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Sterling J. Kernick

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Whither the Long Peace?

STERLING J. KERNEK

During the early 1980s two contradictory currents of thought developed. On the one hand, a brief revival of Cold War rhetoric, an intensification of the arms race, and other manifestations of Soviet-American antagonism provoked widespread fears of nuclear devastation. The popular acclaim given to Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth*, a polemic about nuclear holocaust, reflected that phenomenon.¹ On the other hand, a nascent school of thought began to coalesce around the notion that we are living in a long period of great-power peace. By the mid-80s—about the same time the Reagan Administration softened its attitude toward the Soviet Union—references to various stabilizing factors and the improbability of great-power war had begun to constitute a strong trend in political commentary. Among the most cogent leaders of this development are such distinguished scholars as John Lewis Gaddis, K. J. Holsti, Paul W. Schroeder, Kenneth Waltz, and (more recently) John Mueller.² Buoyed by the rhetoric of “new thinking,” *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and the Reagan-Gorbachev summits, the long-peace theme quickly became fashionable. Yet, while many optimistic remarks have been triggered by recent developments, the long-peace interpretation holds that some key sources of peace and stability have been underlying realities for about two generations.

Of course, those realities did not go entirely unnoticed as they emerged. Indeed, F. H. Hinsley made a prescient case for the central concept of a durable post-1945 peace between leading powers in *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, published in 1963.³ A couple of years later the book *The Cold War . . . and After*, by Charles O. Lerche, Jr., argued that in the view of both Moscow and Washington “a major war between the Soviet Union and the United States is highly improbable, indeed, virtually impossible.”⁴ Many years passed, however, before this view began to gain widespread acceptance.

Not until the post-1945 period approximately equaled the duration of earlier eras that were free of major war—i.e. about 40 years—did the long-peace interpretation acquire widespread credibility among many scholars.⁵ The increased study of how and why major war was avoided has, in turn, yielded additional insights that enhance the plausibility of what can now be

called the long-peace interpretation—a reevaluation of post-1945 Soviet-American relations as a long and relatively benign period of great-power peace that has been based on much more than containment policies and a balance of power. The long-peace interpretation will help supplant heretofore popular assumptions about the nature and dangers of Soviet-American rivalry, and it has some interesting implications that should be considered in analyses of the recent dramatic changes in East-West relations.

The first task in this article is to demonstrate briefly that a convincing and quite elaborate interpretative framework is emerging, one supporting the view that a pronounced long-peace phase of history commenced after World War II, even though we speak of this period as the Cold War. Then, primarily through an examination of historical parallels, we shall reflect on the promising possibilities for extending the long peace into the post-Cold War era.

The Long-Peace View

Attempting to combine elements from various related works into a coherent synthesis does not imply that all the authors cited have demonstrated unanimity on all points. Moreover, some scholars who have not to my knowledge embraced the long-peace thesis in general terms have provided insights that support it. Given the limits of space, let me also plead that it is impossible to be comprehensive. In this article, the goal is merely to survey enough of the major indicators to suggest that the long-peace thesis is well beyond the status of hypothesis, and has now become a rather widely held interpretation.

- *Aversion to Major War.* The first and most obvious tenet in support of the long-peace interpretation is that the current great-power peace has been sustained by an aversion to the destructiveness of modern warfare. The nuclear balance of terror has become well-established as a seemingly obvious (although unprovable) truism, but even the fear of nonnuclear (so-called conventional) wars can be regarded as a powerful stabilizing factor in relations between the major powers.⁶

- *Renunciation of the Right to Initiate War.* F. H. Hinsley argues that the leading states have, in fact, renounced what had long prevailed as a right to initiate war. The nominal transformation of war offices or departments into *defense* ministries or departments reflects the normative change. This has not

Dr. Sterling J. Kernek is a professor of history at Western Illinois University, where he teaches courses in US and European diplomacy. He earned a B.A. from the American University in Washington, D.C., an M.A. from the University of Western Australia, and a Ph.D. from Cambridge University. His published works include a book-length monograph about the British government's relations with Woodrow Wilson during the First World War and various articles about the diplomacy of Wilson, Henry Kissinger, and Ronald Reagan.

meant, of course, that the great powers have ceased using military force, but they have rationalized their warmaking as a police action or as military assistance in response to a request for aid.⁷ To be sure, the practical significance of this normative revolution is difficult to assess since rationalization seems to be a universally practiced art in international relations.

John Mueller gives special emphasis to normative transformation. Stressing that war is a social institution that can change, he draws analogies with the abolition of serfdom, slavery, and dueling. In his view, war becomes obsolete as nations come to regard it as abhorrent or ridiculous.⁸

• *Rules of the Game.* To help stabilize and manage their competitive relationship, the superpowers have developed and have generally followed what Seweryn Bialer has called "tacit rules of prudence."⁹ They have, for example, usually maneuvered to avoid direct military confrontations and have consistently shown restraint in numerous crises from the Berlin blockade and airlift of 1948 to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. They have also displayed restraint when dealing with areas where their principal rival has clearly staked out special interests. While this tacit rule regarding respect for spheres of interest has been less scrupulously followed than the avoidance of direct confrontation, the pattern is discernible.¹⁰ Consider US restraint during the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and of the Prague Spring in 1968. As for the Western Hemisphere, one could cite Soviet passivity regarding the Central Intelligence Agency's overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954, the US military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and the invasion of Grenada in 1983.

Stanley Hoffmann has referred to rules of crisis management. When confrontations have occurred the superpowers have sought a "negotiable way out." They have also restrained their clients.¹¹ Gaddis has emphasized the rule that nuclear weapons are to be used only as an "ultimate resort." Although nuclear threats have been made, especially during the first two decades after Hiroshima, the top statesmen have always shied away from their use—even when they were caught in a military stalemate or losing a war.¹²

• *Peripheral Positions and Mutually Tolerable Interests.* History and geography provide additional insights into the long peace. One of the most stable periods of great-power relations—the heyday of the Concert of Europe following the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815—featured the dominating influence of Russia and Britain, two flanking or "peripheral powers."¹³ Since 1945 Russia and the United States have occupied a strikingly analogous position, albeit on a larger scale.

The current long peace may reflect a fortuitous situation in which the superpowers have, despite their ideological antagonism, mutually tolerable interests. As Kenneth Waltz observed in his *Theory of International Politics*, "The United States, and the Soviet Union as well, have more reason to be satisfied

with the status quo than most earlier great powers had.”¹⁴ Citing Waltz among others, Gaddis points to the “mutual independence” that is remarkably apparent in the Soviet-American relationship despite their extensive involvement in the rest of the world.¹⁵ Neither is economically dependent on the other in a critical way. “Geographical remoteness” has also helped them avoid clashes. Their relations are not complicated by serious boundary disputes, and their vital spheres of influence do not overlap.

- *European Stability.* The postwar territorial and political arrangements, which evolved more by inadvertence than by design, have yielded fortuitous advantages in Europe. The division of Germany constituted a long-lasting solution to the very troublesome German problem that had imperiled the Continent before the First and Second World Wars. As A. W. DePorte remarked in his perceptive analysis of this development, “Thanks, ironically, to the cold war, the outcome of World War II was more sound, more lasting and systemically more beneficent than that of World War I.”¹⁶

The successes of the European integration movement have further reinforced stability in that region. The European Community now seems to be virtually free of the threat of war between its members. Meanwhile, Western Europe and the United States indirectly benefitted from the *Pax Sovietica* in Eastern Europe. While American leaders regretted the trampling of human rights, peace was ensured between the traditionally quarrelsome Balkan states, which historically have been a dangerous source of instability.

- *The Beneficent Impact of the United States.* In sustaining the post-1945 great-power peace, the United States played a beneficent role that is somewhat analogous to the influence exerted by Britain during most of the 19th century. While promoting US interests, Washington helped others by ensuring freedom of the seas and by fostering the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Also, by providing military security to Japan and West Germany, the United States has helped them sustain a high rate of investment in their export and consumer economies, thus promoting their transformation into relatively peaceful states.¹⁷

- *The Reconnaissance Revolution.* Gaddis has repeatedly stressed the salutary effects of what he calls the “reconnaissance revolution.” The development of spy satellites and other sophisticated devices in the past two decades has provided the leaders of the superpowers with extraordinarily comprehensive and detailed information about each other’s military and economic capabilities. Not only does this reduce the chances of war by surprise attack, but it also reduces the chances for a war stemming—as so many wars have—from a flawed assessment of relative power.¹⁸

- *The Benefits of Bipolarity.* An obvious aspect of the superpower rivalry in the current long peace has been bipolarity. The extent to which that bipolarity continues is a debatable question, but the Soviet Union and the United

States clearly dominated many important events during the first two decades of the Cold War and they remain militarily in an exclusive leading position. This is an important issue in the long-peace interpretation because of a theory (principally formulated by Waltz) that the bipolar configuration of the post-1945 period may be inherently more stable than the multipolar systems that characterized the classic periods of European diplomacy. One stabilizing characteristic is its relative simplicity. Even amateurish, mediocre, and provincial leaders can manage it. The superpowers, being in a class by themselves, are less subject to the pressures of a smaller ally that may change sides. Crises that do arise become relatively inconsequential. Waltz concludes: "Each can lose heavily only in war with the other."¹⁹ Gaddis agrees, noting an interesting consequence of bipolarity. While defections of allies are "more tolerable," in his view, the "alliances are more durable"—as the remarkable longevity of NATO demonstrates.²⁰

Another factor stabilizing the post-1945 bipolar system is that it "realistically reflected the facts of where military power resided at the end of World War II." As Gaddis explains, this differs "markedly from the settlement of 1919, which made so little effort to accommodate the interests of Germany and Soviet Russia."²¹

• *The Counterproductive Results of Expansion.* Industrial productivity and technological sophistication have supplanted population and territory as keys to power. Moreover, there is a much more widespread recognition that even the expansion of influence can be costly to the point of being counterproductive. As Waltz observed, "In power and in wealth, both [superpowers] gain more by the peaceful development of internal resources than by wooing and winning—or by fighting and subduing—other states in the world."²² In the 1980s, the Soviet Union bore heavy burdens in Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Such costs have from time to time helped restrain the traditional expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the costs of military intervention combined with a desire to concentrate on accelerating internal socioeconomic development apparently brought about a dramatic decision in the Kremlin to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Perhaps this move reflected the realization in Moscow that the Soviet Union reached the practicable limits of its domination soon after the end of the Second World War.²³ The spectacular and rapid changes in Eastern Europe during 1989, and continuing to the present, have raised speculation that even those limits are receding.

The Post-Cold War Era

Those who embrace the long-peace interpretation will generally be regarded as very optimistic.²⁴ That seems obvious since the long-peace thesis stresses various beneficial factors that prevent great-power war. Moreover, the implications of the growing acceptance of the long-peace interpretation are, on balance, likely to be advantageous.

Yet, the shift to a new interpretation, the remarkable reforms afoot in Eastern Europe, and other great changes also pose some potential drawbacks. Unfortunate possibilities could arise as we move into a new era.

Perhaps during the next generation historians will commonly divide the post-1945 long peace into a Cold War period and a post-Cold War era. Ascertaining when (or if) the Cold War ended is, of course, a slippery task. Gary Trudeau simply announced its end in his "Doonesbury" comic strip in June 1988. The President is told "It's over and we won!" Scholars, of course, tend to trace its demise through a more complex process. In his book *Retreat from Doomsday*, John Mueller writes: "As far as the threat of major war has been concerned, the Cold War has gradually mellowed. It has been in remission at least since 1963 with respect to the Soviets and since the early 1970s with respect to the Chinese."²⁵ But the final demise of the Cold War may, according to Mueller, have been signaled by General Secretary Gorbachev's apparent abandonment of the Soviet Union's "revolutionary commitment to worldwide revolution—or at least toward reducing that commitment to warm smiles and lip service."²⁶ Such a fundamental change tends to obviate the containment policy implemented by the Truman Administration and sustained by all subsequent US Presidents.

Despite pointed prompts from news reporters during the December 1989 Malta Summit, no agreement on whether the Cold War has indeed ended was jointly pronounced by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. Yet President Bush has been under considerable pressure to welcome Gorbachev's initiatives and to respond positively. After his Administration's lengthy review of East-West relations, Bush announced on 12 May 1989: "Now is the time to move beyond containment. . . . The United States has as its goal much more than simply containing Soviet expansionism: We seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations."²⁷

Although the pressure for accommodation and aid might increase as long as reform continues in the East, and although the results of the Malta Summit would seem to confirm the sentiment expressed by Bush in the quotation above, the President can be expected to remain primarily intent on preventing Gorbachev's initiatives from breaking up the containment apparatus established during the past two generations. Bush demonstrated his concern by moving quickly in the spring of 1989 to attempt to resolve disagreements within NATO regarding modernization of short-range missiles and the scheduling of disarmament negotiations. The West German public, now less concerned about the Soviet threat and encouraged by favorable signs of change in the East, demands indications of progress toward nuclear disarmament in Europe.

With so much as prologue, let us now reflect on several factors that bear specifically on prospects for extending the long peace into the post-Cold War era.

• *The Shrinking Soviet Threat.* Although the United States has a different strategic perspective from that of West Germany, trends in the Federal Republic apparently foreshadowed a significant drop in the American public's concern about the Soviet threat and a consequent decrease in support for defense and aid to allies. While a good case could be made that the United States has maintained remarkably consistent commitments since the foreign policy initiatives of the Truman Administration, it should be kept in mind that most of those commitments have been substantially based on a popular belief in the necessity of containing Soviet communism. Emphasizing the Soviet threat has been a key political tactic in building mass support for an active international role and a strong defense.²⁸ US leaders may find it more difficult to sustain a vigorous global role without a credible foreign threat.

The origins of the use of the Soviet threat are quite complex. Despite some intriguing "new left" suggestions that the Soviet threat was largely a deliberate exaggeration, recent scholarship has tended to present a more balanced view—acknowledging that policymakers had real and sincere concerns about communist expansion even though they often overestimated the threat. Paraphrasing Sigmund Freud's apt observation that "even paranoids can have real enemies," Gaddis noted that "fear . . . can be genuine without being rational."²⁹

The plausibility of the anti-Soviet themes in containment policy will be further diminished by acceptance of certain tenets in the long-peace interpretation, for example, recognition that Moscow has, in fact, usually followed tacit rules of prudence, or appreciation of the fact that the Soviet Union does not have any intractable territorial disputes with the United States. Much more spectacularly, of course, Gorbachev's peace initiatives are transforming the Soviet image.

By weakening Western alliances, diminishing US influence as a guarantor of security, and eroding support for defense spending or foreign aid, the waning of the Soviet threat undermines bipolarity. If, as the long-peace interpretation suggests, bipolarity has helped to maintain order, any factor that undermines it could increase instability. That may be cause to regret the decline of the superpowers. As Norman Graebner writes, "Established trends in world politics predict the continued erosion of the American and Soviet positions." He notes, however, that this is not necessarily occurring "at the same rate" for each side.³⁰

• *The Asymmetrical Decline of the Superpowers.* Despite American fears of decline, the country will probably come to realize that it is securely in a class by itself. No rival currently can challenge the global preeminence of the United States. Zbigniew Brzezinski rules out any rival for the foreseeable future.³¹ Samuel P. Huntington identifies the European Community as a potential challenger, but that is contingent on its becoming "politically cohesive,"³² a possibility that Brzezinski discounts.

Yet, even if the European Community fails to achieve political cohesion, US influence there seems destined to diminish as fear of the USSR

wanes. In a related development, a mixture of decline and "new thinking" may mean the demise of the *Pax Sovietica* in its principal sphere of influence. Thus, the specter of serious trouble in Eastern Europe seems to be rising as an imperial order recedes. One immediately thinks of the destabilizing role played by the Balkans in the turmoil leading to the outbreak of the First World War. Given the irredentist antagonisms that still fester in the region, the potential for trouble remains enormous. It may become commonplace for future commentators to refer wistfully to the good old days of the Cold War when the United States and the USSR kept the peace in Europe.

Balkan history also flashes a warning that leaders in the Kremlin may show less flexibility in future crises, especially if Gorbachev's reforms fail to reverse the relative decline of the Soviet Union. The recent withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan—though wise and constructive—is nevertheless a retreat, and it has probably heightened Soviet sensitivity to future defeats. That effect could last a long time even if the pro-Soviet Afghan government survives. Further setbacks will only aggravate fears of declining prestige. During the July crisis of 1914, Russia showed great reluctance to back down, in part because it had suffered a diplomatic humiliation in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09.

• *Dangers in Declining Tensions.* Another warning flag in the historical record is that a serious danger of war can remain even while adversaries are achieving agreements on contentious issues and while tensions are declining. Germany and Britain, for instance, seemed to be enjoying an improvement in their relations on the eve of the crisis that precipitated the First World War.³³ This point—along with some of the less sanguine implications of the long-peace interpretation—gives rise to interesting but perplexing questions. Will the growing realization that we live in a period of great-power peace actually tend to endanger the current international system? Could the persistence of real danger through several more decades of the long peace create conditions for a very perilous irony?

It seems plausible that if the Soviet Union and the United States continue for decade after decade to resolve disputes and intermittent crises peacefully, apathy regarding the dangers of war will become pandemic. A serious Soviet-American confrontation has not occurred since the global military alert associated with the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and that incident was far less serious than the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. If confidence in peace breeds apathy and boredom, it could insidiously reduce the inhibitions and fears that have prompted the superpowers to evolve prudent and tacit rules of the game. Thus, an inclination to take risks in pursuit of advantages or prestige may eventually offset the careful practice of scrupulously avoiding direct military confrontations. Incursions into the adversary's sphere of influence or brinksmanship in space—perhaps the downing of a spy satellite—may increasingly seem worth trying.³⁴ Such risks would, of course, be taken

on the calculation that the adversary would probably back down, but the hope that war can be avoided does not prevent risk-taking from resulting in catastrophe. Consider 1914, when Austria and Germany risked a major war in their attempt to humiliate Serbia, a Russian client.

The darker implications of the long-peace interpretation underscore a continuing reality. While the current international system has powerful and persistent factors that prevent great-power war, it remains important (and may become increasingly vital) that policymakers be prudent and skillful. The reasons go beyond the obvious point that miscalculation in the nuclear age could be ruinous.

Just as the Munich analogy served as the most prevalent so-called lesson of history in justifications of containment, the 1914 analogy has constituted the most widely cited warning by those concerned about the need for caution and accommodation.³⁵ But there is another historical parallel that should be more widely contemplated. Norman Rich's book *Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale* makes some points that relate to our current situation. The Crimean War marked the end of the heyday of the Concert of Europe, the impressive long peace that lasted from 1815 to 1854. The most distinctive feature of the period was the relatively extensive use of great-power cooperation and consultation to prevent crises from resulting in a major war. There were also impressive efforts to restrain disruptive behavior by including all of the leading states in the conferences that presided over the international order. Rich concluded: "The policy of bringing all the great powers into the system, of keeping them 'grouped,' as the technique came to be called, appears in retrospect to have been the most effective method employed by the statesmen of the concert for the preservation of peace."³⁶

Perhaps President Bush is on the right track when he speaks of moving beyond containment by integrating "the Soviet Union into the community of nations." This might include, for example, seeking the active cooperation of Moscow as a partner in settling (or at least dampening) the Arab-Israeli dispute.³⁷ That would truly signal a Western departure from containment and might help lead us toward the establishment of a more constructive pattern of relations between the superpowers.³⁸

A possible advantage in such a departure is that it could help stabilize an international system that is undergoing potentially dangerous changes. The study of history reminds us, even as we notice repetitious patterns and cycles, that change will occur. In a recent article, Gaddis suggested the importance of thinking about how to maintain a peaceful "Soviet-American relationship in a shifting international system."³⁹ The creation of a new (and necessarily more progressive) concert of leading powers would provide a vehicle for reassuring the Soviet Union of continued prestige and influence despite its relative decline.

The 1914 analogy offers a final historical parallel to underscore the importance of alleviating the anxiety of a declining power. Austria and

Germany felt that they were militarily strong in the short term but they acutely feared decline in the long run. That feeling fostered the mood in which they proved to be willing to risk a major war.

Reasonable Hopes

The best that the West could reasonably expect might be limited success for Gorbachev's reforms—enough to sustain the Soviet Union as a stable leading power without making it a more formidable rival than it has been. One hesitates to wish him spectacular success in light of Russia's long history of intermittent expansionist adventures. While it may be true that the nature of the Soviet regime is changing (as George Kennan predicted it would when he originally sketched a containment policy for the Truman Administration), Russia's record of autocracy and totalitarianism should dampen any great expectations for a liberal democratic transformation that *might* make the USSR a more peaceful state.⁴⁰ Consequently it remains reassuring that historically Russia has had a relatively inefficient economy.

Reassurance can also be derived from the probability that some factors identified as important in the post-1945 long peace will continue despite reform in the East. The favorable geographical positions of the United States and the USSR will, for example, obviously remain. President Bush's restrained response to the momentous changes in Eastern Europe during 1989 reflects awareness of the compelling need for continued understanding of the Soviet Union's interests in that sphere. Some other stabilizing factors may even be enhanced. Gorbachev's extraordinary willingness to open the Soviet arsenal to inspection will reinforce the beneficial effects of the reconnaissance revolution. To be sure, there is merit in warnings by cautious critics that reductions in Soviet military capabilities are lagging far behind the rhetoric of Gorbachev's disarmament proposals, and it seems likely that even impressive arms control agreements in the future will leave the Soviet Union with strong nuclear as well as conventional forces. Yet, if the balance of terror has helped keep the peace, we should not be dismayed by the likelihood that the military balance will persist.

The positive changes that have already occurred during the long peace are also worth emphasizing. Germans have developed what A. W. DePorte has called a "most un-Faustian sense of limits"⁴¹ after suffering defeat and the East-West division of Europe. Undoubtedly the great economic prosperity in West Germany has helped reconcile many Germans to the division of their country, and even if a revival of German nationalism brings about a reunified Germany, the consequences are not necessarily to be feared. Continued integration in the European Community could help minimize the dangers.⁴²

The foregoing analysis thus suggests that the post-Cold War era will prove to be another phase in a permanent great-power peace. Although historical warning flags should be heeded, nostalgia for the Cold War seems

decidedly unwarranted in light of the many encouraging changes and potentially great opportunities. The emergence of a real concert of the leading powers may even be possible in the decade ahead. Perhaps the two main conclusions that can reasonably be inferred from examination of the historical parallels are (1) that persistent efforts to create an effective concert should be made to compensate for any possible attenuation of the current long peace, and (2) that continued caution will remain desirable in our statesmen even if they manage to establish a more explicitly cooperative international system.

NOTES

I wish to acknowledge the help of Dr. William D. Anderson of Western Illinois University, who collaborated with me on a study that provided the synthesis of the long-peace interpretation treated here.

1. Jonathan Schell, *The Fate of the Earth* (New York: Avon Books, 1982).
2. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security*, 10 (Spring 1986), 99-142. A slightly different version of this essay appeared in Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries in the History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 215-45. More recently he sketched his views in two articles: "How the Cold War Might End," *The Atlantic Monthly*, November 1987, pp. 88-100; and "Looking Back: The Long Peace," *The Wilson Quarterly*, 13 (New Year's, 1989), 42-45. Another recent and readable work is John Mueller's *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Mueller provided a preliminary summary of his views in "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security*, 13 (Fall 1988), 55-79. For other representative works, see K. J. Holsti, "The Horsemen of the Apocalypse: At the Gate, Detoured, or Retreating?" *International Studies Quarterly*, 20 (December 1986), 355-72; Paul Schroeder, "Does Murphy's Law Apply to History?" *The Wilson Quarterly*, 9 (New Year's, 1985), 84-93; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979). See also, Waltz's "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). Additional examples include Sterling J. Kernek, "Historical Reflections on the Dangers Ahead," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, 60 (Spring 1984), 189-209; Linda R. Killen, *Soviet Union and the United States: A New Look at the Cold War* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Jonathan Knight, "The Great Power Peace: The United States and the Soviet Union Since 1945," *Diplomatic History*, 6 (Spring 1982), 169-83.
3. F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1963).
4. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., *The Cold War . . . and After* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 115.
5. The earlier periods of long great-power peace are 1815 to 1854 and 1871 to 1914. They lasted almost 39 and over 43 years, respectively. The post-1945 long peace reached the 39 year mark in 1984. The post-1871 long peace could be reduced if one categorized the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1904-05 as a major war.
6. Mueller has made an elaborate case for this viewpoint. See *Retreat from Doomsday*, pp. 110-16, and "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons." It is worth mentioning, incidentally, that Hinsley presented a similar view over 25 years ago. See *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, pp. 348-49, 353.
7. F. H. Hinsley, "Reflections on the Debate about Nuclear Weapons," *The Cambridge Review*, 7 February 1981, p. 72.
8. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, pp. 9-13, 242-44, 264.
9. Seweryn Bialer, "Lessons of History: Soviet-American Relations in the Postwar Era," in *U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase*, ed. Arnold L. Horelick (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 90-92.
10. The tacit nature of the "sphere-of-interest" rule should be noted. In fact, "special rights or advantages" were disavowed by the superpowers in the 12 "Basic Principles" agreement of 1972. Ironically, this relatively weak tacit rule has been followed more consistently than the explicit principle.
11. Stanley Hoffmann, "Superpower Ethics: The Rules of the Game," *Ethics and International Affairs*, 1 (1987), 44.
12. Gaddis, "The Long Peace," pp. 136-38. It should not be assumed that fear of escalation or holocaust was the dominant consideration preventing the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam or Afghanistan. See Gaddis's book, *The Long Peace*, pp. 141-42.
13. F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System, 1815-1914* (London: Longman, 1980), p. 30.

14. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 190.
15. Gaddis, "The Long Peace," pp. 112-13.
16. A. W. DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance* (2d ed.; New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1986), p. 149.
17. As Schroeder has pointed out, this transformation also reflects larger historical processes. See "Murphy's Law," p. 92.
18. Gaddis, "The Long Peace," pp. 123-25. As Geoffrey Blainey noted, "Wars usually begin when fighting nations disagree on their relative strength." See Blainey, *The Causes of War* (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 122.
19. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 172.
20. Gaddis, "The Long Peace," pp. 108-10.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
22. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 191.
23. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, pp. 352-53.
24. Hoffmann used the phrase "astonishingly optimistic." See Stanley Hoffmann, *Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 104.
25. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 214.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
27. Janet Cawley, "Bush Prods Gorbachev on Reform," *Chicago Tribune*, 13 May 1989, pp. 1, 4.
28. Ernest R. May, "The Cold War," in *The Making of America's Soviet Policy*, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 210, 226-27.
29. Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, p. 47. See also, Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 213.
30. Norman A. Graebner, "Multipolarity in World Politics: The Challenge," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, 64 (Summer 1988), 396.
31. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America's New Geostrategy," *Foreign Affairs*, 66 (Spring 1988), 693-94.
32. Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.—Decline or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs*, 67 (Winter 1988/89), 93.
33. See Laurence Lafore, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I* (2d ed.; New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1971), pp. 200-02.
34. Although the deployment of reconnaissance satellites has undoubtedly been beneficial, further developments of such technology could have unfortunate consequences. Improvements in the capabilities of intelligence-gathering as well as communication satellites will increase their usefulness for managing battles. This will transform them into more valuable targets—thus providing a justification for developing better anti-satellite weapons. Paul Stares has pointed out that space "offers significant attractions as a medium for brinkmanship." By this he means that a superpower leader might be tempted to intercept satellites in a crisis because that option might appear to be a relatively inexpensive way to show de-termination and because the risks would be lower than if military forces crossed a national boundary or if someone were killed. The main drawback is, of course, that such brinkmanship could create dangerous uncertainties in a crisis. See Paul B. Stares, *Space and National Security* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 137.
35. It is possible, of course, for hard-liners to use the 1914 analogy to support the same moral that is featured in the Munich analogy. See Patrick Glynn, "The Sarajevo Fallacy: The Historical and Intellectual Origins of Arms Control Theology," *The National Interest*, no. 9 (Fall 1987), 3-32.
36. Norman Rich, *Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale* (Hanover, N.H.: Univ. Press of New England, 1985), p. 203.
37. In suggesting a similar approach to a Middle East settlement, Richard H. Ullman argued: "The United States has much to gain from treating the Soviet Union as an ordinary state in this situation." See Ullman, "Ending the Cold War," *Foreign Policy*, no. 72 (Fall 1988), 144-45.
38. In a well-received televised address on 22 November 1989, Bush asserted, "America wants the Soviets to join us in moving beyond containment to a new partnership." See *The New York Times*, 23 November 1989, p. A12. For an interesting historical sketch of what Gaddis calls the option of "cooperative coexistence," see his essay "The Evolution of U.S. Policy Goals Toward the USSR in the Postwar Era," in *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*, eds. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder: Westview, 1988), pp. 331-37.
39. Gaddis, "Looking Back: The Long Peace," p. 65.
40. Gaddis urges considering how democratization inside the Soviet Union might affect relations with the West. "If the historical record is any guide," he suggests, "the result could be to lessen still further the danger of military confrontation: Wars between democratic states have been rare indeed." *Ibid.*, p. 64. Mueller, using works by Michael Boyle, takes up the discussion in terms of liberal states. See *Retreat from Doomsday*, pp. 23-24.
41. DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers*, p. 187.
42. The shattering of the Berlin Wall, the present disarray of the communist leadership in East Germany, and prudent statesmanship in Bonn have fostered rethinking of the separation of the two Germanies. See Edward Cody, "Europeans Back German Reunification," *The Washington Post*, 10 December 1989, pp. A1, A38.