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THE EFFECT OF THIRD WORLD POVERTY ON US SECURITY

by

JOHN M. WEINSTEIN

The persistence of poverty and stagnation in the Third World poses certain problems for American policymakers. Before the United States can achieve mutually cooperative relations with Third World countries, we must decide whether there are limits to growth or whether the economic pie can expand continuously. If the possibilities for growth are not infinite, we may expect more confrontation with less-developed countries (LDCs) as they demand an international redistribution of wealth. We must clarify the role of trade (and especially free trade) as an engine for development. Do we want Third World states to participate in free trade if it means that some American enterprises are to be forced out of business and that larger shares of the international market are captured by Third World producers? Free-trade advocates suggest that such developments would make for a healthier international economy in the long run. Also, there would be greater incentive for American manufacturers to innovate and become more competitive. However, there would be serious short-term consequences in this country. We must ask whether it will become necessary for the United States to compromise certain policy objectives as the international economic and political environments become more interdependent. If such compromises are required, which goals are expendable? In other words, what are our goals, how do we assign priorities to our goals, and how are our

goals related to the dynamics and realities of the international system? For instance, the type of government and political programs the United States favors will depend in part upon whether we identify Soviet subversion or the eradication of hunger as the most pressing concern in the Third World. Does the United States want to integrate Third World states into a global network of alliances? Moreover, could the United States achieve such a network, if doing so were thought to be advisable? This objective may be at odds with an LDC's plan to eradicate hunger. If such an alliance system should prove feasible, would the United States want to rely upon states whose long-term contributions to the alliance may be circumscribed by political instability?

These questions represent a few of the many that must be considered if the United States is to pursue successful long-term policies to deal with the Third World. Let us look at some of the economic, political, and military implications for US security mentioned to understand the nature of the US-LDC relationships.

Economic stagnation in the Third World poses a number of problems for the United States. Stagnation will make it difficult for these countries to purchase US products, a development with serious implications for employment and corporate profitability in this country. Moreover, the need to generate higher incomes from their primary products

or to impress their own needs upon the United States and other industrialized nations may cause LDCs to interrupt the flow of raw materials of strategic or economic value.¹ The oil price increases of the last decade come to mind in this regard. The supply of necessary materials may also be interrupted by domestic instability within a Third World exporting country or that supplier's involvement in a regional conflict, which may have roots in the need of one or both of the combatants to divert the attention of their citizenry from domestic political exigencies.

Another economic consideration of strategic importance is the possibility of Third World countries defaulting on their financial obligations due to an insufficiency of funds to service their debts or a revolution whose leaders refuse to be bound by financial obligations incurred by previous regimes. The inability or unwillingness of Third World countries to discharge their international financial obligations could cause the failure of Western banks and other lending institutions, which already hold a great deal of Third World paper,² and precipitate the further deterioration of North-South relations.³ The former development would drive up even further the already exorbitant cost of investment capital and threaten corporate survival in this country.⁴

The linkage between economic and political considerations is significant in the interactions between the United States and the Third World. The continuation of poverty in the Third World and the loss of US investments or the reduction of their profitability should be considered in this regard. Third World governments might nationalize certain foreign investments as a result of ideological motivations or political exigencies if the governments perceived that these enterprises retarded development efforts as outlined above⁵ or compromised the political objective of revolutionary consolidation. If North American multinational corporations were threatened with or underwent such expropriation, the US government would be placed in a profound dilemma. It could use its political, economic, and military power to protect American

investments, but in doing so the US government would identify itself with an unpopular situation, inviting criticism from other Third World countries that we were pursuing reactionary and exploitive policies. Such criticism provides the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other adversaries powerful propaganda leverage and the possibility of offering countervailing economic, military, and diplomatic aid. On the other hand, the failure of the US government to defend the investments of its own corporations would certainly subject it to negative political prospects at home. More serious might be the failure to defend American investments abroad, which might cause leaders of other governments to believe that they could pursue similar policies with impunity.

Numerous military and strategic threats to the United States are posed by the perpetuation of poverty in the Third World. These threats include the loss of military bases and intelligence facilities (e.g., Iran); the interruption of supply or loss of strategic resources; the introduction or expansion of Soviet, Cuban, Libyan, etc., influence into areas of vital geopolitical, strategic, and economic importance to the United States; and the disintegration of geographical regions into chaos and perhaps war. The latter occurrence is particularly dangerous, not only because of the economic considerations noted above, but also because it might undermine international order and hasten a Soviet-American military confrontation.⁶

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These serious problems require analysis from a long-term as well as a short-term perspective. Due to our political culture, which demands extreme sensitivity by policymakers to day-to-day developments and shifts of public opinion,⁷ to the short-term focus of the economy,⁸ and to the belief that all problems can be solved given the application of enough money, thought, and technological resources,⁹ US policymakers have dealt almost exclusively with the Third World from a short-term perspective. The United States often supports regimes that oppose the Soviet Union and other adversaries of the United States and opposes (through the denial of diplomatic recognition, economic embargo, or the denial of aid) countries that pursue policies perceived as being at variance to US interests. Such a view posits that a religious, good versus evil, struggle exists between the US and the USSR and that various Third World states will be won or lost by superior gamesmanship. These policies are often supported by statements stressing the need to retain access to certain resources, protect US investments, contain the expansion of Soviet influence, maintain regional stability, and maintain the credibility of commitments undertaken by this country.

These interests are legitimate, necessary, and widely held goals of American policymakers. However, the means by which these ends are pursued are not characterized by any consensus. Recent events in Iran, Central America, and Africa suggest that the policies we practice may be counterproductive to the ends we seek. Let us examine several elements that are at the basis of a long-term perspective more in keeping with the political realities of the international environment and the security interests of the United States.

ELEMENTS OF A MORE REALISTIC POLICY

In the first place, it is necessary to define the nature and scope of our interests, what is at stake, and the importance of the actors in the Third World. Unfortunately, the United States has never enunciated cogent policy that takes these elements into account. We have approached the Third World "in a state of

confusion verging on schizophrenia. We waver, hopelessly torn between our legitimate cultural, strategic, and economic affinities and a desire for popularity and moral rectitude. . . . In the end, we achieve neither rectitude nor popularity, or self-interest."¹⁰ Rectitude, popularity, and self-interest are not necessarily mutually exclusive, however, if one sees relationships in the international arena as not necessarily being zero-sum exchanges. Strategic arms control between the superpowers would seem to be a clear example. Foreign (and domestic) policies in the Third World which raised the quality of life and were based on principles of sovereignty, nonalignment, and nonintervention would be another.

Such an outcome will not be achieved, however, if we view the Third World as a stage upon which a struggle is played out between the forces of light and darkness. Former US Senator Birch Bayh has noted such a point about Africa, although his argument is germane for the Third World in general: "If we have learned anything from our experience in Vietnam, it is the folly of permitting a cold war mentality to lead us to choose sides in an internal conflict in a remote corner of Africa which presents no real threat to our national security or to vital national interests."¹¹

The world is more complex than a fight between the United States and the USSR or between the forces of democracy and authoritarianism. If the United States is to develop a more realistic policy toward the Third World, it must be recognized that the Soviet Union does not control the ebb and flow of revolutionary activity in the Third World. According to Robert Legvold, control over the internal dynamics in the Third World

is not a stake over which the Soviet Union feels it has enormous control. By and large, as the Soviet leaders know, change . . . unfolds at its own pace and in its own fashion. There is change that the Soviet Union would be delighted to abet and, at the margin, it doubtless sees a role for itself. This role, however, is essentially as benefactor not instigator.¹²

In other words, the Soviet Union is certainly willing to exploit situations in the Third World that serve its national interests. However, to ascribe developments in LDCs to Soviet design risks confusing correspondence with causation. It would be wise for American policymakers to recognize that Soviet foreign policymaking is not monolithic. There are various schools of thought within Soviet foreign policymaking circles, and each views the Third World from a different perspective.¹³ Furthermore, there are numerous constraints that may limit Soviet involvement in the Third World. Among these constraints are a troubled economy, which is severely burdened by military spending and will not sustain easily the costs of direct (or proxy) involvement in the Third World;¹⁴ growing restiveness among the Soviets' own ethnic nationalities, which will make it increasingly difficult to pursue national liberation abroad while denying it at home;¹⁵ the near universal condemnation by the Third World following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which will moderate calculations of future Soviet adventures; the Soviets' reputation as racist and bigoted toward Third World proletarians; the declining sense of applicability to the Third World of the Soviet model of development;¹⁶ and the traditional Soviet response of preoccupation with domestic politics during periods of economic problems, domestic unrest, and leadership change. Hence, let us not overestimate the ability of the Soviet Union to influence events in the Third World, especially in the decade ahead.

Second, if the United States is to arrive at an objective policy toward the Third World that does not overstate the influence of the USSR, we must learn to separate the ideological rhetoric of Third World countries from the economic and political realities they confront. Helen Kitchen notes:

American policymakers should not make life more difficult for African leaders by assuming that rhetoric equals fact, especially on issues involving Southern Africa, relations with the former colonial powers,

African unity, human and political rights, and economic ideology. As a distinguished African noted recently, there is a "consistent inconsistency" between what African politicians must say for the record and the pragmatism with which they often act—particularly when economic realities are involved.¹⁷

Condemnation of the United States may be generated by a sincere commitment to ideological principles, reaction to real or perceived past or present injustices, or the need of a beleaguered government to focus public anger in a Third World country upon some external actor to consolidate support and legitimacy. Nevertheless, these governments need markets for their products, economic aid, diplomatic recognition, and prestige in the international arena. Having emerged from a colonial condition or being involved in a neocolonial relationship makes Third World countries loathe to exchange one set of countries which can exercise decisive control over their destinies for another.¹⁸ Ideological condemnation of the United States does *not* imply that an LDC rejects economic intercourse with the United States. Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, describes this phenomenon when he states,

On the economic side it was recognized that the raw materials of Africa were important to free world economies, but it appeared that they continued to flow despite the nature of local governments. No matter what unfortunate domestic or foreign policies might be adopted by African leaders, they still had to finance them by selling raw materials to the industrial West.¹⁹

More recently, this view was reiterated by David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank: "We have found we can deal with just about any kind of government, provided they are orderly and responsible."²⁰ Mr. Rockefeller asserted that African Marxism, despite the rhetorical enthusiasm of its leaders, was not to be considered a threat to

the United States or American business interests and that, furthermore, "The more I've seen of countries which are allegedly Marxist in Africa, the more I have the feeling it is more labels and trappings than reality."²¹ Nor does such revolutionary condemnation demonstrate that an LDC wishes to rely exclusively upon the Soviet Union or some other benefactor. The Soviet Union can provide precious little of the economic aid needed by Third World countries for development. The Soviets admit this themselves:

The creation of the material and technical base of socialism and communism demands colossal capital investments. . . . Here [in the Soviet Union] there is not and cannot be "surplus capital" by the very economic nature of socialism. The Socialist countries have never entered into competition with capitalism in the volume of capital resources they export to the developing countries and in the existing stage of development they cannot do so.²²

Furthermore, LDCs realize that the Soviet Union practices its own form of economic exploitation,²³ is hardly beyond blame for the current global economic disarray,²⁴ and offers a development model of limited demonstrated usefulness for solving their problems.²⁵ They recognize that the abandonment of economic and political ties with the Western economic community *reduces rather than strengthens* the ability of Third World countries to pursue their best interests. Recent overtures to the United States for increased economic intercourse from Nicaragua, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and Algeria illustrate this point. Countries with cordial relations with the Soviet Union seek economic relations with the United States and do business with the United States based more upon economic requirements than upon ideological prescriptions. Hence, ideological or political antagonism between the United States and certain Third World countries does not and should not preclude the pursuit of economic relations that are in this country's best in-

terests. Nor should the United States conclude that countries with friendly relations with us cannot or should not pursue economic intercourse with the Soviets when it is found to be in the best interests of the Third World country. To disregard this point overlooks the meaning of sovereignty and nonalignment and risks the antagonism of Third World states that guard jealously their guarantee to make their own decisions. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania underscored the point that sovereignty implies freedom of choice from grantors and recipients of aid:

We do not deny the principle that any African state has the right to ask for assistance, either military or economic, from the country of its choice. On the contrary, we assert that right—Angola, Ethiopia, Chad, Zaire, and all of us. I have that right. It is not for the West to object when Angola asks assistance from the USSR. It is not for the East to object when Djibouti asks assistance from France. And the requested country always has the right to decide whether to give that assistance.²⁶

This sentiment is further illustrated by the distinguished African scholar Ali Mazrui in his description of nonalignment:

Given the competition between the giants, and a reluctance on the part of a newly independent country to be tied to either of the two blocs, a doctrine emerged asserting the right to remain outside military entanglements and the right of diplomatic experimentation for those who are newly initiated into international politics.²⁷

A third related and crucial element of a more realistic US long-term perspective relative to the Third World is the recognition of the distinction between control and influence. The assumption often made by Western academic and government analysts that Soviet influence in a country such as Angola translates directly into Soviet control is not only inaccurate, it is a manifestation of the very Western chauvinism condemned by

many in the Third World. To assume that Soviet involvement in a region or country results ipso facto in its control fails completely to recognize the genuineness, countervailing influence, and importance of the indigenous culture and experience, which may find the Soviet model quite alien and unappealing.²⁸ What the United States and other Western countries must guard against is the belief that friendly interaction with the Soviet Union is tantamount to a complete and permanent rejection of the West. Such an attitude and the hostile Western response it generates may result in leaving the Soviet Union as the only game in town. This self-fulfilling prophecy is most evident in the history of Cuban relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. The vitriolic reaction of the United States to Castro's ascension to power served in part to promote exactly what we feared, an increase in the Soviet Union's influence in Cuba.

Even this increased influence in Cuba and in countries like Angola should not be construed as constituting Soviet control, however. Castro was embarrassingly slow in his support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This invasion, furthermore, resulted in virtually unanimous condemnation by Syria and other Arab states that have often aligned themselves with other Soviet ideological positions or policy objectives. Similarly, repeated Soviet requests for a submarine base on the Angolan coast have not been granted. Also, Soviet requests for basing rights were resisted by the Vietnamese despite the important role played by the former in the latter's victory over their southern neighbors. Basing rights were granted only in the wake of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. The Soviets' access to military bases in Vietnam is more a result of Vietnam's need for continued Soviet support than of Soviet control of Vietnam. In other words, it is in the best interests of the United States to refrain from policies that may soothe its pride but maximize Soviet influence as a result.

Fourth, it will behoove the United States to recognize that even where the Soviet Union enjoys primary influence in the Third World,

this influence need not be permanent, unidirectional, or exclusive. Soviet influence in China, Egypt, Somalia, and Indonesia has been rejected, often with spectacular vigor. In many instances, Soviet attempts at influence have been extraordinarily crude.²⁹ Furthermore, while Soviet military aid (often granted generously) is important to Third World countries in the pursuit of independence, Soviet economic aid is often inadequate for their development purposes.³⁰ And the Soviets have been accused by many Third World leaders of racist attitudes and comportment. If the United States maintains its willingness to cooperate in Third World development programs, the leaders of those countries may be able to balance and lessen their reliance on Soviet influence. To the contrary, a US policy of opposition will result only in the institutionalization of Soviet aid and influence.

Finally, Soviet influence in one state does not result inevitably in its influence in contiguous states. Soviet influence in Afghanistan has galvanized opposition in Pakistan and heightened a pan-Moslem reaction throughout the Middle East which is likely to serve as a bulwark against the further expansion of Soviet influence in that region. Again, to assume that Soviet influence spreads across borders easily or inevitably overlooks the restraining influences of local culture and nationalism, the constraints of international opinion against such expansionism, reforms undertaken in neighboring states, and economic and military aid that neighboring states might receive from their allies.³¹ The Soviet Union's failures in the Third World should not, however, delude one into thinking that the Soviets are neglecting their capability to deal with the Third World.

Certainly, the maintenance of US influence abroad is an important goal of American policy. Also, the expansion of Soviet and other adversaries' influence should be viewed with concern by US policymakers. However, if US policy concentrates too much on short-term perspectives and fails to recognize the long-term elements noted above, we may run the danger

of winning some battles for influence in the Third World but losing the war.³² Therefore, let us consider several policy recommendations that recognize these long-term considerations and the danger of the institutionalization of poverty in the Third World.

US POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Long-term US strategic interests will be served best by the reduction of misery in the Third World, the strengthening of Third World economies, and an increase of governmental legitimacy and support in the Third World.

The United States must facilitate modernization in the Third World while protecting itself from accusations of interference in the internal affairs of Third World states. The colonial experiences of many Third World states make it difficult to overstate the importance of the latter prescription. To these ends, the United States should direct more economic and appropriate technical aid to the Third World, although we should not delude ourselves that the mere provision of aid will mitigate the debilitating obstacles to development.³³ However, more can be done. Currently, the United States allocates .27 percent of its GNP for such aid. This ranks the United States 12th of the 17 industrial countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.³⁴ The Reagan Administration has eschewed direct country-to-country aid, preferring aid from the private sector and reliance on free-enterprise mechanisms to generate economic development. These latter options explicitly depend on the capital-intensive, trickle-down model for Third World development, whose limitations have been outlined above.³⁵ Instead of relying on the private sector as the principal engine of economic development in the Third World, the United States should increase the amount of foreign aid to the Third World.³⁶ Aid given to Third World governments will allow them to take primary responsibility for development. To minimize accusations of US interference in the domestic affairs of Third World govern-

ments, the United States ought to consider making this aid available through multilateral institutions over which the United States does not have direct control. When the United States directs aid to the Third World on a government-to-government basis, the aid should be relatively free of strings that specify how the aid must be spent. The United States can win numerous propaganda points from this policy of altruism and unobtrusiveness, maximizing US influence in the Third World. Such a policy also may reduce Soviet presence inasmuch as it will no longer be the only recourse available to Third World modernizers.

Clearly, American aid cannot guarantee development in the Third World. However, in the event that development in the Third World proves unsuccessful, it will be more difficult for indigenous leaders to condemn the US government and multinational corporations for alleged antipopular and reactionary policies.

Second, I would recommend that the United States be more supportive of the New International Economic Order (NIEO).³⁷ The gap between the rich and poor countries is increasing rapidly in spite of the economic growth of LDCs during the last three decades. Governments that are unable to realize sustained economic growth to the benefit of their citizens may experience internal instability, the identification and vilification of external scapegoats, and foreign intervention. None of these outcomes serves US security interests.

Numerous developmental problems in the Third World are attributable to identifiable domestic, geographic, and cultural shortcomings. Many of these problems, such as the lack of fossil fuel resources, cannot be blamed on the industrialized countries. However, the structure of the international economic system exacerbates the problems of economic development and modernization. As noted above, Third World governments cannot coordinate long-range plans to reduce squalor and misery if the availability of funds is uncertain. Wildly fluctuating commodity prices, unanticipated devaluations of foreign currencies, and trade quotas or tariffs that

reduce access to Western markets for Third World products are elements of the current international economic order which damage LDC economies. A new order that moderated these injurious conditions would advance the prospects of economic growth in the Third World, provide additional capital for human investment, and make more difficult attempts to identify the United States as a cause of economic problems. Of course, the availability of funds would not guarantee that investment in human capital would be forthcoming. Such an investment depends upon a specific governmental decision and successful implementation. While the United States cannot make such a decision for a Third World government, it can encourage the conditions that make a decision to invest in human capital more attractive and more practicable.

The United States needs to direct more diplomatic attention to the Third World if it is to increase stability in the LDCs and improve access to indigenous decision-makers. Third World states seek prestige, perhaps with greater intensity than is understood by most Americans. Their need for prestige is due to Third World perceptions of patronizing attitudes from former colonial masters and LDC governmental attempts to consolidate support and legitimacy. The United States can raise the prestige of Third World governments by increasing substantive consultations on issues of mutual concern, invitations to high-ranking Third World political and military leaders to visit the United States, and student and cultural exchanges, and by effecting other similar policies that require more thought than expense on the part of the United States. Priority should be given to allocating more public resources to funding Third World area studies at American universities.

Increased consultation with Third World governments is a crucial element of any US policy to increase sensitivity to Third World problems and to enhance the prestige of those governments. It is also important for the United States to maintain open lines of communication to all actors of political movements within each Third World country

and at the United Nations and other regional organizations and forums. The United States should not allow itself to become divorced from other significant political actors as an automatic response to their ideological orientations. There should be no distinction between intelligence we want to hear and that which we do not. As we learned in Iran, under such circumstances American policy decisions are based upon incomplete information, are divorced from reality, and reflect a bureaucratic isolation from the complex society we are dealing with. Maintaining communications links with extragovernmental political actors is a pragmatic necessity. Furthermore, the failure of the United States to communicate with other political actors in a Third World state represents, in effect, a complete and unequivocal commitment to the current government. A government receiving such unequivocal support may feel less urgency in being responsive or accountable to a wide range of demands from its citizenry. Again, it should be noted that while the United States cannot guarantee that governments invest in human capital, we can seek to create conditions under which such a policy can occur. The establishment of communications with all extragovernmental political actors within a Third World country serves many useful purposes: it diminishes the sense of paranoia of the opposition, creates less uncertainty about its course of action, and may, perhaps, co-opt it into the system. It also encourages increased governmental responsiveness and accountability and thereby maximizes the likelihood of such a policy coming about.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE US MILITARY

Several military recommendations are suggested by the foregoing analysis. First, it is a truism that the United States will interact more with the Third World. Consequently, the US must be adequately trained and organized for the complex politico-military challenges of the spectrum of low-intensity conflicts most likely to occur in the Third World. In peacetime the US military will be

directly involved in the following areas in a multitude of commands and assignments:

- Promoting cooperative security arrangements, interoperability, and common military doctrine with and among Third World military establishments;
- Promoting the capabilities and professionalism of friendly Third World military forces and their self-confidence in handling both external and internal threats;
- Fostering admiration for and confidence in the competence of the US military and US military technology among Third World nations;
- Fostering understanding of US foreign policy and the issues and expectations that underlie US foreign policy; and
- Establishing military-to-military relationships that can gain for the United States an understanding of the current attitudes and future direction of Third World military and leadership elites; that can foster increased access to decisional elites in order to increase US influence; and that can serve as a bridge between military elites in order to encourage intra-regional cooperation, the peaceful solution of conflict, coalition cooperation, and internal defense and development.

Military personnel assigned Third World responsibilities, whether in the United States or in the Third World itself, must receive thorough instruction in the history, culture, language, and politics of the country to which they are assigned, as well as a thorough grounding in development economics and in US policy. Particularly where the host-country military leaders play a central role in the politics of their countries, the US military has an important diplomatic role and thus must be adequately trained. To that end, the concept of a military diplomat needs to be advanced in the military personnel system. There exists a compelling need for highly trained, high-caliber personnel motivated by the incentive of career advancement and other rewards commensurate with the high responsibilities they assume.

Over the years the US Army has trained thousands of its officers as foreign area officers (FAOs), but, whether accurate or

not, there is a perception that FAOs do not receive a fair shake in promotions in comparison to their peers in other career fields. Moreover, there is a stronger perception that Third World and especially Latin American FAOs do even worse. Indeed, it is said that assignment to Latin America is the "kiss of death."

Promotion opportunity is directly related to the increasing need for the military diplomat to function in positions of high responsibility in the complex world of the 1980s. FAO positions require officers with foreign-area expertise, politico-military awareness, language proficiency, and other specialized skills related to the range of military activities that have economic, social, cultural, psychological, and political import. Foreign area officers may serve as commanders, staff officers, and service school instructors in positions encompassing the areas of plans and operations, intelligence, security assistance, psychological operations, civil affairs, unconventional warfare, and related politico-military activities. Thus there is a compelling need to train and have available cadres of officers at all grades to discharge functions of high politico-military responsibility. There are at least 32 US Army general officer positions that require FAO skills. However, there is only a handful of general officer FAOs in the Army and only one has a Third World orientation. Since there is no assurance that foreign area specialists will be adequately rewarded in future career promotions, incentives for high-quality officers to become area specialists appear to be lacking. This trend must be reversed if the military is to play an effective, complementary role in the formulation and implementation of intelligent and sustained policy for the Third World.

Because of the need for the skills of the foreign area officer, there is a corresponding need to develop and manage properly those with such skills. Fundamental changes are required in the military personnel system to ensure that we will have qualified individuals who perform well and enhance the military's image in the interface with Third World counterparts and governments and, collater-

ally, with other components of the US government. The following steps are recommended as starters:

- Provide greater incentives for foreign area officers, who should be redesignated international military affairs officers, with improved promotion opportunities.
- Establish a foreign language proficiency requirement for promotion to general officer.
- Establish an interservice program at the John F. Kennedy Institute for Military Assistance and integrate the US foreign policy community into the training programs in order to improve interagency cooperation on low-intensity conflict and the US national policy response.

The potential deleterious effects of military spending upon Third World modernization have already been discussed. Nevertheless, Third World governments do have security concerns that require defense equipment, and other governments will gladly sell these systems to LDCs should the United States demur. What policies should the United States pursue to deal most appropriately with these realities?

An analysis of possible courses of action must examine numerous considerations that go far beyond purely military considerations, as well as the scope of this essay. Among others, the following questions must be explored: Do arms sales promote political stability and orderly economic development or do they undermine prospects for economic growth by diverting scarce resources from infrastructural and social projects and fueling inflation? Do such transfers help to institutionalize the military, promote violence, and undermine the legitimate authority of indigenous leaders? Does LDC dependency on foreign advisors encourage or make unavoidable American involvement in local decision-making, heighten opposition to the government, and increase Soviet influence? What is the risk of American equipment falling into unwelcome hands? Can the United States prevent the use of such weapons and technologies in ways that are inimical to American interests? What are the effects of such transfers on America's balance of payments and employment?³⁸

Without going into a detailed analysis of each point noted above, several recommendations can still be suggested. Only weapons that serve appropriate³⁹ security interests should be transferred to Third World governments. Furthermore, the sophistication of these weapons should be consistent with the nature of the threat faced by the government. The transfer of inappropriate weapons may deprive Third World governments of needed funds for modernization, detract from the ability of the recipient to defend itself, generate a regional arms race, create opportunities for other (unfriendly) suppliers to expand their influence, and commit the United States to a long-term program of military advisement.⁴⁰ Such programs may become problematic if the United States becomes more involved in the fortunes of the recipient government and is held responsible for interference in that country's domestic affairs and the government's failure to be responsible and accountable to certain developmental demands.⁴¹ This involvement becomes especially crucial if the weapons or expertise transferred by the United States are used against indigenous political actors. This suggests that the United States should refrain from transferring weapons to a country which is beleaguered by political instability if such weapons or training (e.g., riot control) are likely to be used against domestic political actors. The experience in Iran in which the United States was identified by the populace with the secret police and indirectly held responsible for many of its abuses is a case in point. One cannot cite explicit rules to govern all conceivable circumstances of aid requests in a general essay such as this. What is important, however, is that American weapons are not used to prevent social change. To the extent that the Soviet Union is not identified as the instigator of all unrest in the Third World, the United States need not feel obligated to send military aid to stem the flow of the Red tide. As noted earlier, such restraint will have the long-term effects of encouraging governmental responsiveness and accountability, allowing the United States to escape charges of intervention, reducing opportunities for the penetration of

Soviet influence, and avoiding American association with those political forces opposing social change. It behooves American long-term interests in Africa and anywhere else in the Third World not to be cast in the following light:

On the other hand, the United States, which now sheds crocodile tears on Angola, has not only completely ignored the freedom fighters whom successive US administrations branded as terrorists, it even openly supported morally and materially the Fascist Portuguese Government. And we have no cause to doubt that the same successive American administrations continue to support the apartheid regime of South Africa whom they see as the defender of Western interest on the African Continent. How can we now be led to believe that a government with a record such as the United States has in Africa can suddenly become the defender of our interests?⁴²

This is not to say that the United States should refuse participation in military transfer programs to Third World countries. What should be concluded is that these transfers are fraught with potential political difficulties and must be tempered by analyses from a long-term perspective. There is one type of military program, however, that may avoid many of the potential difficulties mentioned above *and* maximize economic development and an enhanced quality of life in the Third World. This program would involve the Army Corps of Engineers to direct the construction of infrastructural projects needed by Third World governments. This transfer of expertise and the utility of these projects, such as those currently being undertaken by the United States in Saudi Arabia, may make this the most successful military program the United States can pursue in the Third World. Such achievements would address the causes of suffering and associate this country with a highly commendable goal. US participation in projects attacking poverty are likely to maximize American influence in the long run.

A FINAL NOTE

No policy that the United States pursues can guarantee the success of Third World development. At best, we can help create conditions under which a successful attack on poverty is more likely to take place. In any event, the domestic problems discussed in the earlier sections of this article are indeed formidable and, perhaps, intractable. It is one thing to advocate a redistribution of wealth, a redirection of developmental effort, reduction of bureaucratic power, and freedom from foreign influence. In fact, these prescriptions amount to calls for revolution in the Third World. However, the obstacles to revolutionary activity are great, perhaps beyond the realistic capabilities of most Third World societies. Furthermore, the occurrence of revolution in no way guarantees that reform will be forthcoming or sustained. Revolution may indeed replace one oligarchy with another, promote demagoguery, stimulate heightened bureaucratization of society, generate a set of unrealistic expectations, further contribute to the suffering and misery of the masses, and aggravate international tensions. The costs are thus great, the odds are practically insurmountable, and the benefits lie a great distance in the future.

NOTES

1. See Yuan-li Wu, *Raw Material Supply in a Multipolar World*, 2d ed. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1979). The seller's boycott is the exception that proves the rule. Few other resources lend themselves to so efficient a boycott.

2. See Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, "Deepening Crisis of US Capitalism," *Monthly Review*, 33 (October 1981), 1-16, for a discussion of the dangerous consequences of an economy propped up by debt.

3. The cases of Brazil, Costa Rica, Tanzania, and Zaire illustrate this deterioration.

4. See Maurice Zeitlin, "Who Owns America?" *The Progressive*, 42 (June 1978), 14-19; also, see Sweezy and Magdoff.

5. The proffered justifications include the transfer of inappropriate technology; displacement of indigenous competitors; or multinational corporation association with and support of unresponsive, inefficient, corrupt and/or repressive regimes.

6. The Middle East comes to mind most quickly in this regard.

7. See Alan Wolfe, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat* (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1979), and John Spanier, *US Foreign Policy Since World War II* (New York: Praeger, 1974).
8. Sweezy and Magdoff.
9. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (New York: Macmillan, 1973).
10. Cited in *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review: Options for US Policy Toward Africa*, ed. Helen Kitchen, 1 (No. 1, 1979), 15-16.
11. As quoted in Bayard Rustin and Carol Gershman, "Africa, Soviet Imperialism, and the Retreat of American Power," in *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review: Options for US Policy Toward Africa*, p. 8.
12. Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Strategic Stake in Africa," in *Africa and the United States: Vital Interests*, ed. Jennifer Seymour Whitaker (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1978), p. 165.
13. See Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "Shaping Soviet African Policy," *Africa Insight*, 10 (No. 1, 1980), 4-10. Also, see S. Bialer, "The Coming Crisis in Soviet Succession," *Chief Executive* (Spring 1981), 16-23, for a discussion of the surprisingly heterogeneous nature of the Soviet Politburo and leadership structure.
14. John M. Weinstein, "All Features Grate and Stall: Soviet Strategic Vulnerabilities and the Future of Deterrence," Strategic Issues Research Memorandum, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 15 July 1983, pp. 5-19.
15. See Helene Carrere L'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt* (New York: Newsweek, 1979).
16. Helen Kitchen, "Eighteen African Guideposts," *Foreign Policy*, 33 (Winter 1979-80), 86.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
18. Robert J. Lilley, *The Limits of Superpower Intervention: Africa*, Strategic Issues Research Memorandum, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 20 November 1981, pp. 6-8.
19. Daniel O. Graham, "The Nature of the Soviet Challenge," in *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review: Options for US Policy Toward Africa*, p. 6. Perhaps the most remarkable example of this willingness to conduct business with the West is the Marxist government of Angola using Cuban troops, supplied with Soviet weapons, to protect the holdings of Gulf Oil against rebels backed by the United States.
20. Flora Lewis, "The Angola Record," *The New York Times*, 7 March 1982, p. E19.
21. *Ibid.*
22. As quoted in Ali Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), p. 185.
23. See Patrick Clawson, "The Character of Soviet Economic Relations with Third World Countries," *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 13 (No. 1, 1981), 76-84.
24. US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy*, p. 115.
25. Kitchen, "Eighteen African Guideposts," p. 86.
26. Julius K. Nyerere, "Some Questions About Assumptions," in *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review: Options for US Policy Toward Africa*, p. 23.
27. Mazrui, p. 180.
28. See Clawson. The US model may be inappropriate also.
29. Clawson; Mazrui, p. 185.
30. *Ibid.*
31. R. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and Their Behavior," *World Politics*, 21 (January 1969), 226-41.
32. Lilley.
33. Kenneth Adelman, "Why We Can't Pacify Africa," in *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review: Options for US Policy Toward Africa*, p. 14.
34. Statistic reported 31 October 1981 on National Public Radio broadcast of "All Things Considered." In absolute dollars, the United States is the most generous of all aid-granting countries. However, the low amount of money given relative to America's ability to give aid is seen by many in the Third World as indicative of our indifference to the plight of the Third World and the misunderstanding of its strategic importance.
35. President Reagan's Caribbean Basin initiative is based primarily upon the offer of one-way free trade. Certain trade barriers to greater access to US markets have been removed for Central American exporters. As noted above, beyond greater access to US markets, the solution to Caribbean poverty lies primarily in the hands of the US private sector.
36. Increased aid would be a tangible sign of US governmental concern for the well-being of Third World states, as well as a commitment to one of the elements of the New International Economic Order requested by the Group of 77.
37. The Third World has demanded in various international forums a New International Economic Order. The NIEO would create, according to its proponents, a more equitable and mutually beneficial global environment. The basic transformations urged by the Group of 77 include:
 - Freer access to the markets of the rich countries.
 - Stabilization of commodity prices by means of (1) commodity prices agreements in which the richer countries would promise ahead of time to buy set amounts of a given commodity at a predetermined price and (2) the creation of buffer stocks of commodities, financed by international institutions, in order to smooth out the cycles of boom and bust.
 - Indexing commodity prices in the world market.
 - International regulation and supervision of multinational corporations.
 - The right of sovereignty over neutral resources within national boundaries.
 - Increased amounts of untied aid from northern to southern countries.
 - An equitable arrangement for exploiting the resources in the oceans. (See James Lee Ray, *Global Politics* [Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1979], pp. 366-73.)
38. For a provocative collection of essays about militarism in the Third World, see Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee, eds., *Problems of Contemporary Militarism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).
39. The United States should transfer weapons to Third World countries that may face military aggression, and these weapons should be appropriate to the nature of the threat. The requests of countries seeking weapons for internal repression or prestige should be scrutinized carefully.
40. Michael T. Klare, "Arms and the Shah," *The Progressive*, 43 (August 1979), 14-21.
41. See Lilley, pp. 17-18, and Paul Wilson, "Zaire: A Case of Reverse Clientism," in *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review: Options for US Policy Toward Africa*, pp. 46-47.
42. As quoted in Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, *After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976), p. 31.