2012-13 Key Strategic Issues List

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KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST (KSIL)
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NOTE: Topics with (**) are priority from Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; topics with (*) are priority topics from Headquarters Department of the Army, G-3/5 and G-4.
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FOREWORD

The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is published annually for the purpose of making students and other researchers aware of strategic topics that are, or are likely to become, of special importance to the U.S. Army. The list is a compilation of input from the faculty at the Strategic Studies Institute, the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army’s senior leadership, as well as from civilian and military defense experts. The topics are updated annually and reflect current as well as ongoing strategic concerns. The underlying theme this year is strategic “rebalancing”—as the U.S. Army prepares to shift its focus from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations to carrying out rebalancing initiatives, shaping the strategic environment, deterring regional aggression, improving crisis response capabilities, and completing its downsizing efforts. Consolidation of important strategic and tactical successes in the war against al Qaeda will also continue, as will the efforts to distill lessons from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Researchers are encouraged to contact any of the faculty members of the Strategic Studies Institute listed herein for further information regarding current or potential topics.

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
PART I

PRIORITY HQDA AND CONSENSUS TOPICS

FUNCTIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES
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I. Landpower Employment: Evolving Roles and Missions

1. ** Defining the Future Threat.
2. **Shifting the Army’s Focus to the Pacific.
3. **Conventional Forces: Building Partnership Capacity.
   a. *Assess the ability of current partners to assume Phase IV/V operational responsibility in a conflict. Consider both warfighting and sustainment capabilities.
4. *The demonstrated inability of the interagency to source its support to land operations fully (most notably during Phase IV/V) places a burden on the Army to provide stability and reconstruction capabilities. Should the Army institutionalize those required capabilities by designing a force structure that specifically addresses stability and reconstruction requirements, and if so how?
5. *The Army has revised FM 3-0 and changed the Army Operating Concept to Unified Operations—enabled by core competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. How will this change the Army’s contribution to joint force operations?
7. Recommend ways that the Army can broaden its focus from counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and training of partners to shaping the strategic environment, preventing the outbreak of dangerous regional conflicts, and improving the Army’s readiness to respond in force to a range of complex contingencies worldwide.

II. Landpower Generation and Sustainment

1. *Evaluate the Army’s ability to generate and sustain landpower in a protracted conflict.
   a. *Given the decreasing support and capacity from allied forces, does the United States need to increase the size of the ground components to ensure sufficient overmatch/manageable risk in future ground-centric joint campaigns?
   b. *How should the Army (Operational and Generating Force) organize to ensure it is expansible should it need to grow to meet demand in time of conflict? Consider the need for mid- and senior-grade officers and NCOs.
   c. *What is the Army’s responsibility to provide a strategic reserve?
   d. *Should the Army continue utilization of ARFORGEN as a core process versus its use of a temporary wartime procedure? How does the Army’s Title 10 requirement to generate forces change based on conditions and demand?
   e. *Conduct a review of the progress of the Materiel Core Enterprise in integrating sustainment, materiel systems development, and improved materiel life-cycle functions. Assess the level of industry engagement in materiel enterprise strategy and forums and potential contributions.
   f. *Conduct a review to find the best ways to equip our Soldiers in the current operating environment.
   g. *Sustainment of BCT units in current and future operational environments will take place over widely dispersed areas of challenging terrain. Reduced logistics structure and personnel tax units to deliver critical but
often small items and supplies over terrain and distance, using convoys or non-organic requested airframes. Assess whether small UAVs have the potential to address operational shortcomings and challenges associated with aerial delivery under these scenarios.

h. *The dismounted squad has emerged as a “strategic force,” with the future squad envisioned as being organized, trained, equipped, and enabled as a “formation.” Key enablers for this squad in the conduct of operations will be the reduction of the Soldier’s load and improved power and energy capacities. Conduct a high-level assessment of critical task lists for the squad, its impact upon current and future logistics capabilities, and correlation of current investments to desired capabilities.

i. *Evaluate the use of Army multi-modal capabilities in support of contingency operations during Phases II-V of the Joint Operational Phasing Model.

j. *Assess the transformation of Army sustainment over the past decade. What changes (if any) need to be made to Army logistics force structure and modularity concept.

k. *Evaluate the joint logistics lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq to identify what changes need to be made to DOTMLPF.

l. *Assess both Army and joint lessons learned from a logistics planner perspective and determine which findings should be incorporated into the future logistics planner’s template or identified as new planning factors for consideration.

m. *Identify the changes that need to be made to Army contracting doctrine and policy as a result of contracting operations experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

n. *Analyze the current acquisition process. Identify recommendations for improving the requirements determination, validation, and funding process to speed delivery solutions to the warfighter.
2. *Assess the utility and role of advanced technologies in Army sustainment and logistics.*
   a. *Discuss potential contingency basing initiatives that would improve energy requirements and efficiencies. Determine metrics for operational energy that can be employed at the tactical level.*
   b. *The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report stated that the OSD must take steps to strengthen the technology and private sector’s industrial base to facilitate innovation, to include ensuring that critical skills are not lost and that access to venture funding and overall access to capital for small technology start-up companies are assessed. Evaluate observations on OSD efforts to address potential private sector critical issues.*
   c. *Identify science and technological advancements that can be used to meet future logistics requirements.*
   d. *Efforts to develop the means to transfer NIPRNet data onto and off the SIPRNet in near-real time without compromising security have not kept pace with the demands of commanders and staffs for a shared true common operating picture. Identify a clear and rational path for the Army to achieve an integrated network for planning, execution, and control.*
   e. *Conduct a review to develop alternative energy sources to mitigate the dependency on logistics and reduce the number of resupply missions. Explore the use of micro-grids for power generation and converting waste to energy are examples of possible life- and cost-saving methods.*
   f. *Assess logistics dependencies on space-based/space-enabled communications systems. Identify potential means to recognize, respond to, and mitigate the impacts of degraded space environments on the delivery of critical logistics support for combat operations. Identify opportunities to train logistics leaders at all levels on how to operate in a degraded space environment.*
continuity of operations requirements that might help mitigate SATCOM points of failure.

g. *Conduct a review of industry and government initiatives for space-based solar power, with the focus on the current level of investment dollars and projected return on investment. Space solar power is the conversion of solar energy at a location outside of the earth’s atmosphere into power that is usable either in space or on earth. Microwave technology would be used to transmit energy through space back to receiver stations on earth. Commercial sector firms are exploring the capability, but it is not addressed in either the National Space Strategy or the Army Space Strategy. The review should focus on technical and economic feasibility.

3. *Evaluate measures to overcome anti-access and area-denial strategies.

4. *Assess whether and how the Army should maintain forces overseas.

5. *Evaluate measures for operating in areas with primitive and austere infrastructures.

6. *Moving beyond the scope of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publication on Money As A Weapons System (MAAWS); how can in-depth planning for Operational Contract Support (OCS) be integrated into the Combatant Commander’s Campaign Plan and subsequently into the Department of State/United Nations follow-on strategies?

7. *Assess the role of doctrine in a dynamic environment and in the age of wiki-information.

8. *Assess various methods to organize capabilities at the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level:
   a. *Is modularity most functional at the BCT level or better considered at the battalion or division level of employment?
b. *What are the effects of equipping the aviation force to 80% of the Army Acquisition Objective?

9. *Evaluate the tradeoffs of power projection, prepositioning, and forward stationing.
   a. *ASCCs and MACOMs frequently request short-term loans from APS giving auditors the impression that the Army uses APS as a convenient supply warehouse instead of as a strategic asset; can APS fulfill both roles?
   b. *Virtually all fielded products of a Program Manager (PM) will be deployed into an operational theater sometime during the product life cycle; if that product requires contracted support during the deployed period, how best can PMs plan for the application of OCS when mapping the life cycle?
   c. *What is the most efficient means to integrate systems modernization into APS strategic planning?

10. *Evaluate the impact of the expanding or decreasing roles of contractors and other civilians in defense operations.
    a. *Operational Contract Support: How can we strengthen the commander’s ability to use OCS and how do we structure the force to be able to effectively execute OCS during full spectrum operations?
    b. *Is there an over reliance on contractor logistics support (CLS)? Assess/Analyze CLS and what capabilities should be maintained/adjusted in the future maintenance force structure given pending budget and force structure constraints.
    c. *What is the most effective way to encourage green cost savings and forward-thinking contractors with regard to base life support for our contingency forces?
11. *Should there be a Joint Depot Maintenance Organization as some have suggested or should each Service Chief retain the capability to sustain its Service responsibilities under Title X? Assess the benefits and risks associated with such an organization as well as its effectiveness in light of the performance of Army depots over the last decade.


13. Given energy security as a fundamental requirement of land operations, recommend methods that land component commanders should employ for sustainment operations.

III. Strategy and Military Change in an Austere Environment


2. **Acquisition Reform: Streamlining the Process to Field Equipment before It’s Obsolete.

3. *Assess the need for, and roles of, an Army and land forces in the future operating environment.
   a. *Given the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan (and no major competitor in the next decade) how large of an Army is needed to meet the Nation’s security needs and to ensure that the Army can expand in time of crisis?
   b. *What core capabilities must the Army preserve in any reorganization or downsizing?
   c. *Assess the sufficiency of the Army’s current niche capabilities (such as cyber, ballistic missile defense, etc.) to meet the requirements of the strategic environment in the mid-term (3-8 years).
   d. *Assess tactical network capabilities and whether they are sufficient, effective, interoperable, and secure for 21st-century operations.
e. *Evaluate and identify what missions the Army could eliminate as a result of the proposed Defense Department budget cuts.

4. *Assess the size, structure, and design of the future Army:
   a. *What is the most efficient brigade-division-corps organization/structure to support TSC while retaining the ability to meet crisis response needs (maximize forces available)?
   b. *What should the roles and missions of corps and ASCCs be? Are they duplicative?
   c. *Does the Army need to maintain separate heavy, Stryker, and light combat formations?
   d. *How agile is the current institutional Army in terms of its ability to react to changing or surge requirements?
   e. *Assess and recommend an EAB HQ structure for division, corps, ASCC, and theater enabler commands.
   f. *The Army has revised FM 3-0 and changed the Army Operating Concept to Unified Operations—enabled by core competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. How will this impact Army force structure—design and mix?
   g. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of creating regionally focused Army units.
   h. How can Army forces be structured, equipped, and trained to operate effectively in remote dynamic environments without relying on continuous energy or water resupply?

5. *Assess models of Army force generation.
   a. *Is the Generating Force properly organized to ensure that the Army fields capabilities against our articulated strategic requirements?
   b. *Assess the ability of the Army to generate large numbers of formations in the event of a significant land campaign, given the high-tech nature of today’s BCTs?
c. *What is the impact of the growing commercialization of our depot-level maintenance on our ability to react to changing capability requirements?*
d. *The Army has revised FM 3-0 and changed the Army Operating Concept to Unified Operations—enabled by core competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. How will this impact ARFORGEN to include access to the Reserve Component?*
e. *Assess the effects of operationalizing the Reserve Component.*

6. Recommend methods for integrating nonlethal systems into Army operations.

7. Examine the strategic implications for the Army of space as a theater of war.

8. Evaluate measures to integrate military (hard power) and nonmilitary (hard and soft power) tools to achieve strategic objectives and to avoid or resolve conflict.


10. Assess potential impact of global climate change on U.S. national security.

11. Evaluate how energy capabilities influence decisions regarding strategic engagement.

**IV. Leadership, Civil-Military Relations, and Culture**

1. **Health of the Force.**

2. *New elements in U.S. civil-military relations.*
   a. *What are the characteristics required of an effective Strategic Communications Plan that illustrates to Congress and the American public the enduring requirement to*
maintain a suitably sized and effective ground component as the key element of the defense establishment?

b. *Evaluate potential changes to U.S. institutions, founding documents, or policy formulation processes to reflect the 21st-century security environment and the changed nature of armed conflict: Are the current efforts and programs sufficient to achieve the envisioned benefits of “whole of government” approaches to contemporary security challenges?

c. Assess the apparent gap between civilian and military cultures and its effect on interagency interaction and cooperation.

d. Assess the moral and ethical implications of civilian casualties with regard to decisionmaking in contemporary war.

3. Evaluate the ethical implications associated with landpower employment in stability, security force assistance, and counterinsurgency operations; and recommend whether and how Army education, training, and leadership programs should be adjusted.

4. Assess the status of the Army as a profession.
   a. Assess the status of the Chaplaincy within the Army as a profession.

5. Analyze the impact of changing military service requirements on families.
   a. Assess the contribution of chaplains in promoting resiliency and recovery for Army Soldiers and Families.

6. Assess the implications of adopting commercial best business practices for the military.

7. Assess the need for greater energy security awareness at various levels within the Army.
V. Cyber Attack/Defense, Networks, Information Technology

1. *When does an attack in cyberspace constitute an act of war?

2. *Assess the training and exercise requirements for cyber defense: Does the Army exercise and prepare its cyber/network defense capabilities enough to address the risk posed by a cyber attack?

3. Assess ongoing efforts to integrate information technology (IT) into the conduct of war (Dept. of Army, G-6; POC: LTC Paul Craft (703) 693-3062; paul.g.craft.mil@mail.mil).
   a. Examine the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of global network connectivity (C4, ISR, Coalition, etc.) down to the individual Soldier on the battlefield.
   b. Evaluate the possibilities of converging the intelligence and/or sustainment networks into the existing tactical C4 transport network (WIN-T, JTRS, NetWarrior).
   c. Determine a process, or set of processes, to increase the transparency and fidelity of IT planning, programming, budgeting, and execution given that IT requirements and expenditures are spread across 101 different MDEPS and six PEGs in the POM.
   d. Assess what IT services (i.e., email, collaboration, file, voice, etc.) could be provided at an enterprise level and which services should be provided by the Army versus another Joint Service or Agency.
   e. Determine a methodology to better govern IT expenditures and compliance enforcement at the MACOM level.
   f. Examine how the Army’s overarching network, the LandWarNet, can enable a smaller more agile Army and improve its effectiveness and efficiency through all Joint phases of the operation and in all environments.
   g. Examine how Army leaders can be trained and educated to employ the network as a central, intrinsic portion of their combined arms fight.
h. Evaluate the cyber threat on a networked Army at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.
i. Assess the relationship(s) between network operations and cyber operations.

4. Assess the challenges of distinguishing between crimes and acts of war for certain activities in cyberspace.

VI. Homeland Security/Civil Support

1. *Assess the effects of the Mexican Drug Cartels on U.S. defense and homeland security requirements.

2. Evaluate current measures for identifying and protecting Department of Defense (DoD) and/or non-DoD critical infrastructure.

3. Recommend ways for establishing domestic and international intelligence and other information sharing mechanisms between homeland defense, homeland security, and civil support entities?
I. The Middle East and North Africa

1. Assess political upheaval in the Middle East following the Egyptian, Tunisian, and Libyan revolutions.

2. Assess Iranian regional assertiveness and its implications for Middle East security.

3. Assess threats to U.S. interests with respect to a stable, sovereign Iraq.

4. Recommend ways for improving the effectiveness of U.S. military presence in the Persian/Arabian Gulf without raising the profile of U.S. forces.

5. Assess security issues created by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


7. Assess the strategic implications of increasing Chinese interests in Middle East oil, arms sales, and economic aid.

8. Evaluate the nature of politically-oriented Islamic militancy and salafi jihadism and their implications for U.S. interests, regional security, and energy security.

II. Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Assess the evolving role and organization of AFRICOM, and its receptivity within Africa.

2. Assess efforts to address the terrorism in Africa.
3. Assess lessons learned from Africa’s insurgencies and implications for Africa’s future conflicts.


5. Recommend courses of action for improving maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea subregion.


7. Evaluate the effects of climate change and conflict in Africa.

8. Assess the American role in the continent of Africa with regard to energy security.


III. Asia-Pacific

1. Assess how the U.S. should balance its security interests in China and Taiwan given the Pacific “pivot.”

2. Assess the Obama Administration’s “back to Asia” efforts.

3. Assess the implications of China’s growing economic and military power in the region.

4. Assess the strategic implications of China’s growing space capabilities.

5. Examine the impact of North Korea’s leadership change and assess the future of North Korea.

7. Assess the future of ASEAN and the U.S. strategic posture in the region.

8. Recommend ways to transform U.S. forward deployment in Asia.


IV. Europe


2. Analyze energy security in Europe, including operational, infrastructure, and strategic energy security, and related implications for the U.S. Army.

3. Evaluate the impact of ISAF on NATO.

4. Assess the prospects for Russo-American security and/or defense cooperation.

5. Evaluate the U.S. role in EPAA, and the related implications for the U.S. Army.

6. Assess Russia’s future relationships with Europe and the United States.

7. Assess the impact of growing Muslim populations on European security policy.

8. Assess the strategic and operational implications of reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in Europe.

9. Recommend ways for closing the U.S.-Europe military capabilities gap.

10. Recommend ways that the United States can leverage European engagement with China.
11. Assess the implications of U.S.-European defense industry cooperation and/or integration.

V. South and Central Asia

1. Recommend ways that the U.S. should balance its security interests between India and Pakistan.

2. Assess projections for India as a rising regional and global power, and the strategic implications for U.S. foreign and security policy.

3. Recommend methods for managing the global commons—from the Strait of Malacca to the Gulf of Aden.

4. Assess the strategic implications of China-India cooperation and conflict.

5. Assess the strategic implications of energy development in the Caucasus and Caspian regions.


VI. Western Hemisphere

1. Recommend ways for improving security ties with Brazil.

2. Assess lessons from the Colombian insurgency.

3. Assess the strategic implications of illegal immigration and people smuggling.

4. Assess the strategic implications of Narco-funded terrorism networks, and recommend ways to address them.

5. Assess the strategic implications of increased Chinese engagement in Latin America.
PART II

COMMAND SPONSORED TOPICS

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1. The National Guard (NG) State Partnership Program (SPP) has distinguished itself as a highly effective security cooperation program. Identify ways to optimize the support provided by our State Partnership Program (SPP) partners for future operations. For example, when Polish units deployed to Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, they were accompanied by imbedded liaison personnel from their State Partner—Illinois. This is one example of approximately 12 partner countries that had embedded SPP Soldiers deploy with them. Is this an effective strategy and should there be a plan to initiate this process in each partnership, developing a standard requirement?

2. Members of the NG possess many civilian skill sets that could be used in Building Partnership Capacity (BPC). An example of this are the Agricultural Development Teams (ADT) formed by the NG that have proven their value in Afghanistan. What other skill sets could be used to assist the Combatant Commands and the Department of State (DoS) in their “whole of government” approach to assisting allies. (For instance, NG personnel with financial experience could assist in developing financial sector/markets, etc.) Recommend methods for capturing this information and whether it should be centralized at the National level or decentralized at the state/unit level.

3. To ensure that the NG possesses the appropriate resources to support the civil leadership during a civil emergency, is there a basic “order of battle,” i.e., a list of the type of units that should be allotted to each
state, territory, and District of Columbia? What organic equipment should be in these units and what would be the methodology for employment?

4. The British concept of “Sponsored Reserve” uses contractors who support the government in civilian status, but upon mobilization, continue to support the military in deployed operations in a reserve status. A 2009 UK Ministry of Defence Report stated, “Some services which are provided in peacetime by a civilian contractor are provided on operations by staff drawn from the contractor’s workforce who are members of the Reserve Forces, and have been mobilized. Individuals in this category are known as the Sponsored Reserve. They are currently associated with a range of contracts.” Is this concept workable in the U.S. for the NG in light of the civilian skill sets of current contractors, tradesmen, and other capabilities?

5. During the Cold War, the U.S. military and its allies trained numerous linguists and foreign area officers in part to study potential adversaries and to prepare for possible deployments to various continents. This provided the U.S. military with a robust international relations capability. Due to the past 10 years of constant operational deployments, this critical capability has been diminished. Should the NG develop/enhance a program to educate foreign area specialists and linguists, and what would be the benefit?

6. With the intent to maximize the benefit of home state training becoming a future focal point for NG formations, a holistic examination of our training support systems and structure is appropriate. Since the competition for training areas and ranges will increase, how do we develop alternative means of training units and achieving force generation training standards in the emerging environment? A consideration is the expanded use of advanced technology provided by training simulations and devices. Another consideration is prepositioning equipment and transporting troops to that location. What enhanced training concepts will be required to maintain a ready Army or Air NG unit in the future?
7. The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, has Major Force Program 11 for Special Operations unique operations and equipment. Assess the DOTMLPF impacts of the funds for dual use (Defense Support of Civil Authorities [DSCA] and Warfighting) equipment and facilities. An example of dual use facilities are the NG Armories, while an example of dual use equipment might be the trucks used by all NG units during DSCA events.

8. In light of the May 2012 release of Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3.0, *Unified Land Operations*, assess the DOTMLPF impacts of keeping the NG as part of the Operational Reserve versus as part of the Strategic Reserve.

9. In keeping with the Army’s concept of dedicating Active Component (AC) BCTs with regional Combatant Commands, examine the concept of dedicating NG BCTs in support of regional Combatant Commands. For instance, have one group of NG BCTs (six per the current ARFORGEN model) dedicated to SOUTHCOM. During their year for deployment, they would be dedicated to support a variety of missions throughout SOUTHCOM. Using their military and civilian skills, they could perform a variety of Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) tasks. They could also support the regionally oriented Special Forces Group in augmenting Security Force Assistance Teams. By dedicating six NG BCTs to this mission, the BCTs become regionally oriented and are able to use their military and civilian skills to fully support the Combatant Commander.

10. In view of the changes occurring regarding the use of the Reserves during domestic operations, examine the concept (and explain the pros and cons) of allowing the The Adjutant General (TAG) of a particular State to have direct tasking authority for the Title 10 Reserve Component forces located in the State. What authorities would need to be modified and what DOTMLPF changes would be needed?
11. What are the impacts of changes in the local economy on a local NG unit? Do changes in the economy have a major effect on the unit and the National Guard as a whole at state and/or federal level?
1. How should the Reserve Component promote, cultivate, and manage civilian skills?

   a. How can the DoD develop an effective Civilian Acquired Skills Database to identify and track Army Reserve (AR) Soldiers with unique civilian acquired skills?
   b. As the Army enters a period of fiscal austerity, how can the AR leverage its diverse civilian skills to mitigate the gaps caused by resource reductions?
   c. How can the Army leverage AR civilian skills against adversary niche capabilities (i.e., lawyers, police, network security, and software development)?
   d. How can AR civilian skills be leveraged to better support Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) TSC plans?
   e. Can the AR best support GCC needs by aligning its units to Combatant Commands based on U.S. demographics and location? What benefits are gained by developing force structure in specific locations that could deliver critical language skills and cultural experiences for a specific AOR.

2. Operational Reserve.

   a. Considering the recent shift to Asia/Pacific—are there advantages/disadvantages to forward stationing Army Reserve Forces to OCONUS training sites (Darwin, Australia—PACOM; Korea; Fort Buchanan, etc.)?
   b. Is it viable and feasible for the AR to establish forward positioned training sets within the USSOUTHCOM AOR to support exercises? Would it be advantageous to preposition training sets tailored for this AOR? Explain how these assets could be leveraged for contingency operations. How adaptable is this model for AFRICOM and PACOM?
c. What are the strategic lessons learned across the Army Reserve from the numerous mobilizations during the past decade? What changes can be made to improve the process considering an austere fiscal environment with fewer resources? How can the Reserve Component do more with less to facilitate expansion/regeneration to meet future operational challenges?
d. How should the AR work with Combatant Commands to maximize the use of its AR capabilities?
e. How can the new access rules to the RC, approved in NDAA 2012, change the utilization of Army Reserve units for planned missions?


   a. How can the Reserve Component contribute to the concept of reversibility—the ability to quickly regenerate capabilities in response to a strategic shock?
   b. Should any missions/roles be assigned only to or primarily to the AR?
   c. If not a strategic reserve what should be the new model for RC utilization?
   d. How should DoD manage the RC to enable reversibility?


   a. Considering recent legislative changes to Defense Support to Civil Authorities within NDAA 2012, what civilian capabilities should be duplicated or augmented by military capabilities, and vice versa?
   b. What cultural/legal/social/financial limits exist to Defense Support to Civil Authorities?
   c. The Army Reserve has 43K in generating force structure to support TRADOC conducted IET, TASS, and ROTC missions; FORSCOM/1st Army collective training missions; and MEDCOM missions. However, Section 516 Authority only allows the use of Reserve Component for planned Combatant Command
missions, primarily OCONUS focused on BPC/TSC. How could an involuntary mobilization authority be used within CONUS to support service missions to benefit the Army? How would the law need to be changed?


a. How does implementation of the Continuum of Service concept relate to the Profession of Arms? Is an “Army Professional” also a “Soldier for Life”?

b. How can the Army best leverage the experiences from recent operations? Compare and contrast to other post war model?
1. Evaluate multilateral approaches for security and governance in the Maghreb and Egypt.

2. Assess the long-term implications of the Arab Spring on regional security and on AFRICOM’s strategy. What does the future picture of Northern Africa and the Sahel look like?

3. How does an increasingly resource constrained environment over the next 10-15 years impact current U.S. African regional strategy?
   a. What elements of national power do we apply?
   b. Who are the key African partners to engage with in order to develop or maintain access in support of U.S. security interests?

4. Assess the regional impact of continued instability in the East Africa region.

5. Assess the long-term impact on African security of sustenance issues in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and Maghreb regions (food and water security).

6. Assess strategic implications of women, peace, and security initiatives in Africa.


8. In light of the President’s Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (PSD-10), AFRICOM must continue to refine and assess its efforts in concert with Africans, International partners, and U.S. Government (USG) agencies to give primacy to the prevention of mass atrocities. This effort must include the wide range of informational, economic, health-enabling, military, and diplomatic tools available within and outside of the USG.
1. What are the unique operational opportunities that exist in the cyberspace domain that are not possible in any other domains?
   a. Is “cyber” merely another form of “fires,” or does cyber bring something unique to the strategic, operational, and/or tactical toolbox?
   b. What should the role of cyber operations be in the conduct of military operations and the defense of the nation?

2. Given the difficulty of unambiguous attribution at “network speeds” and the availability of sophisticated hacking tools to non-nation-state actors, is deterrence by punishment possible in cyberspace?
   a. Is deterrence by denial feasible? This discussion should also consider how much attribution is “enough,” how best to “demonstrate” preemptive or retaliatory capabilities, and the aspects of intelligence gain/loss applicable to deterrence.

3. With respect to building partnerships with allies, what is the role of “collective self-defense”?
   a. What are the implications for preserving the privacy of U.S. citizens and protecting sensitive intelligence sources?

4. Who bears the responsibility for protecting and defending cyberspace?
   a. What is the appropriate role for DoD? For the private sector?
   b. How should DoD assist the private sector — especially the Defense Industrial Base and other critical infrastructure sectors — both prior to and after malevolent intrusions? This discussion should not be confined to current authorities but should also consider what authorities might be warranted in the future.
5. Many components of our mission critical systems are produced overseas, which raises the specter of undetected malware built into those systems. How should DoD (and the nation) manage the exposure, risk, and/or threat to our supply chain for defense and critical infrastructure sectors?

6. Assume movement to a DoD-wide cloud architecture (the Joint Information Environment), which would allow the repurposing of Global Information Grid (GIG) operators to more active defense and offensive cyber operations. How should the force be structured in the next 5 years? Ten years?

7. The Monroe Doctrine was a declarative policy that announced to Europe that intervention within our sphere of influence would not be tolerated. What would a similar declarative policy for cyber entail? How might it be enforced? Would it create more problems than it addresses?

8. There have been a number of recent discussions about norms of behavior in cyberspace. Totalitarian regimes want to use such discussions to control the free access of their people to new ideas. Western nations want to limit hacking activity and make cyberspace safe. Can these objectives be reconciled?

9. What does “tactical cyber” look like in the next 5 years?
   a. How do we streamline and integrate cyber, SIGINT, communications, electronic warfare, and information operations? Other Services are moving in this direction.
   b. How should the Army change across DOTMLPF to more effectively leverage cyber at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war?

10. Today it is an axiom that the offense has the advantage in cyberspace. The defender must be right all the time; the attacker only has to get lucky once. What conditions might change the calculus to give primacy to the defense in cyberspace?
1. Strategic.
   a. Assess Army efforts to respond to the evolving cyberspace challenges of manning, training, and equipping for decisive operations.
   b. Assess options for integrating current information related capabilities (signal, intelligence, IO, EW) within the Army to produce a combined cyber force capable of dominating the information environment through all phases of operations.
   c. Examine the strategic implications of declaring cyberspace the fifth operational domain.
   d. Assess the mission command requirements of cyberspace at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
   e. Assess the knowledge, skills, and abilities required by military cyberspace professionals that will enable the United States to attain superiority in the fifth operational domain.
   f. Assess the impact of cyberspace capabilities on China’s efforts to become a global superpower.
   g. Outline the theater security cooperation requirements that are needed to build cyber partnerships with key allies and international partners as a result of the changing strategic environment.
   h. Assess how a more CONUS-based Army of the future will utilize virtual partnerships to conduct Phase 0 (prevent and shape) operations with key allies and international partners.
   i. Evaluate the potential impact of social media/networking upon unified land operations.
   j. Evaluate how the Army achieves cross-domain synergy utilizing cyberspace operations in anti-access/area-denial.
   k. Determine the best methods of increasing the understanding of unified land-cyber operations through the use of education, training, and leader development.
1. Examine the Army’s role in the U.S. whole of government cyber security strategy.

m. Assess the cyber security role of the Army and U.S. Army National Guard in homeland defense.

n. Examine the implications of U.S. cyberspace defense strategy for allies and potential adversaries.

o. Does the Army need new kinds of formations to conduct cyber intelligence, conduct maneuver in and through cyberspace, generate fires in and through cyberspace, sustain cyberspace operations and formations, and protect cyberspace operations and formations?

p. Cyberspace is comprised of the physical, logical, and cognitive. If most of the world’s information is in cyberspace, what does this mean for future Army influence activities?

q. How we leverage the approach of SOF, intelligence, and cyberspace operations to achieve more balance across the force?

2. Other.

   a. What are the gaps and seams between cyber, EW, and IO—What coordination/de-confliction is required for synchronized operations?
   
   b. What offensive and defensive cyber capabilities are required as part of the force structure at the BCT level?
   
   c. Develop metrics to conduct an operational assessment of cyberspace operations.
   
   d. Evaluate how Army tactical/operational commanders may achieve effects using the land/cyber concept.
   
   e. Examine the strategic implications of declaring cyberspace operations as a warfighting function.
   
   f. Examine methods and requirements of integrating cyber effects into targeting at all levels of warfare.
1. Assess for the U.S. Army the implications of future cooperation between the EU and NATO.

2. Recommend ways to harmonize EU, NATO, and U.S. goals for the modernization of European militaries.

3. Assess the strategic implications of the European financial crisis on the long-term defense relationship between NATO, the EU, and the United States.


5. Analyze energy security in Europe, including operational, infrastructure, and strategic energy security, and related implications for the U.S. Army.

6. Evaluate the long-term impact of ISAF operations on NATO (interoperability/sustainability).

7. Assess the prospects for Russo-American security and/or defense cooperation.

8. Evaluate the U.S. role in the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), potential allied contributions and burden sharing for ballistic missile defense (BMD), and the related implications for the U.S. Army.


10. Evaluate the potential for normalization of interstate relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
11. Assess the impact of growing diversity of populations on European security policy.

12. Assess the effectiveness of security cooperation programs in promoting stability in the Balkans.

13. Assess the strategic and operational implications of reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in Europe.

14. Recommend ways for closing the U.S.-Europe military capabilities gap.

15. Recommend ways the United States can leverage European engagement with China.

16. Assess the implications of U.S.-European defense industry cooperation and/or integration.
1. Evaluate the exigency, efficacy, and feasibility of legislation that requires interoperational coordination, integration, and synchronization in planning, operations, exercises, and resourcing, much like the Goldwater-Nichols Act did for DoD in obtaining its Joint orientation.

2. **USNORTHCOM J3 (NC/J3).**
   a. Develop recommendations to improve DoD Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) during a no-notice complex catastrophe in the homeland, where additional force structure is not available.
   b. Determine the best way to improve DoD and interagency coordination in Mexico.
   c. Evolving Warfare challenges require USNORTHCOM to maintain sufficient combat capability to deter or defeat attacks both symmetric and asymmetric, on the homeland. Define sufficient combat capability required in order to defend the homeland.

3. **NORAD J3 (N/J3).**
   a. Assess the Army’s contribution to achieving all-domain fused-situational awareness as it relates to defense of the homeland. Discuss the Army’s synchronized efforts with NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and the Interagency.

4. **N-NC/J5.**
   a. Are Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) a national security threat to the United States? What is DoD’s role to counter this threat?
   b. What is the Army’s role in the Arctic as future access to the region expands?
   a. Assess Army communications requirements to support combatant command operations in the Arctic regions.

   a. What are the strategic implications of social media in accomplishing missions across the spectrum of homeland defense, homeland security, and DSCA?

7. How can the Army contribute strategically or operationally to provide needed capabilities?
   a. What capabilities are required to provide C2 and theater setting activities in planning, exercising, and execution of HD, DSCA, and cooperative defense missions?
   b. What domain surveillance, detection, and tracking capabilities are required to provide warning data to national authorities? What capabilities are required to rapidly disseminate threat information to senior decisionmakers, engagement authorities, coalition, and interagency partners?
   c. What capabilities are required to provide comprehensive and tailored cyberspace domain awareness capabilities that provide time shared situational awareness and integrated offensive and defensive solutions?
   d. What capabilities are required to provide resilient network infrastructure to support mission essential functions in an electromagnetic pulse and/or cyber stressed environment to support communications among DoD, federal agencies, and supported mission partners?
1. Western Hemisphere.
   a. Recommend ways for improving security ties with Brazil. What are the possible security implications of neglected U.S./BRA defense, space, nuclear, and energy cooperation?
   b. Assess lessons from the Colombian insurgency (i.e., the power vacuum left by the FARC), will the BACRAM fill this?
   c. Assess the strategic implications of illegal immigration and people smuggling.
   d. Assess the strategic implications of narco-funded terrorism networks, and recommend ways to address them.
   e. Assess the strategic implications of increased Chinese engagement in Latin America. Regarding China’s investment in critical infrastructure (multi-modal nodes, telecommunications, etc.), will a tipping point occur when Chinese contributions and/or influence warrants U.S. intervention in order to preserve our national interests in the region?
   f. Assess the strategic implications of illicit trafficking (e.g., TOC) expansion into other GCC AORs as a result of increased intervention in the WHEM (i.e., SOUTHCOM to AFRICOM to EUCOM—shift to alternate Arrival Zone).
   g. Assess the strategic implications of increased Iranian influence in the SOUTHCOM AOR.
   h. What DoD roles and missions support nontraditional security threats (Law enforcement mission sets)?
   i. How do we achieve greater effectiveness of a Western Hemisphere Regional Security Organization (e.g., OAS, SICA, RSS, and CFAC) in addressing transregional security challenges?
   j. Recommend ways to coordinate with Russia to leverage their capabilities in support of the CTOC effort in the WHEM.
   k. Recommend ways DoD can integrate the Interagency to improve governmental institutions to address governance and social issues that foster environments conducive to TOC.
1. Assess and recommend ways to improve GCC cross-AOR boundary efforts that address transnational threats.

m. Assess the strategic implications of nonstate actors exerting increasing influence in weakened nation states in the Western Hemisphere.

n. What are the implications to the WHEM of a VEN, post-Chavez?
1. **Expeditionary Theater Opening (ETO).**

POC: Mr. Jeff Ackerson (618) 220-4814

a. In light of our new strategy and CONUS based military, along with the issues involved with the Joint Operational Access Concept, recommend a new look at the Expeditionary Theater Opening (ETO). HQ DA G4 and JFCOM have previously examined the topic, but the outcome stalled due to projected costs.

b. We will need to project and sustain our forces, and the logistics portion of the ETO process will be critical. The Army will play a big role along with other joint partners. ETO), an approved Joint Staff Concept, Mission: Provide a joint expeditionary capability to rapidly establish and initially operate ports of debarkation (air and sea), facilitate port throughput and assist in setting the conditions for the “fall in” of larger Service theater distribution and sustainment forces where/when appropriate within a theater of operations.

c. Examine the Army capability to deploy rapidly the logistics enabling forces to conduct theater opening operations, including sustainment and distribution missions.

2. **GCC Theater Distribution Center.**

POC: Mr. Paul Curtis (618) 220-6481

Theater Distribution is a key element of the Sustainment Plan for follow-on forces after the initial surge of forces involved in Joint Task Force-Port Opening. Tasked forces will quickly pass the Logistics Forward Node and need an established Logistics Distribution Center. Theater Distribution is not a new concept but requires consideration in light of the speed and challenges associated with port opening in a nonsupport or perhaps hostile environment. Efficient and effective
theater distribution is key to a successful campaign in the host country. Recommend assessment and analysis of:

a. A fully deployable Theater Distribution Center with assigned personnel and support equipment.

b. Development of a containerized/airlift-ready Theater Distribution Center that can be deployed and fielded by C+30, ready for use by C+50. This Theater Distribution Center would require inclusion in the TPFDD for the COCOM, with developed ULN and UICs.

c. Intermodal capability at the Theater Distribution Center to take advantage of the different capabilities offered by rail/truck/ship/air.

d. Integration of coalition and host nation capabilities with the Theater Distribution Center.


POC: Mr. Jeff Worthing (618) 220-5230

a. Assess shifts in geostrategic forces for their potential implications on U.S. access to distribution nodes/distribution pathways within allied, friendly, and cooperating nations (A/F/CNs). Consider inducements, coercive measures, and commercial partnerships that competitor nations may use to hinder or enable U.S. joint force operations.

b. Assess degradation of military and commercial infrastructure (airports, seaports, multi-modal nodes, connectors, railroads, and roadways) and future investments required to meet both emerging commercial and military demands.

c. Assess growing commercial demands on available CONUS and OCONUS commercial capabilities (conveyances, warehousing/storage capabilities, and infrastructure) and the potential negative impact this may have on the future deployment and sustainment of U.S. forces across the globe.
d. Assess the distribution implications of the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) distributed operations precept on the ability to deploy and operate on multiple independent lines of operations. Identify consequences in terms of distribution capabilities; infrastructure and access requirements; and enabling political, military, and business relationships.

4. **Sustainment Forecasting.**
   POC: Mr. John Pirmann (618) 220-6605
   
   a. The DoD now has more than 10 years of historical data concerning the sustainment requirements of fielded forces operating at all levels of engagement. Is it possible to use this data to predict future sustainment requirements?
   
   b. A detailed deep-dive analysis of this data may yield the sustainment requirements of any force package being considered for future deployment. Should the DoD decide to conduct such an analysis, USTRANSCOM, the Combat Support Agencies, and the Services may be able to forecast their sustainment requirements in future deployment scenarios.
   
   c. If done correctly, sustainment could be pushed to the warfighter rather than pulled. Acquisition of required sustainment could perhaps be executed in a more economical manner. More cost effective transportation could be arranged to satisfy the warfighter’s need in a timely manner while saving funding that will undoubtedly be constrained in the future.

5. **Sealift: Maintaining Readiness through our Commercial Maritime Partners.**
   POC: LCDR Christopher Gilbertson (618) 220-1163
   
   a. Over the past decade, the U.S. Maritime Industry has enjoyed unprecedented success providing support to DoD. With OIF/OND now complete, and OEF quickly beginning to wind down, how do we maintain a U.S. flag commercial maritime fleet which
remains commercially viable and able to meet DoD capacity requirements? Is it feasible to implement a VISA Assured Business program, modeled similarly to the one which is used by the Craf program?

b. Statutes such as the 1904 and 1954 Cargo Preference Acts exist, which lend support to the Maritime Industry. While the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration has responsibility for enforcing and tracking compliance with these important laws, the unique nature of our globally interconnected economy lends credence to the claim it may be time to overhaul the statutes. There are very limited waivers and exceptions to these laws which preclude DoD’s ability to circumvent the language of the laws yet still meet the intent and ensure strategic commercial maritime capability and capacity remains operating. What potential changes may be made to the Cargo Preference Acts and the associated rules which govern their enforcement?

c. Through multiple venues, the commercial transportation and logistics industry has claimed contracting has superseded policy and operational requirements in meeting transportation needs. Normally when the warfighter generates a requirement, a means to fill the requirement is developed within operational and policy constraints, then passed to the contracting personnel who write a contract which meets those requirements. Is the contracting process improperly defining our operations and how we meet commanders’ requirements?
1. How will the Army be able to identify and meet the professional military training requirements necessary to develop the ability of foreign partners to conduct security operations?

2. How will the Army be able to conduct tough, realistic training with foreign partners to foster the adaptability, initiative, confidence, trust, and cohesion required to conduct security operations?

3. How will the Army be able to identify partners’ specific requirements and possess the collective resources necessary to build their institutional capability and capacity for security?

4. How will the Army be able to establish formal and informal relationships with foreign partners to gain access and advance shared global security interests?

5. How will the Army be able to support efforts led by other USG agencies to enhance the ability of domestic and foreign partners for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions?

6. How do local, state, and nonmilitary federal capabilities factor into decisions for the national requirements for HLD and DSCA?

7. What are the most proactive approaches to resolving U.S. Mexican/Canadian border issues?

8. What are the best means for the Army to execute its responsibilities to protect critical infrastructure (nuclear power, fuel, communications, and manufacturing)?
9. How can the Army execute its responsibilities to protect natural resources (oil, gas, timber, pipelines, etc.) as well as their routes of delivery (ground, air, and sea)?

10. What are the Army’s requirements for domestic Emergency Management Operations support to DoD installations/bases/posts in a JIIM environment?

11. What are Army doctrinal, training, and leader/leadership and education requirements for support to civilian authorities during homeland defense and civil support missions in a JIIM environment?
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