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Theater Campaign Planning for NATO's Northern Region

GUY C. SWAN III

For years the Northern Region has been considered of secondary importance to NATO theater military operations. But with the buildup of Soviet forces in the area, especially those on the Kola Peninsula and within the Northern Fleet, Soviet military operations now have the potential to seriously threaten NATO's Atlantic sea lines of communication and even outflank allied forces in the Central Region itself.

NATO's response to this threat is a fragmented division of responsibility among the three major NATO commands-Allied Command Europe (ACE), Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), and Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN). Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), a major subordinate headquarters of ACE, is the Northern Region warfighting command charged with planning and conducting a joint and combined campaign.¹ However, in view of the growing Soviet naval threat in the Northern Region, we must ask whether AFNORTH still has adequate command structure, forces, operational depth, and agility to plan and conduct an effective campaign in a theater where maritime influences have emerged as a dominant feature of the operational environment. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN) have overlapping responsibilities for planning and conducting simultaneous yet separate maritime campaigns in the same general area, yet there does not appear to be a mechanism for developing a cohesive combined campaign plan that unites and synchronizes all air, land, and sea operations for the entire Northern Region.

At the same time, the Maritime Strategy has been criticized by those concentrating on the continental defense of the Central Region as a US Navy political ploy and a global concept having limited utility in NATO military operations. Ongoing budget and force reductions are likely to further intensify scrutiny of the Maritime Strategy's global perspective and perhaps even limit the Navy's worldwide commitments. It seems prudent under these conditions to consider ways to refocus the Maritime Strategy at the theater level. Unfortunately, because of ACE's emphasis on a land-based forward defense, the viability of the Maritime Strategy as a *theater warfighting concept* in the European context has not been fully investigated. In a theater like the Northern Region, naval power and the warfighting aspects of the Maritime Strategy deserve a closer look to see if they have application in improving combined theater campaign plans.

This article is intended to do four things: improve general understanding of the Northern Region's operational environment as it relates to the Maritime Strategy; provide a conceptual process for developing the region's combined campaign plans; increase understanding of its joint and combined theater command structures; and offer specific recommendations related to strategy and command arrangements in the Northern Region, with a view to enhancing unity of command, campaign planning, and successful defense both there and in Allied Command Europe.

A Construct for Analyzing Theater Campaign Planning

In September 1988 two members of the US Army War College faculty, Colonel William W. Mendel and Lieutenant Colonel Floyd T. Banks, published an article in *Parameters* which summarized the findings of an extensive study of campaign planning they conducted in late 1986 and 1987. As part of their findings the authors concluded that in virtually every theaterlevel command they studied (US as well as combined) there was considerable confusion as to how to go about planning a campaign.² In their view this confusion is the result of a lack of doctrine, and they stressed that confusion will continue to reign until a comprehensive, overarching joint and combined doctrine is developed.

Mendel and Banks also recognized that style and format are not as important as the campaign development process and the content of the plans themselves. To this end they offered several "tenets of a campaign plan," four of which are particularly germane to this discussion. In their view, a campaign plan—

• Provides an orderly schedule of strategic military decisions; displays the commander's vision and intent.

- Orients on the enemy's center of gravity.
- Phases a series of related major operations.

• Synchronizes joint air-land-sea efforts into a cohesive and synergistic whole.³

In order to evaluate the ability of the major allied theater commander, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe (CINCNORTH), to adequately plan a campaign, we will determine whether he can adhere to these tenets in his campaign planning effort and, if he cannot, offer solutions to help him do so. Before proceeding, however, we need to take a closer look at the Northern Region itself from the NATO and Soviet perspectives. It will become clear as we go along just how important understanding the operational environment is to a CINC's ability to effectively plan a campaign.

Theater of War and Theaters of Operations

JCS Pub 1 defines a *theater of war* as "that area of land, sea, and air which is, or may become, directly involved in the operations of war." While a theater of war has no spatial limits, it may consist of one or more theaters of operations. A *theater of operations* is in turn defined as "that portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations."⁴ The commander of a theater of war generally operates at the strategic-operational level while the theater of operations commander normally functions at the operational level.

In NATO terms, the area of responsibility for ACE and its Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is considered a theater of war, and the geographic areas assigned to AFNORTH, AFCENT, and AFSOUTH are subordinate theaters of operations.


CINCNORTH's area of responsibility includes Norway, Denmark, the northern tip of West Germany (Schleswig-Holstein), and the coastal waters and airspace above them (see Map 1). This huge area extends some 1750 miles from the North Cape of Norway to Hamburg on the Elbe River. Yet, on land it has even less operational depth than the Central Region—in some places this depth is only four miles!⁵ The emphasis in AFNORTH since its inception in 1951 has been on a land-oriented forward defense against a Soviet ground offensive through Finland or Sweden.

Forces of the Northern Region

To conduct military operations in this huge area, CINCNORTH commands surprisingly few forces. Primary ground defense forces include the 12 brigades of the largely reservist Norwegian army, the Danish Jutland

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Division, the German 6th Panzer Division, and other smaller mobilization units. CINCNORTH is dependent on rapid reinforcement by additional allied ground forces to augment these indigenous forces. The United States is initially expected to provide a 15,000-man Marine Expeditionary Brigade which has prepositioned its equipment at Trondheim in southern Norway. The British and Dutch contribution is the UK/NL Amphibious Force, a combined brigade initially assigned to SACLANT and earmarked for early transfer to CINCNORTH. If not committed elsewhere, the light brigade-sized ACE Mobile Force-Land (AMF-L) could also be dispatched to AFNORTH's area. Canada recently withdrew its 4000-man Canadian Air-Sea Transportable

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Brigade from commitment to AFNORTH, a move with political as well as military impact on CINCNORTH's land defense plans.⁶ Generally speaking, all these elements are best characterized as light infantry units capable of defending in the rugged terrain of Scandinavia, but possessing limited staying power. The question raised by a former CINCNORTH, British General Sir Geoffrey Howlett, is whether there will be sufficient warning time to mobilize these forces into a coherent ground defense that can hold against otherwise overwhelmingly superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact for any length of time.⁷


CINCNORTH's strongest defensive card is allied airpower. Norway and Denmark possess small but modern air forces and the Federal Republic of Germany's *Luftwaffe* and *Bundesmarine* air arm are among the world's best. But command and control of these forces is complicated, especially in the south where AFCENT's 2d Allied Tactical Air Force's area of responsibility overlaps into AFNORTH's area. Reinforcements from the US Air Force and elements of the British RAF round out CINCNORTH's air forces.

The weakest link in CINCNORTH's defense is maritime forces, which are meager when compared to the growing Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat in the region. The *Bundesmarine* and Royal Navy are of high quality, but even when combined with the coastal navies of the other allies cannot challenge the combined strength of the Soviet Northern and Baltic Fleets.⁸ Only SACLANT commands the forces, principally the Striking Fleet Atlantic—composed largely of carrier battlegroups, surface action groups, and submarine attack groups from the US Second Fleet—which are capable of defeating the Soviet fleets.

The point that CINCNORTH lacks strong maritime forces is important. Because of the ruggedness of the terrain and lack of geographical depth in this area, CINCNORTH must rely on the agility of air and naval forces to give operational depth to his land defense.

To command and control these forces, CINCNORTH's command is subdivided into three sub-regional commands, as shown in the diagram on the next page: Allied Forces North Norway, Allied Forces South Norway, and Allied Forces Baltic Approaches. Because each of these subcommands has its own air, land, and sea components, they function more like regional joint task forces. While this may appear to be a judicious use of available forces, it fragments AFNORTH's forces across a wide area of operations and hinders CINCNORTH's ability to concentrate at decisive points.

Unlike the Central Region, where land lines of communication play an important role in the sustainment effort, CINCNORTH has almost no capability to sustain his forces overland. Virtually all logistical support for AFNORTH operations, as well as the majority of the forces needed for the initial defense, must come by air and sea along lines of communication over



which CINCNORTH exercises neither geographic nor operational control. And since these lines of communication flow directly to the subcommands, he must rely on SACLANT and CINCHAN to command and control the sustainment effort.

As SACEUR's major subordinate commander in northern Europe, it devolves on CINCNORTH to be the principal campaign planner for this area. However, CINCNORTH's area of responsibility must not be confused with the much larger Northern Region, which has broader strategic and operational implications.

The Northern Region as a Theater of Operations

The Northern Region (as opposed to CINCNORTH's assigned area of responsibility) encompasses a vast land and sea expanse that embraces the Norwegian, Barents, Greenland, North, and Baltic seas; the Svalbard (Spitzbergen) Island archipelago; Iceland; the Faeroe Islands; and the Scandinavian, Kola, and Jutland peninsulas, including Schleswig-Holstein. At the strategic level, control of this area could have a far-reaching effect on the outcome of a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Central Europe. For NATO, control of the maritime reaches of the Northern Region ensures the survivability of critical sea lines of communication from the continental United States. Conversely, the area is vital to the Soviets in achieving their two main strategic objectives in the region: protecting their nuclear ballistic missile submarines and projecting their naval power into the Atlantic and Channel sea lanes to interdict allied sea lines of communication.⁹ Moreover, the region represents a potential operational axis of advance that could enable the Soviets to "envelop" NATO from the north.

In a short war, a Warsaw Pact thrust through the Baltic Sea against the defenses of Denmark and the northern Federal Republic could play a crucial role in unhinging allied defenses in the center. In a protracted war, the Northern Region's maritime character would take on crucial importance largely because of the area's relationship to the allied sustainment effort. In short, both alliances have vital reasons for placing considerable operational and strategic emphasis on the Northern Region.

When the Northern Region is viewed from this broader perspective, it becomes clear that CINCNORTH's land-oriented area of responsibility plays only a part in NATO's overall response to Soviet challenges in this vast area. Indeed, NATO's response at this time is not a simple theater of war/theater of operations arrangement but a complex and often confusing combination of NATO commands. CINCNORTH is not the sole actor. CINCHAN, SACLANT, and CINCENT also exercise control over portions of the Northern Region. The number and variety of joint and combined commands responsible for these overlapping areas and missions make truly effective combined campaign planning difficult if not impossible.¹⁰

Soviet Theater Strategy and Warfighting Capabilities in the Region

The Soviet Union's Northwestern Theater of Military Operations (TVD) is primarily responsible for warfighting in the northwestern USSR, Finland, Scandinavia, northern Scotland, and Iceland. It is expected that TVD ground forces stationed on the Kola Peninsula would be organized as a front for operations against AFNORTH. In the opening days of operations in the Northern Region, the Soviet Northern Fleet would be subordinated to the Northwestern TVD commander to support the early phases of a land campaign in north Norway, principally to provide security on the maritime flank* of the main effort overland.

But the Soviets also consider the Northern Fleet an *operational-strategic* or *higher operational* formation capable of conducting independent strategic or operational missions in an ocean or maritime TVD.¹¹ It is conceivable that the Northern Fleet would revert to this more independent role once the land campaign had succeeded in securing tactical and operational objectives and land-based air cover could be provided to the fleet. The Soviet

scheme for achieving its goals offers an interesting example of the interrelationships among tactics, operational art, and strategy.

The opening phases of a Soviet campaign by the Northwestern TVD would probably see the Soviets launching an overwhelming land offensive through the Finnish wedge supported by naval forces, probably to seize the airfields and ports of north Norway. Success at this tactical level would have distinct operational implications in that control of the airfields would serve to protect the Kola bases by vastly reducing NATO's capability to stage land-based air strikes. Tactical victories would also free the Northern Fleet of the NATO air threat in the Norwegian Sea, thus allowing unimpeded operations. With these operational objectives achieved, the Northern Fleet would be capable of breaking out of the Norwegian Sea. The strategic impact comes from the Soviets' ability to project the Northern Fleet south to cut the sea lines of communication upon which the survival of NATO's main effort in the Central Region will depend. Under these conditions the Soviet center of gravity in the Northern Region, the "hub of all power and strength" to achieve strategic objectives, is the Northern Fleet (and its associated Soviet naval aviation arm) consisting of:

• 55 percent of all Soviet nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile-firing submarines

- 55 percent of cruise-missile submarines
- 45 percent of attack submarines
- 48 naval Backfire bombers
- 30 percent of cruisers
- 7 percent of amphibious craft
- 2 of 3 deployed aircraft carriers¹²

Clearly, it is no longer appropriate to regard the Northern Fleet as an expendable force which must survive long enough to get off one nuclear salvo in the first few hours of war. Indeed, the blue-water character of the "new" Northern Fleet allows the Soviets to pursue the open-ocean operations that could give their early tactical victories a decisive strategic impact.

CINCNORTH and Northern Region Campaign Planning

Based on our earlier definitions, SACEUR is responsible for developing a theater of war campaign plan for all of ACE which seeks to attain *alliance* strategic objectives (for example, deter war, respond to aggression, insure territorial integrity of member nations, etc.).¹³ In support of SACEUR's campaign plan, CINCNORTH should develop his own theater of operations campaign plan which seeks to achieve *theater* strategic military objectives (for example, defend or regain NATO territory, deny Soviet use of friendly airfields and ports, prevent interdiction of sea lines of communication by defeating the Northern Fleet, etc.) through the attainment of operational objectives.

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As we saw in the discussion of the Northern Region's operational environment, the balance of forces favors the Soviets, who will have the strategic and operational initiative to seize objectives like Norwegian bases early. Based on the geographic scope of the Northern Region and our assumption that the Northern Fleet is the Soviets' center of gravity in the north, AFNORTH's main effort, the land battle, has only tactical and operational importance while the maritime battle holds in its grasp the theater's strategic decision. If CINC-NORTH's initial forward land defense fails, another operation or several phased major operations will be necessary to regain lost territory. Further, even if CINCNORTH were successful in his defensive operation, the theater's "flashing sword of vengeance" would still be manifested in a maritime-based counteroffensive phase designed to destroy the Northern Fleet and regain lost alliance territory. With the present command structure, assigned areas of responsibility, and force allocations, CINCNORTH is capable of fighting only the opening operation of a much larger campaign that must include subsequent maritime operations to achieve overall theater strategic objectives. Clearly, then, CINC-NORTH is not presently in a position to meet the Mendel and Banks tenets of providing an orderly schedule of strategic military decisions and phasing a series of related major operations.

Mendel and Banks make it explicit that "the campaign plan synchronizes land, sea, and air efforts against the enemy center of gravity." CINC-NORTH cannot effectively synchronize the air, land, and sea efforts for the entire Northern Region into a cohesive and synergistic whole because the maritime forces necessary to challenge and defeat the Northern Fleet belong to SACLANT. As noted at the outset, this is fundamentally a unity-of-command issue in that CINCNORTH, SACLANT, and CINCHAN are conducting independent campaigns in overlapping areas of responsibility. However, SACLANT is the only commander with the forces capable of affecting the Soviet center of gravity, not CINCNORTH. Therefore, under the present theater structure, CINCNORTH cannot meet the campaign planning tenets of synchronization and orienting on the enemy's center of gravity.

Maritime Strategy as a Theater Warfighting Concept

Accepting the proposition that the Northern Region is largely a maritime theater, it is incumbent upon us to examine the Maritime Strategy as it might apply to the development of theater campaign plans in this area.

The Maritime Strategy is intended to be a conventional, offensively oriented warfighting strategy. The concept is designated "maritime" rather than "naval" because it is essentially a combined arms concept for maritime theaters, not simply a strategy for the employment of submarines and carrier battle forces.¹⁴ While the US Navy considers the Maritime Strategy global in nature, the concept has a regional focus, some features of which apply directly to the operational level of war, especially in theater campaign planning and warfighting. The concept is broken down into three sequential phases:

Phase 1: Deterrence or transition to war.

Phase 2: Seizing the initiative.

Phase 3: Carrying the fight to the enemy.

While these phases do not represent a specific time schedule or campaign plan, they do provide a useful framework for planning.

Phase 1 seeks to "win the crisis, to control escalation, and . . . make our intentions clear to cede no area to the Soviets by default . . . through the early worldwide, decisive use of seapower."¹⁵ If such deterrence fails, rapid forward deployment of military forces becomes critical, especially in defending decisive points like the Norwegian airfields and in forcing Soviet attack submarines, surface ships, and aircraft into a defensive role oriented on protecting their nuclear ballistic missile subs.

During Phase 2 allied maritime forces would seek to exploit their qualitative advantage in antisubmarine warfare, aviation technology, command and control, and pilot training to seize control of the airspace over the Northern Region. Vital to this phase is the security or retaking of the Norwegian airfields and concomitant attack submarine operations to help clear the way for surface battlegroups.

"Carrying the fight to the enemy" in Phase 3 is dependent on sufficient attrition of Soviet naval and naval air forces. Then "carrier battlegroups and amphibious task forces would press home the initiative to destroy Soviet forces, regain lost territory, and support the theater land campaign."¹⁶ While this concept of challenging the Soviet fleet in its own home waters is not new, it does have important theater warfighting implications in that it seeks to strike at the Soviet center of gravity in that area, the Northern Fleet.¹⁷ Dr. Robert S. Wood, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, cautions that the offensive flavor of Phase 3 "does not mean a foolhardy rush of forces into the Norwegian Sea but a sea, land, and air campaign partially sequential in character. The viability of various mixes and sequences requires intense campaign planning, gaming, and exercises."¹⁸

Success in Phases 2 and 3 depends on the ability of SACLANT to project adequate forces and transport the reinforcements so desperately needed by CINCNORTH. The principal maritime forces available to SACLANT are three: Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and the two components of the Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic: the Striking Fleet Atlantic and allied amphibious forces.¹⁹

Unlike NATO's Concept of Maritime Operations, which is merely a defensive concept designed to maintain the confusing status quo command structure, the Maritime Strategy provides the necessary direction for building a coherent theater campaign plan.²⁰

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Mendel points out that campaign planning at the theater level must begin with the CINC's formulation of a *theater strategy* which applies to his entire area of responsibility throughout the encompassing periods of peace, crisis, and war. The CINC's theater strategy—

provides broad conceptual guidance for deterrence and prosecution of regional war.... The CINC's strategy is expressed in general terms of ends, ways, and means, with such objectives as "deter war" and "protect the seaward approaches to North America"; such concepts as "US conventional forces will be forward deployed" and "naval presence will be maintained along sea lines of communications"; and such broad categories of resources as "Marine expeditionary forces" and "division force equivalents."²¹ [italics supplied]

The fundamental concepts of the Maritime Strategy discussed above fit this purpose neatly in that they outline how the CINC in a NATO maritime theater would deter, and if necessary, transition to war. Further, they provide an overarching concept for prosecuting the regional campaign to support the theater of war campaign plan proposed by SACEUR. In the Northern Region the Maritime Strategy, with its phased peace-crisis-war approach, represents a theater of operations strategy which can help guide CINCNORTH's theater campaign planning effort.

Mendel goes on to say that the theater of war/theater of operations strategic statement is much too broad for the actual application of military forces. A campaign plan is needed to guide the warfighting itself, but before a comprehensive plan can be devised, the CINC must develop what we will call an *operational concept*.

The commander's operational concept is his visualization of how he intends to prosecute the campaign. It is necessarily broad in scope and purpose, providing only a general framework for follow-up planning. An example of an operational concept in CINCNORTH's theater might include an initial forward defense on land followed up by a theater-wide maritime counteroffensive to achieve the overall objectives of the theater strategy.²² Ideally, the operational concept should dovetail with the theater strategy; in this case it does because a maritime counteroffensive is expressly anticipated in Phases 2 and 3 of the Maritime Strategy.

Once the CINC has clearly defined his operational concept he can proceed with the development and preparation of the campaign plan itself. The campaign plan is essentially the CINC's "scheme of operational synchronization" of air, land, and sea forces within his theater of operations. Additionally, the campaign plan translates the CINC's vision and intent expressed in his operational concept into a more clearly defined sequencing of major operations.

Finally, depending on the nature of the campaign, the CINC's subordinate component commanders and/or joint and combined task force commanders formulate supporting operations plans and orders. These documents detail the tactical functions of specific groupings of combat forces and round out the overall theater-wide planning effort.

While this construct represents only one approach to theater campaign planning, it does show how the Maritime Strategy can be used as a theater warfighting concept in an area dominated by maritime influences.


Conclusions and Recommendations

When NATO established AFNORTH in 1951 the primary concern in the north was Soviet ground operations against the Scandinavian and Jutland landmasses. The Soviet navy was merely an auxiliary force, clearly unable to challenge US and allied naval forces. In the last two decades, the scope of CINCNORTH's command has been overtaken by the Soviet naval buildup to the point that his current area of responsibility is now only a portion of a much larger maritime-oriented theater of operations.

Today, the Northern Region must be viewed as an organic entity—a theater of operations—which can be managed only through a maritimeoriented strategy aimed both at the Soviet Northern Fleet and at power projection against the shore.²³ This approach is vital to restoring the operational depth and agility currently lacking within CINCNORTH's area of responsibility.

Approaching the entire Northern Region as one unified theater of operations requires a fundamental readjustment of the present areas of command responsibility so as to enhance unity of command and focus the campaign planning effort. I recommend a new, single-theater area of responsibility subordinate to Allied Command Europe which encompasses all of the ocean areas north of the Greenland-Iceland-UK-Norway gap, including the Norwegian and Barents seas and their island chains; and all of the Scandinavian landmass (see Map 2).

Under this proposal SACLANT and CINCHAN would have to provide some maritime forces to bolster the "new" AFNORTH. A reinforcement of CINCNORTH's maritime forces could take several forms. One option is to expand Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and transfer it to CINCNORTH on a full-time basis. Another would be the creation of a Standing Naval Force for Northern Waters²⁴ perhaps reinforced with the three carriers of the Royal Navy. A third option would be to transfer command of the Striking Fleet from SACLANT through SACEUR to CINCNORTH upon its commitment north of the Greenland-Iceland-UK-Norway gap. Naval forces, like air forces, are inherently flexible; the Striking Fleet's ability to exploit its speed and power to move quickly to the theater would enable CINCNORTH to concentrate all maritime, land, and air forces at the decisive point of the campaign. Ideally, a combination of these options would ensure that CINCNORTH possesses




sufficient forces to gain time to launch a theater maritime counteroffensive at the appropriate time. Further, the clear transfer of command authority in each option fosters unity of command in the planning and execution of a campaign. And finally, the realignment of areas of responsibility and forces would enable SACLANT and CINCHAN to better concentrate their efforts on maintaining security of the vital Atlantic and Channel avenues.

The line between the land and the sea is blurred at the operational level of war; any prospective maritime counteroffensive launched by CINCNORTH will rely heavily on a secure land flank. This means that CINCNORTH's land forces must be strengthened, especially to maintain control of key air bases. Early warning, rapid deployment of light forces, and prepositioning of equipment are only partial solutions. The key to ensuring a strong land flank rests on convincing the Norwegians of the necessity of basing some heavier foreign forces in Norway or permitting more frequent and larger exercises in their country. Such forces need not be—indeed, *should* not be—solely US. Rather, they should be multinational and European to demonstrate a broad commitment to deterrence and an unwillingness to concede any territory to the Soviets in the Northern Region.

Since the security of Denmark, the northern portion of the FRG, and the Baltic approaches is more directly related to allied success in the Central Region, AFCENT's area of responsibility should also be expanded to include this area. A former deputy commander of Allied Forces Baltic Approaches, Lieutenant General Heinz von zur Gathen, supports this view, noting that "the defense of the Baltic approaches is closely linked to NATO's Central Region. Central Region land and air forces and those of the Baltic approaches are contiguous neighbors. They also face the same enemy. . . . It would seem logical for NATO to place the Baltic approaches under the command of the Central Region of ACE."²⁵

We may also conclude that the land orientation of AFNORTH's present command structure is inappropriate for planning and conducting a multi-phased campaign in a theater where maritime factors hold the key to strategic military decisions. In recognition of the decidedly maritime nature of the region, CINCNORTH should be a naval officer. The command should, however, remain subordinate to Allied Command Europe to enhance unity of command and effort throughout the European theater of war. The proposed structure is depicted in the diagram below.

To further enhance unity of command, CINCNORTH should be dualhatted as the Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Northern Europe, exercising operational command over all allied naval and amphibious forces transferred to him in time of war. Major General Sir Jeremy Moore, commander of British land



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In recognition of the decidedly maritime nature of the region, CINCNORTH should be a naval officer, subordinate to the SACEUR.

forces in the 1982 Falklands War, supports this concept, observing that "the essential nature of the Northern theater . . . being a maritime one, . . . for the most efficient execution in war the command [in AFNORTH] ought to be maritime."²⁶

CINCNORTH, paralleling the structure of AFSOUTH, would have subordinate component commanders responsible for land and air operations throughout the theater. These commanders would be designated Commander, Allied Land Forces, Northern Europe, and Commander, Allied Air Forces, Northern Europe. This structural change would eliminate the regional subcommands now in place, strengthen unity of command, and permit CINCNORTH to concentrate his forces at critical points in the theater instead of trying to defend weakly everywhere. CINCNORTH would still be able, under this design, to form joint and combined task forces for specific missions within the theater of operations. Overall, this comprehensive restructuring of AFNORTH would focus campaign planning responsibility in one commander instead of the current three.

Finally, the maritime nature of this theater of operations warrants a maritime approach to warfighting. Campaign planning within the Northern Region would be enhanced by applying selected elements of the Maritime Strategy to the planning process. Specifically, concepts inherent in the Maritime Strategy have application in the Northern Region as a possible theater strategy for CINCNORTH which, when properly incorporated into the campaign planning process, can only improve the overall preparation of a unified combined campaign plan for the Northern Region.

NOTES

1. Northern European Command (NEC) is an equivalent term used in NATO jargon for this command. For simplicity's sake we will use the term AFNORTH.

2. The Mendel and Banks study examined four US Army component commands, four US unified commands, and six combined commands (the latter including Combined Forces Command in Korea). Though their focus was clearly on the Central Region, the authors' conclusions certainly pertain to campaign planning in AFNORTH and the Northern Region as well. (See Wm. W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, "Campaign Planning: Getting It Straight," *Parameters*, 18 (September 1988), 43-53; see also Wm. W. Mendel, "Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan: Both are Essential," *Parameters*, 18 (December 1988), 42-48. For the study on which these articles were based, consult Mendel and Banks, *Campaign Planning*, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: USAWC, Strategic Studies Institute, 1988).

3. The remaining three tenets are as follows: (1) Provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment to achieve military objectives in a theater of war or theater of operations; serves as the basis for all other planning and clearly defines what constitutes success; (2) composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships; (3) Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates. These three tenets also apply to campaign planning in the Northern Region, of course, and should be incorporated in any comprehensive planning effort. Mendel and Banks, "Campaign Planning: Getting it Straight," p. 46.

4. Department of Defense, JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington: GPO, 1 June 1987), pp. 34, 370.

5. Geoffrey Howlett, "Concepts and Future Capabilities in NATO's Northern Region," RUSI Journal, 133 (Autumn 1988), 13.

6. The Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade is being withdrawn to augment the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in the Central Region. These two units will form the nucleus of a new wartime headquarters, the 1st Canadian Division.

7. Geoffrey Howlett, "Alliance Defense of the Northern Flank," NATO's Sixteen Nations, 31 (December 1986), 22.

8. H. F. Zeiner-Gundersen, "NATO's Northern Flank," in NATO's Maritime Flanks: Problems and Prospects, Volume 3 in The Atlantic Alliance and Western Security: The Maritime Dimension, a collection of three Special Reports published under the auspices of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis [no editor] (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987), p. 13.

9. Zeiner-Gundersen, p. 10; and Howlett, "Alliance Defense of the Northern Flank," p. 21.

10. See "Conference Discussion" following Part IV in Geoffrey Till, ed., Britain and NATO's Northern Flank (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 127: "The NATO tendency to compartmentalize its area of responsibility into discrete regions and not relate them very much to each other tends to conceal the need to work out priorities. It may therefore be that . . . some of the runners do not turn up on the day of the race because they are away somewhere else. This could happen in BALTAP or north Norway."

11. Milan Vego, "The Soviet Envelopment Option in a NATO Contingency: Implications for Alliance Strategy," in NATO's Maritime Flanks: Problems and Prospects, p. 104.

12. Zeiner-Gundersen, p. 11; and Vego, pp. 92-95.

13. NATO planners emphasize deterrence over warfighting, focusing their efforts on the transition from peace to war and the preparation of General Defense Plans. Because campaign plans can be construed as having an offensive purpose, planning for operations beyond the initial forward defense phase is considered inconsistent with NATO's charter. While such political restrictions are recognized, our concern remains the soldier's obligation for effective coalition warfare planning.

14. Robert S. Wood, "Maritime-Air Operations in the North: American Perspectives," in Britain and NATO's Northern Flank, ed. Geoffrey Till (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 94.

15. James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," US Naval Institute Proceedings, Special Edition (January 1986), 9.

16. Hugh K. O'Donnell, Jr., "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 111 (September 1985), 28.

17. Harlan Ullman, Future Imperative: National Security and the US Navy in the Late 1980s (Washington: Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), p. 17. 18. Wood, p. 99.

19. Ellmann Ellingsen, ed., "Military Balance 1983-1984," in the Norwegian Version of I.I.S.S. (excerpt written under the auspices of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, FR. HANSEN PLASS 6, Oslo 1), p. 10.

20. Till, p. 124. Further, in the author's view NATO's Concept of Operations and other peacetime cross-command agreements are inadequate substitutes for rigorous campaign planning. In such agreements, responsibilities tend to be divided rather than focused on the kind of clearly defined end state that can come only from a single commander's vision for the campaign.

21. William W. Mendel, "Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan: Both Are Essential," pp. 43-44.

22. Another example of a commander's operational concept is CINCENT's Operational Guideline (Bonn, 20 August 1987) in which the CINC visualizes a campaign involving a "first battle," a "second battle," and perhaps "subsequent operations."

23. Thomas E. Campbell, "The Baltic Approaches: A Strategic Naval Alternative for the Northern Flank," unpublished research paper, US Naval War College, 22 June 1984, p. ii.

24. Geoffrey Till and Richard King, "A Standing Naval Force for Northern Waters?" Naval Forces, 8 (No. V, 1987), 16.

25. Heinz von zur Gathen, "The Federal Republic of Germany's Contribution to the Defense of Northern Europe," in Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s, eds. Paul M. Cole and Douglas M. Hart (London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 62.

26. Jeremy Moore, "Land-Air Operations in the North," in Britain and NATO's Northern Flank, ed. Geoffrey Till (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 137.