Implications of DoD Directive 3000

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Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000: Department of Defense Capabilities for Stability Operations (DRAFT) has now progressed through two or three iterations and appears to be approaching formal publication. The directive could be one of the most important documents of this decade, whether properly or improperly written and interpreted.

Beginning with a statement of DoD policy “that Stability Operations are a core U.S. military mission and . . . shall be accorded priority and attention comparable to combat operations,” it is clear that what has been done since at least 1846, when Major General Winfield Scott’s forces occupied and administered Mexico City, is about to be formalized and more importantly resourced in meaningful terms. The thrust of the directive’s early evolutions strongly suggests a significant commitment of resources, as well as the extension of stability operations awareness into every campaign plan and specifically the full development of the stability operations phase.

While the directive claims to provide “guidance on how DoD personnel and forces plan, train, and operate to conduct and support stability operations,” it really does nothing more than direct the establishment of policies, the conduct of exercises and the offer to other U.S. Government (USG) departments to “come train with us” once we figure out what that training will be.

It directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to develop stability operations policy, support of Department of State’s Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and a process to facilitate intelligence sharing. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is directed to extend intelligence capabilities into this realm, while the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is directed to find and train the right people across DoD and extend training opportunities to other U.S. departments and agencies. Perhaps of greater importance is the charge to “develop a joint and combined training and exercise policy for stability operations and generate metrics on their quantity and quality, with lessons learned and with recommendations to improve DoD stability operations capabilities.” Similar direction is given to other Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regional combatant commands, and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

All this direction is worthy and essentially right-focused, but it begs several lingering questions that matter a good deal more than detailed direction to the military services:
a. Who will compel the appropriate members of the other departments of the USG to participate in exercises or attend training? Unless those departments are regular participants in stability operations exercises, little will be truly “learned” despite the periodic publication of “Lessons Learned” pamphlets. This directive will not solve that crucial problem.

b. Will compliance with the directive be funded by the services at the cost of ongoing programs or will DoD make additional funding available to both JFCOM and the services who will have to bear the greatest burden of implementation. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is to “Ensure DoD medical personnel and capabilities are optimally prepared to meet military and civilian health and medical requirements in stability operations.” How is “optimally” defined and translated into dollars for service manning, training, technical, and logistic support?

c. Are some or all of the military departments already engaged in much of this? Will the directive foster unity or duplication of effort? Will DoD increase effectiveness in stability operations or create inefficiencies? Will money be saved or squandered?

Certainly more questions will continue to be raised, but until those posed above are answered satisfactorily, the resolution of other issues is beyond reach. Until then we can expect “more of the same,” and the services will again be required to shift their own resources about to meet this critical task of the moment. Then what will be next?