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SIREN CALL TO DISASTER: THE EMERGING CAMPAIGN FOR US TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

by

HENRY G. GOLE

American defense policy proceeds from the assumption that we have a vital interest in preserving the independence of NATO Europe, a region second in strategic importance only to the United States itself. The paramount elements of strategy in Europe are to deter war, to maintain stability where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces confront one another, and to prevent a successful Soviet invasion by being prepared to fight if necessary. The purpose of stationing US troops in Europe in those difficult years after World War II was to give physical evidence of the stated strategy. Whether called "containment" or "forward defense," the message to friends and enemies was clear: The United States drew a line which could be crossed only at risk of war. While feelings of kinship or compassion played a role in policy formulation, it was in the US interest to insure that Europe would not be dominated by the Soviet Union. It continues to be in the US interest to assure the independence of NATO Europe. If policy is to be more than posturing, if strategy is to be more than empty rhetoric, forces in place must match pronounced intent.

Thus far the strategy has worked. It is perfectly reasonable to ask whether the strategy might have worked just as well with one less US brigade or division. Less reasonable would be the actual withdrawal of brigades or divisions to discover the precise point at which troop reduction will cause our strategy to fail. That information would be

useful to some future historian, but it would offer little solace to the United States to have discovered that critical point.

In the past decade US ground combat strength in Europe has actually increased. One might ask, therefore, why it is necessary to argue for the continued maintenance of those forces. The answer is that a combination of trends and perceptions is underway which seems certain to result in serious challenges to maintaining US troops in Europe at near-current levels. Among these trends and perceptions are American charges that Europeans fail to contribute their share in the common defense; the need for a US strategic reserve to back up America's self-imposed commitments to defend Western interests in the Persian Gulf; broad policy differences that separate Europe and the United States; and the inclination by Western Europe to be accommodating to the Soviet Union wherever possible.¹

The cyclical recurrence of pressures to reduce US troop strength in Europe peaked last in the early 1970s under the leadership of Senator Mansfield. Pressures receded primarily because unilateral reductions made little sense once we entered into the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna. It was hoped that even limited agreement would find Warsaw Pact forces matching, in some proportion, US reductions. Events in the Persian Gulf are driving the next cycle of pressures to get US troops out of Europe for use elsewhere. At

this moment such voices may be muted, but the issue can be expected to resurface soon at the policy level.

THE SIREN CALL

“Division of labor” and “burden-sharing” are becoming code words for a diminished US role in Europe. Oblique references, thinly veiled threats, and trial balloons abound. According to William Safire:

The United States must put it to the Western alliance frankly: if American units are to stay in Europe, then Europe must be ready to join in an economic boycott of the Soviet Union if it invades Poland. No nation can be permitted to profit from America’s economic response to aggression without taking the loss of American protection.²

Jack Anderson has reported that his associate, Dale Van Atta, uncovered a secret, 35-page report written by Admiral Harry Train, former head of the US Atlantic Command, and former Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Ellsworth advocating “an almost total US withdrawal from Europe as a move that offers ‘the best prospects for the future.’” Anderson’s article concludes:

The authors recommend that the United States withdraw all but a ‘small U.S. force’ from Europe, making up for this pullout by a promise of quick military backup in the event of a Soviet attack. This would free the limited American military strength for use elsewhere in the world, encourage a credible European nuclear deterrent—and, of course, be popular with budgetcutters at home.³

More recent American cries are anything but muted. The December 1980 issue of *The Washington Monthly* carried a piece by George Ott under the title “The Case Against NATO.”⁴ A few excerpts convey Mr. Ott’s message:

This year nearly one-half of our defense budget—more than \$81 billion—will not be

spent on American defense at all. It will be spent to defend our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in Europe. That is, it will be presented as a gift to countries rich and powerful enough to defend themselves. . . .

The alternative is to withdraw our soldiers and money from NATO and to return the burden of defending Europe to the Europeans, the ones who enjoy its benefits. . . .

This is not to suggest that Europe is in no danger from the Soviet Union. But that danger is nowhere near as great as many assume, and nothing that European NATO cannot handle on its own, if it is willing to apply its size and resources at a reasonable level.

The editors of *The Washington Monthly* endorsed Mr. Ott’s thesis under the lead “We’ll Stay If They Pay”:

The alternative to withdrawing from NATO this magazine has endorsed in the past is to make the allies pay. Charge them \$81.1 billion for protection. Sidle up to Helmut Schmidt and Margaret Thatcher and say, ‘Nice little continent you have here. Too bad if anything should happen to it.’ Tell them we’ve had it with the current subsidy arrangement, which made sense after the war, but is crazy now that Europe is healthy and wealthy once more. Offer them the choice: either we pull out, forcing them to defend themselves, or they pick up the tab. Eighty-one billion a year direct to the US Treasury, please don’t send stamps.⁵

Colonel William L. Hauser, US Army retired, a widely respected commentator on the state of the Army, is the latest to add his voice to the rising chorus: “If we want worldwide capability,” he states flatly, “we are going to have to reduce our forces in Europe.”⁶

Two recently published European views suggest that Europe has begun to plan for a European defense either without US conventional forces or in a vastly changed relationship to them. Jean-Paul Pigasse,

writing in *Strategic Review*, assesses the "objective" factors which could make Europe an independent third force in the world power equation. He concludes: "The thrust of this analysis has been to demonstrate that Europe can, if it so desires, ensure its security with the resources at its disposal. The issue is one of political choice and political will."⁷ His case is nicely made, but it is precisely the political obstacles in Europe which require US troop presence there for the coming decade to substitute for European political will.

In addition, three French military commentators—Rene Cagnat, Guy Doly, and Pascal Fontaine—recently co-authored the book *Euroshima*, which asserts the need for Europe to assume defense initiatives formerly reserved for the United States.⁸ Both the Pigasse article and *Euroshima* press for a revitalized European Defense Community relatively immune to American influence.

To warn against the emergence of such sentiments as the foregoing is not to suggest that NATO should be immutable. Changes within NATO are certainly feasible, and the day may come when NATO, like all human institutions, will have outlived its usefulness. But that time is not now. Major shifts of US troops from Europe will require a climate characterized by a willingness on the part of Europe's polity to do more for defense, and one in which the United States is viewed as a strong and determined leader of the alliance. If either condition is not met, withdrawal of US troops will be viewed as evidence of US decline. The impatient assertion that simply pulling US troops out of Europe would force Europeans to take up their own defense is myopic. True, one *possible* consequence of such a precipitous act could be that desired: NATO Europe might fill the gap created by the deployment of US troops elsewhere. But there are other possible and less desirable consequences: a drift to the East, a loss of faith in America.

THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP

The revival of Europe with American assistance after World War II brought with it

a restored sense of confidence and self-assertion which can be welcomed as perfectly natural or viewed with suspicion, depending upon one's predisposition. Certainly Western Europe was more easily led when climbing out of the debris of World War II, in effect a ward of the United States. That relationship has changed. The more sanguine view of European recovery stresses the naturalness of the evolution toward normal relations between states and the capability of Europe to carry its fair share of the defense burden. The independence of sovereign Western European nations might also tend to normalize relations between East and West, with the states of Middle Europe leading the way. The Federal Republic of Germany's *Ostpolitik* in 1970 resulted in the Moscow Treaty signed in the Kremlin on 12 August of that year, a milestone in Europe's postwar history. That treaty paved the way for the nonaggression and normalization treaties with the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The admission of both German states to the United Nations and the agreements at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe can also be seen as milestones in the process of normalizing affairs between European states and legitimizing existing frontiers.

There is a more pessimistic view. Western Europe could drift beyond independence to ties with the East that could bind in a manner more advantageous to the Soviet

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Union than to the West. Detente and *Ostpolitik* have allowed for increased trade and freer movement of people between East and West—resulting in, for example, increased reliance on Soviet gas in Western Europe. The United States could reduce trade with the Soviet Union with relatively painless consequences, though President Reagan's lifting of the grain embargo might suggest otherwise. Western European countries, however, would find the end of detente a more wrenching experience both in economic terms and in the psychic effects of the tension bound to accompany a return to something like confrontation politics in Europe.

Further undermining the Europeans' westward orientation are their doubts about the strength and resolve of the United States. US strength and determination attracted allies in the post-World War II years as the best vehicle for the realization of European interests. The combination of awe, respect, and admiration enjoyed then has been declining steadily. Events since the 1960s have eroded the general feeling on the part of Europeans that America can do anything, that America is the land of unlimited possibilities and the backbone of the West. The reservoir of confidence and trust in the United States resides in a generation which will be passing from the scene in the next decade, and leadership will be assumed by those whose memories of the Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift are less clear. One senses a mood in Europe that asks whether the United States is a declining power, one unwilling to stay the course. Friends, foes, and those sitting on the fence wonder at the apparent "inability of the United States' political system—its policies, leadership, and institutions—to arrest its slide."⁹ We pose a problem for Europeans: They sense our potential and suspect our will.

To understand European temporizing when demands are placed on Europe by Washington requires some sense of this mood as Europeans reconsider the connection with America in the 1980s. The lukewarm European support for strong counter-measures proposed by the United States in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan and the mixed European reaction to the boycott of the Moscow Olympics are manifestations of the increasing willingness to question American leadership of the West.¹⁰ The desire to pursue detente in Europe—a policy beneficial to Western Europe and particularly beneficial to the Federal Republic of Germany—has introduced new language to diplomacy as we ask how "divisible" detente is. This takes us to the issue of the primacy of regional interests of Europeans versus the global interests of the United States.¹¹ Is it possible to maintain detente in Europe in the face of Soviet nibbling on the "periphery" (as Europeans prefer to see extra-European issues), or must the United States cajole Europeans into playing an unwanted role outside of Europe? Alternatively, as the United States continues to represent Western global responsibilities, will Europeans demonstrate a willingness to make greater efforts for the defense of Europe? In brief, will Europe stand with us or stand aside as we confront the Soviet Union outside of Europe?

Similar questions could be raised regarding other diverging US-European policies: Conflicting national policies regarding arms transfers to third nations divide, for example, France and the United States. Human rights issues often collide with the need for strategic materials and unattractive allies. As commercial ties between East and West in Europe become stronger, it may well be that Washington's call for the denial of strategic materials and high technology to the Soviet Union will fall on European ears deafened by the roar of here-and-now economic profit.

Nuclear trends and issues will almost certainly provide opportunity for debate within the alliance. The US nonproliferation policy will collide with the profitable business enjoyed by some European nations in the transfer of technology to so-called Third World countries. The stationing of nuclear weapons and delivery systems is currently prohibited in some NATO lands and unpopular in others where such weapons and systems are positioned.¹² New capabilities and improved systems will occasion future

debates, both domestic and international. The ambivalence of Europeans stems from a desire to live under the American nuclear umbrella while preferring that the US weapons be stored elsewhere, ideally in a neighbor's country. Nuclear facilities for peaceful use are regularly challenged by vocal citizen groups, so one can reasonably expect debate and protest to accompany the stationing of nuclear weapon systems in European countries—a sentiment not unknown in the United States, as citizens of Utah or Arkansas will testify.

The cultural, political, economic, and security ties that have long bound Europe and the United States promise to make a continued close relationship through the 1980s possible, but not certain. Changes in economic and security factors will complicate relationships, and preserving NATO will require imagination and willingness to accommodate alliance partners. One of the major changes will be the frequent intrusion of extra-European issues into alliance considerations: European perceptions of events in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, for example, will differ from those of the United States, thus straining relations. Another change will be the inclination of the junior partners of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to be more assertive in dealing with their allied superpowers. The tolerance of the Soviets and Americans will be tested as both Warsaw Pact and NATO member states tend to disengage themselves from US-Soviet confrontations in Europe and around the globe. The smaller states of central Europe will prefer the further cultivation of normal relations among themselves while enjoying the advantages of association with their superpower allies. The number of moving parts and independent wills involved surely will make future relationships increasingly complex within blocs, between blocs, and outside of Europe.

Yet, buried in dire projections and dismal prospects lies a success story.¹³ A kind of stability and equilibrium in Europe has evolved even while tensions and crises have succeeded one another almost without pause from the 1940s to the present. Regular

tensions are unpleasant, but the ad hoc arrangements made over the last 35 years have contributed significantly to a *modus vivendi* quite out of keeping with the fractious behavior of Europeans in their long history. This has been possible for the most basic reason: The alignment in Europe reflects the reality of a power relationship. The USSR and the United States emerged from World War II as superpowers and attracted, one way or another, allies. The rough equivalence of the superpowers and the rough equivalence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have made an attempt at hegemony by either side too risky to chance. The result has been stability based in a balance of power.

On a day-to-day basis the solid and lasting power arrangement has seemed, to the players involved, fragile and temporary. Crises in Berlin, flareups in the outside world threatening to spill over into Europe, dramatic events in Prague and Budapest, inflammatory statements by leaders, disappointing stalemates at international conferences with ambitious purposes, nuclear terror and frightening weapon systems—all of these have heightened tensions as Armageddon has repeatedly been promised for tomorrow. The need for improvisation in attempts to fix short-term problems has given the system the appearance of impermanence. The reality is that the system has served quite well for a relatively long time.¹⁴ It may be that new factors will disrupt this state of affairs, but we have heard that before—often. Europeans and Americans will continue to view the world from different perspectives, but it is in the interests of both to cooperate to maintain the system that has evolved in Europe since 1945. The system represents the best bet for Europe and the United States because it serves the interests of so many states, particularly of those with the power to change things.

US SECURITY INTERESTS IN EUROPE

Europe's geopolitical situation and its great wealth are most often expressed by strategists in terms of what Europe's loss would mean to the United States. Western

Europe's integration into the Soviet sphere would be a shift of such magnitude that it would effectively signal the victory of the East and the decline of the United States.

US interests and objectives in Western Europe guide our policy there. Leading a list of interests is the deterrence of war in Europe and the maintenance of stability where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces confront one another. Collaborative political, economic, and military relationships with Canada and Western European countries contribute to the realization of our principal aims. Minimizing Soviet influence and easing tension in Europe derive from these principal aims.

These security interests can be taken as a first premise and extended to a lengthy list of political and economic objectives. Suffice it to say that war should be deterred and stability maintained for one overarching political purpose: to protect and promote Western democratic principles and practices in order to insure a favorable environment for the survival of American values. We seek to promote economic conditions in Europe which provide a solid basis for the West's political, psychological, and military strength in order to insure the survival of those same American values. It is for these reasons that American soldiers have served continuously in Europe since World War II. The strategic challenge to the United States has remained constant: to be strong enough in Europe to assure that NATO could not be overwhelmed in the first weeks of a blitzkrieg war and to cope with contingencies around the globe. It is important that we keep our priorities in mind. Defense of Europe remains essential.¹⁵ Given our domestic political and economic constraints, which prevent a massive infusion of resources to defense in time of peace, we must make the most of the contributions of our allies. To elicit greater efforts from them we must demonstrate our continued determination to pay the price of leadership.

Insuring peace and stability in Western Europe while denying an extension of Soviet influence there contributes to world order as well. Indeed, the kind of stability that has evolved in Europe despite many crises since World War II would seem attractive to the

United States in some of the more volatile regions of the world where local instability threatens world order. Maintaining US credibility and influence in Europe while preventing an outbreak of hostilities continues to be one of the key elements of US policy. A significant loss of US influence there would adversely affect the US position around the world in both tangible and intangible ways. A diminished US role in Europe in the foreseeable future would almost inevitably signal weakness and decline as a world power.

The strategy of forward defense projects US power abroad to demonstrate Alliance front-line solidarity and to be committed in battle, as required, where damage and destruction will not necessarily touch the United States. Declaring that the nations of NATO and the lines of communication between Europe and the United States are "vital" to the United States draws a line which an enemy cannot cross without risking a fight. That line is thousands of miles from our shores. Forward basing of ground troops and of sea and air forces in and around Europe signals our intent to friend and foe, enhancing both deterrence and the capability to defend US interests.

Order in Europe contributes to world order; disorder anywhere contributes to feelings of insecurity and unease. Trading on the stock exchanges around the world illustrates this point: Seemingly unrelated events in remote areas affect the confidence of investors in New York, London, and Tokyo. Psychological momentum has a force of its own in another way as well. Agreement on various issues is almost sanctified if the European nations, the United States, and Japan agree. It is in this sense that collective security—NATO—takes on a symbolic significance that is more than the sum of its parts in contributing to world order. Security concerns interact with social, political, economic, and psychological factors, creating a mood of either unease or well-being. The close association of the United States with Europe is a relationship which contributes to world order; even the suggestion of disassociation would signify a

change of great proportion, the creation of a vacuum begging to be filled.

CONSEQUENCES OF US TROOP REDUCTIONS

Recent events outside of Europe have required US military planners to review our strategic options. One outcome of the review has been the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). The need for such a force has been shown by our weakness in certain world regions in which we and our allies have important interests. Consideration is being given to the possible use of general purpose reinforcements currently planned for NATO to constitute a part of the RDJTF. There is an ironic touch to all of this. At a time which finds the Congress and the Reagan Administration kindly disposed to defense, and when civilian voices advocating the reduction of US forces in Europe are still a minority, military planners are the ones being forced to take a hard look at military deployment around the world. Those who have fought off domestic political pressures to diminish our presence in Europe find themselves scanning the European landscape for "assets." Hard military choices will be necessary.

Any decrease in US troop strength in Europe would create gaps which the allies would have to fill if the essential equilibrium in Europe is to be maintained. While planners may be able to distribute resulting additional tasks among various allies, the main conventional ground combat tasks would fall to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The recent decision by the United Kingdom to buy Trident makes an expanded conventional force contribution by the British unlikely, even if military efforts in Northern Ireland were suddenly considered unnecessary and British economic problems were to vanish overnight. It appears that the decision to spend billions of dollars for a strategic weapon system will inevitably diminish British general purpose forces.

There is no evidence that the French are prepared to depart from their policy of maintaining an independent military role.

France will probably maintain its II Corps in the southwestern corner of West Germany and not, as much as we might wish it, forward, either to reduce the length of the West German II Corps front or to assume part of the US VII Corps mission. Efforts to fully integrate French forces in NATO military planning, particularly as a result of a reduced US troop presence, would continue, but success in these efforts is more a wish than a probability.

It is also unlikely that Benelux, Denmark, or Norway could provide a solution to the problem of filling gaps created by departing Americans in the central region. Marginal contributions to NATO's overall strength might be feasible, but to expect additional major troop units from the smaller allies is unrealistic. The expected admission of Spain to NATO is unlikely to produce a feasible alternative to forward US forces. The quality of the Spanish Army, the attitudes of the French and German governments, and indeed the wisdom of investing Spanish assets outside the western Mediterranean area all raise difficult questions.

The only realistic alternative to US forces in the central region is the *Bundeswehr*. But serious political and psychological problems would attend any increase in German military capability, a fact which cannot be blinked. Memories of German militarism persist in Europe to an extent greater than Americans want to believe. These memories rule out a simple substitution of West German NATO divisions for US divisions, even if other considerations did not dictate against this course of action. West Germany is keenly aware of its neighbors' attitudes: suspicion in the East and ambivalence in the West. A drawdown of American troops in Europe would increase centrifugal forces within the alliance, particularly if associated with expansion of the *Bundeswehr*.

One can only speculate about the probable effect on the Soviets of unilateral US troop withdrawal, but it is difficult to imagine any way that the consequences would work to our advantage or contribute to stability in Europe. American hesitation to

use military force since the Vietnam experience—in Africa, in Afghanistan, in Iran, in Central America—could lead the Soviets to conclude that our will has failed us. True, it is unlikely that American force reductions in Europe would result in an immediate Soviet charge westward. It is likely, however, that the Soviets would continue to exert political pressure on the West over time. Should Western Europeans conclude, with the Soviets, that American will has eroded, the inclination of Europeans would tend toward greater accommodation with an ascendant USSR.¹⁶ To Marxist-Leninists everywhere there would be sufficient evidence that the capitalist system was, indeed, falling of its own weight, as predicted more than a century ago. The United States and the West would have “proved” that the internal contradictions of our system have rendered us incapable of sustained competition with a superior system destined to reorder the world.

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

In broad outline the coming decade will be much like the past decade, but more complex. Europe will remain a vital interest of the United States. NATO allies will be more assertive, a reflection of their own self-confidence, of diminished respect for US resolve and use of power,¹⁷ and of hope that cultivating normalization in relations between East and West will bear fruit. As the small and medium states of Europe attempt to normalize East-West relations, they will keep an eye on the superpowers and hope that a return to confrontation politics can be avoided. The USSR will carefully watch the development of assertiveness in Eastern Europe. Detente may have stimulated nationalistic tendencies throughout Eastern Europe to a point which the Soviets will deem intolerable. Measuring gains against losses—disarray in the West and independent impulses in the East—could turn the USSR from the charade of detente to direct confrontation in the mid-1980s, while it still enjoys certain military advantages. It is unclear whether a

waiting game or bold initiatives will be more appealing to the Soviet Union, itself shifting to a new generation of leaders in this decade. In either event, the United States must demonstrate beyond doubt the will and intention to continue to be the leader of the West.

Our allies in Europe need to be convinced that, even though we will remain strong in Europe, total defense requirements around the world demand that regional powers carry a fair share of the burden. This argument has thus far proved unconvincing in Europe. Vietnam was regarded as an American war, not a defense of Western interests. Afghanistan is regarded as an exotic place far from Europe, clearly not worth the poisoning of West European relations with the USSR. We must nevertheless persist in our efforts to have Europe do more for its own defense. The reduction of oil supplies resulting from turbulence in the Near East may force Europeans to recognize their interests beyond the white cliffs of Dover and the white peaks of the Urals. The 1980-81 Polish crisis will stimulate European concern for defense, but it will also focus attention on Europe.

NATO was created to satisfy a need which still exists. As long as the need exists, as long as the security of Europe is second only to that of the United States itself in US strategic planning, it would not be in the national interest to dismantle an effective instrument of US policy. Policy without the means of implementation is posturing. And we cannot afford to posture in Europe.

A primary challenge to the United States in its efforts to establish world order in the 1980s will be the maintenance of equilibrium and stability in Europe. That probably will entail a need for US troop presence in Europe at the end of the decade at a level more or less the same as at the beginning of the decade, and the maintenance of a strategic reserve with the means to get it in a timely manner where it is needed. The temptation to find that strategic reserve from within our NATO force should be resisted. Strategic flexibility should not be bought at the price of risking stability in Europe.

NOTES

1. Walter F. Hahn takes a pessimistic view regarding European accommodation to the Soviet Union in his article, "Does NATO Have a Future?" *International Security Review*, 5 (Summer 1980), 151-72. He contends that the circumstantial variable of leaders' personalities combines with a progressive trend, which he calls the "confidence gap," and concludes that the temptation to come to terms with the Russians will become almost irresistible in Western Europe, particularly in Germany. It does injustice to Mr. Hahn's intelligently developed analysis, but summarized in briefest terms, he sees the Germans in their historical dilemma: Should they tilt West, East, or attempt to round up the wagons against all comers? An ascendant Soviet Union and a United States unsure of itself might incline a prudent German to tilt East, to be more "reasonable" in accommodating the Russians. While European fears previously focused on American willingness "to go the entire route of escalation in the defense of Europe," they now focus on the American wherewithal for the nuclear guarantee of Europe. Realpolitik might cause the Germans—by degrees—to edge eastward. Walter Laqueur ("Euro-Neutrality," *Commentary*, 69 [June 1980], 21-27) notes the same trend in Europe—the trend that seems to say "we are weak, we are dependent, we cannot afford heroic gestures"—but he is less fatalistic than Hahn. Laqueur reminds us that "Europe has nowhere to go, and societies seldom accept voluntary satellization." He prescribes leadership: "America's task in Europe is twofold, to reassure the faint-hearted and to stiffen the resolve of those who are prepared to stand straight."
2. William Safire, "To Deter the Invasion of Poland," *The New York Times*, 11 December 1980, p. A35.
3. Jack Anderson, "Report Urges US Pullout From Europe," 28 April 1980, p. B13.
4. George Ott, "The Case Against NATO," *The Washington Monthly*, 12 (December 1980), 34-36.
5. "We'll Stay If They Pay," *The Washington Monthly*, 12 (December 1980), p. 36.
6. William L. Hauser, "Reducing Our Forces In Europe," *The New York Times*, 27 February 1980, p. A27.
7. Jean-Paul Pigasse, "The Case for a European Defense of Europe," *Strategic Review*, 8 (Fall 1980), 29-39.
8. Rene Cagnet, Guy Doly, and Pascal Fontaine, *Euroshima* (Paris: Editions Media, 1979).
9. Edward A. Kolodziej, "European Perspectives on Europe's Roles in the World: The Partial Partner," in *Rethinking US Security Policy For The 1980s* (Washington: National Defense Univ., 1980), p. 122. This article presents an excellent appreciation of the way Europe currently looks at the United States, the Third World, and itself.
10. Jeffrey Record, "The Western Alliance, Japan and International Security Threats," in *Rethinking US Security Policy For the 1980s*, pp. 72-74.
11. Kolodziej, pp. 95-110.
12. R. W. Apple, Jr., "Britain's Labor Party Veers Emphatically to the Left," *The New York Times*, 3 October 1980, p. A3:

A number of speakers denounced the United States, one of them calling it 'that country that has consistently meddled in the affairs of every other country.'

The conference rejected the strongest motion before it, one calling for withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But on a show of hands it backed resolutions committing the party to remove all British and American nuclear weapons from British soil and from British waters and 'opposing British participation in any defense policy based on the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons.'

13. A. W. DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1979). Mr. DePorte's thesis is essentially that a divided Europe and two Germanies, one in each of the two great power blocs on the Continent, is a happy solution to the search for stability in Europe. It has worked well, when one considers the history of Europe, a history of various nations attempting hegemony through centuries. Division reflects the power relationship as the US-led NATO faces the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. This sensible arrangement promises to reach out to the turn of the century.
14. As one writer put it, "The most powerful unifying force in NATO was the constraining influence imposed by the absence of alternatives" (Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO In the Second Generation," *NATO Review*, 28 [October 1980], 4).
15. Most Europeans can provide impressive statistics when charged with refusal to carry their fair share of the NATO defense burden. The West German *White Paper 1979 (The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces)*, pp. 23-24, says that the European allies contribute 90 percent of the land forces and 80 percent of the combat aircraft fielded by NATO. The *Bundeswehr* provides 50 percent of the NATO land forces in central Europe, 50 percent of the ground-based air defense resources, and 30 percent of the combat aircraft.
16. Walter Laqueur, writing in *The New York Times* ("Europe in the Woods," 27 January 1981, p. A19) explains the "misunderstanding about the causes of the drift" in basic terms. It is not a result of growing economic and political strength in Europe nor Western Europe's dependence on trade with the Soviet Union. Nor is it caused by US inconsistencies or lack of leadership. "Finally, it is not true that the demand for a 3 percent increase in defense spending caused all the bad blood in Europe." Europe sees things differently because of Europe's physical proximity to Soviet power, because geography cannot be rearranged, because they live in the woods with the bear. They believe that it is a mistake to anger that bear.
17. The matter-of-fact acceptance by Europeans of a changed power relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is noteworthy. The United States "needs the alliance more than before. The weakening of the United States does not alter the fact that it is the only major power in the alliance." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung fuer Deutschland*, 11 April 1981.

