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# JCS REFORM AND THE LESSONS OF GERMAN HISTORY

by

JOHN M. NOLEN

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A simmering debate is underway in the United States over the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General David C. Jones (USAF, retired) and General Edward C. Meyer (USA, retired), among others, have offered suggestions for forming a stronger, more centralized JCS structure. Proponents of change have argued that a more cohesive Joint Staff is needed to insure sound defense planning and that a more centralized organization would solve the operational and managerial shortcomings of the JCS. Critics, however, have argued that a reformed JCS might centralize military planning to the point that it would threaten civilian control of the military. Oddly enough, a historical example used by both sides in the JCS debate is the role of the German General Staff in World War II. Some advocates of a reformed JCS have pointed to the German General Staff system as a model of military efficiency, while opponents of JCS reform have seen the German General Staff as an authoritarian elite responsible for German rearmament and Nazi aggression. As a consequence, many of the arguments over JCS reform that revolve around the advantages and disadvantages of a general staff often contain sub rosa interpretations of German history and the German General Staff.<sup>1</sup> Given the diverse conclusions drawn from German history, a

review of the German experience is needed to evaluate the "lessons of history" pertinent to the current debate over JCS reform.

In order to understand Germany's military organization during World War II, one must trace its evolution after the final events of World War I. In the fall of 1918 the German army was reeling under the blows of Allied offensives on the Western Front. By November 1918, as armistice negotiations dragged on, a war-weary German populace rose in revolution. The monarchy was overthrown and a new government, later known as the Weimar Republic, was declared. To many observers the fall of the monarchy signaled an end to the power and prestige of its great bulwark—the German army. Despite the demise of the Kaiser, the army quickly regained its former stature in German politics. Within days of the founding of the new republic, an agreement was reached between President Friederich Ebert and General Wilhelm Groener, the new Chief of Staff of the Army. In exchange for Groener's support of the Weimar Republic, Ebert promised a hands-off treatment of the army's internal affairs. In 1925 Germany's premier soldier, General Paul von Hindenburg, was elected President of the Republic. Not surprisingly, Hindenburg's presidency further insulated the army from civilian control.<sup>2</sup>

The key point about German military organization under the Weimar Republic was that little had been achieved in centralizing the armed services under a single, adequate staff. The President of the Republic, like the Kaiser he replaced, had ultimate authority over the armed forces. However, presidential control was normally limited to key personnel decisions and matters of protocol. The Minister of Defense was the cabinet officer responsible for the command of the armed forces. However, the Minister of Defense concerned himself principally with general policy and the budget and was not involved in the detailed affairs of the armed forces. As a rule, the ministers were content to leave the day-to-day operations and training of the army and navy in the hands of the service chiefs.<sup>3</sup> The limited size of the Defense Ministry staff was also a key factor restricting the minister's role in service affairs. Thus, while the Defense Minister was the cabinet officer responsible for all defense activities, he only loosely supervised the activities of the separate services.

Unlike the Defense Ministry, the separate services had large staffs. The key office in the army staff was the *Truppenamt*. The Treaty of Versailles had specifically banned the formation of a general staff, and consequently the army had organized a de facto general staff under the disguise of the *Truppenamt*.<sup>4</sup> A similar arrangement preserved a naval general staff. Since German military aircraft were forbidden by the Versailles accords, no air force staff existed except in very rudimentary form within the army staff structure.<sup>5</sup>

General Hans von Seeckt, the chief of the Army Section from 1920 to 1926, was particularly successful in keeping the Minister of Defense out of army affairs. Seeckt made clear his policy when he issued instructions to the army stipulating that all reports to the Minister of Defense must first be reviewed by him.<sup>6</sup> Seeckt's undisputed expertise in army affairs allowed him to bypass the Defense Minister and establish direct contact with the President of the Republic. Even though frictions between Seeckt and the Defense Minister eventually led to Seeckt's resigna-

tion, Seeckt's legacy remained: a line of demarcation had been established between the Minister of Defense and the armed services he theoretically controlled. In the absence of a strong Ministry of Defense, the army and navy were not only free from civilian scrutiny but were also independent of centralized planning and control—a situation the services clearly desired.

While civilian involvement in armed forces affairs remained minimal, the same cannot be said of military involvement in German politics. This is particularly true of the army. Indeed, in the early 1930s the army generals violated their often-voiced principles of political neutrality and played a critical, behind-the-scenes role in Weimar politics. The army's political meddling has been blamed in part for the rise of Adolf Hitler.<sup>7</sup>

**W**hen Adolf Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, he inherited the military organization developed under the Weimar Republic. His Defense Minister was General Werner von Blomberg, an appointee of Hindenburg. However, Blomberg proved to be very receptive to National Socialism and was soon under the influence of Hitler. Blomberg instituted several policies, such as the saluting of SA men and the incorporation of the swastika into army insignia, which indicated the rising influence of Nazism in the army.<sup>8</sup> Yet there were still limits to Hitler's ability to direct military affairs. For example, in 1934 when General Kurt von Hammerstein retired as chief of the Army Section, Hitler was unable to replace him with General Walther von Reichenau, a key assistant to Blomberg with strong pro-Nazi sentiments.

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Despite Blomberg's support for Reichenau, President Hindenburg refused to appoint Reichenau as chief of the Army Section and instead appointed General Werner von Fritsch.<sup>9</sup> Thus, in the first two years of Hitler's chancellery, when Hitler was eliminating all political opposition, the army still retained a degree of independence.

The first event to undermine the *Wehrmacht's* political autonomy was the participation of army units in the Röhm purge in June 1934. Apparently Blomberg and Reichenau supported the purge in the hope of eliminating the SA as a rival military organization.<sup>10</sup> Yet by supporting Hitler in the Röhm purge, Blomberg and Reichenau sacrificed the army's much-vaunted claim of independence from parties and politics. The army's loss of autonomy became clear when President Hindenburg died in August 1934. Hitler immediately amalgamated the offices of President and Chancellor and thereby assumed supreme authority over the armed forces. Blomberg faithfully directed that all members of the armed forces take a personal oath of loyalty, not to the German state, but to Adolf Hitler. Years later some officers would claim that their oath to Hitler prevented them from disobeying his orders. However dubious such a claim may be, the loyalty oath clearly undermined the army's claim to be above parties and politics.

Hitler's first significant reorganization of the armed forces occurred on 21 May 1935. Hitler redesignated Blomberg's post as Reich War Minister and linked it with the title of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Previously, as Minister of Defense, Blomberg had exercised only administrative authority over the separate armed services. Now, by virtue of his title as commander-in-chief, the Reich War Minister could lay claim to command authority over the army, the navy, and the newly revealed air force. The same day the *Heeresleitung*, the Army Section, was redesignated as the *Oberkommando des Heeres* (OKH), the Army High Command. Its chief, General Fritsch, received the new title of commander-in-chief of the army. The *Truppenamt* also dropped its post-Versailles disguise and was renamed the General Staff

of the Army. Similar redesignations were effected in the navy and the air force. Thus the innocuous-sounding titles and organizations of the Weimar period had been replaced by an apparently unified command structure in which the service commanders-in-chief were at last subordinated to a single armed forces commander. In 1936 Hitler promoted all of his service commanders-in-chief to the rank of *Generaloberst*, and Blomberg was given the rank of *Generalfeldmarschall*, only the sixth German so honored in peacetime.<sup>11</sup>

The natural result of Blomberg's expanded duties was the growth of his staff. A key office within Blomberg's War Ministry was the *Ministeramt*. Created in 1929 as part of the Defense Ministry, the *Ministeramt* was originally the domain of generals adept at pursuing the interests of the armed forces in Weimar politics.<sup>12</sup> Its best-known director had been General Kurt von Schleicher, a key figure in the final years of the republic. After Hitler's rise to power, the *Ministeramt* maintained its political complexion under the direction of General Reichenau. Indeed, Reichenau was probably the army officer most involved in the Röhm purge.<sup>13</sup> Given the reputation of the *Ministeramt* for political intrigue, Blomberg's plan to expand it into a staff capable of controlling the German armed forces was a dubious undertaking. In 1936 the *Ministeramt* was redesignated the *Wehrmachtamt* (Armed Forces Office), but even the new name could not gloss over its shortcomings in size and experience. Its principal rival, the General Staff of the Army (hereafter referred to as the General Staff) had a far more impressive heritage, record of performance, and elite membership. The organizational rivalry between the Army High Command and the upstart *Wehrmachtamt* was only exacerbated by the animosity between the "political" generals, Blomberg and Reichenau, and the so-called professionals, Fritsch and his subordinate, General Ludwig Beck, who was the chief of the General Staff.<sup>14</sup>

Blomberg's goal of centralizing command of the German armed forces was certainly justified from the standpoint of

military efficiency. Nevertheless, the three services were opposed to any efforts by Blomberg to subordinate them to the *Wehrmachtamt*. When an Armed Forces Academy was established in 1935 to train *Wehrmachtamt* officers, the three services protested and succeeded in forcing its closure two years later.<sup>15</sup> When Blomberg attempted to establish *Wehrmachtkreise* (Armed Forces Commands) to replace the army's system of military districts, Fritsch threatened to resign, and Hitler quickly squashed the proposal.<sup>16</sup> The fundamental problem with Blomberg's scheme of interservice coordination was the fact that the army was far more important than the other services. Consequently, air force and navy leaders insisted jealously upon their independent status in order to avoid being swallowed up by the army. Meanwhile the army viewed Blomberg's organization as essentially a second army high command which overlapped the functions and threatened the prerogatives of the Army High Command.<sup>17</sup>

*Reichsmarschall* Hermann Göring, commander-in-chief of the air force, proved to be in the best position to block Blomberg's efforts to construct an armed forces command. Not only was Göring a key member of the Nazi Party, but as head of the Air Ministry he was Blomberg's equal on the cabinet.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, Göring thought that he should be War Minister and he plotted Blomberg's downfall. Göring found a powerful ally in Heinrich Himmler, who wanted to eliminate military opposition to the expansion of the SS. Thus Blomberg was faced by two of the most powerful men in Nazi Germany. If his goal of creating an armed forces command had been handicapped by the military professionals, it was now doomed by Nazi politics.

**W**hile Blomberg was struggling to assert his command over the three services, Adolf Hitler was taking measures to achieve his personal control of the armed forces. Most accounts point to the so-called Hossbach Conference of 5 November 1937 as the event that triggered Hitler's decision to dismiss the top military leadership. During the conference Hitler revealed his scheme for

German expansion in the east. When both Blomberg and Fritsch proved lukewarm to his plans, the Führer decided to replace them with more submissive generals. Characteristically, Hitler capitalized on opportunities presented by others. Using information obligingly provided by Göring and Himmler, Hitler forced the resignations of Blomberg and Fritsch on separate charges of immoral conduct. In Fritsch's case the charges were totally unsupported. Yet Fritsch, like the many generals to follow him, proved quite incapable of resisting Hitler's will. A product of the aristocracy and the officer corps, Fritsch was no match for Hitler's brand of political bluff and slander.<sup>19</sup> On 4 February 1938, the country was informed of the resignations of Blomberg and Fritsch as well as sweeping changes in Germany's military organization. Thirteen senior officers were forced to retire, and 44 others were transferred to new duties.<sup>20</sup> Hitler announced that the position of War Minister was eliminated and that henceforth he would exercise direct control over the armed forces. He redesignated the *Wehrmachtamt* as the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW), the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Its new chief, General Wilhelm Keitel, was given the equivalent rank of a cabinet minister.

An analysis of Hitler's reorganization appeared in the London *Times* on 7 February and was remarkably accurate in analyzing Hitler's motives. Where the *Times* erred was in judging that "the changes in the Army seem likely to result in a greater coordination of the defense forces under more homogeneous direction."<sup>21</sup> True, Hitler's actions theoretically solved the problem of centralized control of the armed forces. All commanders-in-chief were now directly subordinate to the Führer. In practice, however, centralized control was diminished. Only a large, well-organized staff could have exercised control over the armed forces. Yet the OKW still lacked the requisite size and knowledge to achieve this. The OKW also lacked the leadership needed to assert its position.

In an interview with Blomberg in January, Hitler had asked whether Keitel would be a suitable successor to Blomberg as

War Minister. Blomberg described Keitel as merely the man who ran his office, not someone capable of leading the armed forces. Blomberg did not realize that Keitel was exactly the kind of man Hitler was looking for. By appointing Keitel to the head of OKW, Hitler insured that his will would not be opposed.

The same motive was behind Hitler's appointment of General Walther von Brauchitsch to replace Fritsch as commander-in-chief of the army. Hitler had learned that Brauchitsch was seeking a divorce in order to marry another woman. Unfortunately, Mrs. Brauchitsch insisted upon a generous financial settlement or else she would create a scandal. Hitler kindly offered the necessary funds to insure a quiet divorce. When Brauchitsch assumed the post of commander-in-chief of the army, his independence was already compromised by the personal gift from the Führer of 80,000 marks. Resistance to Hitler was further weakened by Brauchitsch's devotion to his new wife, who was said to have been "200% National Socialist."<sup>22</sup>

With Keitel and Brauchitsch in such key positions, Hitler insured his personal control of the OKW and weakened the resistance of the Army High Command to centralized authority. Despite his new power over the armed forces, Hitler did little to bring the three services under unified command. He adopted the practice of dealing directly with the service commanders-in-chief without working through the OKW. Göring and Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander-in-chief of the navy, maintained direct access to the Führer, and their separate staffs merely exercised the courtesy of informing the OKW of air force and navy actions. The Army High Command acted in much the same manner. Even though Keitel and his operations chief, General Alfred Jodl, were army officers, they failed to achieve any rapport with the Army High Command.<sup>23</sup> Keitel's unwillingness to state positions contrary to Hitler's earned him the lasting enmity of the army generals. Keitel was often referred to as "Lakeitel"—a play upon the German word for lackey.<sup>24</sup>

The weaknesses of the German command structure became even more apparent as the armed forces were called upon to support Hitler's aggressive foreign policy. Walter Warlimont, the deputy chief of operations in OKW, offers a detailed account of the confused state of Hitler's command structure.<sup>25</sup> For example, the OKW was not consulted during the preparations for the invasions of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The planning for the attack on Poland was coordinated between the army and the air force without OKW supervision. During the campaign in Poland, Hitler established his headquarters aboard a train and only one OKW officer, General Jodl, accompanied him.<sup>26</sup>

The German invasion of Norway in 1940 provided one of the more novel approaches to command structure. The OKW recognized its inability to conduct detailed planning and looked for a planning headquarters. Eventually it selected the army corps under Hitler's chosen commander, General Falkenhorst. All three services objected to the final plan and largely ran their own campaigns. Göring objected to the subordination of *Luftwaffe* units to a mere corps commander, and he contrived to circumvent the measure. The navy objected to the deployment of warships to Norwegian ports, and Hitler eventually let the requirement drop. The army was especially angered at being removed from the planning process and then being ordered to supply forces to execute the operation. Not surprisingly, control of the operation was poor and became worse when Hitler lost his nerve. Fortunately for the Germans, General Jodl kept his head, and the operation succeeded.<sup>27</sup>

During the campaign against France, the OKW and the Army High Command continued to have poor relations. In the course of the army's spectacular advance from Sedan to Abbeville, Hitler became concerned about the southern flank of the panzer force and insisted that the army divert forces southward. When the Army High Command objected to this scheme and appeared slow to comply with it, Hitler summoned the army

commander-in-chief and his chief of staff and issued them explicit instructions. To insure army compliance, Keitel and Jodl circumvented the Army High Command and dealt directly with the units involved. A similar disregard of the army's operational expertise and integrity occurred a week later when Hitler halted the panzers before Dunkirk against the advice of the Army High Command.<sup>28</sup>

The early campaigns of World War II demonstrated that ultimate control of the German armed forces rested in the hands of Adolf Hitler. Yet Hitler was devoted to the principle of divide and rule. Just as he divided responsibilities in foreign policy and economic planning, he prevented the establishment of an effective central command structure. The OKW never achieved the requisite size, nor, under Keitel, did the OKW exercise the leadership to function as a general staff. Instead of serving as a planning and controlling headquarters or even as a source of military advice, the OKW functioned merely as a clearinghouse for Hitler's directives to the three services.<sup>29</sup>

The final step in Hitler's reorganization of the military command came after his failure to defeat Russia in 1941. In December 1941, Hitler relieved General Brauchitsch and appointed himself commander-in-chief of the army. Hitler told Halder, the chief of the General Staff: "This little affair of operational command is something that anybody can do. The task of the Commander-in-Chief is to educate the Army in the idea of National Socialism, and I know of no general who could do this in the way I want it done."<sup>30</sup>

Walter Warlimont points out that Hitler's action could have improved the German command structure if Hitler had then directed the merger of OKW and the Army High Command.<sup>31</sup> Instead, Hitler chose to use the Army High Command for his personal control over army operations in the east while he used OKW for control of the west and several minor theaters. No headquarters was in charge of overall strategy. Coordination of German military operations occurred solely in the person of Adolf Hitler.

Those who see the German General Staff as a model of military efficiency should reconsider the evidence. The German General Staff never solved the problem of centralized command; it remained an army organization. Though amazingly efficient at managing army affairs, it never achieved the status of an armed forces staff with the more complex mission of managing all three armed services. The OKW, which might have performed such a role, was denied by Hitler the size, leadership, or authority to do so. However, Germany's failure to organize a strong armed forces staff was not the fault of Adolf Hitler alone. The armed forces must also bear part of the responsibility. The three services never willingly accepted subordination to a higher headquarters—either to Blomberg's *Wehrmachtamt* or, after 1938, to Keitel's OKW. The services certainly had grounds to question the competence of these higher organizations. Yet one wonders how much of their resistance was for professional reasons and how much was due to organizational rivalries. The army, for example, had always been Germany's premier service, and it is doubtful that it would ever voluntarily abdicate its domination of German military affairs. The army disapproved of Hitler's OKW, but it is unclear what alternative it offered for unified command except the rule of its own General Staff.

Germany's early victories in World War II are frequently cited as proof of German military efficiency. One must remember, however, that Hitler had the advantage of being the aggressor. For years he had been building the *Wehrmacht* for offensive warfare, while other countries had allowed their armed forces to stagnate. Yet even in the early campaigns, the Germans proved to be awkward in coordinating the efforts of the three services. The invasion of Norway, discussed above, is one example of the breakdown in joint planning. The *Luftwaffe's* failure at Dunkirk and its misguided efforts to supply the 6th Army at Stalingrad are other examples of failures in joint planning. Clearly the Germans needed an organization that could properly judge the capabilities of the services to support each

other. Lacking such an organization, the three armed services had to rely upon close coordination. When coordination was lacking, the results were often disastrous.

Yet to emphasize German shortcomings in joint operations is to overlook more serious failures in German military organization. Was it necessary that German joint operations be coordinated by a centralized staff? Allied experience in World War II showed that joint operations could be managed at the theater level by the formation of joint commands. By placing the bulk of operational decisions in the hands of theater commanders, the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff were able to concentrate on their primary mission: the formulation and implementation of Allied grand strategy. Included in that task was the planning of global strategy, the allocation of resources, and perhaps most important, the rendering of military advice to the allied political leadership—Roosevelt and Churchill. Nowhere in the German command structure can we find a staff empowered to perform similar tasks. After the initial victories of blitzkrieg, Germany found itself embroiled in a massive, industrialized war. German efficiency on the battlefield, due in no small measure to the army's General Staff, was called upon to compensate for serious shortcomings in industrial production and economic planning. Yet as the Allied war effort gained in momentum, the *Wehrmacht* was placed under increasing strain. Clearly the absence of an armed forces staff compounded Germany's military deficiencies. Only such an organization could have provided a balanced view of military strategy and properly divided resources among the three services.

Telford Taylor points to the summer of 1940 as a turning point in the German war effort. Hitler's emasculation of the German General Staff system prevented any systematic assessment of Germany's strategic options. For all of its tactical brilliance, the German officer corps was strategically barren. Strategic decisions were made without the benefit of interservice consultation and coordination, and without

considering the relations among the several decisions.<sup>32</sup> From the summer of 1940 onward, Germany embarked on a diverse collection of strategic schemes. The Battle of Britain was a failure which served only to maul the *Luftwaffe* and undermine its performance in Russia. In turn, the air and sea blockade of Britain was pursued but never adequately supported, owing to the demands of the Russian front. A Mediterranean strategy, so promising in 1940, was virtually ignored until it was too late. Thus by 1942 German forces stretched from Scandinavia to Africa and from the English Channel to the Volga. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of German strategy was that it never came to terms with the limited resources of the German economy. Spread so thin, the *Wehrmacht* could not be decisive, only grimly fight on. The fundamental problem, of course, was that Germany had no mechanism to develop a national strategy; there was only Adolf Hitler. As Taylor notes, "He who cannot reject cannot select, and the downfall of the Third Reich was due, in no small measure, to Adolf Hitler's inability to realize that, in strategic terms, the road to everywhere is the road to nowhere."<sup>33</sup>

**W**hat are the lessons of the German experience in World War II? The German experience provides no sound model for reforming the current JCS structure. The Germans never solved the problems of an armed forces staff system, nor under the leadership of Adolf Hitler were they ever likely to do so. Germany went to war with a military organization that failed to unite its three services. Given the dominance of the German army and the continental nature of its employment, the *Wehrmacht* was able to compensate for some of its organizational shortcomings. But where the *Wehrmacht* proved to be quite impotent was in influencing Germany's national strategy. Germany's bankruptcy in political leadership and economic planning insured its defeat in a prolonged war. The German General Staff, tactically brilliant but strategically myopic, could never overcome this fact; it created an army that was magnificent in battle but



disastrous in war.<sup>34</sup> As Williamson Murray has noted, "To the end, they waged that struggle with operational and tactical competence, but the tenacity of their defense only insured that their final defeat would be all the more terrible."<sup>35</sup>

Those who claim that JCS reform might threaten civilian control cannot make their case using Hitler's Germany as an example. Granted, the German generals are not guiltless figures in the rise of Hitler and subsequent Nazi aggression. But one of the clear lessons of the Hitler era is that civilian control was never jeopardized. Hitler, the Nazi politician, insured his lasting control over the generals. Paradoxically, Hitler's concept of personal leadership and the resultant confusion within the German High Command doomed Germany to military inefficiency. Perhaps that was the fundamental dilemma of Nazi Germany—a militaristic state incapable of sound military leadership.

Yet a critical analysis of the *Wehrmacht* is not an argument against JCS reform. On the contrary, German history illustrates the need for effective coordination of a nation's war effort. What the Germans failed to realize was that an army general staff was not enough. Nations conducting modern warfare must do so within a much wider political and economic context. Those who seek to reform the JCS structure must realize that the armed forces are but one component of the national defense establishment. Therefore, a mere restructuring of the JCS is unlikely to enhance American military efficiency significantly. If JCS reform is to be effective, it must be part of a broader reshaping of the way Americans plan for their defense. Civilian agencies and private industry must be made a part of this process. As World War II demonstrated, success in modern warfare requires not only military expertise, but the efficient management of manpower, raw materials, and industrial capacity. Those seeking historical examples of defense planning should not look to German history, but to the more fertile ground of British and American experiences in World War II. The pivotal role, of course, then and now, rests

with the civilian leadership. If, as in the case of Nazi Germany, political leaders only seek and accept military plans and advice that conform to their own predilection, then JCS reform will be a failure. Consequently, Congress and the president must not only provide legal consent for JCS reform, they must become a part of it. They must seek a more efficient JCS structure and then give proper weight to the plans and advice that such a structure produces.

One hopes that as the debate over JCS reform continues, the participants will continue to use history as a source of ideas. If the "lessons" of German history provide no simple solutions for JCS reform, the past can still serve as a valuable source of experience and perspective.

#### NOTES

1. Though not directly connected to the debate over JCS reform, T. N. Dupuy's *A Genius for War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977) is perhaps the best example of reverence for the German General Staff. For a more recent assessment within the context of JCS reform, see William G. Hanne, "An Armed Forces Staff," *Parameters*, 12 (September 1982), 53-62. Hanne contends that the very term "general staff" is often a veiled reference to the German General Staff (p. 54). In advocating the creation of an armed forces staff, Hanne tries to differentiate between the original concept of a general staff system and the subsequent abuses associated with the German system (p. 56). This approach is similar to General Meyer's brief rebuttal to critics who see JCS reform as the creation of a German-style general staff ("The JCS—How Much Reform is Enough?" *Armed Forces Journal*, 119 [April 1982], 82). Because the term "general staff" is so frequently linked with the most sinister pages in German history, advocates of JCS reform appear reticent to use it. General Jones, for example, has specifically denied that his concept calls for a general staff (see "Jones Seeks Reorganization of JCS" in *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 22 February 1982, p. 25). Meanwhile, opponents of JCS reform have clearly used the term in a pejorative sense. In expressing his opposition to JCS reform, General Robert H. Barrow, then serving as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, warned against the creation of a "general staff system" that would narrow the alternatives presented to civilian leaders ("Navy, Marines Adamantly Oppose JCS Reforms" in *Armed Forces Journal*, 119 [January 1982], 61-62). In its examination of the debate over JCS reform, one news magazine cited fears of a "Prussian-style general staff" as a major obstacle to reform ("Do Armed Forces Need a Super Boss?" *U.S. News and World Report*, 24 May 1982, pp. 28-30).

2. F. L. Carsten, *The Reichswehr and Politics* (Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1973), pp. 11-12, 103-245, 249; see also Gordon A. Craig, *Germany 1866-1945* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 404-05; and Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1955), ch. X, pp. 382-426.

3. Craig, *Politics*, pp. 384-85; Carsten, pp. 111-12.
4. Telford Taylor, *Sword and Swastika* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952), p. 24.
5. Carsten, pp. 148-49.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-23.
7. Gordon A. Craig, *The Germans* (New York: New American Library, 1983), pp. 240-41.
8. Matthew Cooper, *The German Army 1933-1945* (New York: Stein and Day, 1978), pp. 21, 28. See also William Deist, *The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto, 1981), p. 32.
9. Robert J. O'Neill, *The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933-1939* (London: Cassell, 1966), pp. 23-24.
10. Craig, *Politics*, pp. 479-81; also Deist, p. 34.
11. Cooper, pp. 40, 84.
12. Carsten, pp. 296-300.
13. O'Neill, pp. 47-48.
14. Walter Warlimont, *Inside Hitler's Headquarters*, trans. R. H. Barry (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962), p. 9; O'Neill, p. 30. By the fall of 1935 Reichenau had been replaced by another "political" general, Wilhelm Keitel. Taylor, *Sword and Swastika*, p. 100.
15. O'Neill, p. 108.
16. Cooper, p. 86.
17. Taylor, *Sword and Swastika*, p. 101.
18. Warlimont, pp. 8-9. See also Williamson Murray, *Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1983), pp. 4-5.
19. Taylor, pp. 145-61. For a complete treatment of the subject, see Harold C. Deutsch, *Hitler and His Generals* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1974).
20. Craig, *Politics*, p. 495.
21. *The Times* (London), 7 February 1938, p. 7.
22. Cooper, pp. 80-81. See also F. L. Carsten, "Capturing the Army" in *The Times Literary Supplement*, 25 October 1974, p. 1208.
23. Warlimont, pp. 20-21; 60-61.
24. Cooper, p. 80.
25. Warlimont must be viewed with some reservations. Wheeler-Bennett, with some qualifications, claims that Warlimont was also guilty of dotting on Hitler in the same manner as Keitel and Jodl. See John Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954), p. 429. Michael Howard has accused Warlimont of attempting to exculpate himself. See "Hitler and His Generals" in Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace* (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), pp. 110-21.
26. For examples see Warlimont, pp. 15, 24, and 32.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-76.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-99. Admittedly, this is a controversial interpretation. Taylor argues that key army generals, specifically Rundstedt, were involved in the decision to halt the panzers. See Telford Taylor, *The March of Conquest* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), pp. 258-65.
29. Howard, *Studies*, p. 116.
30. As quoted in John Strawson, *Hitler as Military Commander* (London: B. T. Batsford, 1971), p. 146.
31. Warlimont, p. 216.
32. Telford Taylor, *The Breaking Wave* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 295.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 298.
34. See David Schoenbaum, "The Wehrmacht and G. I. Joe: Learning What from History," in *International Security*, 8 (Summer 1983), 205.
35. Murray, p. 319.

