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THE *BUNDESWEHR* AND GERMAN SOCIETY

by

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The army of the German Federal Republic, the *Bundeswehr*, has now existed longer than either the *Reichswehr* or the *Wehrmacht*, the armies that fought the First and Second World Wars. Unlike the armies of the Second and Third Reichs, however, the *Bundeswehr* has never been tested in battle. The question of how this organization will perform in combat is of primary importance to the United States and the Atlantic Alliance.

The key to the continued pursuit of American national interests in Western Europe is a valid deterrent. The nature of that deterrent has been continuously debated and modified over the last three decades. The concept of massive retaliation based on US nuclear superiority has given way to flexible response, in which a Warsaw Pact attack would be met by an equal or somewhat greater response in order to achieve a stalemate in hostilities that would lead to negotiations. NATO conventional forces are a fundamental element of this limited response. Nuclear parity and the likelihood that limited initial nuclear exchanges would escalate into general nuclear war emphasize the importance of a credible conventional force. To be effective, the conventional force must make Soviet intervention, either directly or indirectly, less likely. And, since the preponderant share of the European conventional component is German, the validity of the deterrent is in great measure dependent upon *Bundeswehr* capability.

Typical analyses of armed forces tend to follow a quantitative format. The highly respected International Institute for Strategic Studies, for example, places great reliance on "power potential statistics," which include population, energy production, military expenditures, and transportation fleets. Additional emphasis is placed on quantitative listings of weapon systems by type and on army manning levels.

Such statistical comparisons are, of course, very valuable and useful in the development of conflict predictions. Statistical comparisons, however, do not tell the whole story. They do not, and cannot, come to grips with a vital ingredient. Dennis Chaplin, a Research Fellow of Defense Affairs at East Anglia University, has identified this essential subjective quality.

The ultimate reliability of a country's armed forces rests on the readiness of its members to sacrifice themselves for the common good The degree of dedication that is present in an army, which is also a good measure of its battle worthiness, is defined by its morale.¹

A useful departure for a study of the German willingness to engage in combat is to define the relationship of the German federal armed forces to the society they are sworn to defend and then to address the effect of that relationship on *Bundeswehr* effectiveness. Since the degree to which the armed forces

are accepted, rejected, or ignored by German society has a real and direct bearing on military efficiency, this can have an important effect on how *Bundeswehr* combat capabilities are perceived and consequently on that army's role as a deterrent.

THE RELATION WITH SOCIETY

The fear of an army becoming a state within a state is particularly real to the German people and government. Germany's last experience with democracy was to some extent undermined by the Weimar government's inability to control the military. Additionally, it is understandable that the horrors of the Second World War could result in a deeply ingrained anti-militarism. Finally, pacifism and apathy are not unreasonable reactions for a people seeking survival amid the ruins of centuries of nationalistic dreams. When a call went out for rearmament less than a decade after Germany's dismemberment by foreign armies of occupation, the response of *ohne mich*—"without me"—should not have been unexpected.

Previously, the mission of the German Army had been historical rather than moral. By appealing to this historical sense of purpose, strong leader figures were able to dominate the army and direct it to their particular goals. The military could be expected to perform its assigned tasks to the best of its ability, while the citizenry could be expected to man that military without question. Moral objections were silenced by the call of duty. Thus, the formation of the new armed forces was not only a less-than-popular decision with the general public, but the concepts behind the new force flew in the face of German experience and tradition. Reconciling the new army with the new Germany could not be an easy process.²

The basic, guiding principle of the new armed forces organization would be that of the citizen in uniform. Citizens and soldiers would have to remain a single entity. The institutionalizing of this concept was and remains a major objective of the republic and the military leadership. So long as this

concept is inherently linked with military service, then it will be impossible for the German military to regress into a segregated elite. The danger of an armed state within the state will remain remote. Other Western states have proved that effective military forces can be developed in a democracy. As the institutionalization of the process has been completed, development of an effective armed force has followed.

To assist in the institutionalization of democracy, the *Bundeswehr* was chosen as a vehicle to help develop those ideals that make the citizen army possible. Hans Karst writes:

Our young democracy is dependent on the *Bundeswehr* for civil assistance in a way that practically no other state in our history has been. One should consider that many draftees learn for the first time, from their officers, not only the meaning behind their duty, but also learn the basic concepts of democracy and the state and their functions and fundamental values.³

Whether an army should be saddled with a requirement other than training for combat is open to debate. It is unlikely that anything else is possible in the modern German context. Whatever the military can do to make its position more acceptable is without question useful. The more acceptable the armed forces are to the citizens called upon to man them, the more effective they will prove. To make them acceptable is not, though, an easy task.

Perhaps a majority of *Bundeswehr* soldiers could be labeled skeptical or even cynical concerning the reason for their service.⁴ They represent an international

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idealism where comfort and pleasure vie with radical solutions to social problems as the most important personal issues. In one survey, less than a fifth thought the federal armed forces were necessary for Germany. Most stated that the *Bundeswehr* was necessary for Western security. Of those sampled in the survey, only 17 percent were willing to give their lives for the Federal Republic. Interestingly enough, 50 percent were willing to risk their lives for freedom and democracy.⁵

Such servicemen's attitudes should probably not be weighted too heavily. This cynicism is representative of the skepticism found throughout the Western democracies. And the time of the survey, 1970, was a period of particular questioning and reassessment of values in the West on the part of military-age youth. Social pressures alone were sufficient to prompt West German youth to speak out against the military. It was an attitude that was carried over into active service.

A more recent survey indicates that the *Bundeswehr* may do very well indeed in its role as the developing agent of civic responsibility. In 1978 Ekkehard Lippert and others of the *Sozial wissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr* conducted a unique study of socialization in the German Army. First, the project concluded that military service did not lead to a destabilization of the individual's social orientation. In other words, the soldiers did not become unthinking robots serving military or political masters. Second, and perhaps most significantly, a distinct correlation was developed between *Bundeswehr* service and strengthened democratic awareness on the part of draftees and enlistees.⁶ The individual did become a more useful member of his democratic society. Whether this leads directly to a more efficient, more effective army is of course questionable. It would surely seem, however, that a more dedicated citizenry must result in a society more willing to defend itself.

In order to foster the development of the citizen-soldier, the *Bundeswehr* has accepted fundamental concepts of a soldier that are far

different from traditional Prussian attitudes. What is significant, though, is that these new attitudes are basically no different from those found throughout the Western democracies. For instance, in regard to military training, it is now accepted that the training must be conducted in such a way that no total break with the civilian world occurs. The soldier retains much of his individuality and his awareness as a citizen. As discussed elsewhere, there are persuasive arguments that this informed individual would be far more effective on the modern battlefield than a mere "bullet launcher" in field gray.

To achieve this end, and, incidentally, to make military service more palatable to its citizens, the Defense Ministry has taken some innovative steps:

By inducting conscripts into units close to their homes, privileging them to wear civilian clothes, granting them free travel and providing for liberal leave and curfew arrangements, the forces take advantage of the principles of modern leadership and seek to avoid disrupting, more than is absolutely necessary, the serviceman's customary civilian way of life.⁷

The uniform privileges, nighttime curfews, and leave policies are those familiar to most Western armies. The stationing policy is seemingly an effective one and utterly reasonable in the Federal Republic. The garrisoning concept at work in NATO's central region calls for maximum dispersion as near forward deployment positions as feasible. Thus, NATO forces are scattered throughout West Germany in relatively small battalion and regimental garrisons. Consequently, it is easy to station draftees near their homes. Social disruption is thus limited.

An interesting sidelight to German efforts to prevent social disruption is the relatively low incidence of drug use in the *Bundeswehr*. In 1979 the German Army's Inspector General could state that "compared with other Western armies we have virtually no drug problem."⁸ German efforts to make military service more desirable, more rewarding, and less disruptive have reduced

the perceived need for drugs. This is a luxury not afforded German allies. For contrast, one only has to turn to British and US troops who serve 18 to 36 months in a foreign country without benefit of any real chance for home leave. Social disruption is great, and drug use is far higher. Whatever the reason for low drug use in the *Bundeswehr*, the potential for increased operational effectiveness cannot be disregarded.

The process of institutionalizing the *Bundeswehr* and the need for the armed forces has proceeded apace, at least in the eyes of the Ministry of Defense. By 1974 it could state, "The *Bundeswehr* is an integrated part of a society where it is accepted in the public mind as matter-of-factly and unquestionably as other organs of the state."⁹ During the same period, however, a somewhat different perspective was provided by Walter Nelson, a historian reviewing the process of rearmament. He concluded,

If one considers the West's reliance on this *Bundeswehr* and the fact that it is supposed to be a full NATO partner, then one can also come to the conclusion that there is something shabby about the way in which today's military is so often treated in West Germany.¹⁰

Perhaps both conclusions are correct.

The conclusion that a federal armed force is necessary to preserve society was accepted by the German populace in one form or another shortly after World War II. Perhaps the two most common arguments were that the armed forces were necessary to protect a free Germany and that they were necessary to protect Western democracy (and thus Germany). Acceptance of either argument meant acceptance of the *Bundeswehr* as a necessary organ of the state. This did not, however, necessitate any sort of popularity for the armed forces. Perhaps inevitably the *Bundeswehr* found itself the target of German reaction to past militarism. If generations of Germans enthusiastically supporting German arms could only result in the ashes of Dresden, then it was not unreasonable to expect reaction and disillusionment to run deep. Governmental

protestations that the army would never again be a threat, that Prussian militarism was dead, and that all links with the past were severed were not the sort of actions to inspire martial ardor. Even the ceremony founding the new armed forces was conducted in an old warehouse. Though the problem has tended to grow less acute as the decades between 1945 and the present have passed, the peculiarity of the *Bundeswehr's* position in society will remain until true normalcy as a European power returns to the Federal Republic.

Additionally, in many respects the *Bundeswehr* is in a position in which escape from criticism is virtually impossible. If the armed forces adapt to public dialogue directed against it, then it is criticized by the press for being a spineless imitator of what an army should be. If, on the other hand, the *Bundeswehr* ignores public criticism, then the press flays it for being insensitive. Additionally, all the efforts the *Bundeswehr* has made to make military service as bearable as possible have opened another door for criticism. The de-emphasis of drill and ceremonies has resulted in a soldier who appears somewhat less soldierly than his Prussian or *Wehrmacht* predecessors. Consequently, many Germans think of the army as poorly disciplined and soft.¹¹ Its position is, then, an unenviable one. The *Bundeswehr* is by one account the bastion of a militaristic elite and by another account a gaggle of amateurs attempting to be soldiers. The army is ridiculed for indiscipline and at the same time criticized for representing a war-mongering class with no place in a modern Germany. Though exacerbated by 20th-century German history, it is a situation not atypical of other democracies.¹² Such an army might not respond automatically to the whim of a generalissimo. Its conduct in the face of armed aggression, however, should not be expected to be anything less than capable. No invader can afford to plan otherwise.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

Conscientious objection is an area of major concern both within the *Bundeswehr*

and within the German society. Since 1967 there has been a disturbing increase in applicants for status as conscientious objectors. In 1967, 5963 applied after receiving draft notification, while from 1971 through 1973 there were more than 25,000 applications annually. The number appears to have now stabilized.¹³ Registrations for conscientious objector status actually fell three percent in 1974. Though the figure is still the highest among the major powers, there have been no further increases approaching those of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The sharp increase during the 1970s was a result of the new conscientious objection law championed by then Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt. The new law, which permitted young men to achieve conscientious objector status by simply mailing a postcard, initially caused a tremendous debate within the German Republic. The Christian Democratic Party led the loudest and most strident outcry. It argued that allowing easy recourse to conscientious objection would in effect destroy the principle of constitutionally established universal male conscription. In its basic form, the argument predicted that so many young men would choose the route of conscientious objection that none would be left to man the armed forces. It is significant that in the 15 years since the inception of the conscientious objection law, the *Bundeswehr* has never failed to maintain enlistment requirements.

Unquestionably, a primary reason that the worst fears about conscientious objection have never been realized is the existence of an incurred national service obligation. Conscientious objection does not relieve the individual of the requirement for federal service. Upon filing for objector status after receipt of draft notification, the individual is placed in a national charity service program for two years. In reality, the conscientious objector is exposed to more unpleasantness daily than most of his uniformed counterparts ever see. Conscientious objectors are put to work in hospitals, asylums, old-age homes, and as ambulance orderlies. In fact, conscientious objectors have come to form the personnel foundation of many different

charity organizations. At one point up to 20 percent of hospital orderlies and assistants and nearly all ambulance attendants were conscientious objectors.¹⁴ The option has not proved to be an altogether attractive alternative to military service.

The ever-growing dependence of the German health service sector on conscientious objectors seems to insure that the national service requirement will be maintained. And as long as the national service program exists, it is unlikely that the *Bundeswehr* will ever run short of personnel due to conscientious objection. In any given year, the armed forces only incorporate about half of the draft-eligible young men in maintaining authorized troop levels. The hardship associated with two years of national service would seem to insure that conscientious objection will never be a universally desirable alternative to uniformed service. Consequently, manning the system, though certainly a concern, is not likely to detract from *Bundeswehr* readiness.

Indeed, a case might arguably be made that conscientious objection actually contributes to German national security. The success of the national service system, due to the manpower reserves provided by conscientious objection, contributes to the Federal Republic's social well-being. The government is able to provide excellent service at a remarkably low price because of the limited expenditures needed for personnel. Whatever citizen contentment and confidence that develops as a result of successful social programs then serves to insure that the fabric of society will not be rent by the popular demand for social change. The ensuing stability serves to insure the credibility of the government of the Federal Republic and consequently to increase security.

One element of concern is somewhat more complex and cannot be easily answered. Critics of the conscientious objector law argue that it is impossible for a nation to seem serious about national defense if it allows its citizens to escape defense duty by merely mailing in a postcard.¹⁵ Such arguments generally seem to regress into

tirades against a younger generation alleged to have no moral values. Perhaps that contention makes a point that is valid throughout the West, but it is an argument that seems to be superfluous in the national security context so long as military manning levels continue to be met.

MILITARY DISCIPLINE

Reconciling accepted standards of military discipline with a free society is a difficult problem. It is a concern that the Federal Republic has addressed:

Leaders vested with formal competences and responsibilities must be in a position to enforce their will in consonance with the organization's essential objectives, even against resistance if need be. No military organization can be ready and effective if these conditions do not prevail unreservedly.¹⁶

This recognition of the need for discipline has been tempered in practice. Postwar Germany understandably did not find itself ready for a return to traditional iron Prussian and *Wehrmacht* discipline. Still, military leaders have resisted pressures to lower disciplinary standards too far, cognizant that doing so could render army units ineffective and incapable of performing their NATO mission. While serving as Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr*, Ulrich de Maiziere outlined the ideal level of discipline for the army of a republic when he stated simply that the *Bundeswehr* should have "as much freedom as possible and as much order as necessary."¹⁷

The crux is the concept of the citizen in uniform. The individual in uniform is a soldier, but he is a free citizen first. Consequently, the extent to which discipline can be forced upon him is a question open to debate. This was particularly a concern in Germany as the nation embarked on its first successful venture into democracy. Initially commanders were too often wary of truly enforcing acknowledged, required levels of military discipline. All too many officers and

noncommissioned officers condoned what can only be termed soft treatment of the soldiers they were obligated to prepare for combat. They were afraid of running afoul of democratic guidelines, which they often misunderstood. Obviously, such conditions could lead to ineffectiveness in training and in combat operations.

A protest by 30 captains in 1971 was perhaps indicative of more widespread unhappiness with the ambiguous position in which commanders found themselves. As much a cry against a lack of authority and discipline as against any aspect of moral leadership, the memorandum seems to have reached sympathetic eyes. In 1972, military disciplinary laws were revised. Company and regimental commanders were granted far more latitude to reprimand and to punish. For minor violations, such as failure to report or unauthorized absence, commanders were given the authority to levy fines, confine to barracks, and assign extra duty. Additionally, commanders have been given far greater latitude in recognizing superior performance with such rewards as citations and extra leave time. Thus, commanders can now exercise at least some of those command prerogatives that are so necessary to maintain morale and discipline in any army organization.

More serious, purely military crimes, such as long absences without leave and desertion, are judged by military disciplinary courts. Other crimes that are defined in general law are tried in civilian courts under the civilian penal code. Most of these latter cases involve property damage or bodily harm caused by drunk driving. So long as the commander can continue to depend on quick investigation and court action, then the maintenance of discipline within the *Bundeswehr* should be guaranteed. There have been no more memoranda by disaffected captains.

MILITARY TRADITION

German military tradition is among the oldest in Europe. The heir of this tradition, the *Bundeswehr*, has often been all too

hesitant to claim its parenthood. In the zeal to eradicate militarism, the federal government broke most traditional ties to the German military past. The disbanding of historical regimental lineages and certain traditions was seen as a way to insure that the modern army would be unfettered by traditional military values. Even the founding of the new army was conducted in as sterile and unmilitary a manner as possible. The image of Theodor Blank swearing in the first *Bundeswehr* officers in a warehouse was scarcely one to inspire the new army. Yet, the child, whether willing or not, is still heir to a glorious tradition—a tradition by which it is inevitably judged.

The old regiments, the traditional flags and customs, have been eliminated. The links with the past that do exist are unofficial and usually are perpetuated by modern units stationed in areas of historical German units. For instance, safely tucked away on a low hill in a corner of the field training area for the Kulsheim *Kaserne* is a rather subdued monument to a Panzer division. On it are detailed the division's many campaigns of the Second World War. Though a visitor would have difficulty in locating the monument and even more difficulty in locating an officer who would elaborate on it, the ties with the past are almost palpable. From the same melancholy Franconian fields and villages whose sons manned the division come the troops of the *Bundeswehr*'s 12th Panzer Division. However unofficial, to the parents who send their sons and to the officers who command them, the tradition of the old division is real.

This question of tradition is an important one and one that has commanded much interest and debate within the republic. What would an army be with no moral foundation? Many concerned commentators feel that an army without moral tradition could be nothing more than a facility whose sole function would be killing. Self-sacrifice, motivated through tradition, would be discarded as nonproductive. This is hardly the guidance a people would wish for the primary institution chartered with the defense of their liberty. Yet, given that a moral

foundation is necessary to an army, the question remains upon what tradition the *Bundeswehr* could be built. Depending on the tradition it interpolates, and given the horrors of recent history, what support could the military expect from the German public as a whole?¹⁸

The answer has yet to be found. For instance, a major public and press debate accompanied the naming of the Frigate *Lütjens*. This was the first ship named for a World War II naval leader. The conflict was exacerbated by a continuing drive to name a post for Guderian, the famed World War II tank commander. The argument further emphasized that any traditional hero of the *Bundeswehr* would have to be acceptable to the public, to the press, and even to Germany's NATO allies.

The moral tradition of an army is unquestionably important. That moral foundation is usually physically expressed in traditional trappings and ceremony. The scarlet and navy of the Horse Guards of the British Court and the buff and blue of the Old Guard of Washington are two of the more common examples. Regimental colors and lineage do not automatically turn soldiers into militarists and enemies of democracy. The US and British experiences would seem to bear adequate evidence to that. In Germany, however, any traditional event, indeed any effort to express military pride through martial display, runs the risk of opposition and condemnation. Consequently, a feeling of rootlessness has often pervaded the army. It is a dangerous situation for a military force, one that could leave it either ineffective or isolated within society. Since most military traditions are developed through the national historical experience, such rootlessness would tend to suggest that the military would also be isolated from national and social goals and beliefs. Such a condition would arguably be a far greater danger to democracy than would any number of loosely interpreted expressions of militarism.

In July of 1965, the Defense Minister, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, issued a memorandum entitled "*Bundeswehr* and Tradition." The culmination of six years of study, this

document went far in giving some traditional meaning to German military service. It addressed concepts that would be considered natural in other Western democracies. Ideals of freedom, democracy, and loyalty to countrymen and the homeland were articulated officially for the first time. The flag, the Iron Cross, and other military symbols were placed in their historical perspective in relation to the ideals of the maturing democracy. As a result, the dangerous feelings of rootlessness and isolation were lessened. If the German people and military are beginning to come to grips with their past, then the foundation of that development must be the memorandum of 1965.

Today, an observer can often find limited expressions of traditional military ceremonies to which the *Bundeswehr* has returned. For instance, all German Army recruits are sworn into federal service and their regiment while holding an edge of the national colors. Normally, this is done before a regimental formation, and often at night by torchlight. On other occasions, regimental parades are led by the traditional fifes, drums, and regimental standards of an older order. The music that accompanies the formations commonly includes many of the same marches that played for the regiments of Blucher, Ludendorf, and Rundstedt. These relatively new and acceptable displays culminate each year in the Grand Tattoo, a somber public military parade that celebrates *Bundeswehr* service in the cause of peace. Ideally, the Tattoo represents a public institution sharing its pride in accomplishment with fellow citizens. Unfortunately, it has also been a vehicle through which some of those fellow citizens have shared a far different emotion.

On 6 May 1980, the Grand Tattoo was held to celebrate both the swearing in of the annual group of recruits and the 25th anniversary of West German membership in NATO. Ideally, it should have been a solemn moment of German pride. As it was, the Grand Tattoo became a symbol against which thousands of anti-war demonstrators rallied. The resulting clash left 257 policemen and more than 50 protestors injured.¹⁹ One

cannot but wonder if questions concerning the maturity to understand properly the moral necessity of traditions should not be directed to the Federal Republic as a whole rather than to her armed forces.

Another aspect of the question of tradition that has further colored the argument is the National Peoples' Army of the German Democratic Republic. East Germany has claimed Blucher, Scharnhorst, and Clausewitz among other historical figures as part of their progressive revolutionary pantheon. Even the uniforms, parades, and ceremonies of the National Peoples' Army reflect *Reichswehr* and *Wehrmacht* styles. It is thus difficult for the *Bundeswehr* to make a case that these same figures and similar ceremonial practices represent a tradition readily acceptable to a democratic state.

The Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr*, General Harald Wust, best articulated the dilemma and the only means of resolution:

There is no *Bundeswehr* tradition outside the tradition of the Federal Republic. There is however a military tradition of the *Bundeswehr* within the context of our national tradition. Both must be in basic agreement.²⁰

As the Federal Republic matures, it will come to embrace those aspects of the German historical experience that reflect national tradition. As these elements evolve, so too will the traditions of the armed forces. For if the army is to defend society, then it must reflect the ideals and traditions of that society. It will only successfully do so as society identifies those ideals and traditions.

The basic strategic situation that resulted in the formation of the *Bundeswehr* remains much the same as it was in 1955. If anything, Warsaw Pact forces have become proportionately stronger at an ever-increasing rate. Pact capability for offensive war has continued to improve year by year. The need for modern, powerful, conventional forces to deter the use of such offensive potential has never been so apparent. That conventional force, based as it is on *Bundeswehr* strength,

has a firm and capable foundation. And that strength is bolstered by the successful and ever-maturing relationship between German arms and the German society.

NOTES

1. Dennis Chaplin, "Faith in What Cause? A Survey of Political and Social Doctrines in the Armies of the two German Republics," *Army Quarterly and Defense Journal*, 102 (October 1971), 34.

2. Perhaps the best historical work on the postwar German experience is Alfred Grosser, *Geshichte Deutschlands seit 1945, eine Bilanz* (Munchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1974). The more specific relation of society to the armed forces is well developed by Eric Waldman, *The Goose Step is Verboten, the German Army Today* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

3. Hans Karst, *Das Bild des Soldaten, Versuch eines Umrisse* (Boppard am Rhein: H. Bolt, 1969), p. 107.

4. Ekkehard Lippert, Paul Schneider, and Ralf Zoll, "The Influence of Military Service on Political and Social Attitudes: A Study of Socialization in the German Bundeswehr," *Armed Forces and Society*, 4 (February 1978), 265-80.

5. Walter Henry Nelson, *Germany Rearmed* (New York: Simon, 1972), p. 57. Though over ten years old, Nelson's history of German rearmament catches the social mood of the population far better than any other work of the period.

6. Lippert, Schneider, and Zoll, 274-75.

7. Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, *White Paper 1973/74, The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces*, (1974), p. 30.

8. Bundeswehr Inspector General Jurgen Brandt, *Bild* (Hamburg), 14 May 1979, p. 8.

9. *White Paper 1973/1974*, p. 52.

10. Nelson, p. 40.

11. This observation is based on five years, January 1975-January 1980, continuous service in the German Federal Republic.

12. Sam C. Sarkesian, "An Empirical Reassessment of Military Professionalism," *Military Review*, 57 (August 1977), 3-20.

13. John Keegan, *World Armies* (New York: Facts on File, 1979), p. 254.

14. Tom Heneghan, "CO's or Cheap Labor," *Commonweal*, 6 (January 1978), p. 5.

15. Hans Ruhle, "German Security Policy: Position, Problems, Prospects," *International Security Review*, 1 (1980), 197. This provides an interesting review of the peace-first policy.

16. *White Paper, 1973/1974*, p. 60.

17. Ulrich de Maiziere, *Christ und Welt*, 1 March 1968, p. 37. General Maiziere is one of the most outspoken proponents of enlightened military leadership.

18. Gordon A. Craig, *The Germans* (New York: Putnam, 1982), p. 248. Craig's new work gives an excellent overview of many of the current problems affecting the soldiers of the two Germanys.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 252.

20. Harald Wust, "Tradition in der Bundeswehr," *Europaische Wehrkunde*, 8 (1978), 382.