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David Curtis Skaggs

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OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA

by

DAVID CURTIS SKAGGS

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Unknown to or forgotten by most US observers are the conventional arms control and confidence-building negotiations conducted in Vienna and Stockholm. Although they lack much of the drama of the nuclear talks in Geneva, many commentators feel that nuclear war would more likely arise from escalation than from a nuclear surprise attack. Thus, if the winds (or at least the breezes) of peace are to replace the winds of cold war, then the guarded optimism prevailing at these ignored talks needs to be seen in light of their implications for the security of Europe and the role of the United States in the world.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS

The longest running arms control negotiations in history are the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks conducted in Vienna since 1973. Thus far there have been no agreements, but 1987 may be the year of a modest breakthrough. Failing that, there might be a complete breakdown or major modification of the talks.

These discussions between NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives concern efforts to reduce to parity the force levels in central Europe (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the one side, and West

Germany and the Benelux countries on the other). For the most part the negotiations have been stymied over issues of data and verification. The Western negotiators have insisted that before any agreement can be concluded, they must have accurate data regarding troop strengths in the region in order to gauge parity. At the same time the West demands stringent verification measures in order to insure the terms of any agreement are not violated. Both of these demands have been rejected by the East on the grounds that such measures constitute legalized spying and that there are adequate means for verification through national technical means, especially photoreconnaissance and electronic intelligence.¹

A new phase in the MBFR talks began in February 1985, when the Eastern bloc suggested a small reduction in Soviet and US troops as an initial step in the process. After careful US intra-governmental and intra-NATO negotiations, the West accepted the Eastern framework of a time-limited, first-phase agreement involving US and Soviet ground force reductions followed by a no-increase commitment covering all forces within the negotiation area. The NATO counteroffer of December 1985 proposed smaller troop reductions from each side, while agreeing to drop the pre-agreement troop strength data request in exchange for a

stringent series of verification measures and the presentation of an accurate data list after the first-phase withdrawals. The initial Eastern response to these concessions has not been encouraging, especially in its desire for a veto over any inspection request and in its omission of a requirement for annual troop rotations to pass through stipulated exit and entry points. Currently the West awaits a more substantive response from the Pact negotiators.²

The intent of the Vienna talks is to reduce and equalize force sizes within the negotiation area. At present the Eastern bloc possesses a moderate manpower superiority and a substantial conventional armaments advantage over the Western allies. When one is talking in terms of hundreds of thousands of troops, the modest reduction of 13,000 US and 20,000 USSR (Warsaw Pact proposal of February 1985), or 5000 US and 11,500 USSR troops (NATO counterproposal of December 1985), or 6500 US and 11,500 Soviet troops (Pact proposal of February 1986) are insignificant. However, there is some risk that any US reductions constitute significant dilutions of American strength and a relative increase in Warsaw Pact power because of the relatively greater time it would take to reinforce from the continental United States in the event of war.

There are two critical aspects of reductions. First, the United States desires that the ratio of US and USSR troops be such that, should subsequent reductions occur at the same ratio, the end result will be an equality of American and Soviet forces within the negotiation area. Second, the logistical disparity between the United States and the USSR relative to the central European theater makes it imperative that the United States be allowed to leave some armaments in the negotiations area (or at least on the Continent) to compensate for this geographic disadvantage. While there is considerable room for negotiation regarding the amount and type of armaments to be left in Europe and the frequency and size of maneuvers involving such equipment, the central issue of reserve stocks cannot be negotiated away if

the West is to maintain a credible conventional deterrent on the Continent.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

While these alliance-to-alliance MBFR negotiations continue, in Stockholm 33 European states plus the United States and Canada concluded in September 1986 the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (usually known as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe or the CDE talks), an outgrowth of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which produced the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Technically these are not arms control talks, but the CDE design is to reduce the chances of military confrontation in Europe by developing means to unmask any aggressive military intent. The CDE talks were concerned with providing greater predictability regarding military activities in the region (from the Atlantic to the Urals).

The Stockholm accord requires each signator to provide an annual calendar of all out-of-garrison activities involving 13,000 troops or 300 tanks. Participants may add additional exercises with 42 days' notice, but maneuvers cannot exceed 40,000 troops unless they have been forecast a year in advance and cannot exceed 75,000 troops unless forecast two years in advance. The accord mandates observers at all maneuvers involving 17,000 or more troops. The West

Dr. David Curtis Skaggs is a professor of history at Bowling Green State University, Ohio. A colonel in the Army Reserve and a graduate of the US Army War College, he is a member of the consulting faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College and a mobilization designee to the US European Command. Dr. Skaggs is the author and editor of four books and numerous scholarly articles, and he served as a William C. Foster Fellow with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the 1985-86 academic year.



hoped for a lower threshold of notification; the East desired a higher one. Most significant was the East's acceptance of up to three challenge inspections per country, per year. Such inspections may be carried out on the ground, in the air, or both, with the inspected state providing the transportation. Inspections must begin within 36 hours after the issuance of an inspection request.³

Despite a tight deadline, the Stockholm conferees agreed to these concrete tension-reducing measures for the Continent in time to report to the third review conference of the Helsinki agreement in Vienna that began in November 1986. The Vienna review conference will consider the CDE recommendations in light of human rights and economic aspects of the Helsinki process to ascertain whether or not to incorporate this accord into the Helsinki regime.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

The Stockholm accord creates a series of "confidence- and security-building measures" and the MBFR conference includes "associated measures," both of which sets are normally called "confidence-building measures" or CBMs. They incorporate a variety of proposals for out-of-garrison exercise notification, observation, and inspection features. Whatever a particular negotiation effort calls them, CBMs bridge the gap between arms control and arms races, the aim being to limit the latter by reducing international tensions.

When combined with the potential troop reductions that are part of the MBFR talks, CBMs have important implications for Western security interests. One can jointly discuss both sets of CBMs only in a general fashion, since there is considerable difference in the intent of CDE (which is primarily one of greater openness in the whole of Europe) and of MBFR (which deals with specific security issues in a limited region). However, no MBFR agreement can violate any CDE measures accepted by the continuing Helsinki process. Moreover, the whole negotiation situation is in a state of flux as a consequence

of the Gorbachev initiative of 18 April 1986, the Pact's Budapest Appeal of 11 June 1986, and NATO's formation of a high-level task force on conventional arms control at its Halifax foreign ministers meeting in May 1986. Consequently, there may be a folding of MBFR into some sort of CDE Phase IB or Phase II that could emerge out of the Vienna review conference.

Central to CDE is the confidence-building requirement to publish an annual military exercise calendar indicating the location, type, and identity of participating units and mandating multinational observers at such maneuvers. Of the various CBMs, maneuver pre-declarations (called "forecasts" in arms control jargon) are of less military significance than the others. However, deviation from annual calendars could alert NATO to potential attack. Exercise notification would reduce the possibility of peacetime military exercises being used as a cover for a surprise attack since they require an indication of the number of troops and units involved in the maneuver. Obvious non-compliance, as when the size of an exercise exceeded that announced, would alert NATO officials to a violation of far clearer specificity than would now be the case.

More significantly, forecasts limit extemporaneous military activities that could be used to intimidate. They would define as obvious violations of the continuing Helsinki process such activities as the unscheduled Soviet maneuvers used to coerce the Polish government to crush the Solidarity movement. That in and of itself may not stop the Soviets from such actions in the future, but they would pay a steep diplomatic price.

On the other hand, openness alone cannot prevent war. It might cause a nation to hesitate and it might avert strategic surprise, but we recall from the lessons of 1914 that each side knew essentially what the other was doing and that, far from promoting peace, this knowledge impelled them to take aggressive action in kind. Openness might preclude surprise attacks such as the 1941 Nazi invasion of Russia or the Japanese attack on Oahu, but mere knowledge of

another's military activities is hardly sufficient to prevent war when the political authorities are willing to wage it.

While annual forecasts are a critical aspect of confidence-building, the right to observe maneuvers is also a significant feature of Western proposals. But far more controversial than observation is that portion of the Western verification package calling for on-demand inspections of maneuvers and garrisons in order to insure that the terms of the agreement are kept. While observers would be allowed to see only those portions of an exercise necessary to determine whether the activity conformed to a particular forecast, inspectors would be permitted to enter designated sites on demand to determine whether violations had occurred.

Additional Western MBFR demands require both sides to break out their troop data by unit so that each side can determine the size, type, and location of all units on the other side. Such intrusions into the other side's military affairs are called "legalized spying" by Eastern negotiators, and the most serious deadlocks in Vienna concern this issue.

In the MBFR negotiations, both sides have accepted the concept of permanent transit points through which all Soviet and American forces entering and exiting the area encompassed by the agreement would have to pass. How easily such points could be circumvented depends upon the provisions of any final agreement. The NATO proposal calls for a three-year freeze on US and Soviet forces within the agreement area after the initial withdrawal. Since both sides have frequent and large troop rotations, such exit and entry points constitute important means for verifying that rotations have not been used as a cover for reinforcing residual units. Hence the West demands that both unit movements and individual troop rotations into and out of the agreement area pass through these posts.

Whether there will be a final agreement in the MBFR talks remains in the realm of conjecture, but several factors contribute to possible agreement. First, both the United

States and the Europeans face economic and demographic forces that push them toward a reduction of tensions and troop levels in Europe. Both sides wish to reduce the costs of such troops, and each confronts population declines in males eligible for conscription. On the Soviet side this problem is exacerbated by the increasing proportion of non-Slavs in the military age group which contributes to ethnic conflict, linguistic barriers, and political unreliability. Second, apart from a natural desire to improve national security, President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev both seem bent upon some sort of agreement for purposes of satisfying domestic and diplomatic interests. Third, the CDE and MBFR negotiations constitute important diplomatic forums for the European states (East, West, and nonaligned), which are left out of the nuclear weapons negotiations and which for various international and domestic political purposes desire agreement.

The ultimate success of both force-reduction and confidence-building negotiations depends upon the degree of verification required. How much verification is needed? How intrusive should observation and inspection procedures be? Should the standards be designed primarily for political significance (emphasizing any intentional breach of an agreement regardless of its size) or should they focus on variables of true military significance? Are photographic and signal intelligence-gathering means sufficient to acquire information that will confirm militarily significant violations of any CDE or MBFR agreements? With the Soviets arguing that national technology provides sufficient verification means and the Americans demanding inspections as an absolute requirement, impasses have been reached not only in the MBFR talks in Vienna, but also in the talks dealing with chemical weapons and intermediate- and intercontinental-range nuclear weapons being conducted in Geneva.⁴ Thus the long-term implications of the inspection regime negotiated in Stockholm will have great significance for the whole spectrum of arms control talks.

IMPLICATIONS

While it is not my purpose here to elaborate on the details of the negotiations or the probable outlines of the final agreements, it is possible to foresee consequences that affect NATO's strategic and tactical posture. Given the MBFR objective of relative equality of troop strength inside the negotiation area, given the economic and demographic imperatives that impinge on both alliances, and given the CDE potential for reduced secrecy relative to ground maneuvers in Europe, what are the operational options confronting NATO?

Foremost, one must assume that even on the most favorable terms CDE and MBFR agreements will not eliminate the possibility of a conventional war in Europe. At best they might provide a little more strategic warning than before. They will not eliminate the need for credible military forces. This means that the political will to maintain nuclear and conventional deterrent forces must remain as well as the political will to react to threats from unauthorized Warsaw Pact maneuvers and mobilizations.

Inherent in political will is readiness to respond appropriately to noncompliance with treaty provisions. But without ambiguous evidence of massive and blatant violations, the broad political consensus within the Alliance necessary for effective reaction will be most difficult to achieve. One significant manifestation of such will would be to grant the NATO supreme commander authority to mobilize forces prior to the onset of hostilities. Otherwise, the desired relaxation of tensions could lead to a relaxation of vigilance, producing a net decrease in security.

Only slightly secondary to political will is the maintenance of operational forces sufficient to deter Warsaw Pact decisionmakers. A corollary is increased reserve readiness. The economic and demographic realities require NATO to rely increasingly on reserve forces along the first line of defense. The European armies must increase reserve readiness just as European politicians must demonstrate their willingness to respond

appropriately to confirmed intelligence reports of Pact mobilization. Obviously, reliance on armored reserves as the major NATO counterattack force would be most dangerous. The operational and maintenance requirements of such units combined with limited European training areas mean that the West has to rely mostly on regulars for the essential armor component.

Such considerations lead to one of the more significant features of a defensive plan for central Europe. It should include fortification and barrier defenses along the inner-German border of sufficient strength, depth, and lethality to deter Pact aggression and to provide the cover, concealment, and fields of fire that will assure NATO's first echelon forces (a large portion of whom will be reservists) of their survivability. Permanent field fortifications combined with natural and man-made obstacles would not only increase defensive abilities, but also enhance the potential for less strained relations between East and West. Such a recommendation is not to endorse a "Maginot Line mentality" of purely static defenses. Rather it is to heed the Clausewitzian dictum that defense is the stronger form of war. His defense was not a static one. On the contrary, it called for balance between waiting for a blow and parrying it. If CDE and MBFR increase warning time and decrease chances of surprise attack, the ability of NATO to receive and parry an attack is greatly enhanced. Despite West German political reluctance to even consider such a fortification option, a number of American strategic analysts and public officials urge its development.⁵

For instance, Under Secretary of Defense Fred Iklé endorsed such a concept in a speech in February 1986 to the 23rd annual *Wehrkunde* Conference in Munich:

Forward defense close to the Alliance's borders . . . remains a political and strategic imperative. How are we to maintain such a forward defense? The nature of the terrain over which the enemy forces would seek to advance, of course, affects the ease (or difficulties) of our forward defense. And the

obstacles of terrain are not only the work of God, but can also be created by man—as Marechal Vauban and André Maginot have demonstrated.

No! I am not advocating that we build Vauban fortifications from Lubeck to Passau. I am instead referring to inventive uses of modern technology. There are ways to enhance the contribution of natural or artificial terrain features to NATO's forward defense, on the central front and elsewhere The good bureaucrats of our Alliance are keeping, I am convinced, a big black book—The Index of Prohibited Ideas. Some people would like to place the idea of enhancing terrain features to assist our forward defense on this index.⁶

There are, of course, deep political, psychological, and environmental currents within the West German psyche against any consideration of barrier defenses. The Germans' love for nature is enough in and of itself to cause them to oppose such potential large-scale injury to the landscape that barriers might entail. Further, combined with their natural disposition toward reunification of the German states, such barriers are seen as inhibiting these national goals.⁷ Such a fear, however, might be misplaced: the presence of a more expressly defensive stance could be seen by the Soviets as indicative of benign intentions and thus contribute to greater FRG/GDR social, intellectual, and economic interaction than they will allow at present. Indeed, according to Robert Komer, "The best support for Ostpolitik is a well-defended West Germany." Fortunately, barriers can be built in an environmentally acceptable manner. There are indications that the Social Democratic Party is giving barriers serious consideration in its defense plans.⁸

Obviously, adoption of the barrier system would entail complementary rethinking of certain other aspects of the present NATO defensive strategy. Redispotion of forces and changes in weapons are the sorts of adjustments that would become necessary.⁹

So far as the Vienna and Stockholm negotiations are concerned, it is unlikely that

the West will secure all the verification safeguards it would prefer. From a strategic point of view, this means intelligence-gathering capabilities will retain a vital role in NATO operations. Determination of the degree of compliance with any agreement is subject to limitations imposed on technical collection by Pact cover, concealment, and deception initiatives and by the meteorological, geographical, and geological characteristics of the area east of the Elbe. It thus becomes incumbent upon NATO to acquire expansible surveillance technologies that enhance our capacity for early, unambiguous warning of an impending attack. Such efforts should be a high priority item for NATO.

Nothing in the barrier strategy impinges upon the critical features of present NATO defense policy—forward defense and flexible response. In fact, it enhances them. However, it does affect one possible outgrowth of General Bernard Rogers' war plan—the attack of follow-on forces. Even though General Rogers disclaims that these plans include a deep ground attack across the border connecting the two Germanies, many interpret this as a potential option.¹⁰ One of the consequences of the construction of a defense-oriented barrier system (and the resultant forfeiture of the option of a deep ground attack) would be a lessening of the threat of destabilizing the settlement of 1945. A lowering of NATO's offensive threat (and there are serious questions about the alliance's ability to carry out such a policy) may not only be good military strategy, it may also become a confidence-building measure in itself that would contribute to Soviet willingness to withdraw forces from Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, NATO should retain the planned attack of Pact second-echelon forces and logistical facilities by air interdiction. Such deep strikes have always been an important feature of NATO defense policy. It will continue even if there is an MBFR treaty. Since a final MBFR agreement would require withdrawal of significant numbers of Soviet forces to the Western Military Districts of the USSR, such units

would be more vulnerable to air attack once the balloon goes up because of their presumed deployment toward the forward line of troops. In fact, NATO's willingness to prosecute a war through the use of precision guided missiles against the Eastern bloc constitutes both a deterrent in and of itself and a threat to the stability of the bloc's political regimes.

LONG-TERM US POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Beyond the immediate policy implications for NATO as a whole, the CDE and MBFR could have important consequences for US strategy. The increased openness resulting from successful CDE negotiations could encourage those who wish to reduce the economic costs of our troop deployments in Europe. A reduction in the perceived threat in Europe could lead to a demand for reduced military expenditures. In any event, one can be assured that a perceived reduction in the threat in Europe would not go unnoticed by politicians operating in the Gramm-Rudman environment.

Of course, serious rethinking of US force levels in Europe and the military budget in general may occur regardless of the CDE and MBFR talks and any treaties that may result from them. But any such tendencies can be accelerated by what goes on in Vienna and Stockholm.

In conclusion, there will be no final agreements if the consequences of the talks are not economically feasible, politically acceptable, and militarily credible. They must affect both East and West in such a way as to pose a sufficient deterrent to attacking, while ensuring each side of adequate protection from surprise attack.¹¹ Because of their close strategic relation to the Geneva nuclear negotiations, it may take a summit meeting to cut the Gordian knot of verification. On the other hand, since the Vienna and Stockholm talks concern conventional armaments, it may be they can become the harbinger of other arms control agreements. Whatever happens, confidence-building measures, in and of themselves, will not reduce a rival's

military potential, and arms control will not solve the East-West confrontation. But effective and verifiable conventional and nuclear arms reductions and withdrawals should succeed in reducing the tensions materially in central Europe.

NOTES

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1. For general background on MBFR see Christoph Bertram, *Mutual Force Reductions in Europe: The Political Aspects*, Adelphi Papers No. 84 (London: IISS, 1972); John G. Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions—The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe* (New York: Pergamon, 1980); Steven Canby, "Mutual Force Reductions: A Military Perspective," *International Security*, 2 (Winter 1978), 123-35; William B. Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction: Issues and Prospects* (Washington: AEI, 1978); Jeffrey Record, *Force Reductions in Europe: Starting Over* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980); Jonathan Dean, "MBFR: From Apathy to Accord," *International Security*, 7 (Spring 1983), 116-39; Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance," *International Security*, 9 (Winter 1984/85), 47-88; J. I. Coffey, "New Approaches to Arms Reduction in Europe," in *Arms Control and Military Force*, ed. Christoph Bertram, Adelphi Library, 3 (London: IISS, 1980), pp. 3-30; Lothar Ruehl, "MBFR: Lessons and Problems," in *Arms Control and European Security*, ed. Jonathan Alford, Adelphi Library (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), pp. 44-80; US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Status of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Negotiations* (Washington: GPO, 1983).

2. Stanley R. Sloan, "Mutual Force Reductions in Central Europe: Prospects for Accord," Issue Brief 86064 (Washington: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1986); Jonathan Dean, "Soviets and US—Edging Closer to an Agreement in Vienna," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 January 1986, p. 11; Roger Fontaine, "Western Concessions Pave the Way for Troop Withdrawals in Europe," *Washington Times*, 7 March 1986, p. 7A; Kenneth L. Adelman, "Lowered Hopes for Disarmament: The U.S. View," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 March 1986, p. 8.

3. James MacIntosh, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, 1985), provides a solid survey of the literature and arguments. Excerpts of the Stockholm text are found in *The New York Times*, 22 September 1986, p. A12.

4. The issues revolving around verification and compliance are summarized in Jeanette Voas, "The Arms-Control Compliance Debate," *Survival*, 28 (January/February 1986), 8-31.

5. Among the Americans calling for reconsideration of the barriers option are Jeffrey Record, "Defending Europe Conventionally: An American Perspective on Needed Reforms," *Air University Review*, 36 (September-October 1985), 62-63; Canby, 130-31; Stanley R. Sloan, "The NATO Focus on Conventional Defense," *National Defense*, 70

(January 1986), 21; Eric R. Alterman, "Central Europe: Misperceived Threats and Unforeseen Dangers," *World Policy Journal*, 2 (Fall 1985), 702-04; Robert W. Komer, "Strategic Responses to Conflict in Europe," in *Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s*, eds. J. Taylor, Steven A. Maaranen, and Gerrit W. Gong (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1984), p. 200; John Tillson, "The Forward Defense of Europe," *Military Review*, 61 (May 1981), 68; Waldo Freeman, "NATO Central Region Forward Defense: Correcting the Strategy/Force Mismatch," in *The Art and Practice of Military Strategy*, ed. George Edward Thibault (Washington: National Defense University, 1984), pp. 759-64; John J. Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense and the NATO Central Front," *International Security*, 6 (Winter 1981/82), 104-22.

6. Fred C. Iklé, "Atlantic Alliance Is the Global Guardian of the Democratic Order," in "ROA National Security Report" section, *The Officer*, 62 (September 1986), 5-9.

7. Among recent commentaries on the German question see, US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The German Question Forty Years after Yalta* (Washington: GPO, 1985), esp. p. 22; Richard Lowenthal, "The German Question Transformed," *Foreign Affairs*, 63 (Winter 1984/85), 303-15; Jonathan Dean, "Directions in Inner-German Relations," *Orbis*, 28 (Fall 1985), 609-32; Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," *Orbis* (Winter 1985), 719-42; Ronald D. Asmus, "The Dialectics of Detente and Discord: The Moscow-East Berlin-Bonn Triangle," *Orbis* (Winter 1985), 743-74; Ronald Smith, *Soviet Policy Towards East Germany*, Adelphi Papers No. 203 (London: IISS, 1985).

8. Komer, p. 200. On SDP policies see, "Don't hit me, I can't hit back," *The Economist*, 20 September 1986, p. 54; James M. Markham, "European Socialists Get Ready to Take on NATO," *The New York Times*, 30 September 1986, p. A12.

9. See note 5, and Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier, "Competing Strategic Concepts: The Need for a Unified Military Strategy," in *National Security Strategy: Choices and Limits*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (New York: Praeger, 1984), 15-36; John F. Meehan III, "NATO and Alternative Strategies," *Parameters*, 16 (Spring 1986), 14-23.

10. General Rogers denies that the follow-on forces attack involves a conventional ground force advance across the German border in "Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Realities," *NATO Review*, 32 (December 1984), 1-9. However, considerable confusion does exist regarding the use of ground forces. The most significant argument in favor of the deep ground strike is that of Samuel P. Huntington in *The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1982), pp. 1-52. Critiques of the conventional offensive doctrine include Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier, "The Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO," *Survival*, 27 (May/June 1985), 108-18; J. J. R. Oswald and R. McKendrick, "Flexible Response—Is There an Alternative?" *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies*, 131 (March 1986), 20-25; Meehan; Mearsheimer; Jane M. O. Sharp, "Arms Control and Alliance Commitments," *Political Science Quarterly*, 100 (Winter 1985-86), 649-67.

11. Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs*, 61 (Winter 1982/83), 309-24, articulates this theme most effectively.

