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# Germany's Unification and Its Implications for US Strategy

STEPHAN D. KRETSCHMER

The statement "for the third time this century, the old order in Europe is crumbling"<sup>1</sup> is surely a correct description of the dramatic changes that have reshaped the European order since 1987. The bankruptcy of communism and the subsequent breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union led ultimately to a "geopolitical event of the first magnitude": German unification.<sup>2</sup> After 45 years of confrontation, "the core conflict of the Cold War in Europe, the German Question"<sup>3</sup> had been solved. German unification was a success for post-World War II Western policy and for former Soviet President Gorbachev's attempt to free the Soviet Union from some of its Cold War burdens.

Geopolitical success does not necessarily translate into success for the individual governments involved, however. The key document of German unification, the "Two-Plus-Four" Treaty, was signed on 12 September 1990 by both Germanies, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.<sup>4</sup> Now the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Germany are no longer political entities. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher, resigned in November of 1990. George Bush was not reelected in 1992. President Mitterrand has had to change prime ministers twice since 1990<sup>5</sup> and his Socialist party suffered a devastating defeat in the March 1993 national elections. In Germany, Chancellor Kohl struggles with the follow-on problems of unification and faces dwindling support in parliament and public. Neither the states nor the political parties nor the politicians who helped to bring about reunification remain as they were a mere four years ago.

Even a dramatic success like German unification does not represent the end of the line. One cannot simply rest, lay back, and enjoy the accomplishment. Old ways must be reviewed, and strong vision and leadership into the future must be provided. The full understanding of the implications of such an event is key for a country's vision and for its strategy. It was

probably insufficient analysis of long-range strategic implications of this development which led to some of the problems that today face the governments involved. The ongoing discussions about the role of the united Germany in the world community demonstrate that this analysis remains incomplete, now three years after the event.

West Germany was a key US ally during the Cold War in Europe. Now that the Cold War has ended, which elements of the relationship ended with it? Do both countries need a common threat to have a special relationship? What will future bilateral relations look like? The following analysis concentrates on the implications of German unification for US security strategy. The analysis focuses on military and alliance subjects and concludes with some basic recommendations for US security strategy.

German unification had always been the stated policy of US Cold War diplomacy,<sup>6</sup> a policy that corresponded to US support of human rights and self-determination. US policy kept pressure on the Soviet Union and its most valuable ally, the German Democratic Republic. Finally, and probably most important, it made sure that the Federal Republic of Germany pursued unity in concert with its allies and not on a separate path. The important 1967 Harmel Report, which determined NATO strategy toward the Warsaw Pact for more than 25 years, stated:

No final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German Question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany.<sup>7</sup>

The policy for bringing about unification, however, was totally unclear. Unification remained a distant goal, lying so far in the future that no one ever bothered to think about the practical issues related to planning for and living with a unified Germany. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 made it obvious that it was high time to get specific. President Bush continued "four decades of support for German unification" by formulating four guiding principles for its realization: Germany's self-determination, its continued

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commitment to NATO, a gradual and peaceful unification process, and a solution of border questions within the context of the Helsinki Final Act procedures.<sup>8</sup> The United States provided massive and consistent support for the unification process in accordance with these four principles.<sup>9</sup> Close US cooperation with the Kohl-led coalition insured that the resistance to unification by the other allied powers was overcome.

The four points did not, in themselves, contain new elements of US strategy. Obviously the general idea was that a major shift was not necessary and that the existing security structures could assimilate Germany's unification. Besides, Washington wanted to maintain its traditional postwar status in Europe, and thus had no incentive to initiate radical reforms in arrangements that in their original form would continue to preserve its political influence in European affairs.<sup>10</sup> For the United States, the idea of a strong, united Germany was much less threatening than it was for France or the United Kingdom.<sup>11</sup> Both European powers would automatically lose their wartime status following unification. Unlike the United States, which alone enjoys superpower ranking, neither France nor Great Britain has the means to offset that loss of status, despite the fact that both are nuclear powers. Then-President Bush even went a step further, increasing Germany's newly acquired power by promoting its new role as a "partner in leadership."<sup>12</sup>

This new role had no practical consequence in daily politics, or in reshaping institutions, and was thus regarded as mainly political rhetoric. The question of whether such a partnership is really feasible for Germany will be examined later.

Examining US security policy during the transition to unification reveals three significant points:

- First, the United States welcomed unification and the increased importance of Germany.

- Second, the principal emphasis was on how to achieve unification and not on an analysis of its implications.

- Third, the existing security structures in Europe were not to be changed by Germany's unification.

US policy notwithstanding, German unification has caused revolutionary changes in the strategic and political map of Europe.<sup>13</sup> Germany continues to be a member of NATO, adding the territory of the former East German Republic to the alliance. Improvements for the Western alliance are obvious. The NATO boundary moved eastward to the Oder-Neisse River. Germany's eastern border is much shorter now and favors a defense close to the border. NATO territory has gained depth in an east-west direction. This change eliminates one of the biggest problems for military planners, which in the past contributed heavily to short warning time and a lack of depth to employ strategic reserves.

The political map has also changed in favor of the West. Germany no longer borders an antagonistic power. A layer of independent and increasingly democratic countries lies between its boundary and Russia, the strongest military power of Europe. Most important for the improvement of the Western strategic situation is the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the ongoing and so far peaceful withdrawal of the Russian army from all territory occupied after the Second World War. Gorbachev's decision to acquiesce in continued German NATO membership after unification and to permit the peaceful withdrawal of the Democratic Republic of Germany from the Warsaw Pact was a serious blow to the longtime opponent of NATO. Membership in the Pact was no longer a must, and the threat of the Red Army to keep the club together was gone. Consequently, nine months after German unification the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist. A centralized, offensive military capability that had threatened the West for more than 40 years disappeared with it.

East Germany had played a key role in the Warsaw Pact, both as an ally and as a potential springboard for an offensive toward the Atlantic. The Soviet Union had stationed up to 350,000 of its best-equipped and best-trained forces there. The scheduled withdrawal of the remaining elements of the Russian army from East Germany in September 1994 will end the biggest military threat for NATO's Central Region. The ongoing withdrawal from Poland and the Baltic republics leaves NATO without an impending military threat from the east. The magnitude of this change is illustrated by the massive increase in warning time on which Germany bases its military planning. From 1989 to 1992 it increased from 48 hours to one year.

**F**or the United States the effects of these political, strategic, and military changes are threefold. First, fewer forward-deployed military forces are required for the protection of Europe. Defense planning scenarios have changed from threat-based to risk-based. The biggest risks currently lie in the peaceful transition of the former Soviet Union toward democracy and a free-market economy, and in solutions to such struggles as those presently taking place in the former Yugoslavia. However serious these events may become, the conventional military threat to Europe is considerably lower than during the existence of the Warsaw Pact.

Second, political influence through military capabilities can be achieved on a much lower level of forces than in the past. US military capabilities in Europe, both conventional and nuclear, have been directly related to the level of US influence in the region. All NATO nations in Europe are now in a process of downsizing their standing military forces. As long as the US withdrawal from Europe stays in the framework of these reductions, the transatlantic balance should not be changed fundamentally.<sup>14</sup>

Third, the risk of involvement in a major military conflict is greatly reduced. The inner German border was the line of confrontation between the

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***“German unification has caused revolutionary changes in the strategic and political map of Europe.”***

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superpowers in Europe. Any conflict that might have evolved there could have threatened the existence of the United States. This threat is gone and no border in Europe currently contains a potential conflict of the same magnitude.

To put it very simply, the US commitment in Europe is now cheaper and less risky, but it is not free. The decision on what long-term level of military commitment the United States wants to maintain in Europe remains unanswered. That answer is of central importance for US influence in Europe. NATO will be significantly affected by this decision. Both Germany and the United States want to keep the alliance strong and viable. The 1993 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, in a chapter titled “How We Can Influence the Future,” makes the point without equivocation: “In Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance remains central to our security. . . . We should work to strengthen the NATO Alliance.”<sup>15</sup> In the previous edition the US commitment was no less certain: “Basic to the new structure of peace we seek to build throughout Europe is the continued vitality of the North Atlantic Alliance—the indispensable foundation of transatlantic cooperation.”<sup>16</sup>

In Germany one scarcely can find any official address on security matters without a strong commitment to NATO. At the Bundeswehr Commanders Conference in spring 1992, Chancellor Kohl said:

Our foreign and security policy rests in a continuity which has been proven effective in the past and which will be effective in the future. We can base this policy on strong structures and institutions, which are mainly the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. The anchor for European security is and will be NATO. We do not want to and we cannot dispense with the Alliance as a guarantee for peace and freedom in Europe.<sup>17</sup>

Germany relies both on European and transatlantic institutions, and the alliance plays a central role in its security policy.

Both the United States and Germany have good reasons to maintain and strengthen NATO. For Germany, NATO is a protective shield for the completion of its unification, which could be endangered in several ways. The disappearance of the old order in the East still carries a significant amount of risk. Transition in the former Soviet Union is by no means completed. Since the breakup, the Russian economy has become much weaker and the standard of

living is deteriorating significantly. In some of the new republics disappointed voters have turned to former communist leaders who are enjoying a comeback with old ideas under new labels. President Boris Yeltsin is entangled in a constant struggle against former communists who dominate the parliament in Russia and has had to replace his reform-oriented Prime Minister. Influential and powerful groups like the military and the former *nomenklatura* are fighting to prevent the loss of privileges and status.

In other areas, increasing political and personal freedom has unleashed nationalism, religious fundamentalism, corruption, and crime. With the loss of tight and centralized control, numerous ethnic conflicts have emerged in the Balkans and border disputes between republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States prevent progress in needed cooperation. Some of the potential ethnic-based conflicts carry a real danger of spreading and undermining the security in Europe.

Finally, the war in Yugoslavia, violent turmoil like that in Romania, and economic hardships all over eastern Europe have created a massive refugee movement that threatens the stability in the region. Germany received more than 400,000 refugees in 1992; Austria had to reinforce its border police in order to cope with the problem; and Italy had severe problems with massive illegal immigration from Albania. Almost every country in Europe has been affected. If an unforeseeable escalation would force Western Europe to react with more than police force, NATO would provide an organizational framework to deal with the problem.

The second significant role for NATO is to reduce lingering anxieties among Germany's neighbors regarding unification. It is obvious that as long as Germany is firmly bound to NATO, Germany's influence will be balanced by the alliance and by the presence of the United States.<sup>18</sup>

Third, NATO membership provides the United States the easiest and most effective way to exercise political influence in the region,<sup>19</sup> sort of an institutional *pied à terre* in Europe. In none of the other institutions in Europe can Washington enjoy the status that it has in the alliance. In the European Community (EC) and the Western European Union (WEU), the United States has no direct voice. In the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the United States is one among equals, and the principle of unanimous vote gives, for example, Malta the same veto power. If this current institutional framework changes, the United States would most certainly lose political and military leverage, because the change would most likely strengthen European institutions like the EC or WEU at the expense of NATO. A loss of influence within NATO, or a weaker alliance, therefore translates directly into a loss of US influence in Europe.<sup>20</sup> Besides that, NATO supports the US role as a world power in the region and beyond. It provides the framework of a forward base, partly funded by NATO infrastructure funding, which serves also for purposes

outside the NATO region, as was the case during the Gulf War.<sup>21</sup> Hence, much more is at stake for the United States in its relationship to NATO than the common defense of the Atlantic region.

**D**espite the continued strength of US-German relations, the range of common interests shared by the United States and Germany as NATO partners has become significantly smaller. Both nations must deal with the memories of a successful past and the realities of a lack of alternatives for the future. Germany shares many American values and is grateful for US support of Germany's unification. Yet the United States and Germany no longer share a continuing overriding rationale for keeping NATO. The breakup of the Warsaw Pact tore a huge gap in the common security interests of both partners. Unfortunately, daily politics continue as if this broad basis still exists. Cooperation toward the goal of unification is clearly a strong point in German-US relations; their policies toward NATO since German unity was achieved are definitely not.

Bonn watches with a wary eye the US withdrawal from Europe.<sup>22</sup> About half of the previous Cold War level of US forces have already left Germany. Announced reductions total more than 70 percent of the former US presence. The shift from the Bush to the Clinton Administration has brought another reduction in the end-strength of US forces in Europe by one third, now to 100,000.<sup>23</sup> In a desperate effort to bring these rapid reductions to a halt, German officials have called frequently for a substantial and meaningful US presence in Europe, especially in Germany. The unexpected and surprising decision of Canada to withdraw its forces shocked the alliance, particularly Germany, despite the relatively minor numbers concerned.<sup>24</sup> The United States, on the other hand, watches with a wary eye as Germany appears to turn toward France, an ally which some in the United States think "is out to destroy NATO."<sup>25</sup> The development of the Eurocorps is a striking example of misunderstanding, lack of coordination, and suspicion between Germany and the United States.

Taking all this into account, the outlook does not appear to be bright. To get NATO back into "pre-unification-shape," a new common interest must be found to fill the gap created by the disappearance of the Soviet threat.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the transformation of NATO since German unification, in terms of depth of the battlefield and warning time, has been enormous. The shift from confrontation to cooperation with the former Warsaw Pact countries and the introduction of humanitarian missions and support of UN or CSCE initiatives are significant examples of this realignment of thinking and policies. All of that, however, is not enough to fill the "interest gap." And while the new military cooperation with the former Warsaw Pact countries is important, economic cooperation will be more decisive for peaceful transitions in the East.

Support of the UN or CSCE is a complicated and not-very-attractive matter for Germany. Since unification, Bonn has tried without much success




to come to grips with the use of the German armed forces outside NATO. A lengthy political debate over changing the constitution to allow peacekeeping or even peacemaking missions under the command or authorization of the United Nations has not yet solved the constitutional issue. Even if the debate should end unexpectedly soon, the practical approach to these missions would be slow and very cautious. Finally, the structural changes NATO has approved reflect mainly the drawdown of forces in Europe.<sup>27</sup> Such national realignment of forces will in no way stop the discussion about the purpose of NATO.

To sum up, unification of Germany, and its consequences, have had a major effect on NATO. Three factors will have a long-lasting influence on the alliance. First, the United States and Germany no longer share a primary reason to sustain NATO. Second, the changes and adaptations within the alliance have not stabilized it to a pre-unification level. Third, US force reductions in Europe and the German handling of its policy toward the WEU and Eurocorps have further undermined the alliance.

German unification has not only caused NATO to change, it also has put significant pressure on those seeking acceptable solutions in other areas. To dampen the fears of its neighbors, united Germany is pressing forward with initiatives for greater European integration. This effort has been supported by France and some other European countries, who seek to neutralize Germany's influence by establishing a greater Europe.

France pursues European integration to balance Germany's power in conjunction with another longtime goal: to reduce US influence in European affairs.<sup>28</sup> When President Charles de Gaulle withdrew French forces from NATO's integrated military command structure, France lost considerable influence in the alliance which it has never regained. Trapped by de Gaulle's decision, France has since been unable to restrain US influence in NATO or to strengthen European influence in the alliance. European unification and US military reductions now have provided Paris with an opportunity to escape from the trap. French officials point regularly to the declining US military presence and comment that "the United States is not willing to exert its leadership in Europe"<sup>29</sup> or even more simply that "the big brother is a thing of the past."<sup>30</sup>

The search for European military unity led France and others automatically to revitalize the WEU. Created as a European defense arrangement in 1947, the WEU had never become fully institutionalized, let alone politically meaningful. It coexisted nearly unnoticed with NATO because nobody seemed to care enough to decide to abandon it. Now the WEU has been endowed with all the necessary features to become revitalized and to act as forum for developing the European defense initiative. A charter and organization already exist, which made it unnecessary to start lengthy negotiations. The WEU had coexisted with NATO and lent support to it for decades; a



revitalized WEU would obviously not hurt the NATO alliance. Membership is exclusively European, so it is clearly a European initiative. But as a consequence, Germany and the United States find themselves in an unfavorable situation. The United States realizes that it is difficult to argue against more European defense effort in the framework of an organization which has existed for years alongside NATO.<sup>31</sup> The fact remains, however, that the United States has no institutional voice in the WEU.

Germany is trapped in its own uncomfortable *Mittellage* (middle position) between Europe and the United States. Its relationship to France is key to European integration and stability, and its relationship to the United States is key for its ultimate security.<sup>32</sup> Germany is constantly balancing both positions and trying to bridge the difficult differences between Paris and Washington.<sup>33</sup> The creation of the Eurocorps and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council demonstrate that bridge-building of this sort is difficult and very likely to upset NATO or the WEU, the two organizations seeking to represent European defense interests.

The Eurocorps started as an initiative between Federal Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterrand in October 1991. Both wanted to strengthen European integration, but with different motivations as outlined earlier. This initiative was a complete surprise for the rest of the NATO allies. Elements of the US government quickly turned publicly against the initiative, realizing that Germany would have to commit forces already assigned to NATO if the corps were to have any military significance.<sup>34</sup> Germany's intent was to draw France closer to NATO's integrated military structures by making the corps available to NATO. The Eurocorps would also give France a reason to continue to station troops in Germany after 1994, when stationing based on post-World War II status will end. The initiative was not very well presented to NATO and caused considerable tension within the alliance. These tensions

finally eased when it became clear that the corps would be made available to NATO for defense under the operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.<sup>35</sup> NATO officially endorsed the project in December 1992, and other countries (e.g., Belgium) have since decided to participate.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) started as a US-German initiative in fall 1991 to create a platform for dialogue between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries. The idea was opposed by France, which used the argument that NATO should limit itself to its military mission only.<sup>36</sup> In the final analysis the idea won the support of all other NATO allies and was finally implemented after France gave up its isolated position.<sup>37</sup> The NACC is now an established institution which allows former Warsaw Pact members to discuss cooperation with the NATO alliance as a matter of routine. For some former Pact countries—Poland and Hungary, for example—participation in the NACC could become a preliminary stage to full membership in NATO.

It is not likely that the struggle about dominance in NATO will go away. Unification and the return of full sovereignty to Germany makes Bonn the dominant player vis-à-vis France. With the support of the United States, the outcomes of both of the above issues reflected Germany's position, which was in the interests of NATO and corresponded to the will of the majority of its members. Similar outcomes in the future will require both a strong US position in NATO and close policy coordination with Germany. For the United States the real danger of the WEU is that it might change from being a European pillar in NATO to an alternative to NATO. In contrast to NATO, all of the WEU members share the main motive for the union, that is, European integration. German unification is likely to keep the pressure on for further progress toward an integrated Europe. That limits the time for NATO to find its new identity.

We can see that German unification had a major effect on the security structures of Western Europe. For the United States the main consequences are threefold. First, unification has encouraged the revitalization of the WEU as a European defense organization without direct US influence. Second, the rejuvenated WEU has initiated a challenge to US influence in NATO. Third, there is also a possibility that the European defense initiative might develop into an alternative to NATO.

German unification has put pressure on the political and economic development of Europe through the role of Germany within the European Community, mirroring the strains that have appeared within NATO. Even before unification, West Germany already had the strongest economy in the EC, and East Germany had the strongest and most advanced economy in the Eastern bloc. Unification means a greater Germany with more people, more area, and eventually a much larger economy. The only way to balance the united Germany is through greater European integration. For the EC, "the main problem was

how to build Europe in time for Germany.”<sup>38</sup> There was a fear that as Germany got bigger after 1990, the combination of West German money and East German ties to the former communist countries offered new economic possibilities for Germany which might make it less dependent on the EC.

Germany, for its part, was also interested in speeding up European political and economic integration, mainly to neutralize any uneasy feelings about its unification. The rush toward a more-integrated Europe led to the summit at Maastricht. The pressure for some type of accomplishment by 1992 brought a desperate attempt to take a huge step toward a united Europe. It was overlooked at the time, however, that the prerequisites like synchronized economies were simply not there and that it is crucial for success to prepare the public for important decisions like a common currency. Realities forced the EC to slow the pace and even to accept some setbacks.<sup>39</sup>

Political turmoil then caused the EC to concentrate on internal matters at a time when global events required attention. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks stalled, and the transition of the economies of the former communist countries was not supported in the way those countries (and some Europeans) might have hoped. It is not likely that these problems can be solved in a short time. The subsequent economic turmoil may even require a review of the Maastricht Treaty. This will certainly hamper the EC as it attempts to play a bigger role in world affairs. Hence, the EC itself may be a less predictable and reliable negotiation partner due to increased problems of internal coordination.

The United States has so far no fundamental problems in dealing with the European Community. Bilateral trade is almost balanced.<sup>40</sup> Although there are differences, especially on farm subsidies, the general idea of free trade is agreed and supported. However, the United States has no voice in the EC and can exert only indirect influence in the community through bilateral relations with member states. Germany is considered the most valuable ally in terms of support of the US position in the EC because of Germany’s power base in the community. Increasing European integration, however, will lead to a devaluation of the role recently played by Germany. As is the case with all other member states, Germany will gradually lose its ability to conduct independent policy, especially economic policy. The rank order of interests will most likely put EC interests as number two after national interest. It seems likely that US policy and strategy will be affected adversely as Germany loses the ability and the national will to manage bilateral relations outside of the community.

As in the defense arena, German unification was an event of the first magnitude for the EC. For the United States, the consequences in dealing with the community are threefold. First, the accelerated pace toward unification triggered a crisis which will decrease the EC’s ability to assist the United

States in solving worldwide problems. Second, the pressure for achieving greater integration will remain, leaving the United States with fewer options to influence the EC. Third, the value of Germany as an ally to support US positions in the EC will decrease.

Some of the problems the United States faces in the economic field are caused by Germany's monetary policy following unification. The condition of the East German economy was grossly overestimated. Low unemployment rates and a strong position in the communist world gave a false impression that the way to economic unity would be relatively easy and short. Internal pressures led to an exchange rate of the East-Mark which was far too high compared with its inherent economic value. When the bill for unification was presented, upcoming elections prevented Bonn's ability to raise taxes to pay for it. Germany instead started to borrow money to balance the budget, which caused the *Bundesbank* (the Federal, or Central, Bank) to raise interest rates to fight inflation. This had severe consequences not only in Europe,<sup>41</sup> but also in the United States. It caused the dollar to plunge to an all-time low and slowed the US recovery from a long-term recession. For more than two years Germany withstood international pressure, including from the United States, to lower interest rates. This was seen as the first time that Germany relied on its greater strength to pursue a national interest at the cost of other nations and allies.

Indeed, the economic arena is likely to be one of the principal trouble spots in US-German relations. Although both nations agree on basic issues, such as free trade and a free-market economy, future relations will be difficult when national interests are involved. For the public, especially in the United States, it is hard to understand that an ally which owes the United States so much can also be a tough competitor. However, conditions may well permit the two countries to settle their disagreements through negotiations. The bilateral trade balance is much more favorable than with Japan. Both countries' markets are equally accessible and the investment ratio is about even. It should be possible for both nations to control economic competition to a degree that prevents negative spillovers in their overall relations.

Germany and the United States will nevertheless have to adapt their relations to post-unification realities. A first attempt was President Bush's offer to Germany to be a "partner in leadership." This offer certainly reflects the fact that Germany has increased its physical size, population, and economy. But that does not automatically mean that Germany can fulfill the expectations implicit in a special partnership with the United States. Such an offer requires that the United States define the expected ends and means for such leadership. The outcome of the US elections in 1992 clearly indicated that the American people for the moment support an "America first" policy. Depending on the recovery of the US economy and job market, the new Administration might be able to shift the focus in the second half of President

Clinton's tenure to international matters again. The central task then is to define America's place in a multipolar world and to rank order its priorities.

For Germany, a pause in the pace of events is good, because such an intervening period might help the German people to overcome indecisiveness about the role of a unified Germany in the international arena. The first steps toward a greater role have been taken. Germany has asked for a permanent seat in the UN security council and has started to engage worldwide in humanitarian aid in support of UN efforts. The central question, however, how to employ German armed forces outside NATO in peacekeeping or peacemaking missions, is yet to be decided. This debate has raged for almost two years now, and progress is slow. It will take some time for Germany to come to grips with its new status as a unified sovereign country and learn to use its power to create a national strategy.

Unfortunately, ongoing events do not permit officials to take time out for internal decisionmaking. A striking example where US-German leadership would be of great benefit is in the transition of the former East bloc countries. Both the United States and Germany have a vested interest in stability and progress in that region. A combined effort on the part of both countries would mobilize the best available resources worldwide. Instead, help has been widely uncoordinated and useless debate has occurred over who has contributed more. To be successful, the idea of partners in leadership requires more emphasis and coordination from both sides and a sense for good opportunities to make it happen.

This, then, is the case for the overall US-German relationship. German unification requires both sides to exercise more effort and express new ideas. It also requires adaptations in US security strategy. Concerning NATO, the United States must take into account the inevitable decline of the alliance's importance. The future of NATO will heavily depend on US support for new strategy and on the US contribution to a new military structure, especially one based in Germany. Continued European integration is of great interest for the European NATO partners, above all for Germany. Therefore, European integration must find its place in NATO, for example, by further integrating the WEU into the NATO alliance. Active US support of European integration would better enable Washington to participate in the process of shaping the future of Europe. Part of this participation could be a treaty to regulate cooperation between the United States and the European Community.<sup>42</sup> This would also obviate any need for Germany to choose between Europe and the United States, a very uncomfortable situation that could damage US-German relations.

Such is equally true for US relations with France, the key ally for Germany in achieving a united Europe. A US policy that is at odds with France might force Germany to choose between two friends. Former President Bush's

offer to Germany to be a partner in leadership should be maintained by present and future US administrations. It provides an incentive for Germany to find its new role and to become a positive catalyst for mutual progress. In the economic field both partners have to work constantly to keep tough competition fair and to minimize harmful misunderstandings, which should be manageable when relations have a sound and broad basis.

For over forty years, US-German relations have been a success story. This record of success should motivate both partners to devote the necessary attention to developing constructive ideas which, despite internal problems, will give the friendship a good start into the new millennium.

#### NOTES

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3. Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, *Europe and German Reunification* (New York: St. Martins, 1992), p. 5.
4. Deutsches Auswaertiges Amt, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1990/91* (Bonn: Auswaertiges Amt Referat Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit, 1991), p. 167. Source provides complete text (German version) and facsimile of signature page.
5. Harenberg Lexikon-Verlag, *Aktuell '93 Das Lexikon der Gegenwart* (Dortmund: Harenberg Lexikon-Verlag, 1992), p. 536. Changes of prime ministers: June 1991, Michel Rocard to Edith Cresson; and April 1992 Edith Cresson to Pierre Berezogovoy.
6. Fritsch-Bournazel, p. 81. Speech by President Bush to the NATO council, 4 December 1989: "We all have supported German reunification for four decades."
7. NATO Information Service, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1981), pp. 288-90.
8. Fritsch-Bournazel, 81. Quote and four points taken out of speech by President Bush to the NATO council, 4 December 1989. The Helsinki Final Act was a major step forward to the end of the Cold War era. It guaranteed that all borders in Europe could only be changed by negotiations and peaceful settlements. The former communist countries agreed to opening their societies to a free flow of information, people, and ideas.
9. Moens, op. cit., gives a detailed description of US policy during the process of German unification.
10. Lanxin Xiang, "Is Germany In the West or In Europe?" *Orbis*, 36 (Summer 1992), 417.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 416.
12. Fritsch-Bournazel, p. 99.
13. Landesverteidigungsakademie Wien, *Militaerstrategisches Umwelt- und Konfliktbild(Synopse)* (Wien: Landesverteidigungs akademie des Bundesministeriums fuer Landesverteidigung, 1992). Detailed analysis from the viewpoint of a neutral country with main emphasis on military matters.
14. Christian Tuschhoff, "Neue Sicherheit mit Deutschland," interview by Oliver Schmidt, *Sued-deutsche Zeitung*, 2 December 1992. Tuschhoff sees a direct proportionality between US military presence in Europe and US political influence in the alliance.
15. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, January 1993), p. 7.
16. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, 1991), p. 6.
17. Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Wandel und Aufbruch Bundeswehr-Streitkraefte der Einheit" -33. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr in Leipzig- 12. bis 14. Mai 1992 (Bonn: Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik, May 1992), p. 4.
18. Peter Tarnoff, "America's New Special Relationships," *Foreign Affairs*, 69 (Summer 1990), 73.
19. Ole Wæver, "Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian," *International Affairs*, 66 (July 1990), 488. Wæver characterizes NATO as "the main ticket to Europe" for the United States.
20. Charles W. Corddry, "Another War Won, An Army Regroups," *Army*, May 1992, pp. 24-31. On page 25, the article quotes General Galvin, at that time Supreme Allied Commander Europe, on US commitment in Europe: "A token force won't do. There's too much involved in this. We wouldn't have the

kind of influence we have today in Europe if that what we were talking about were a token. There must be a viable military capability, a competent force." General Saint, at that time Commander in Chief, US Army Europe, is quoted to the same subject (page 30): "If you want to have a say-so as a partner in what happens in Europe, which is of direct importance to the United States, then you'd better stay. If you're not there, then you don't count." This belief is not only shared by soldiers. As Donald Snow phrases it in his book: "The question of commitment in the NATO sense, however, tends to be framed in terms of physical commitment measured in dollars, manpower, and equipment." Donald M. Snow, National Security, *Enduring Problems in a Changing Defense Environment* (New York: St. Martins, 1991), p. 150.

21. John R. Galvin, "Still Vital to U.S. Security," *Defense* 91, July/August 1991, pp. 2-10.

22. Thomas-Durell Young, *The "Normalization" of the Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1 September 1992. Young states in his summary: "The retention of allied forces in the federal republic remains a key objective of Bonn."

23. Rolf Clement, "Gedankenspiele, wie haelt es Clinton mit der US-Aussenpolitik," *Loyal*, 1/93, p. 14.

24. Clyde Farnsworth, "Canadian Troops to Pull Out of Europe by '94," *The New York Times*, 27 February 1992, p. A9.

25. Richard N. Perle, "An American View: NATO's Future, Threats," *The Officer*, January 1993, p. 31.

26. Dirk Sommer, "Im Dilemma, Die Welt brennt an vielen Enden, doch das westliche Buendnis weiss nicht recht, ob und wie es darauf reagieren soll-Eindruecke von der Herbsttagung der NATO-Verteidigungsminister," *Wehrausbildung*, 1 (February-March 1993), 4-6. The article analyzes the problems NATO has in search of a new identity and in facing crisis situations like that in the former Yugoslavia.

27. Wolfram von Raven, "Die Stufenpyramide der Kommandostruktur, eine komplizierte Hierarchie der Einflüsse auf die NATO," *Europäische Sicherheit* (No. 7, 1992), 383-86. The article describes NATO's new command structures and provides background analysis.

28. Heinz Schulte, "Deciphering the Franco-German Partnership," *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 September 1992, p. 6.

29. François Heisbourg, "A French View: Developing a European Identity," *The Officer*, January 1993, p. 29.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

31. Karl Feldmeyer, "Die sicherheitspolitische Rolle Amerikas nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts," *Der mittlere Brief Informationsdienst zur Sicherheitspolitik* (Bonn: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 7. Jahrgang no. 2, 2. Quartal 1992), p. 6. The United States has up to now always supported a Western European defense identity with the aim of an increased burdensharing by the European nations.

32. William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, *Franco-German Security Accommodation: Illusion of Agreement*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 11 January 1993. The study describes in detail the problematic situation for Germany and gives recommendations for US policy.

33. Xiang, p. 420. Xiang suggests that for a viable US strategy, "Washington must encourage Franco-German security cooperation by devolving its own leadership of NATO to Europe."

34. Andrew Denison, *Die Haltung der USA gegenueber dem "Euro-Korps": Akzeptanz oder Ablehnung?* (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung No. 50 October 1992), p. 4. Besides the perceived disadvantages for NATO, the United States was again faced with the fact that each step toward greater European cooperation means a loss of US influence in the region.

35. Karl Feldmeyer, "NATO will Grundlagen fuer friedenswahrende Einsatze erarbeiten," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 December 1992.

36. Alexander Gerry, "With Cold War Over and the USSR No More, NATO Is In a Difficult Transition Phase," *The Officer*, January 1993, p. 27.

37. Frederick Kempe, "U.S., Bonn Clash Over Pact With France," *The Wall Street Journal*, 27 May 1992, p. A9.

38. Wæver, p. 477.

39. For an excellent negative assessment of the current situation in the European Community, see Herbert Kremp's commentary in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), 21 May 1993.

40. Paul Krugmann, *The Age of Diminished Expectations* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), p. 118. Although the US trade with Germany is not balanced, this is not seen as a result of trade barriers or a closed market.

41. Marc Levinson, "Europe in Pieces," *Newsweek*, 28 September 1992, pp. 24-26. The imbalances in the monetary system put enormous pressure on some currencies, like the British Pound, and caused several countries to leave Europe's exchange-rate system.

42. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 November 1992. The idea of an overall treaty between the United States and the EC is favored in Bonn and was suggested publicly by Chancellor Kohl.