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A Power Projection Force: Some Concrete Proposals

DANIEL P. BOLGER

The fundamental mission of our Army is achieving deterrence through demonstrating a credible capability to project and apply overwhelming combat power from both CONUS and forward deployments. This is a shift from dependence on large forward deployments. We seek the capability to preempt crises—but if combat power must be used, its application must be swift and decisive, to win with minimal casualties.[1]

Have you noticed that everybody in a US military uniform has suddenly developed a burning interest in something called "power projection"? The sea services coined the term several years ago to describe what aircraft carrier aviators and Marines do best—pop up from over the sea horizon and hammer troublemakers ashore. During the Cold War, the Navy and Marines did a lot of this sort of thing while large forward contingents, the overwhelming bulk of the Army and Air Force, held the line against the Soviet Union and its irksome minions.

Now, with the Evil Empire melted down as thoroughly as the Wicked Witch of the West, all four armed services have proclaimed a renewed interest in projecting power against America's remaining foes around the globe. The US Army, harnessed for decades to static deterrence missions in Europe and northeast Asia, has responded to the challenge of power projection with a fervor appropriate to the newly converted.

Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan explains Army thinking this way:

> The chief focus is power projection, power projection from the continental United States, crisis response and power projection with a much reduced forward presence. For years, we had a large forward defense and then it went to

forward presence—230,000 Army people . . . in Central Europe and somewhere around 50,000 in Korea. Those numbers will diminish greatly, so primarily our forces will be based in the United States.[2]

Before describing such a power projection Army, it would be smart to explain why we need one. Power projection is not just another doctrinal flavor of the month. This is particularly true for soldiers posted in the continental United States. Barring some sort of ugly domestic upheaval or a wild, unforeseen collapse in Canada or Mexico, the US Army must find a way to get across those miles of storm-tossed ocean that separate us from our potential theaters of war. We may be good, but we cannot yet walk on water.

We never could. Since 1898, the Army has gone to wars, both great and small, as a passenger on someone else's transports. Until World War II, America moved its Army and Marine landpower courtesy of the US Navy and contracted commercial shipping. Transits took months, and any fighting at the other end necessitated at least one intermediate stop to permit elaborate reshufflings, crossdeckings, and last-minute training prior to mounting actual attacks. It would have been nicer to get there sooner, but just crossing the broad Atlantic and even wider Pacific seemed like, and was, achievement enough.

Getting there in God's good time simply won't do anymore. Since 1945, America has found itself, however unwillingly, the premier power on the globe. With great power comes great responsibility, to lift a phrase from Stan Lee's reluctant superhero, Spiderman. America, equally uncertain in its own great strength, has discovered its share of weighty responsibilities.

One of the greatest burdens of international predominance stems from our myriad political, economic, and military commitments involving virtually every region on Earth. Before 1945, most Americans stayed home, safe between the great ocean moats. Today, US citizens, government organs, and business corporations can be found here, there, and everywhere, a worldwide portfolio. As long ago as 1898, but since 1945 in earnest, American combat units occupied a network of overseas bases, ready to guarantee those lives and treasures, not to mention the national interests they represent.

With the Soviet threat evaporated, growing budget pressures at home, and allies tired of caring for thousands of US personnel, our overseas bases have

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begun to go away. We have already withdrawn many units, and the future promises few American troops in such traditional forward basing areas as Panama, Germany, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Our unarmed countrymen and our vital interests, though, have neither come home nor gone away. Somebody has to be ready to reach out and protect these people and these interests.

Enemies aplenty await. With or without communists, American wealth and power will continue to breed envy and discontent in the unhappy Third World and, soon enough, in the wreckage of the socialist sphere. Americans exacerbate this natural jealousy by confronting it with unbounded moralizing, arrogance, and, most annoying of all, consistent success. It's one thing to endure an overbearing, loud, sanctimonious neighbor, but it just drives people nuts to see that same neighbor advance from triumph to triumph, many of them seemingly undeserved. "God protects fools, drunkards, and the United States of America," grumbled Otto von Bismarck more than a century ago. It's as true today as ever.

The global family of ex-Soviet client states, egged on for years by their patron in its ruthless competition with the United States, found plenty of opportunities to threaten American lives and test American resolve. As much as US policymakers bemoaned Soviet support for anti-American undertakings, we should remind ourselves that the Soviet communists also curbed their more rabid running dogs on more than one occasion. It is likely that we will soon long for the comparative restraint of the Cold War era. Nikita Khrushchev, after all, had enough sense to recognize the perils of a nuclear apocalypse. Fidel Castro, Kim Il-sung, Moammar Gadhafi, Haffez Assad, and Saddam Hussein give no evidence of such pangs of conscience.

These unsavory types realize that they accrue propaganda victories among their scruffy comrades by merely confronting Uncle Sam's alleged imperialism, even if the attempt results in a crushing military riposte. Enough of them have gotten away with piracy, terrorism, border aggression, support for insurgencies, and hostage-taking to make the games worth the risk. The more they can draw out the drama, the more such strongmen resort to these measures. In order to gain the upper hand in these occasional skirmishes, America must react swiftly and decisively.

More often than not, an aircraft carrier battle group or Navy/Marine amphibious group cruising off shore can defuse a building crisis.[3] If that fails to work, air raids may do the job, hurting the enemy and demonstrating US resolve. But when bad goes to worse and citizens or key geographic holdings are threatened, ground forces must go in—fast and hard.[4] So it has gone in Korea, Lebanon (twice), the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Arabian peninsula, and dozens of other hot spots since World War II ended.

Ground forces generally deploy into the realm of low-intensity conflict, wars involving limited US ends and severely limited means (read "regular

troops"—no real mobilization). They are low-intensity from the domestic American perspective, not from the view of the enemy or the American expeditionary fighter, both of whom are likely battling for their lives just as surely as anyone who was engaged at Bastogne. The Grenada and Panama contingencies offer good examples of these types of conflicts. Though the conflicts are small in scale, the political costs of defeat often far outweigh the actual military results of a botched troop commitment. LIC has been a problem for the US military since 1945—really since 1775, if you count the Indian troubles and a long, nasty string of Latin American, Caribbean, and Asian forays. There's always a pot bubbling somewhere.

DOD Still Media Records Center

Two soldiers of the 4th Bn., 6th Infantry, 5th Infantry Div., search for a sniper near the destroyed Panamanian Defense Force headquarters in Panama City on 21 December 1989 during Operation Just Cause. "When bad goes to worse and citizens or key geographic holdings are threatened, ground forces must go in."

At times, though, situations escalate into mid-intensity conflict, what most folks think of as conventional warfare. Ends remain limited, as US national survival is not at stake. If it was, the result could be high-intensity conflict and the use of nuclear devices, with all the attendant horrors. At the mid-intensity level, unlike in LIC, the means of war increase drastically and entail some degree of true national mobilization of organized reserves, industries, and the population.[5] Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War provide the only post-1945 examples. These ones have been rare in US history. The cost of screwing up, though, can be high in lives, wealth, and prestige. Just ask the survivors of unlucky Task Force Smith.

To meet today's military challenges, American ground forces must arrive rapidly from stateside bases, must be prepared to enter by force, and must be ready to exploit violently following the shock of the initial assault. These three elements form the essence of power projection.

Getting there amounts to the most fundamental issue in this whole enterprise. Land forces that cannot deploy rapidly serve little purpose in today's national security arena, save as an overmanned, overequipped, overly expensive garrison for an already unassailable Fortress America. The available means of moving put finite limits on which forces can play, and that in turn dictates which situations the US armed forces can handle.

In the broadest sense, ground forces can deploy rapidly by air or fast sealift. They do not own these conveyances, so it's little surprise that there's not enough, although the United States has a lot more than any other country. Everyone in the defense community piously agrees that we need a lot more lift, then they continue to do nothing about it.

That won't change in today's bleak fiscal climate. In the minds of airmen, tubby airlifters hardly stack up against sleek F-22 fighters. To sailors, a wallowing roll-on/roll-off freighter surely seems pedestrian compared to a racing *Arleigh Burke*-class Aegis destroyer. It's a fair assumption that the Army and Marines will be damn lucky to have access even to the present inadequate level of air and sea lift after another decade of certain defense reductions.[6]

What can be lifted rapidly, defined as within a week or so? Unfortunately, the only things that move that quickly must go by air. Military airplanes, like their civilian counterparts, are best suited to haul people and small, light equipment. Anything much bigger than a towed howitzer, a Hummer, or a pallet of ammunition quickly overtasks America's standard airlifter, the C-141B Starlifter. True, a C-141B can haul certain armored fighting vehicles, and the mammoth C-5A/B Galaxy can even carry a main battle tank. But there just aren't enough aircraft to make such an air movement efficient or effective.[7] Given a choice between moving a few thousand light infantrymen or a few dozen tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, the National Command Authorities invariably opt for boots on the ground.

So forget rapidly moving a lot of heavy equipment like tanks and artillery. Even "fast" sealift takes weeks to get to a crisis area. Thereafter, planners could probably bank on one heavy division a month under ideal conditions. If the tanks and heavy stuff are not afloat in amphibious ships or prepositioned in a storage site, they will not get there in any significant numbers for months.[8] Faster deployment of heavy divisions is possible in theory, but the United States has not invested in it.[9] With shrinking budgets and no discernible mortal threat, we probably never will.

All this has serious consequences. In essence, the United States has chosen to restrict itself to LIC—we can't get to a no-notice mid-intensity war in force, unless the bad guys cooperate. To cite a recent example, we could not possibly have landed enough potent ground forces to save Kuwait from the initial Iraqi offensive in 1990, nor did our small, weak vanguard of light ground forces stand much chance had the enemy continued his massive tank-led attacks into Saudi Arabia.[10] Quick early deployments of airpower and some pretty unvarnished public threats generated sufficient uncertainty in Saddam Hussein's mind, and he hesitated. Considering the beating he took for restraining himself, it's unlikely his imitators and protégés worldwide will be so foolish. Not that it matters. Given our limits on available lift, our only choices in meeting a mid-intensity blitzkrieg remain too light or too late.

For those concerned with force structure issues, the handwriting is on the wall. While we have maintained an active Army and Marine Corps of almost 20 divisions since World War II, not to mention a huge force of full and cadre-strength reserve divisions, we have tended to send about ten active divisions to our three post-1945 mid-intensity wars, and about five brigades to our contingencies. Only two reserve component divisions marched off to these conflicts.[11] We cannot afford to maintain excess anymore, let alone get it to potential theaters of war.

If we restrict ourselves to maintaining only those ground forces we can really deploy, the entire Army and Marine Corps should total ten divisions. Of those, three light to middleweight Army outfits and two Marine divisions must stand at full readiness for immediate deployment into LIC. Since the Third World teems with armor these days, what about a heavy punch? The Marines' small mechanized contingents and a balanced Abrams/Bradley battalion task force per Army division will be about all the heavy stuff that can be added if we intend these folks to move rapidly. Expeditionary soldiers can't keep waiting for the light armor of the future—they need something now. The M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley may be too heavy and outsized, but they can fight well. They will have to do, but we can't take many.

The other five Army divisions, all mechanized/armored types, need to be manned at a reduced level (70-80 percent), completely equipped with modern arms, and geared for deployment into mid-intensity conflicts at

mobilization plus 30 days or later. Most of their personnel shortfall will be in the lower grades, to be filled by young reservists when the whistle blows. Tank and mechanized battalions might field only three of four line companies in peacetime, with assigned regular cadres for the missing units.

Army and Marine reserve components could provide certain specified combat support and combat service support units, prepare individual replacements, and maintain equipment parks. We might as well eliminate all of the organized reserve combat divisions and brigades, since they will never deploy anywhere but to the nearest flood plain or to an Independence Day parade. While we're at it, let's be sure to kill off the politically popular but militarily suspect roundout and roundup combat brigades and battalions. Power projection must be a way of life for full-time warriors, not an avocation for part-time soldiers who also carry a full-time civilian job, no matter how patriotic or dedicated these soldiers are. Contingency combat demands an extraordinary degree of battle readiness. Technically astute, tactically aware expeditionary soldiers and units must be ready to go *now*. To maintain such standards will require total professional commitment.

Thus a ten-division ground force, half at full manning, matches the hard facts of lift. It would probably suffice against any likely ground threat.

If the means of deployment defines the limits to force, then projecting power into a low-intensity theater dictates the nature of the five divisions prepared for rapid deployment. The magic term here is "forced entry," the ability to fight through opposition to get on the ground. Typically, this entails seizing airheads and runways or beaches and ports to guarantee reinforcements, along with a small number of crucial initial objectives, such as rescuing trapped civilians or taking enemy command centers. Four methods of tactical assault exist: amphibious, airlanding, parachute, and helicopter.

Amphibious assault belongs to the US Marine Corps and its US Navy "gator fleet," even though the Army has also mastered these skills as necessary. Presently, though, it's a sea service show. With their Navy colleagues in direct support, Marines can fight ashore along any coast, and they come with their full combined arms team, including tanks, armored infantry carriers, heavy artillery, combat engineers, and the like.[12] They're exactly what any expeditionary commander would want—trained, heavily armed shock troops complete with dedicated transportation.

The Marines' biggest drawback summarizes the frustration of power projection. While the United States fields plenty of Marines, we usually keep only two battalion landing teams permanently on station, one in the Pacific and one in the Mediterranean. This is a function of limits on amphibious shipping, not to mention the trials of six-month stints on cramped troopships. Moreover, because they move by ship, the Marines can respond quickly only if they happen to be nearby when something brews. A Marine Expeditionary

Unit in the western Pacific cannot do anything but worry about trouble in the Caribbean.[13] Though Marines have fought with distinction in many a lengthy ground campaign, Corps senior officers make no secret that they consider their Marines best used as assault troops, a role that matches their training, doctrine, equipment, austere logistics, and gung-ho traditions. They rightly turn to the Army if things get out of hand.

Corps advocates thrill to suggestions that the Marines inherit the entire rapid deployment/LIC mission. That seems imprudent. Without a lot of additional amphibious shipping or an expensive reorientation toward using US Air Force airlift, it's as foolish as building more of those imposing but strategically immobile Army armored divisions.[14] The country simply cannot deploy enough Marines quickly using existing assets. As always, the Marines can expect to share their small wars with the complementary Army rapid deployment units.

One needn't sweat through Parris Island boot camp to use assault airlanding, the simplest of the four opposed entry techniques. The plane lands and the passengers and their vehicles get off as quickly as possible. That's all there is to it. Any unit that can be delivered to an airfield can do this, which avoids all the specialized training and equipment associated with the other three techniques. Airlanding offers the only reliable way to introduce armor speedily into theater. Best of all, whatever is on the plane lands intact.[15]

Provided it doesn't go down in flames, that is. Hostile soldiers would enjoy nothing better than popping off incendiary rounds and rocket-propelled grenades at a succession of overloaded Starlifters and Galaxies trundling down contested taxiways. Faced with even rudimentary antiaircraft guns or shoulder-fired missiles, US aircraft attrition could get pretty gruesome. Worse, only a few Third World airports can handle any sizable number of aircraft on the ground simultaneously. It takes a long time to land a force plane by plane, which jeopardizes the goal of rapid forced entry.[16] Reliance on initial airlandings risks a fiasco in the opening assault. Airlanding, then, hardly ever provides a usable forced entry tactic, though it offers the best way to bring in cohesive, more heavily equipped reinforcements.

Parachute assault tactics came to fruition during World War II. A parachute unit can fly from stateside bases directly to drop zones. Unlike airlanding troops piecemeal, paratroopers land in force. Modern US parachuting techniques allow accurate delivery of men and equipment at night and in poor weather. These people can drop almost anywhere, whereas Marines stick pretty close to the waterfront and airlanding troops need airstrips.[17]

Paratroopers do have their problems, though. Like Marines, these highly trained, expensive soldiers outnumber the seats on the airlifters that carry them. The US Air Force cannot drop all of the paratroopers and gear the Army wants. As with airlanding forces, parachute assault flights must be wary

of enemy air defenses. Foul weather or pilot errors can scatter drops badly, as happened fairly often in World War II. Finally, only light weapons and support equipment will be delivered by parachute. The heavier stuff, still pretty skimpy by modern mechanized standards, must airland. So paratroops fight with what they're carrying, and hope to avoid enemy armor.[18]

Helicopter assault, or vertical envelopment as the Marines call it, evolved from the glider forces of World War II. Carried by choppers, modern air assault troops descend in massed landings, placing intact fighting units on target, day or night. Today's helicopter assault units are a lot more deployable than their predecessors due to work on helicopter self-deployment and a draconic trimming of equipment and supplies. Their organic Army and Marine aviation includes supporting attack gunships, medical evacuation types, and cargo helicopters. These forces enjoy significant antiarmor capability, thanks to their attack aviation. They don't just ride in helicopters—they build their tactics around their trusty rotary-winged steeds.[19]

Air assault units have their shortcomings. They cannot deploy from the continental United States ready to fight, and thus need an intermediate staging base to prepare aviation and ground forces for the actual assault. For the Marines, these activities can be accomplished on the decks of their amphibious ships. Army helicopter assault troops have no such luxury, and must locate a staging area. All helicopters share the airlifters' vulnerability to enemy antiaircraft gunners.[20]

In isolation, an opposing force could defeat any single forced-entry tactic. The trick, as usual, involves mixing enough of all four methods to derive an order of battle that is more than the sum of its parts. No likely LIC opponent could simultaneously defend every beach, runway, drop zone, and helicopter landing zone day and night. Wherever and whenever he concentrates, the Americans can go in elsewhere. This is why it's good to be a superpower with a lot of different tools in the kit bag.

Getting there and getting in amounts to only two-thirds of the task, though. Once in country, American forces must gain a quick victory. That challenge is inherent to LIC interventions, and it throws one more twist into the force-mix question. As luck would have it, those lightly armed outfits suited for speedy deployment and forced entry do not always move all that swiftly once on the ground.

The Marines, the air assault units, and whatever heavy forces can get there offer the best hope for rapid exploitation of the initial assaults. Parachute and light infantry forces, unless liberally supplied with borrowed ground transport or helicopters, move at walking speed. Some think that pace proved too slow in Grenada and Panama.[21] If commanders expect to follow up their opening moves with a quick succession of finishing strokes, they had better include Marines, air assault units, and armor in their task organization.

Examining our current ground force list in light of these power projection requirements, we can draw some rather pointed conclusions. On the brighter side, in choosing what forces to retain we have the right pile of things to choose from, the heritage of President Ronald Reagan's defense buildup. Since the force is due for major fiscal surgery anyway, the Army's senior commanders seem willing to make a virtue of necessity and do more than just slice the salami. Choosing the right ten divisions makes all the difference. (See chart, next page.)

Our Marine friends can forget about assuming the entire power projection mission. They will be major players, with a bigger role in fighting small wars than at any time since the Banana Wars earlier in this century. Still, they should expect to share their work with the Army. The Corps probably needs two divisions, one on each coast of our continent, in order to maintain an expeditionary unit at sea with customarily associated US Navy Atlantic/Caribbean and Pacific/Indian Ocean fleets.

The Army must accept even more painful troop cuts. Eight Regular Army divisions (one airborne, one air assault, one light for airlanding, five armored/mechanized at reduced readiness) can do the job. It's what we'll probably end up with anyway, so let's pick the ones we want. Right now, even in the touted Army program for a minimum-risk force of 12 active and eight reserve divisions, we would be trying to hold on to too many light infantry and armored/mechanized divisions, not to mention the reserves with their notoriously long mobilization lead-time. We can't and won't move all these excess outfits. Why try to afford them?

We also need to capitalize on our strong suit. The 82d Airborne Division certainly has proven its worth as a national ready-response force.[22] The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) lends further flexibility for meeting LIC contingencies, considering its unique blend of rapid deployment, forced entry, and exploitation capacities, all thanks to its huge complement of organic aviation. Embarked Marines and selected small mechanized task forces, though not numerous, provide exactly what may be needed to break the back of Third World armored threats.

As we reshape units and recast plans, we need to concentrate on training that reflects a joint and light/heavy mix under our Army and Marine division flags, rather than comfortable but unlikely pure division exercises.[23] A future LIC contingency expedition might see a joint task force containing a parachute brigade, an air assault brigade, a Marine expeditionary unit, a reduced-strength tank battalion task force, and an airlanding light infantry brigade, plus the usual combat support, service support, and special operations forces. Experience in Grenada and Panama certainly suggests such force packages.[24]

The hardest thing for our senior Army leaders, of course, will be picking who stays and who goes. Not everybody can project power. That's not

A Proposed Ten-Division Power-Projection Force

	Rapid Deployment	Forced Entry	Rapid Exploitation
US Marine Corps (low-intensity contingencies)			
1st Marine Division Camp Lejeune, N.C.	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**
2d Marine Division Camp Pendleton, Calif.	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**
XVIII Airborne Corps (low-intensity contingencies)			
7th Infantry Division (Light) Fort Lewis, Wash.	**YES**	**NO**	**NO**
82d Airborne Division Fort Bragg, N.C.	**YES**	**YES**	**NO**
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Fort Campbell, Ky.	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**
III Corps (mid-intensity war)			
1st Armored Division Fort Hood, Tex.	**NO**	**NO**	**YES**
1st Cavalry Division Fort Hood, Tex.	**NO**	**NO**	**YES**
1st Infantry Division (Mech) Fort Riley, Kans.	**NO**	**NO**	**YES**
4th Infantry Division (Mech) Fort Carson, Colo.	**NO**	**NO**	**YES**
24th Infantry Division (Mech) Forts Benning and Stewart, Ga.	**NO**	**NO**	**YES**

NOTES:

One balanced tank/mechanized infantry battalion task force would be assigned to each XVIII Airborne Corps division.

Divisions in III Corps would maintain 70-80% personnel, 100% equipment, and prepare for deployment at mobilization plus 30 days. 1st Armored Division would be restationed from Germany.

a reflection on the considerable battle skills and willingness to fight of those who will be cut from the first string. Simply grafting the 75th Ranger Regiment onto the armored legions of III Corps does not create a strategically mobile contingency force, any more than an indomitable warrior ethos in the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) makes them capable of anything more than assault airlandings. Reputations and egos will be bruised as we realign, and other proud outfits soon must join the 2d Armored, 3d Armored, 8th Infantry, and 9th Infantry divisions on the inactive rolls.

Those grim realities define an Army built to fight in the constrained world of power projection. It won't be easy or pleasant. But whatever else happens, this much can be assured—our government will call on tommorrow's Army to project power. It's up to today's Army to build forces designed to get there, get in, and get it over with on our terms.

NOTES

1. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5: *AirLand Operations* (Fort Monroe, Va.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August 1991), p. 45.

2. Quoted in L. James Binder, "No More Task Force Smiths," *Army*, January 1992, p. 18. For a good summary wrap-up of the Army's current position, see Neil Munro, "U.S. Army Steps Up Efforts to Bolster Rapid Deployment," *Defense News*, 24-30 August 1992, p. 10.

3. US Navy aircraft carrier battle groups and Navy/Marine Corps amphibious ready groups responded to hundreds of post-1945 crises without significant Air Force or Army assistance. The classic study of such incidents determined that sea service power projection forces reacted to 177 of 215 such crises (82 percent) from 1945 to 1978. This trend continued in the 1980s. See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 38-39.

4. US Department of the Army, US Army Command and General Staff College, *Strike Operations: Handbook for Commanders* (Draft) (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: USACGSC, 28 March 1990), p. 1-1.

5. US Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: GPO, May 1986), pp. 2-5. For an explanation of the distinctions among the various intensities of warfare as they will likely exist at each level in the future, see Rod Paschall, *LIC 2010* (McLean, Va.: Brassey's [US], 1990), pp. 41-43, 67-75, 81-84.

6. An excellent discussion of the grim prospects for air and sealift improvements can be found in Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Airlift/Sealift in Short Supply at Very Time Need Grows Fastest," *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 1989, pp. 66-68. Most of the hope for airlift improvement centers on the promising new C-17, a C-141B replacement capable of carrying tanks into rugged forward landing strips. At one time, the Air Force anticipated fielding more than 200. Recent budget decisions may reduce the buy of C-17 airlifters to as few as 120. See David J. Lynch, "The C-17 is Up," *Air Force*, December 1991, pp. 46-50.

7. Airlift planning factors strongly discourage moving heavy battalions and brigades by air. The Air Force has 109 C-5A/Bs and 234 C-141Bs. A light infantry brigade deploys on 191 C-141 types. An airborne brigade requires six C-5s and 201 C-141s. An air assault brigade uses 18 C-5s and 230 C-141s (tailorable to 18 C-5s and 62 C-141s by full reliance on helicopters for resupply). An armored cavalry regiment flies out on 262 C-5s and 190 C-141s. An armored brigade (two tank, one mechanized battalions plus support) totals 273 C-5s and 243 C-141s—even a balanced tank/mechanized battalion task force needs 71 C-5s and 78 C-141s. For more details, see US Department of the Air Force, Military Airlift Command, *Airlift Planning Guide* (Scott AFB, Ill.: HQ MAC, 1989).

8. The recent Desert Shield deployment probably represents the best case for deploying heavy forces. See Douglas M. Norton, "Sealift: Keystone of Support," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1991, pp. 42-49; Richard Jupa and Jim Dingeman, *Gulf Wars* (Cambria, Calif.: 3W Publications, 1991), pp. 63-64; and Peter S. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Deployment and Preparation for Operation DESERT STORM," *Military Review*, January 1992, pp. 2-16. In the seven months from August 1990 through February 1991, America shipped seven and a third Army and Marine heavy division equivalents to the Gulf, plus assembling another Marine division by concentrating maritime prepositioning stocks. This optimum pace reflected liberal use of allied shipping, lack of enemy interdiction, and the ability to move almost a third of the forces from Europe rather than the continental United States. Even so, some units in VII Corps continued to receive tanks and equipment for weeks after the air offensive started.

9. John C. Bahnsen, "Mr. President, We Can't Go," *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1987, pp. 112-16. The technology exists to build surface-effects ships—massive twin-hulled, shallow draft, air-cushioned cargo carriers—capable of speeding across the Atlantic in less than four days. Sixteen such vessels could move an entire armored division. These types have been repeatedly proposed, but their development has never been seriously undertaken in this country.

10. Dingeman and Jupa, pp. 14-19. In its series of articles on US Army divisions that fought against Iraq, *Army Times* headlined its piece on the 82d Airborne Division with the derisive cover teaser "Speed Bumps," a reference to the paratroopers' black humor at their prospects had Iraqi tanks continued south in August 1990.

11. American forces deployed for Korea totalled nine and one-third divisions: Marine 1st and Army 1st Cavalry, 2d, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th, 40th, and 45th, plus the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. The 40th

and 45th, both National Guard formations, represent the only reserve component combat divisions sent to battle since 1945. In Vietnam, the United States fielded 11 and one-third divisions: Marine 1st and 3d, Army 1st Cavalry, 1st, 4th, 9th, 25th, 101st Airborne, Americal, plus the 26th and 27th Marine regiments and the Army 11th Armored Cavalry, 3d Brigade/82d Airborne, 1st Brigade/5th, 173d Airborne Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry, and 199th Light Infantry Brigade. In the Gulf, America provided ten and one-third divisions: Marine 1st and 2d, Army 1st Cavalry, 1st Armored, 3d Armored, 1st, 24th, 82d Airborne, 101st Airborne, plus the 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades and the Army 2d and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiments.

With regard to some of the larger LIC contingencies, America deployed two brigade-type units to Lebanon in 1958 (2d Provisional Marine Force, 24th Airborne Brigade). Four brigade equivalents entered Santo Domingo in 1965 (4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, all three 82d Airborne brigades). Four brigade-sized elements went to Grenada (24th Marine Amphibious Unit, two brigades of the 82d Airborne, and a provisional Ranger regiment). Panama employed six brigade-level outfits (portions of all three 7th Infantry Division brigades, a brigade of the 82d Airborne, the local 193d Infantry Brigade (+), and the 75th Ranger Regiment), plus a small Marine contingent.

12. Edward B. Atkeson, "Long and Short Swords in the Caribbean," *Army*, July 1991, p. 34; TRADOC, *AirLand Operations*, p. 12; John H. Cushman, "Command and Control in the Coalition," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1991, pp. 78-80.

13. John C. Scharfen, "The U.S. Marine Corps in 1990," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1991, pp. 134-40.

14. For an extreme version of the argument for Marine primacy in power projection, see George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, *The Coming War with Japan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

15. Command and General Staff College, *Strike Operations*, pp. 3-15, 3-34.

16. Consider the differences between the 82d Airborne Division's experiences in Grenada and Panama. Airlanding on an incomplete, contested runway in the 1983 Grenada operation, it took the 82d Airborne more than two days to build up to three battalions on the ground. See Daniel P. Bolger, *Americans at War, 1975-1986* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988), p. 347. That same size force arrived by parachute in a few hours during the 1989 Panama operation. See US Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume I: Soldiers and Leadership* (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, October 1990), pp. I-2, I-9 to I-10.

17. Harry E. Mornston, "The Emerging National Military Strategy of Power Projection and the Army's Contingency Corps," unpublished Master of Military Art and Science thesis (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), p. 64. Major Mornston's insightful study deserves a wide readership though his conclusions differ somewhat from this author's.

18. Ibid.; also Atkeson, p. 31.

19. US Department of the Army, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), *The Air Assault Division and Brigade Operations Manual* (Fort Campbell, Ky.: 101st Airborne Division [Air Assault], 1 August 1988), pp. 1-4 to 1-8; Atkeson, pp. 33-35. The 101st Airborne's current "Slim Eagle" initiative will result in even more reductions in vehicle numbers in the division, making it more deployable.

20. Atkeson, pp. 33-35; 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), *The Air Assault Division and Brigade Operations Manual*, pp. 1-12 to 1-13. The Marines hope to remedy many of the shortcomings of helicopter assault with the V-22 Osprey, a tilt-rotor craft now under development that takes off and lands like a helicopter but flies like an airplane. Aside from the fact that this developmental craft has shown a disconcerting tendency to crash, its procurement is opposed by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. See Davis S. Steigman, "Fatal Crash Renews Battle Over V-22," *Navy Times*, 3 August 1992, p. 23.

21. Atkeson, p. 30-31.

22. The 82d Airborne Division's shining reputation as America's premier ready-reaction unit is well established, even in the more unusual niches of the popular culture. For example, when the rock musical group the Rolling Stones recorded a song protesting America's Gulf War policy (1990's "High Wire," from the album *Flashpoint*) one lyric proclaimed, "Another Munich, we just can't afford—gonna send in the 82d Airborne." From Mick Jagger to Mainstreet USA, sending in the 82d has become almost as well known as this century's earlier, and similar, catchphrase: "Send in the Marines."

23. The National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center have taken the lead in mixing light and heavy forces. See, for example, US Department of the Army, Joint Readiness Training Center, "Joint Readiness Training Center Client Update," 28 January 1992, pp. 1-2.

24. Recent joint task forces reflect a mixture of brigade types. In Grenada, one could find Marines, Army paratroopers, and Rangers serving under operational control of the 82d Airborne. In Panama, a paratrooper battalion served under the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and a mechanized infantry battalion task force beefed up the the 193d Infantry Brigade (Light). While both operations required more than a division, the resulting forces proved to be composites. No intact divisions deployed.