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**ETHNIC CONFLICT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE**

Major General William A. Stofft
Dr. Gary L. Guertner

March 14, 1994

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FOREWORD

Ethnic conflict is an ascendant phenomenon replacing ideology as a social force most likely to promote violence and regional instability. The ferocity of ethnic violence and its potential for escalation increase the political pressures for U.S. leadership and collective engagement. The U.S. Army has a direct interest in ethnic-based conflicts because land power is the dominant means for intervention through coalition peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.

For these reasons, the Army War College was tasked to identify potential Army requirements for responding to ethnic-based, regional conflicts. This study pinpoints specific patterns of ethnic conflict, and cautions that each may confront military planners with unique circumstances and requirements. Political and military strategies must be tailored to fit a broad spectrum of ethnic conflict. Specific Army requirements are discussed, the most important being a thorough understanding of the complex political environments of ethnic conflict before committing our forces.

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM A. STOFFT is the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College. He graduated from the State University of South Dakota in 1959, with a Bachelor of Science Degree in History Education and a commission in Armor. He also holds a Master of Arts Degree in History from New York University and has completed the program for Senior Executives in National and International Security at Harvard University. His military education includes the Armor Basic and Advanced Courses, the Airborne Course, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College. He is the coeditor of the book, *America's First Battles, 1776-1965*, Kansas University Press. His early career included such assignments as company command at Ft. Hood, Texas; deputy province senior adviser, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; assistant professor of history, U.S. Military Academy; and instructor in the Department of Strategy, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. His later assignments were as Commander, 16th Training Battalion, Ft. Knox, Kentucky; Director, Combat Studies Institute, and then Assistant Deputy Commandant at the Command and General Staff College. In March 1985 he was selected for Brigadier General and appointed the Chief of Military History on the General Staff in Washington, DC, a position he held until July 1989. For the next two years General Stofft was the Army's Director of Management in the Office of the Chief of Staff. His tenure as Commandant of the U.S. Army War College began in August 1991.

GARY L. GUERTNER is the Chairman of the Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. Prior to this position, he was Director of Research at the College's Strategic Studies Institute. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in Political Science from the University of Arizona and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Claremont Graduate School. A former Marine Corps officer and veteran of Vietnam, Dr. Guertner has also served on the staff of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as a Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fullerton. He is the editor and an author of *The Search For Strategy: Politics and Strategic Vision*, Greenwood Press, 1993, and has written books and articles for numerous professional journals.

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History is littered with the wreck of states that tried to combine diverse ethnic or linguistic or religious groups within a single sovereignty.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Introduction.

Ethnic conflict is an elemental force in international politics and a major threat to regional security and stability. Ethnicity as a source of conflict has deep historic roots. Many such conflicts lay dormant, suppressed by the Soviet empire or overshadowed by the ideological competition of the cold war. Both protagonists in the cold war demonstrated unwarranted optimism about their ability to defuse ethnicity and ethnic conflict. Marxists believed that ethnicity would give way to "proletarian internationalism." Social class and economic welfare would determine both self-identity and loyalty to political institutions that would transcend ethnic identification or religious affiliation.

Western democracies assumed that "nation building" and economic development were not only vital components in the strategy to contain communist expansion, but that capitalism, economic prosperity, and liberal democratic values would also create free societies with a level of political development measured by loyalty to the state rather than to the narrower ethnic group. Instead, the goals of assimilation and integration within the larger context of economic and political development are being replaced by violent ethnic corrections to artificially imposed state boundaries. The Balkan and Transcaucasian conflicts, for example, are ancient in origin and have as their object the territorial displacement of entire ethnic groups. Such conflicts by their nature defy efforts at mediation from outside, since they are fed by passions that do not yield to "rational" political compromise. They are, as John Keegan describes in his most recent study of war, "apolitical" to a degree for which Western strategists have made little allowance.¹

The demise of European communism and the Russian empire has unleashed this century's third wave of ethnic nationalism and conflict. The first came in the wake of the collapsing Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires which came to a climax after World War I; the second followed the end of European colonialism after World War II.

The third wave of ethnic-based conflict may transform international politics and confront the United States with new security challenges.² The extent of the historic transformation underway since the cold war will be determined by the interplay

of many trends, some cyclical like ethnic conflict, and some historically unique. Cyclical trends include the violence that follows failed empires and states, economic scarcity, environmental degradation, epidemics, mass migrations, and even ethnic cleansing.

Historically unique trends which make the post-cold war world unpredictable include global transparency and communications, mobility, proliferation of military technology, including weapons of mass destruction, and the potential scope of environmental changes caused by the unprecedented assaults from population growth, industrialization, pollution, climatic change, and the emergence of new, virulent diseases. Any one of these trends is capable of producing synergistic effects that fast-forward systemic collapse in the Third World, reducing the radius of trust and loyalty to ethnic kinsmen, tribe, clan, or religious group.

The United States and its allies are confronted with intractable zones of hostility in failed, fragmenting states that resemble the anarchy of the pre-nation-state system. Failed states are inevitably altered by what Martin van Creveld describes as the legal monopoly of armed force being wrested from official hands by warring factions that create an environment in which the distinctions between war and crime are lost in a rising tide of violence and anarchy.³ Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Peru, Sudan, Chad, and Liberia are all dramatic cases.

These trends are not indicators of an inevitable dark age of ethnic conflict. They are, however, warnings to both our military and civilian leadership that we face an unprecedented number of conflicts ranging from high-tech forces emerging from the "military-technical revolution" to primitive inter-clan, urban warfare. The primary interest for the U.S. Army is to protect our national interests when they are at risk from these trends.

Implications for Military Strategy.

Emerging patterns of ethnic conflict are forcing Americans to reexamine long held principles. Self-determination, for example, seemed morally clear and compelling in President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" designed to formalize the liberation of small states from European empires after World War I. These same principles were equally compelling when Roosevelt applied them to European colonial empires at the end of World War II.

The third wave of ethnic conflict confronts policymakers with more complex patterns, patterns that idealist policies based on self-determination cannot resolve. What, for example, is a reasonable unit of self-determination? Is it every ethnic group that wants a sovereign territorial state? Where does the proliferation of states end? How does "reunion" take place if the process was to begin to reverse itself? Are U.S. interests better

served by support for the integrity of existing states or their fragmentation? How is support for the status quo squared with our political history and contemporary world view?

Thinking about these challenges begins with the *National Security Strategy*. A specific national security goal of the United States is the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. These objectives require political and economic strategies based on the recognition that not all ethnic conflict is synonymous with a desire for separatism or secession. Regional stability may be underwritten by support for civil rights movements or for greater autonomy for ethnic groups within an existing state. How another sovereign state shares political and economic power within its own borders is not a problem for U.S. military leaders until efforts to achieve peaceful integration and assimilation erupt into violence, terrorism, insurgency, or patterns of repression that threaten to destabilize an ally or a region in which the United States has a clear interest at risk. (Appendix A illustrates the spectrum of ethnic conflict and corresponding military roles and missions.)

The line between appropriate U.S. political support for stability and peaceful resolution of ethnic-based civil conflict, on the one hand, and a military strategy to deal with ethnic-based regional instability, on the other, needs to be drawn with some degree of clarity concerning U.S. interests as well as specific patterns of ethnic conflict that U.S. military forces might confront. Understanding patterns of ethnic conflict is an essential starting point for military strategy, because each case varies in its causes, potential for escalation, and probability of successful intervention. Military strategy and operational plans must be tailored to counter specific enemy capabilities and centers of gravity. Such an understanding also provides good historic indicators for the intractability of conflict, the potential for domestic and international support, and the degree to which military instruments can achieve desired goals at acceptable costs.

Patterns of Ethnic Conflict.

The academic literature on ethnicity and ethnic conflict is extensive and controversial. This study uses Donald Horowitz's working definition of ethnicity—a narrow self-identification and basis for affiliation, loyalty, and action, but elastic enough to embrace groups differentiated by race, color, religion, language, regional origin, tribe, or nationality.⁴ This section addresses those patterns of ethnic conflict that are the most threatening to regional stability:⁵

- Communal violence
- Repression of ethnic enclaves

- Irredentism and retrieval
- Separatist movements

Communal Violence. Communal violence is the result of an ethnic mosaic or intermingling of groups, often through centuries of conquests, migrations, and dislocations. Ethnic groups can be distributed in such a mishmash that it is difficult to discern a discrete territorial unit which nationalities or ethnic groups inhabit. Many of the groups evidencing this pattern have literally lived side-by-side (usually in a segregated fashion) with one another for dozens of generations. Nowhere is this better typified than in India, where one commonly finds a Muslim "side" of a village and a Hindu "side" of a village. Jerusalem, as well as Sarajevo, each with its respective "ethnic" or "religious" quarters typifies this distribution pattern, as did Beirut. Each of these cities can attest to the volatile mix of ethnic groups that can lead to intense violence. These types of societies are given to periodic and virulent outbursts of conflict.

The Bosnia example is made more complex and tragic because it is surrounded on two sides by newly independent states (Serbia and Croatia) seeking to lop off large segments of its territory.

Bosnia combines at least three patterns of ethnic conflict—communal violence, repression of ethnic enclaves (variously by all three parties), and irredentism or retrieval of adjacent enclaves of ethnic kinsmen by Croatia and Serbia. As discussed below, these complex patterns are vital parts of the strategic landscape that must be understood and accounted for by strategists who must decide whether or how to apply military forces.

Repression of Ethnic Enclaves. Enclaves are most often created through the process of imperial exhaustion. The collapse of empires and the emergence of newly independent states usually lead to the creation of "pockets" of stranded co-ethnics in territory no longer under a former imperial power's control. Ethnic populations living within enclaves have both contemporary affiliations to, and historic claims upon, the territory which they inhabit within their host state.

Host state repression of enclaves may take the form of human rights abuses committed against stateless minorities (Azeris in Armenia, Kurds in Iraq or Turkey, and Baluchis in Pakistan, for example). More often, however, threats to large ethnic enclaves have the potential for escalation because these enclaves have patron states near or contiguous to the borders of repressor states. Examples that could or have flared up include Hungarians in Slovakia, Russians in newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union, Armenians in Azerbaijan, and Moslems in Bosnia, a tragic battleground on which nearly every pattern of ethnic conflict is visible.

Azerbaijan provides an instructive lesson for newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union not to discriminate against their Russian "minority." Armenia is attempting to claim an enclave of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh by capturing a corridor linking the two. The reclamation of an enclave generally means the reclamation of non-ethnic/non-nationals, automatically leading to the creation of an entirely new enclave. In such a situation, the reclaiming state may have to accede to some sort of guarantee towards the rights of the newly created minority population, or engage in the types of large-scale "population transfers" which occurred at the end of World War I and World War II.

More extreme "solutions" are at work in Bosnia where one finds many "islands" of Serbs that are distributed in an enclave-like fashion (as well as the communal mosaic described above). The Bosnian Serb nationalists in concert with the Serbian military have sought to "reclaim" these enclaves throughout Bosnia, again through the establishment of, in their own words, "corridors." Implicit in the creation of these "corridors" is the recognition that one will have to "reclaim" individuals who are not co-ethnics, which would lead to the creation of new enclaves. The Serbians, however, rather than live with this condition, have engaged in a process (in ethnic doublespeak) of "ethnic cleansing." This is a benign word for expulsion from one's homeland or, in the extreme form, a "final solution"—genocide.

The use or establishment of "corridors" to make enclaves territorially contiguous is not without historical precedent. The so-called "Polish Corridor" connected the Baltic Coast with Poland during the period between World War I and World War II. This corridor, however, created a German enclave in East Prussia that was forcefully reunited by Hitler. At Yalta, this former German enclave became part of the Soviet Union, and today is Kaliningrad, the only noncontiguous portion of Russia, separated by Lithuania. Clearly, ethnic enclaves have and will continue to be a source of regional instability.

Closely related to the enclave problem, but with greater potential for conflict are those patterns where national boundaries divide ethnic groups between two sovereign states.

Irredentism and Retrieval. Irredentism is one state's attempt to claim or reincorporate contiguous territory occupied by ethnic kinsmen (Russians in Kazakhstan, Somalis in Ethiopia, or Tajiks in Afghanistan, for example). Irredentas are caused by territorial boundaries which for a host of reasons have been imprecisely drawn. In Europe, irredentas were often created in the aftermath of major power conflict, such as the two World Wars. Hitler, for example, used irredentist pretexts to incorporate Austria and the Sudetenland. In the Third World, irredentist claims are most often attributable to the capricious fashion in which the boundaries for colonial empires were delineated.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, a whole new array of real and potential irredentas has been spawned. The Soviet Union was loathe to launch irredentist or other ethnic-based claims for fear of riling ethnic tensions both within and without the USSR. The same is no longer true of the new nationalist regimes created with the Soviet empire's fall. Nationalists in newly independent republics feed their counterparts in Russia, many of whom are prepared to mobilize Russians to retake the lost empire. Ethnic-based claims reinforced by repression anywhere against the 25 million Russians living in the newly independent republics are likely, along with economic chaos, to resonate as the most effective rallying call for extremists.

Regional conflict stemming from new irredentist-retrieval patterns is not limited to the former Soviet Union. We find ourselves in a period of profound international transformation in which nationalist, including irredentist, claims will be more frequent than during the more stable bipolar period of the cold war. As one leading expert has warned:

Irredentism has been a by-product of transition and uncertainty in the international order. Irredentist propensities may lie dormant for years and then erupt when interstate arrangements are destabilized. The latent and overt phases of irredentism are therefore closely connected to occurrences in the international arena in general and regional politics in particular.⁶

Secessionist Movements. Separatist or secessionist movements are not always ethnic-based or motivated, but they nearly always result in or are affected by some degree of ethnic conflict. The former Soviet Union, for example, did not fragment along purely ethnic lines. Indeed, as discussed above, each new state is confronted with ethnic conflicts within. The last act in this great drama has yet to unfold, and ethnic conflicts will play a major role in determining the former Soviet empire's continued fragmentation or forceful reunion by revanchist Russian nationalism.

Historically, most ethnic-based secessionist movements are spawned by failures in integration and assimilation. Eventually convinced that they are unable to compete in an undivided state and often, in effect, colonized by civil servants and administrators from other regions, and subject to uncongenial policies on language and other important symbolic issues, such groups are apt to seek independence. More often than not, they do so heedless of the economic costs. If the region is economically backward, as the Slovakian Republic (a good, but atypical example of peaceful separation), the southern Sudan, the southern Philippines, the former East Pakistan, and the hill country of Burma, secession very likely means a loss of subsidies from the center. One reason people living in such regions nonetheless choose secession is that their political and ethnic goals

outweigh the economic benefits that come with the undivided state. Another reason is that the political and economic interests of their elites lie with independence. Rather than be a minority political leader in a heterogeneous larger society, independence makes it possible to be at the center of things. Rather than be a very junior civil servant, if other groups have longer traditions of education and have produced many more senior civil servants, independence makes it possible to "jump the queue."⁷

Two specific cases of secessionist movements are worth noting because of their potential impact on regional stability and military strategy. The first is the violent but successful independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia. This secessionist victory sets a precedent that may contribute to a domino effect throughout Africa where some degree of regional stability had been achieved by the acceptance of colonial borders, no matter how arbitrarily they may have been drawn.

The second example of ethnic-based separatism is illustrated by stateless minorities who form recognizable enclaves divided by two or more states. The Kurds in Iraq and Turkey or the Baluchis in Pakistan and Afghanistan are examples. The Kurds are especially challenging because their fate has already prompted an ongoing humanitarian relief and enclave security mission in northern Iraq. In Turkey, the Kurds have the potential for destabilizing not only a region, but also a U.S. ally that plays a strategic role in both Europe and the Middle East.

Separatist movements in general demonstrate the paradox confronting U.S. national security strategy. Political, economic, and military strategies must be carefully coordinated throughout the interagency process to avoid what may seem in some regions of the world to be paradoxical, if not contradictory, U.S. objectives. The "enlargement of democracy," as the follow-on strategic objective replacing the containment of communism, will produce both the desire for self- and group-expression and the electoral vehicles by which to promote separatist ambitions.⁸ This is why the administration has clearly stated that the national security strategy of the United States is not to embark on an idealistic, global crusade. Selectivity and discriminate military intervention are guides to both our involvement in ethnic conflicts and our parallel efforts to enlarge democracy. Moral commitments are not multiplying while military resources decline. The guiding principle is the degree of risk to a clearly identifiable U.S. interest. We know how to say no to intervention, and we will encourage others, including the United Nations, to say no as well.⁹

Implications for the Army.

The patterns of ethnic conflict described here will continue to erupt in human rights violations, terrorism, insurgency, civil

conflict, territorial disputes, and open warfare. These produce economic dislocations, refugees, and mass migrations which contribute to the domino effects that can engulf an entire region.

Our ability to affect the root causes of centuries-old ethnic conflicts is marginal. Few ethnic conflicts in the world pose direct threats to U.S. security. As the last global superpower, however, the United States plays a leading role in the promotion of collective security and the protection of human rights. Moreover, there is reason to believe that domestic political pressures for U.S. participation in multinational efforts to alleviate the consequences of ethnic conflict will grow as the result of global transparency and the technological capability for virtual real-time coverage of violence everywhere in the world. Violence is no longer remote or abstract. Ethnic violence and human suffering are viewed in our living rooms every night. This raises two major questions for the Army leadership: (1) Under what conditions should they recommend that U.S. forces participate either unilaterally or in coalition to contain or terminate an ethnic-based conflict? and (2) What specific military requirements are needed for the wide range of operations that ethnic conflicts may require?

Under What Conditions Should Military Force Be Introduced?
Military leaders can play a vital role in the interagency decision-making process. This process should clearly assess U.S. interests, objectives, risks, and costs of intervention. The risks of military intervention in ethnic-based conflicts are high. Ethnic conflicts are deeply rooted, and, in some cases, intractable. They may be driven by emotional rather than material interests. Economic and political incentives may neither satisfy nor suppress the combatants. The risk of escalation is high especially when ethnic combatants have patron states in the region. Escalation may also include terrorism directed against the United States. Military objectives and centers of gravity will be difficult to identify, difficult to attack, or lie outside imposed political constraints.¹⁰

This last point is central in civil-military decisionmaking. Civilian leadership identifies the broad political objectives and acceptable levels of cost and risk. Military leadership is responsible for a military strategy that can achieve political objectives. Reconciling the two requires a clear delineation of political constraints and a clear assessment of military objectives and centers of gravity that must be attacked to achieve both military and political objectives. If centers of gravity, the most vital military targets, lie outside the political constraints imposed on the nation's leadership, military intervention is unlikely to succeed. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship. Typical political constraints on military intervention against ethnic (or any other) conflicts include:

- Lack of support of Congress and the American people;
- An inability to terminate conflict quickly at reasonable costs;




Figure 1

- No clearly definable end state;
- Lack of political cohesion and compromise to hold and field a coalition force;
- Limited U.N. mandate;
- Avoiding military targets that may lead to escalation, unacceptable risks, and costs;
- Minimal collateral damage, especially noncombatant casualties; and,

- Media coverage and global transparency.

The various patterns of ethnic-based conflict described earlier can make the reconciliation of political constraints and effective military targeting against centers of gravity difficult. Typical centers of gravity include:

- Military forces, generally land forces;
- Political-military leadership;
- External political/economic/military support;
- Popular support for ethnic combatants.

This list is by no means inclusive and may not apply to all ethnic-based conflict. It does, however, serve as an example for matching patterns of ethnic conflicts with centers of gravity that must fit within the political constraints imposed on our forces. If external political, economic, or military support is a center of gravity (Serbia's support of Bosnian Serbs, for example), then regional escalation of a conflict must be an acceptable risk. If land forces are the center of gravity, then the United States must be prepared for a level of effort, including American casualties, required to destroy or degrade those forces. If popular support for ethnic combatants is a center of gravity, then economic and other targets that are punitive to noncombatants must be acceptable.

The difficult reconciliation process between political constraints on war and centers of gravity is vital to the formation of effective military strategy if military force is to be the principal means for conflict termination. Reconciliation is equally important whether in war-situations in which military force is the principal means to achieve national objectives-or in operations other than war-situations in which military force is subordinate. In either circumstance, specific Army capabilities are required.

What Army Requirements Are Needed to Respond to Ethnic Conflicts? As this analysis has stressed, ethnic conflicts stem from deep historical roots. They ultimately require political solutions. The use of military force can never achieve a lasting solution. The best that military force can accomplish is to temporarily contain violence and contribute to an environment that permits the establishment of political conditions or institutions that lead to a more permanent solution. Even given this "limited" objective, military contributions to the resolution of ethnic conflicts may require the commitment of considerable forces, resources, and lives.¹¹

Under current domestic and international political conditions, the Army leadership can make several operational

assumptions about their role in responding to ethnic conflicts. First, with the possible exception of humanitarian relief operations, U.S. involvement will not be unilateral. A growing consensus in the post-cold war world is that in regional conflicts, if military force is to be used it should be applied collectively—that collective uses of military force can be legitimate means to just ends.¹² By contrast, unilateral interventions establish precedents that lead to more bold, potentially destabilizing behavior by other governments. Russian demands for unilateral peacekeeping in their "near-abroad" is one example. The assumption of this monograph is, therefore, that U.S. participation in ethnic conflicts will be virtually synonymous with participation in multilateral peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. This does not suggest that, as Desert Storm illustrated, all peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations are the result of ethnic conflict.

Second, military commitments will be limited to peacekeeping and to low- and mid-intensity peace-enforcement operations. But low- and mid-intensity operations are likely to be land combat dominant, requiring decisive capability to bring conflicts to an early end before public support erodes. Decisive capability, both numbers and firepower, also provides a potent deterrent effect on local populations from which hostile forces might otherwise draw support.

Third, a broad range of noncombat operations will be required. As discussed below, these requirements may come in competition with the readiness requirements for the "nearly two simultaneous" major regional contingencies prescribed in the Secretary of Defense's *Bottom-Up Review* and in the new *National Military Strategy*.

These operational assumptions give rise to several specific requirements for the Army:

- The ability to deploy trained and ready forces on short notice.
- The ability to rotate forces from protracted peacekeeping operations to meet major regional contingencies.
- The opportunity to train with and the ability to operate in a multinational force structure.
- Sufficient forces to meet anticipated peace support missions while maintaining the ability to execute major regional contingencies (MRCs). As discussed below, this severely challenges specialized units such as civil affairs, psyops, engineers, military police, and medical.
- Interagency coordination from planning through execution, especially with nongovernment agencies (NGOs), a potential force multiplier in medical and humanitarian relief missions.

- Healthy Foreign Area Officer and strategist programs and language skills for effective regional liaison—over the long haul.

- Tailored leader development and training programs to include:

- The nature of peacekeeping operations
- Root causes and patterns of ethnic conflicts
- Regional orientations
- Negotiating skills for officers and NCOs
- Thorough understanding of Rules of Engagement.

The most significant shortfall for the Army is combat service support—medical, engineers, military police, civil affairs, and psyops, of which there are insufficient numbers to support peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and major regional contingencies. Three solutions are possible: (1) restructure the reserve component to provide additional support capabilities and access to those units in peacetime, (2) add more "specialized units" to the active force, or (3) as the President's National Security Advisor, Tony Lake, has done, declare a clear priority:

We will never compromise military readiness to support peacekeeping. Nor would we hesitate to end our engagement in a peacekeeping operation if that were necessary to concentrate our forces against an adversary in a major conflict.¹³

Declaring priorities does not make the United States an unreliable partner in collective security. It means that peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations are, by definition, burden-sharing enterprises. The United States will honor its commitments and share the burdens of world order. It cannot, however, under current fiscal constraints, carry so large a percentage of the collective security burden that other interests are risked as the result of overcommitment. Peacekeeper's fatigue is a threat to readiness if a declining U.S. force structure is confronted by frequent or protracted deployments.¹⁴

Two specialized leader development requirements cited above also deserve emphasis here. One is the importance of negotiation skills. Officers and NCOs will be in close contact with combatant and noncombatant groups in situations where decentralized diplomacy and on-the-spot negotiating skills can defuse a volatile situation, saving American, allied, and noncombatant lives.

Thorough understanding of the rules of engagement is also a

critical part of specialized training for ethnic conflicts. Rules of engagement have political significance that resonate far beyond the battlefield. Global transparency, the omnipresent news media, and the political nature of collective security and peacekeeping forge an unprecedented convergence of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war in the theater of operations. A single infantry unit can bring immediate praise or condemnation from the world community. Similarly, a single explosive event with "high casualties" (as in Somalia) can cause U.S. domestic support to evaporate overnight.

Finally—a point that must be widely understood throughout the defense community—peacekeeping operations generally and ethnic conflicts in particular are land-power dominant. They will require the best of our traditional combat skills, and our best efforts to be open-minded and innovative in an era of declining resources, ambiguous threats, and additional missions under the umbrella of "operations other than war."

These requirements do not mean that ethnic conflicts and peacekeeping operations are the centerpieces of our foreign and defense policies. Our armed forces' primary mission is to fight and win wars. Nevertheless, early, collective participation to contain or dampen ethnic conflicts can protect allies, create breathing room for fledgling democracies, and contribute to regional stability. But, the interests of the nation and the credibility of the Army demand that we thoroughly understand the complex environments of ethnic conflict before we commit our forces.

APPENDIX A

SPECTRUM OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

<p>CIVIL RIGHTS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NONVIOLENT PROTEST - CIVIL RIGHTS MOVE-MENTS - VIOLENT PROTESTS - REPRESSION OR, INTEGRATION AND STABILITY 	<p>DEMANDS FOR GREATER AUTONOMY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NONVIOLENT PROTESTS - VIOLENT PROTESTS - REPRESSION OR, REVOLUTION OF POWER; FEDERAL UNION 	<p>SEPARATISM/ SECESSION</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - VIOLENT PROTEST - TERRORISM - CIVIL CONFLICT - INSURGENCY - REPRESSION 	<p>REPRESSION OF MINORITIES (NO PATRON STATE)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS - CULTURAL OPPRESSION - COMMUNAL VIOLENCE - ETHNIC CLEANSING - GENOCIDE 	<p>REPRESSION OF MINORITIES (PATRON STATE)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SAME PATTERN, BUT LESS LIKELY DUE TO THREAT OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION 	<p>IRREDENTISM/ RETRIEVAL OF LOST KINSMEN OR HISTORIC TERRITORIAL CLAIMS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - TERRORISM - CIVIL WAR - AGGRESSION - REGIONAL CONFLICT
RESPONSES TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NON-INTERVENTION - POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR STABILITY AND PEACEFUL RESOLUTION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UNILATERAL DIPLOMACY - INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY - SANCTIONS - THREATS OF FORCE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY - SANCTIONS - THREATS OF FORCE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY - PEACEKEEPING - PEACE ENFORCEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY - PEACEKEEPING - PEACE ENFORCEMENT
U. S. MILITARY ROLES AND MISSIONS					
NONE LIKELY					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS - SHOW OF FORCE - SOF - HUMANITARIAN RELIEF - SANCTUARY SECURITY 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ALL TYPES OF COMBAT/NONCOMBAT OPS POSSIBLE - PEACEKEEPING - PEACE-ENFORCEMENT 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - HUMANITARIAN RELIEF - SANCTUARY SECURITY 	

PEACEFUL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES WAR



INCREASING LEVELS OF VIOLENCE

ENDNOTES

1. John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, p. 58.
2. The most comprehensive, documented post-cold war study of ethnic conflict is Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993.
3. Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, 1991, pp. 197-207.
4. Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict: The Known and the Unknown," paper presented at the Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC, June 23, 1992, pp. 5-6. Horowitz is recognized as one of the nation's most prolific scholars on ethnicity and ethnic conflict. One of his most significant warnings is to avoid using ethnicity and race as synonymous. He calls this the "figment of the pigment." Groups with identical gene pools can be parties to conflicting ethnic factions. In Bosnia, for example, all factions are predominately Slavic in origin.
5. More comprehensive patterns of ethnic conflict are developed in Tomas A. Hopkins, "Resurgent Nationalism: Ethnic Group Distribution Patterns and Interstate Relations," paper presented at the International Studies Association-West meeting, Phoenix, AZ, November 5-7, 1992.
6. Naomi Chazan, "Irredentism, Separatism, and Nationalism," in *Irredentism and International Politics*, ed. Naomi Chazan, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991, p. 143.
7. Developed in detail by Donald L. Horowitz, pp. 19-20.
8. The "enlargement of democracy" theme was developed by Tony Lake. See Daniel Williams, "Clinton's National Security Adviser Outlines U.S. 'Strategy of Enlargement'," *The Washington Post*, September 22, 1993, p. A16.
9. A major theme in President Clinton's speech at the U.N. General Assembly. "Address by the President to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," White House Press Release, September 27, 1993.
10. The authors are indebted to COL Bruce Clarke for the relationships between political constraints and centers of gravity. See his "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model," *Journal of Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 16, 1993, pp. 25-50.
11. This theme is developed by Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen, *Ethnic Conflict in Europe*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, forthcoming.

12. Morton H. Halperin and David J. Schneffer, *Self-Determination in the New World Order*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992, p. 105. See also Daniel Williams, "Clinton Peacekeeping Policy to Set Limits on Use of U.S. Troops," *The Washington Post*, February 6, 1994, p. A24.

13 Tony Lake, "The Limits of Peacekeeping," *The New York Times*, February 6, 1994, p. E17.

14. This problem was described by Secretary of the Army Togo West. See Steve Vogel, "Secretary Concerned that Frequent Deployments Will Run Troops Ragged," *Army Times*, February 28, 1994, p. 4.

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