

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

Volume 11
Number 1 *Parameters* 1981

Article 4

7-4-1981

EAST-WEST BARGAINING ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

John Borawski

Follow this and additional works at: <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters>

Recommended Citation

Borawski, John. "EAST-WEST BARGAINING ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES." *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 11, 1 (1981). <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol11/iss1/4>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

EAST-WEST BARGAINING ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

by

JOHN BORAWSKI

As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated in the fiscal year 1981 *Annual Report*, "In recent years, Soviet deployments of the SS-20 ballistic missiles and Backfire bomber have given rise to concern among the NATO allies in the context of perceived US-Soviet parity in central systems."¹ The NATO response to these disconcerting trends in the Soviet long-range theater nuclear force threat to Western Europe has taken a two-fold course: first, the December 1979 decision to deploy 108 Pershing II medium-range ballistic missiles and 464 Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe; second, the simultaneous invitation to Moscow to begin talks on such weapon systems at SALT III. The NATO invitation, however, was probably designed more as "a mechanism for forging alliance solidarity"² among those members of the alliance less resolute about the missile program than as one with a view to any *real* prospects of initiating constructive negotiations with the Soviets. And despite West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's summit trip to Moscow in late June 1980, which produced the Soviet "concession" of agreeing to forego holding theater nuclear force negotiations' hostage to NATO revocation of the missile program, the object of these negotiations remains far from clear. And for good reasons, not the least of which is that the present "balance" of theater nuclear vehicles between the Warsaw Pact and NATO stands at a precarious 5330 to

1552, respectively.³

The invidious political and technical problems associated with exacting balanced and verifiable solutions to the theater nuclear force problem are well known, and no attempt is made here to recapitulate.⁴ But since Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko are due to meet before the end of 1981 to discuss theater nuclear arms control, much more specific inquiries than those which have been raised thus far must be posed as to what such discussions can accomplish. The purpose here, therefore, is to address squarely the merits and demerits of four hypothetical negotiating "targets" in order to discern which bargaining options NATO should pursue or avoid during the months ahead.

OPTION I: THE QUICK-FIX ON MODERN LAND-BASED MISSILES

Since the most politically sensitive topical issue concerns the Soviet SS-20 MIRVed mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile and the projected American cruise and Pershing II missiles, and since NATO has declared that the immediate objective of negotiations should be the realization of agreed limits (in the form of *de jure* equality in both ceilings and rights) upon US and Soviet land-based missile systems, perhaps a simple expedient trade-off could be arranged. Formally or informally, each side could agree to place ceilings upon its respective systems.

Indeed, a quick-fix trade-off between the SS-20 and the Pershing II and Tomahawk systems has been the most commonly suggested palliative. One of the principal benefits of this step, of course, would be to stem the buildup of the SS-20s, which now stand at approximately 160 but could well reach 300 by 1983 if not sooner. (Sixty-six percent of total deployment is assumed to be oriented toward NATO Europe.)

To curb such expansion, however, a ceiling would have to be relatively low, say for purposes of illustration, at 200. However, an identical ceiling on NATO missiles would detract from the goal of commencing deployment of 572 missiles by December 1983 (with deployment completed in 1989). Substantially less than that number, of course, would retard the evolution of NATO's theater nuclear force posture away from present highly vulnerable short-range "battlefield" tactical weapons toward continental-range, accuracy-enhanced, and survivable delivery vehicles that reduce the temptation of an enemy preemptive strike and thus improve stability. As Brown declared, the products of such an evolution will reduce further "any Soviet misperception that it might be possible to fight a theater nuclear war limited in such a way that [Soviet] nuclear forces could operate from a sanctuary."⁵

US Senator Sam Nunn, in a speech before the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Washington on 22 October 1979, outlined the inequities of the present situation in no uncertain terms:

Two-thirds of NATO's 7000 tactical nuclear warheads are tied to delivery systems with ranges of less than 100 miles, and most of these have ranges of 10-20 miles. The limited reach of the Alliance's 155mm and 8-inch nuclear artillery and its tactical surface-to-surface missiles—including the new Lance missile—would in all likelihood confine their use to targets on NATO territory. Knowledge that the bulk of NATO tactical nuclear weapons, if employed, would be confined to strikes on NATO territory is hardly likely to terrify or to deter the Soviet Union.

Long-range systems such as the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missiles, by threatening the destruction of Pact forces *before* they reach NATO soil, would reduce NATO's present heavy reliance on short-range weapons. Their deployment . . . would open the way to reductions in the number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.⁶

In short, such ceilings would impede the efforts to deploy land-based missiles in Europe capable of striking targets on Soviet territory as well as limit the West's bargaining chips—there being no such NATO land-based missile presently deployed.

Moreover, in a certain sense, the tradeoff suggested would involve assessing incommensurables. First, the SS-20 has a 5000-kilometer range; the cruise and Pershing II have a 2500-kilometer range. Indeed, no NATO system apart from the aging UK Polaris and SACEUR Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missiles approaches the range of the SS-20. The number of targets each system can hit is thus an important disparity. Second, neither of the planned NATO systems is fitted with multiple warheads as is the MIRVed SS-20. A common ceiling of 200 systems would yield a warhead ratio of 600 to 200 in favor of the Soviets, although this relative disparity would obtain irrespective of the level of any common ceiling. Third, the cruise missiles, which compose the great majority of the new NATO weapons, can hardly be characterized as first-strike weapons such as the SS-20 and Pershing II, and their ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses is uncertain. Would it be

Mr. John Borawski is a student of law at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a graduate of Duke University and formerly was a research associate in the Department of Political Science at Duke. He spent the summer of 1980 at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and has authored prior commentaries and articles appearing in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Orbis*, and *The Washington Quarterly*.



wise to limit such dissimilar missiles under equal aggregate ceilings?

In a forthcoming Adelphi Paper, Gregory Treverton suggests that, instead of negotiating a common limit, NATO could discretionarily deploy either 108 Pershing II missiles in West Germany or 160 cruise missiles in Britain in exchange for a Soviet freeze on SS-20 deployment at their current level of approximately 160, with supplementary NATO missile deployment contingent upon Soviet restraint.⁷ Such a measure might occasion a timely end to the latest round of the theater nuclear force arms race. However, Treverton's suggestion does not take account of the 440 older-generation SS-4 and SS-5 Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles now in place, and NATO rejected Brezhnev's February 1981 call for a mutual moratorium on preparation for and deployment of new missiles. Moreover, a stop-and-go approach to deployment of the proposed NATO missiles risks political intervention, so that a situation could well develop where NATO might be prevented from further deployment while the Soviets kept on deploying. The rate of SS-20 deployment, furthermore, suggests that Moscow will extract full bargaining capital rather than engage in freezes, or that if it accepted a freeze it would do so only at a point where it was well ahead of the NATO deployments. Of course, since Moscow already has the momentum while the NATO missiles are only in engineering development, with initial operational capability almost three years down the road (a road laced with political uncertainty given resistance to their deployment in NATO European capitals), an immediate Soviet freeze is probably unobtainable.

Theater nuclear forces, however, are not the only factor in the total defense equation. As Brown stated in the 1981 *Report*:

We do not plan to match the Soviet program system by system or warhead by warhead, which might be construed as an attempt to create a European nuclear balance separate from the overall strategic relationship—and thus as risking 'decoupling.' Instead, we

seek to strengthen the linkage of US strategic forces to the defense of Europe.⁸

The countervailing consideration, of course, is that NATO has already stated that theater nuclear force ceilings must be equal between the two sides. A curious paradox thus emerges. If the United States is worried about possible erosion of the view that strategic nuclear retaliation against Soviet territory figures integrally in the defense of Europe, then perhaps only a limited force of Pershing II missiles would suffice; a token force, however, that appears to make no genuine attempt to respond to the Soviet theater nuclear force buildup risks making a charade of NATO "flexible response" strategy. How can the Soviets be expected to negotiate seriously, moreover, without incentives? As Treverton observes, "What Europeans now perceive as NATO's weakness in long-range theater systems can hardly be regarded by the Soviets as an inducement to arms control concessions."⁹

OPTION II: INCLUSION OF ALL LAND-BASED MISSILES

A better solution might be to expand the scope of what is meant by "land-based" missiles to encompass *all* such systems—old, new, and projected—with ranges, say, over 1000 kilometers. Indeed, the proposal of the High Level Group of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group to deploy as many as 572 missiles probably reflected a basic concern over the total Soviet theater nuclear force of 600 weapons (which include, of course, the older SS-4s and SS-5s in addition to the new SS-20s). An aggregate ceiling of 600, more or less, for each side would allow NATO to deploy *all* 572 missiles and yet would include *all* Soviet weapons, not just the SS-20s.

Verification of the cruise missile and SS-20 limits would doubtless pose substantial problems. Concealability of cruise missiles is easily managed, and their ranges and missions are difficult to monitor (particularly if conventional-munition cruise missiles were also introduced on the Continent). Reloading of the mobile SS-20 is probably undetectable

(thus also creating doubts about the efficacy of warhead ceilings), and they can be retrofitted as SS-16 intercontinental ballistic missiles by the addition of a third stage.

Nevertheless, the common ceiling of 600 on all theater land-based missiles would appear relatively painless and achievable. Moreover, in view of the uncertainty as to the number of older-generation Soviet missiles that will be phased out in the future and replaced by SS-20s, each side would be allowed freedom to mix within the equal aggregate ceiling.

OPTION III: INCLUSION OF FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS

However, if the Soviets were to accede to demands for limits on the totality of their theater ballistic missile force, it is likely that they would demand inclusion of US forward-based systems—that is, the 540 land- and sea-based aircraft (F-111s, F-4s, A-6s, A-7s) which are capable by virtue of their geographic deployment in and around Europe of delivering nuclear strikes against targets on Soviet soil.

This, indeed, is the major snag that preliminary talks have already confronted, although it was not unexpected in view of the fact that forward-based systems were a major issue in both SALT I and SALT II, as evinced by Soviet proposals to restrict the number of US aircraft carriers operating in European waters and to dismantle US ballistic-missile submarine bases at Holy Loch, Scotland, and Rota, Spain (the latter unilaterally deactivated in 1979, thus forfeiting a potential SALT III bargaining chip). Whereas the United States argued that forward-based weapons were theater weapons intended simply for the defense of Europe, the Soviets argued that any weapon which could impact on their territory is strategic *per se* and, therefore, within the proper scope of SALT.¹⁰ However, while the Soviets argued that forward-based systems should be included in the aggregate total of US offensive strategic delivery vehicles permitted by SALT limits or be withdrawn from station, they exempted their own medium-range bombers and

medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from similar consideration because such systems could not reach the continental United States. After Vladivostok in 1974, however, it was agreed that neither the Backfire bomber nor the SS-20 would be limited under the treaty in exchange for keeping forward-based systems, US-based FB-111s, and allied nuclear forces out of the aggregate ceilings for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.¹¹

Likewise, the Soviets also pressed for inclusion of forward-based systems at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna—a demand which was partially met by NATO's tabling of the so-called Option III in December 1975 offering to withdraw 54 F-4s, 36 Pershing I-As, and 1000 warheads in exchange for the withdrawal of a tank army from the elite Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The offer, however, was withdrawn in December 1979 (perhaps removing an important incentive for the Soviets), with the negotiations now focusing exclusively on ground force manpower. Unilaterally, however, Moscow withdrew 1000 older-vintage T-62 tanks from its forces in East Germany during 1979-80 (although simultaneously introducing more modern T-64s and T-72s) and the United States announced the withdrawal of 1000 warheads from its European stockpile.

While exclusion of forward-based systems from SALT III may therefore no longer be possible if Washington seeks to constrain Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, negotiating such limits would quickly evolve into a most parlous enterprise because comparable nuclear-capable Soviet aircraft (Backfire, Badger, Blinder, Fencer, and Flogger) total 2188 vs. only 540 for the United States. Whereas such a scheme would have the virtue of setting more satisfactory restrictions on the infamous Backfire than those secured in SALT II, obviously given these disparate numbers a forward-based-system package seems non-negotiable, at least in terms of common ceilings.

Further, since aircraft range and payload are extremely flexible, depending upon

variables such as in-flight refueling and basing modes, and since not all are assigned nuclear missions, any ceiling on forward-based systems would invariably be arbitrary, potentially detrimental to NATO's flexibility in responding to various levels of aggression, and probably unverifiable (the contents of internal bomb bays cannot be visually determined). It has been suggested, however, that eliminating nuclear-delivery potential of NATO dual-capable aircraft would prove beneficial by freeing aircraft for conventional ground-support and interdiction missions; yet this would deprive NATO of the majority of its nuclear long-range assets. And since the Soviets are only beginning to develop a sophisticated long-range deep-strike capability for their forward-based aviation, it is unlikely that Moscow would be strongly inclined to accept such constraints.

It should also be noted that range limitations have little meaning for carrier aircraft (as well as for ballistic-missile submarines and Soviet cruise-missile-carrying surface combat ships and submarines) since range is a function of the weapon carrier's mobility, which in turn is limited only by the legal definitions of the territorial sea. A final factor is the vast Soviet SAM and interceptor air defense network, which can impede the penetrability of NATO's forward-based aircraft and, possibly, ground-launched cruise missiles as well.

Efforts by the United States to achieve a favorable settlement based upon inclusion of forward-based systems would inevitably be responded to by Soviet references to the French and UK independent nuclear forces, which necessarily affect the numbers game in the theater nuclear force context and, hence, Soviet conceptions of what the counting rules should be. For example, if all systems with a range of more than 1000 kilometers were made subject to ceilings, the US-Soviet ratio would stand at 216 to 1548. If British and French systems were included, however, the NATO total would increase to 468 delivery vehicles. But neither London nor Paris has expressed any desire to participate in theater nuclear force negotiations. While their exclusion will necessarily have to be accepted

for the present (the talks, after all, will initially be a bilateral undertaking), the Soviets are likely to look askance at the possibility of a joint West European or Franco-German nuclear deterrent at some point in the future, given the erosion of the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella over NATO Europe. Indeed, by the 1990s, the French *force de frappe* alone will deploy over 700 submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads capable of striking at Soviet targets for purposes beyond mere countervalue retaliation, whereas the improved range and accuracy of the UK submarine-launched ballistic missile force (owing to British conversion to Trident) will also enhance the formidability of independent European nuclear systems.

The existence of such forces, however, does not necessarily mean that the Soviets should be entitled to a larger number of systems than the United States, as Alton Frye has recently suggested,¹² since the overall theater nuclear force balance inclusive of French and British deterrent forces still leaves Moscow with an overwhelming edge—and this is so including SACEUR Poseidon C-3 missiles but excluding Soviet Yankee-class ballistic missile submarines and SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs of variable range, although all are counted in SALT. The point is rather that their existence is likely to complicate the calculus of Eurostrategic arms control as well as demonstrate the artificiality of any theater nuclear force regime from which they are exempt.

OPTION IV: RESTRICTED DEPLOYMENT ZONES

On account of the inability of weapon range limitations to ensure accurate reflection of capability, and given the panoply of problems associated with attempting to secure and verify quantitative limitations on theater nuclear forces, other types of restraints as a complement to or independent of negotiated ceilings have attracted interest. Such has notably been the case with the concept of what I shall designate as "restricted deployment zones." Frye, for

example, has suggested that in exchange for a Soviet relocation of some SS-20s out of range of targets in Western Europe (which Brezhnev proposed during his October 1979 speech in East Berlin), the United States could deploy only cruise missile transporter-launchers in Europe while stationing the missiles themselves within the continental United States "available for rapid deployment to Europe in the event SS-20s were detected moving into prohibited zones."¹³

At first blush one might be tempted to criticize this proposal on grounds similar to those directed against the Rapacki Plan in 1957 for an "atom free zone" in central Europe—it was charged then that an area would be carved out wherein the deployment of nuclear weapons would be prohibited but upon which nuclear weapons could nevertheless be fired. The Frye proposal does not entail removal of the 440 Soviet older-generation SS-4s and SS-5s, which are based at fixed sites; the trade-off is rendered further dubious by the fact that a US subsonic second-strike system (cruise missiles) would be traded for a Soviet MIRVed first-strike ballistic missile system (SS-20s). However, this concept, if verifiable, possesses the advantage of alleviating mutual anxieties (ensuing from short warning time). Further, it does so without actually necessitating quantitative reductions in the new NATO long-range assets—reductions which could very well signal a lack of willingness on the part of the West to respond to the Soviet threat in kind (although the political vagaries within NATO Europe about proceeding with deployment of all 572 missiles already suggests such a situation in any event).

Another restricted deployment zone, broached by the Soviets in SALT, might be the establishment of "denuclearized" patrol areas in the Mediterranean so as to move US sea-based nuclear-capable aircraft out of range of Soviet targets. This sort of naval arms control, however, obviously favors the Soviets since they do not deploy a carrier fleet anywhere near the size of the US Navy's. Restrictions on carrier movements and escort ships, moreover, would constrain the crucial

foreign policy role of the Sixth Fleet in an area of both extant and latent local geopolitical tension (e.g., Israel, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia). Indeed, similar concerns have been voiced at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea with respect to the "jurisdictional creep" of coastal state claims; the extension of the territorial sea from three to twelve miles could negate the previously inviolate right of freedom of navigation for military as well as commercial maritime transit upon the high seas in favor of the more restrictive privilege of innocent passage. As Elliot Richardson observes, extension of the territorial sea to straits (e.g. Gibraltar, Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb) "could seriously affect the flexibility not only of our conventional forces but of our fleet ballistic missile submarines, which depend on complete mobility in the oceans and unimpeded passage through international straits."¹⁴ The demise of the Carter Administration's efforts at Indian Ocean arms control serves as a prime example of the improbability of negotiated restraint in turbulent maritime areas wherein superpower stakes rest perilously high.

But even if limits on carrier deployment were politically attainable, such limitations would accomplish very little in the way of balanced restraint unless reciprocal controls were imposed upon the deployment patterns of Soviet medium-range bombers and tactical aircraft in Europe. Jonathan Alford has suggested as one possible remedy the rear-basing of tactical aircraft at a distance from borders greater than their tactical range, with collateral restrictions on ordnance and forward maintenance facilities.¹⁵ Aircraft restricted deployment zones, like quantitative restrictions, still pose problems of verifiability and run the risk of impeding conventional operations. Again, however, they avoid the problem of quantitative limits on forces quite disparate in size and disposition.

As with all restrictive zones, of course, the primary significance is that of enhancing warning time. Since weapons are not actually reduced or numerically limited, system levels remain the same, and ultimate *capability* is

not truly limited in the same manner which actual reductions would effect. Nevertheless, these are directions which could be explored. Obviously, restricted deployment zones and quantitative restraints are not mutually exclusive, so that some form of restrictive zones might be employed as "sweeteners" or equalizers in a larger package.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

This brief and selective review of potential long-range theater nuclear force negotiating targets suggests that no panacea is apparent which can definitely and comprehensively resolve the Eurostrategic quandary. Option I, a quick fix based only on the latest-generation missile systems, would seem to disadvantage the West. Option III, inclusion of forward-based systems, is impracticable and should be set far back on the negotiating agenda. On the other hand, Option IV—devisal of appropriate and feasible restricted deployment zones—deserves further investigation, particularly since it is unlikely that Moscow will agree to cut back on its "heavy" ICBMs unless forward-based systems are put on the SALT III table.

However, Option II—securing limits on *all* land-based missiles—appears to be the most promising course of the four. Much will depend on how the 440 older-generation Soviet SS-4s and SS-5s are to be regarded. If all are eventually replaced by SS-20s, then the problem becomes straightforward. But if the Soviets elect to retain a substantial quantity,¹⁶ either for bargaining purposes or as a complement to modern missiles, should they be considered as inaccurate, obsolescent, vulnerable systems of no relevance to arms control considerations, or as 440 megatons worth of trouble? In any event, an aggregate ceiling of 600 land-based missiles would allow freedom to mix.

In the final analysis, regardless of which alternative NATO pursues, a few points deserve special note. First, NATO will be bargaining from a position of inferiority. Soviet SS-20s are already in place and their number is increasing steadily; NATO ground-

launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs are still two or three years away from operational capability. Deployment of all 572 missiles is thus probably unavoidable both to provide incentives for the Soviets to negotiate constructively and, more important, to modernize NATO's theater nuclear force posture. Setting low limits on NATO's missiles in exchange for a freeze on SS-20s is therefore ill-advised.

Second, since Europeans tend to view arms control accords and detente with the Soviets somewhat more "seriously" than the United States, there will exist numerous opportunities for the Soviets to exploit alliance divergency through carrot-and-stick diplomacy. At the 26th Party Congress held in Moscow in February of this year, for example, Brezhnev explicitly warned that deployment of the missiles in Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium "is bound to affect our relations with those countries to say nothing of how this will prejudice their own security. So their governments and parliaments have the reason to weigh the whole thing again and again."¹⁷ The irony is that although security can probably be better enhanced by concrete, unilateral defense efforts on NATO's part than by interminable negotiations with an advantaged party, decisions to improve NATO deterrent and defense capability invariably provoke controversy within the alliance, as the entire theater missile affair continues to demonstrate.

However, opportunities for serious negotiations of even modest scope should not be automatically eschewed as exercises in propaganda, for there exist very real anxieties on each side about the other's theater nuclear programs. Efforts to attain a balanced and verifiable interim accord on all land-based missiles will require a protracted time, obviously, and even if ultimately successful will largely compartmentalize military reality in the European theater. It is nevertheless important that even limited enterprises be given full opportunity to achieve fruition. For, as Leslie Gelb reminds us, "What arms control needs now, perhaps more than anything else, is the restoration of the sense that it is feasible."¹⁸

NOTES

1. *Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget, FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981-1985 Defense Programs, January 29, 1980* (Washington: GPO, 1980), p. 145.

2. Joseph J. Kruzal, "Arms Control and American Defense Policy: New Alternatives and Old Realities," *Daedalus*, 110 (Winter 1981), p. 155.

3. All figures derive from *The Military Balance 1980-1981* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980). It is important to note that the total number of Soviet missiles and medium bombers oriented toward Western Europe has declined over the past decade; the only increase has been in warheads (Raymond L. Garthoff, "Brezhnev's Opening: The TNF Tangle," *Foreign Policy*, No. 41 [Winter 1980-81], 85).

4. See my "Towards Theatre Nuclear Arms Control?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 3 (Winter 1980), 84-99; Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Arms Control Enters the Gray Area," *International Security*, 3 (Winter 1978-79), 17-52; and Gregory F. Treverton, "Nuclear Weapons and the 'Gray Area,'" *Foreign Affairs*, 57 (Summer 1979), 1075-89.

5. *Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown*, p. 147.

6. Sam Nunn, "MBFR/TNF Modernization," speech in Washington, D.C., 22 October 1979, p. 3.

7. Gregory F. Treverton, *Nuclear Weapons in Europe*, Adelphi Paper (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), forthcoming.

8. *Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown*, p. 7.

9. Treverton, "Nuclear Weapons and the 'Gray Area,'" p. 1087.

10. Consider the following exchange between Senator Gordon Humphrey and ex-SACEUR Alexander Haig:

Senator Humphrey: The point is that our . . . forward-base systems are not to threaten the Soviet Union, but to protect our allies if the Soviets and Warsaw Pact countries decide to attack?

General Haig: That is right. The bulk of our systems do not reach or target on the Soviet Union.

Senator Humphrey: As a matter of fact, it would have been to our advantage if both sides had included so-called forward-base systems in SALT II because the Soviets are vastly superior in those systems?

General Haig: Had it been manageable. I think we would have recoiled from the unmanageability of it to some degree.

(*Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto [SALT II Treaty]*, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 23, 24, 25, 26 July 1979, Part I [Washington: GPO, 1979], pp. 419-20).

11. The Soviet concession on forward-based systems was purchased in addition at the price of American relinquishment of demands for a cutback in Soviet heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles, primarily the SS-18.

12. Alton Frye, "How to Fix SALT," *Foreign Policy*, No. 39 (Summer 1980), 67.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

14. Elliot L. Richardson, "Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea," *Foreign Affairs*, 58 (Spring 1980), 905.

15. Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects," in *The Future of Arms Control: Part III, Confidence-Building Measures*, ed. Jonathan Alford, Adelphi Paper, No. 149 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 11.

16. Lawrence Freedman reports that the 380 SS-4s and 60 SS-5s still deployed are now exclusively targeted on Europe as opposed to the Far East. "No SS-4s (but some SS-5s) have been dismantled since last autumn. This may reflect a desire to maintain a bargaining card for negotiations" as well as lead to greater Soviet long-range theater nuclear force superiority by 1985 than previously assumed. "The Dilemma of Theatre Nuclear Arms Control," *Survival*, 23 (January-February 1981), 5.

17. Karen Elliott House, "Brezhnev's Bid for Talks With Reagan Draws Cautious White House Response," *The Wall Street Journal*, Midwest Edition, 24 February 1981, p. 4.

18. Leslie H. Gelb, "A Glass Half-Full," *Foreign Policy*, No. 36 (Fall 1979), 23.

