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## A Case Study in Security Sector Reform: Learning from Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan (October 2002-September 2003)

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**A CASE STUDY IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM:  
LEARNING FROM SECURITY SECTOR REFORM/  
BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN  
(OCTOBER 2002-SEPTEMBER 2003)**

**Jason C. Howk**

**November 2009**

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## FOREWORD

This PKSOI Paper is designed to further the U.S. and other interested international governments' understanding of how Security Sector Reform (SSR) was conducted in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003. This was America's first attempt at conducting formalized SSR, so it offers readers an opportunity to learn whom the United States saw as key actors in the process, what institutions were slated for reform, and how well the United States and its partners met the typical challenges of SSR.

The author rightly points out the synergy that was lost because of a lack of coordination and understanding between government officials and nongovernmental organizations like aid groups, academia, and think tanks. This deficiency became one of my focal points as I started to build my team in Afghanistan.

The lessons learned from this endeavor were useful to me as I developed my strategy for helping the Afghans make their country a secure and stable state. The author's experience revealed many pitfalls in security sector building and international team-building that we are trying to avoid today.

Finally, this paper provides a case study to help explain the SSR concepts that were recently formalized in U.S. Army *Field Manual 3.07, Stability Operations Doctrine*. It provides insights into how the military interacts with host-nation governments, the United Nations, the State Department, and national embassies to solve today's complex problems.



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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JASON C. HOWK, a U.S. Army captain, is currently Aide de Camp to General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan. He has served in the U.S. Army since 1991. Previously, he was Aide de Camp to then-Major General Karl W. Eikenberry during his first tour in Afghanistan. Captain Howk has held leadership positions from Fire Team through Company Commander in the Parachute Infantry and Engineers Corps. He has worked on Joint, NATO, Coalition, and Inter-Service staffs from Battalion to four-star levels. He conducted this research as a student at the Naval Postgraduate School under the guidance of Professor Thomas Bruneau of the National Security Affairs Department, while studying to become a Middle East Foreign Area Officer.

## SUMMARY

Security sector reform (SSR) is that set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. This is a complex and involved task against which Captain Howk evaluates the early international effort to rebuild effective governance in Afghanistan. The purpose of this case study is to document the lessons learned through the development and execution of the SSR program in Afghanistan, with special emphasis from 2002 through 2003. The author has a unique and enviable position from which to observe the inner workings of the highest level commands in Afghanistan—first as an Aide de Camp to then Major General Karl Eikenberry during his first tour in Afghanistan and as the current Aide de Camp to General Stanley McChrystal.

This paper is not only a case study, but in effect is a primer on SSR. It critically evaluates the underlying theories of SSR and discusses how SSR should work in an operational environment. The paper concludes by reexamining the development of the strategy and implementation of the SSR effort in Afghanistan. By 2002 it was clear that SSR was an important focus, and it was recognized to be essential for the successful development of economic and governance institutions in Afghanistan.

The paper uses the four major elements of the security sector as outlined by D. Hendrickson and A. Karkoszka to focus on seven key objectives. To narrow the scope of the paper, the author details the role of four typical actors involved in SSR: donor nations; recipient state of Afghanistan; multilateral participants such as the United Nations (UN), SSR experts, and

nongovernmental organizations; and regional security cooperation entities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The paper provides an insider's view of the preparation accomplished by the leadership team prior to entering Afghanistan, and then it provides a critical assessment of the SSR activities that were conducted. The paper incorporates an assessment by General Eikenberry in which he assesses the implementation of the SSR Strategy in 2002-03.

The author concludes with several lessons learned in communication, staffing, interagency issues, leadership, and implementation, noting several rules of thumb and best practices.

Captain Howk recommends that SSR be the single, primary duty for a senior leader so that it does not decline in scope and emphasis, and that planners determine the refined mission objectives and goals for such a position should it be reinstated. He further recommends that the United States create an SSR coordinator on the National Security Council to integrate and synchronize all agencies and departments. Finally, he recommends that we consider former UN Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi's advice that lead nations remain patient. Afghanistan must be mentored and given every opportunity to succeed.

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All photos courtesy of author.

**Figure 1. Afghan Tribesmen at a Buzkashi Match.**

Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan is a lot like a Buzkashi match, lots of motivated people running around trying to grab the calf, then a ferocious scrum to determine whom to chase next . . . it seems to have no end, exhausts all the horses, leaves the riders bruised and broken, and it's hard to tell who's actually winning; but the players will never forget it.<sup>1</sup>

**INTRODUCTION**

The goal of this paper is to answer three questions about Security Sector Reform (SSR) by studying the

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\*I am indebted to Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the many members of the U.S. Security Coordinator's Staff, the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, the SSR forum, and the international SSR community who assisted me in recalling and organizing these lessons before they were lost to time. All errors are the author's alone.



case of Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003. First, how was SSR conducted in Afghanistan—what was the forum, who were the actors, and what was the strategy? Second, what did SSR mean in Afghanistan—what institutions were slated for reform, what were the goals, and how well were nations prepared to achieve them? Finally, how well did the SSR strategy and team meet the typical challenges for SSR as outlined by David Hendrickson and A. Karkoszka? What goals were met, what issues were avoided or solved, and what lessons can be gleaned for future use?<sup>2</sup>

The purpose of this paper is to document the lessons learned through the development and execution of an SSR program. Some of the positive findings of this work should help guide future SSR leaders, while the explanation of unsuccessful decisions and policies should prepare future planners for the difficulties of SSR. This paper is not meant to correct the record or cast blame on any actors, but rather to describe the actual facts of the SSR process between 2002 and 2003. The lessons and history described here are specific to how SSR was conducted and should be useful to future leaders called upon to conduct it.

The articles, books, and studies written about Afghanistan and SSR have pointed out how the Bonn agreement of 2001 set forth key pillars that would enhance Afghan sovereignty and development. They also showed how many of the critical pillars have needed improvement over the 7 years since the international intervention in Afghanistan. But the literature largely fails to describe the actual process of SSR in Afghanistan, namely, how it developed after the October 2002 introduction of a SSR coordinator and what its goals, accomplishments, and shortcomings were. The primary reason for this omission is twofold:

authors did not know about or chose not to write about the monthly SSR meetings that started in the fall of 2002. These same authors do not reference the role of the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) who was sent to Afghanistan in October 2002 to develop and coordinate an Afghan SSR strategy that would enable the international community to address the concerns being heard by the U.S. Administration from the Afghan government, the coalition military commanders, and the international community.<sup>3</sup>

In hindsight, it was a loss for the Afghan people and the world that many SSR experts/authors from numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international governmental organizations (IGOs), and think tanks spent so much time assessing and critiquing the SSR pillars in Afghanistan and yet never effectively integrated themselves into the Afghanistan SSR working group to share their expertise and present their concerns for address. But one of the most critical oversights was the International SSR working group's failure to invite these experts into the formal SSR process, incorporate their wisdom into the strategic plan, and give them an official seat at the table each month to discuss their issues. This omission might be one of the most important lessons from the SSR process in Afghanistan.

This paper begins with a discussion of the international understanding of SSR, the U.S. definition of SSR in Afghanistan, and how SSR's performance was envisioned. Next, it will highlight the development of the SSR strategy, and how that strategy was implemented, with special attention to the positive measures and the many areas that could have been improved. Additionally, it will evaluate the SSR campaign, relying principally upon an SSR article that

explains most of what was known about SSR in 2002. This will show that the SSR strategy was fairly sound, but that execution was difficult. Finally, it will offer some lessons learned by the SSR team and some areas that should be explored in greater detail.

## **SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN 2002**

By 2002, when the endeavor to rebuild the security structure in Afghanistan became a major focus for the coalition, SSR was commonly (but not unanimously) defined as a long-term enterprise that “aims to improve governance, thereby reducing the risk of state weakness or state failure.”<sup>4</sup> Moreover, it was believed to have never been successfully and fully implemented in any country.<sup>5</sup> It was also clear that SSR was directly tied to successful economic and governance development. Most nations willing to conduct conflict prevention and state building missions understood this linkage in 2002.<sup>6</sup> Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) discuss the new reality that such security entities as militias and private armies bring to situations, and further refine what the typical security sector includes. Although private militias may not be legally authorized by a state, they need to be dealt with in the broader picture of reforming the other traditional security elements. For the purposes of this paper, I will use the the four major elements of the security sector as outlined by Hendrickson and Karkoszka: (1) armed forces of all persuasions that are authorized by law to use force on behalf of the government, (2) the elected and appointed civilians that are responsible for both the management of security forces and the oversight of their activities, (3) the institutions that enforce laws and deliver justice to the citizens according to official legislation, and (4)

the nonstatutory security forces such as militias and private armies.<sup>7</sup>

Some of the key objectives traditionally focused on during the SSR process that will be useful in assessing the Afghanistan case include (1) professionalizing all the security forces, (2) developing the capacity of civil servants to “manage and oversee the security sector,”<sup>8</sup> (3) creating an environment that protects human rights, (4) nurturing a civil society that has the capability of surveilling the security sector and pressing for change or giving advice to the civil authorities on matters related to the security sector, (5) establishing transparency in security matters so the citizens can have a basic understanding of the issue, (6) ensuring that the security sector operates within national and international legal frameworks, and (7) convincing regional actors that share the problems of the troubled nation to support the reforms (see Table 1).<sup>9</sup>

Professionalize security forces
Develop capacity in the civil servants
Create an environment that protects human rights
Ensure the civil society can observe, press for change, and give advice about the security sector
Establish transparency in security matters and aid citizens to gain a basic understanding of them
Ensure the security sector operates within national and international legal frameworks
Convince regional actors to support the SSR process.

**Table 1. Traditional SSR Objectives.**

For this paper, I have chosen to detail the role of four of the typical actors involved in SSR. First are the donor nations that choose to take on a role in SSR. Second is the recipient state itself, in this case the Afghans. Third are the multilateral players whose focuses are traditionally towards development; these can be United Nations (UN) elements, SSR experts, or NGOs. The fourth element consists of regional security cooperation entities like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (See Table 2.) An explanation of the role of some of the key actors follows.<sup>10</sup>

Main donor nations/Lead Nations
Recipient State
Multilateral Players
Regional Security Cooperation Establishments

**Table 2. Typical Actors within the SSR Process.**

The main donor state actors included the USSC, the Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), the Commander of Coalition Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180), and the main donor nation Ambassadors to Afghanistan. The Afghan government actors included the President and nearly his entire cabinet. The primary multilateral actor was the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who worked closely with the USSC. He was assisted by numerous UN agency leaders specializing

in various SSR pillars (see Table 3). Finally, the regional security cooperation actor was NATO, represented by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander.

Germany	Police Reform
Italy	Judicial Reform
Japan (UN)	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
United Kingdom	CounterNarcotics
United States	Military Reform: Afghan National Army (ANA) and Ministry of Defense (MoD)

**Table 3. Five Security Sector Reform Lead Nations and Pillars Determined by the Bonn Process.**

**The U.S. SSR Concept and What It Meant for Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup>**

In the summer of 2002 after 8 months of military action in Afghanistan, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, wanting a senior military officer to assess and better coordinate the SSR process in Afghanistan, selected then-Major General Karl W. Eikenberry, an officer with Infantry (up to Assistant Division Commander level) and Foreign Area Officer experience (up to the one-star level), from the Army Staff to become the first USSC for Afghanistan. General Eikenberry was tasked to assemble a team from the U.S. Government, the Afghan Government, and international community actors that could better tackle the SSR process. There was a personal interest on

the part of the Defense Secretary to create and fill this position as reflected by his conducting the interviews for the job himself.<sup>12</sup> At this point, the U.S. SSR concept was far from solidified; in fact, the concept of an SSR working group within the U.S. Government was not formalized until about 2004.<sup>13</sup> Before he departed for Afghanistan, an additional portfolio titled Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) was added to General Eikenberry's duty description. Though the OMC-A billet was being filled at the time by a U.S. brigadier general, discussion among the Joint Staff, Central Command (CENTCOM), and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) had determined that the USSC should be dual-hatted as the Chief of the OMC-A.

Although the dire situation on the ground in Afghanistan after decades of war and civil strife actually made the term *building* more adequate than *reform*, the Department of Defense (DoD) chose to call the mission Security Sector Reform (SSR). The devastation of human capital, infrastructure, and societal institutions above the tribal structure all added to the herculean task the United States and the Coalition were undertaking.

The position of USSC was unique and possibly unprecedented; thus many agencies, departments, and bureaucrats wanted to have input into the duties and limits of this job. This was understandable, given the number of agencies the person would be coordinating with and the traditional non-DoD agency areas that the coordinator would be operating in. After several months, OSD, the Joint Staff, CENTCOM, CJTF-180, the State Department, and the U.S. Embassy Kabul reached an acceptable understanding for the Terms of Reference in which the USSC would operate. The understanding embraced the following initial essential tasks and objectives.<sup>14</sup>

The **primary task** for the USSC was to *accelerate the development of a Security Sector Reform working group that would include the five lead nations, the Afghan government, and the UN. Additionally he would ensure that all SSR programs were compatible with and supportive of the Afghan government's goals and objectives. A secondary task was to advise the State and Defense Departments on all matters involved with the Security Sector Reform process through the USCENTCOM and U.S. Embassy Kabul.*

The **major objectives** included *establishment of the SSR forum, expansion of the organizational SSR capacities of lead nation embassies in Kabul (identifying their needs and coordinating for assistance), facilitating the acceleration of SSR work in the provinces, and synchronization of the Afghan National Army (ANA) building program and Afghan DDR plans to ensure they were politically and logistically feasible.*<sup>15</sup> While no clear criteria for success were given at this time, it was hoped by OSD and USCENTCOM that near-term gains would be made by developing a better understanding of the current state of the Security Sector on the ground and executing recommendations on ways to accelerate security from the USSC.<sup>16</sup>

### **Preparing for an SSR Mission.**

One of the dilemmas in preparing for this mission was that in 2002 there was no U.S. Government model or doctrine that detailed the SSR process. In preparation for the deployment, the USSC relied on four distinct sources of information:

1. The Bonn frameworks that stipulated how the Afghan government would function and delineated which of the G-8 nations would be responsible for each of the five primary security pillars.

2. The basic military officer problem-solving method: identify and assess the issues and then create



a plan to solve them. This method was used to execute the plan, assess the execution, and periodically make changes when necessary.

3. Civilian experts that had been observing that region of the world for years, including journalists and authors such as Barnett Rubin, Ahmed Rashid, and Carlotta Gall, to name a few. These civilians would have access to the USSC once he arrived in Kabul, maintaining a continuous dialogue during his tour.

4. Numerous U.S. Government agency updates and reports on the situation.

When asked how he would describe the initial planning and execution of the SSR process, General Eikenberry replied:

Overall it might be termed exploratory learning because the many uncertainties of the Afghanistan mission added to the steepness of the learning curve. They included: (1) Lack of doctrine for nation building on this level of destruction. (2) Lack of cooperative agreements among the lead nations as to the scope of their efforts and willingness to cooperate. (3) The unprecedented nature of building a security sector in a nation that is so damaged from 30 years civil war and humanitarian disaster.<sup>17</sup>

The Security Coordinator developed four initial short-term goals to be executed upon arrival in Kabul. The first goal was to take stock of the situation on the ground, to include the environment, the infrastructure, the institutions, and the human capital. The next goal was to meet with the SSR actors from all sides—military, civilian, Afghan, and Coalition. The third goal was to establish relationships with necessary players within the SSR realm and beyond to include all relevant government officials. The final goal was to identify

the key stakeholders in the process and evaluate their capabilities.

Before he left the United States, General Eikenberry ran into two additional obstacles as he tried to define a clear initial strategy for Afghanistan's SSR project. First, the key stakeholders (the UN, United States, European partners, and Afghans) did not have a clear understanding of the Afghanistan crisis; and second, it was unclear what resources and expertise each nation was bringing to the table or what level of commitment they were willing to give to this project. Literally building a nation was not a challenge to be taken lightly. The SSR strategy would remain imprecise until these two uncertainties were resolved. Until an assessment was made, the basic strategy would follow the four main steps outlined in Table 4.

1. Assess and identify the key actors.
2. Establish a mechanism for information sharing and network building.
3. Go beyond information sharing to coordination of Security Sector areas.
4. Begin collaboration on tasks so as to create synergy in the SSR process.

(The underlying theory of this strategy was to build the Afghan capacity at each stage.)

**Table 4. Initial SSR Strategy.**

### **On the Ground in Afghanistan: An Assessment.**

After General Eikenberry arrived in Kabul, an assessment of the initial strategy revealed who the key actors were, how prepared each element of the

SSR process was, and how to proceed. The assessment ended with the selection of the SSR Forum participants and a newly agreed-upon SSR strategy.

Among the key players most directly involved in the SSR forum, UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Lakhdar Brahimi was chosen to head the forum, working side by side with General Eikenberry on all SSR issues. His presence lent credibility, coherence, counsel, and leadership to the SSR Forum. His years of experience and expertise in SSR-related matters and ability to strengthen institutions were critical to motivating other actors to step forward and take risks to make real change in Afghanistan. SSR daily operations were managed by General Eikenberry, the USSC, who determined the needs of SSR and provided strategic guidance and advice to all members of the forum through frequent bilateral and multilateral meetings. He additionally filled the role of Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), which made him the leader of the organization tasked with building the ANA and reforming the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the government agencies providing oversight of the military.

Beyond the SSR leadership were the five lead nations' representatives to Afghanistan: for Germany, Ambassador Eberle and Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Schlaudraff; for the United States, Ambassador Finn, Special Ambassador Taylor, and later Chargé d'Affaires David Sedney; for the United Kingdom (UK), Ambassador Nash; for Japan, Ambassador Komano and DCM Miyahara; and for Italy, Ambassador Giorgi. The forum also included numerous defense attachés, political officers, and security sector project officers and members. Two other critical members

of the SSR team from the UN included Mr. Sultan Aziz from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), who was working on DDR with the Japanese, and Mr. Jean Arnault, the Deputy to Special Representative Brahimi and a key counsel to the USSC. Finally, from the Coalition were the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) team which was normally represented by the Commander or Deputy Commander and their Political Advisors, and the Commanders of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-180, Lieutenant Generals Dan McNeill and John Vines.



**Figure 2. SSR Senior Working Group at the British Embassy Summer 2003.**

**(Left to Right: German Representative, U.S. Chargé d' Affaires Sedney, Afghan NSA Dr. Rassoul, Japanese Ambassador Komano, UNSRSG Brahimi, USSC MG Eikenberry, British Ambassador Nash, Italian Ambassador Giorgi, ISAF Commander LTG Gliemeroth.)**

The primary Afghan asset on behalf of the SSR forum was President Karzai, who was crucial to two of the pillars, the development of the ANA and launching DDR. The future of each of these pillars depended on the other; additionally, their success played a critical political role because the President could not truly consolidate his administration and secure his citizens until DDR occurred. Although President Karzai did not attend the forums, his support of the process was invaluable because he led the Afghan buy-in into the concept of SSR. Afghan National Security Advisor Dr. Rassoul and President Karzai's Chief of Staff Said Jawad were the two critical actors who stayed abreast of SSR issues. Though not in attendance at all forums, they were always briefed on the latest actions and helped the SSR team select appropriate Afghan representatives to attend the SSR forums. Finally, key actors included the five Afghans who headed the Security Pillars being reformed. These members changed over time and did not always attend the formal SSR Forum, but they were the key interlocutors with the lead nation SSR experts, usually meeting on at least a weekly basis to address the reform issues.<sup>18</sup>

A quick assessment of the current SSR activities revealed a divergence in preparedness, manpower, and resources among the countries.

1. While the United States had no organized SSR effort, its initial strategy for building the ANA and reforming the MoD was in place and was being swiftly executed by a very small but resourceful team of personnel tasked with a massive effort and given few resources.

2. Japan had good political leadership and linkages to the UN agencies helping to execute the DDR process

and had a committed aid package, but was handicapped by the small size of its staff.

3. Germany had a very narrow training-centric vision of what its role was going to be in reforming the police and very few personnel committed to the endeavor.

4. The UK was inadequately resourced to execute its counternarcotics role, mainly due to a lack of manpower.

5. Italy was the least prepared in terms of resources, vision for success, and personnel committed to the judicial sector reforms.

Simply put, no country was really ready for the mission it had signed up for. Only two of the five lead nations had developed adequate, detailed long-term visions for success—the U.S. team building the ANA and the Japanese/UN team performing DDR. The following roadmap (Table 5) is an example of the type of broad vision for reform that would have been helpful to the SSR process if possessed by the other lead nations. This vision provided the kind of focus needed to sustain the U.S. reform effort for at least a year.

After self-examination, the SSR forum members realized that the initial overall long-term plan for SSR in Afghanistan was feasible in the abstract, but that they lacked resources and would be able to take the effort only so far based on their current capabilities. The nations contacted their governments for more resources to alleviate the limitations. Some states were more successful than others in changing their vision for SSR and in gaining the appropriate resources to execute their plans. The final SSR strategy was created

Task: The Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) will plan and direct U.S./Coalition efforts to reform the MoD and field the Afghan National Army (ANA) Central Corps by June 2004 and solicit international donations for the Afghan Armed Forces.

Major Objectives:

- Ensure activation of Central Corps HQ and its 3 Brigades by 1 Oct 2003
- Develop and begin implementation of Afghan MoD/General Staff reform plan
- Establish ANA institutional support systems including officer and NCO schools, ANA training and doctrine directorate, and garrison support elements
- Design and build OMC-A structure consisting of U.S./Coalition military, contractor, and Afghan civilian and military personnel capable of managing the ANA building program as it increases in scope and complexity
- Increase international and Afghan domestic support for and confidence in ANA through the maintenance of quality within the force and the conduct of effective information operations.

**Table 5. U.S. Afghan Army Building and MoD Reform Plan October 2002.**

after assessing the new assets the nations had pledged towards the mission and acknowledging the lack of resources that they would have to live with. The final strategy is outlined in Table 6.

**Carrying out SSR.**

To explain how the SSR process was executed, specific events that were conducted to support the strategy are analyzed. The reader will gain a better idea

1. Establish a forum that at first provides a conduit for information sharing about SSR issues and later becomes a vehicle for collaboration among the key actors.
2. Build a network of interested actors that would proactively manage and solve the issues in their areas of interest.
3. Build the Afghan government capacity.
4. Develop strategic plans among and agreed upon by all actors so as to identify and fix problems by leveraging the resources from their nations or the international community.

**Table 6. Final SSR Strategy.**

of what is required of a SSR coordinator by looking at a description of the typical daily, weekly, and monthly events that the USSC participated in and what areas consumed most of his time. Finally, a discussion of some of the surprising and disappointing activities and issues that the USSC encountered in his duties will raise awareness of the pitfalls that exist in war-torn regions.

In general, SSR forums were conducted in the following manner. The host of the meeting was chosen 1 month prior to the event and was responsible for developing the program for that meeting and coordinating and preparing the attendees. The senior SSR leaders would all be in attendance, along with selected Afghan representatives associated with that month's topic. Additionally, all the staff and special guests would be present for the discussion. The USSC would make the opening remarks to refocus the team and then hand it over to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for the UN perspective on events. After the leadership finished the opening



remarks, each stakeholder would give an update on his particular area, and the floor would be opened for specially slated topics. Some of the areas discussed in the meetings included the introduction of new military concepts like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the role of Afghan actors in various SSR areas. One of the items often highlighted was the need for synchronized planning and execution of reforms. Another key element of the meeting was deciding the next major step to be taken with members' Afghan counterparts. Finally, these meetings allowed for discussions of recent setbacks to coordinate surging resources for getting back on track, meeting obstacles that needed to be overcome, or speeding up the reform of one sector to relieve pressure on another.

These forums occurred monthly, which seemed to be the right frequency to allow recognizable progress to be made and a sufficient number of new problems to arise that required attention. These monthly meetings were not the only occasions that SSR team members met, but they were the only scheduled times for the entire extended group to gather. Bilateral and multilateral meetings frequently occurred to follow up on initial plans or handle emergency issues. The meetings contributed to the success of all four elements of the SSR strategy, although it was weakest in helping to build Afghan government capacity.<sup>19</sup>

Bilateral and multilateral meetings on SSR subjects were another key event for the success of the program. A model for how the security sector reform multilateral meetings could work was the synchronization between the Army and Police standing up, on one hand, and the militias standing down, on the other (see Table 3). This effort was always synchronized to ensure that the lead nations developed timelines and plans that balanced

their demobilization events with security forces recruiting events. The Japanese, UN, Germans, and Americans met continuously and came to agreements about the timing of the militia drawdowns throughout the year. Because of a lack of resources and an unclear method for coordinating the acquisition of their resources, not all lead nations were coordinated in this manner. The nations did well based on the resources at hand, but resources were inadequate by all accounts because of the immense size of the problem. These events also supported the SSR strategy (Table 6) but were least successful in fulfilling the fourth element (developing mutual strategic plans) since getting more resources from any state was nearly always an issue.

What started as a chance for the USSC to meet with the Afghan citizens on the street and assess in person the needs of the people turned into one of the most useful events for building the Afghan government capacity. The Afghan National Army recruiting/awareness trips outside of Kabul to the provinces were one of the most critical events every week. There were a few different goals for these trips. Among these goals were evaluating security forces, spreading awareness of the Afghan National Army and Police, meeting with governors, and talking to tribal leaders. The members on the trips changed weekly, but generally they consisted of the USSC, various Afghan ministers, Afghan military personnel, lead nation embassy personnel, at least one lead nation Ambassador, U.S. personnel involved with ANA or SSR tasks, UN representatives, and IGO/NGO representatives.

Another purpose for these trips was to show the people of Afghanistan that there really was a new government, and that it was ethnically mixed and interested in their issues. Still another purpose was to

explain and display the new security institutions to the provinces, while promoting ANA or Police recruiting. Additionally, it gave the Afghan people an opportunity to put a face with their new national government leaders' names. Also, it allowed provincial leaders to talk shop with the central government, which was often impossible because of poor communication and transport. Finally, the trips allowed the Afghan ministers to see their tasks and responsibilities outside of Kabul and to let them be seen by their people and understand that, as national leaders, they now served all the people of Afghanistan and not just one ethnic group or region.

General Eikenberry recalled that one of the best examples of how he knew success had been achieved through these weekly trips was the locals' change of focus from him to the Afghans. He noted that on the early trips the entire traveling party would follow him around and observe his interactions. Later, they followed his lead, yet were still quite unsure of themselves, mostly talking among themselves and not really engaging the locals. In still later trips, however, he often found himself standing alone, except for his security detail, as the Afghan members were immersed in crowds of people, interacting with them, answering questions about their ministries, and giving little speeches. Once the general saw this new dynamic, he knew the Afghan officials were developing one of the requisite skills for leaders in a representative and accountable state.<sup>20</sup>

A series of events was launched in March 2003 that would require the total involvement of the Afghan government leaders and the international community in highlighting and working through all the security-related issues still simmering in the country. The first was a trip to the United States for the two primary

leaders of the Intelligence Service (NDS) and the two key leaders of the MoD to engage with their counterparts in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pentagon and to observe the training of cadets, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), special forces, infantry soldiers, and officers at numerous American bases. This visit helped to impress upon the leaders the level of responsibility they had laid claim to as Kabul was retaken when the Taliban retreated. It also underscored the need for them to be responsible actors on the national stage and support the international community in its efforts to reform the security sector.

The next such event, a truce, occurred in April 2003 when the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the Commander of CJTF-180 co-hosted a working conference for senior military leaders. This meeting allowed for the open discussion of the Afghan national security situation, particularly the relations between the reforming MoD and General Staff and the commanders/warlords from throughout the country. Discussions ranged from the building of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to the role that DDR would play in developing this new security force. As can be imagined, discussions were lively, but after 2 days the assembled group came to an understanding about what was going to happen. That does not mean that all were necessarily happy or supportive of the arrangement, but they understood it. The second day of the conference included a visit to the Kabul Military Training Center where the Afghan, French, British, and American trainers spent a few hours explaining and demonstrating the tasks and skills the Afghan Army was learning. The visit ended with an opportunity for the commanders/warlords to share lunch with new ANA soldiers in the dining facility and spend time asking the troops questions and assessing for themselves the capabilities of the new

Army. The commanders were quite surprised to see a force that was ethnically integrated down to the squad level. The conference definitely helped the Afghans to gain skills in negotiation and public speaking and also subtly showed off to the commanders the new Army supported by the coalition that was at the disposal of the central government. Particularly, it allowed them to compare the ANA with the regional militias still under their control. This helped to increase acceptance of the SSR strategy by Afghans outside the official government channels, but as history shows it did not heal all wounds and end all disputes.



**Figure 3. Senior Commanders of the Northern Alliance tour the Kabul Military Training Center where the New Afghan Army was being built, April 21, 2003.**

**(Left to Right: Hazrat Ali, Atiqula Bariyali, Ismail Khan, Atta Mohammad Atta, and Daud Khan)**

The conference agenda included discussions on the national vision and strategy, the current status of the reform effort, shaping the Afghan forces, the principles of organizing the military, training and equipping the ANA, the support systems of the military, and a way forward.<sup>21</sup> This conference served many purposes, but

it was particularly critical in persuading Minister of Defense Fahim Khan to support both the Coalition and President Karzai's plan to remove all the non-ANA military personnel (Northern Alliance fighters) from the Presidential Palace barracks (thus removing the Alliance fighters from close proximity to a planned ANA brigade). Shortly after this conference, the Defense Minister gave in to these demands, paving the way for a peaceful transition between the Northern Alliance troops and the ANA after months of effort.<sup>22</sup> This is just one example of the painfully slow yet persistent approach that was necessary to communicate peacefully with the Northern Alliance leaders in an attempt to avoid another civil war or deadly uprising that might sideline the entire SSR process.



**Figure 4. A moment that would have been unthinkable one year before as “once” bitter enemies discuss the future of Afghanistan’s security forces in a seemly manner, April 2003.**

In July 2003 the Afghan government and UNAMA, supported and resourced by the USSC, hosted the Afghan SSR Symposium. It represented an opportunity

for the President and his Cabinet to gather together all the members of the Provincial and Central Government and discuss the path forward for Afghanistan, to include how the SSR process could and would aid the development of the country. This event clearly reinforced all the elements of the SSR strategy and was seen by the majority of the attendees as a success. The format consisted of a series of roundtable discussions co-led by members of the Afghan government and international organizations. The entire event was filmed and aired on television for the Afghan people, allowing them to observe their government in action with pens and paper instead of Kalashnikovs. The SSR Forum and Afghan government were pleased with the outcome of the symposium, the final event of a long drawn-out maneuver, despite the fact that turning the discussion points into action would prove to be difficult in the coming months. Such events, however modest in their immediate successes, were moving Afghanistan in the right direction and would be useful models for later practitioners of SSR.



**Figure 5. President Karzai flanked by the Afghan and International team that participated in the SSR Symposium, July 2003.**

As the head of the effort to reform the Afghan military, the USSC enhanced the process through three key weekly and monthly events. First were his weekly information exchange and negotiating sessions with the Deputy Minister of Defense Atiqulla Baryalai. This Afghan leader was critical to MoD reform and building the ANA and DDR. These efforts were closely entwined, often requiring movement in one area to allow progress in another. These sessions, which could often last over 4 hours, yielded many concessions from the Northern Alliance factions of the government regarding decreased military capability among the militias, thus paving the way for better overall security. These events were also essential for showing by example how business needed to be conducted in the new MoD, thereby building Afghan government capacity.

Second was his attendance at all graduations and special events related to security forces training. Third was his faithful monitoring and observation of the training of security forces not only in Kabul, but also in the provinces where they were conducting real world operations. These latter two techniques allowed the USSC to evaluate the capabilities of the forces and to ensure participation of the Afghan government leaders in these activities by his own presence. The techniques provided valuable leverage, since the Afghans would never want to be found lacking compared to an American.

Bilateral and multilateral meetings with various members of the Afghan and international team consumed the majority of the USSC's time. These ranged from late-night discussions with cabinet members who had concerns with the actions of a particular warlord, to in-depth planning and advisory sessions



with President Karzai and the UN SRSG. Some of the most useful meetings for determining the direction of the SSR process were with UN SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi. He was an excellent source of expertise and common sense, rapidly boiling down problems and devising workable solutions for the international community. These meetings clearly supported the SSR strategy except as related to building Afghan capacity. Separate meetings with the UN SRSG and President Karzai enabled the SSR leadership to learn what the Afghan people wanted and needed from the international community. These meetings also allowed the SSR leaders to evaluate President Karzai's competence as he grew into his role of national leader. These and numerous other meetings with President Karzai's Cabinet and staff helped the SSR leaders determine the growth of the Afghan government's capacity for governing and ascertaining when they could increase expectations.

Finally, the interaction between all the Afghan leaders, regardless of their portfolio, and the SSR forum members allowed the international community to ensure an Afghan embrace of the SSR process and make certain that its objectives were reinforcing the goals of the other nonsecurity sectors in country. The meetings included Afghans from all departments—finance, reconstruction, tribal relations, information and culture, health care, rural development, and communications.<sup>23</sup>

It may be useful to view the SSR coordinator's agenda longitudinally in his meetings with Afghan and international actors. Such a view will provide a rough idea about the issues that seemed to rise to the top and require action or discussion. Analysis of 4 months of USSC meetings and events (over 500) suggests that 80

percent of them were focused on meetings with the U.S. Ambassador, SRSG Brahimi, and other UN officials; on meeting with the leaders involved with reforming the ANA and MoD; on discussions with USCENTCOM, OSD, the Joint Staff, Deputy Minister Defense Baryalai, Afghan Chief of Staff General Delawar, the CJTF-180 commander, the ISAF commander (police reforms, counternarcotics activities), the DDR (judicial reform), and Afghan ministers not involved with SSR. Within that 80 percent, the majority of the SSR coordinator's time revolved around meetings with the U.S. Country Team or the U.S. Ambassador; observing the ANA or meeting with their trainers; meeting with key Afghans and international leaders in informal settings; negotiating with the Afghan Ministry of Defense interlocutor; and communicating with U.S. Defense and State department leaders.

The remaining 20 percent of the events focused on executive level leaders from the United States and Afghanistan, the leaders of other nations assisting in building the ANA, Afghans at the provincial and tribal level, militia commanders, other leaders from the Afghan government, and international Afghan experts. These meetings were generally designed to move the SSR process forward by resolving conflicts among the various actors and also by improving the capabilities of the Afghan government through mentoring. Table 7 describes an agenda of a typical 3-day meeting reflecting the diversity of players involved in the SSR process and beyond.

Day 1

- 0800 Meeting with U.S. State Department Political Officer, U.S. Embassy
- 0830 Country Team Meeting, U.S. Embassy
- 0900 Meeting with BG Mulamaki, UN, subject DDR
- 0930 Update on ANA from ANA Design Team
- 1030 Pre-meeting for President Karzai, with U.S. and Japanese Ambassadors, U.S. Embassy
- 1100 Meeting with President Karzai, Palace
- 1400 Meeting with Deputy Min Def Baryalai, MoD
- 1600 Observe Officer training with French Ambassador, KMTC
- 1800 Dinner with Tribal elders, ANA recruiting
- 2200 Send out updates

Day 2

- 0700 Emails and phone calls
- 0830 Country Team meeting, U.S. Embassy
- 0900 Discussions with Afghan officers in Brigade Staff officer program
- 1030 Meeting with Afghan Generals, MG Karemi and BG Khan, subject MoD Reform
- 1130 Discussions with French ISAF component, reference ANA training support opportunities
- 1300 Graduation speaker, Presidents Protective Service Special Agents
- 1400 Meeting with Minister of Finance, Finance Ministry
- 1730 Meeting with Afghan National Security Advisor, NSC building
- 1900 Dinner with Commander British Forces, reference ANA NCO training
- 2200 Send out updates

Day 3	
0830	Country Team meeting, U.S. Embassy
0900	Meeting with PRT political officer from Mazar- e-Sharif
0930	ANA update brief from coalition trainers
1100	Meeting with Barnett Rubin, various Afghanistan topics
1230	Background update with Financial Times reporter
1530	Meeting with Deputy Min of Def Baryalai, ANA-MoD-DDR
1930	Dinner with key leaders of Afghan Security Forces, Ambassador Residence
2300	Send out updates

**Table 7. Typical 3-Day USSC Meeting Agenda.**

Two final areas should be discussed to explain the SSR strategy adequately. First, there were unexpected *positive events* that should be replicated by future SSR practitioners. Unexpected positive events included the following: nations such as France and others stepped up to assist in reforming the military, even though they did not sign up as a lead nation during the Bonn process; many smaller nations or states that could not send large numbers of troops were very helpful to the production of a quality military force, e.g., the French who were placed in charge of training the ANA officers; nations that participated in the ISAF mission continued to step forward and assist in specific tasks and skills training of the ANA, e.g., medicine and mine detection; and ex-Warsaw Pact officers that were assigned to the ANA design team volunteered to assist in transforming the old Soviet

tanks and inexperienced ANA tank troopers into an armored fighting force. These types of serendipitously offered skills and capabilities are often overlooked, but should be capitalized on because they save precious time and resources, especially considering the lead-time required in obtaining the additional expertise and manpower through official U.S. channels.

Second are the *frustrating issues* that were associated with SSR in Afghanistan but are difficult to avoid when conducting this type of mission. The most frustrating impediments were, at worst, interference from Afghanistan's nearest neighbors, and, at best, their nonsupport. Such impediments are likely typical in all areas where SSR is undertaken. The distraction from the SSR mission occasioned by such discussions with large neighbor nations regarding their unhelpful actions in Afghanistan is clearly trying but unfortunately expected. Such states have to live in the neighborhood and will be interacting with Afghanistan long after the international community leaves. They therefore have their own ideas about Afghanistan's future.<sup>24</sup>

### **Assessing SSR in Afghanistan 2002-03.**

This section employs the challenges and objectives commonly associated with SSR, as highlighted by Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002), to evaluate the efforts in Afghanistan. Most of the analysis is based on the author's personal observations and attendance at meetings when these areas were being discussed. Additional analysis comes from the judgments of other participants.

One of the first points that Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) make is that states cannot become democratic and functional without a competent security authority operating under oversight by civilian

authority.<sup>25</sup> It can surely be said that all members of the SSR team understood this concept and worked to create the proper oversight by civilians as they developed expertise in the security sector. This is not to say that the oversight was free of corruption or could exercise sufficient power over the security forces, but it was a pillar of the process. Clearly more effort must be put into this area to yield success. Another point they highlight is that earlier intervention forces often ended up supplanting the local security forces with the donor nation's own military and failed to prepare the state's security entities for the future when the outside actors would depart.<sup>26</sup> This self-defeating process was clearly not the intended model that the international community used for Afghanistan. The ANA and Police force were built and trained immediately and fielded with Coalition forces as soon as they were capable of operating as a unit. Within 1 year, the ANA forces were earning high praise for their endurance and tenacity in battle from the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) operating with them. The SSR forum also placed a high premium on creating forces that the Afghan government could safely control and continuously afford.

Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) here describe three key elements of the shift from the old intervention models to SSR:

1. The realignment of security forces' focus from state protection to the protection of the citizens in that country, which means the civilian government must be involved in the policy of security.
2. The correct choice of security forces selected by the government to carry out the security policies.
3. Civilian government whose interests are ultimately served by the chosen security policies.<sup>27</sup>

These three factors, crucial to successful SSR, were adhered to through the use of the Coalition forces to protect the state's sovereignty so that the Afghan troops could focus internally on helping the coalition secure the citizens. There were many discussions about limiting the size of the army, focusing more efforts on building police, and ensuring that President Karzai was involved in security decisions, so as to guarantee that the best interests of the nation were placed above any factional groups.<sup>28</sup> The authors felt that the SSR agenda is the next logical step in resolving security issues because it extends beyond the traditional focus of civilian-military (CIVMIL) relations by pursuing actual reform of security elements that will make or break a nation's recovery.<sup>29</sup> This new paradigm for simple CIVMIL relations was replaced with a reform agenda that included all security sector areas and any government body that could enhance security. In this case, SSR was extended to include updates and discussions with almost every ministry and deliberately planned meetings with Afghan leaders at all levels of government.

Their next observation really hits home as one looks back at this endeavor. SSR was still not defined by international consensus nor had the objectives and priorities been agreed upon. At this stage, most of the international actors were still working to understand the complexities of SSR. They lacked the required policies and institutions to conduct SSR in an integrated manner.<sup>30</sup> It is clear that although some states had a fairly good grasp of the process, others were learning as they went along, i.e., writing policy and developing institutions through trial and error. Results would

have been much better if a clear international model had been available, understood, and accepted by the actors. However, despite not having a consensus on what SSR involved or a clear doctrine to follow, the actors worked as a very effective team and followed the U.S.-devised strategy very closely, thus increasing efficiency and developing synergy.

The list below rank-orders the short-term objectives of SSR as outlined by Hendrickson and Karkoszka, showing which ones were pursued earliest. Although there was focus on all of these objectives, some were more immediately doable than others:

1. Make security forces effective.
2. Improve management of security expenditures.
3. Demobilize and reintegrate unneeded security personnel.
4. Replace the military with a police force to provide internal state security.
5. Remove military members from their political roles.<sup>31</sup>

While all of these goals were determined to be worth striving for, they are not all easily pursued at the same time, and some can take years to achieve.

Additionally, Hendrickson and Karkoszka provide seven basic governance objectives that should be part of SSR; these were highlighted in the introduction. The international actors found that pursuing all of these objectives was worthy of the SSR team's time. Although success in accomplishing many of the objectives relied on host countries capabilities, they should be cornerstones of the process.

1. Professionalizing security forces was a straightforward task so far as the Afghan army was concerned. However, the process was not as easy with



the police forces already in existence. Their bad habits had become ingrained, and corruption was endemic.

2. Promoting capacity building among civilians for providing policy and leadership supervision over the security sector was essential. This was a more difficult issue because these civilians had factional leanings that had to be overcome. Additionally, development was slow due to their level of participation in the SSR process. For example, the judicial sector reform team had a hard time getting the minister and the attorney general to cooperate because of their personal, not professional, relationship.

3. Instilling respect for human rights was difficult due to the unspeakable level of violence and the numerous atrocities that the Afghans had endured and perpetrated. This is an area that most felt would take a generation to correct.

4. Nurturing civil society into developing capabilities, such as monitoring the security sector and promoting change and providing input to the government on security issues, was especially challenging because the government was still forming and a legislative body was not in place. This is one area in which the Afghans' tribal culture proved useful, because the elders from throughout the country had no qualms about voicing their opinions and questioning security leaders. These nurturing changes were slow to come due to the factional nature of the government, but the mechanisms were created to allow for this in the future.

5. Making basic information about security policy known to the populace was a critical element of the SSR team's public information plan. Whenever Afghan leaders and international actors traveled in the country, they spread the news about the new security reforms. The USSC made this a weekly event involving all

members of the SSR team. Finally, the security sector events and team members were open to the public and news media except for especially sensitive meetings.

6. Ensuring that security sector elements are operating within national and international law was another straightforward task, but it was very difficult to do with the limited manpower of some of the lead nations and the high level of corruption found in so many of the existing ministries.

7. Involving regional players in security issues so as to obtain an integrated approach was difficult to achieve in practice and probably should have been pushed more aggressively in the process. Though seemingly based on common sense, pursuing this objective can be a very dangerous endeavor because most regional neighbors have certain objectives that conflict with those of the nation undergoing reform. Afghanistan's history clearly shows a pattern of regional neighbors interfering in its internal affairs for reasons other than to assist the Afghan people.<sup>32</sup> Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) seem to offer a clarification of this objective later in their article, noting that to truly integrate a SSR program, the neighboring states that have strategic interests in the recipient nation should be viewed separately from other donors to ensure they are not executing a hidden and harmful agenda.<sup>33</sup>

One of the concerns Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) expressed was the possibility that subsequent effects of September 11, 2001 (9/11) might cause future interventions to return to the old model in which U.S. goals and security of the state would take precedence over the protection of the citizens.<sup>34</sup> Although the initial military intervention has sometimes been labeled heavy-handed, from a very early stage the welfare

of innocent Afghan people was elevated to the top of the Coalition's priority list. Within the SSR team, the members clearly placed the welfare and safety of the Afghans above U.S. military objectives, and there was little need to worry about the security of the Afghan state because of the overwhelming power of the U.S.-led Coalition.

The SSR team faced many of the challenges outlined by Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) and made attempts to overcome them.<sup>35</sup> On one hand, a lack of a shared definition of the SSR process made it hard to evaluate progress, but the SSR team's basic strategy helped to define their purpose. On the other hand, the lack of detailed individual reform area strategies with clear end states made assessment of their current status more difficult. The international support of the Afghan SSR intervention may have been better than a purely ad hoc or seat-of-the-pants approach,<sup>36</sup> but they still were not very well resourced. Most would agree that by the year 2002, the international agencies still had not developed the tools needed to assess the effectiveness of SSR policy, but they certainly played a crucial part in advising and assisting the leaders of the SSR team in its drive toward successful ends. Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) observe that the issue of receptivity among recipient states arises because there is fear that international actors are pushing western concepts on them. This was clearly the feeling among some of the Afghans, while others were receptive to change and were not as particular about which culture it was derived from. The SSR team understood the importance of the buy-in from the Afghans and made it a key element of their endeavor. Some of the SSR process may indeed have been handicapped by the donor states' emphasis on imposing western concepts and norms on the Afghans, while other reformers tried to ensure that

the Afghan culture and way of doing business must be sensitively accommodated when reforming. Building the ANA presents a clear example of the latter, where over five nations were involved in the training. In the end, the Afghans were allowed to modify the training to meet their values and institutional history. The ANA had to be the *Afghan's* institution, not that of the Western builders.

Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) also included a section describing the special difficulties for SSR programs in unfavorable environments, such as war-torn countries just emerging from long civil wars. This section seems applicable to the present case. Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) noted that the hardest place to conduct SSR is in a conflict-ridden area, because the urgency for reforms can force a timetable on the reformers. But the need for a functioning security force may preclude the very reforms that are so sorely needed. The SSR leadership had to guard against requests to speed things up because they felt that, in the long run, durable reform of high quality would be more useful to Afghanistan than immediate reform that proved transient. Unfortunately, the immediate need for police forces often outweighed the desire to train them correctly, and this caused problems for the Afghans.

Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) point out that governments may be reluctant to take on reforms because of weakness and lack of wherewithal. This was recognized by the SSR team and became one of the larger hurdles to overcome in the reform process, especially in the sectors that were heavily factionalized. In such sectors, reform could translate to loss of power by one or another group. Often a lower priority was given to national ownership of the reform, building

civilian capacity, and developing a strategic planning capability because of the dangers and uncertainties in a war zone. To ensure it was done right the first time, the SSR team held to the high priority to have the Afghans take ownership of the process. That being said, it was recognized by all members that they could have done a better job of persuading the Afghans to take ownership earlier in the process. It would be hard to say that things would have gone any smoother if the Afghans were involved sooner, because at the early stages the international community was still trying to figure out their objectives. Thus it might not be helpful for the recipient country to have the early turmoil of SSR strategy building as a model.

Two final points that were raised by Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) bear discussion here. First, a higher priority needs to be given to bringing together the conflicting internal factions to address common SSR issues and persuade them all to accept the concept. This was recognized fairly early by the SSR team, and many of the key events throughout the year were geared towards this objective. The series of conferences ending in the Afghan SSR Symposium present an excellent example.<sup>37</sup> Second, a point prophetically made by Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) was that other perspectives, like those of NGOs and SSR experts, are often absent from the SSR discussion and therefore are not integrated into the SSR policy.<sup>38</sup> As noted in the introduction, this was one of the measures that probably could have had a huge beneficial effect on the coordination between development and aid organizations and the SSR team. The points made by Hendrickson and Karkoszka would form a useful checklist for planners of SSR operations and would serve as an assessment tool to check the status of

the program once under way. The Afghan SSR team made many strides towards addressing some of the objectives and challenges facing it but clearly fell short on others.

### **Grading the SSR Strategy.**

After reviewing many of the assessments of SSR in Afghanistan, we find that the pillars of the program have been evaluated many times over.<sup>39</sup> What better way to grade the SSR process than to ask the architect of the plan what he thought of their efforts in implementing it? General Eikenberry made the following assessment after serving in Afghanistan as the commander of the Coalition forces in 2005 and working at NATO as the Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. His advice to me in writing this paper was to make sure that you do not exclude treatment of our faults, because the paper will not be useful if it says simply, “We did great, but everyone else screwed things up.”<sup>40</sup> Table 8 highlights the final assessment of the SSR strategy based on what the SSR team originally set out to do in October 2002.

- |   |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Establish a forum that initially provides a conduit for information sharing about SSR issues but later becomes a vehicle for collaboration among the key actors. Grade: A- to B+</li><li>2. Build a network of interested actors that would proactively manage and solve the issues in their areas of interest. Grade: B+ to A-</li><li>3. Build the Afghan government capacity. Grade: C-</li><li>4. Develop consensus-based strategic plans that identify and fix problems by leveraging the resources from all actors’ nations or the international community. Grade: D</li></ol> |
|---|

**Table 8. Grading Implementation of the SSR Strategy, 2002-03.**

## **Thoughts for Improvement in SSR.**

Based upon the analysis of the SSR process in Afghanistan as well as the collective thoughts of people who have executed SSR in one of the most difficult environments in the world, many lessons have emerged.

### **Communication:**

- The chain of command for the USSC was a bit murky partly because of the novelty of having a Security Coordinator. In the U.S. model, we traditionally have had field commanders and diplomats, whereas in 2002 we had a hybrid position that fell in the middle.
- The USSC received excellent basic guidance from the senior operational commander: Be transparent in all endeavors and coordinate with all appropriate parties so no one was surprised. Specifically, he laid down the requirements that (1) the ANA be ethnically integrated down to the squad level and that only he would make a decision to break that rule; (2) all recommendations and requests for resources from DoD would go through him to ensure that all resource requests were synchronized; and (3) that with regard to all Coalition actions, it be made clear and distinct to the Afghan government as to the role of the CJTF-180, on one hand, and the roles of the dual-hatted USSC/OMC-A on the other. These basic rules made things run very smoothly and should be modified very little for future operations.
- The chain of command should be clarified back to Washington, DC (or any capital), and

the reporting process for requests of non-DoD specific assets. It should be more specific about who needs to know what is not working and how those issues can be fixed rapidly. The role that the U.S. Ambassador plays if he is not the USSC should also be clarified. Responsibility for solutions for nonmilitary issues of security should be made clear. The Security Coordinator may or may not be the right person to communicate these issues directly with the Administration. All OMC-A (ANA building) tasks, are a DoD function, so the DoD chain of command should be used. With USSC (SSR) tasks, it is not as clear because one is coordinating the efforts of other nations. So when a problem with a nation's efforts surfaces that it cannot or will not resolve, the issue arises as to where the problem is referred—the United States, that country's national government, or the UN?

- Not all nations have a clear mandate or the ability to reinforce their efforts. For example, when the United States realized it needed more resources to build the ANA and reform the MoD, it requested and received the increased resources it asked for, but it was not the same for other states. For initial SSR planning conferences, (1) nations must develop a clear channel to communicate to their government what they need (including all instruments of national power), and (2) initial international plans need to be more specific as to how a state is going to fulfill its role if it signs on as a lead nation in the SSR process (end state sought and means of transport to theater should be in writing).



- Fortunately for the SSR team, some public incidents and failures helped to speed resources to Afghanistan, but overall the assistance and priority given to the enterprise by all states and the UN were inadequate to the task. It may never be known whether the SSR team was not asking the right people for help or whether donor governments were not listening, but it is clear that the resources were not received.

#### Staffing:

- Experts in SSR and related skill sets should be assembled before departure so they can plan as a team before hitting the ground. It is not useful to have an ad hoc staff that gets replacements by luck of the draw. For example, the OMC-A consisted of eight people when the USSC arrived, and most members of the original team did not know each other before arriving in Afghanistan. The leadership did not select future additions to the team, and new members often had to be returned home and replaced with more qualified people. This process wasted time and caused continuity issues between the Afghans and Coalition.
- The staff and units involved with SSR need to be large and diverse enough to complete the mission. Specifically, it is advisable to ensure that key SSR staff members possess experience in stability and reconstruction or nation building. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Thomas from the British Army was an engineer officer with this type of background and was particularly invaluable in the effort. It would also be advisable to have SSR staff

members with backgrounds in the particular pillars that are being reformed, in this case, rule of law, development of security forces, ministry of defense, and counternarcotics. But as useful as these types of skill set are to the team, building one's own parallel SSR team that may start interfering in the pillars assigned to other nations is to be avoided. Each team's role is to assist the SSR coordinator in making strategic analysis and recommending future policies within the areas of responsibility assigned to the team.

#### Interagency Issues:

- There is a need for a better mechanism to ensure coordination and unity of effort among the disparate government agencies, both in the recipient country and back in the donor nation capitals.

#### Leadership:

- Whether the SSR coordinator should be a civilian or military leader is irrelevant in the long run. The true test of who should fill this role comes down to the questions: Does the candidate have the skills and attributes needed to fulfill the job description? Can he or she plan strategically? Does he or she have leadership skills? Is he or she a problem-solver?

#### Implementation:

- From the beginning, SSR forum meetings should include the recipient nation actors so as to increase their sense of ownership in the process more quickly. Also it is ill-advised to

hold a first meeting without a solid plan and having conducted rehearsals to ensure that the recipient nations attendees are not turned off by the lack of organization.

- The true collaboration point among international SSR teams should be arrived at immediately, and more emphasis placed on the capacity building of the recipient government and key actors. If recipient government positions are set, then immediately involve the person in that job during the lead nation role assignment planning (in this case the Bonn process) to ensure that nations understand the issues and the key players are involved before they sign up for it.
- A more defined agreement should be reached on what the lead nations' responsibilities are and how they intend to shoulder them. This will allow better coordination between those nations, particularly in complementing each other in dealing with the overlapping nature of SSR pillars. Such coordination will also enhance the ability of nations to impact other lead nations. Examples are the close ties between DDR, ANA, and Police building efforts, or the need to tie the rule of law reform to prison reform, each of which responsibility was assigned to a different team. More specific questions need to be answered during the planning process such as: Who has the responsibility to reform prisons? Should it be the lead nation for police building or justice reform? Such decisions will require more analysis before a lead nation signs on to an endeavor, but it would help ensure that the right people are sent into the country and that the coordinating parties know who they

will need to work with on issues that cut across functional boundaries.

- The NGO/IGO/functional area experts should be formally involved in the SSR process. A board of SSR advisors should be created that can offer policy ideas and surge to assist the lead nations that are struggling with manpower or other resource constraints. Such SSR experts need to step forward forcefully with solutions even if the SSR coordinator does not call upon them and invite them to take part. The coordinator himself is likely under-resourced and short on time, so he cannot possibly know who all the experts are and what type of parallel subject matter resources exist. Likewise, the SSR leadership needs to make room for these assets at the table and treat them as team members, not visitors. This involvement should take place not only in the recipient country but in each donor nation so that experts can solve problems on both ends.

## **RULES OF THUMB AND BEST PRACTICES**

1. Ensure close coordination between the separate pillars of SSR, e.g., the DDR drawdown and the ANA/Police stand-up.

2. Employ the format and scheduling (monthly) of SSR meetings (see Appendix E).

3. Be prepared and anticipate when to begin moments of intense lobbying to get some of the host nation actors to buy in to the process (e.g., the U.S. team spent 3 weeks pushing MoD reforms using marathon-long meetings and multiple approaches to wear down the Afghan resistance to the new policy, thus

reaching an early agreement with the MoD regarding restructuring and reforms.

4. Use dinners and lunches to squeeze in more meetings and mentoring time in the work day. Many critical issues were ironed out between Afghan government and tribal leaders over meals late at night when they were not influenced by their followers. They could speak more freely and discuss options that they could not mention in front of their subordinates or superiors. In just 3 months, over 40 working meals that lasted late into the night yielded very useful information and agreements. Topics of discussion ranged from getting rural recruits to Afghan Army and Police recruiting centers in the provinces to the equitable promotion of officers within the MoD.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS IN NEED OF RESEARCH**

It seems that the position of USSC was not continued as a single primary duty position in Afghanistan after 2003. Accordingly, the number of formal SSR events dwindled as a result of this decreased emphasis.<sup>41</sup> If this continues to be the case, it would seem to signal the importance of having a senior leader with SSR as a sole-responsibility portfolio to ensure that the process does not decline in scope and emphasis. It would also be useful for planners to determine what the refined mission objectives and goals would be for this position if it was reinstated in Afghanistan today. Finally, if the United States is going to continue to lead SSR missions in the future, it might be useful to create the position of SSR coordinator on the NSC to integrate and synchronize all agencies and departments. This would fulfill the requirements and needs of the Security Coordinators in all the nations where the United

States is conducting SSR. The USSC's in each country could report their needs directly to the NSC after discussions with the Ambassador and/or military commander of that nation to ensure that the State and Defense departments are not surprised by any requests that would need to be filled by them in support of the SSR mission. Contemplating such a change would lead to a further topic of study: how would that chain of command work, or is it time to reform our entire national security structure if SSR is going to be a key mission of the U.S. Government in the future.

## FINAL THOUGHTS

Is this a model for the future? It appears that this model, with modifications as outlined above, would prove to be successful in similar endeavors. While not achieving a glowing record of success, the strategy and implementation set the Afghan nation on a path towards better governance and security. The 2008 NATO report, *Progress in Afghanistan*, shows that many of the initiatives started by this forum have continued and are coming to fruition.<sup>42</sup> It is instructive to keep in mind a passage that Hendrickson and Karkoszka provided in their insightful article: "In war-torn states, a clear national vision to reform is not possible . . . attempting SSR may actually mobilize an opposition against change . . . this makes security sector reform a long-term endeavor."<sup>43</sup>

Hopefully this paper has described the formal SSR process that was enacted in Afghanistan and pointed out its key successes and critical failings. Future SSR leaders will need to understand the pitfalls and models that the United States has already experienced and tested.

The efforts of SSR from fall 2002 through fall 2003 may have been summed up best by the UN SRSG Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi during the fifth SSR meeting. That day his opening statement emphasized that SSR was the key to the future of Afghanistan. He emphasized to the lead nations the need to remain patient because of the level of devastation attending the starting point for this process. He reminded the participants that eventually the Afghan counterparts would take more of a lead role and that instant progress was not a hope that any nation's government should be holding.

Most significantly, he pointed out that the SSR work being done by this international team was "as good as he had seen anywhere else in the world,"<sup>44</sup> but he followed that compliment with a warning that this was still not enough to get the Afghan capacity up to par and succeed in the long run. Everyone must dig deeper, he reminded the group, and must always bring the Afghans along every step of the way.<sup>45</sup>

Special Representative Brahimi closed his remarks by emphasizing that the inclusion of Afghans in the SSR meetings and policies had been part of the strategy from the genesis of the team, and that it must remain on the agenda in the future.

Even after successful implementation and sharing of SSR ideas, the real test for the state is how well the next generation of leaders of security sectors continue to adhere to the reforms. It is here that one will see whether the required norms and values continue in the new methods, or whether the leaders fall back on the previous mentality and practices.<sup>46</sup>

## APPENDIX A

### SSR PLAYERS AND THEIR ROLES

Head of the SSR Forum, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)  
Lakhdar Brahimi, UNAMA

United States Security Coordinator (USSC), Major General Eikenberry, day-to-day control of SSR and Military Reform operations

Ambassador Eberle and DCM Schlaudraff of Germany, Brigadier General Wolf, Head German Police Project, Police Reform

Ambassador Finn and Ambassador Taylor of the United States, Military Reform and Reconstruction, respectively

Ambassador Nash of the United Kingdom, Counter Narcotics and ANA Building

Ambassador Komano and DCM Miyahara of Japan, Colonel Ando, Military Advisor, DDR

Ambassador Domenico Giorgi of Italy, Judicial Reform

Ambassador Guinhut of France, ANA Building

Mrs. Frederique de Man, Chargé-Netherlands

Mr. Sultan Aziz from UNAMA, DDR

Mr. Jean Arnault the Deputy to Special Representative Brahimi, SSR and UN operations, UNAMA

ISAF Commanders or Deputy Commanders and their Political Advisors, Security of Kabul

President Karzai, Afghan buy-in of all SSR operations

National Security Advisor Dr. Rassoul

President's Chief of Staff Said Jawad

Vice President and Minister of Defense Marshall Fahim, Military Reform

Deputy Minister of Defense Atiquilla Baryalai, Military Reform and DDR



Ministers of Interior Wardak and Jalali, Police reform  
Minister of Justice Karimi, Judicial Reform  
Mr. Robin Barnwell, UNAMA-Political Officer  
Mr. Adam Bouloukos, Deputy UNODC  
Mr. Mark Clayton, 1st Secretary CN-UK  
Mrs. Annett Guenther and Mr. Adriaan Kooiymans,  
ISAF Political Advisors  
Brigadier General Olli-Matti Multamaki, Senior  
Military Advisor-Finland  
Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Stahnke, Military Advisor-  
Germany  
Lieutenant Colonel Gerard Hughes, Lieutenant  
Colonel Mark Thomas, Lieutenant Colonel Henry  
Eagan, and Lieutenant Colonel Tucker Mansager,  
U.S. Security Assistants to the USSC.

## APPENDIX B

### KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

<b>ANA</b>	Afghan National Army, created to replace the militia/warlord system and existing Army skeleton, one of the five SSR pillars
<b>ANP</b>	Afghan National Police, one of the five SSR pillars
<b>CJTF180</b>	Combined Joint Task Force-180, operational command headquarters for coalition forces headed by an American three-star General
<b>CN</b>	Counter-Narcotics, one of the five SSR pillars
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Re-integration, program intended to increase security by carefully managing the drawdown of existing unsanctioned security forces, one of the five SSR pillars
<b>GoA</b>	Government of Afghanistan
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force, NATO force initially sent to provide security for Kabul the capital of Afghanistan
<b>MoD</b>	Ministry of Defense
<b>MoI</b>	Ministry of the Interior
<b>NA</b>	Northern Alliance, loose confederation of warriors who fought the Taliban and al-Qaeda before and then alongside the U.S. led Coalition invasion.

- OMC-A** Office of Military Cooperation - Afghanistan, agency headed by Major General Eikenberry responsible for building the Afghan National Military and reforming the Afghan Ministry of Defense
- SSR** Security Sector Reform
- SRSG** Special Representative of the Secretary General, UN Secretary General's Envoy to Afghanistan
- USSC** United States Security Coordinator, the other title MG Eikenberry held, responsible for the expedited development of the SSR process

## APPENDIX C

### DUTIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR USSC AND CHIEF OF THE OMC-A

#### **Description of overall task per duty title:**

1. USSC: Expedite the development of Security Sector Reform (SSR) within Afghanistan by synchronizing relevant efforts of the United Nations and those of the Geneva-designated SSR lead nations for law enforcement (Germany), justice (Italy), counternarcotics (UK), Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (Japan and UN), and the Armed Forces (United States). Ensure SSR programs are consistent with Government of Afghanistan policy goals and objectives.

2. Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A): Plan and direct U.S./Coalition efforts to reform the MoD and field the Afghan National Army (ANA) Central Corps by June 2004. Solicit international donations for building the Afghan Armed Forces.

3. As both USSC and Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation: Advise the U.S. Ambassador, CJTF-180, USCENTCOM, and the Department of Defense on security sector and ANA Issues.

#### **Major Objectives:**

1. USSC:

Establish SSR forum in Kabul with participation of UNAMA, the 5 lead SSR nations, and the government of Afghanistan

Promote expansion of organizational SSR capacities of lead nation embassies in Kabul  
Facilitate acceleration of SSR work in the provinces  
Coordinate transfer of Border Police training responsibility from the United States to another appropriate lead nation  
Develop complementary ANA building and Afghan DDR plans that are politically and logistically feasible.

2. Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation:

Ensure activation of Central Corps HQ and its 3 Brigades by October 1, 2003  
Develop and begin implementation of Afghan MoD/General Staff reform plan  
Establish ANA institutional support systems including officer and NCO schools, ANA training and doctrine directorate, and garrison support elements  
Design and build OMC-A structure consisting of U.S./Coalition military, contractor, and Afghan civilian and military personnel capable of managing the ANA building program as it increases in scope and complexity  
Increase international and Afghan domestic support for and confidence in ANA through the maintenance of quality within the force and the conduct of effective information operations.

## APPENDIX D

### ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED WITH SSR AND/ OR AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU),  
Kabul. [www.areu.org.af/](http://www.areu.org.af/)

The International Institute for Strategic Studies,  
London, UK. [www.iiss.org/](http://www.iiss.org/)

Global Facilitation Network for SSR (gff ssr), University  
of Birmingham, UK. [www.ssrnetwork.net](http://www.ssrnetwork.net)

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and  
Development, Development Co-operation Directorate  
(OECD DAC) Handbook on Security System Reform  
(SSR), Paris, France. [www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_33721\\_37417926\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en_2649_33721_37417926_1_1_1_1,00.html)

International Peace Institute (Academy), UN, New  
York. [www.ipacademy.org/our-work/state-building](http://www.ipacademy.org/our-work/state-building), [www.ipacademy.org/publications/books-occasional-papers](http://www.ipacademy.org/publications/books-occasional-papers)

United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington,  
DC. [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org)

NATO, Brussels, Belgium. [www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html)

Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC),  
Bonn, Germany. [www.bicc.de/ssr\\_gtz/index.php](http://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/index.php)

Human Rights Watch, New York and worldwide  
locations. [hrw.org/doc/?t=asia&c=afghan](http://hrw.org/doc/?t=asia&c=afghan)

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, and Brussels, Belgium. [www.dcaf.ch/](http://www.dcaf.ch/) "One of the world's leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG)."

USAID Conflict Management, Washington, DC. [www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/cross-cutting\\_programs/conflict/focus\\_areas/security.html](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/focus_areas/security.html)

UN Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, (PEP). [www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/](http://www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/)

The Stabilisation Unit, UK Government. [www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.html](http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.html)

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State, Washington, DC. [www.state.gov/s/crs/](http://www.state.gov/s/crs/)

International Crisis Group. [www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3946](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3946)

Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC. [www.stimson.org](http://www.stimson.org)

Peace Studies Journal, UK. [www.peacestudiesjournal.org](http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org)

Department for International Development, UK. [www.dfid.gov.uk/](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/)

Conflict, Security, and Development Group, Kings College, London, UK. [www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/ws/groupresearch/int/csdg/](http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/ws/groupresearch/int/csdg/)

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. <https://pksoi.army.mil/>

Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK. [www.ssronline.org/](http://www.ssronline.org/)

Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (CSCP) Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands. [www.clingendael.nl/cru/](http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/)

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities, Pentagon. [www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy\\_offices/solic/stabilityOps/index.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/solic/stabilityOps/index.html)

The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. [www.csrs-nps.org/](http://www.csrs-nps.org/)

The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. [www.ccmr.org/](http://www.ccmr.org/)



## APPENDIX E

### EXAMPLE MEETING NOTES (EDITED) OF AN SSR FORUM<sup>47</sup>

#### MINUTES

#### 5th SECURITY SECTOR REFORM MEETING

Monday 17<sup>th</sup> February 2003, 1000-1200, Japanese  
Embassy Conference Room

#### Attendees

1. Col (Military Advisor-Japan)
2. Mr A (UNAMA-DSRSG)
3. Mr. A (UNAMA-DDR)
4. Mr. B (UNAMA-Political Officer)
5. BG B (ISAF Dep Cdr)
6. Mr B (UNAMA-SRSG)
7. Mr. B (Dep UNODC)
8. Mr. C (1st Sec CN-UK)
9. MG E (Security Coord-U.S.)
10. Amb G (Ambassador-Italy)
11. Mrs. G (ISAF Political Advisor)
12. Amb K (Amb-Japan)
13. Mr. K (ISAF PolAd)
14. Mrs. M (Chargé-Netherlands)
15. Mr. M (DCM-Japan)
16. BG M (Senior Military Advisor-Finland)
17. Amb N (Amb-UK)
18. Mr. S (DCM-Germany)
19. Lt Col S (MilAd-GE)
20. Amb T (Donor Asst-U.S.)
21. Lt Col T (U.S. Security Asst)
22. BG W (Head German Police Project)

**Purpose:** Meeting hosted by Japanese Embassy intended to address issues, progress, and strategies related to ANA building, counter-narcotics, law enforcement, DDR, and judicial reform.

**Introductory Remarks:**

USSC welcomes attendees of the 5th meeting, recognizing special guests and accomplishments.

Chairman stated that this was a focused group with an overarching strategy and dialogue that were now well established. Although these sessions had become very productive, we would keep to the planned 2-hour duration.

Pointed out that as yet there had been little positive routine engagement with the Afghans in the security sector reform (SSR) area, and this would need to be discussed later in the meeting.

SSR should be looked at on a holistic basis as all lanes interrelate. For example, the imminent implementation of DDR will prove to be a catalyst for the ANA, Police, CN, and the Judiciary sectors. All will be required to support the DDR process as it rolls out across the country on a phased basis.

**UNAMA Perspective:**

Mr. Brahimi, SRSG-UNAMA, stated that SSR was key to the future of Afghanistan. He made the point that the nation needed to be built up from

scratch and that as a consequence, it was essential to remain patient above all else. The work would be done by counterparts—eventually, but one should not expect instant progress.

He added that although the SSR work done here by the international community (IC) was as good as he had seen anywhere else in the world, this on its own was not enough.

We must strive to bring Afghans with us in our efforts; in short, we should make the Afghans help themselves. This was a key point, and he was pleased to see it included on the agenda. From the very genesis of these meetings, Afghan inclusion had always been envisaged.

Comments on recent successful Afghan leaders, felt that we should continue to develop such people.

Mr. Brahimi thanked certain attendees for their patient and determined approach in pushing DDR forward over the last few weeks particularly. He stressed that if the DDR process proved to be successful, it would represent a giant leap forward for both SSR and also for the future of Afghanistan.

### **Lead Nations Update:**

#### **U.S. (ANA)**

- MG Eikenberry highlighted the theme of MoD reform recently discussed with Marshall Fahim.

Afghan MoD reform had two aspects – structural and political. Political reform is critically important because it will also contribute to increased confidence in the impartiality of the MoD, and thereby facilitate both DDR and ANA recruiting.

- Mr. Brahimi agreed with the significance of MoD reform and suggested that engagement with Fahim be continued into the future on a more regular basis and on broader issues. On a different subject, institution building remained very important for Afghanistan and so reform of the MoD, when it happened, would greatly help this process. “A Kabul Government for all Afghans” was the message to be pursued.
- MG Eikenberry outlined deployments of ANA forces to the provinces, currently Bamian and Orgun. Although these missions represented good tactical level successes, there was also a strategic/political level benefit. The deployments sent the message that the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) was now able to project military power beyond Kabul and perhaps at the same time, persuade some of the undecided factional groups to enter the DDR process and behave in an appropriate manner or eventually risk exclusion from a reconstituted Nation. Increasing emphasis now needed to be placed on reassuring Afghans of the good intentions of the GoA by using an “effects based” approach, to include more extensive media activities to generate confidence and trust. There were not enough ANA to garrison every major town, so a realistic alternative had to be thought out and implemented.

- DCM Schlaudraff informed the meeting that he had recently visited Mazar-e Sharif. While there, key individuals had stated that they were aware of the new ANA but had no details about how to join, etc. MG Eikenberry agreed that this was an area which might benefit from further development, while explaining that U.S./Coalition had started to take Governors to KMTC to show them the ANA training regime and give them the opportunity to speak to their soldiers. This appeared to be a promising initiative and other opinion formers were very welcome to visit ANA training to see it for themselves.

### **Italy (Judicial)**

- Amb. Giorgi reported that he had already met with Minister Jalali and had found him to be very cooperative and helpful. He was now confident that there were several areas within the judicial sector which could be readily advanced with his assistance. Amb. Giorgi reported that there had been limited development of the Judicial Sector “Master Plan” since the last meeting as many key members of the Judicial Commission had been absent from the country and were only now arriving back.
- Amb. Giorgi made the following additional observations:
  - o Mr. Brahimi’s help was requested to alert President Karzai to the urgent requirement to identify a suitable government building to house the Judicial Commission, consisting of some 12 members plus secretariat. The

present building was too small and was unworkable.

- o Italy was currently deploying 1,000 troops as part of CJTF-180 to operate in the area of Khowst. To assist them in their mission, a number of projects were being identified to benefit the local people and generate good will. The support provided will be both bilateral and multilateral in nature with the full involvement of the GOA. In addition, Italy was contributing two personnel to the Gardez PRT who would also be directly involved in related operations. Amb. Giorgi planned to hold a meeting soon to discuss this work in greater detail with interested parties.
- o Amb Georgi expects his Judiciary Team to be augmented by six MFA and MoJ personnel by the end of the month, including one prominent senior-level judicial expert who will travel between Rome and Kabul.

### **Germany (Law Enforcement)**

- DCM Schlaudraff stated that he would cover four areas, starting with MoI reform, which had now been stalled for some months reportedly awaiting President Karzai's approval. The old plan for structural reform had actually been further revised under Minister Jalali and was much improved. It was worth noting that police represented only one of many important divisions in the new structure. The intention now was to widen the German remit, and an advisor will be sent to look at broader MoI reform aspects. Some infrastructure related work in the

MoI will also be undertaken. Other nations had also provided assistance, for example, UK DFID had provided a budget advisor to assist the MoI with this important task. The DCM asked UNAMA to note at this stage, that MoI would be technically responsible for elections in the future and would therefore benefit from any experience or exposure to the process that could be given to them as the preparations for June 04 were ramped up. Mr. Brahimi then pointed out that a National Committee would be appointed to supervise the elections and that a team of experts would soon be arriving to consider all aspects of this and provide advice.

- The second point concerned the requirement for a Presidential decree on the police, along the same lines as the earlier Bonn decree for the ANA. A first draft had been produced and commented on. Thirdly, in order to get police into the provinces quickly, Minister Jalali wanted to create a Highway Patrol to cover the major roads in Afghanistan. The DCM felt that this would be both a visible and relevant mission. The next step would be to create a commission to look at this under Secretary of State Halal and the necessary planning to achieve this was already underway.
- Fourth point concerned the Border Police (BP) situation. MG Eikenberry set the scene regarding the recent Norwegian fact finding visit which had been successful. Important follow-up meetings were scheduled to take place in Oslo on 18 Feb which would involve U.S., Germany, UK, France, Italy and other Nordic nations. This

was an encouraging response and the political decision would be forthcoming from Oslo in due course. Walter Wolf then gave a quick summary of the recent BP Working group meeting and noted that roles and missions and a definition of BP had been achieved. Afghan ownership was being established with future meetings planned to consider structures of BP and then training aspects. Significant progress was being made in this area that was encouraging after a lackluster start.

- Of more general interest was the planned visit of the German Minister of the Interior in March. This was now the target date for the decree to be issued on the police and for MoI structural reforms to have been announced. Tied in with this as well, would be the next Police Commanders Seminar in Kabul. The most significant police training currently awaited in Afghanistan would be the U.S.-led patrolmen courses for 7,000 individuals.
- MG Eikenberry asked about the drive for a nationally representative MoI, like the MoD reform issue. In his reply the DCM suggested that the Minister had picked the more difficult individuals to change first and had therefore experienced difficulties. It is hoped that this would be addressed in the future.

### **U.S./Coalition CJTF-180 (Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Information Work)**

- COL Purdy spoke about emerging lessons from PRT's, beginning with the caveat that it was still "early days" within the life of the PRT concept and that these points had not been staffed fully.



As such, they more accurately represented his own observations:

- o Vital to select the right individuals for the key posts. Induction and orientation was also very important as were close links with organizations operating in the same areas such as the UNAMA field teams and others.
- o Establishing the PRT takes time. There was an expectation management aspect to all of this so that instant results were not assumed. Progress would be gradual.
- o Important to clearly differentiate between combat elements and the PRT proper. This would become clearer with time and experience.
- o There is presently no clear mechanism to link province to central government. This needs to be addressed. Governor to Minister level is working well however.
- o PRT is partly there to gather and share information. There is therefore a requirement for a government information management system to be set up. National input is key to the value of PRT in this respect.
- o Engagement with local militias and police is developing slowly in the provinces. This will evolve and improve gradually over time.
- Mr. Brahimi said he was watching the progress of the PRT's with interest and he endorsed the need to pick the best people for the PRT task as he felt that first impressions with local leaders would be very important. Amb. Taylor made the point that Minister Jalali had also suggested sending senior government representatives to join PRTs to provide a physical central government presence on the ground.

- COL Wood then spoke as the Director of Information Operations CJTF-180. He stated that his mission was to help GoA get key messages to the Afghan people by the most appropriate means. To accomplish this, he had two mobile broadcast systems which could cover the majority of the country as well as a newspaper product printed in English, Dari, and Pashtun. Some 50,000 copies were distributed every two weeks. A recent initiative had also seen the distribution of 50,000 hand-cranked radios that would allow more of the populace to listen to important radio messages. COL Wood stated that he worked closely with the Ministry of Information and Culture and Afghan Radio and TV. In this way, it was possible to transmit interviews with GoA officials for example, from Kabul, then transmit them across the country using in-place resources. The longer term intent was to help produce a flourishing free media eventually while contributing to the SSR process in any way possible in the shorter term.
- CAPT Weizer from ISAF then spoke about the benefits of Radio Sada-e Azadi (Voice of Freedom) which had been operational for some seven months and had the potential to reach three million Afghans, broadcasting 24 hours a day in a variety of languages. In addition to educational and entertainment based content, the station would transmit GoA or ISAF policy information, including public safety and security notices. This could range from a warning about children carrying toy weapons to the promotion of the ANA as a national force for good. Liaison between ISAF assets and the

CJTF-180 teams had already been established and the coordinated creation of joint products was ongoing, to include the print media.

### **ISAF (Initial Mission Assessment)**

- BG Bertholee introduced himself as Deputy Cdr ISAF III and explained that LTG van Heyst would attend future meetings. He handed out a presentation explaining the commander's mission and his intent. He added that full operational capability would be achieved on 5 March—having taken over from ISAF II on 10 February. The five main lines of operation were described briefly as follows:
  - o Ensure a safe environment.
  - o Reconstitute Afghan authorities.
  - o Improve the capability of Afghan police and armed forces.
  - o Operate KIA and maintain ALOC.
  - o Force protection measures and improved situational awareness.
- The new focus for the ISAF III deployment would be a clearer division and increased coordination between ISAF and KMNB activities, a greater emphasis on civil-military cooperation and an enhanced liaison structure with respect to CJTF-180, the Afghan authorities together with their military and police assets, and also NGO's. BG Bertholee suggested that the unit emblem with the motto "Together we are strong" was particularly applicable to the situation in Afghanistan.

- Mr. Brahimi welcomed the ISAF III representatives and stated that he looked forward to working with them in the future. MG Eikenberry made the observation that with the arrival of the DDR process in the Spring/Summer, and the approach of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and elections, DDR in Kabul would need to be addressed in due course. ISAF III would be required to play a key role in preparing the conditions for this and for implementation aspects also.

### **Japan (DDR):**

- Amb. Komano stated the Japanese wish to achieve two main objectives from the forthcoming Tokyo Conference to be attended by President Karzai. The first was to encourage further donors to come forward from the international community (IC) by highlighting unequivocal Afghan support and commitment to the DDR process. The second was to use the conference as a springboard for the rapid implementation of DDR. Although considerable progress had recently been made in this area, much still remained to be achieved in a short timeframe. Amb. Komano stressed the importance of putting the DDR process into perspective in terms of broader SSR aims. This holistic approach was not well understood by the Afghan side. President Karzai and Marshall Fahim were both now clear on this. Ambassador Komano then outlined the following tasks which he believed the GoA needed to accomplish before the Tokyo Conference:

- o The Four Defense Commission sub-commissions needed to announce full details regarding membership, Terms of Reference, etc., and progress of their work.
- o An Advisory Committee must be established in accordance with the President's earlier decree which would encourage further support from the IC, and provide transparency.
- o The Defense Commission should meet before President's departure to endorse sub-commission's work and receive progress reports to date. They would have the opportunity to also discuss and endorse the major policy issues to be announced by the President in Tokyo. There was also a need to formally introduce the Advisory Committee.
- o The time frame for the process needed to be outlined. It is proposed that Karzai deliver a speech on 21 March (Islamic New Year) announcing a start date for DDR and when it should finish—hopefully after one year, in time for the June 2004 elections, though the Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP), the re-integration program itself, would go on for 3 years.
- o DDR implementation would have to be sequenced, with a phase 1 plan clearly laid out and targeted on an area with a good chance of success. Any power vacuum created by DDR must be filled, possibly by deployment of the ANA, but police and judiciary would also be important in this regard.

- Amb. Komano believed it was important to make explicit the eligibility criteria for DDR. This would produce a realistic target figure. Not everyone with a gun, for example, would qualify. The aim of DDR was to dissolve active duty security forces, which included factional armies. The target figure would be discussed in detail, together with other sensitive issues in the days leading up to 21 March speech by the President, when detailed implementation aspects would also be announced. Progress over recent weeks had been hampered by the lack of key leaders being available in Afghanistan. Amb. Komano stressed that donor nations also needed to adopt a coordinated funding approach to DDR. As a final comment, Amb. Komano mentioned that the Japanese Embassy was being reinforced with two DDR experts to assist them in their task. These were welcome and necessary additions.

## **UK (Counternarcotics)**

- Amb. Nash reported briefly on four areas. The first was President Karzai's ongoing poppy eradication program in five key provinces. The UK had received mixed reports of the results, and intended to send out teams with UNODC to evaluate these claims and make an independent assessment. The second related area was development support, as international experience has shown that without strong development support for at least 3 years, poppy eradication is not sustainable. President Karzai was aware of this and had asked the UK and

others to proceed with the rapid development of alternative livelihood work. Following on from this, a major success has recently been achieved with the assistance of donors/ UNAMA/UNODC in that new funding for this area has been found (\$10-20 million) as well as the reprioritization of existing government programs.

- Amb. Nash then talked through a diagram which set out the CN law enforcement structures of the state. This work would become the basis of a government decree. It was important to note that the NSC would have no law enforcement operational role, but rather an overarching and strategic coordination function. The final point he covered concerned wider international involvement in the CN work. The intention was to convene a meeting in the near future to discuss wider CN involvement to include all interested parties. The Chinese, the Iranians, and possibly the Russians would also wish to attend such a gathering. As a footnote, the Ambassador added that the core group addressing CN issues consisted of CND, UNODC, INL, UK, and German Police Project.

### **Security and Rule of Law Consultative Groups**

Amb. Taylor reiterated that the purpose of the consultative group structure was threefold, to put Afghan ministers in charge, to help coordinate assistance within a sector, and to assist with the preparation of a budget. The consultative group mechanism was designed to assist ministers to pull together donors in a coordinated fashion. The budget was currently being

prepared and was due to be presented on 17 March at the donor's conference, possibly in Brussels. There would be a premeeting in Kabul the week before at which Ministers would present their plans for initial scrutiny. This process puts the GoA in charge and links in with earlier points made about Afghan ownership by Mr. Brahimi. Amb. Taylor urged SSR group participants to use the CG structure for these purposes and to call the first meetings in the near future.

### **Strategies for Afghan Involvement in SSR**

- MG Eikenberry expressed the view that Afghan involvement in the SSR process remained an important challenge to be resolved, as stated earlier in the meeting. Bringing the relevant Afghan SSR leaders together was crucial to educating them about the interdependence of SSR issues and forcing them to address these matters in a collective fashion. The matter was not assisted by frequent overseas travel by Afghan leaders, which now had to be curtailed as it represented a brake on progress. Once the leader had left, the lack of an effective Deputy meant that nothing could be taken forward. Mr. Brahimi agreed with this point and pleaded with lead nations to stop extending so many invites to Afghan leaders, and to instead hold conferences in Kabul rather than their own capitals. MG Eikenberry suggested that there were two possible routes to achieve progress with respect to broader SSR dialogue with the Karzai Administration. One was the higher level approach to the President through the offices of Mr. Brahimi together with lead nation



Ambassadors; another was use of an organization like the NSC to join with an expanded group to include the lead nation reps and then report back to the President. Amb. Nash commented that he had examined the latter option and believed that it was potentially too complex to orchestrate. A better solution might be for Dr. Rassoul to attend this meeting and then report back to the President. Amb. Nash felt that the NSC had to be involved in the process somehow. This option was discussed and the final outcome was that Dr. Rassoul would be invited to the next meeting, but that he would not be a regular attendee. This would be done on a trial basis, as part of what Mr. Brahimi had described as an "ad hoc" approach to Afghan engagement in SSR.

- In closing the meeting, MG Eikenberry suggested that it might be worth setting up a meeting with the President, the five lead nation Ambassadors, and Mr. Brahimi in order to discuss the need to keep leaders in Afghanistan at this sensitive and important time for the development of SSR. Mr. Brahimi agreed.

#### Lead Nation Reviews of Policy and Information Theme Papers:

There was no time to cover this item.

Date of Next Meeting: German Ambassador offered to host the next meeting on 12 March 2003, 10am-12pm, German Embassy Conference Room. The tentative agenda is as follows:

- Tokyo DDR Conference Readout (Japan).
- Defense Commission Sub-Commission Updates (UNAMA, Japan, and U.S.).

- Preparation for President's 21 March Address on DDR Implementation (UNAMA and Japan).
  - Norwegian Border Police Decision and Outcome of Structures Working Group (Norway, U.S., and Germany).
  - Master Plan & Unified Framework Update (Italy)
  - ADF Conference and SSR Related Issues (U.S. - Amb. Taylor)
  - MoI Structures & Police Decree Update and Plans for Expansion into Provinces (Germany)
  - Briefing on U.S. INL Police Training and Communications/ID Card Scheme (U.S.).
  - Discussion of Policy and Information Theme Papers (UNAMA and Lead Nations, with each Lead Nation focusing on its particular security sector area. Suggested format and example [U.S. paper submitted at 26 Jan 2003 SSR meeting] attached below.
- \*NOTE: Dr. Zalmay Rassoul, National Security Advisor, will be invited to attend this meeting.

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## ENDNOTES

1. Inspired by one of Lieutenant General Dan K. McNeill's comments about Buzkashi to the USSC Staff and OMC-A team, when he served as Commander of CJTF-180.

2. D. Hendrickson and A. Karkoszka, "The Challenges of Security Sector Reform," *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 175-201. The major framework of the present monograph is based on their thoughtful article. It should be required reading for all students and practitioners of SSR. Unfortunately the SSR forum in Afghanistan was unaware of this gem as they learned by trial and error from 2002 to 2003.

3. Michael Brzoska *et al.*, *Short Assessment: Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan*, Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2005, [www.bicc.de/ssr\\_gtz/pdf/afghanistan.pdf](http://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/afghanistan.pdf), accessed April 12, 2008; Andrew Cottey, "Afghanistan and the New Dynamics of Intervention: Counter-Terrorism and Nation Building" In *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 181-194; Human Rights Watch, "Backgrounder: Afghanistan's Bonn Agreement One Year Later, A Catalog of Missed Opportunities," Human Rights Watch News, [www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan/bonn1yr-bck.htm](http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan/bonn1yr-bck.htm), accessed April 12, 2008; Mark Sedra, "Confronting Afghanistan's Security Dilemma," e conference, June 4-11, 2003, [www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief28/content.php](http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief28/content.php), accessed April 12, 2008; J. Alexander Thier, "Afghanistan" In *Twenty-First Century Peace Operations*, William Durch, ed., Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace (USIP), 2006, pp. 467-572; J. Alexander Thier, "The Politics of Peace-Building, Year One: From Bonn to Kabul" In *Nation Building Unraveled*, Antonio Donini, Norah Niland, and Karin Wermester, eds., Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004, pp. 39-60; Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, New York, Viking, 2008, pp. 171-218.

4. Hendrickson and Karkoszka, pp. 182-185.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

7. *Ibid*, p. 179.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
9. *Ibid*.
10. *Ibid*, p. 186.
11. For a detailed listing of the SSR working group actors, see Appendix A.
12. Karl Eikenberry, *Interview about SSR in Afghanistan 2002-2003*, conducted by Jason Howk at NATO HQs, Brussels, Belgium, May 23, 2008.
13. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Answers to American SSR Development Questions*, Jason Howk, ed., via Emails with a senior USAID SSR team member, April 9, 2008. This USAID SSR expert explained that SSR was not formalized in the U.S. Government until 2004.
14. Karl Eikenberry, *Answers to SSR Questionnaire*, Jason Howk, ed., Via email, April 19, 2008.
15. The tasks and objectives came primarily from the USSC's Officer Evaluation Report Support Form, the summary of which can be found in Appendix C.
16. *Ibid*.
17. Eikenberry, *Interview about SSR in Afghanistan 2002-2003*.
18. For a detailed listing of the SSR forum and working group members, see appendix A.
19. Mark Thomas, "5th Security Sector Reform Meeting," Japanese Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan, February 17, 2003. For a detailed description of the SSR Forum's agenda, see Appendix E. Used with permission of Colonel Mark Thomas, British Armed Forces.

20. Eikenberry, *Interview about SSR in Afghanistan 2002-2003*.
21. From the conference agenda for *A Working Conference for Senior Military Leaders*, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2003.
22. Jason Howk, Notes and Observations, April 24, 2003.
23. Jason Howk, "U.S. Security Coordinator Calendar," Microsoft Outlook Calendar, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2002-03.
24. Author's personal observations while attending meetings at the Embassies of many of Afghans regional neighbors.
25. Hendrickson and Karkoszka, p. 175.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. Howk, Notes and Observations.
29. Hendrickson and Karkoszka, pp. 175-176.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-188.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
39. Brzoska *et al.*; Cottey, pp. 181-194; Human Rights Watch,



p. 12; Ali Jalali, "Rebuilding Afghanistan's National Army," *Parameters*, Autumn 2002, pp. 72-86; NATO, *Progress in Afghanistan, Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008*, Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2008, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int); Sedra; Thier, *Afghanistan*, pp. 467-572; Thier, *The Politics of Peace-Building, Year One*, pp. 39-60.

40. Eikenberry, *Interview about SSR in Afghanistan 2002-2003*.

41. Decreased emphasis on SSR by U.S. leaders from the notes and recollections of a senior officer closely associated with SSR who stayed behind after MG Eikenberry's departure. Although an Afghan observer of the inner workings of government recalls that the SSR group was later split into two separate forums. One forum, the Policy Action group (PAG), was led by President Karzai, and a second forum, Strategy Action Group (SAG), was led by the NSA, Dr. Rassoul. The key participants in both meetings were expanded to include the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Communication, Education, Culture and Information, the Chief NDS, NATO Commander, European Union Representative, and the Commander CSTC-A, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, the replacement of OMC-A. This switch to Afghan leadership and involvement would actually indicate that the initial SSR strategy met more success than it was believed to have met.

42. NATO, *Progress in Afghanistan*, pp. 1-20.

43. Hendrickson and Karkoszka, p. 182.

44. Thomas.

45. *Ibid.*

46. Based on a passage from Hendrickson and Karkoszka, p. 194.

47. Thomas.