSCP itself, the Joint Staff describes the document’s purpose: “. . . provides guidance to the CINCs and Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term (emphasis added) military capabilities.” There is no claim that it fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility for preparing strategic plans. Additionally, the revised CJCS MOP 7 points out that the JSCP is directly impacted by the Contingency Planning Guidance, a near-term document revised or republished annually. Clearly, therefore, the JSCP is structured primarily to cause CINCs to prepare contingency (operation) plans and, by itself, does not meet the 10 USC requirement for a strategic plan. However, strategic planning conducted by the CJCS should provide the basis for the JSCP. The Chairman’s strategic plan is critical in linking the strategic direction provided by the National Command Authorities to the disparate deliberate planning efforts of the CINCs.  

Force Strengths and Deficiencies. Contained within the Contingency Planning and Preparedness paragraph of Section 153 of 10 USC is the requirement for the CJCS to “[advise] the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities . . . identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effects of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.” Here again,
strategic planning plays a key role. As the CINCs prepare their operation plans and as the plans are reviewed, it is expected that specific force capability strengths and deficiencies will be illuminated. These strengths and deficiencies have relevance only within the context of particular regional plans until the Chairman performs an integrated assessment of them to determine their impact on strategic plans, national defense policy, and national security objectives. A strategic plan prepared by the Chairman would provide the necessary standard against which force capability strengths and deficiencies could be weighed from a national perspective.

*Integrating and Establishing Priorities for CINC Requirements.* Strategic plans would facilitate the fulfillment of other responsibilities of the Chairman. If we combine the responsibilities assigned in sections 153 and 163 of 10 USC, we find the Chairman is responsible for soliciting the requirements of the combatant commanders; evaluating, integrating, and establishing priorities for their requirements; and advising the Secretary of Defense of the commands’ requirements, individually and collectively. Additionally, he is to advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which service program recommendations and budget proposals conform to the priorities established in strategic plans and for the combatant commanders. This advice may include alternative program recommendations that differ from those submitted by the Services. By developing strategic plans, the Chairman can establish appropriate rationale for the priorities he assigns to the various requirements of the CINCs, for his assessments of service programs, and for alternative program recommendations he may submit to the Secretary of Defense. The absence of strategic plans has caused the Chairman to devise other means of underpinning his recommendations, specifically the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments (JWCAs), the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR), and the linking of the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process.

*Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).* The revision of the charter of the JROC and the initiation of Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are recently implemented means for the Chairman to develop and support recommendations concerning requirements for military capability. Under its 1992 charter, the JROC was
oriented toward reviewing, validating and approving requirements for future military capabilities identified by the CINCs, Services, and others. The 1995 revision of the charter significantly expanded the mission and functioning of the JROC. It now "[assists] the Chairman . . . in carrying out his responsibilities to assess warfighting capabilities . . .[and] . . . to assess the extent program recommendations and budget proposals of Military Departments and DOD components conform with established priorities." In assessing warfighting capabilities in addition to requirements for future capabilities, the JROC now appears to be also concerned with current force capability strengths and deficiencies, an area previously assessed by other means.

Assessment of current force strengths and deficiencies, to include their "effect . . . on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans," is a task quite dissimilar from identifying future force requirements. It is clear 10 USC places responsibility for assessing current capability on the Chairman but it is equally clear the CINCs are to be principal participants. Bringing the assessment of current force capability under the auspices of the JROC can have the effect of emphasizing Service perspectives while marginalizing the participation of the CINCs.

Assessment of current force capability can serve two important purposes. First, and most immediately, it can provide a strategic level risk assessment with respect to the use of the military element of national power. Secondly, but equally important, it can provide strategic relevance to force capability strengths and deficiencies identified by the CINCs by pointing out which strengths and deficiencies really matter given the priority of strategic objectives.

The difficulty with the JROC assessing current military capability is that contemporary deficiencies do not necessarily translate into requirements for future capabilities. A significant current force deficiency, one that may warrant a major program, would take perhaps 10 years to result in a compensating fielded capability. However, in the intervening period, changes in the strategic environment, U.S. interests, and national military strategy may mitigate or eliminate the deficiency. So we cannot base requirements for future
capabilities on current deficiencies. If we were to do so, we would always be developing and procuring capabilities to fight the last war. To the extent the JROC assesses future capability requirements, it relies on scenarios to extrapolate current deficiencies into the future. A better approach would be to base requirements on a strategic plan that anticipates the future national security environment, projects and establishes a priority for national military objectives, and provides the basis for a national military strategy that rationalizes anticipated resources with objectives.

Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR). The Chairman recently introduced a new document, the CPR, by which he provides programming advice to the Secretary of Defense. The purpose of the CPR is to inject the Chairman’s advice into the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System early enough to influence the Defense Planning Guidance. It is purported to be an integration of the views of the CINCs with those of the Chairman regarding military requirements. CINCs formally submit their program priorities, in the form of Integrated Priority Lists (IPL), through the Chairman to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (ASD [PA&E]). The Integrated Priority Lists are keyed to the Future Years Defense Program under consideration. For example, the Integrated Priority Lists for the FY 94-99 Future Years Defense Program were required to be submitted in the fall of 1991 so they could influence the FY 94-99 Defense Planning Guidance. However, the CPR is not based principally on the CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists, but on the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments performed under the auspices of the JROC. The CPR should be based principally on the Chairman’s evaluation, integration, and prioritization of the CINCs’ Integrated Priority List. It should not depend on the consensus of the JROC membership. Development of the CPR and its submission to the Secretary of Defense is a noteworthy initiative. Nonetheless, by basing it on the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments, its focus is directed away from the requirements of the CINCs and toward the desires of the Services. Orienting the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments more on the requirements of the CINCs could overcome this problem; however, this too would require integration by the Chairman based on the global strategic perspective contained in a strategic plan.
Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). In 1994, the JROC became a principal participant in the development of the CPA. Prior to that time, no relationship between the JROC and the Joint Staff’s CPA development efforts was apparent. In fact, they were two separate and distinct activities. Notwithstanding this, the CPA remains the Chairman’s principal tool for assessing the extent to which the programs of the military departments and other DoD components conform “. . . to the priorities established in strategic plans . . .” and to the “. . . priorities established for the requirements of the CINCs.” The CPA is also a vehicle by which the Chairman can offer alternative program recommendations. Formally, it is a product of the Joint Strategic Planning System that nominally serves as an interface with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. The statute calls for the Chairman to use the priorities established in strategic plans and those he establishes for the requirements of the CINCs as the bases for this assessment. Without strategic plans, there are no articulated and documented strategic priorities. The requirements of the CINCs are made known to the Chairman via the Integrated Priority Lists. But the Chairman does not require the lists, nor is he the principal user of the information they contain. However, he should be. He should evaluate, integrate, and prioritize them so that the programming advice he provides to the Secretary of Defense in the Chairman’s Program Recommendation synthesizes the requirements of all the CINCs in accordance with the strategic plan for the Future Years Defense Program under consideration. The CPA, like the Chairman’s Program Recommendation, should also be strongly influenced by the Integrated Priority Lists.

Force Capability Net Assessments. The Chairman has another assessment responsibility that warrants review. The Strategic Planning paragraph of Section 153, 10 USC requires the Chairman to “[perform] net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.” This assessment responsibility is distinct from, and in addition to, that contained in the Contingency Planning and Preparedness paragraph of 10 USC. To fulfill this statutory requirement, the Chairman has prepared, and the Secretary has submitted to the Congress, Joint Military Net Assessments (JMNAs).

While the JMNAs may be useful for Congress in considering
the merits of budget submissions and attendant Future Years Defense Programs, they suffer from the same flaw as the Defense Planning Guidance, i.e., they are scenario based. The placement of this net assessment requirement in the Strategic Planning paragraph of the Chairman’s functions section of 10 USC points toward a congressional intent to have the assessments based on strategic plans, not hypothetical scenarios. This makes eminent sense. If a JMNA is based on an approved strategic plan, Congress would be in a better position to judge the extent to which a given Future Year Defense Program promises to achieve specific national security and military objectives. Additionally, since the scenarios do not reflect established policy, it is difficult for Congress to discern how much weight the JMNAs should be given. The less compelling Congress views the JMNAs, the more difficult it will be for DoD to counter the congressional forces that tend to suboptimize defense programs.

Roles, Missions, and Functions. 10 USC requires the Chairman triennially to “submit to the Secretary of Defense a report containing . . . recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the armed forces to achieve maximum effectiveness . . . .” In preparing the report, the Chairman is to consider, inter alia, changes in the threat, unnecessary duplication, and changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare. Two such reports have been produced since passage of the GNA. The first received little notice; however, the second generated considerable controversy. It was not that the report proposed radical changes, but that it was perceived to be, more or less, an affirmation of the status quo. This led to the establishment of the congressionally mandated, independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM). The present Chairman has indicated that identification of needed changes may be a task too difficult for DoD. Some argue that the task also proved too difficult for the CORM. If recommended changes to roles, missions, and functions were based, in part, on approved strategic plans, the task of identifying needed changes would be less difficult and the Chairman’s recommendations could be better supported.

Joint Doctrine. 10 USC also gives the Chairman the responsibility for the development of joint doctrine. The relationship of strategic planning and joint doctrine is somewhat opaque but, nevertheless important. The value of joint doctrine
in improving joint (and unified) warfighting capability is widely accepted. However, effective joint doctrine has additional value. It can serve as information to senior civilian leadership and governmental agencies as to how they may expect the armed forces of the United States to be employed. It can also serve a similar purpose for alliance and potential coalition governments and armed forces, particularly apropos establishing the U.S. national position for the development of multinational doctrine. The Chairman’s strategic planning can help uncover joint doctrinal challenges, voids, and opportunities; thus providing impetus for the development of new doctrine and revision of extant doctrine. Additionally, the unifying effect of strategic plans would enhance the implementation of joint doctrine across Services and combatant commands.

Conversely, the absence of strategic plans gives rise to disaggregated development of joint doctrine. Additionally, without strategic plans the Services are less likely to implement joint doctrine in a standardized fashion. Finally, without strategic concepts that should be established in strategic plans, there is no unified strategic basis for the development of joint doctrine. Strategic plans would provide the critical linkage between the National Military Strategy and the development and implementation of joint doctrine.

The Missing Nexus in Strategic Planning.

Recent measures taken to overcome the inadequacies in strategic planning have recognized and ameliorated some of the difficulties resulting from the absence of strategic plans, but they do not directly or fully address the problem. These initiatives, including expansion of the responsibilities of the JROC, the initiation of Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments, and linking the Chairman’s Program Assessment to the JROC process, can be incorporated into a holistic solution and should not be abandoned. Given the current state of the planning processes at the Chairman’s level, there appear to be three viable alternatives for correcting the deficiencies in strategic planning:

- revising and expanding the National Military Strategy so that it meets the requirements of a strategic plan;
• expanding the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan making it, as its name implies, a joint strategic plan; or,

• creating a new document, the National Military Strategic Plan (NMSP).

There may be other alternative solutions but these three are directly supported by statute, are executable within the current strategic planning framework, and do not require reengineering of the Chairman’s strategic planning processes.

**Option 1: National Military Strategy Expansion.** Prior to the end of the Cold War, the National Military Strategy Document, coupled with the Base Case Global Family of OPLANs, closely approximated a strategic plan. However, the mutation of the national military strategy from the detailed and comprehensive version contained in the National Military Strategy Document to the unclassified, generalized form of the post-Cold War National Military Strategy was by design, and for good reasons. The arrival of a post-Cold War era of significantly diminished military threats to U.S. national security and increased focus on domestic social and fiscal issues brought with it an intense demand on the part of Congress and the public for an explanation of what changes in military force levels are required and why. General Powell responded to the requirement for more widespread communication of military strategy and the forces needed to support it by publishing an easily understood, unclassified National Military Strategy. This new National Military Strategy was widely accepted because the Congress and the public were generally unable to understand the new strategic environment with any more clarity than it reflected. Nevertheless, the abandonment of the National Military Strategy Document and shelving of the Base Case Family of OPLANs were tantamount to inadvertent abdication of the Chairman’s statutory strategic planning responsibility.

Over half a decade has elapsed since the Berlin wall came down. The “new world order,” or disorder as some have characterized it, has taken sufficient form for critics to suggest that it is time to develop a strategy for coping with it. The question before us now is should the Chairman replace the National Military Strategy with a comprehensive, classified, modern version of the National Military Strategy Document? The
answer is no. The current National Military Strategy is not a strategy per se, but a hybrid of national military doctrine and policy. It is an institutionalized form of communication among the Services, CINCs, OSD and other offices of the Executive Branch, Congress, industry, academe, the public, and the international community. It effectively informs all of the general rationale for U.S. military forces, reaffirms national security policies, encourages debate, reassures allies, and puts potential adversaries on notice. This type of National Military Strategy continues to serve the purposes for which it was created and, therefore, warrants perpetuation. However, some measures must be taken to fill the strategic planning void which resulted from abandonment of the National Military Strategy Document and the Global Family of OPLANs.

Option 2: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Expansion. An alternative to changing the form and content of the National Military Strategy is to expand the scope of the JSCP. As we noted earlier, although the JSCP in its current form compiles planning guidance, tasks, and force apportionments for all the CINCs under one cover, it falls short of meeting the requirements of a strategic plan. However, it could be expanded to contain a strategic plan. This approach is appealing at first glance. The précis of the National Military Strategy that appears at the front of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan could be replaced by a comprehensive strategic plan that specifies strategic objectives and priorities, forces expected to be available for each 2-year deliberate planning period, and the globally integrated strategy for applying U.S and allied military capabilities to accomplish the objectives. If this were done the planning guidance, specific tasks, and force apportionments that followed would be placed in an unambiguous strategic context. This would allow the CINCs to devise more coherent and interrelated theater strategies and develop operation plans that collectively better reflect national level strategic priorities.

However, this alternative is unattractive for at least three reasons. First, the JSCP in its current form is a large, complex document and, as such, is difficult to produce. It must be staffed with all the CINCs, Services, and agencies it directly affects, and consensus-building is understandably problematic, particularly given the JSCP’s near-term impact on service support and training responsibilities and operational responsibilities of
the CINCs. A document that combined the strategic plan and the
derivative planning guidance, tasks, and force apportionments
would likely prove too unwieldy to produce or change in a timely
fashion.

Second, the JSCP, a near-term document by design, is
impacted annually by the Contingency Planning Guidance. In its
current form, it has been able to accommodate annual
fluctuations in contingency planning policy. While this may
remain true for the planning guidance and tasks sections of an
expanded JSCP, it would be untrue for the strategic plan section.
If the Chairman is to realize any stability in strategic
planning, subjecting his strategic plan to annual adjustments may
be unwise. Additionally, the Chairman’s strategic plans should be
viewed, in part, as military advice that informs the development
of contingency planning policy, not the reverse.

Third, notwithstanding its substantial volume, the JSCP is a
coherent, focused document. It serves one purpose—to provide for
the preparation and review of contingency plans. Given its
longevity in joint strategic planning, its purpose and format are
clearly understood and it has genuine utility for combatant
command, Service, and defense combat support agency planners. If
it were enlarged to incorporate the Chairman’s strategic plan, it
could lose its central focus and its utility may be lessened. For
these reasons, we conclude that the expansion of the JSCP is not
the preferred alternative for developing and promulgating
strategic plans.

Option 3: The National Military Strategic Plan. The most
appropriate alternative is the creation of a new document, the
National Military Strategic Plan. It would be a product of the
Joint Strategic Planning System, developed by the Joint Staff in
consultation with the CINCs and Services, and published by the
Chairman. It would be updated or republished as required in
anticipation of changes in the geostrategic environment, revised
national security objectives and strategic priorities, and/or
significant changes in fiscal guidance. The plan would be
harmonized with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
and focused on the Future Years Defense Program, but would also
feature a long-range (FYDP + 14 years) section. It would derive
specific national military objectives from the broad national
security objectives expressed in the National Security Strategy
and present them in measurable terms. It would establish a priority of national military objectives and clearly describe a strategy for attaining them within the Future Year Defense Program period and the long-range planning period, as appropriate.

The National Military Strategic Plan would proactively orchestrate and guide the development of CINC theater strategies to ensure that, in combination, they conform to the U.S. global strategy. It would undergird the planning guidance, tasks, and force apportionments provided to the CINCs in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. It would be particularly useful since it would contain near-, mid-, and long-term strategies. Additionally, it would enable the Services and defense combat support agencies to predict more effectively the type and amount of military capability they must build into their respective programs to support the requirements of the CINCs. The National Military Strategic Plan would also give them a preview of the standard against which their programs would be assessed. In short, the National Military Strategic Plan would provide the critical nexus connecting the strategic direction provided by the National Command Authorities, the operation planning and requirements determination by the CINCs, and the supporting military capabilities developed by the Services and defense combat support agencies.

Implementation of the National Military Strategic Plan alternative would not be without difficulty, but is certainly feasible within the current strategic planning framework. Much of its basis would be developed during the Joint Strategy Review process of the Joint Strategic Planning System. Having been briefed on the results of the Joint Strategy Review, the Chairman would issue guidance outlining the key elements of the plan. At a minimum, the guidance would include national military objectives and their priorities, anticipated resource levels for the Future Year Defense Program period, and specific strategic elements that should be reflected in the plan. Armed with the Chairman’s guidance, the Joint Staff would develop the strategic plan and coordinate it with the CINCs, Services, defense combat support agencies, and selected officials within Office of the Secretary of Defense. After approving the plan, the Chairman would present it to the National Command Authorities in keeping with his responsibility to provide military advice and assist in the
strategic direction of the armed forces. While there would be no requirement for the National Command Authorities formally to approve the plan, their endorsement would help ensure that the plan was resourced by the Future Years Defense Program.

Development of the National Military Strategic Plan, therefore, would not disrupt any of the joint strategic planning processes or initiatives currently in place, but would modify some. For example, the National Military Strategic Plan could incorporate the Unified Command Plan and the latter’s biennial review would become part of the strategic planning process. Additionally, the National Military Strategic Plan would inform the Chairman’s triennial review of roles, missions and functions. The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments would continue to be performed. However, they would be guided by the military capability requirements and strategic concepts reflected in the National Military Strategic Plan. Additionally, each Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment would no longer be a discreet assessment but would be anchored to the National Military Strategic Plan. The CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists would be submitted to conform to the National Military Strategic Plan and thus have greater coherence. The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments would integrate and establish priorities for the IPLs under the staff supervision of the Director of the Joint Staff. The JROC would continue to be briefed on the integrated priorities of the CINCs’ requirements, particularly those with major program research and development implications. The Chairman’s Program Recommendation would remain a Chairman’s report to the Secretary of Defense. In conformance to the military capability requirements reflected in the National Military Strategic Plan, it would become the means of reporting the CINCs’ integrated priorities.

A National Military Strategy, similar in form and content to today’s document, would be developed from unclassified information extracted from the National Military Strategic Plan. The Chairman would be prepared to disclose classified aspects of the National Military Strategic Plan, as necessary, to assist selected members of Congress in deliberations on the defense budget. The Joint Planning Document (JPD) would be assimilated into the National Military Strategic Plan. It would no longer be published as stand alone volumes. Neither the Defense Planning Guidance nor the Joint Military Net Assessment would be based on
scenarios, but on the National Military Strategic Plan. The result would be a more efficient redirection of Joint Staff energy toward strategic planning and not a net increase in the Joint Staff’s work load. Finally, the National Military Strategic Plan would provide the strategic basis for the development and implementation of joint doctrine.

Conclusion.

This essay has argued that strategic plans should act as the critical nexus connecting national security policy with operation planning, military requirements determination, and military capability development. Without strategic plans, joint strategic planning will continue to be flawed by:

- inability to establish specific priorities for national military objectives;
- unnecessary duplication in the development of military capabilities;
- disaggregated, regionally-focused contingency planning;
- inability to reach consensus on a more rational assignment of service functions; and,
- continued difficulty in the development and implementation of joint doctrine.

10 USC, as amended by GNA, vests the Chairman with responsibility for the development of “strategic plans.” The Chairman holds the highest position in the strategic planning hierarchy that is not directly constrained by political considerations. This is not to infer that the Chairman is oblivious or immune to political forces, but only to point out that he may have greater political latitude than the Secretary of Defense or the President. There is no statutory requirement for the Secretary or the President explicitly to approve the strategic plans prepared by the Chairman. The National Military Strategic Plan should be considered part of his military advice to the National Command Authorities. So advised, the National Command Authorities may develop a clearer and more concise approach toward implementing the National Security Strategy,
without openly risking the political capital that a more precise NSS might risk.

When Georgy Arbatov, Chairman of the U.S.A.-Canada Institute, said in late 1989 “We are depriving you of an enemy,” few realized the prescience of his comment. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, demise of the Soviet Union, and end of the Cold War unsuspectingly cut away the anchor that provided continuity in strategic planning for the U.S. Armed Forces. Set adrift, the ship of state has successfully defended itself from encroaching menacing vessels. It defeated a corrupt government of Panama, punished and ejected Iraq from Kuwait, and restored the legitimate government of Haiti. However, the United States cannot drift indefinitely lest it unexpectedly run aground or be caught up in an unforeseen storm. The United States needs proactive strategic plans that will equip the U.S. Armed Forces to face the challenges of the 21st century. It is time to set sail and get underway. The strategic planning machinery is already in place. All that is needed is a star by which to steer.

**Recommendations.**

- The Chairman should implement the National Military Strategic Plan option described above.

- The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should be reoriented so they evaluate, integrate, and prioritize the CINCs’ requirements.

- The JROC should be divested of its oversight responsibility for the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments, reaffirming its original charter. Oversight of the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should become a Director of the Joint Staff responsibility on behalf of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman. This would permit the assessments to be more closely coordinated with the Joint Strategy Review.

- A principal input into the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process should be the Integrated Priority Lists submitted by the CINCs. This would help focus the identification of military requirements on the CINCs, while continuing to ensure their requirements are integrated with national level warfighting concerns.
• Continue to publish the Chairman’s Program Recommendation, but as a product of the reoriented Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process.

• Base the biannual review of the Unified Command Plan primarily on the National Military Strategic Plan.

• Continue the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan in its current form, but base the guidance, force apportionments, and taskings on the National Military Strategic Plan.

• Base the assessment of force capability strengths and deficiencies identified by the CINCs on the National Military Strategic Plan.

• Integrate and establish priorities for the CINCs’ requirements based upon the National Military Strategic Plan.

• Use the National Military Strategic Plan as the basis for assessing the OPLANs developed by the CINCs.

• Base Joint Military Net Assessments on the National Military Strategic Plan, vice scenarios.

• Discontinue use of Defense Planning Guidance scenarios in the development of service programs in favor of conformance to the National Military Strategic Plan.

• Use the National Military Strategic Plan as input into the triennial review of roles, missions and functions.

• The National Military Strategic Plan should guide the development and revision of joint doctrine.

ENDNOTES


2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,


4. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

5. The Secretary of Defense’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the President’s National Security Council System (NSCS) are critical to national level strategic direction and planning and are certainly worthy of critical analysis. However, we will address them in this essay only to the extent necessary to facilitate our study of Chairman level processes and products. For example, the National Security Strategy (NSS), developed by the NSC, directly impacts and to some extent predetermines the National Military Strategy developed by the Chairman. While we will refrain from assessing the NSCS, we must examine the NSS. Similarly, while a complete assessment of the PPBS is beyond the scope of this study, we will examine the Defense Planning Guidance and the manner in which it relates to the strategic planning conducted by the Chairman. Therefore, we will focus on the interfaces between the Chairman’s Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the PPBS and NSCS.

6. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 253, defines the NCA as the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.


11. Ibid., section 153(a)(3)(C).

12. Ibid., section 153(a)(4)(B), (C), and (E).


14. The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) focuses on the period from 2-8 years into the future. For example, the FY 98-99 Department of Defense budget would normally be submitted, as part of the President’s Budget, to Congress by February 1997. This DoD budget would represent the first 2 years of the FY 98-03 FYDP. The FY 98-03 FYDP would be built largely during 1996, based on Defense Planning Guidance nominally published in 1995. Thus, work on the FYDP during late 1995 and 1996 would focus on the FY 98-03 time period.


18. Ibid., passim, particularly pp. 3-5, 8-9, 11, 13-16, 18-25, 27-30.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 14. Dr. Snider came to a similar conclusion concerning the 1994 NSS saying, “Equally noticeable by their absence in this globalist approach are the priorities necessary to make this strategy operative.”

21. To the current NSS’s credit, it does state unequivocally that a two-war military capability is required—that is, armed forces that can fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. It then goes on to say that programmed forces will do just that. This type of overt commitment to a specific level of force capability is refreshing and contributes stability to strategic planning. The NSS specifically declares that the threat of intrusion into our military and commercial information systems poses a significant risk to national security and must be addressed. This also provides useful guidance to strategic planners. Complementing the definitions of vital, important, and humanitarian interests is a more complete set of intervention criteria that now include “a clearly defined, achievable mission” and an assessment of the “environment of risk.” The NSS provides unambiguous guidance concerning the U.S. commitment to NATO and the advisability of increasing its membership. So while the current NSS has clear deficiencies, it also provides significant policy guidance and certainly is not without value. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13, 26.


23. There is no requirement nor explicit authorization set forth in 10 USC for the Secretary of Defense to prepare strategic plans. That is an exclusive responsibility of the Chairman. The preparation of strategic plans is one means by which the Chairman assists the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the U.S. Armed Forces. *Title 10, United States Code*, chapters 2-4.
24. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section 113(g)(1).


26. The “advice” of the Chairman is currently provided primarily through the NMS. The NMS is based on the same strategic planning that the Chairman would use to assign tasks to the CINCs.

27. The requirement in 10 USC, Section 153, for the Chairman to prepare strategic plans that conform to resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available during the plans’ effective periods is based on recommendations contained in A Quest for Excellence, the Final Report to the President by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Washington, DC: 1986), also known as the Packard Commission Report. The report recommended (p. xix) that defense planning should start with a comprehensive statement of national security objectives and priorities by the President. The President would then provide the Secretary of Defense provisional 5-year defense budget levels. The Secretary of Defense would, in turn, direct the Chairman to conduct strategic planning based on the provisional budget levels.


30. Ibid., pp. 29-40.


32. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section 113(g)(2).

33. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17,
34. There is, however, informal coordination between the authors of the CPG in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and members of the Joint Staff’s Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy. This coordination normally amounts to members of the OSD referring drafts of the CPG to Joint Staff officers for comment. The authors of the CPG are normally not part of the Joint Strategic Review process and the Joint Staff officers who review the drafts of the CPG may or may not be.


36. Ibid., pp. II-1 through II-11.

37. Ibid., pp. II-1 through II-11, V-2, VII-3.

38. Ibid., p. V-1. Note that on page I-2 the Joint Staff asserts that the JSCP fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility for preparing strategic plans as well. We will show this to be incorrect.

39. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section 153(a)(3)(A) and (B).

40. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section 153(a)(1), (2), (3).


42. Ibid., p. 9.

43. The Senate Armed Services Committee identified the inability of the JSPS to provide useful strategic planning advice and to formulate military strategy as one of the causes of ineffective strategic planning within the DoD. Admiral Zumwalt, a former Chief of Naval Operations, commenting on a key JCS MOP 84 JSPS document remarked “... I found this particular document to be almost as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write. Some of its prescriptions always were in the process of being falsified by events. Others were so tortured a synthesis of
mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave was minimal.” See, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization and the Need for Change, pp. 495-496.

44. Memorandum of Policy 84, Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. 30, 35. The Base Case Family of Operation Plans was a grouping of OPLANs prepared individually by the CINCs in accordance with the strategy and guidance presented in the National Military Strategy Document and the specific tasks assigned in the JSCP. Collectively, they served as the “Base Case” for Chairman-level force capability determinations and assessments as well as for identifying risks associated with implementing national security policy and achieving national security objectives. Each plan within the grouping related to others with respect to force apportionments, assumptions, timing, and objectives.

45. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (Issued January 30, 1990), Joint Strategic Planning System, p. 1. Based on the author’s notes and experience as a member of the Joint Staff and the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) Working Group from 1990 to 1993. Although detailed JSR Administrative Instructions were published, they were never implemented. The conduct of the JSR was deferred until after the annual CINCs’ Conference (also see Harry Rothman, Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post-Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1992, pp. 12-15.) During the 1990 conference, the Chairman achieved consensus on a broad outline for a national military strategy for the post-Cold War period. Therefore, in consultation with the Service Chiefs and CINCs, the Chairman decided that the minutes of the conference, or more specifically the message that summarized the conference and resulting taskings, would suffice as Chairman’s Guidance and no JSR was required. This is the point at which the formal JSPS began to fall apart.


47. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

49. Ibid., p. 40.

50. Each military department transmits its proposals for resource allocations, in accordance with its interpretation of the Defense Planning Guidance, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the form of a document called the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). It is the Secretary of Defense’s responsibility, in consultation with the CJCS, CINCs, and secretaries of the military departments, to rationalize and integrate the POMs into a coherent defense program.


52. Based on one author’s experience as a member of the Joint Staff working group formed to revise the JSPS. The Joint Staff office of primary responsibility, J-5, initially attempted to remove almost all of the structure from the process and eliminate the regular publication of documents such as the Chairman’s Guidance, NMS, and JSCP. The Services and several of the CINCs resisted this since they believed regular document publication would bring them into the process because of standard Joint Staff coordination requirements for joint documents.


54. Although an NMSD was not published under either CJCS MOP 7 or CJCS MOP 7 (Revision 1), NMSD FY 92-97 was published in 1989 (JSSM-162-89, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: National Military Strategy Document FY 92-97, September 21, 1989) in anticipation of revision of the JSPS.


56. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JSSM-162-89, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject:
57. While the Joint Staff was involved in the JSR, the new Secretary of Defense initiated the now well-documented "Bottom-Up Review." The BUR, intentionally conducted outside the JSPS, served to delay publication of the new NMS. Additionally, although his predecessor had given guidance for the development of a new NMS, General Shalikashvili wanted the Joint Staff to have the benefit of his guidance before proceeding. Another factor is the delay by the new administration in publishing a new National Security Strategy. It would have been poor form to publish the new NMS before the new NSS.

58. National Military Strategy of the United States, February 1995, passim. We make this statement cognizant of a subtle difference between the NMS published by General Powell and the current NMS published by General Shalikashvili. In his letter transmitting the 1992 NMS, General Powell states, "This strategy provides a rationale for . . . a capability which will serve the nation well throughout the remainder of the 1990s." The 1992 NMS was matched to the FY 94-99 FYDP. The comparable section of General Shalikashvili's letter transmitting the 1995 NMS says "This new national military strategy describes the objectives, concepts, tasks, and capabilities necessary in the near term . . .." This NMS is matched to the FY 96-01 FYDP. The JSPS still describes the NMS as a mid-range product. It is not completely clear why the current Chairman infers his NMS is a near-term document. However, this could be additional evidence of the need for stability in strategic planning that could be brought about by strategic plans.


61. "This new national military strategy describes the objectives, concepts, tasks, and capabilities necessary in the

62. It is interesting to note that after 20 years of effort, the Australian Department of Defence has developed a threat-ambiguous defense planning and force development methodology. See Thomas-Durell Young, “Capabilities-based Defense Planning: The Australian Experience,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 21, No. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 349-369.

63. Certainly strategic planning conducted by the Chairman is important for reasons beyond those discussed in this essay. However, we are focusing our analysis on these key areas because they stand to benefit most from strategic planning directly under the purview of the Chairman.

64. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, Section 161(b).


66. Unified Command Plan, passim.

67. Recall the Chairman’s responsibilities for strategic planning and providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans enumerated in Section 153 of 10 USC.

68. Title 10, United States Code, Section 153(a)(3). Deliberate operation plans are those plans developed by the CINCs during non-crisis periods. They take approximately 18 months to develop and describe, in detail, the actions the CINCs would take if crises commensurate with the JSCP taskings were to develop. They are based on assumptions and contrast with crisis action plans that are developed in response to unanticipated crises. Crisis action plans can be developed by modifying deliberate operation plans or built from scratch in “no-plan” situations.

69. Deliberate operation planning within the Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System uses the term “operation plan” vice 10 USC’s use of the term “contingency plan.” There is a history behind this convention, but for the present it is sufficient to point out that the plans tasked by the JSCP are of the type referred to as “contingency plans” within 10 USC.


75. Title 10, United States Code, section 153 (a)(3)(C).

76. Title 10, United States Code, sections 153(a)(4) and 163 (b)(2).


80. See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-03. 31, Preparedness Evaluation System, January 1993,
pp. 2-1 thru 2-7 and 4-1 thru 4-3 for a discussion of the CINC’s Preparedness Assessment Report (CSPAR) and the Chairman’s Preparedness Assessment Report (PAR). Also see Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17, 1993) Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. VII-2 thru VII-3 and Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 53 (1st Revision), Military Capability Reporting, March 25, 1993, p. GL-3, for a discussion of the Chairman’s Contingency Capabilities Assessment (CCA).

81. Title 10, United States Code, section 153(a)(3)(C) and (D).

82. This observation is offered notwithstanding the recently implemented Joint Monthly Readiness Reports (JMRRs) submitted by the CINCs. While the JMRRs seem to be effective in highlighting readiness strengths and deficiencies and can serve to inform the JROC in its deliberations, they do not go so far as to assess the effect current force capability strengths and deficiencies have on achieving national security objectives and implementing national security policy.

83. Given the JROC membership, which includes all the vice chiefs of the Services, there is a danger that these JROC-sponsored assessments will rest largely on service consensus. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Washington, DC: February 7, 1995, p. 2.


86. The ASD (PA&E) requests the IPLs by a memorandum to the CINCs. For example see the June 24, 1991, memorandum, Subject: Submission of FY 1994-99 Integrated Priority Lists.

87. Information received from a member of the Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, the directorate with staff responsibility for the JROC and CPR. The officer informed us the CPR will not replace the IPLs and the
IPLs will continue to be submitted to ASD (PA&E).


89. Title 10 United States Code, sections 153(a)(4) and 163(b)(2).

90. Ibid., section 153(a)(2)(c).

91. Ibid., section 153(a)(3)(C).

92. Ibid., section 153(b)(1).


96. Title 10, United States Code, section 153(a)(5).


