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US Civil-Military Relations in World War II

MARK A. STOLER

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Civil-military relations within the topmost rungs of government were revolutionized in the United States during the years 1939-1945. In examining this revolution, one is tempted to conclude that its causes can be summarized in a mere six words: World War II and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The war led the United States to increase its armed forces from a paltry 200,000 in 1939 to more than 12 million in 1945, an enormous expansion that was to have profound consequences for the broad relationship between the civilian and military communities. Equally profound consequences flowed from the character, methods, and ideas of the chief executive during these years. As numerous scholars have noted, Franklin Roosevelt was one of the most active and influential Commanders-in-Chief in US history. Seldom, if ever, has a President taken such an avid interest in military affairs or left so personal a stamp on civil-military relations.¹

To limit analysis to these two factors, however, is to ignore the broader historical context of civil-military relations during these years. That context included long-term trends and changes in military organization, presidential power in military affairs, national security requirements and policies, and military interest in those requirements and policies. Roosevelt and World War II clearly accelerated all of these trends and changes and gave them the shape they took during the years 1939-1945, but to understand them thoroughly one must examine their origins and development both before and after that time. This essay will analyze the changes in civil-military relations wrought between 1939 and 1945 by examining the history of these broader issues, as well as the impact of the war and Franklin Roosevelt. In the process, it will emphasize the rise and importance of the service Chiefs of Staff, as well as their interest in

national security policies, as key factors in the redefinition of civil-military relations that took place in the United States during World War II.

The most important alterations resulted not so much from the enormous growth of the armed forces themselves as from a tremendous increase in the powers and influence of the service Chiefs and their staffs, combined with the establishment of an extraordinary relationship among those Chiefs and with the President. By 1942, they had acquired total operational control over their field forces as well as their bureaucracies, established direct contact with the President, and organized themselves into a special and powerful body known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although there were some personnel changes in this body in the first half of 1942, membership from July of that year until the end of the war in 1945 was stable, consisting of the same four individuals throughout this period: Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall; Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King; Army Air Forces Chief of Staff General Henry H. Arnold; and Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief Admiral William D. Leahy.²

The Joint Chiefs were never officially chartered during the war, existing throughout the conflict solely at presidential discretion. Yet they quickly emerged as the single most important body in Washington. Indeed, they and their planning committees became a de facto combined War, Navy, and State Department, with a virtual veto over the war-related activities of other agencies. With the possible exception of Harry Hopkins, they also became the President's closest advisers on a host of political as well as military issues. Each member of the JCS had frequent and direct access to the President, with Admiral Leahy maintaining a White House office and seeing his boss regularly. The Joint Chiefs also accompanied Roosevelt on all his wartime summit conferences, composed his briefing books, and even wrote the drafts of many of his telegrams to other Allied heads of state.

A corollary to this tremendous growth in power and influence for the service Chiefs was the severe diminution in the powers and influence of those who had previously exercised important functions in the civil-military realm. Most notable in this regard were the field commanders, the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State, and the Congress.

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With the possible exception of General Douglas MacArthur, field commanders were not directly involved in high-level civil-military affairs during World War II. They of course dealt with civil-military affairs in their own theaters and often had diplomatic personnel assigned to their staffs for such purposes, but relations with the President and Congress remained the prerogative of the Joint Chiefs. While the war clearly did produce its share of generals who would become prominent political figures, no World War II version of Zachary Taylor, Winfield Scott, or George McClellan emerged to work directly with, or against, the President, or to challenge him while the war was in progress. MacArthur and his congressional supporters may have tried to do so, especially in early 1942, but the effort was unsuccessful.³

The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy similarly remained in the background of civil-military affairs and large issues of national policy. The Secretary of State did not accompany Roosevelt on a single wartime summit conference until February of 1945, and was not even on the distribution list for JCS minutes and documents from those conferences. His Army and Navy colleagues fared little better.⁴ Nor did the Congress assume anything approaching the large role in military affairs it had held during the Civil War. Its military contacts were with the members of the Joint Chiefs and consisted essentially of what those Chiefs, and Roosevelt, desired and thought prudent.

This rise in the power of the service Chiefs during World War II was the culmination of a profound alteration in military organization that had been taking place for more than a half century before Pearl Harbor. The late 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed dramatic changes not only in weapon technology and the size of national armed forces, but also in their organization. In what Walter Millis aptly labeled the "managerial revolution" in warfare, principles of large-scale corporate organization and expertise were applied to the rapidly expanding armed forces of the industrialized powers. While the United States lagged far behind its European counterparts in this development, it did possess by World War I, albeit in skeleton form and with very limited powers, the key components associated with this revolution—most notably Army and Navy general staffs headed by uniformed service Chiefs of Staff, and a Joint Army-Navy Board composed of these Chiefs and their key strategists.⁵

One of the principal goals of these organizations was rational, long-term planning for the armed forces so that they would be prepared for any contingency. Control over both field forces and existing bureaucracies was a necessary prerequisite for such planning and preparedness, and throughout the early decades of the 20th century the service Chiefs and their staffs fought a series of bitter battles to obtain such control. The process was well under way before either the advent of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President or the outbreak of World War II, but it was not completed until the years 1936-1942.⁶

The Joint Chiefs were never officially chartered during the war, yet they quickly emerged as the single most important body in Washington.

Furthermore, in previous battles, most notably the famous Stimson-Wood-Ainsworth controversy within the Army, the service Chiefs had received support from the service Secretaries and President while their adversaries had sought and received assistance from members of Congress. This fact reinforced two complementary beliefs among the new managerial reformers, beliefs that had been growing since the Civil War: legislative "interference" in military affairs was dangerous and should be avoided, and military relations with civil authority should therefore center on the chief executive.

With the rise of the service Chiefs in the 20th century also came requests by them and their staffs for greater civil-military coordination within the executive branch and a larger role for the military in the formulation of national security policy. Such requests flowed logically from both the nature of their work and significant changes in US foreign policy during these years. The managerial revolution in the armed forces coincided with the rise of the United States as a world power maintaining extensive overseas possessions and interests. The new Army and Navy staffs viewed the protection and promotion of these interests via appropriate contingency planning as one of their primary functions. Such planning required clear understanding of the objectives and priorities of the government policies they were supposed to defend and promote, as well as an appropriate matching of military means with political ends. Throughout the first four decades of the 20th century, the service Chiefs and their staffs therefore requested policy guidance from and consultation with the State Department regarding the formulation, prioritization, and implementation of US national policies.

The Secretaries of State and their subordinates consistently ignored or rejected these requests on the grounds that they constituted a challenge to civilian prerogatives in the policymaking process, and thus to civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Some of these figures further insisted that war constituted an aberration and existed in a category quite distinct from diplomacy, that it should be undertaken only when diplomacy had failed, and that military officers should therefore play no role in policy formulation until war had been declared. As Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan stated in 1913, "Army and Navy officers could not be trusted to say what we should or should not do till we actually get into war." Bryan's successors modified this policy

somewhat and did consult with the armed forces on the arms limitation treaties of the 1920s and early 1930s, but they often ignored the advice they received when it did not coincide with their own desires and beliefs.⁷

Such behavior quickly led the Joint Board to try to bypass the State Department by going directly to the President for policy guidance and coordination. Ever since James K. Polk in 1846-48, chief executives had been expanding their powers as Commander-in-Chief. The White House thus seemed the logical place to turn, and its inhabitant an individual who would smile upon such an opportunity to increase his own powers. Again, however, the board met with total failure, especially during the 1913-21 presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Shocked and intensely angered by the very existence of war plans, as well as by military efforts to influence his foreign policy, Wilson in the first years of his presidency ordered all war planning discontinued, threatened to relieve every officer on the Army General Staff, suspended the Joint Board, and promised to entirely abolish it as well as the Navy's General Board should either ever again attempt to influence policy. His position softened somewhat after US entry into World War I, but even then he remained relatively aloof from his admirals and generals and provided them with very little guidance or consultation. So did his Republican successors, who consistently sided with the State Department in this conflict.⁸

This situation changed in the mid and late 1930s under the impact of both world events and Franklin Roosevelt's leadership. The series of European and Far Eastern crises during these years led the State Department to agree finally to coordination with the armed forces, albeit on a limited basis. In 1935, Asian expert Stanley Hornbeck began to participate in Joint Board discussions of Far Eastern issues. Three years later, a Standing Liaison Committee composed of the Under Secretary of State and the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff was established.⁹ More important, Roosevelt during these years began to respond positively to the appeals of the armed forces for direct consultation and coordination without any State Department intermediaries.

Franklin Roosevelt was of course responsible for an enormous expansion of executive power in virtually all areas, but in no area was this expansion greater than in the realm of military affairs. He was clearly one of the most active and powerful Commanders-in-Chief in US history, and his extensive use of the military powers he possessed revolutionized civil-military as well as executive-legislative relations in this country. But Roosevelt's extensive use of his powers as Commander-in-Chief was by no means the result only of World War II. His keen interest in and knowledge of military affairs dated back at least to World War I, when he served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and became one of the leading exponents of both Mahanian doctrines and civil-military coordination. In 1919, for example, he made the first formal proposal for

high-level State-War-Navy coordination, a proposal that was ignored by the State Department.¹⁰

As President, Roosevelt at first remained preoccupied with the Great Depression and his New Deal, but between 1936 and 1939 he began to provide the armed forces with unprecedented direction, guidance, and coordination. Beginning in 1936, he supported increased powers for the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff within their respective services so as to give them complete control of their field forces as well as their staffs. In 1937, he began to examine existing war plans, to request the creation of new ones, and to initiate military staff conversations with the British. By 1938 he was requesting funds from Congress for extensive expansion of the armed forces. In 1939, before the outbreak of war, he carefully selected a new Chief of Naval Operations and a new Army Chief of Staff—Admiral Harold E. Stark and General George C. Marshall.

Perhaps most important, Roosevelt provided Marshall and Stark with a direct link to him in 1939 by transferring the Joint Board from the existing service departments to the newly created Executive Office of the President. This shift enabled the board to become a true national strategy body for the first time and, by bypassing the service secretaries, made its members the President's foremost and immediate strategic advisers. As one scholar has noted, the move also made Roosevelt himself the "sole coordinating link" between US strategy and policy.¹¹

One reason Roosevelt felt comfortable bypassing the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy was that he had originally appointed all three primarily for domestic political reasons and had little faith in their opinions. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was useful for maintaining good relations with Congress, but the President held both him and his department in low esteem, disagreed with and ignored their conclusions on numerous occasions, and was clearly determined to be his own Secretary of State. By 1939-40 he was also having serious policy disagreements with his cautious if not isolationist Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring, and Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison. In June of 1940 he replaced them with Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, but this shift only reinforced his urge to bypass the service secretaries as much as possible. Stimson and Knox were highly respected, and the former possessed enormous experience as a previous head of both the War and State Departments. However, both were Republicans (Knox had been the Republican nominee for Vice President in 1936) whom Roosevelt had appointed primarily to prevent preparedness from becoming a partisan issue and whom he could not and would not trust with his innermost thoughts. While they dealt with Congress and the public, he would deal directly with his chief admiral and general.

During the rearmament campaign of 1940-41, Roosevelt established very close and direct working relationships with both General Marshall and Admiral Stark, and came to rely upon them and their staffs for appropriate

war plans, strategic and rearmament advice, and legislative initiatives in behalf of the military. He also came to rely upon them for getting that legislation through Congress. Indeed, Marshall and Stark were able to establish such intimate relations with the members of Congress that the latter gave the two service Chiefs legislative accommodations they would not grant the President alone, thereby making continued close relations among the three of them mandatory. By 1940 Roosevelt could give military equipment to Britain only if one or both of the service Chiefs certified it was not essential for national defense. Neither the sending of aircraft, guns, and ammunition to England nor the famous destroyer-bases deal of 1940 would have been possible without such close relations. Nor would the passage of the massive military appropriations bills of 1940-41. "Let General Marshall, and only General Marshall, do all the testifying in connection with the Bill you are about to send up for additional appropriations for the Army," Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau advised Roosevelt in May of 1940.¹²

Official US entry into World War II after Pearl Harbor saw this relationship between Roosevelt and the service Chiefs grow even closer, with an enormous expansion of their powers. There were many reasons. As Roosevelt himself stated, "Doctor Win-the-War" had replaced "Doctor New Deal," and the new doctor would by definition wear a military uniform and receive priority over his civilian colleagues. That the head doctors would be Chiefs of Staff rather than field commanders was clear not only because of the powers those chiefs had recently obtained, but also because World War II was a global conflict requiring US participation in and planning for multiple theaters—only Chiefs of Staff stationed in Washington could properly plan for and coordinate such an effort. Furthermore, unlike such theater commanders as Douglas MacArthur, these Chiefs of Staff had no personal political ambitions (as a matter of principle, Marshall did not even vote in US elections) and therefore did not constitute even a potential threat to Roosevelt's popularity and leadership. The fact that they had already established such close relations with Congress was further reason to rely upon them, for in positions of power they could keep war-related issues out of the partisan arena and hold congressional interference, something both the President and the Chiefs disliked, to a minimum.

Official US entry into the war also expanded the Chiefs' scope of interests to include more political factors. US wartime strategy, for example, was part of a coalition effort and had to take into account differing Allied strategies and policies. Furthermore, the total and global nature of the conflict fused political and military issues to an unprecedented degree, making separation impossible. As General Marshall stated, "Any move in a global war has military implications."¹³ Illustrative of these expanded interests, and reinforcing them, were the reorganization and expansion of the Joint Board in early 1942. The board metamorphosed into the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the addition

of General Arnold and Admirals King and Leahy so as to parallel the British Chiefs of Staff organization and the newly formed Combined Chiefs of Staff, an extraordinary Anglo-American body charged with all strategic planning for both nations and responsible only to Roosevelt and Churchill.

Unfortunately, a great deal of mythology surrounds the wartime relationship between Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President and his military advisers supposedly worked very well together from the start, partially because the President refused to challenge their "purely military" judgments. Consequently, in this view, an advisory vacuum on political issues emerged, with the Joint Chiefs refusing to make political assessments and the President refusing to seek it elsewhere. The result was a series of US blunders regarding postwar issues, and a massive, unnecessary increase in Soviet power by war's end. The President's chaotic decisionmaking style, including his refusal to institutionalize channels and delegate authority, so the view goes, only made matters worse.¹⁴

The historical reality of the Roosevelt-JCS relationship does not support such conclusions. That relationship developed only slowly and gradually, and it was marked by numerous problems and disagreements. Furthermore, Roosevelt usually won those disagreements, overruling the Joint Chiefs on several occasions and usually for political reasons. Rather than a chaotic decisionmaking process in which a political vacuum existed, Roosevelt created a very personal *modus operandi* in which he reserved the right to overrule military advice on political grounds, something he did on numerous occasions. Furthermore, the advice Roosevelt received from the Joint Chiefs was quite political, and not "purely military" by any means.

Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs clearly established a close working relationship during the war, but it was a relationship marked by profound differences in methods, temperaments, and ideas. Accustomed to working within a rigid, detailed chain of command, the Chiefs were often unnerved and disappointed by the President's informal methods and style. Indeed, throughout the war General Marshall refused to bend to such informality, insisting that he be addressed by last name in public, refusing all invitations to Hyde Park or to "drop in" at the White House "for a chat," and often using Harry Hopkins as an intermediary with the President.¹⁵

Roosevelt finally acceded to Marshall's rigid code of behavior, but the Army Chief and his JCS associates were much less successful when it came to their numerous differences with the President—from rearmament legislation through the size of the armed forces, aid to the allies, and global strategy. As Kent Roberts Greenfield has noted, there were at least 20 such disagreements during the war, and Roosevelt won most if not all of them.¹⁶ The Joint Chiefs could on occasion influence or alter Roosevelt's views, and would do so more frequently as the war progressed; but for the most part the President forced them

to bow to his wishes as Commander-in-Chief. Roosevelt did admit to Marshall that he could not sleep at night with the Chief of Staff out of the country,¹⁷ but that comment was not made until December of 1943. Furthermore, to say one cannot sleep at night with Marshall out of the country is not to say one will follow everything Marshall recommends, and Roosevelt clearly did not.

Many if not most of the Roosevelt-JCS conflicts were due to the President's and his military advisers' different military *and* political perspectives. Roosevelt was, of course, more attuned to domestic and international political realities, while the Joint Chiefs were more attuned to military realities. And throughout the war the President's political impulses usually emerged triumphant, as they should have by Clausewitzian doctrine as well as by the American tradition of civilian supremacy over the armed forces. In 1942, for example, Roosevelt forced the Joint Chiefs to agree to an invasion of North Africa instead of northern France primarily for *political* reasons: British refusal to cross the Channel in 1942 made the North African operation necessary to reassure the Soviets and to mollify public opinion. When the Joint Chiefs suggested turning to the Pacific instead, Roosevelt angrily rejected the idea, ordered them to London to reach agreement on North Africa, and signed the

President Roosevelt confers with Admiral William Leahy, Admiral E. J. King, and General George C. Marshall aboard the USS *Quincy*, at Malta, on 2 February 1945.

orders "Commander-in-Chief" for emphasis (he also suggested they alter the historical record on the matter).¹⁸

As we have noted, the advice of the Joint Chiefs to the President was not "purely military" in nature. They and their planners clearly understood the relationship between political factors and military plans, and included such factors in their strategic assessments. Their major strategy papers are filled with detailed comments on the nature of US political objectives in the war and the military means needed to fulfill them, as well as the political objectives and strategies of their British and Soviet allies and the possibility of clashes with them over strategic and policy differences. As Dean Acheson later stated regarding Marshall's understanding of this linkage between military and political factors, "Nothing could be more mistaken than to believe that General Marshall's mind was a military mind in the sense that it was dominated by military considerations. . . . When he thought about military problems, nonmilitary factors played a controlling part."¹⁹

This understanding by the Joint Chiefs of the political basis of strategy was not perceived by their British counterparts or others during the war because the JCS did not believe in disseminating such ideas to outsiders unless absolutely necessary. As Marshall told his biographer, Forrest C. Pogue:

I doubt there was any one thing, except the shortage of LSTs, that came to our minds more frequently than the political factors. But we were very careful, exceedingly careful, never to discuss them with the British, and from that they took the count that we didn't observe those things at all. But we observed them constantly, with great frequency and particular solicitude. . . . We didn't discuss it with them [the British] because we were not in any way putting our neck out as to political factors, which were the business of the head of state—the President—who happened also to be the Commander-in-Chief.²⁰

Despite such reticence, the Joint Chiefs did coordinate political as well as military issues with both the President and the State Department throughout the war. On the advice and insistence of Marshall, Roosevelt in mid-1942 agreed to the appointment of a fourth member of the Joint Chiefs for just such a purpose; Admiral Leahy became Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, with a White House office and regular meetings with the President. Marshall, Arnold, and King also continued to have individual meetings with the President, as well as group conferences on occasion. They and their planners also consulted with the State Department throughout the war on an informal basis, had State Department personnel assigned to individual theater commanders, and placed high-level representatives on the department's important Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. The comments made by those representatives, and by the Joint Chiefs themselves to both the President and the State Department,

reveal substantial political sophistication by individuals who supposedly thought in "purely military" terms.

In late 1940 and early 1941, for example, Stark, Marshall, and their planners based their proposed "Europe first" strategy on the fact that British survival and a European balance of power were crucial to American security. To obtain these objectives, they argued, the United States would have to become an active belligerent in the European war, and it should therefore avoid immediate conflict with Japan at all costs. Implicit within this conclusion, and partially motivating the enunciation of such a strategy and policy at this time, was their recommendation that the President reverse US Far Eastern policy. This recommendation made sense in light of the political and military realities as perceived by the planners. However, it ignored the possibly negative reaction of America's Far Eastern allies, as well as the problems with public opinion Roosevelt would face should he try to pursue an interventionist policy in Europe while promoting what amounted to appeasement regarding Japan. Not surprisingly, the President accepted the Europe-first military strategy proposed by his service Chiefs while rejecting the policy change they considered mandatory to achieve success.²¹

In 1942 and 1943, the Joint Chiefs and their planners asserted that the Anglo-American strategic conflict over cross-Channel vs. Mediterranean operations was but part of a broader, global strategic conflict based on very different British and American postwar interests. Protection of US interests, they insisted, required both cross-Channel operations and a higher priority for the Pacific at the expense of the Mediterranean. Although their arguments failed to sway Roosevelt in 1942, they did win him over to this point of view in 1943, resulting in both cross-Channel operations the following year and a higher priority for the Pacific.²²

Perhaps most surprising, the Joint Chiefs and their planners argued from late 1943 through early 1945 that close collaboration with the Soviet Union both during and after the war had to be a fundamental policy objective for the United States. Without wartime collaboration, they warned, the Axis powers could not be defeated and US casualties would reach unacceptably high levels. Postwar cooperation was equally necessary because with Axis defeat, the Soviets would possess "assured military dominance" in central and eastern Europe, the Middle East, and northeast Asia that "could not be successfully challenged eastward of the Rhine and the Adriatic." This "phenomenal" and "epochal" development of Soviet power matched a precipitous decline in British power, heralding a shift in the world power balance unparalleled since the fall of Rome. In short, Russia as well as the United States would be a superpower in the postwar world.²³

The Joint Chiefs did not naively ignore the possibility of future conflict with the Soviet Union; they merely warned against it. Simultaneously,

they prepared in their postwar plans for just such a contingency by insisting that security be based on a national rather than international police force, and by pressing for US postwar acquisition of a worldwide system of air and naval bases as well as a central intelligence agency. This time, they insisted, there would be no complete postwar demobilization. Sufficient forces and bases would have to be maintained to provide security suitable for a global super-power like the United States, with suitability defined in global terms and potential enemies including a possibly hostile USSR as well as a resurgent Germany or Japan.²⁴

The extent to which these sentiments were expressed within a coherent institutional context of civil-military relations is, of course, another matter. Despite the efforts of Marshall and his colleagues, Roosevelt throughout the war resisted any institutionalization of the Joint Chiefs or their relationship with him. He even objected to note-taking during their sessions, and according to Marshall he "blew up" when General John R. Deane, the Joint Chiefs' Secretary, brought a "big notebook" to one of their meetings. The next time he tried a smaller notebook, "so small that he couldn't use it." Roosevelt also refused to allow Leahy to serve as a true military adviser and representative of the Joint Chiefs, relegating him instead to the virtually opposite status of "leg man" to the JCS.²⁵ Yet, Marshall and his colleagues managed to fill informally the role they had hoped Leahy would undertake formally, and the resulting system worked quite well during World War II—so well, in fact, that it was institutionalized after the war in the 1947 National Security Act. Indeed, the JCS structure and the system for a civil-military interface as established during World War II remain the bases of arrangements prevailing to this very day.

That World War II system can surely be criticized, but not on the grounds it has been. Contrary to popular belief, Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs succeeded during World War II in forging an extraordinarily successful new relationship for waging global, coalition warfare. As a result, US strategymaking during the war was based upon and promoted US security interests while simultaneously maintaining the constitutional principle of civilian supremacy over the military. What may have been truly wrong with this system was not its effectiveness, but rather two different aspects: its centralization of decisionmaking in so few hands, and the fact that it relied so much on the *personal* relationships FDR established with the individual service Chiefs. Neither he nor they would be around after the war to insure its continuation.

NOTES

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1. See, for example, William Emerson, "Franklin D. Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II," *Military Affairs*, 22 (Winter 1958-1959), 181-207, and his "F.D.R.," in *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief*, ed. Ernest R. May (New York: George Braziller, 1960), pp. 133-77; Kent Roberts Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 49-84; and Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 1-39.

2. The original Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of Marshall, Arnold, King as Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet, and Admiral Harold E. Stark as Chief of Naval Operations. In March 1942, King replaced Stark as Chief of Naval Operations while maintaining his position as Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet. On Marshall's urging, former naval Chief Leahy was added in July 1942 as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief. Each of these individuals would hold five stars by war's end.

For brief overviews of these men, see Larrabee, *Commander-in-Chief*, pp. 96-255; D. Clayton James, *A Time for Giants: The Politics of the American High Command in World War II* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1987), pp. 1-50; and Robert William Love, ed., *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), pp. 101-79. For more detailed information, see the following memoirs and biographies: Henry H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949); Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* (New York: Norton, 1952); William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whittlessey House, 1950); Thomas M. Coffey, *HAP: The Story of the U.S. Air Force and the Man Who Built It*, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold (New York: Viking, 1982); Thomas B. Buell, *Master of Seapower: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980); Henry H. Adams, *Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985). The definitive study of Marshall is Forrest C. Pogue's *George C. Marshall*, 4 vols. (New York: Viking, 1963-86). Two recent, much briefer studies are Thomas Parrish, *Roosevelt and Marshall: Partners in Politics and War* (New York: William Morrow, 1989); and Mark A. Stoler, *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989). See also Larry I. Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1981-1986).

3. See Richard W. Steele, *The First Offensive: Roosevelt, Marshall, and the Making of American Strategy* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 81-93, 125-26; Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1933-1945* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 331-34; Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 156, 261-63, 368; D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 2, 1941-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), pp. 83-88, 137-41, 248-53, 361-63, 403-40.

4. The Secretaries did meet on occasion with the President during the numerous Anglo-American summit conferences held between 1941 and 1944 in Washington and in Quebec, but these meetings were infrequent and, for the most part, unimportant.

5. See Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), pp. 131-210.

6. The Army Chief of Staff obtained operational control over field forces in 1936, and a structure that enabled him to exercise that command efficiently with the War Department reorganization of 1942. His naval counterpart obtained full operational control only when Admiral King assumed the twin titles of Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the US Fleet in early 1942.

7. Quoted from David F. Houston, *Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1926), I, 66. See also Louis Morton, "Interservice Cooperation and Political-Military Collaboration, 1900-1938," in *Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military*, ed. Harry L. Coles (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 142-50; Lester H. Brune, *The Origins of American National Security Policy: Sea Power, Air Power and Foreign Policy, 1900-1941* (Manhattan, Kans.: MA/AH Publishing, 1981), pp. 7-8; Thomas H. Buckley, *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922* (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1970), pp. 49-56, 90-92; Gerald E. Wheeler, *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931* (Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1963), pp. 50-57, 131-50, 159-74. The 1927 Geneva Conference provides a notable exception to the State Department pattern of refusing to heed military advice, but the failure of that conference to achieve a naval arms limitation treaty probably strengthened civilian desire to ignore military advice in the future.

8. Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 298-99; Frederick Palmer, *Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of General Tasker H. Bliss* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934), pp. 106-07; Hermann Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood: A Biography* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1931), II, 144; James L. Abrahamson, *America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power* (New York: Free Press, 1981), pp. 168-69; Louis Morton, "National Policy and Military Strategy," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, 36 (Winter 1960), 1-2; Morton, "Interservice Cooperation and Political-Military Collaboration," pp. 135-37, 143-48; Ernest R. May, "Woodrow Wilson," in *The Ultimate Decision*, pp. 112-13.

9. Morton, "Interservice Cooperation and Political-Military Collaboration," pp. 151, 155-56.

10. Ibid., pp. 142-43; Ernest R. May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly*, 70 (June 1955), 167-68; Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1954), pp. 19-20; William L. Neumann, "Franklin Delano Roosevelt: A Disciple of Admiral Mahan," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 78 (July 1952), 713-14.
11. Emerson, "Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief," pp. 183-85. See also Brune, *Origins of American National Security Policy*, pp. 106-10.
12. Larry I. Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 2: "We Cannot Delay," July 1, 1939-December 6, 1941* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986), p. 214.
13. Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, in Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1951), p. 319.
14. See, for example, Hanson W. Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948); and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relationships* (New York: Vintage, 1957), pp. 315-44.
15. George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue: Transcripts and Notes, 1956-1957 (Lexington, Va.: Marshall Research Foundation, 1986), 15 January 1957, col. 259; 11 February 1957, col. 385; 15 February 1957, cols. 440-41; 13 November 1956, cols. 584-86; Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 324.
16. Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II*, pp. 49-84. See also Emerson, "Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief," pp. 181-207.
17. Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (rev. ed.; New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1950), p. 803.
18. Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, in *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1953), pp. 270-78; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 602-05; Steele, *The First Offensive*, 150-82; Mark A. Stoler, *The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 36-58, and "The 'Pacific-First' Alternative in American World War II Strategy," *International History Review*, 2 (July 1980), 436-42, 451.
19. Dean G. Acheson, *Sketches From Life of Men I Have Known* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 163-64.
20. Marshall Interviews, 11 February 1957, cols. 381-82; Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945* (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 315.
21. This example (as well as the two that follow) will be fully analyzed in a book-length study of the wartime Joint Chiefs presently in progress. The best and most recent published works on the topic are the following by Mark M. Lowenthal: "The Stark Memorandum and American National Security Process, 1940," in *Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History: Papers From the Third United States Naval Academy History Symposium*, ed. Robert William Love, Jr. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1980), pp. 352-61; "Roosevelt and the Coming of War: the Search for United States Policy, 1937-1942," in *The Second World War: Essays in Military and Political History*, ed. Walter Laqueur (London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 60-62; and *Leadership and Indecision: American War Planning and Policy Process, 1937-1942* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988), I, ch. 7. See also Louis Morton, "Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II," in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington: GPO, 1960), pp. 11-47.
22. Stoler, "The Pacific-First Alternative," pp. 449-50, and *Politics of the Second Front*, pp. 80-85.
23. Numerous JCS memoranda to this effect are located in the World War II records of the US Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Groups 165 and 218 in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. Those quoted in this article are partially reprinted in three volumes of US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* series (Washington: GPO): 1944, I (1966), 699-703; *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (1955), pp. 107-08; and *The Conference of Berlin, 1945*, I (1960), 264-66. See also Mark A. Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy During the Second World War," *Diplomatic History*, 6 (Summer 1982), 309, 312-15.
24. Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism," p. 310; William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 259-61, 271-73; Lester J. Foltos, "The New Pacific Barrier: America's Search for Security in the Pacific, 1945-1947," *Diplomatic History*, 13 (Summer 1989), 317-27; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948," *American Historical Review*, 89 (April 1984), 346-65. See also Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-1945* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1977); Perry McCoy Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1970); and Vincent Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1962).
25. Marshall Interviews, 14 February 1957, cols. 395-97; 13 November 1956, cols. 587-88.