Global and Functional Strategic Issues

Antulio J. Echevarria II

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The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) offers military and civilian researchers a ready reference of topics that are of particular interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense. The KSIL performs a valuable service by linking the research community with major defense organizations which, in turn, seek to benefit from focused research. It thus forms a critical link in an ongoing research cycle.

With the publication of the AY 2008-09 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College invite the research community to address any of the many strategic challenges identified herein. Further information regarding specific topics can be obtained by contacting SSI faculty or relevant KSIL sponsors.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
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GLOBAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES

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I. Global War on Terror

1. Reconceptualizing the “war” on terror: is it a war, and, if so, what is its nature and how should it be prosecuted?

2. Revising U.S. global strategy for the war on terror; reassessing the ends, ways, and means

3. Understanding challenges confronting the coalition in Afghanistan and developing appropriate responses

4. What coalitions, partnerships, and alliances should the U.S. be building and supporting?

5. What measures of effectiveness should be applied to the larger war on terror?

6. Countering ideological support for terrorism through domestic and foreign means

7. Recognizing progress in counterinsurgency operations, and reinforcing it

8. What proportion of U.S. land power should be focused on counterinsurgency operations and how should it be organized, trained, equipped, and deployed?

9. Training international security forces (military, paramilitary, and police)

10. Balancing political, economic, and military tools in counterinsurgency operations

11. Challenges and opportunities of employing militias in counterinsurgency efforts

12. Should the war on drugs be integrated into the war on terror?
13. What should be the military role in the collection of foreign intelligence in areas of interest and the linkage to, and collaboration with, nonmilitary collection?

14. Is there a clash of perspectives between the U.S. focus on the Global War on Terror and the priority placed by our partners on other security issues (e.g., human security in Africa), and, if so, how should we address it?

II. Homeland Security/Homeland Defense/ Civil Support

1. Does the U.S. homeland have a center of gravity?

2. Assessing, countering, and responding to WMD threats

3. Identifying intelligence collection requirements and restrictions in homeland security and whether there are any likely and/or possible implications for information/intelligence sharing and warning

4. Information sharing among intelligence, law enforcement, and other federal, state, and local agencies, and the likely and/or possible impacts on warning and our homeland defense/security effectiveness

5. Strategic implications of missile defense as a component of homeland defense.

6. Active and reserve components’ roles in homeland security

7. Combining federal, state, and local resources for combating homeland threats

8. Identifying and protecting DoD and/or non-DoD critical infrastructure

9. Implications of the North American Defense Agreement (U.S., Canada, Mexico)

10. Implications of dual Title 10 and Title 32 responsibilities for State Adjutants General given operational control of federal assets for local event support. Likewise: Implications of dual status (Title 10 and Title 32) responsibilities for active duty officers under USC Title 32 section 315 given operational control of non-Federal National Guard soldiers to support domestic incidents
11. Interagency planning for pandemics

12. Strategic implications of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Western Hemisphere

13. What is the impact of under-equipped active duty and reserve units responding to WMD or natural disasters, or other Civil Support missions?

14. How should U.S. Northern Command be organized and resourced, and how should it be composed (ratio of AC to RC and service composition) to better support its Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions?

15. Should changes be made to either the Posse Comitatus or Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order Act to facilitate the use of National Guard or AC in support of Homeland Defense and Civil Support?

16. What are the second- and third-order effects of mass evacuations?


18. Integration of the private sector in response to a public health emergency (e.g., information distribution, mental health counseling, goods, accountability for employees)

19. Cyberspace Operations: Determine if the operational framework being pursued by the DoD for cyberspace operations is the most effective for all warfighters. Will it be sensitive to Geographic Combatant Commanders’ needs or will they be required to standup their own cyberspace operations capability? Should there be a sub-unified command that consolidates all cyberspace capability? Should all Service and Agency capabilities be aligned to USSTRATCOM?

20. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Standardized Tracking. How can the DoD standardize a method for tracking critical infrastructure and what should the tool look like?
21. Rules of Engagement in Cyberspace: What are they, and are they relevant and/or appropriate?


23. Advantages and disadvantages of moving all U.S. territory (specifically Hawaii, U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico) under USNORTHCOM as the lead combatant command for expertise in Homeland Defense

24. Interagency coordination and cooperation in Homeland Security/Homeland Defense

25. Should DoD and non-Federal National Guard have dedicated Civil Support capabilities to respond to natural and manmade domestic disasters?

III. Military Change

1. Understanding revolutionary change in warfare

2. Analyzing developments in contemporary warfare

3. Historical responses to unexpected technological breakthroughs

4. Alternative paths for transforming the U.S. military

5. Preparing for fog and friction on the future battlefield

6. Land force requirements for full spectrum dominance

7. Future force capacities for peacekeeping and stability operations

8. Networks and Warfare:
   a. Leadership in a network environment
   b. Command and control (Battle Command) in a network environment

9. Strategic implications of future operational concepts:
   a. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and family of Joint concepts
   b. The Army in Joint Operations, and Army future force operational concepts
10. Evaluating the themes in the Army’s Strategic Planning Guidance:
   a. Assessing force proficiencies against irregular challenges
   b. Assessing force capabilities for stability operations
   c. Assessing force capabilities to dominate in complex terrain
   d. Assessing force capabilities for strategic responsiveness
   e. Assessing the Army’s Global Force Posture
   f. Assessing force capabilities for Battle Command

11. Impact and fundamental requirements for interdependence

12. Information, misinformation, and disinformation. How can DoD manage these in an information-rich world?

13. Inter- and intra-theater mobility requirements for a transformed military force

14. Transforming logistical support for U.S. Army, allies and coalition partners

15. Transforming OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Service staffs

16. Transforming the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve

17. Women in combat: laws and norms

18. Modular force performance within existing and/or emerging Joint doctrine

19. The mix of heavy, medium, and light elements in future forces, both AC and RC

20. Savings and costs of the Future Force, both AC and RC

21. Transformation in light of OIF and other ongoing operations

22. The risk of technology maturation versus stable investment strategies

23. Resource conflicts between operational and institutional transformation

24. Advantages and disadvantages of transforming toward lean efficiency
25. Does ARFORGEN meet the Army’s needs for extended combat operations?

26. Operating in cyberspace

27. Streamlining the business of DoD’s business: Is DoD’s governance responsive enough in today’s fast-changing world?

28. Strategic implications of outer space as a theater of war

29. Army equities in nuclear warfare

30. U.S. Africa Command as a case study for interagency integration—implications for other commands and agencies, measures of effectiveness, roles and responsibilities, etc.

31. Impacts of increasing role of theater security cooperation activities (building partner capacity, etc.) on the force. Is it competing with/undercutting warfighting readiness?

32. The need for larger pools of Foreign Area Officers and offices of security cooperation in the Joint community.

IV. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy

1. Assess the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and/or U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS); how/where should the next administration prioritize its efforts?

2. Alternative American grand strategies, their costs and benefits

3. Determine strategic implications of irregular, traditional, and hybrid challenges

4. Deterrence and dissuasion in U.S. national strategy

5. Proliferation and counterproliferation in a globalized world

6. Integrating military and nonmilitary tools to achieve strategic objectives and avoid or resolve potential conflict
7. The utility of military force as an instrument of policy in the 21st century
8. Implications of U.S. missile defense for allies and potential adversaries
9. Implications of preemptive and preventive war doctrines
10. Responding to the collapse of strategically significant states
11. Long-term stability, support, reconstruction and transition operations
12. Post-Cold War security assistance and its utility
13. Alternatives to the spectrum of conflict model and alternative strategic futures
14. Is a full-spectrum force required for the future; is it possible to sustain?
15. Strategic net and risk assessment in a multipolar system
16. Examining the relationship between energy and security
17. “Global warming” and U.S. national security

V. Landpower Employment

1. The Army and irregular challenges:
   a. Given some success in defeating IED challenges, what other measures might insurgents or terrorists take?
   b. What steps should U.S. forces take to minimize the effectiveness of those measures?
2. Requirements for counterinsurgency operations
3. Requirements for military operations in complex terrain
4. Assess the importance of information superiority in military operations
5. Conducting combat operations, security operations, and stability operations concurrently: how to transition, where to focus?
6. Changing landpower roles in stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian operations:
   a. Information and intelligence sharing between military and coalition partners
   b. Integrating military and civilian logistics
   c. Definitions and policies for establishing a “safe and secure” environment

7. Improving Joint, combined, interagency, NGO and IGO cooperation in humanitarian and counterinsurgency operations

8. Evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy execution by combatant commanders and country teams

9. The international criminal court and American military operations

VI. Landpower Generation and Sustainment

1. Changing requirements versus legal constraints for military and interagency mobilization

2. Assessing the effectiveness of the War Reserve Materiel Program

3. Impact of force protection requirements on power projection and force employment

4. Globalization’s impact on the military-industrial base

5. Strategic implications of implementing base closures

6. Overcoming anti-access and area-denial strategies

7. Planning for operations in areas with primitive and austere infrastructures

8. Tradeoffs with respect to power projection, prepositioning, and forward stationing

9. Planning for protracted conflicts

10. Logistics for dispersed/distributed combat operations
11. Expanded roles of civilians in defense operations and the impact on force structure
12. Adapting the Reserve Components to continuous mobilization
13. Landpower’s role in seabasing as a logistical and operational concept
14. Sustaining a modular, capabilities-based Army
15. Establishing a single Army logistics enterprise
16. Managing support for Joint, Interagency, and Multinational (JIM) commodities
17. Incorporating LOGCAP and other augmentation agreements into DoD and DoS strategies
18. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model’s implications for manning, equipping, and sustaining functions in and specific impacts on:
   a. The generating force’s roles and missions
   b. Title 10 requirements for generating capabilities for the Joint Force Commander
   c. Exporting generating force capabilities to JIM partners
   d. Support for the modular Army concept
   e. Generating forces to support the long war

VII. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture
1. Retention and readiness of active and reserve forces
2. Developing forces and doctrine for expeditionary operations
3. Developing forces and doctrine for security cooperation, assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence
4. Developing soldiers and leaders for the future force
5. Teaching strategy for 21st century conflict
6. Changing the continuum of service
7. Assessing the gap between civilian and military cultures

8. The U.S. military and American society:
   a. Demographics: who is in it, and who fights?
   b. Civilian control over the military in the 21st century

9. Identifying, managing, and sustaining the Army’s intellectual and technological talent

10. The status of the Army as a profession

11. Sustaining public support for the U.S. armed forces

12. How the Army develops and responds to “lessons learned”

13. Obtaining Joint synergy despite different service cultures

14. Establishing and maintaining a culture of innovation

15. Implications of adopting commercial best business practices for the military

16. Managing changes in temporary end strength

17. Implications for the All-Volunteer Force fighting the “long” war

18. Implications of DoD reorganization initiatives and military reform

19. Managing deployed civilians and contractors

20. Managing nondeployable soldiers

21. Strategic purpose and effectiveness of the Individual Ready Reserve

22. Examining the pre-commissioning program

23. Revising the military decisionmaking process

24. Determining the difference between dissent and disloyalty with civilian oversight

25. Analyzing the impact of repeated deployments on families
26. How will the fact that fewer members of Congress have served in the armed services affect future Defense policy?

27. Implications of full knowledge enablement on traditional hierarchical organizations.

28. Implications of interagency integration on the professional military education, career progression, and other human resource management practices; how should DoD facilitate the implementation of the DOS-led Interagency Management System?

29. Discuss the utilization of foreign area officers in ODC and DAO positions within the Senior Defense Official (SDO) concept.
REGIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES

POC: Dr. Steven Metz (717) 245-3822
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I. Evolving Regional Security Matters in Africa

1. Africa and the war on terrorism
2. Lessons learned from the recent insurgency in Chad
3. Implications of HIV/AIDS on the ground forces of African partners
4. Strategic implications of Chinese activity in Africa
5. Analysis of regional African infrastructure and its impacts on how African nations provide for their own security. (e.g., the Zambezi River Valley or the Great Lakes nations or the Trans-Sahel)
6. U.S. strategy toward the Trans-Sahel
7. U.S. strategy toward the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its impact on its neighbors
8. Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea subregion—threats, challenges, and solutions
9. U.S. strategy toward the west Indian Ocean nations (Comoros, Mauritius) and southeast African coast
10. Nexus of security and development in Africa—why they go hand-in-hand
11. U.S. military roles in human security issues in Africa
12. The impacts and risks of mass migrations and refugee flows in Africa
13. The role of the African Union in African peacekeeping operations
14. Army international activities programs in Africa
15. Professional development of African militaries

II. Evolving Regional Security Matters in the Middle East and the Islamic World

1. U.S. interests with respect to a stable, sovereign Iraq
2. Changing the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf
3. Security issues created by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
4. U.S. strategy toward Iran
5. U.S. strategy toward Libya
6. U.S. strategy toward Syria
7. Implications of a nuclear Iran
8. The impact of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) on U.S. national security
9. Strategic implications of a changing Egypt
10. The future of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the smaller Gulf monarchies in Middle Eastern security
11. Strategic implications of fully or partially democratic, but anti-U.S. governments, mass movements, and political parties in the Middle East
12. Strategic implications of increasing Chinese interests in Middle East oil, and arms sales and economic aid in the Middle East
13. Future role of external powers and security organizations in the Middle East
14. Emerging and evolving military relationships among Middle Eastern states including counterterrorism relationships.
15. Strategies regional states have for dealing with the United States and its allies in the Middle East
16. Regional security strategies in the Middle East.

17. The nature of politically-oriented Islamic militancy and salafi jihadism, and their implications for U.S. and regional security

18. U.S. strategy toward Lebanon

19. Efforts to contain and moderate violent ethnic and sectarian conflicts throughout the Middle East

20. Dangers of “spillover” problems from Iraq, and the activities of regional states within Iraq

III. Evolving Regional Security Matters in the Asia-Pacific Region

1. Balancing U.S. security interests in China and Taiwan

2. The future of the Japan-U.S. security relationship

3. Implications of China’s growing economic and military power in the region

4. Security concerns in Southeast Asia and implications for the United States

5. Strategic response to North Korea’s intentions and capabilities

6. Evolving Republic of Korea-U.S. security relations

7. Evolving Japan-U.S. security relations

8. Japan’s relationships with Asian nations

9. Future of ASEAN and U.S. strategic posture in the region

10. The role of the U.S. military on the Korean Peninsula

11. Future of the U.S. alliance with Australia and New Zealand

12. Sources and dimensions of anti-Americanism in Asia: policy implications
13. Chinese-North Korean relations
14. Politics of history and memory in South-North Korean relations
15. Role of nationalism in Asia and implications for U.S. policy
16. Role of ideology in Asia and implications for U.S. policy
17. China’s regional and global grand strategy
18. China’s military transformation
19. Russia’s interests, policy and actions in Asia
20. Transformation of U.S. forward deployment in Asia
21. Toward U.S. energy security strategy for Asia and the Pacific
22. The strategic implications of China’s growing space capabilities
23. Organized crime and security in South Asia
24. India as a rising Asian power and the expansion of its overall capabilities and interests

IV. Evolving Regional Security Matters in Europe

1. U.S. Army roles in future Balkan security
2. A roadmap for future security in the Balkans
3. The revival of the Russian military
4. Prospects for Russo-American security and/or defense cooperation
5. Russia’s future relationships with Europe and the United States
6. Russia, the Middle East, and energy security in Europe
7. Democratization and instability in Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus
8. Impact of growing Muslim populations on European security policy
9. Strategic implications of reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in Europe
10. Implications of a changing NATO
11. U.S. leadership in NATO: Does/should the U.S. Army still play a role?
12. NATO and EU defense capabilities: new or just repackaging the old?
13. EU civil-military cell—a useful model for Joint/interagency operations?
14. Is the U.S.-Europe military capabilities gap still growing; are U.S. technology transfer rules helping or hindering?
15. Implications of OIF for European cooperation in the war on terror
16. EU expansion while excluding Turkey from membership
17. Strategic implications of drawing down U.S. forces in Europe
18. Will ISAF break NATO?
19. Should the U.S. encourage handover of OEF to NATO and allow CENTCOM to focus on OIF?
20. EUCOM’s future role with the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre - Narcotics (MOAC-N) located in Lisbon, Portugal (7 nation regional center)
21. Discuss coordination across the COCOM SEAMS: The unique role that Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) plays in the EUCOM AOR to combat cross-Atlantic illicit narcotics trafficking
V. Evolving Regional Security Matters in South Asia

1. Balancing U.S. security interests between India and Pakistan
2. Role of India in world events and U.S.-Indian military-strategic relations
3. Maintaining stability and security in Afghanistan
4. Long-term implications of maintaining the OIF coalition
5. The evolving American security relationship with Pakistan
6. The global response to state failure or internal conflict in South Asia
7. Organized crime and security in South Asia
8. The risks, benefits and implications of poppy eradication in Afghanistan
9. Iran: A potential partner in stemming illegal Afghan drug flow. Should the coalition seek to engage Iran in mutually beneficial border control to stem the flow of illicit narcotics?

VI. Evolving Regional Security Matters in Central Asia

1. Growing U.S. security interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia
2. Russian-China-U.S. competition in Central Asia
3. Implications of energy development in the Caucasus and Caspian regions
4. Synchronizing security cooperation and political reform in Central Asia
5. The role and structure of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia
VII. Evolving Regional Security Matters in the Western Hemisphere

1. U.S. interests in Caribbean security issues
2. Hemispheric security forces (military and police) and new threats
3. Improving security ties with Brazil
4. Lessons from the Colombian insurgency
5. Immigration and people smuggling as a security issue
6. Ungoverned space and implications for territorial security
7. Gangs and other transnational crime as a threat to the area
8. Venezuela as an exporter of political instability
9. Narco-funded terrorism networks
10. Instability and disenfranchised indigenous and poor populations
11. Implications of the rising threat of populism in the region; the difference between populists and the “responsible left”
12. How to address the fundamental disconnect between the U.S. and Latin American visions of current threats to the region
13. Long-term implications of Chinese engagement in Latin America
14. Implications of economic integration such as the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
15. Impact of the American Serviceman’s Protection Act of 2000 (ASPA) on hemispheric security relations
16. Maintaining the viability of hemispheric security forces during a time of declining budgets
17. Implications for U.S. security of a post-Castro Cuba
18. Forming a North American Security Community

19. Improving security ties with Mexico

20. Improving security ties with Canada

21. Impact and desirability of forming sub-regional security organizations like the Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas (CFAC)

VIII. Other:

1. Revising the boundaries of the geographic Combatant Commands

2. Integrating regional security cooperation plans and basing and presence policies

3. Environmental issues as a basis for enhancing security cooperation
WAR AND SOCIETY

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I. American Society

1. Balancing individual civil rights and national security requirements
2. Debating America’s place in the world
3. America’s changing perceptions of other nations
4. The purpose of war: historical interpretation and debate
5. The U.S. media and political and social mobilization
6. American civil-military relations in wartime
7. Changing notions of liberty and freedom
8. Role of religion and faith in the American way of war
9. Changing views of patriotism in America
10. Strategic implications of public perceptions of who serves, and who dies
11. The impact of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq on U.S. civil-military relations
12. Civilian control of the military and the duty to provide military advice effectively
13. Political boundaries for general and flag officers, active and retired
II. **International Society**

1. Rethinking the “Clash of Cultures” debate
2. Strategic implications of the “unipolar” moment
3. Anti-Americanism and U.S. foreign policy
4. International views of the United States
5. Understanding centers of power in other societies, cultures
6. International ramifications of American exceptionalism
7. Establishing trust with our partners and our emphasis on ‘strategic communication’ — a proper need or risk-inducing exercise?
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EXPANDED TOPIC LIST

Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1

POC: Dr. Michael Drillings (703) 695-6761
michael.drillings@us.army.mil

1. Investigate future trends (up to 2020) in American population (ages 17—42) that will impact recruiting for Army Components and recommend courses of actions that maintain recruiting success. (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

2. Review, investigate, and recommend an appropriate set of recruiting quality standards that predict operational mission success; are understandable and acceptable to the public and national leadership; and achievable within the projected 17-42-year-old American population. (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

3. Investigate performance of Soldiers recruited from 2001 to 2007 who enlisted with high school diploma vs. those who did not; who enlisted with moral waiver vs. those who did not; whose who enlisted with and without a medical waiver. (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)


5. What is the value of the high school diploma to military service? (Does possessing a high school diploma upon entry onto active duty equal a better soldier? Should the military, like most of society, view a GED [General Education Development] the same as it views high school diploma?) (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

6. Outsourcing for Combat Power: Is there an overreliance on contractors? (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

7. Mobilizing the Elements of National Power for the War on Terror (the long war). (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

8. What defines “quality” in the Army of the future (2010 and beyond)? (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

9. What are the effects of the DoD Business Management Modernization Program (BMMMP)/Investment Review Board (IRB) certification process for Human Resources Management (HRM) Domain’s information technology
systems? Has the certification program provided any cost savings or cost avoidance to the domain or the Army? How can the HRM Domain make this certification process more efficient or effective? (LTC Barrington, CIO)

10. Identify the changes and efficacy of Army bonuses and incentive programs in maintaining an all volunteer force during wartime. How do current enlistment retention bonuses stack up historically with previous wars? What do results of such study imply on initiatives to grow Army end strength by 20-30K? (LTC McSherry, PR)

11. Identify the marginal cost and benefit curves for recruiting’s main levers such as advertising, recruiter strength, and financial incentives. Can the lever’s impact be captured in an equation? How strong is the correlation? Example: # additional recruiters = # additional recruits. What is the optimal mix? (LTC McSherry, PR)

12. Investigate and recommend ways for reducing the divorce rates of female enlisted soldiers in the Army (holding for no additional funding and no change to the Army’s missions). Identify reasons for the increasing trend in female enlisted divorce rates and determine why this particular group has higher rates than male soldiers and female officers? What are the most effective services, according to soldiers, that the Army provides to reduce divorce rates for its officers and enlisted soldiers? (Dr. Betty Maxfield, HR, 703-696-5128)

13. Conduct a review of the current naturalization process for service members and veterans to determine why applicants are waiting extended periods of time for their citizenship. In reviewing the process, special attention should be paid to the impediments to the process such as current laws, policies, or bureaucratic procedures. (Dr. Betty Maxfield, HR, 703-696-5128)

14. What does “right” look like as it relates to Army workforce diversity for all components of the Army? (COL Tony Reyes, HR, 703-696-5114)

15. How effective is mentorship in today’s Army? Is the current voluntary mentorship program sufficient to meet the needs of tomorrow’s leaders or do we need to structure our program in the same manner as is found in the corporate arena? (LTC Jay Carlson, HR, 703-604-0623)

16. Implementing and operating a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program (SAPR) in a deployed environment. What are the challenges of
operating a SAPR Program in a deployed theater, and what are possible methods to overcome them? How should the hand-off of cases/victims after redeployment be managed? (Ms. Carolyn Collins, HR, 703-693-0764)

17. What is the relationship between unit cohesion and high risk behaviors, specifically drug and alcohol abuse, in the Army? Data from the Army risk reduction program (RRP) in conjunction with the reintegration unit risk inventory (RURI) could be used to examine unit risk behavior, the high risk units can be identified from the RRP and RURI data (data are available from the Army Center for Substance Abuse Programs). The nature of the interrelationship among cohesion and high risk and their developmental dynamics needs to be examined. Of particular importance will be the identification of the precise conditions under which social cohesion can become detrimental or beneficial for unit performance. Moreover, it will be interesting to see how deployment plays a role in unit cohesion (e.g., measuring cohesion before, during, and after deployment). (DAPE-HRS, 703-681-5557).

18. Implementing and operating an Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) in a deployment environment. What are the challenges of operating an ASAP in a deployed theater, and what are possible methods to overcome them? (DAPE-HRS, 703-681-5557)

19. What is the role of junior leaders in developing and exercising personal leadership skills with soldiers to help prevent and mitigate high risk behaviors such as substance abuse, suicide, sexual assault, harassment, and child abuse? An ideal doctrinal and training package would consist of what elements? (DAPE-HRS, 703-681-5557)

20. The soldier life cycle includes recruiting, training, and, ultimately, separation and retirement. How effectively does the Army strategically communicate with the soldier and spouse and prepare them for retirement? To what degree are soldiers and spouses taking the initiative to begin planning for retirement years prior to their actual date of retirement? What can be done to enhance strategic communications in this important life cycle process? (Mr. John Radke, HR, 703-325-2699)

21. The Secretary of Army has directed that the Army needs to incorporate continuum of service as part of the Human Capital Strategy. What are the most significant obstacles, in policies, laws, regulations, etc. that must be addressed in order to achieve continuum of service? (LTC Jeff Sterling, DMPM)
22. Complete a review of the Officer Candidate School (OCS) selection process to identify the reason(s) College Option OCS graduates have a low propensity for service beyond their initial active duty service obligation (ADSO). Does the selection process adequately screen candidates for the qualities of “officership”? How does the performance of College Option OCS graduates in Basic Officer Leadership Course II/III (BOLC) compare to their peers from other sources? What are the reasons this population decides to become Army officer? Are there biases in the branching and/or assignment process that impacts career satisfaction? What could be done to market continuum of service to these officers after they have entered the Army? (COL Paul Aswell, DMPM)

23. How can the Army better recruit Reserve Component officer and retain those officers at a higher rate?” (COL Paul Aswell, DMPM)

24. What are the characteristics of organizations where pay for performance concepts worked over time? Right now, pay for performance seems to work well in lab demonstration projects. What does the literature say about implementing such a system in a broad, heterogeneous environment like the total civilian Army? What kinds of interventions are called for and when should they take place in order to create an environment that fosters cooperation and trust, even within a concept that, on the surface, seems to reward competition within groups? (Ms. Jeannie Davis, CP)


26. Is there a need for increased civilian education opportunities? What is the need and/or requirement of the Army’s human capital for increased civilian education programs for the Army of 2010 and beyond? (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

27. Impact of combat-related stress on unit personnel readiness (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

28. Impact of deployment OPTEMPO on Army family divorce rates (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

29. Analysis of changing trends in personnel nondeployable categories (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)
30. Qualitative analysis of reasons captains elected not to take CSRB, yet remain in service (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

31. Impact of high unit OPTEMPO on counseling/mentorship provided to junior officers (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

32. Is their a relationship between deployment experience and successful performance? (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

33. What effect does PCSing to PME courses have on family stability? (This counts as dwell time even though the family life is potentially disrupted.) (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

34. Impact of deployment OPTEMPO on the academic performance of Army children (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

35. How do soldiers (customers) perceive the quality/timeliness of personnel services provided under PSDR structure? (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

36. Has the officer shortage resulted in leaders holding officers to lower performance standards out of fear of attrition? (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

37. How will the ARFORGEN model impact soldier dwell time? (HRC-EP)

38. What are the capabilities and limitations of the Modular (plug and play) Army? (HRC-EP)

39. What are the disconnects between ARFORGEN and the monthly accessions mission? (HRC-EP)

40. Assess current RC policy to determine if the numerous categories of soldiers are needed and how we can effectively track, monitor, and use the categories when needing the IRR soldiers? (HRC-TAGD)

41. Assess the Defense Business Board’s recommendation to the SECDEF to outsource all military postal operations and outline a plan of how postal operations could be contracted throughout the Army to include during wartime. (HRC-TAGD)

42. Assess the effectiveness of the command and control relationships of the Human Resource Sustainment Centers with the Theater Support Commands and the HR companies. (HRC-TAGD)
43. Analyze the readiness reporting nonavailable and nondeployable criteria and make recommendations to reduce the number of soldiers nondeployable. Evaluate and make recommendations to the DoD policy and the Physical Disability Agency’s practice that allows nondeployable soldiers to be found fit for duty and retained in the service. (HRC-TAGD)

44. Analyze alternatives for One DoD Postal Budget and recommend how to handle shortfalls if the budgeted amount is less than the bills. (HRC-TAGD)

45. Analyze alternatives for One DoD Postal Organization with organizational chart and positions for each level within the organization. (HRC-TAGD)

46. Analyze alternatives for postal planners to be integrated into the COCOMs from MPSA or stand-up a Joint Postal Cell for contingency operations. (HRC-TAGD)
I. Global War on Terror:

1. What economic trends would indicate a long-term inability for the U.S. to continue prosecuting the war on terror?

2. Are there any national financial and trade policies that support or undermine the Long War?

3. Is combat information and intelligence integrated effectively down to the tactical level in the war on terror?

4. How can defense and counterterrorism intelligence integration be maximized in the war on terror?

5. Conventional deterrence theory states that a credible threat is essential to challenging enemy designs. Can nihilistic, nonstate actors be seriously deterred from committing mass casualty events with such techniques (e.g., by holding at risk key geography [e.g., Mecca, Qom] or loved ones)?

6. As DoD intelligence and the FBI have to synchronize and integrate activities with respect to international and domestic terrorism, how or will the respective cultures adjust for information sharing purposes?

7. At what point should GWOT no longer be considered a “war,” but instead a series of law enforcement operations?

II. Homeland Security:

1. How have new Homeland Security policy, regulations, doctrine and executive orders affected U.S. military intelligence operations inside the U.S.?

2. What is the impact on homeland security of the growing influence of al-Qaeda in Central and South America?
3. To what extent should the U.S. military be used inside the homeland for either natural disaster or attacks?

4. How should the American people, the U.S. Government, and the U.S. military balance domestic counterintelligence and rights to privacy?

III. Regional Strategic Issues:

1. Will the continued manipulation of the yuan-dollar relationship combined with increasing Chinese exports to Latin America countries have an effect on the security and stability of Latin American governments and their relations with the U.S.?

2. Will continued manipulation of the yuan-dollar relationship combined with increasing Chinese fossil fuel requirements have an effect on the relationships between Southwestern Asian countries and the U.S.?

3. Would a dramatically reduced Western reliance on fossil fuels lead to an altered set of security and stabilization norms in southeast or southwest Asia?

4. What effect would a power projection-capable China have on U.S. relations with U.S. allies and other states throughout southeast and southwest Asia?

5. Could the expansion of U.S. technology and telecommunications throughout southwest Asia assist in developing a U.S.-led or U.S.-participating regional security regime?

6. Is the current level of intelligence focus on Latin America sufficient for meeting policy maker needs in the region?

7. Looking to the time between 2015 and 2025, what estimates can be made about changes in the global political and military environment (to include threats and capabilities of likely adversaries)?

8. What regional security implications are developing due to the changing nature of the U.S.-Republic of Korea military relationship and reduced U.S. ground presence on the peninsula?

9. Which states will be added to those strained by food shortages, and what U.S./allied policies could be changed to lessen the strain?
IV. Military Change:

1. What techniques have produced the most efficient use of the military linguist in support of combat operations?

2. What techniques have proven successful in integrating civilian linguists into military operations at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels?

3. Has the new national intelligence architecture affected defense intelligence?

4. What techniques have proven successful in allowing tactical users to leverage strategic intelligence capabilities?

5. Does the modern battlefield require a different intelligence construct from the traditional delineations of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence?

6. How will networked robotics across all warfighting functions shape future doctrine?

7. Are there any identifiable emerging technologies or technique trends in denial and deception campaigns targeting U.S. or allied forces?

8. How can the ELINT expertise of Army Military Intelligence be leveraged to build capabilities and strategies for protecting air defense and fire support radars against ground and air based EW threats?

9. Has the CENTCOM implementation of the JIACG concept proven successful in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how could this and other “fusion” concepts be combined to coordinate intelligence activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, host nation and third country intelligence services in combat zones?

10. Does the U.S. Government need a Constabulary Force for future conflicts?
V. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

1. How have the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and the PATRIOT Act impacted Army intelligence activities?

2. Has the establishment of a cabinet-level Director of National Intelligence significantly changed the roles and interactions among members of the intelligence community?

3. What would a large-scale asymmetric attack on the U.S. by a state opponent look like, and what would be its possible indicators?

VI. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

1. Could a specific operational deployment rate result in “breaking” the Global War on Terror’s requirement for low density, high demand linguists?

2. Recognizing the great potential for error, what techniques and procedures should be utilized in the selection, training, and employment of interrogators and interrogation units?

3. Which evolving missile technologies are most likely to mature and become disruptive against Army modernization and acquisition priorities?

4. What type of fuel should power Army vehicles, aircraft, and equipment beyond 2025, and what are the investment and infrastructure implications?

VII. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:

1. If the U.S. military, and specifically the U.S. Army, regressed to a conscripted force, what changes would be necessary in leadership selection, education, and retention of the military intelligence corps?

2. What should be the role of the Military Intelligence Branch and its officers in the development and operations of tactical, operational, and strategic electronic warfare forces?

3. Have past strategic and operational intelligence failures, especially recent instances such as the Iraq WMD NIE, created a demand by
senior warfighters for evidence, rather than intelligence from the intelligence community; if so, what are the implications of this in providing warning as well as intelligence support to operations?

4. Are there secondary effects to the consolidation of a full civilian intelligence force structure dedicated to strategic intelligence?

5. Does the Army culture toward psychological counseling need to change?

VIII. War and Society:

1. What influences U.S. civil support for the war on terror, and how can this support be measured?
I. Analytical Considerations:

1. Using facts, assumptions, and data sets from previous combat planning processes, determine if using the Systemic Operational Design would have resulted in an improved assessment of the battlespace/environment versus that of MDMP.

2. Is Arab nationalism a spent force? How does nationalism affect the human terrain in the Middle East?

3. Has international cooperation truly increased as a result of the Global War on Terror? Is cooperation episodic or enduring? In what ways can we improve cooperation and collaboration in the military intelligence sharing arena? What level of support should we expect or depend on in the future?

4. Is there a struggle in the Islamic fundamentalist community for the title of “revolutionary” Islam? How does this affect the relationship between Sunnis, Shi’i and other regional/systemic actors?

5. What are the near-term (5-10 years) prospects of the Europe Union fielding an expeditionary military force and how will this affect U.S. foreign and military policy? What lessons have been learned in trying to overcome cultural, language, and operational obstacles to integration?

6. How will recently renewed Japanese nationalism affect stability in Asia?

7. Do recent trends in Central Asia and Eurasia threaten U.S. interests? Do recent efforts at military transformation, collaboration and cooperation between regional powers indicate a change in strategy or simply the pursuit of individual interests? Determine the relevancy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

8. What are the potential consequences of Russian withdrawal from its bi- and multilateral arms limitations treaties?
9. Over the past half-dozen years, much has been said about the technological revolution that has been transforming Army Intelligence. Has any real change occurred? Has it been revolutionary, as proponents suggest, or evolutionary? More importantly, what has been the pay off of any change for the Army?

II. Operational Considerations:

1. How should MI be postured and structured to exploit the human dimension of the Long War?

2. Does MI have the right capacity and balance across the Army (in the right component AC/RC) to support ARFORGEN?

3. Since Fusion Centers transcend the modular build, what should we as an Army/JTF plan for in the future?

4. What adjustments, if any, to the existing national, interagency, military, and coalition capabilities are needed to sufficiently address the requirements associated with Complex Environments?

5. How should the Army and INSCOM meet and get ahead of requirements for obscure or dialectical language requirements?

6. Is there enough nonmilitary (economic, political) policy training in MI schools to allow analysts to understand the goals, methods, and intent of nonmilitary U.S. policies?

7. How do we achieve global cultural awareness, and how do we fix this for the Long War view in our education process?

8. Are we training MI soldiers appropriately, on political, social, economic, information, infrastructure issues, cultural awareness, and Red Teaming? How do we train CDRs and non-MI staffs?

9. How do we handle detainees who are suspected terrorists and what is their ultimate disposition?

10. For the Long War, do we have appropriate rules governing biometrics and cyber warfare?
11. Do our relevant policies allow us to retain the moral high ground, both in fact and in perception?

12. How do we keep the spirit of flexibility and adaptiveness alive and proactive? How do we incorporate nonenduring capabilities (e.g., site exploitation, certain ISR sensors, etc)?

13. Will the introduction of persistent surveillance require INSCOM to staff a larger analytical force to meet the demands of analytical resource management versus that of collection management (i.e., focusing on analysts instead of collection assets)? How will this affect operations and cooperation?

14. Are we out of balance in manning ISR systems, as compared to lethal systems?

15. How should military intelligence support the fight against terrorist financial networks and the proliferation of WMD?
I. The Age of Persistent Conflict:

1. Can emergent and improved space-based surveillance techniques be applied to monitor terrorist activity around the globe? What are the most promising technologies/techniques and how should they be applied?

2. What metrics should be used to gauge progress in the age of persistent conflict?

3. How can assessments be used to identify the root causes of instability? Can they be integrated with the Military Decision Making Process? (Many development agencies such as USAID or DIFD have developed conflict assessments to facilitate long term development strategies).

   a. What is the role of DoD in support of Inter-Agency Personnel Recovery operations?
   b. U.S. Government justification for conducting unilateral operations in the recovery of isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) individuals in sovereign nations


6. In the Age of Persistent Conflict, what are the implications of applying a Task Force Odin capability to the future force structure of Army Aviation and/or Military Intelligence?

7. Identify ways and means essential to meet train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission sets and examine the requirements associated with building partner capacities (BPC) and how each service can leverage or complement their unique capabilities.
8. In order to develop greater interoperability with other government agencies such as the State Department and USAID, what joint doctrine needs to be developed? Should employees be trained in self-defense tactics and armed when deploying as part of a civil-military team such as a PRT?

9. Does the Army currently possess the correct mix of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to operate in the full spectrum of conflict against asymmetric threats in this era of Persistent Conflict?

10. How can the intelligence community provide continuously refreshed and current, combating WMD situational awareness information to USSOCOM and other Combatant Commands and their Service components of Combatant Commands conducting CT operations?

11. How should conventional forces train and equip in order to support counterterrorism operations?

II. Homeland Security:

1. What space capabilities do Civil Support Teams need to have rapidly employed to support their operations?

2. Can space-based capabilities facilitate the interoperability and interaction of military and civil first responders? Which space-based capabilities offer the most benefit for doing so?

3. What is the potential for development and our associated susceptibility to home grown extremists similar to those increasingly seen in Europe?

4. What are the challenges in Domestic Consequence Management (DCM) efforts to support Homeland Defense/Homeland Security?

5. Given the recommendations given in the 2008 Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, should Congress adjust legislation to allow the DoD (and the Army) to train, man, and equip units whose primary mission is consequence management, not warfighting?

6. What should DoD’s DCM response be in the future? What can DoD do internally to make its response more effective and efficient? Should DoD have an increased or decreased role in DCM?
7. Tactical forensic collection and biometric matching has proven very successful. What benefits and challenges would there be to apply these lessons learned to Civil Support Teams and the overall Domestic Consequence Management (DCM) efforts?

8. What is the realistic approach for use of Army forces in a domestic and OCONUS quarantine situations?

III. Regional Security Issues:

1. Can cooperation on space-based programs with allied and coalition partners improve the net capabilities and the overall collaboration between U.S. military forces and their allies/coalition partners?

2. Can integrated architectures comprised of complementary space systems/capabilities operated by several nations in a coalition improve partnership, data sharing and the overall persistence and availability of communications and surveillance in a given region of the world?

3. Assess the effectiveness of cultural-based human behavior representations, models and simulations, in preparing a combat-oriented force for stability operations.

4. How can the US enable other NATO nuclear forces (UK and France) to assume responsibility for providing NATO with its nuclear capabilities?

5. What Interagency process should lead planning for pandemics and other large scale events (earthquake, hurricane, etc)?

VI. Military Change:

1. What responsibilities and overlap should exist between Military Intelligence, Signal Corps and Space Operations personnel within the U.S. Army? Where and how should the synergy between these three areas of expertise be developed to the benefit of the Future Force? Are there opportunities to exploit these synergies to improve the Army’s overall engagement across and influence on the overall National Security Space community?

2. What is the way ahead for Irregular Warfare capabilities and capacities in the Army?
3. How should the Requirements Validation process integrate combat development recommendations with acquisition and programming considerations to ensure force modernization proposals are feasible and affordable?

4. How should the Army’s family of strategic guidance documents be structured to support Army force modernization within an increasingly prescriptive (top-down) DoD system that includes joint operational concepts, a joint capability lexicon, and joint investment portfolios?

5. DoD’s emerging Capabilities-Based Planning (CBP) environment (Aldridge Study 2004/Institutional Reform & Governance Roadmap) drives integrated modernization investment decisions to the Department level. How should the Army organize and utilize organic analytic capacity to optimize Army participation in Joint validation and development of required capabilities?

6. Assess the military’s capability to participate in long-term nation-building operations.

7. How should acquisition and programming be adjusted to take external rapid acquisition development (REF, JIEDDO) and integrate it into the Army Requirements Validation Process?” Rationale: Since the stand-up of JIEDDO and the Rapid Equipping Force, items have been developed for the Warfighter that are not within the programs of the Services. Given this fact, Services wrestle with how to support the rapid acquisition development while supporting current programmed development.

8. How should regionally based, tactical and operational level Army organizations obtain cyberspace operations support?

9. What is the utility of expanding language training across Army specialties beyond intelligence? Consider providing regionally oriented military forces with the requirement and ability to obtain basic and advanced language skill training for a fraction of their most common military specialties as additional skill identifiers?
V. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

1. How should tactical exploitation of the national capabilities program (TENCAP) evolve in a period of increasing synchronization of DoD and intelligence community support to deployed forces? What are the new opportunities for TENCAP to continue leading the way in the sharing of technology, capabilities and techniques between DoD and the intelligence community?

2. How should Title 10 and Title 50 change to improve space situational awareness and support rapid, effective employment of space control negation capabilities?

3. Should terrestrial-based offensive space control capabilities be given priority and focus instead of space-based offensive space control capabilities as the former are less provocative internationally than the latter? Are there advantages to U.S. National Security by assigning such a priority?

4. Should U.S. National Security Space Policy embrace the idea of an evolving set of “rules of the road” to establish space navigation “best practices” instead of pursuing a series of negotiated treaties to constrain activity in earth-orbital space?

5. What are the implications of global warming and energy security through a national security lens, specifically implications for military force planning?

6. What are the military force planning implications for a rising power of China?

7. Who should lead in US Government efforts in orchestrating security cooperation and partner activities? How does this orchestration unify State Department and DoD, Combatant Commands’ efforts for a common objective?

8. Who should lead DoD efforts in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Elimination during all phases of conflict and how should efforts be divided between military force roles and missions and contractor provided functions?
9. Does the Combating WMD policy structure of three pillars (Counterproliferation, Nonproliferation, and Consequence Management) and the Supporting eight Joint Mission Areas (Offensive Operations, Active Defense, Passive Defense, Interdiction, Elimination, Consequence Management, Security Cooperation and Partner activities, and Threat Cooperative Reduction) need to be revised to reflect how a Joint Force Commander would plan and execute operations either regionally or globally?

10. What is the most effective method to link Army Security Cooperation Assessments to the achievements of strategic guidance?

11. What is the best method to link Army Security Cooperation Assessments to changes in resource allocation?

VI. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:

1. Human Resources Command and Managing Personnel: Is this the center of gravity?

2. How many Senior Service College Fellowships should the Army have and why? Provide an analysis of the type of fellowships, including academic content and standards, required for tomorrow’s Army.

3. Describe the application of leadership and decisionmaking to achieve mission success, in the absence of “a fully capable network.” In an environment where net-centricity is the goal, consider the character of leadership and decisionmaking, given a catastrophic failure of the network.

4. With respect to the behavior of an adversary, post “operational or strategic event,” compare the pre-event modeled outcome to the post-event ground truth. Considering the elements of PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure) effects modeling, describe the lessons learned for future cultural modeling initiatives.

5. Address how biometrics as an enabling technology will impact our business and tactical systems and the means by which we determine access to our facilities and systems. How could this change or impact the military culture?

6. Given the enduring requirement for specific skill sets provided by
Army civilians and contractor personnel, should they be managed in an ARFORGEN like process or should they be formed into unit formations and managed in the ARFORGEN process to ensure a ready pool of those given capabilities?

7. How best should the Army implement the National Security Personnel Development (NSPD) program? Military and Army civilian personnel must be developed to successfully perform in the Joint, inter-agency and multi-national environment. How can the Army best identify and enhance existing national security professional development programs and infrastructure, and establish new programs, as necessary, in order to fulfill its mission to educate, train and employ security professionals consistent with the National Strategy.

8. What steps need to be taken in order to sustain and improve the all-volunteer force in an era of Persistent Conflict?

9. How should military technical expertise in combating weapons of mass destruction be cultivated across the Services for availability in missions across the spectrum of military operations?

VI. Landpower Employment:

1. How can space control be relevant to tactical units under current policy restrictions?

2. What level of assurance would the Global Information Grid require for delivering ISR and missile warning capabilities to deployed forces using CONUS-based processing?

3. Assess Army capability to manage the Warfighter’s airspace, given the current and future employment of myriad unmanned aerial systems and manned aviation systems.

4. How are contingency plans affected by USTRANSCOM restrictive policies on transit into CBRN contaminated areas?

5. How does USSTRATCOM integrate the Geographic Combatant Command Army Service / Joint Service Land Component Command into conventional and nuclear global strike planning?

6. How should Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination (WMDE) missions planned and coordinated for execution by nonmilitary/contractors?
7. What are the expected vulnerabilities of digitized forces using commercial of the shelf technologies to electromagnetic or other energy based disruption?

8. Can Army forces obtain better chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) readiness through providing platforms with built in, detection, protection, warning, and decontamination features?

9. Can existing CBRN sensors be digitally linked to provide continuously updated, automated situational awareness in command and control systems?

10. How can the Army’s lighter and more dispersed forces recover from chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear contaminating events?

VIII. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

1. What are the design considerations for a comprehensive Force Modernization & Integration process that identifies, evaluates, prioritizes, resources and delivers capabilities to current and future Operational Commanders through the dynamic ARFORGEN planning model. How should the Army modernize a force in contact? (ACP Decision Point 82)

IX. Other Questions:

1. The future strategic environment portends to be one of persistent conflict with increasingly technologically empowered nonstate actors and proxies challenging traditional military capabilities. Will this change the role of U.S. landpower in the next 10-20 years? If so, how and what implications does this have for our current strategic efforts in force modularity, design and basing?

2. What are the roles and missions of GPF and SOF in the current and future force? If tasks should migrate from one to the other, how should the force organize and train to effectively accomplish the mission? How can JFCOM and SOCOM field an integrated SOF-GPF force to the Global Combatant Commanders when an irregular warfare themed operation requires it?

3. What is the historical record for successful stability operations, by DOTMLPF, in the 20th century?
4. How will the Army evolve its processes to address comprehensive DOTMLPF net-centric capabilities at a pace that meets the needs of the Warfighter?

5. How can the Army align and synchronize its decision processes to address the evolving Joint needs and enablers?

6. What activities are required to achieve fully integrated, synchronized net-centric capabilities and what is an appropriate model for resolving technical, architecture, interoperability, and technology shift challenges?

7. How will the Army measure its improvement in warfighting under the construct of net-centricity?

8. What is the strategic impact of linking the Global Information Grid to the unit level (battalion/ship/squadron and below)?

9. What are the operational impacts, at the brigade level and below, of Joint integration of C4I through large scale programs such as the Network Enabled Command Capability?

10. How do evolving Biometric applications affect (a) maneuver warfare, (b) stability operations? What are the implications for Battle Command?

11. What are the operational/strategic impacts of the LandWarNet concept on Battle Command?

12. How will full implementation of Battle Command on the Move affect the Army strategically?

13. A major impact of rapid fielding of new COTS and other capabilities to theater has been that material solutions have “outrun” doctrine, organization, training, leadership (education), personnel and facilities. Is this transformational? How can the Army best synchronize all elements of DOTMLPF to capitalize on these innovations?

14. The management and execution of National Security Space has again
become the focus of multiple studies both congressionally directed and DoD initiated. In light of the emerging recommendations, how should the Army best engage across this community for the purpose of shaping and informing space policy, strategy and acquisition efforts?

15. As the Army transforms to become increasingly expeditionary, how should the Army mix its architecture of capabilities across the terrestrial, aerial and space domains in order to provide the right mix of complementary capacity and risk mitigation?

16. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has a plan for realization of capabilities to establish a global ballistic missile defense shield. What is the Army’s associated vision for its integral support to this roadmap? What capabilities must or should be associated with the Army as lead service and why.

17. The relationship between the Missile Defense Agency and the Services is particularly strained when considering the transition of responsibilities for components of the BMDS from the spiral acquisition approach of the MDA to the JCIDS based development approach required of the Services. How well will newly proposed business rules help to bridge the differences between these two approaches and how can the Army improve these transitions?

18. Should a military service be designated as the Executive Agent or Lead Service for Global Ballistic Missile Defense?

19. With the onset of the Joint Operationally Responsive Space Office and the emergence of viable, relatively inexpensive small satellites, should the Army consider its own acquisition of small satellite capabilities to mitigate land Warfighter gaps and needs?

20. What is the role of the Army and its operational forces in the protection of space-based capabilities?

21. How deep into the Army tactical echelons should organic access and payload control of space-based ISR and MASINT capabilities be pushed in order to provide the required level of assuredness, responsiveness and timeliness for those capabilities to be tactically relevant?

22. As technology evolves, should the Army develop, field and operate high altitude unmanned aerial systems to provide Joint
communications and ISR platforms, or should that capability be assigned to another service?

23. Is there a “Battlefield” Consequence Management (BCM)?

24. How is mission space defined for Army support to Foreign Consequence Management and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR)?

25. Examine and develop methods to improve the use and rapid dissemination of biometric data and match results to the end user/Warfighter.

26. Examine ways to enhance and optimize the implementation of biometric capabilities in counterinsurgency and intelligence operations.

27. Examine and develop methods for the use of biometric capabilities in stability and reconstruction activities.

28. Stability operations are now equal to offensive and defensive operations for MTOE development; what assets and/or force structure changes do maneuver platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades need to be successful in stability operations?

29. How should human intelligence assets be integrated into the modular force at brigade level and below to effectively manage, integrate, assess and act on intelligence collected by soldiers and junior leaders?

30. What tools have been the most successful in conducting stability and/or counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

31. What approaches and tools should AFRICOM use in Africa? How can the military effectively meet expressed local needs while achieving its stated objectives?

32. What are the impacts of creating an Operational Reserve Component on Total Army Force Structure and its ability to meet both Combatant Commander and Homeland Security requirements? Are there alternative force structure solutions for the Reserve Component?

33. Examine effective uses of Phase 0 operations to shape destabilizing regions.
a. Examine how stability operations executed in Phase 0 can preempt ideological (terrorist) strongholds.
   (1) AFRICOM
   (2) CENTCOM
   (3) PACOM

b. Examine the military’s role in establishing local governance as a required first order effect during Phase 0 through Phase III and how best to integrate local traditions, legal and religious expectations.

34. Does the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure (PMESII) construct adequately describe the current environment? FM3.0 adds two additional elements; physical environment and time. Are there additional elements that should be considered to adequately visualize the operational environment?
I. Global War on Terror:

1. What are the readiness implications of the Global War on Terror on logistics/sustainment strategy for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force?

2. What are the issues related to coalition support (reliance and dependence) for the Joint Force? What are the logistics implications of a coalition force?

3. What are the issues related to logistics support for special operations forces in their global commitment to the war on terror? Have we provided better support since 9/11?

II. Homeland Security:

1. What should be the Army’s concept of logistics/sustainment support in defense of the homeland? What are the implications regarding the integration of local, state, federal, and commercial logistics capabilities?

2. What is NORTHCOM’s relationship to the Army’s logistics capabilities, and what is the concept to ensure effective command and control of logistics/sustainment operations?

III. Regional Security Issues:

1. How can we leverage the commercial capabilities that are already in place across the globe to facilitate logistics/sustainment support for regional operations?

2. Are there opportunities to develop regional sustainment platforms that can support the Joint Force? What are the implications on Service logistics and Title X responsibilities?
IV. Military Change:

1. How can we best leverage and communicate, both horizontally and vertically, emerging strategic technologies/capabilities to enhance the capability of the Joint support and sustainment process?

2. What does “modularity” mean to Army logisticians?

3. Compare and contrast DoD vs. commercial business sustainment planning and operations. What are the key similarities and differences? What are the major conclusions; provide recommendations as to how the DoD and the Army should proceed in areas of organization, business processes, interoperability, associated information technology, and resourcing.

4. Research the background and identify the challenges of achieving interoperability of DoD data standards, and its impact on Army Logistics and Logistics C2.

V. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

1. What are the support and sustainment capability implications of long-term commitments to Sustainment Replenishment Operations (SRO), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and the GWOT, CONUS, and OCONUS?

2. How can the Joint Force leverage the concept of a sea base, and enable a more globally flexible sustainment capability? How does the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) strategy fit into the concept?

3. Are the Army’s current readiness assessment systems capable of accurately portraying the Army’s preparedness to execute the National Military Strategy across the entire Spectrum of Conflict? Does the ability to execute at the highest level of the Spectrum of Conflict indicate the ability to execute all missions at a lower level on the spectrum?

VI. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

1. What are the sustainment implications of the simultaneous deployment and employment of the Joint Force?
2. What are the challenges in implementing the Army logistics enterprise and what is its role in LANDWARNET?

3. Implications for sustainment in the current operational environment

4. Commander’s intent—distribution planning and executing—developing unity of effort

5. How will an integrated Life Cycle Sustainment Strategy guide Army capital equipment investments, skill development, and training requirements?

6. Given the current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model, is the current force structure capable of conducting protracted warfare at the high end of the Spectrum of Conflict? If not, what additional force structure would be required?

7. How will institutionalizing the RESET process support the ARFORGEN cycle? Can this be sustained financially?

8. From an Army supply chain perspective, what does a “supply chain” process architecture reveal about relationships, processes, ownership, and interfaces with the Joint and OSD communities of interest?

VII. Force Management and Leadership:

1. How can we best forecast and determine the cost to sustain and support a specific force capability over time in an operational environment (multiple intensity and threat scenarios)? As part of this discussion, how can we quickly determine, validate, and verify known resource requirements in near-real-time as agile force structure and operational requirements change?

2. What are the force management and leadership implications, gaps, shortfalls, risks and challenges that have been identified during the expanded use of contractors for support and sustainment operations? How much contracting is enough?

3. Research and address how the POM process can be streamlined to better ensure balanced Army transformation in order to implement an optimal Army sustainment strategy.
IV. What are the essential skills, knowledge, and expertise that Army logisticians will require to function effectively in a network-centric future logistics environment?

5. What force preparation and force management capabilities will be required in the future network-centric environment to generate logistics capabilities through ARFORGEN, and how are these capabilities integrated with the larger Joint Force Management (JFM) initiative?

6. What are the implications of the GWOT on logistics human resources, training of “core skills” and competencies for total force requirements across the warfighting and business support and sustainment spectrums, for global support and sustainment of qualified personnel: military, government and commercial enterprise in the short, mid and long-term?

VIII. Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational:

1. What are the implications for supporting JIM and what can we learn from past operations? Have we taken advantage of the lessons learned?

2. How can we best leverage and improve the fusion and operational distribution, protection, and utilization of resources data in order to enhance support and sustainment capability for the COCOMs, JTFs across DoD’s joint warfighting and business enterprises and our strategic partnerships across the National and International Logistics Sustainment Base? Does this justify a Joint Logistics Command?

IX. Other:

1. How can DoD and the Army transform logistics concepts into capabilities faster and more effectively? Address the background, status and recommendations. How do these recommendations enhance the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)?
Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6

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I. Global War on Terror:

1. How can the Army achieve a balance for information sharing among agencies across the full spectrum of engagement (local, state, federal, and international) with protection of information?

2. What is the Army’s role in the emerging Cyber Operations missions?

3. Is global plug and play merely an enabler or a critical capability to the warfighter?

4. What changes in acquisition policy will enable the rapid fielding of COTS solutions to the warfighter while still ensuring the products delivered are capable of operating in the intended environment?

II. Homeland Security:

1. Identify the physical, cultural, and legal barriers that prevent the sharing of information in classified networks and databases among DoD, other federal agencies, and state governments? What changes need to be made to enable information sharing?

2. Assess the current and future use of biometrics technologies for identity management in support of the war on terrorism.

3. Communications support. In reference to the Active Army (Title X) providing national disaster support, what are the challenges of a Title X agency providing support in the Title XXXII (National Guard) environment, and what are some potential solutions to overcoming these legal barriers? What should be the role of the new 7th Army Signal Command Theater in CONUS as it relates to Homeland Security?

4. How should spectrum be managed in light of military and interagency needs and priorities?
III. Regional Strategic Issues:

1. Western Hemisphere, specifically CONUS. Assess the roles and missions of NORTHCOM in light of the war on terror and recent regional natural disasters.

2. Is it practical to achieve theater network architecture in CONUS, similar to that found in the OCONUS theaters with all the elements of the institutional Army and generating force operating in CONUS? What should the construct be to deliver Army Enterprise Services effectively?

IV. Military Change:

1. How can the Army achieve a balance between the needs of near-term information technology insertion requirements and long-range investment strategy?

2. Achieve DoD’s netcentricity vision of assured access sharing of information, and collaboration, in light of the cultural biases among people and organizations to control information.

3. Data Strategy: What are upcoming on the horizon methods, protocols and techniques that will aid in achieving national data standards to accomplish true interoperability between inter- and intra-service, joint and coalition command and control systems?

4. Knowledge Management Strategy: What steps must the Army take to create a culture of collaboration where good ideas are valued and rewarded with the ultimate aim of creating a knowledge enabled force?

5. How can the Army rapidly leverage the latest commercial wireless technology to expand the network down to the soldier—latest 802.11 series, 802.16, 802.20, and 802.21?

6. Currently IT is spread across all of the Program Executive Group (PEG) with ineffective governance at the CIO level. Should the Army create an Information Technology or Network PEG?
V. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

1. What are the implications of migrating everything over Internet Protocol (EoIP)?

2. Soldier vs contractor operated and maintained tactical equipment. Are the new soldier systems so “high tech” that we cannot fight wars without contractors on the battlefield?

3. Should every soldier be equipped with a hand-held radio, cell phone or Personal Data Assistant (PDA) on the battlefield?

4. What is the impact of high tech IT equipment on recruiting the next generation of soldiers and civilians? How can the Army retain rising stars rather than lose them to competitors/industry?

5. Are commercial-off-the-shelf IT solutions actually putting warfighters at risk as globalization expands the IT market?

6. What impact will CAC-restricted networks have on the Army’s extended family (retirees and family members) in terms of personnel services? Will this cause a secondary impact on the QOL of deployed Soldiers?

7. Will implementation of thin client technology launch the Army closer toward achieving a total net-centric environment or cause regression back to the age of mini-computers?

VI. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:

1. What is the future of telecommuting in the Army and its implications on performance and productivity?

2. On Shore, Off Shore. Where should the United States invest human capital in technology?

3. Every soldier is a shooter-sensor-communicator. Is the training and compensation commensurate with the requirements and expectations?
1. How do we determine an Army investment strategy, appropriately defined, that is most likely to succeed in a competitive market across the Services and on Capitol Hill?

2. How can the Army synchronize JCIDS and Army capabilities (either organizational or system specific) to analyze acquisition and programs of record that are feasible, affordable, and sustainable?

3. Are the current JCIDS products and decision points adequate to facilitate synchronization with acquisition and programming?

4. How could the JCAs be incorporated into the POM to better link the Army’s organization into the Joint decisionmaking process?

5. How do we incorporate supplemental programs into the PPBE process to ensure sustainment of these rapid initiatives across the program and in the Force File?

6. What are the implications of a continuous resource process vice the current POM process?

7. How does the defense transformation affect force management?

8. What is the role of the force management officer in stabilization, humanitarian, peacekeeping, and counterinsurgency missions?

9. What should be the force management doctrine for expeditionary operations or for the Future Fforce?

10. What is the changing role of force management functions within the RC?

11. How do FA50s (Force Management Officers) integrate combat capabilities?

12. What is the ideal mission, roles, functions and structure of the Force Management Division (FMD) in the ASCC?

13. How does ARFORGEN affect the duties of the Force Management Officer at the strategic level?
14. What adjustments or adaptations must the Army make to address the changes required in the force management processes as the role of the Generating Force becomes more operational?

15. What are the best modular packages for the Army, and how are we going to use them?
Joint Staff, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5

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1. By what metrics should progress in the war on terror be measured?

2. What are the policies and actions the U.S. Government needs to establish and support in order to shape conditions for regional security?

3. When regional security fails, what are the policies and actions the U.S. Government needs to establish (process and procedures) to achieve rapid building and sustaining of coalitions?

4. What should be the long-term strategy for Iraq?

5. What should be the long-term strategy for North Korea?

6. What should be the long-term strategy for India/Pakistan?

7. Would an interagency “Goldwater-Nichols-type” initiative enhance integration of all U.S. Government elements of power? What would such a program or process look like?

8. How can we better focus U.S. Government long-term security assistance efforts? Currently there is no coherent focused methodology for coordinating security assistance efforts and resources across the interagency arena based on U.S. Government priorities.

9. What should long-term U.S.-Russia strategic relations look like?

10. What should long-term U.S.-European Union relations look like?

11. Has the post-9/11 government reorganization been effective? Are we safer and more effective in countering threats to national security as a result of the establishment of DHS/NCTC/NC/HSC/ODNI, et al.?

12. How effective is interagency IA coordination in responding to the terrorist threat? Is there a need for Goldwater-Nichols type legislation to spur IA coordination?
United States Africa Command

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I. Global War on Terror:

1. What areas are appropriate to synergize the efforts to counter international terrorism with those efforts to counter international drug trafficking?

2. What sources of funding exist to support terrorism and what could/should the Army do to reduce them?

3. What should the Army/Joint community be doing to proactively affect emergence of terrorist environments?

4. The emerging north-south clashes between Muslim and Christian segments of society within trans-Sahel and some sub-Saharan nations

5. Is there a clash of perspectives between our focus on the Global War on Terror and the priority placed by our partners on other security issues (human security in Africa)?

6. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and its impacts on regional stability

II. Economic Development:

1. Security issues and challenges impacting oil-producing countries

2. Diamonds, gold, etc. — Competition for access to Africa’s mineral wealth and the use of that wealth to finance armed movements from the warlord to state level.

3. How, when, and where to invest in air safety infrastructure (airports, radar, communications nodes, etc.)

4. Optimizing air transport in Africa (cargo, personnel) either intracontinent or intercontinent
III. Regional Security Challenges:

1. Prospects for continued conflict in Darfur and the Sudan/Chad border regions, and its impacts on Chadian domestic security

2. African contributions to peacekeeping operations

3. Long-term regional security impacts of the growth or nongrowth of African regional organizations such as the Maghreb Arab Union, COMESSA, ECOWAS, etc.

4. Libya’s future security role in the African Union


6. Border control efforts by North African and Sahelian states (to combat trafficking in arms, humans, drugs, etc.).

7. Mediterranean security issues and North African states (illegal emigration, smuggling, etc.)

8. Impacts of drought or other environmental stressors on Saharan and Sahelian security

9. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs in Africa: successes, failures, and lessons learned

10. The Swahili coast and Mozambique—a strategic maritime corridor

11. Assessment of Regional Economic Commission efforts (e.g., ECOWAS) at peacekeeping efforts in Africa

IV. Third-Party Interests in Africa:

1. Chinese security and economic agendas in Africa

2. Indian security and economic agendas in Africa

3. Russian security and economic agendas in Africa
4. Future changes in the Euro-Mediterranean (or “Barcelona”) process, and their impact on North Africa

5. Bilateral security cooperation between European and North African states (e.g., Italy-Libya, France-Algeria)

6. Impacts of relationships between former colonial powers and their colonies as they affect U.S. national interests

7. Successes, failures, and lessons learned from intergovernmental interventions in Africa (e.g., World Bank activities)

V. Societal-Cultural Issues in Africa:

1. The future of Arab nationalism in North Africa

2. Inflaming ethnic animosities to instill fear and solicit support for unscrupulous leaders

3. Breaking the cycle of corruption in Africa

4. Balancing the trade-offs between maintaining stabilizing relationships with long-standing authoritarians versus the push to democratize Africa

VI. African Military and Building Security Capacity:

1. Security impact of improved LOCs (highways, air routes, etc.) within Africa (e.g., between North and Sub-Saharan Africa)

2. Evolution of professionalism in African militaries

3. The future of force modernization in African military forces (ground or naval)


5. Information sharing and interoperability among African military forces and their respective European and Trans-Atlantic partners
6. Can AU, UN, and EU peacekeeping operations mature enough to improve stability over the next seven years in Africa’s hot spots?

7. Public health capacity in African countries and militaries

8. Are efforts to address HIV/AIDS among southern African militaries doing any good? What can be done?

VII. National Issues:

1. Central African Republic: How to end the strife and build a foundation for lasting peace

2. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Options for extending government control throughout its large land mass and attaining a peaceful solution to conflict in the eastern region

3. Ethiopia/Eritrea: Finding solutions that help prevent a border war

4. Kenya: Lessons learned from the post-election crisis

5. Libya: Impacts of the succession of Qadhafi on Libyan allies and aid recipients

6. Nigeria: A looming failed state?

7. Somalia: What are the dynamics leading to state collapse and what internal and external factors are required for stability and state building?

8. South Africa: Implications of the success or failure of the 2010 World Cup on overall African security, stability, and development

9. Sudan: Implications of the potential north-south break-up of Sudan

10. Western Sahara: How to resolve the territorial dispute and impacts on the region

VIII. U.S. Africa Command:

1. Achieving long-term objectives in Africa while balancing demands for “quick wins” by the command’s stakeholders

2. The interagency structure of the command, its applicability in other unified commands, and its impacts on other U.S. government agencies

3. Partnering with international organizations, non-governmental or private volunteer organizations, or private industry to achieve objectives

4. Implications of the command’s emphasis of “Phase Zero” operations as it affects traditional campaign planning processes and other common joint business practices

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1. The term “Phase Zero” is not popular with the command. A pending article on “Active Security” seeks to provide an alternative approach and definition.
GLOBAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES

I. Global War on Terror:

1. The role of the nationstate in the war on terror

2. Balancing democratic reform and internal security: Short- and long-term implications for the war on terror. Transition to democracy is a fragile and often unstable period—what level of instability is expected and/or tolerable when transitioning from an autocratic regime to a democratic form of government? General and specific [individual nationstate] case studies

3. Countering ideological support for terrorism through domestic and foreign means

4. Implications of expanding war on terror to state-sponsored terror groups: Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah

5. The role of the war of ideas, especially radical religious ideas, in the war on terror

6. The role of perception management as it relates to worldwide perceptions of U.S. power and actions

7. Lessons from the “War on Drugs” that apply to the war on terror

8. Evaluation of U.S. SOCOM’s, USSTRATCOM’s, and USJFCOM’s roles in the war on terror

9. Is there a need for a “strategic” counterinsurgency doctrine? Are there separate principles for “strategic” COIN?

10. Balancing political, economic, and military tools in counterinsurgency operations
11. What should be the military role in the collection of foreign intelligence in areas of interest and the linkage to, and collaboration with, nonmilitary collection?

12. Developing a “whole of government” approach to counterinsurgency

13. Developing and assessing the importance of strategic communication

14. Balancing the principle of war associated with Mass against the implicit vulnerability associated with convoys and logistics

II. Military Change:

1. Future force capacities for peacekeeping and stability operations

2. Evaluating the themes in the Army’s Strategic Planning Guidance:
   a. Assessing force proficiencies against irregular challenges
   b. Assessing force capabilities for stability operations

3. Resource conflicts between operational and institutional transformation

4. Assessing the capabilities and allocation of resources of U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets associated with counterinsurgency operations

5. Reducing U.S. military dependence on foreign energy sources

III. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

1. Integrating military and nonmilitary tools to achieve strategic objectives and avoid or resolve potential conflict

2. The utility of military force as an instrument of policy in the 21st century

3. Responding to the collapse of strategically significant states

4. Long-term Stability, Support, Reconstruction and Transition (SSTR) Operations
5. Examining the relationship between energy and security


7. Interagency strategy for transnational insurgency

8. Improving the planning and execution of national strategy for the war on terror:
   a. Structure
   b. Process


10. Operationalizing the interagency process—converting policy decisions to interagency operations:
    a. Role of the Joint Staff and role of the Combatant Command staff in interagency integration and planning
    b. Integration of other Executive Branch Departments (DoS, DoJ, DoT, etc.) into security operations (planning phase and operational phase)

11. Role of strategic communications in prosecuting activities in USCENTCOM AOR

IV. Landpower Employment:

1. Requirements for counterinsurgency operations

2. Conducting combat operations, security operations, and stability operations concurrently: how to transition, where to focus?

3. Changing landpower roles in stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian operations:
   a. Information and intelligence sharing between military and coalition partners
   b. Integrating military and civilian logistics
   c. Definitions and policies for establishing a “safe and secure” environment

4. Improving joint, combined, interagency, NGO and IGO cooperation in humanitarian and counterinsurgency operations
5. Evaluation and recommendations for individual and collective cultural awareness training in support of COIN/stability mission deployments:
   a. Precommissioning, especially language requirements and major/minor fields (area studies, history, international relations)
   b. PME (especially ILE, SSC, JPME)
   c. NCOES
   d. Predeployment collective training
   e. Feasibility/desirability of establishing advisor training similar to that used for personnel assigned to advisory duty in the RVN

V. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

1. Changing requirements versus legal constraints for military and interagency mobilization

2. Globalization’s impact on the military-industrial base

3. Planning for operations in areas with primitive and austere infrastructures

4. Adapting the Reserve Components to continuous mobilization

VI. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:

1. Developing forces and doctrine for security cooperation, assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence

2. Developing soldiers and leaders for the future force

3. Examining the pre-commissioning program

REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

VII. Evolving Regional Security Matters in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Islamic World:

1. U.S. interests with respect to a stable, sovereign Iraq

2. Regional security strategies in the Middle East and North Africa

3. The nature of politically-oriented Islamic militancy, Salafi Jihadism, and their implications for U.S. and regional security
4. Efforts to contain and moderate violent ethnic and sectarian conflicts throughout the Middle East

5. The ability of willing states to control the flow of illicit trade, weapons, and people across borders

6. The ability of willing states to control ungoverned territory

7. The implications of the youth bulge and options for expanding economic opportunities with respect to the youth bulge

8. With the coming uncertainty in Egypt, what are the possible scenarios in a post-Mubarak Egypt, and what can be done to help shape and contain the uncertainty?

9. What will violent extremists look like in the future? And what are the trends and influence opportunities? (taking into account 2nd and 3rd order effects)

10. How will the shifting demographics (i.e. the “youth bulge”) in the Middle East/Central Command AOR affect the region over the next 20 and 50 years?

11. Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation (EM). Is it the new national security strategy for Pakistan? Arguably, all major policy priorities are related to Musharraf’s vision of enlightened moderation (economy, education, political reform, economic development, western influence, federalization of tribal areas in NWFP and Baluchistan). Is EM more than just a path to moderate Islam for Musharraf?

12. The strategy and future role of the PRC in Central and SW Asia

13. The strategy and future role of India in Central and SW Asia

14. The strategy and future role of Russia in Central and SW Asia

15. Analysis of the interrelationships of the logistic train for narcotics trafficking, WMD, weapons, and people trafficking

16. Developing a democracy in the Middle East in the 21st century: What roles should the military play?
17. Viability and implications of an OSCE-like organization/process for the Gulf Region (to include Iran and Iraq)

18. Given limited U.S. resources, is a “pivotal states” strategy for the AOR feasible and acceptable?

19. Plans, programs, and policies to help Pakistan, KSA, and Egypt help themselves:
   a. Military
   b. Economic
   c. Political

20. Nuclear Iran:
   a. Ways to deter going nuclear
   b. What is Iranian strategy following the achievement of nuclear capability to do if/when Iran does go nuclear?
   c. How do Iran’s neighbors react in terms of capabilities?
   d. Strategy for deterring Iran following its achievement of nuclear capability
   e. What does a nuclear weapon capable Iran look like? How does the international community react/respond?
   f. If Iran does acquire a nuclear weapon, how does the international community ensure these weapons do not proliferate, either intentionally or unintentionally?
I. Global War on Terror:

1. What methods are most appropriate for breaking the synergy between international terrorism and international drug trafficking?

2. What sources of funding exist to support terrorism and what could/should the Army do to reduce them?

3. What should the Army be doing to proactively affect emergence of terrorist environments?

4. Terrorism:
   a. The spread of Islamic fundamentalism within Europe
   b. How nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are used to provide funding to terrorist groups
   c. Iranian intelligence’s use of NGOs to conduct intelligence activities
   d. Case study: Iranian intelligence double agent operations against other intelligence services
   e. How Iranian intelligence uses businesses to conduct intelligence activities
   f. How Iranian intelligence uses businesses to forward dual use technology to Iran
   g. Is Iran trying to build a nuclear bomb and how close is it?
   h. What level of cooperation is the IRGC/QF, MOIS and senior leadership of the Iranian theocracy giving to the terrorists in Iraq
   i. Case Study: How the Iranians have quelled internal opposition since the 1979 revolution and ended with the disqualification of thousands of reformist parliamentarian candidates in February 2004
   j. Iranian dissident operations (assassinations, intimidation, infiltration) around the world since 1979
   k. MOIS and IRGC/QF support to the Palestinian rejectionist groups and Hizballah
   l. Will Israel attack the Iranian nuclear facilities as they did with the Iraqi Osirak nuclear facility in the early 1980s?
II. Eurasia:

1. Generational changes of attitude in the Caucasus
2. Long-term Iranian interests and objectives in the Caucasus
3. Crime networks in any or all: Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia
4. Corruption networks in any or all: Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia
5. Progress toward and prospects for European or NATO integration for: Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan
6. Russia-Asia relations (especially China)
7. Implications of Russian demographic changes

III. Balkans:

1. Role of Serbia in regional stability
2. Impact of Kosovo final status on Balkan stability
3. Influence of Islamic extremism in Bosnia-Herzegovina
4. Impact of Albanian nationalism on regional stability
5. Influence of Islamic extremism in Kosovo and Macedonia
6. Threat of Balkan organized crime on Europe
7. Future stability of Kostunica minority government in Serbia
8. Influence of organized crime on Balkan society
9. Integration of Balkan States into EU and NATO structures
10. Impact of Union of Serbia-Montenegro split on regional stability
11. Influence of organized crime on Albanian governmental institutions
12. Role of clan demographics on Kosovo and Albanian democratic institutions

13. Future of Dayton implementation by EUFOR on Bosnia-Herzegovina

14. The role of Albanian transnational crime and drug trafficking organizations in regional stability.

IV. Kurds (Kongra Gel/PKK):

1. Case study of the potential impact and implications, both to Turkey and to the Kongra Gel/PKK, of the transition of the Kongra Gel from an insurgency to a political movement supporting the Kurdish cause

2. Case study of factors enabling the Kongra Gel, as a Marxist insurgency made up of primarily of Muslims, to mitigate pressures to adopt more of a radical Islamic agenda and maintain its focus on the basic Marxist (secular) tenets of the organization

3. Case study of Kongra Gel/PKK insurgency from the basis of its ability to avoid/prevent serious schisms or splintering, even after its leader’s imprisonment, at least up to the current potential split. What are the potential implications of the apparent division of the Kongra Gel into “reformist” and “hardline” camps?

4. Case study of the effectiveness of Turkish Jandarma paramilitary police forces in combating the Kongra Gel/PKK

5. Case study of the effectiveness of Turkish military operations against the Kongra Gel/PKK inside northern Iraq from the 1990s to present. Were these operations successful in disrupting the KGK/PKK, for the long term, short term, or has there been little actual disruption to Kongra Gel operations?

V. NATO:

1. Should NATO have a JIC-like organization?

2. In a peacetime environment, how can NATO best provide intelligence for out of area operations?
3. Role of U.S. intelligence support to EU and Eurocorps in and out of NATO operations

4. Future application of bilateral/multilateral intelligence systems in EUCOM AOR to support existing information sharing agreements as well as the war on terrorism

5. Cross-command intelligence security cooperation (engagement) in an increasingly complex allied/coalition environment

6. The impact of NATO expansion on the intelligence/information sharing environment of old members

7. Moving NATO intelligence beyond reliance on the member nations: NATO collection assets needed?

8. Multinational coalition intelligence architectures and intelligence sharing: How do/should NATO, CENTCOM, ISAF, interact?

9. NATO Intelligence: Does it function?

10. Intelligence sharing with NATO partners in non-NATO and out-of-area operations

11. Intelligence support to operations: How can NATO best do this?

12. Develop a “dream” intelligence architecture and intelligence community structure for the NATO of tomorrow; where should it be in 10 years?

13. Assess the impact of demographic changes on the long-term viability of NATO.

14. What are the proper authorities and relationships among EUCOM, NATO, the U.S. NMR to NATO, and the JS given the current security environment?
I. NATO:

1. What should the future NATO Command Structure look like? Should Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), report directly to SACEUR? What Joint Force and Component Commands are required?

2. How could NATO best adopt a joint/common users logistics structure for expeditionary operations? Is overall common funding a desirable future approach, or is the current national responsibility approach best suited for expeditionary operations?

3. Are the EU and NATO redundant or complementary?

4. How does NATO avoid donor fatigue in Afghanistan? Is the concept of minimum military requirement (MMR) still useful in articulating capabilities requirements?

5. What are the possible effects of Joint Task Force-East (JTF-East) training rotations on the relationship between NATO and Russia?

6. What effects could the renewed call by France for developing a European Security and Defense Identity have on the NATO alliance? Will Germany support this call?

7. What effects do national caveats have on the success of NATO out-of-area operations? How will adopting a two-tiered policy (those countries that contribute forces for full-spectrum operations and those that are not willing to provide soldiers for out-of-area combat operations) affect the future success of the NATO alliance?

8. What are the implications of including Russia in the NATO alliance? Would including Russia in the alliance make NATO ineffective?
II. Army Service Component Commands:

1. Are our proposed ASCCs postured correctly to support the GCCs’ overall requirements to perform their three missions: be the Title 10/Theater ARFOR; provide Army Service Component Command support; and being trained and ready to conduct expeditionary, full spectrum operations and serve as a deployable C2 headquarters?

2. Are ASCCs correctly structured and resourced to support GCCs’ theater security cooperation requirements?

3. What size should the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) be for AFRICOM? What difference in scope (if any) should the ASCC for AFRICOM have from other ASCCs?

4. Should the U.S. Army make do with a current available ASCC to support AFRICOM, or establish a new command to provide the ASCC support to AFRICOM?

III. Theater Security Cooperation (TSC):

1. Are ASCCs correctly structured and resourced to support GCCs’ theater security cooperation requirements?

2. What is the best way for the U.S. Army to inform Congress and the American public about the importance of TSC engagement to build today’s and tomorrow’s coalitions?

3. What should be done to restructure the funding procedures for TSC engagements between U.S. and allied military forces, in order to increase existing multinational training opportunities?

IV. Europe and Eurasia:

1. What are the long-term security impacts on Europe from a resurgent Russia?

2. What are the long-term security impacts on Europe caused by instability in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea region?
V. Information Operations:

1. Are the resources the Army is investing in information operations yielding commensurate gains? How can we assess the impact of information operations on the operational and strategic environment? Without a mature assessment capability for information operations, are the potential/actual impacts upon operations tangible and worth the cost?

VI. Strategic Communications (StratComm):

1. How well does the Army at large understand and leverage the importance and impact of the media? What needs to change for the Army to get its story out?

2. What is the optimal structure/organization to develop strategic communication (StratComm) at the HQDA/ASCC level (OCPA/PAO; CIG/CAG; Operational Effects; combination)? What mechanisms are best suited for dissemination of StratComm?

3. What structure should the ASCCs have to conduct effects assessments in conjunction with their StratComm programs?

VII. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

1. Does the State Department command the requisite authority in forming U.S. foreign policy, or do the Geographic Combatant Commanders hold more influence than perhaps is appropriate?

2. Does the U.S. adequately address global economics and transnational crime in its NSS/NMS?

VIII. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

1. Life cycle cost/total ownership cost versus commercial leasing for ground support equipment or other soldier support items; is leasing a viable option?

IX. Global War on Terror:

1. What motivates individuals and groups living in wealthy countries to support terrorism, or to become terrorists?
2. What are the most likely targets of terrorist attacks in Europe? What strategic objectives would the terrorists fulfill by attacking these targets?

3. What fault lines exist between cultures in Europe, and on the periphery of Europe that are sources of current and future terrorist attacks within USEUCOM AOR?
United States Joint Forces Command (J-2)

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2. Leadership, Personnel Management and Culture: Examine the issue of understanding cultural intelligence (CQ) and its implications in conflict and the war on terrorism.

3. Heating Up: Global warming and its implications on U.S. national security and diplomacy

4. Pros and Cons of establishing an intelligence community lessons-learned data base
I. Global War on Terror:

1. What doctrinal or technological “gaps” must be addressed to enhance land power employment in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? (CSG)

2. What are the limits of land power within the GWOT? (CSG)

3. If future “winners” and “losers” in the GWOT will be defined by how well the Joint Force, adversary states, or transnational terrorists can deny, disrupt or destroy the domains /elements of the extended battle space of “war amongst the people”(i.e., political, military, economic, social structures):
   a. How must operational land forces change to ensure the Joint Force “wins”?
   b. What can other elements of the USG do in advance to ensure a U.S. victory?
   c. What holistic view of metrics or benchmarks should be utilized to determine whether or not the Joint Force is “winning or losing” within any of those domains? (CSG)
4. To what extent does the Nation dedicate resources to develop a “partner-nation capacity building” capability across the Services generally and in the Army specifically? (CSG)

5. How should DoD’s visualization of the GWOT complex operating environment be changed? What are the more significant structural and interactive elements of the GWOT operating environment? (CSG)

II. Homeland Security:

1. Considering 9/11 as a terrorist probing effort, what lessons have been learned by an adversary in preparation for the next attack? (CSG)

2. What emerging capabilities can enhance mission effectiveness of Army units committed for disaster relief, particularly in terms of communication and relief supply distribution? (CSG)

3. How can Department of Homeland Security requirements be best integrated into overall Department of Defense planning end force requirement identification processes? (CSG)

4. What is the most flexible response capability DoD can engineer for responding to catastrophic events in the homeland? What are the pros and cons of a national vice a regional response force? (CSG)

5. How can DoD optimize the sourcing, training, deployment, C2 relationships, and employment of special purpose forces (i.e. CBRNE) in support of NORTHCOM? (CSG)

III. Regional Strategic Issues:

1. How can the Army improve training of soldiers and units for language and culture awareness and astuteness prior to deployment into theaters of operation? (CSG)

2. How do the Combatant Commands determine Army Support to other Services (ASOS) and multinational organizations within their respective AORs? (G-4)

3. What can be done to rationalize and optimize the multiple and varying LOGCAP contracts in SWA? (CSG)
4. Given the requirement for an enduring presence in SWA, how can the theater architecture be rationalized to include the proper role of the ARFOR and the theater sustainment effort? Identify impediments and recommend solutions. (CSG)

5. How can we meet theater security cooperation demands from other Combatant Commanders while meeting the tremendous demands in CENTCOM? Is there a role for other governmental agencies or institutions to fill this requirement? (CSG)

IV. Military Change:

1. Develop the rationale that informs the national discourse regarding the imperative to operationalize the Reserve Component in order to preserve the All Volunteer Force and to restore operational depth and strategic flexibility. (CSG)

2. Propose a mechanism to “fast-track” policy and legislative changes that are needed to match the contemporary use of the Reserve Component across the Services. (CSG)

3. What force management policies or practices must change in order to reduce the number of DUICs created when meeting operational requirements? (CSG)

4. How must/will the Army adapt when the Congressional supplementals end and funding the Army’s high priority programs becomes problematic? What more can the Army do to facilitate a successful transition of Supplemental funding to the base budget? (CRO)

5. In January 2007, the SECDEF established a 12 month mobilization policy. Provide a cost benefit analysis of that policy. Include a consideration of variables such as the requirement to deploy multiple units in a 12-month period, family support, soldier readiness, employer support as you deem appropriate. Provide recommended policy changes. (CSG)

V. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

1. If implemented, will the recommendations in the Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves result in
reforms required to operationalize the Reserve Components? Which recommendations could result in the required reforms and which “miss the mark?” (CRO)

2. How can other elements of the U.S. Government partner with DoD (“whole of government”) to achieve victory post-conflict in emerging democracies? (CSG) What is DoD’s responsibility to enable our governmental partners to realize their role generally during Full Spectrum Operations and specifically Phase 0 (Shaping) and Phase IV (Stability) operations? Who should take the lead? (CSG)

3. How can the Combatant Commander both increase and improve inter-agency involvement in combat operations in theater and in the Army’s planning and exercise programs? (CSG)

VI. Land Power Employment:

1. What “gaps” must be addressed to enhance land power employment? (CSG)

2. Given the enhanced capabilities and the changing tactics and operations of all actors (combatants, institutions and other instruments of civil government, and indigenous and non-indigenous personnel) in the current theater of war, how can this new complexity of warfare be better handled by U.S. forces? (CSG)

3. In preparation for employment in complex operational environments, how can the U.S. Army improve decisionmaking approaches through the use of simulations, gaming or other training concepts? (CSG)

VII. Land Power Generation and Sustainment:

1. Should Joint Staff validated combatant commander requirements drive ARFORGEN output or Service force structure /end strength (should the process be supply or demand driven)? (G-1)

2. Is the Army modular organization sufficient? Is there a need reconsider the BCT as the lowest level of modularity? Is there a need to improve the modular design of support units? (G-1)

3. What can the Army do to better prepare troops, especially those in Basic Combat Training, for the rigors and reality of a combat
environment? Discuss relevant techniques for providing realistic “Resiliency Strengthening” in both the AC and ARNG the BCT ARFORGEN Cycle. Suggest how to infuse these techniques along with the concepts of “Stress Inoculation” into the immediate pre-deployment phase of troops deploying to the CENTCOM AOR? (G-1, MED)

4. Provide analysis of how Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) impact “Return To Duty” statistics. Include discussion on how “Length of Stay” in WTUs correlates to either return to duty or separation from service, as well as how “Average Length of Stay” compared to diagnosis in regard to return to duty or separation from service. Provide recommendations on policy/practices required to mitigate unwanted separations. Provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the WTU and propose alternatives. (G-1, MED)

5. How should FORSCOM and AMC optimally manage equipment training sets in and out of ARFORGEN? Do we need new business practices to better manage this process? (CSG)

6. Can ARFORGEN be utilized to justify and obtain resources? (CSG)

7. How can the CENTCOM theater ARFOR effectively reduce stock piles of equipment requiring retrograde to CONUS? (G4)

8. How can the Army improve unit readiness through responsive equipping strategies given the high operations tempo (current operations, modularity equipment requirements, and future operations)? (G4)

9. Suggest how the Army Staff might reconcile establishing resource priorities by rationalizing the proposed Joint Integrated Requirements Priority List, the IRPL and DARPL? (CSG)

10. How can the Army better integrate and synchronize the Army Campaign Plan and ARFORGEN? (CSG)

11. How could the Reserve Components best utilize TTHS accounts to improve Manning levels in operational units and to reduce the practice of cross-leveling personnel in order to meet required unit Manning levels for mobilization? (CSG)
VIII. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:

1. What policy or personnel management practices must be changed in order to significantly reduce the practice of cross-leveling personnel in order to meet required unit manning levels for mobilization? (CSG)

2. Should the Department of Defense pursue forcing functions to limit the growth in number and size of Joint Manning Documents? (CSG)

3. How has transformation impacted Army traditions and culture (change of command, reception operations, division HQ on different deployment schedule than attached BCTs)? How has engagement in protracted conflict facilitated and/or improved our transformational efforts? (CSG)

4. Is the operational Army structured to manage contracting while deployed? (CSG)

5. What can the Army do to improve company grade officer/non-commissioned officer retention? (CSG)

IX. War and Society:

1. In recognition of the assumption that the Nation will be in a condition of persistent irregular conflict for a generation, what should the Army do today to shape national security strategy to preclude a downsizing of the U.S. Army that has followed the conclusion of all major conflicts? (CSG)

2. Has the Army fully transformed from Industrial-Age to Information-Age warfare? (CSG)

3. What government incentives could be provided to encourage employers to hire RC soldiers? How can the Army better “market” the potential a RC soldier brings to a business in terms of productivity and profitability given cyclical deployments under ARFORGEN? (CSG)
North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command

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1. How can DoD contribute to the ongoing traditional counterterrorism coalition given that civil authorities (intelligence and law enforcement services) have the lead role and have done the most post-9/11 work to counter terrorists’ threats to the Homeland? Can DoD make a valid contribution to these agencies while prosecuting the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq?

2. While we focus on tracking the vessel as a first step in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), what is required to track cargo and people? What is required to determine the intent?

3. What challenges would be involved in accepting Mexico into NORAD?

4. How can the DoD influence the development of, effectively participate in, and leverage the capabilities of the National Command and Coordination Capability (NCCC) to ensure effective mission accomplishment?

5. How can the U.S. Government, in cooperation with Canada and Mexico, establish a North American Cyber Safe Zone, as detailed in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, in order to protect commerce and promote security in the region?

6. What should the intelligence fusion capability between Canada, the United States, and Mexico look like?
7. What are the consequences and/or benefits of changing the current intelligence culture of “need to know” to a culture of “need to share”?

8. NORAD has operated binationally in the air and space domain for 50 years. With the establishment of USNORTHCOM and Canada Command looking at similar Areas of Responsibility there is necessary interaction among the three commands. Is there benefit in making NORAD more domain-inclusive as a bi-national command (pick up maritime defense responsibilities, land responsibilities, one or both)?

9. Should NORAD dissolve and have USNORTHCOM and Canada Command operate bilaterally in mutual support in all domains? What laws or policies need to be adjusted or created for success?

10. Climate change in the Arctic Ocean portends increased access to a strategically-important region that borders the United States. Additional international activity in the region to pursue economic, military, and political aims suggests a future requirement for U.S. forces to operate routinely in the region to conduct search and rescue, surveillance, and force projection missions. Currently, the U.S. espouses no explicit policy regarding the Arctic to guide military preparedness. What considerations should comprise the framework of a coherent U.S. National Security Policy/Strategy regarding the Arctic?

11. According to current strategy and policy, homeland defense is a global mission applied over an active layered defense, from the forward regions to the homeland. All geographic combatant commanders, in the execution of their responsibilities, are defending the homeland. Given this description, what is the difference between homeland defense and national defense?

12. How can Title 10 and Title 32 forces better achieve unity of effort in U.S. Civil Support (CS) Operations?

13. The Commission on National Guard and Reserves made several recommendations regarding Title 10 force employment by the State Governors during disaster relief operations. What are the advantages and disadvantages of these recommendations?

14. Should the National Guard paradigm be modified to restructure it to have primary responsibility for CS operations? If so, what role should the Active duty forces perform for CS operations?
15. What role, if any, should the Department of Homeland Security play with respect to the National Guard?

16. Identify the new technologies used by terrorist organizations, within their cultural context, to facilitate the spread of their cause and draw new recruits to their cause. Are current actions taken by the U.S. mitigating these technologies? How does the use of these technologies differ between terrorist organizations in U.S. versus those in developing countries?

17. Seven years after 9/11, are USNORTHCOM and Department of Homeland Security the right solution to provide U.S. homeland defense and security? How might they be changed, adjusted or reorganized to improve their effectiveness? Is there a better alternative to these two organizations?

18. What is the proper role for DoD in providing support to civil authorities for special events or in response to natural disasters? Is current policy in providing support within the National Response Framework satisfactory? Should DoD acquire capabilities for civil support (currently prohibited by DoD policy) or should Homeland Security organizations such as DHS/FEMA take the lead in this direction?

19. Should the NGB be an operational command? What issues, such as unity of command and unity of effort, would an operational NGB face conducting multi-state domestic operations when each State National Guard force is under the command and control of their respective State Governor? Is NGB’s relationship with the NG of the several states optimal? How could it be improved? Should the NG be transformed to focus on civil support/emergency management (transfer warfighting capability to the Reserves) and aligned with DHS? Would this solve the problem of training, equipping, and organizing for two separate missions?

20. How does the U.S. Government best organize for and execute the War of Ideas (Strategic Communication)?

21. Canadian Forces (CF) and Other Government Agencies (OGA) such as Transport Canada have a responsibility for Maritime traffic as does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the U.S. Navy (USN). Should all stakeholders pursue a common operational picture of MDA for both the defense and security missions?

22. High Altitude Platforms. Which platforms (high altitude airship, tethered aerostat, other) meet NORAD and USNORTHCOM needs for a system
to provide an emergency communications and/or wide area surveillance capability during incident awareness and response?

23. Capabilities-Based Assessment Methodology. Develop a methodology that can be used in a standard CBA.
   a. What method should be used to estimate capability levels, gaps, and excesses?
   b. How can disparate capabilities and their gaps be compared?
   c. How can this comparison be translated into a ranking of the capability gaps regarding their importance?

   a. What, if any, are the defensible quantitative facets to risk assessment?
   b. How can the qualitative risk assessment facets be better articulated?
   c. How should the formalized risk assessment actions between the CRA and GFM be defined and executed?
   d. How should differences in the CRA and the GFM be adjudicated?

25. DoD Policy toward Civil Support. What are the benefits and limitations of changing DoD policy to allow DoD to acquire capability solely to support civil authorities?

26. What threat does an empowered China, with significant and growing economic and military capabilities, present to the United States and what are the implications for NORAD and USNORTHCOM?

27. What are the integrated responsibilities (Interagency, Active and Reserve Components, and National Guard) for CBRNE incident assessment, management, and response regarding C2 structure, timelines, capabilities, requirements, etc.?
United States Pacific Command

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The USPACOM list addresses some issues at the Tier 0 level which directly affect us as a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). The remainder of the issues are organized along the PMESIIE construct, first at the region-wide level, then at sub-regional level, as they apply.

USG TIER 0 ISSUES

I. Interagency Process:

1. How can we make it work at the national level to provide the needed unified guidance to the departments and DoD GCCs?

2. Is it feasible to establish “supported” and “supporting” interagency departments?

3. Unified Action: Can we / do we need to geographically align the interagency’s subregions across the world?

4. Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review: What should it fix/change? How can we align it with other Interagency roles and missions? Can DoD revise ours unilaterally?

5. Measuring Crisis Management: What could be some qualitative and quantitative approaches to evaluate programs and strategies during complex, whole-of-government, multinational disaster management activities?

6. Handing off the ball: Explain the dynamics and challenges in transitioning authorities/ responsibilities at various disaster stages, from chaos and insecurity to full restoration of “normal” government.

II. Common Understanding of Our Strategic Environments:

1. Common Terms of Reference. Do we need a common taxonomy to describe global and regional trends? How does the lack of one hinder our analyses and estimates?

2. Globally shared estimates. How can we link strategic estimates? How can we move from hard copy estimates to living, virtual, interactive ones?

3. Centers of Excellence. There is no standard. What should it be? Who is the expert reach-back authority on what? How can we formalize, define the scope of, and designate “Centers of Excellence”?

4. Policies. What should be the U.S. energy security strategy—WRT Asia?

PACOM TIER I STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ISSUES

DIME Considerations

I. Military:

1. How should PACOM integrate its actions with international organizations and NGOs?

2. Should/how can PACOM actually generate interagency OPLANs?

3. What might PACOM’s future (2020) military requirements be:
   a. OPTEMPO requirements?
   b. Force posture/access needs?
   c. Future CSL or FOS needs?何 will we determine them?

4. How can PACOM best help explain and justify our presence as a member of Asia-Pacific?

5. Design the “model U.S.” fleet for operating in the Asia Pacific region in 2025. What would this fleet look like?

6. What are the prospects of a heightened U.S. military presence in East Asia beyond 2015?
II. Information:

1. Universalization of strategic communication (public diplomacy) in the 21st century: Who has the advantage today? Can USPACOM get/stay out front?

2. How can we manage expectations during crisis management—the interplay between government, media and publics.

PMESIIIE Considerations

I. Political:

1. What might be the security implications (probability and consequence) to PACOM or the region?
   a. The future and utility of the ASEAN Regional Forum?
   b. Any change in security alliances among various Asian states?
   c. The accession/growth of influence of key nations into regional security alliances
   d. If the U.S. does not conduct effective strategic communications with partners
   e. Potential emergence of a different ideology

2. What governmental trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Which Asian states could fail?
   b. Which Asian states could democratize?

3. What political stability trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Market instability degrades ability to govern?
   b. Politically disenfranchised indigenous populations?
   c. Nonparticipatory governance?
   d. Transnational crime organizations? Assess trends and propose a regional response.
   e. Resource nationalism impact on international business relations between states?

4. What ethical trends (probability & consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Willingness/ability of states to address human trafficking?
   b. Willingness/ability of states to address corruption?
   c. Erosion of public confidence in governments?
5. What geopolitical trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Russia’s actions in Asia?
   b. Chinese checkbook diplomacy without strings?

II. Military/Conflict:

1. What conflict related trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Emergence of new anti-U.S. Governments?
   b. Emergence of rogue powers, terrorist networks?
   c. Continued low-tech threats from nonstate actors?
   d. Hi-tech threats from nonstate actors?
   e. Agreement on confidence and security building measures (CSBMs)?
   f. Successful border security among nations?
   g. The risks to international trade in ethnic, sectarian and religious conflicts?

2. What military related trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Formation of an alliance and coalition that includes adversaries who oppose U.S. interests?
   b. Effective interoperability between states in the region?
   c. Which Asian militaries will significantly improve professionalism?

III. Economic:

1. What economic trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. States’ economic policies and sustainable growth that addresses poverty and income equality?
   b. Persistent economic obstacles to democratization among our partners?
   c. Transnational market instability/market crash?
   d. States’ fiscal discipline or lack thereof?
   e. Competition for access to Africa’s energy?
   f. Instability from economically disenfranchised/impoverished populations?
   g. Uncontrolled intra- or transnational economic migration?
h. Market instability and resulting impact on international business investment?

i. Persistence of corruption and impact on international business investment

j. Donation “fatigue” on the part of donor nations?

2. What fiscal/budgetary trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Adequacy or inadequacy of nations’ defense/security spending vs. investment?
   b. The “costs” of terrorism?
   c. The “costs” of corruption?
   d. The “costs” of illicit activities?
   e. The “costs” of energy dependency?

IV. Social/Cultural:

1. What demographic trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Rural-urban flight in unstable states?
   b. Growing gender imbalance in states such as China?
   c. Generational changes in attitudes?
   d. Demographic obstacles to democratization?
   e. Mass and/or persistent starvation?

2. What sociological trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Failure to curb human trafficking?
   b. Climate change that displaces peoples?
   c. Income disparity?
   d. Educational obstacles to democratization?

3. What cultural trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Indigenous religious extremism/fundamentalism?
   b. Externally/foreign sponsored Islamist movements?
   c. Ethnic/tribal/clan animosities that instill fear/solicit support for unscrupulous leaders?
   d. Cultural obstacles to democratization?
4. How can PACOM work with *multinational firms* to encourage:
   a. Engaging in operations in failed states?
   b. Observing/enforcing human rights?
   c. Mitigating corruption?

V. Informational:

1. What *infosphere* trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Proliferation and distribution of info technology in poorer states?
   b. Telecommunications expansion and ability to inform population?
   c. Telecommunications expansion and inability of governments to misinform populations?
   d. Impact upon PACOM’s Strategic Communication?
   e. Ability of PACOM to measure how well we are achieving our desired Phase 0 effects?
   f. On democratic processes?
   g. Responsiveness and vulnerability to hi-tech state and nonstate actor threats?
   h. Ability to mitigate adverse consequences of natural disasters?

VI. Infrastructural:

1. What *ground, air, or sea LOCs* trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Ease of travel within developing states?
   b. Ease of transnational migration/emigration?
   c. Logistics of/tracking of arms or human or narco-trafficking?
   d. Proliferation of fossil fuel vehicles?
   e. Border security?
   f. Democratic processes (such as elections)?
   g. Maritime security?

2. What *scientific and technological* trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Emergence of alternative/bio fuels?
   b. Affordability of renewable energy?
   c. Stability through domestic and shared ISR?
   d. Developments to help prevent or mitigate effects of natural disasters?
e. Developments to mitigate instability from agricultural or water challenges?
f. Increased security relationships between U.S. and partners through S&T projects?

VII. Environmental:

1. What environmental trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Regional climatic change/warming?
   b. Droughts—agriculture, hunger?
   c. Potable water scarcity?
   d. Demand for and supplies of energy/resources?

NORTHEAST ASIA-PACIFIC REGION STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

I. Political:

1. What political trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Japan’s role and future relationships, including an isolationist Japan?
   b. The future of the Japan-U.S. security relationship?
   c. South Korea’s desire for an expanded subregional role?
   d. Russia’s future role and future relationships?
   e. China’s future external role and future relationships?
   f. China’s involvement in Africa? What should we plan?
   g. China’s potential for liberal democracy: What should be the agenda for the next decade?

II. Military:

1. What military trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   b. NE Asia multilateral cooperation?
   c. China’s military and space transformation?
   d. Successful Mongolia Defense Reform?

2. What conflict trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Nepal’s stability?
b. North Korean ambitions?
c. China and Taiwan?

III. Economic:

1. What *economic* trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Chinese economic agendas and responsible interactions in Africa?
   b. China’s rising appetite for energy from regional nations?
   c. Russian economic agendas in Africa?

IV. Informational:

1. What *informational* trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Telecommunications expansion and NK or PRC’s populations’ ability to be informed
   b. Telecommunications expansion and impact on NK or PRC’s ability to control information

**SOUTHEAST ASIA-PACIFIC AND OCEANIA REGION STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

I. Political:

1. What *political* trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. Outlook for internal stability in Timor and Bangladesh?
   b. Burma’s governance?
   c. The future role of China in SE Asia?

II. Military:

1. What *military* trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. China’s power projection capability to achieve greater influence
   b. Maritime security capacity in the Strait of Malacca and tri-border region (Sulu/Celebes Sea)
   c. Future of U.S. alliance with Australia and New Zealand
III. Environment:

1. Assess the impact of global warming in the Asia Pacific region in terms of irregular human migration. What are the implications of the whole migration of Oceanic state populations and low lying coast states (e.g., Bangladesh) moving to “higher ground?”

SOUTH ASIA-PACIFIC REGION STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

I. Political:

1. What political trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. India’s role as a rising Asian power, and its expanding capabilities and interests

II. Military:

1. What military trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon PACOM or the region?
   a. India’s future large future arms purchases

SELECTED POTENTIAL TOPIC AMPLIFICATIONS

1. Within the Asia Pacific region, four enduring insurgencies exist—Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Compare and contrast these four insurgencies. What factors make them so resilient to government intervention? Are any of these factors common to all four insurgencies? How have the governments of Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Nepal responded to these factors?

2. Assess the insurgency in Southern Thailand. Identify the sources of conflict, and draft a national security plan for addressing the insurgency, including core, defensive and offensive strategies. This blueprint for success should include discussion of the role that regional organizations such as ASEAN and ARF might play, as well as regional powers including the United States.

3. The global balance of power is shifting from Europe to Asia. For the past 50 years, NATO has served a strategic role in ensuring a peaceful Europe. No such mechanism exists in Asia-Pacific. Discuss the desirability and feasibility of implementing a NATO-like organization in Asia Pacific.
4. Educating senior leaders about comprehensive crisis management. What is needed for curricula, educational practices and supporting technologies to educate non-specialist leaders to integrate prevention, preparation, response and recovery aspects of disaster management?

5. Partner, Policeman or Nanny: What is the role of regional organizations in assisting nations to develop capabilities to deal with disasters at home?

6. The U.S. should be able to not only acknowledge China’s peaceful rise, but also the prospect for power sharing with China and other nations. Suggest possible future power sharing arrangements between the U.S. and other nations.

7. China’s economic strategy. Besides a qualitative assessment/analysis of where China is headed with its international economic strategy, it seems reasonable to undertake a “mapping” (location and type) of Foreign Direct Investment by Chinese Government-owned enterprises in South and Southeast Asia and in Africa. Analyze these investments to provide insight on China’s economic strategy. Going one step further, with respect to investments in South and SE Asia, mapped investments should indicate whether China has a grand strategy to optimize production in those regions and to create an integrated set of regional economies.

8. U.S. DoD outsourcing. Focus on testing the efficiency and effectiveness of outsourcing. Analysis could further explore what types of outsourcing contracts are being used by DoD. One hypothesis is that “incentive contracts” represent the most cost-effective method of outsourcing. Research how much more efficient DoD outsourcing could become if the prevalence of incentive contracts increased.

9. Develop taxonomies to ensure the comprehensiveness of Political, Military, Economic, Socio-cultural, Information, Infrastructure, and Environment systems analysis. By providing analysts with a tabulation of all potentially important considerations, taxonomies could serve as guidance and/or check lists, and even as research tools or plan scoping aids. Is there a specific set of well-defined steps that could be followed? Can the process be automated? Should elements of the taxonomies vary from country to country — i.e., Third World vis-à-vis industrialized nation?
United States Southern Command

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1. Can the U.S. build and maintain positive relationships with existing as well as newly elected governments in the region who oppose U.S. policies? If so, how? (either broad, regional solutions or more pointed recommendations for single nations)
   a. What specific role can regional mil-to-mil engagement play in engaging these governments?

2. Assess the types of threats the region will face circa 2015-2020.

3. Third Border Initiative: Successes and Shortcomings. Which Caribbean countries have made the most positive contributions to border security; which are lagging? Where do the greatest opportunities for regional mil-to-mil or mil-to-law enforcement reside? Where does USSOUTHCOM fit in?

4. Examine the eventual restoration of U.S.-Cuba mil-to-mil relationships (for example, survey applicable lessons from the restoration of mil-to-mil relationships with Eastern European states following the end of the Cold War).

5. Epidemiology and major health threats to the region and their impact on the regional, political and economic stability.

6. A study of the strategic culture in Venezuela: What historical, cultural, and demographic factors determine why Venezuela reacts the way it does and what can that tell us about its reaction to future situations? Is the strategic culture changing? Why or why not?

7. Demographic study of the region: What are the trends 5/10/15 years out? What will be the effects of those trends in each of the subregions?

8. Analysis of the 2006 (and when it comes out the 2007) Latinobarometer poll: What does it mean for the U.S. military and for U.S. policymakers?

9. A study of the strategic culture in Brazil: What historical, cultural, and demographic factors determine why Brazil reacts the way it does and what can that tell us about its reaction to future situations?
10. Latin America: Is an arms race picking up steam? Who are the regional actors attempting to achieve superiority? Are competing regional military alliances being contemplated?

11. Examine the most successful instances of U.S.–Latin American engagement/cooperation (government-sponsored or not) of the 20th and 21st centuries.

12. Identify structure/composition of Cuban industries. Consider senior level individuals’ and agencies’ military and regime affiliations. This will aid in planning for HA/DR efforts. Provide updates by industry.

13. Analyze the history and the impacts of extra-hemispheric actors (both state and nonstate) in the region.

14. How can the U.S. negotiate basing rights in partner nations with governments that may not support our regional policies (for example, a Cooperative Security Location [CSL] in Manta, Ecuador)?

15. Colombia-Ecuador: What is the potential for border issues to lead to armed confrontation? Do Plan Colombia and Plan Ecuador complement each other, or are they a roadmap for border conflict?

16. Assess the deliberately transnational nature of contemporary Latin American populist movements and their impacts on regional governability and security.

17. Unified Command Plan (UCP) and its inherent seams: Is there a better way to organize combatant command theaters?

18. What is the future of democracy in Latin American nations with significant indigenous populations?

19. Identify strategies to eliminate or significantly reduce illicit trafficking throughout the Western Hemisphere.


21. Examine and present frameworks that will serve to engage and/or defeat enemies that employ asymmetric warfare. (The study should encompass all types of actors: those from outside the region as well as those from within.)
22. Assess the relationships between transnational threats and those threats traditionally viewed as internal security challenges. Do threats traditionally viewed as internal security challenges possess a transnational component?

23. Examine successful models for reducing state corruption.

24. Should the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the mission responsibilities of the Unified Commanders be revised?

25. Assess present and future U.S. dependence on Latin American energy sources (including, but not exclusively, Venezuelan and Mexican petroleum).

26. Is there a discernible trend away from inter-regional relations? If such a trend can be established, does it have precedents and what have been the results?

27. Examine predictive models that forecast the migration of coca cultivation in response to eradication efforts. What are the implications for national policy formulation and strategic security planning?

28. Provide literature review (5-8 pages for each country) describing challenges to the judicial systems of listed priority countries (top four listed—Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Paraguay). What are requirements for effective judicial reform, specifically as it pertains to improving overall security? Overall security of each partner nation and the region rely on a solid cooperation between security forces and the judiciary. (E.g., Colombia is transforming its judicial system; it is over burdened and considered inefficient, and the demobilization process will create more challenges.)

29. Trace the evolution (changes and growth) of regional military professionalization since the mid-1960’s (also changes and growth of civil military relationships).

30. Viability of ethanol production for achieving energy security in CENTAM and select Caribbean nations (Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Barbados). Use open source information to determine if sugar cane ethanol is a better economic use of land suitable for sugar production. Determine comparative rates of return by researching relative production costs, yields per hectare (lbs of sugar, gallons of ethanol), and market values of these commodities. Assume the price of ethanol is inflexible to a major expansion
in the supply for ethanol. Research amount of available land for potential sugarcane ethanol production versus national consumption. Determine labor intensity (employment potential) from these two activities (sugar production vs ethanol production) on a per-hectare basis. Note: This research will produce preliminary data to indicate whether there are significant benefits to energy security from ethanol production. In the affirmative, follow-on research could be conducted to produce an array of inter-agency recommendations for promoting ethanol production in these subregions.

31. What are the future USAF contributions to theater security cooperation for emerging nations? How can the world’s most advanced air and space team contribute to strategic alliances with our Western Hemisphere neighbors?

32. Examine the security implications of CAFTA-DR and Central American regional integration initiatives, such as those proposed by the Central American Integration System (SICA). (Example: border control/security issues)

33. Assess the “total costs” of terrorism and other illicit activities (governability, security, economics, etc.)—not only the obvious costs, but also the less tangible ones such as the erosion of public confidence in governments (at all levels) due to corruption, etc.

34. What reforms are necessary to make Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) beneficial to all sectors of society? How can nations seek ways to benefit and create sustainable long-term growth using FTAs as a tool for economic development?

35. Assess the varying degrees to which most nations in the Western Hemisphere have paid a price in the GWOT.

36. Examine the range of economic policies and their results in key countries throughout the region. Assess these policies with respect to their ability to provide long-term sustainable growth that addresses poverty and income equality while maintaining fiscal discipline.

37. Analyze defense/security spending and social investment by country over the past 5 years (10 years if possible).
1. Are we fighting one global insurgency or regional insurgencies along a common theme?

2. USSOCOM, DoD, and the interagency—collaboration in the war on terror

3. Clarifying the lines under the authorities of Title 10 and Title 50 with respect to intelligence activities and the implications in terms of prosecuting the war on terror outside designated combat areas

4. Global posturing of all Special Operations forces—specifically synchronizing integrated training prior to deploying components as an integrated SOF task force.

For additional SOF-related topics see the USSOCOM Research Topics List
United States Army Special Operations Command

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I. Global War on Terror:

1. Networks: DoD lacks capacity for developing ethnographic information as a weapon against hostile networks. While formerly addressed to a minimal extent in the SOF community, the entire force needs this training and ability; how should it be done?

2. There is a great deal of discussion of Information Operations, but many real doctrinal and practical issues remain in its employment. How can we turn the discussion into practice?

3. Electronic Warfare is a serious deficiency in the Army, prompting the Vice Chief of Staff to issue instructions on building this capability. How can the Army’s EW capability be increased and synchronized with the other Joint players?

4. Military role in developing partnerships with allies in war on terrorism. The Army’s role in developing these partnerships (USASOC G-2)

5. Military contributions to information operations in war on terror (USASOC G-2)

6. How can SOF better coordinate with and support other U.S. Government agencies in strategic communications and information operations? (USASFC)

7. Who within the U.S. Government should have the lead and proponency for information operations, and what should DoD’s role be? (USACAPOC)

8. How do we prosecute the war on terror in the GCC and U.S. Government seams? What special command structures are required? Is the JIATF structure appropriate? (USASOC G-35)
9. Study the willingness to exploit surrogates to further U.S. foreign policy (USASOC G-3X)

10. Sustainment of the war on terrorism including:
   a. How the Army and Joint Forces will support and conduct a large-scale, long duration irregular warfare campaign spanning several countries or regions. (USASOC G-8)
   b. Full spectrum operations in irregular war:
      (1) Do DoD’s counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate actors?
      (2) Do DoD’s counterterrorism capabilities allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate actors?
      (3) Do DoD’s unconventional warfare (UW) capabilities allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate actors?
      (4) Do DoD’s foreign internal defense (FID) capabilities allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate actors?
      (5) Do DoD’s stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) capabilities allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate actors?
      (6) Do DoD’s civil-military operations (CMO) capabilities allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate actors?
      (7) Do DoD’s psychological operations (PSYOP) capabilities allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate actors?
      (8) Do DoD’s information operations (IO) capabilities allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate actors?
      (9) Do DoD’s intelligence operations capabilities allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives
given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate actors?

c. Do current Army capabilities support the roles and missions necessary to conduct full spectrum operations in irregular warfare against asymmetric opponents? Do current Special Operations capabilities support the roles and missions necessary to conduct full spectrum operations in irregular warfare against asymmetric opponents? (USASOC G-8)

d. Study the relationship between DoD and DoS as the war on terror expands beyond OEF and OIF. Who is the lead/focal point for the combined DoD and DoS operations? (USASOC G-8)

11. What the influence of religious beliefs and religious radical groups is in the present development of the war on terror (Chaplain)

12. Examine the context of the war on terror and evaluate the associated risk of defining a strategy that potentially fights the “tool” and not the people, ideologies and movements that employ terror as a means of propaganda or a method to influence political change (75th Ranger Regiment)

13. Examine the roles of nonstate actors in challenging the authority and sovereignty of the established nationstates (75th Ranger Regiment)

14. The challenge of synchronizing the UN, NATO and other regional security forces in support of the war on terror (75th Ranger Regiment)

15. Prioritize the information war. The challenge of influencing or challenging Muslim fundamentalist ideology (75th Ranger Regiment)

16. How we can refine processes and approvals needed for the successful execution of clandestine operations? (75th Ranger Regiment)

17. Evaluate the methods to improve SOF human intelligence capabilities to fight terrorism in restricted and denied countries. (75th Ranger Regiment)

18. How current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq—and their potential outcomes—will affect regional security in the greater Middle East and East Asia (75th Ranger Regiment)
19. How to build and maintain coalitions in a manner that does not dilute the will of America to take decisive action in the international arena? (In some cases, success will require the United States to have a low profile.) (75th Ranger Regiment)

20. Define U.S. policy with respect to preemptive, preventive and retaliatory measures in support of the war on terror. (75th Ranger Regiment)

II. Homeland Security:

1. Does DoD need to reexamine Posse Comitatus and traditional roles in response to 9/11 and future homeland security threats? (75th Ranger Regiment)

2. Enhancing situational awareness without becoming a police state. Evaluate measures required to preserve liberties and institutions central to American culture. (75th Ranger Regiment)

3. Execution of war-gaming exercises at the national level to establish operational working relationships and identify critical vulnerabilities (75th Ranger Regiment)


III. Regional Strategic Issues:

1. Study the implications of strategic water control to the economic, political and military stability of critical regions. (USASOC ARNG Advisor)

2. North Africa and the Middle East. What is the U.S. long-term strategy towards Hamas as a legitimate governing body? (USASOC G-3X)

3. How do we—and who does this (i.e., the UN)—professionalize regional security forces in areas currently not identified as central battlefields in the war on terror? (75th Ranger Regiment)

4. Examine the role of the media in rebuilding failed states (venue for fair representation of information). (75th Ranger Regiment)
5. Examine the need for justice and reconciliation programs within the process of rebuilding governments of failed states. Examine impacts on continued coalition operations within this construct. (75th Ranger Regiment)

IV. Military Change:

1. The probable impact of fog and friction in the Future Force and suggested lubricants (USASOC ARNG Advisor)

2. Integration of traditional law enforcement tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) into military TTP. Such “cross-over” skills are needed to target terrorist rings and support networks. (USASOC G-2)

3. How do we streamline the POM process to make it more responsive to immediate needs as we continue to prosecute the war on terror? (75th Ranger Regiment)

4. Determine the effects of technology on the Principles of War. Has technology truly enabled smaller combat formations, or is the individual soldier, and the ability to mass when required, still as important as ever? (75th Ranger Regiment)

5. Considerations with respect to actions directed against enemy computers and networks (75th Ranger Regiment)

6. Method to compress time associated with cultural change that fosters innovation and flexibility in a time of war (75th Ranger Regiment)

V. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

1. Revision of Foreign Assistance Program (circa 1961) in support of the National Security Strategy. Reduce from 30 objectives to a less cumbersome, more focused effort. (75th Ranger Regiment)

2. International recognition for emerging states (or nonstate actors). (75th Ranger Regiment)

3. 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap (USASFC)
   a. Implications of the document on Army Special Operations Forces and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC)
b. Analysis and study of what is required in mission sets, organizational structure, force structure, equipment, technology, and stationing to conduct "long-duration, low-visibility and multiple" irregular warfare campaigns (USASFC)

c. Integration of a long-duration irregular warfare campaign with Joint, conventional, and multinational forces (USASFC)

VI. Landpower Employment:

1. Given current demographic and social trends, can SOF capabilities and doctrine support operations against asymmetric opponents in restricted and urban environments? (USASOC G-8)

2. What are the roles for, and the implications of, using surrogates in urban warfare to support GWOT national objectives? (USASOC G-8)

3. What is the role of SOF in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations? (USASOC G-8)

4. Can Future Force sustainment capabilities as currently envisioned support noncontiguous operations in separate nations as part of the global irregular warfare campaign in support of GWOT objectives? (USASOC G-8)

5. Should unity of command or unity of effort be the governing paradigm for interagency operations? (USASOC G-3X)

6. A measure to increase DoD influence or communicate with the State Department with respect to infrastructure improvements in failed states (i.e., improve utilities in cities and rural areas) (75th Ranger Regiment)

VII. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

1. Does current logistical planning doctrine support planning requirements for simultaneous, dispersed/distributed combat operations in protracted conflicts in multiple countries and regions? (USASOC G-8)

2. What are the logistical implications for current U.S. capabilities to support surrogate forces employed by the U.S. during irregular war in support of GWOT objectives? (USASOC G-8)
3. How can the current U.S. Army modular concept (i.e., centered on the Brigade Combat Team) support irregular war as it is conducted simultaneously in multiple regions and countries? (USASOC G-8)

4. Identify unique force protection capabilities required to conduct sea-basing operations. (75th Ranger Regiment)

5. Role of industry in support of the “Long War.” Examine the relationship of the U.S. economy and extended military operations. Can industry increase efficiencies in this regard? (75th Ranger Regiment)

VIII. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:

1. Maintaining the necessary cultural awareness and linguistic competence to deal with multiple active and potential conflicts within the wide-ranging Islamic world (USASOC G-2)

2. Developing imaginative leaders who are able to produce creative solutions to complex problems (USASOC G-3X)

3. Study the impact of service members not paying Federal taxes (USASOC G-3X)

4. Evaluate the existing Joint Planning models with respect to both deliberate and crisis action planning. (75th Ranger Regiment)

5. How can we develop more adaptive leaders? What is the feasibility of incorporating “social intelligence” into soldier and leader development and education? (75th Ranger Regiment)

IX. War and Society:

1. Assume there will be no major technological advancements in alternate fuels that would lower U.S. dependence on oil. How high will fuel costs have to be and/or how low will fuel supplies have to be before the low costs of foreign labor are offset and production of goods made in the United States (clothes and electronics, for example) becomes economically feasible again? In other words, when will the costs and availability of transportation begin to work against a global economy and for a regional economy, and push the United States toward an isolationist policy? (USASOC G-35)
2. Prioritize “Public Diplomacy” in the foreign policy process. Grant interviews to foreign media. (75th Ranger Regiment)

3. Strengthening of public opinion research (including within foreign countries) (75th Ranger Regiment)

4. Development of rapid response capability to respond to misinformation (75th Ranger Regiment)

5. Expanding and empowering the roles of ambassadors and military liaison elements (75th Ranger Regiment)

6. Sustaining foreign exchange programs and providing visibility at the local and national levels (75th Ranger Regiment)

7. Development of message campaigns with support of the private sector (75th Ranger Regiment)

X. Other:

1. Military working dogs (MWD). What is the DoD position on contract dogs in offensive operations? What agency sets the standards for contract dogs? Is the current inventory of MWDs sufficient to support all war on terror and Homeland Security requirements? (USASOC G-35)

2. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat. Can technology defeat IEDs? Is counter–IED a force protection question or is it offensive operations? What agency is responsible for writing counter-IED doctrine? Is the MWD (Special Search Dog or Patrol Explosives Detector Dog) the appropriate tool to defeat IEDs for mechanized units? (USASOC G-35)

3. Asymmetric Warfare. This is associated with IEDs, but of a greater scope. Is asymmetric warfare simply management, training and coordination of actions in response to threats? What is the offensive (vice reactive or defensive) posture of asymmetric warfare? Is irregular warfare simply the continually changing nature of warfare, the “revolution of military affairs,” or is it the future of war? Is the real problem one of semantics? Are U.S. forces trapped in a status quo mentality, or are they ready to redesign themselves to confront the current threat at the expense of confronting a peer foe in the future? (USASOC G-35)
4. Explore the second and third effects of the AC/RC Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations split. (USASOC Futures Center)

5. Explore the advantages of moving RC SF units from the NGB to the USAR. (USASOC G-35)

6. Can science develop robotics that protect or reduce our vulnerability? (75th Ranger Regiment)

7. Where can “lesser technologies” improve efficiency? (75th Ranger Regiment)

8. Who should control Civil Information Management (CIM) and have the lead for it in the different theaters? Study how to develop a Common Operating Picture for CIM. (USACAPOC)

9. After nearly 20 years, is it time to reexamine Goldwater-Nichols in view of the following questions? (USASFC)
   a. Does Goldwater-Nichols maximize Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and integration in the interagency and multinational spectrum? (USASFC)
   b. What are the relationships in ARSOF and other government agencies, while facing 21st century challenges and defeating enemies in the war on terror? (USASFC)
   c. What is the impact of command climate/human relations environment on retention and recruiting?
   d. How can equal opportunity (EO) programs be tailored and leveraged to create a positive human relations environment/command climate?
   e. Do deploying/deployed EO advisors have the appropriate training and are there enough per unit in consideration of supporting reserve units and civilians on the battlefield? (Many reserve units have EO advisor positions as required, but not authorized. Therefore they never receive the 10-week qualification training).
I. Global War on Terrorism:

1. National Implementation Plan and the way ahead for DoD/SOCOM

2. Counterproliferation initiatives

3. Interoperability with interagency

4. Deterrence and nonstate actors:
   a. In the event of a serious military threat to the CONUS, will nuclear deterrence remain the ultimate guarantor of our security? What are the challenges involved with nuclear deterrence as related to nonstate actors? From a policy perspective should/can/will the U.S. hold state actors responsible for actions of NSAs originating/operating from their borders (either knowingly or unknowingly)?
   b. What new deterrence capabilities (beyond legacy nuclear deterrence capabilities) do the U.S. military or U.S. Government at large need in today’s increasingly global security environment? How should the military posture its capabilities to deal with increasingly asymmetric threats from both nationstates and NSAs?

5. Nation and rogue state sponsorship of terrorism

6. Countering ideological support to terrorism

7. Proliferation Security Initiative

8. Combating WMD: Develop a complementary proliferation-risk vector chart that characterizes states of proliferation concern on scales of both physical and political/environmental attributes. The research effort should define meaningful increments on the attribute scales and identify associated metrics for characterization.
II. Homeland Security:

1. Missile Defense – theater and global. Develop an analytical framework for use by regional-level defense planners, to assess bottom line effectiveness of combined offensive and defensive capabilities for preventing successful missile attacks on defended assets and areas.

2. QDR – Global Deterrence

3. What deters the U.S. and how does that impact security decisions?

4. Nonconventional threats to U.S. security. Establish the salience of emerging non-conventional threats for U.S. military strategy. These involve the challenges posed by global jihads, including the possible use by radicals of weapons of mass destruction

5. Missile warning

6. Impact of the integration of air, cruise and ballistic missile activities/tasks

III. Regional Strategic Issues:

1. Interdependence on allies and friends

2. Information sharing

3. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy/Regional Strategic Issues. How to integrate and apply DoD effects to deter and dissuade potential adversaries from creating, proliferating and using weapons of mass destruction. The research should include the application of cyberspace forces and operations, information operations and strategic communication to deter specific state actors/decisionmakers (examples include North Korea, Iran and Syria). The research should also consider how to integrate the desired effects with the regional combatant commander’s strategy and potential/required interagency actions.
IV. Military Change:

1. Transforming from asset to requirements-based capabilities
2. QDR force construct and sizing
3. Impact of BRAC
4. Army Guard and Reserves transformation to conduct cyberspace operations
5. There are assertions that we should move to a joint combatant command staff that is 60-70% civilian and 30-40% military. What impact will significant civilianization of the command staffs have on the U.S. military? Given an increasing civilianization of the military (command staffs in particular), what actions should be taken to prepare for this eventuality?
6. Is it time for Goldwater-Nichols II? This project should consider the manner in which all components of the DoD coordinate with the interagency — direct coordination, DIRLAUTH, or only through OSD.

V. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

1. Integrating Information Operations — vertically and horizontally
2. Leveraging and integrating existing analytical capabilities
3. Operations in cyberspace/netwarfare/NETOPS
4. Way ahead for Strategic Communications/Information Operations

VI. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:

1. Leveraging government/agency expertise — Joint Functional Component Commands at STRATCOM
2. Using collaborative tools — changing culture from “need to know” to “need to share”
3. Establishing distributed collaborative, interdependent organizational environment
4. Study the statistical inverse correlation between NSPS pay bands with the ability of AFPC to identify qualified applicants for sensitive positions.

VII: War and Society:
1. Role of nuclear weapons in deterrence
2. Emerging powers

VIII. Intelligence:
1. Ways to gather forensic data on an enemy quickly and accurately in order to prosecute them
2. Does the Intel cycle change when attack/defend actions take place in seconds?
3. Is the current Target System Analysis process capable of producing relevant Intel in time?
4. Is nuclear/kinetic targeting different from nonkinetic/cyber targeting?

IX. Technology/Cyberspace:
1. Computer processing and its effects on decision calculus in a sub-second environment
2. The impact, both cost and operational, to the Warfighter of not having a standard DoD collaboration tool/process
3. Foreign use/permeation/securability of Wi-Fi
4. Organizing for presentation of cyber forces to the COCOMs
5. What are the major trust issues inherent in cross service sharing of data?
6. What are the major trust issues inherent in multinational sharing of data?
7. What levels of data should be provided to each level of command? How do we determine what is useful from what is distracting?

8. How long will it take for legacy systems to adopt netcentric tenets?

9. How can we ensure situational awareness data is not intercepted or stolen by adversaries? Blue force tracking is invaluable to commanders but dissemination to red could result in our own culmination.

10. What would a strategic roadmap for Information Technology systems look like, and what are the barriers to developing a consolidated DoD roadmap? How would this relate to an overarching IT services and systems catalog?
In the context of persistent conflict, assess the ability of existing national security space capabilities to responsively meet the needs of the land component in stability operations and less-than-general-war scenarios.

Should the Army develop and acquire small satellites dedicated to the tactical level?

Should the Army view small satellites as unmanned space vehicles and develop, acquire, and operate these to meet the unique requirements of its forces, just as it operates unmanned aerial vehicles to meet the needs of the tactical land forces?

Should the Army view high altitude comms and ISR as similar unmanned aerial vehicles and develop, acquire and operate these to meet the unique requirements and needs of the tactical land forces?

Assess the Army role in the space and high altitude domain against the Army role in aviation; should the Army develop tactical space and high altitude ISR and communications dedicated to support at the brigade and lower echelons.

What niche technologies can be brought to bear to augment current national security space capabilities for disadvantaged users such as SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM?

What are the implications of the inability to deny adversary space based ISR and communications on the ability of the land component to maneuver and protect the force?

What are the effects of denying the adversary space based ISR and communications on the ability the land component to maneuver and protect the force?
9. Can space control be relevant to tactical units under current policy constraints?

10. As the Army depends more on space-based capabilities to support persistent conflict, what is the best way to conduct requirements and combat development within the Army?

11. Assess impact and mitigation strategies of adversary use of commercial ISR and communication on the land component in stability operations?

12. Assess political implications and advantages/disadvantages of expanding binational and multinational partnerships for missile defense in Europe and the Pacific.

13. Assess the geopolitical and security implications on NATO regarding positioning missile defenses in Eastern Europe.

14. Assess the challenges for effectively integrating and conducting information operations and cyber warfare in the era of persistent conflict.

15. Army Operations in Cyberspace --- tools, CONOPS, ROE

16. How can integrated architectures across the vertical domains of space, high altitude, and air increase the overall persistence and availability of ISR products and communications?

17. Is the threshold between Title 10 and Title 50 impacting the ability to develop and employ space-based tactical ISR capabilities?

18. Should the Army be designated as the executive agent or lead service for Global Ballistic Missile Defense?

19. Should the Army be designated as the lead service for all land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities?
The Defense Intelligence Agency

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I. Global War on Terror:

1. The spread and role of radical Islam and international terrorist group capabilities

2. International counterterrorism (CT) capabilities and worldwide perception of U.S. power and CT actions

3. How best can the United States counter adversary use of the Internet as a means of propaganda and communications?

II. Homeland Defense:

1. Homeland defense and homeland security cooperation in anticipating, assessing, and countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats and consequences

2. Avenues for information sharing among intelligence agencies, Federal, state and local law enforcement officials

3. Examine current laws and statutes that enhance or impede information sharing, coordination, and cooperation among homeland defense and homeland security agencies

4. Weigh the military’s role in responding to natural disasters in the United States—testing and improving interagency collaboration in homeland security

III. Regional Strategic Issues:

1. Identify the significance (in North Africa/Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Southwest Asia) of the presence of militant Islam; anticipate internal and regional instability in view of the U.S. global defense posture
2. Assess national strategy, security policies, and decisionmaking in the Caucasus and Asia

3. Examine U.S. role in promoting ethnically plural polities inclusive of politically and economically disenfranchised indigenous populations in Latin America

4. Interpret regional strategic goals and ambitions of North Korea and China and their ability to achieve them through military and economic capabilities

5. Explore advanced infrastructure and network analyses for use by U.S. planners, policymakers, and warfighters

6. Characterize the role of Army/ground forces exercises in enhancing U.S.-Russian relations.

7. Identify the implications of merging crime, government, and intelligence services personnel and practices in Russia

8. Explore the implications of Muslim population growth within Russia for Russian military (manpower, training, roles and missions)

9. Assess efficacy of (select) allies’/partners’ armies, experienced in peacekeeping operations, now doing “warfighting” in Afghanistan

IV. National Security Strategy:

1. Should DoD continue to rely on commercial hardware and software?

2. How does DoD ensure supplier assurance when the complexity and size of software programs have surpassed the ability to reach high or moderate assurance that malicious code has not been embedded?

3. Proliferation of sophisticated, malicious, cyber knowledge and the asymmetric vulnerability of the United States and its allies to its employment: What international partnerships can create an effective export-control regime?

4. How can the maintenance of U.S. moral and ethical values by our government’s representatives abroad be managed so as to prevent the practice of those values from aggravating the current and future threat environment in countries of interest?
5. What happens if the GWOT ends? How can the U.S. benefit from the greater capabilities of sharper foreign security services?

6. How can the U.S. retain a technological edge even when other countries become centers of technological innovation?

7. How can the U.S. propagate synchronized strategic communications in cyberspace if our footprint there is declining?

8. How can the U.S. positively develop its international reputation as world leader in national security?

9. How can the U.S. deal with multiple nuclear-capable rogue nations?

10. How does the U.S. deal with an evolving international situation where scores of nations may acquire the capability of creating fissile material that could be diverted for nuclear devices or weapons?

V. Leadership: Examine how DoD and service intelligence agencies are modifying training, education, management, and leadership principles to meet new Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Intelligence Reform Act requirements.

VI. Underground Facilities as a National Security Challenge:

1. The construction and employment of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs) facilities by potential adversarial nations and nonstate organizations is growing each year. Whether those nations and non-government organizations are classified as rogue, major, or emerging powers or terrorist groups, they use underground facilities (UGFs) and HDBTs to protect and conceal WMD, ballistic missiles, leadership, and activities that constitute serious threats to U.S. national security. The growth and sophistication of UGFs and HDBTs is especially notable among nations with mature WMD programs. Denial and deception operations complicate detection and characterization of UGFs, and the facilities themselves commonly frustrate assessment of the UGFs’ functions. Of grave concern is what these countries and nonstate entities have learned from U.S. attack tactics and weapons used against underground targets over the last decade in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Their new and modified facilities incorporate features that
make them more survivable against U.S. weapons. Moreover, these countries are exporting their underground construction techniques and construction equipment. What can be done to counter the proliferation of UGFs and HDBTs among America’s adversaries and the commensurate improvement in methods of producing, hardening, and concealing them?

2. Detection and analysis of these facilities is the sole responsibility of the Underground Facility Analysis Center (UFAC). The UFAC integrates analysts, collection managers and strategists, R&D experts, and program managers from DIA, NGA, and NSA with engineers from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to meet its mission end-to-end. This intelligence and engineering integration is unique and has proved highly successful. It provides outstanding coordination and analysis. What more should be done?

VII. Combat Operations Support:

1. How best can the United States use human intelligence in areas of active confrontation, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan?

2. How can the Intelligence Community best support warfighters and get feedback on the effectiveness of intelligence products provided?

VIII. Acquisition: What are the benefits and drawbacks of using contractors, civilian employees, and active or reserve military in the Intelligence Community and what criteria should be used to ascertain which should be used in a specific position?
United States Transportation Command

POC: Ms Diana Roach DSN 779-1535
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1. How do the capabilities provided by USTRANSCOM’s Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) fit in the continuum of theater opening operations and complement the Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) theater opening capability? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

2. How can a Joint Force Commander best decide when to use third party logistics providers versus Service organic capabilities? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

3. How should DoD establish, monitor, and enforce performance standards for intra-theater distribution? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

4. How can we consolidate Army and Defense Logistics Agency inventory to improve support to the warfighter? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

5. Recommend potential improvements to redeployment processes for the Joint Force. (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

6. How can DoD use commercial forecasting models and processes (e.g., collaborative planning forecasting replenishment (CPFR) model) to improve end-to-end Joint distribution operations? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

7. How do we institutionalize the planning and modeling of the theater distribution network as part of the Adaptive Planning process? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

8. How should DoD use service-oriented architectures (SOAs) to improve interoperability across the logistics information domain? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

9. Provide recommendations for improving DoD global supply chain performance based on Time Definite Delivery (TDD). (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)
10. What information is required for logistics visibility to/at the “last tactical mile?” How should that information be provided (i.e., CONOPS with roles/responsibilities of COCOMS, Services, and National Partners [e.g., USTRANSCOM and DLA])? (Lt Col Mark Wyrosdick, DSN 779-1132, mark.wyrosdick@ustranscom.mil)

11. Identify COCOM capability requirements for a real-time Common Operating Picture for Deployment and Distribution (COP D2). (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

12. How does the DoD build and enforce a single, multi-echelon distribution prioritization system? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

13. Recommend how to forecast supply requirements. (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

14. Determine a method for logistics integration with multinational, interagency organizations, nongovernment organizations and civilian contractors. (Mr. Lance Carpenter, DSN 779-3740, lance.carpenter@ustranscom.mil)

15. How do we develop a customer booking process that drives the customer to focus on level of service versus selecting a mode (service levels—x days vs. transport mode—air, surface)? (Ms. Paulette Pardue, DSN 779-4518, paulette.pardue@ustranscom.mil)

16. What is the role of logistics and distribution in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) and Security Cooperation? (Mr. Lance Carpenter, DSN 779-3740, lance.carpenter@ustranscom.mil)

17. How should DoD apply the Non-linear Supply Chain, system-of-systems approach to modeling supply chain management? (Mr. Lance Carpenter, DSN 779-3740, lance.carpenter@ustranscom.mil)

18. How can Combatant Commands that support OEF and OIF on a daily basis best plan and execute a joint training program in order to prepare for future operations? (Mr. Pete Zielinski, DSN 779-1471, peter.zielinski.ctr@ustranscom.mil)
19. What is the optimum sealift siting strategy to support the National Military Strategy? (Mr. David C. Lyle, DSN 325-5530, david.c.lyle@navy.mil)

20. What is the capability of U.S. flagged and Effective U.S. Controlled (EUSC) commercial sealift tankers to provide support to DoD contingency operations? (Mr. David C. Lyle, DSN 325-5530, david.c.lyle@navy.mil)
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

POC: Mr. Larry Abercrombie (757) 788-5821
Lawrence.abercrombie@us.army.mil

I. Global War on Terror:

1. What lessons have future adversaries learned from OIF, OEF, and the 2006 Middle East Hezbollah conflict about how to use strategic communications and information operations?

2. How do we establish, resource and measure the relative effectiveness of nonkinetic effects versus lethal effects?

3. How will we preclude an adversary from manipulating national will through the media and internet? What proactive measures can we take?

II. Homeland Security/Homeland Defense/Civil Support:

1. Alternatives to using military forces in support of homeland security and implications for the Reserve Components

2. What capabilities should the Army possess to execute the Homeland Defense (HLD)/Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions?

3. What are the capabilities required to conduct WMD Elimination Operations?

4. What are the operational constraints of providing medical support for Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions?

5. Which nations or nonstate groups are likely to employ WME and what are the most likely targets?

III. Regional Strategic Issues:

1. What existing or emerging states and nonstate entities have the ability and the will to challenge U.S. strategic and national security objectives?

2. What are the political trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving the conditions of the future operational environment?
3. What are the economic trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving the future Joint operational environment?

4. What are the social trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving the conditions of the future operational environment?

5. What are the cultural trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving the conditions of the future operational environment? Trends in religion, information and PMESI?

6. What aspects of an adversary’s approach to irregular warfare will require an integrated DIME response?

7. What states/nonstates have the potential to emerge as a military peer or near-peer competitor?

8. What states/nonstates have the potential to emerge as economic peers or near-peer competitors?

9. Where will competition for scarce resources lead to instability and/or violent confrontation? What will be the U.S. role in such a confrontation?

10. Which nations or nonstate groups are likely to employ WME and what are the most likely targets?

11. What ongoing efforts have the potential to significantly increase the ability to feed the growing world population?

12. How will the hydrological effects of global warming and climate change (e.g., melting ice caps, rising oceans, desertification, water scarcity) in the next 10 to 20 years impact security in Africa and the Pacific?

13. How will legal and illegal immigration impact the Future Modular Force and its allies?

14. How the Future Modular Force should be to deal with failed and failing states, provinces, autonomous regions and/or mega-cities across combatant command AORs.
15. How will state or nonstate entities with, or access to, space, high altitude (HA), cyber, and other technologies use those capabilities against U.S. and multinational land component forces in 2015?

IV. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

1. What are the effects of changes to NSS/NMS on the Army’s force structure, systems, supporting elements, and the resulting resource implications?

2. Reassess the Army’s roles and missions and their impact on the QDR

3. Appropriate roles for Active and Reserve Components in support of building partnership capacity

4. The Army’s contribution to developing a national strategy and narrative


6. How will competition between surging economic powers over limited resources affect NSS/NMS?

V. Landpower Employment:

1. Effective combination of GPF and SOF mission sets to execute FSO in conjunction with interagency and coalition forces

2. Ways to better align of military and interagency planning processes to improve unity of effort

3. What are the strategic and operational benefits of developing high speed shallow draft platforms that enable deployment and sustainment of land forces?

4. How will the employment of Future Force lethal / non-lethal Directed Energy capabilities impact the Army across the full spectrum of operations?
5. Do future force operational concepts adequately address adversary integrated anti-access strategy and ensure the capability to deploy?

6. What vulnerabilities, if any, do future forces have against effectively employed strategic communications like those employed during OEF/OIF and Israel-Hezbollah conflict?

7. Do future modular force concepts adequately account for continued military technological dominance over future rising competitors such as China and Russia?

8. How will future modular forces optimize cyberspace in 2025 in order to assure U.S. Army and Land Component center of gravity?

9. What are the implications of distributed and non-contiguous expanded operational environments (distance) on Army Aviation?

10. What are the aviation lift and range requirements to support air movement and vertical maneuver in Future Operational Environments (FOE)?

11. How do elements of space control or mitigate near peer threat intent/capability to deny access to friendly space products and services in 2015 timeframe?

12. New approaches to allied and coalition engagement in Irregular Warfare

VI. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

1. Future Force Generation requirements for Full Spectrum Operations

2. To what extent can reducing the Army’s fuel consumption and its class V bulk weight permit reductions in sustainment organizations, infrastructure and operations?

3. What processes are required for Army to identify remaining economic useful life (REUL) of individual tactical wheeled vehicles (TWVs), over mid-future term, based on a vehicle’s OPEMPO and maintenance history in support of Full Spectrum Operations?

4. What are the ways and means required to reset Army units in core competencies?
VII. Leadership, Personnel Management and Culture:

1. What leadership skill-sets are most important in JIIM environments and how can the Army accelerate learning to get personnel proficient in JIIM operations?

2. How can the Army build and retain the future All Volunteer Force?

3. How can the Army provide the knowledge, skills, and abilities required in the future All Volunteer Force?

4. How can the Army provide competent leadership capable of dealing with future operations?

5. How can the Army address the significant moral-ethical challenges it will face in the future?

6. How can the Army sustain a high OPTEMPO with the current human capital policies?

7. How can the Army meet future demands for holistically fit soldiers?

8. How can combat training centers and operational deployment experiences be leveraged to maximize development of leadership competencies?

9. Expanding the military recruiting market (officer and enlisted) to include legal, non-green card holding immigrants—legalities, implications, and long-term impact on sustaining the All Volunteer Force

10. Assessing the health and sustainability of recruiting for an All Volunteer Force—resource challenges of incentivizing the prospects to serve during a period of protracted conflict

11. Reconnecting America with its Army through an effective, centralized and fully integrated strategic communications (to include marketing and advertising) strategy. Will future national propensity to serve in the Army continue to decline and, if so, what are the incremental steps necessary to reverse the decline or increase the available accessible population to meet the needs of a growing Army without sacrificing the standards the Army currently enforces?
12. Adapting initial military training to compensate for health and education problems in America

13. Developing culturally attuned soldiers and leaders, with the right language skills to meet the demands of the Future Operating Environment (FOE)

14. How to adapt the Army’s soldier and leader development strategy (during and after initial military training) to address the cultural understanding and targeted language proficiency requirements to meet the demands of today’s contemporary operating environment and beyond?

15. How does the Army develop long-term capacity to provide the unique and critical advanced non-warfighting skills required to effectively execute Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations—Should the Army develop an “extended” force (e.g. civilian reserve corps) to meet those needs?

16. Are biometric technologies suitable for identity and behavioral management in support of full spectrum operations; and how will those technologies be implemented?
United States Army Combined Arms Center

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I. Leader Development:

1. How should the Army train leaders to make the transition from conventional to unconventional operations in COIN?

2. How can leaders at the operational level effectively integrate conventional and Special Operations Forces?

3. How can leaders sustain and improve soldier morale and unit cohesion in COIN operations?

4. What is the role of military education in a time of war? How must this change to meet the demands of the current conflict and beyond?

5. How does/should an asymmetric environment impact small-unit leadership?

6. Case studies: Training indigenous forces – successes and failures; lessons learned from recent advisors’ experiences.
   a. How do you make advising a “top priority” assignment?
   b. What are the challenges in advising at ministry/national levels? How can they effectively be met?
   c. How does cultural awareness help the organizational leader meet challenges in COIN?

7. How should leaders approach the challenge of balancing technology with the human element?

8. How can the tools that come with a network-enabled force be applied to leader development?

II. JIIM—Interagency Emphasis:

1. How can the military operate with the “whole of government” at various echelons?

2. How do organizations at division and above conduct “campaign planning” for COIN, Security Force Assistance, and Stability Operations?
3. How can we apply the lessons of previous military operations in Africa to the COE and beyond?

4. How can we apply lessons of successful and unsuccessful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes?

5. How can operational-level leaders leverage integration and coordination with international organizations while avoiding pitfalls?

6. How has the interagency process worked in the past? How should it change?

7. How can the lessons from DOS PRT and DoD interoperability be applied to future planning and execution?

8. What are the roles of interagency organizations in security force assistance operations: reality vs. potential?

9. What are the lessons learned about JIIM Integration from large-scale training/equipping missions?

10. What are the lessons foreign forces (host nation and partner/ally) learned from OIF and OEF?

11. What are the implications of being a U.S. military ally and partner?

III. Information Superiority:

1. How should soldiers engage with Web 2.0 media capabilities?

2. What should an officer know about the media?
   a. Historical case studies on the impact of strategic communications. What have been the impacts of strategic communications in the past?
   b. How can information operations in COIN be improved?
   c. How has the U.S. Army successfully used embedded reporters to achieve its communications objectives? What are the areas for improvement?
   d. How do information operations working groups operate effectively?
3. How can we learn from shaping change in political cultures in post-war situations (de-Ba’athification/de-Nazification)?
   a. How should military reconstruction efforts be applied as an aid to civil affairs?
   b. How should metrics be used to define and evaluate performance in long-term COIN conflicts?

4. What does an officer need to know about negotiations?

5. What are cyber-warfare tactics? How can they be used for and against us?

IV. Battle Command:

1. How can battle command methodologies be applied in tactical and operational decisionmaking?
   a. How can leaders maximize effectiveness and minimize turbulence while attaching and detaching units in combat?
   b. How will the Army bridge the current to future force battle command?
   c. What are the capabilities and functions required to enable the commander to develop and maintain situational awareness and understanding?

2. What are effective knowledge management techniques for battle command?

V. COIN:

1. How will we improve COIN strategy based upon the battles in Iraq (Mosul 2003-2008; Baghdad: The Surge; Anbar Province)?

2. How should logisticians support COIN?

3. In a “Long War,” under COIN environment conditions, how do U.S. and Coalition forces, working with HN security forces, apply the precepts of a “Clear-Hold-Build” strategy, to leverage all elements of U.S. national power and multinational partners?

4. What are the implications of COIN for military ethics? What are the ethical challenges faced by combat advisors? How can advisors be better prepared to meet these challenges?
5. What is the military role in filling the capacity gap in Security Force Assistance operations?
   a. How can lessons learned from past Foreign Internal Defense (FID) campaigns be used to improve Security Force Assistance planning in the contemporary environment?
   b. How can conventional headquarters (e.g., BCT, DIV, CORPS) be modified to effectively execute large-scale Security Force Assistance missions (e.g., MNSTC-I, CSTC-A)?
   c. How should the Reserve Components be factored in to large-scale Security Force Assistance missions?

VI. Conflict Termination:

1. How can military governments posture themselves to support transition to civilian government?
   a. How should the Army approach wartime planning for conflict termination?
   b. What are the considerations for fielding and training a new national army and police force in occupied territories?
   c. How should the Army plan for withdrawal?
   d. How has/should the Army proceed with organization transformation during or after a conflict?
   e. How has conflict been successfully and unsuccessfully terminated using a transition from combat to dialogue?

2. How has the advisory effort in Iraq evolved?

3. How has the advisory effort in Afghanistan evolved?

4. Has history provided knowledge of military withdrawal from ongoing conflict?
   a. British withdrawal from the former Ottoman Empire (in Turkey) in 1922-1923.
   c. The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.

5. Post-Iraq War Army: How should the organizational officer play a role in reconstitution?
VII. Transition to MCO:

1. How should the Army approach transitioning conventional forces back to MCO from COIN?
   a. How can the Army maintain a strategic MCO capability while executing COIN?
   b. How can units reset and prepare for MCO in a window shortened to 12 months?

2. What are the roles of the operating force and the generating force in maintaining full spectrum capabilities in the modular force?

3. What is the impact on readiness of the Artillery secondary mission?

VIII. Operations and Other:

1. How can we determine current and future roles of Army aerial reconnaissance, manned and unmanned?

2. What are the pros and cons of ground vs. aerial precision fires?

3. What is the impact of unit reorganizations in wartime? How can it be mitigated?

4. How has Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D³A) been implemented as the IED targeting process?

5. How can suicide bombers be defeated using planning, detection, and prevention?

6. What changes can be implemented in training the military transition team (MiTT)?

7. How can we understand and define the “human terrain” mission of the MiTT?

8. How can we apply future biometric technologies of improved matching and robust identity analysis?
9. What are the lessons learned for robot applications in offensive and defensive operations?

10. How does America’s National Guard play its role in border states to protect against a naval/land invasion?

11. How do foreign armed forces approach cultural training?

12. How can Red-Teaming be used to identify and exploit enemy weakness?

13. Who in the chain of command is responsible for war crimes?
I. Homeland Security:

1. The viability of a ground centric (Army) Sustainment Support Command integrating U.S. Army Reserve assets

2. Opportunities for technology transfer from the military to the Department of Homeland Security and/or dual-use technologies

3. Army support for domestic disasters

4. Are the contracting vehicles responsive enough to determine when the government should step in and sustain a commercially procured weapons system with limited fielding? (E.G., UH-72A LUH or ARH)

II. Realizing the Potential of Network Centric Warfare:

1. Evaluate new information assurance requirements in a net-centric army or analyze effects of a transforming army at war on information assurance.

2. Strategic implications for combat service support operations given planned mix of FCS systems and current systems that will equip the BCTs of the near future

3. Operational and cost benefit opportunities from leasing of Combat Support/Combat Service Support equipment to include: cost effectiveness, impact on national security/military operations, logistics management of leased equipment (safety implications, transportability implications, supportability considerations)

4. Implementation of sense and respond logistics concepts integrated with AIT technology, demonstrating improved warfighter support from supply chain management, fault isolation, and maintenance technical data access and rights of usage for logistics
5. Increasing and changing role of contractors in forward areas (interacting with military force)

6. Strategic and logistical planning for increasing numbers of contractors who will accompany the military force

7. Maintaining Army industrial support (organic/private) for transformation

8. The role of the Army’s organic manufacturing base in transformation

9. Evaluate the demands of increased bandwidth requirements and the ability of technological improvements to meet those demands

10. A DoD-wide data strategy enabling true interoperability

11. Extend the network to the soldier by using latest industry wireless technology

12. Test and implement Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) technology across the Army

13. Develop COOP strategies and capabilities across the Army

14. Going deeper into an information landscape involved in a very real cyber-war

15. Battlefield systems interoperable with other current systems and future systems

16. Provide comprehensive information assurance and information security in AMC Information Operations

17. Realize the full potential of information sharing through continued development and modernization of applications and service oriented architectures connecting to LandWarNet

18. Move logistics infrastructure toward digitization, miniaturization, virtualization, personalization, and wireless

19. Employ a secure, collaborative, web-enabled, and tailorable Enterprise Architecture intended to integrate and leverage AMC’s mission planning and execution capabilities
20. Structure the AMC enterprise as a networked organization that features task focused, adaptive teams that facilitate efficient and parallel thinking behavior

21. Provide a Business Intelligence Center concept that would maximize the use and availability of command wide data, enabling real time data analysis and decisionmaking. Leverage information technology (IT) innovation and Knowledge Management (KM) to achieve decision superiority by transforming AMC processes, applications, and data into net-centric capabilities that accelerate information sharing.

22. Compare actual effects versus planned effects of the Army’s Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program (I3MP) on AMC’s information technology network and posture at the 30 special installations.

23. Evaluate the role of service-based architecture approach in enhancing information dominance and decision superiority for Army and Joint warfighters and logisticians.

III. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

1. The impact of raw material for Class V production

2. Viability of a CONUS ground-centric sustainment/support structure

3. Risk of offshore production of tires, electronics, ball bearings, etc.

4. LOGCAP/other augmentation agreements as a part of DoS and DoD strategies

5. The impact of certain strategic materials only being available from foreign sources

6. The impact of declining rotorcraft technology investment in the U.S. as compared with foreign governments and industries

7. The impact of multinational corporate teams and/or foreign-owned corporations providing military materials and/or expertise
8. Does the current acquisition model meet the war replacement requirements?
9. What is the potential impact of repeated rotations on acquisition, sustainment, replacement, and modernization of Army and USMC weapons systems and materiel despite announced increases over time?

IV. Landpower Employment:

1. LOGCAP and other similar instruments in stabilization and reconstruction operations
2. Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army
3. Joint applicability of Army weapon systems

V. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

1. Implications of “sea-basing”
2. Impact of all civilians (government and contractors) on the battlefield
3. Implementing “sense and respond” logistics in an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) environment
4. The role of the Army’s industrial base (organic/private) in supporting landpower generation and sustainment
5. Joint Theater Logistics Management
6. Development of a national level Global Logistics Command
7. Establishment of a single Army Logistics Enterprise
8. The Army planning, budgeting and funding schema for new systems in light of the extended contractual periods associated with performance-based logistics
9. Logistics operations in dispersed/distributed combat operations against predominantly insurgent forces
10. Changing materiel requirements as operations transition from combat to stabilization to reconstruction/nation-building
11. New requirements for the organic industrial base given the changing force structure and nature of conflict

12. Implications for reliance on the commercial industrial base given changing force structure and nature of conflict

13. Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army

14. Joint applicability of Army weapon systems

15. Methods to reduce reliance on contractor support on the battlefield

16. Implication of centralized/single fact to warfighter nontactical maintenance

17. Implication of central control of all Reset

18. Requirements for, and implications of, an Army logistics component of a Joint Logistics Command

19. Desirability of single control of logistics systems from factory to foxhole—acquisition, fielding, maintenance, distribution, etc.

20. Assess how the new Active and Reserve Component force generation models will change the way the Army manages, maintains, and accounts for materiel. Consider both Title 10 and Title 32 requirements for the respective components.

21. The emerging growth of radio frequency identification technology and the required uses and security implications for DoD

22. What are the role and impact of contractors on the battlefield?

23. What are the role and impact of nongovernmental organizations on the battlefield?

24. Will the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) enhance supply chain management?

25. Assess how to implement BRAC decisions while not impacting readiness.
26. Consider the difficulties created within the prepositioned stock program by how quickly the equipment needs of the Army change.

27. What is the military’s role in controlling environmental impact on the modern battlefield?

28. Assess the implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS).

29. Assess whether indemnification is still a good strategy for GOCOs when using performance-based acquisition principles.

30. Has the integration of Automated Identification Technology (AIT) into logistics tracking systems used for visibility and accountability of Class V, VII, and IX lived up to Army/DoD expectations during the most recent deployments into Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines? If not, what have been the shortcomings?


32. Logistics Transformation—Reduce Footprint
   a. Distribute supply nodes dynamically across the battlefield
   b. Robust and flexible transportation networks—leverage Joint capabilities to share
   c. Situational awareness of requirements, demand, and location of forces
   d. Net-centric environment where IT provides seamless connectivity
   e. “Wal-Mart” like efficiencies
   f. Develop, create, and put into use a tracking system—FedEx and UPS
   g. Actualize the Rapid Fielding Initiative and Rapid Equipping Force
   h. Adopt CBM+ across the Army—export successes from Army Aviation
   i. Predictive and ‘smart’ supply management

33. Support the Army Structure Transformation—Think Expeditionary
   a. Supply and sustain an increased number of soldiers (Active force at least 547,400)
b. Support expansion and modular conversion (FY 07—13) of AC and ARNG BCT and AC
c. ARNG, USAR multifunctional and functional support brigades; include readiness and availability
d. Deploy and employ logistics forces simultaneously
e. Evolve supply methods to enable modular conversion
f. Develop modular logistics organizations complementing overall modular Army structure
g. Reset APS and ASF and convert into modular structures
h. ARFORGEN—Review and properly equip units
i. Role of security assistance and expanded use of U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC)
j. Directly connect the warfighter to the logistics environment—flatten the logistics chain
k. Robust and flexible transportation networks
l. Prepare for a possible increase in the use of sea basing for strategic logistics support
m. Reduce or eliminate demand; shrink size of supplies.
n. Replacement for fossil fuels
o. Super reliable, self repairing machinery and electronics
p. Replace food with pill or tablet
q. Way to recycle and reuse body waste
r. Predictive logistics through data/trend analysis for real-time support

34. Contractors on the Battlefield
   a. Examine statutory and regulatory implications of contractors in the fight.
   b. Are the contractor tasks captured and translated into soldier-based maintenance in a timely matter?
   c. Examine contractor labor levels and applications in adjusting Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) for weapons system sustainment.
   d. Are the transitions from PBL contractor to retail logistics (at the weapon system) addressed in automation initiatives?
   e. Examine LOGCAP current capabilities and enhancements that duplicate contractor missions.

35. Assess the impacts of DoD and DA regulations on GOCO facilities. Consider the effects of such requirements on the factors of production and the feasibility of carrying out all tasks on installations that are personnel and resource deprived.
36. Assess the efficiency of the Army structure to support the acquisition life cycle:
   a. Assess the impact of RDECOM, LCMCs, FCS, multiple TRADOC representatives, the Rapid Equipping Force on Readiness and expedition fielding.
   b. What effects do multiple process owners, multiple customers and overlapping functions have on morale and productivity?

37. Determine the opportunities and challenges associated with developing a Federated Army Net-Centric Sites (FANS) operating model to conduct Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computing and Information Technology (C4IT) interoperability testing.

VI. Global War on Terror:

1. Overarching, integrated analysis of terrorism funding, including narco-terrorism, sale of diamonds, etc.

2. Technological advances and/or dual-use technologies that can bolster border protection and homeland security

VII. Military Change:

1. Analyze of the issues associated with implementing the Army’s data strategy and products to improve NETOPS functionality.

2. Analyze of Multi-Level Security (MLS) issues for systems being developed for the Future Force.

3. Discuss IPV6/IPV4 translation issues and implementation pilots/demos required.

4. Develop strategic options for providing an acceptable level of protection for information systems and networks using fewer resources. The problem is balancing the manpower, time and materiel costs of protecting U.S. information systems from enemy exploitation so we can provide an acceptable level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the information in U.S. operational and tactical systems and networks with the requirement to conserve scarce resources.
5. Assess the impact of the growing requirements to use wireless technology to communicate on and off the battlefield.

6. Weapons: Look closely at a new individual weapon (e.g., rifles and machine guns). To any soldier under fire, the ability to save his own life, and those of his colleagues, begins, and often ends, with the individual weapon (rifle, pistol or bayonet-knife). For the long term, we must look at electronic, electro-magnetic and laser weapons. For the short term, replace the M16 rifle. The M16 rifle first appeared in 1957. It was a marginally effective weapon then, and its successors have not been much better. Increase use of the Mossberg 12ga military shotgun, the M240 machine gun (7.62 NATO), the M2 .50 cal heavy machine gun, a .45 cal pistol, the Barrett .50 cal sniper rifle and the M24 sniper rifle.

7. Radios: Every soldier should be equipped with a personal communications device of the future. Just as every cop on the beat has a hand-held radio, every member of a squad should possess a communications device sophisticated enough to allow every soldier to remain connected to every other soldier in his squad, and if needed, beyond. If possible, the device should provide data as well as voice.

8. Protection: Technology exists today to equip light infantry with an exoskeleton—essentially a robotic suit powered by a small gas engine that a soldier can strap on his arms and legs. Computers and sophisticated hydraulics sense and amplify muscular movements in his arms and legs. In the interim keep body armor relatively light and reliable.

9. Mind and Body: Greater attention must be given to the selection, bonding, and psychological and physical preparation of close combat soldiers if they are to perform well in the dangerous, unfamiliar and horrifically desolate terrain and weather in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Modern science offers some promising solutions.

10. IEDs and Beyond: Adapt to protect against future threats. IEDs and other threats will change. The enemy will improve capabilities to disrupt soldiers. Look at protecting against the growing threat to helicopters.

11. Night Vision: Do whatever it takes to keep the U.S. in the lead. Make sure we continue to “own the night.”
12. Lights: Weapon mounted and personal lights are essential in urban operations. Develop such items with sufficient power to support long duration missions.

VIII. Force Management and Leadership:

1. The Arming of Civilians: What are the implications from an international law perspective and what protections/safeguards exist for the individual?

2. Deployment Incentives: What compensation should be provided to deploying DACs, including necessary legislative changes (i.e., tax exemptions, recruitment bonuses, increased life insurance, etc.). What can be done to encourage more civilians to deploy in the face of an aging workforce? What recruitment and retention incentives should be considered for emergency-essential personnel?

3. Special Needs: What special needs exist for civilians and contractors who are deploying or on the battlefield? The CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) does not have enough uniforms in unusual (larger) sizes to allow everyone to deploy in a timely manner.

4. Disciplinary and Performance Issues: How should disciplinary and performance issues be handled for deployed DACs? AR 690-700, Chapter 751, states that the on-site chain of command has the authority and the discretion to initiate appropriate administrative action against a civilian employee for misconduct or disciplinary issues. Generally speaking, the easiest course of action is to send the employee back to the home station, many times with no documentation of the infraction or problem. This often results in no action being taken because the home station does not have the information necessary to take the disciplinary or performance action.

5. Post-deployment issues: What physical/psychological services should be available to DACs and contractor employees for injuries suffered on the battlefield, including post traumatic stress syndrome, etc.?

6. Attracting and developing senior civilian leadership

7. Conduct a feasibility assessment on matrixing AMC’s C4IT capabilities into technical Center of Excellence designed to provide services back to the command.
8. What would be an effective strategy to shift program requirements from supplemental back to their base funded program?

9. What are the critical elements required in a justification/impact statement on shifting programs/requirements from supplemental to base funding?

10. Chemical warfare destruction
United States Military Academy

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I. Homeland Security; U.S. Army:

1. Securing the southern border of the United States from illegal immigration
2. Ramifications of the North American Defense Agreement
3. Budgetary politics: the problem of allocating funds for homeland security
4. Evolution of civil-military relations
5. Motivations for service in the U.S. armed forces
6. Growth of the gap between the U.S. military and American society
7. The level of civilian support for the war on terrorism: key determinants
8. The nature and quality of American patriotism and nationalism
9. The state of the military as a profession
10. Best practices for the U.S. Army in post-hostility operations
11. Best practices for the U.S. Army in the war on terrorism
12. Best practices for the U.S. Army in counterinsurgency strategy
13. The process of military reform: What are the components of a successful strategy?
14. Preemptive versus preventive war: evolution and legitimacy of concepts
15. The evolution of the Army Field Manual: key determinants
16. The reform of military education to better encompass language and culture training.

II. International Issues:

1. The roots of anti-Americanism: regional variations
2. The utility of public diplomacy; best practices
3. Democratization as a response to terrorism: promise and limitations
4. The threat convergence of WMD proliferation and terrorism
5. The use of information warfare tactics by violent nonstate actors
6. Internet-related challenges to U.S. grand strategy and national security
7. Cooperation between the United States and the EU (also individual countries) in the war on terror
8. The erosion of Latin American democracy over the past decade: undermining U.S. security interests in the region
10. To what extent does Chavez control the political process in Venezuela? Develop metrics to gauge the strength of organized and diffuse opposition to Chavez. Evaluate the strength of civil and political society. What are the prospects for democratization under and/or after Chavez?
11. The prospects for stability and democratization in Cuba over the next decade: the roles of the Cuban Army and foreign investment
12. The growth of Islamic radicalism in Latin America: determinants
13. The growth of Islamic radicalism in Africa: determinants
14. Identification of the sources of liberalization in the Arab world: the role of intellectuals, the middle class, NGOs, and international pressure
15. Sources of democratization in the Muslim world: case studies in Asia and Africa

16. The interpretation of Muslim scripture as a support for political and cultural liberalization

17. Evaluate the utility of Turkey as a model for democratization for other Islamic nations.

18. Political reform in Morocco and Kuwait as models of “reform from above” for other Islamic countries

19. Explanations for the strength of moderate Islam of Mali. Why have Wahhabi or jihadist movements failed to strike deep roots in Malian society?

20. Assess the ability of Indonesia, the largest Islamic nation, to contain Islamic radicalism and institutionalized democratic institutions.

21. Hezbollah: estimating the growth of its influence in Lebanese politics over the next 5 years

22. Palestinian and Israeli politics: prospects for an authentic two-state solution

23. Prospects for defeating insurgency in Afghanistan under NATO

24. Prospects for democratization and state-building in Afghanistan

25. Social, political, economic, and cultural obstacles to democratization in Iran

26. Best practices for the U.S. Army in nation and state-building in Iraq. The components of an American “Plan B” in Iraq: What does Iraq and the immediate region look like in terms of America’s role if reconciliation and stabilization fail?

27. Measuring the prospects for state failure in Pakistan: develop metrics

28. Identify the relative political strengths in Pakistan of liberals and Islamists
29. What are the political interests of the Pakistani military as a corporate body?

30. Deescalation of tension between India and Pakistan: How durable? What are the prospects for a settlement in Kashmir?

31. Identify the factors that support a closer political and military relationship between India and the United States. How durable are these factors?

32. What is the state of Indo-Chinese relations? What are the prospects for political and military rivalry?

33. Politics of oil in Africa. Threats to the free flow of oil to the United States

34. The prospects for state- and nation-building in Nigeria under the new government

35. Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan: prospects for successful democratization

36. Ukraine and Georgia: prospects for membership in NATO

37. Russia’s response to “regime change” on its borders. Assess the growth and durability of Russian political, military, economic, and cultural influence in the Near Abroad, particularly Central Asia.

38. Evaluate Russia’s contributions as a partner in the war on terror

39. The growing estrangement of Russia from the West: the role of the siloviki

40. Identify policies that might enable the West to influence Russian behavior

41. Gauging the stability of Chechnya: Has separatism and radicalism been contained or have they metastasized to surrounding republics?

42. Instability in Daghestan: Identify the causes; weight the prospects for worsening crime and political unrest.
43. Politics of leadership succession in Russia: Assess the “liberal credentials” and policy preferences of President Medvedev; evaluate his ability to push through an agenda that challenges the Putinists.

44. Politics of oil and gas pipelines in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and western China

45. The politics of succession in Kazakhstan: What institutional forces are likely to play a role after Nazarbayev’s death or retirement?

46. The prospects for political stability and political reform in Turkmenistan

47. Problems of human security as obstacles to building sound states and promoting democratization

48. Evaluate the roots of the current food crisis and the prospects for a second “Green Revolution” to alleviate global economic distress.
Sustaining U.S. Contractor Support versus “Capacity Building”: Much of the engineering design and project management, and all of the construction work for USACE-managed programs is performed by contract. During the early stages of foreign contingency operations, the U.S. Government typically calls on major elements of the American engineering and construction industry to provide rapid support. Such firms often accept such work, with all its uncertainties, hoping to later qualify for long-term work in a given theater. Policy that mandates maximizing contract awards to local firms, and training them for greater capacity, provides disincentives for U.S. firms to gamble early on contingency contracts, either by declining to bid at all or to build in short-term profits by bidding for significantly higher payment. How can this contradiction be addressed to the benefit of U.S. national security?

Efficiency versus Effectiveness: Both the institutional and the operational Army have seen significant pressures for enhanced efficiencies, doing more with less. Carried to an extreme, efforts in this direction lead to an Army that is 100% efficient, with all of its personnel and other resources fully employed performing current tasks. This leaves no surge capability to respond to unforeseen contingency requirements. How can we balance our requirements to provide adequate surge capacity to win our Nation’s wars (effectiveness) as a “not-for-profit” organization with demands for business efficiency?

Strengthening the Scientific and Engineering Capacity Available To Serve the Army and the Nation: At a time when science and technology continues to play an ever-increasing role in transforming society and warfare, the numbers of scientists and engineers graduating from our colleges and universities nationwide continues to decline. What can the Army do to promote and encourage larger numbers of our youth to pursue technical degrees, whether as civilians, as members of ROTC, or within USMA?

Civilian Deployments to OCONUS Contingencies: DoD is currently changing or adjusting personnel recruiting, transfer, and other incentive policies to encourage more civilians to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of GWOT. The problem of maintaining adequate civilian staffing in support of U.S. national security policies has grown as the elapsed time has gone to being measured in years rather than months, and as roles for civilian participation have increased. How critical will it be to solve this problem as the Long War drags on, perhaps for decades?
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve

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1. Examine the current process for health assessment and follow-up care of Army Reserve soldiers returning from combat theaters. Post-deployment health assessment and follow-up care for these soldiers presents challenges for the health care community in general. Study should identify the existing shortcomings and the recommended policy, regulatory and legislative enablers to improve the provision of post-deployment care to soldiers, including those in remote areas where TRICARE availability is limited or not available.

2. Examine the provision of medical and dental care to Army Reserve soldiers. Medical and dental readiness shortfalls are significant contributors to the non-deployability of AR soldiers. Ensuring recurring and assured access to AR capabilities in an environment of persistent conflict requires that those shortcomings are overcome. Examine the current process for the provision of care to Army Reserve soldiers and recommend solutions to improve their medical and dental readiness throughout the ARFORGEN cycle, including soldiers residing in remote locations. Study should address the following questions/points:
   a. Based on the ARFORGEN model and historical data, what is the projected cost to Army to institute pre-mobilization medical and dental care to RC Soldiers?
   b. Based on historical data, what is the projected cost savings the Army could realize by providing required corrective medical and dental care pre-mobilization vice at the mobilization station?
   c. Should limitations be placed on pre-mobilization medical/dental benefits for RC Soldiers?
   d. What barriers (e.g. legal, policy, regulatory, legislative) currently exist that preclude the provision of medical and dental care prior to mobilization?
   e. What are the “quick-wins” that can be identified for immediate implementation to improve medical and dental readiness in the Army Reserve and what are the costs and benefits associated with each?

3. Examine and determine opportunities to more effectively recruit and retain health care professionals into the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve is experiencing challenges in attracting and retaining health care professionals across the force. To address these challenges, examine current initiatives
and management practices and propose solutions to the current recruiting and retention issues impacting the Army Reserve. Research/study should identify the policy, regulatory and legislative barriers, and enablers to achieving recruiting and retention goals for health care professionals in an Operational Reserve in an era of persistent conflict.

4. Examine current practices for manning the force as an operational reserve. In a time of unprecedented employment of its forces, the Army Reserve—like the other services—is challenged to recruit and retain soldiers to man its formations. The future security environment will be characterized by persistent conflict across the spectrum of operations. Manning an operational reserve in an environment of persistent conflict will require a new portfolio of management tools and practices. Study/research should address the following:
   a. Identify the projected long-term effects of persistent/sustained conflict on the ability to recruit soldiers to man an operational reserve.
   b. Identify the projected long-term effects of persistent/sustained conflict on the ability to retain sufficient numbers of soldiers to man an operational reserve.
   c. Identify the best mix of prior service and nonprior service soldiers to adequately man an operational reserve.
   d. Identify a menu of incentives that could enable the Army Reserve to sufficiently man an operational reserve.
   e. Identify current practices that are obsolete in an environment of persistent conflict as they relate to manning an operational reserve.
   f. Identify the “quick-wins” that can be identified for immediate implementation to increase recruiting and retention rates in an operational reserve.

5. Examine and assess the potential long-term effects of utilizing the Army Reserve as an operational force and the impact of that use on recruiting and retention rates over the long term. Identify potential initiatives to reverse negative trends that might emerge as a result of operationalizing the RC and develop a strategy for their implementation. Research/study should identify the policy, and regulatory and legislative enablers required to implement initiatives.

6. Examine the change in paradigm from a strategic to an operational reserve in an effort to identify and quantify the point at which military responsibilities and duties become too demanding for part-time citizen-soldiers. At what deployment/operations tempo point does the concept of an operational reserve begin to negatively impact unit readiness? Study/research should identify mitigation options, their costs and a strategy for implementation.
7. Examine DoD-wide credentialing programs as they relate to manning the force as an operational reserve. Current credentialing programs allow for the determination of a civilian Standard Occupation Code (SOC) based on a Military Occupation Code (MOC) but not the reverse. As such, these current programs serve largely as a transition benefit for separating soldiers rather than as a recruiting tool for potential new soldiers. An effective credentialing program that provides for accelerated accession into the Reserve Components could mitigate recruiting challenges currently facing the force. Study/research should address the following:
   a. Identify the barriers and enablers associated with expanding existing “credentialing” programs to make them a benefit to potential NPS candidates.
   b. Determine if there is value added in executing a “proof of principle” and if so quantify the scope of that effort and recommended civilian target.
   c. Identify the “quick wins” that could be implemented immediately to improve manning in the Army Reserve.

8. Examine opportunities to expand Army Reserve participation in International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. IMET is a grant program established by Congress as part of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. IMET grants enable foreign military personnel from countries that are financially incapable of paying for training to take courses offered annually at U.S. military schools. IMET is designed to accomplish two primary goals: (1) help strengthen foreign militaries through the provision of skills necessary for the proper functioning of a civilian controlled professional military, and (2) serve as an “instrument of influence” through which the U.S. shapes the doctrine, operating procedures and the values of foreign militaries. In its current state, IMET is an Active Component function. Study/research should address the following:
   a. Identify opportunities for the Army Reserve to build relationships through IMET that could translate into future Security Cooperation missions conducted by the Army Reserve.
   b. Determine if Army Reserve participation in IMET would lead to an increased partnership capacity with a foreign nation’s RC.
   c. Identify existing barriers to increasing Army Reserve participation in IMET and recommend a strategy — along with critical enablers — to implement.

9. Examine opportunities to leverage Army Reserve core skill sets for participation in security cooperation missions. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) does not apportion forces specifically for security
cooperation missions. Forces employed for security cooperation missions come from forces assigned to a COCOM’s AOR or forces that are temporarily deployed for engagement activities. The Army Reserve does not have a formalized mechanism to source forces for recurring participation in security cooperation missions. Study/research should address the following:

a. Determine benefits afforded to the Army Reserve through participation in security cooperation missions.

b. Recommend a strategy for sourcing security cooperation missions and determine if such missions are supportable using the ARFORGEN construct.

c. Identify the barriers and critical enablers (e.g. policy, regulatory, legislative) to implement the strategy for the Army Reserve.

d. Identify “quick-wins” that could result in increased Army Reserve participation in security cooperation missions.

10. Examine the current Full-time support (FTS) program in the Army Reserve and its ability to support an operational reserve. FTS in the Army Reserve is a critical readiness enabler for an operational reserve. In its current form, the FTS program is not configured in a manner that results in predictable and assured recurrent access to ready Army Reserve forces. Examine the current FTS program in the Army Reserve and determine its ability to provide optimal support to an operational reserve in an era of persistent conflict. Research should identify initiatives and strategies to transform the FTS program to better support an operational reserve as well as the policy, regulatory and legislative enablers to transformation.

11. Examine the impact of the redesignation of Army Civil Affairs (CA) and PSYOP forces as part of the conventional force. A recent DEPSECDEF decision has re-designated selected Army CA/PSYOP forces as conventional forces rather than SOF. Study/research should address the following:

a. Determine whether the Army has responded adequately to this reintegration effort with regards to doctrine, policy, programming, concept and materiel development, training, equipping and sustainment (both pre-mob and post deployment).

b. Propose solutions to identified deficiencies.

c. Develop a strategy to ensure the ability of the now-conventional CA and PSYOP forces to meet the demands of an operational reserve in an era of persistent conflict.

12. Numerous countries are considering creating/restructuring their Reserve Components as part of security sector reforms. Analyze this process, either from a general perspective (the theoretical benefits of different RC structures,
historical analysis of past reforms) or by looking at specific countries and their likely strategic choices. Identify opportunities for the Army Reserve to engage foreign militaries in this process and develop appropriate engagement strategies.

13. Examine the challenges associated with cross-cultural communications. Cross-cultural communications on the ground present significant challenges for Joint Force commanders. Study/research should focus on the development of solutions to these challenges including the determination of the best mix of heritage speakers and career linguists across the force (Active, Guard, Reserve, contractor and civil service) and strategies for the development and delivery of cultural/language familiarization training.
1. What are the appropriate roles and missions for the Army’s components?
   a. The ARNG as part of the operational force?
   b. ARNG’s state role in addition to federal role?

2. What is the future force structure of the Army National Guard?
   a. Considering only the needs of state governors in domestic operations, many critics have suggested that the ARNG should predominantly consist of CS/CSS force structure. However, the Constitutional basis for the National Guard is as armed militia for the governors, so “trigger pullers” were arguably intended by the Framers of the Constitution. This legacy of combat arms in the ARNG continues to this day.
   b. Are the ARNG’s 28 BCTs, 8 Combat Aviation Brigades, and other structure enough?
   c. Role of ARNG’s maneuver enhancement brigades and CS/CSS brigades in war and domestic operations

3. What is the future of the All Volunteer Force?
   a. Although the ARNG has achieved personnel strength of 350,000 troops, will Army resource the ARNG with equipment to accomplish its missions?
   b. How will continued deployments/mobilizations affect the ARNG’s ability to remain a viable State and Federal volunteer force?

4. How can the Army National Guard personnel system transform?
   a. Will the ARNG receive resources to further automate its personnel system with DIMHRS, iPERMS, etc.?
   b. How will new 12-Month Mobilization Policy affect the management of ARNG soldiers?

5. What is the future of training simulation in the Army National Guard?
   a. Located in Indiana, the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center (MUTC) is a self-contained training environment. The 1,000 acre site was turned over to the Indiana National Guard in July 2005 and has been evolving into a full-immersion contemporary urban training center.
   b. ARNG Aviation forces regularly use a combination of individual and collective training equipment to keep aviation skills sharp.
c. The BCTC at Fort Leavenworth also uses simulation training to prepare combat brigades and battalions for the warfighting and other operations
d. How else could simulation be utilized to maximize training in the ARNG?

6. How should the mobilization and deployment processes be changed?
a. The new 1-year mobilization is an appropriate change. Coupled with this new 1-year mobilization are efforts to increase pre-mobilization training and reduce post-mobilization training.
b. How will new 12-Month Mobilization Policy affect the management of ARNG forces?

7. How can the National Guard expand the State Partnership Program (SPP)? The National Guard’s SPP links a particular state with a particular foreign nation to promote and enhance bilateral relations with that nation. It nurtures dependable collaborative partners for coalition operations in support of the Global War on Terror. There are 51 countries currently linked to 44 states, 2 territories (Puerto Rico and Guam), and Washington, DC. SPP seems to be a good way for a U.S. Governor to support overseas COCOM Theater Security Cooperation plans and overseas U.S. Embassy efforts without actually having to send Guard forces out of state. Does SPP present an economical way for the United States to assist partner nations while simultaneously freeing more Active Component forces for warfighting and expeditionary missions?

8. How should the ARNG develop commission and warrant officers? Although the ARNG develops warrant officers in ways similar to the Active Component, the ARNG must allow warrant officers to maintain civilian jobs. What challenges does this present?

9. How should the ARNG implement the Army Force Generation Model? In April 2007, the DARNG approved the latest array of ARNG forces in the ARFORGEN template. With ARNG forces plugged into the ARFORGEN model, the ARNG is already executing. How can the ARNG balance ARFORGEN execution with domestic operations, which are difficult to predict?

10. Future ARNG Force Structure: What can the ARNG sustain? With 350,000 personnel, the ARNG has sufficient personnel strength to sustain its current force structure. Will the Army permit the ARNG to grow?
11. Impact of the Global War on Terror on officer and NCO career development. Deployments have admittedly forced some individual officers, NCOs, and soldiers to defer their professional schooling. However, the schools can be rescheduled for these individuals. It is not a serious problem for the Guard. One must also keep in mind that for most Guardsmen and Guardswomen, their military careers are second careers. Guardsmen and Guardswomen have always had to schedule their military professional schooling around events in their civilian careers. Can the Army and the ARNG better accommodate ARNG Officers, NCOs, and soldiers in terms of professional development and schooling?

12. What levels and forces will the ARNG require to fight the war on terrorism for 10 to 20 years? The ARNG currently has sufficient forces to fight the Global War on Terror and perform its other missions during the decade ahead. However, the Guard could easily grow. One should remember that ARNG forces include unique units such as civil support teams (CSTs), which are ideal for protecting the homeland against acts of terror. How should the ARNG grow to best support the Global War on Terror and perform its other missions during the decade ahead?

13. Can the ARNG continue to provide its own replacements for extended periods under the current Partial Mobilization Authority? There is no policy requiring the ARNG to replace its deployed units with other ARNG units. ARNG forces are sourced as part of the “Total Army” forces. The needs of the Army and the availability of all the Army’s forces will continue to determine what forces are provided by the ARNG. When the Army determines that an ARNG capability is required, the Partial Mobilization Authority serves as authority to mobilize the ARNG forces. Should the Army try to replace ARNG units in theater with other ARNG units to best implement the new 12-Month Mobilization Policy?

14. What is the State Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) role and interaction with NORTHCOM? Each of the 50 States, Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia has its own Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ). The JFHQ provides the Governor and the Adjutant General with planning and staffing capability for contingencies. In an emergency situation, the Governor and Adjutant General typically exercise command and control through the JFHQ and the JFHQ actively coordinates all the activities within the state or territory. Unless ARNG forces have been federalized, they are not subordinate to NORTHCOM. To the contrary, federal forces typically come in to augment National Guard and other first responders at the request of a state’s governor. How can NORTCHOM best support a State’s JFHQ during a domestic operation?
15. What is the impact of remobilizing ARNG soldiers for a second deployment? Repeated deployments are admittedly stressful for Guard members, their families, and their employers. Nevertheless, the ARNG continues to meet missions, and the personnel strength of the ARNG is good. For the long term, it is important to provide as much predictability as possible for Guard members, their families, and their employers. For the individuals and units that endure extended deployments or suffer from insufficient dwell time between deployments, incentives should be provided. How can the Army and ARNG best provide predictability to ARNG soldiers, employers, and family members?

16. Define requirements and resourcing criteria for the ARNG in each ARFORGEN cycle. For ARFORGEN to work properly, units must be resourced properly. Early in the ARFORGEN cycle, ARNG units need to have their equipment so that they can train with it. As a unit progresses into the later stages of the ARFORGEN cycle, additional training days have to be built into the schedule. In the final stages of the ARFORGEN cycle, personnel stabilization policies must be utilized to keep trained personnel in the unit. Will the Army and the Nation resource the ARNG to meet the requirements of ARFORGEN?

17. What is the National Guard role in a post-Katrina Homeland Defense environment? The ARNG forces in each state and territory are still the first responders. This will not change for at least two reasons. First, while the Active Component forces are consolidated on relatively few federal installations, the ARNG is already “forward deployed” in each state and territory. Second, the ARNG is immediately responsive as it provides capabilities directly to the Governor on scene. How can the ARNG best support the Governors and first responders in a crisis? Will the Army and the Nation resource the ARNG to meet the requirements Homeland Defense missions?

18. Will the ARNG’s role in the operational force present so many training requirements and mobilizations that individuals will stop volunteering to serve in the ARNG?

19. NGB currently provides NORTHCOM with information and assists in planning for possible NORTHCOM support to first responders during domestic emergencies. What should be the relationship between the National Guard Bureau, ARNORTH, and NORTHCOM?
20. What are some of the systemic processes that inhibit National Guard units from increasing their readiness posture? What can be done to correct these systemic inhibitors?

21. Since the ARNG has hit its FY13 objective end strength 4 years before it is scheduled, what end strength level can the ARNG achieve and how can that level provide additional capability to the Army? What is the impact to the Army of the ARNG growing beyond 358,200?

22. There has been a great deal of discussion since the Committee on the National Guard and Reserve’s report about Strategic Reserve versus Operational Reserve. What is the definition of an operational reserve? How does this different reserve component construct better serve the nation as a portion of the military element of power. How can this be used to leverage domestic power in a manner similar to the concept of the “Abrams Doctrine”? Does this new construct provide an additional continuing tool for the nation to use in international engagement in operations other than war? (POC: David K. Germain, Deputy Division Chief, ARNG Plans, Readiness and Mobilization Division (703) 607-7372.

23. The Secretary of Defense has mandated a one year mobilization period for Reserve Component units. How can pre-mobilization preparations including personnel, training and logistics be used to minimize not just training, but total time at the mobilization station, thus maximizing “boots on the ground” mission execution for a unit’s mobilization cycle? What does “right” look like in these pre-mobilization preparations: time of sourcing, time of alert, unit stabilization, training time for traditional RC soldiers prior to mobilization, etc? With the correct preparations, is the Cold War concept of a mobilization station still necessary? POC: David K. Germain, Deputy Division Chief, ARNG Plans, Readiness and Mobilization Division (703) 607-7372.

24. Within current force structure allowances, end strength allowances and funding constraints, what statutory, regulatory, fiscal, policy and procedure changes can be made to ensure that an Army National Guard unit attains the highest personnel readiness (P1) by the day of mobilization (M-Day) and achieves maximum deployability from assigned soldiers prior to deployment? POC: David K. Germain, Deputy Division Chief, ARNG Plans, Readiness and Mobilization Division (703) 607-7372.