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**EGYPT:
SECURITY, POLITICAL,
AND ISLAMIST CHALLENGES**

Sherifa Zuhur

September 2007

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
FOREWORD

Egypt is a major power and political force in the Middle East, as well as a recipient of significant amounts of U.S. aid for military and economic purposes. It is triply important to American interests in the region as a participant in an important peace treaty and accords with Israel, in the ongoing Global War on Terror, and in its own transition to a more democratic and prosperous nation.

In this monograph, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur argues that the Egyptian government's efforts to retain tight control over the political landscape is impeding the democratization process. In the name of antiterrorism, these efforts may not put an end to sporadic outbreaks of militant violence which reemerged after the 1999 truce with the larger of these radical groups. The long-protested official state of emergency which grants the Egyptian government extraordinary powers has been extended, and that action required constitutional amendments which were recently approved by referendum. These will be bolstered by a new antiterrorism law. The political opposition has protested these actions, which undo some of the progress previously made with judicial supervision of elections, and prohibit the largest Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, from transitioning into a legal political party. As a background for understanding these events, Dr. Zuhur explains the nature of problems inherent in Egypt's political and economic development, and how these relate to the various militant Islamist movements emerging within it. This explanation and the current dilemma challenge some of the typical recommendations that are seen in

discussions of the “failing” or “failed state” models.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr." in a cursive script.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

SUMMARY

This monograph approaches three issues in contemporary Egypt: failures of governance and political development, the continued strength of Islamism, and counterterrorism. It is easier to tackle their contours in Egypt if they are considered separately. They are not, however, separate or independent; continuing to treat them as mutually exclusive conditions will lead to further crisis down the road.

Egyptian failures of governance have taken place through three eras: monarchy and the liberal experiment, the period of Arab socialism, and Egypt's reopening to the West under Presidents Sadat and Mubarak. In combination with a large military and security establishment in Egypt, these failures meant a continuing authoritarian government has served and used its military and security apparatuses to block significant political transformation. The failures of governance provide grievances for Islamist militants and moderates, and also for many ordinary Egyptians, and inhibit the growth of political or civic maturity.

The Egyptian government forged a truce with its most troublesome Islamist militants in 1999. However, violence emerged again from new sources of Islamist militancy from 2003 into 2006. All of the previously held conclusions about the role of state strength versus movements that led to the truce are now void as it appears that "Al-Qa'idism" may continue to plague Egypt, and indeed, the region as a whole. In consequence, an important process of political liberalization was slowed, and in 3 to 4 years, if not sooner, Egypt's political security and stability will be at risk. Widespread economic and political discontent

might push that date forward. In addition, continuing popular support for moderate Islamism could lead to a situation where the current peace could erode, unless a comprehensive peace settlement to the Palestinian-Arab-Israeli conflict is achieved and if various other factors were to come into play.

Observations for the future and recommendations made in this monograph include the following ideas:

1. U.S. policymakers can expect to see the continued emergence of radical Islamist elements in Egypt due to the regional spread of jihadist ideology, failures of governance, repression and injustice in counterterrorist measures, and antipathy to Western and Israeli policies.
2. Economic progress is being made in Egypt, but more needs to be done to ensure the stability of the population.
3. Policymakers need to acknowledge the strength of Islamism in Egypt and consider that the legalization and inclusion of moderate Islamists—a trend in Iraq—may inhibit radical Islamists as well as popular disaffection.
4. While the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is committed to justice for the Palestinians, the organization as a whole has shifted on many other issues. It would be unwise to support governmental attacks on this group simply on the basis of this issue, or to promote democratization only if it excludes Islamist actors.
5. Policymakers should realize that Egypt will come to a political turning point by 2011, if not sooner.
6. U.S. policymakers need to educate themselves about the second effects of Egypt's economic

transformation and development plans. They should encourage the Egyptian government to reform public education and health-care more thoroughly and establish a means for citizens to participate in consensual community-based decisions. A more civic-minded culture needs to be created.

7. U.S. policymakers should insist that the Egyptian government ensure the political and human rights of citizens, ending the use of torture, extra-legal physical abuse, and irregular detentions, and reinstate judicial oversight of the electoral process. The mistreatment of the political opposition, prisoners, and the electoral violence and irregularities of the last several elections have no place in a free and democratic Egypt.
8. U.S. policymakers should be aware of Egyptians' distaste for American views expressed about Islam and Muslims in the "war of ideas." Treating Egyptian Muslims as if they are the source of the war on terror instead of an ally in that war is counterproductive.
9. Egyptians should not be excluded nor shut themselves out of the discussions on counterterrorism and the future of the Middle East, which take place on the American policymaking stage.
10. U.S. policymakers should consider the 2006 critique of U.S. military aid given to Egypt and the demands for political reform and cessation of support to Gazan militants in a 2007 congressional bill attached to a portion—\$200 million—of that aid. The large size of the

security forces in Egypt (at 1 million persons), in combination with the military and its political economy, requires frequent review, particularly in tandem with an understanding of Egypt's regional foreign policy. The attempt to tie military aid to Egypt's internal policies angered Egyptian officials. A new ten-year military assistance plan was announced at the end of July 2007. The linkage of aid to reform could, however, resurface in the future.

EGYPT: SECURITY, POLITICAL, AND ISLAMIST CHALLENGES

INTRODUCTION

Overview.

This monograph addresses three issues in contemporary Egypt: failures of governance and political development, the continued strength of Islamism, and counterterrorism. It is easier to tackle their contours in Egypt if they are considered separately. They are not, however, separate or independent; continuing to treat them as mutually exclusive conditions will lead to further crisis down the road.

The Egyptian government forged a truce with its most troublesome Islamist militants in 1999. However, violence emerged again from new sources of Islamist militancy from 2003 into 2006. All of the previously held conclusions about the role of state strength versus movements that led to the truce are now void as it appears that "al-Qa'idism" may continue to plague the country or, indeed, the region as a whole. In consequence, an important process of political liberalization was slowed, and in 3 to 4 years, if not earlier, Egypt's political security and stability will be at risk. Widespread economic and political discontent might push that date forward. In addition, continuing popular support for moderate Islamism could lead to a situation where the current peace could erode if a comprehensive peace settlement to the Palestinian-Arab-Israeli conflict is achieved, and if various other factors were to come into play.

A glossary of terms that may be unfamiliar to the reader is located at the end of this monograph, following a list of references.

Egypt's Visibility in the New Middle East.

Only by examining what American policymakers, and more generally Americans, do not know, can we begin to explain the need for concern about Egypt. In particular, we must explain why Americans should be so concerned when the country is nearly invisible in the American media but for reruns of "The Mummy" and occasional footage of the Great Pyramids of Giza.

Egypt's political development and stability in the context of the global war on terror (GWOT) and the Arab-Israeli conflict should concern U.S. policymakers as well as ordinary Americans today, and in the future. At a minimum, the reemergence of Islamist radicalism in Egypt and the stability and future of the regime should be considered. President Husni Mubarak, who is 79 years old and serving his fifth term as President, is not expected to run for that office in 2011. It is no longer clear that a large number of Egyptians will passively accept a successor put forward by Mubarak, or even the military, from whose ranks all presidents have been drawn since the end of the monarchy in 1952.

This invisibility is not the case within the Middle East, where the regional Arabic press, and thus the Arab people, take note of events in Egypt. For instance, regional viewers saw footage on and read editorials about the strikes and labor demonstrations occurring since December 2006; the unprecedented attacks on women in the streets at the `Id al-Fitr (the celebration at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan) in October

2006; Egyptian judges protesting; Muslim Brotherhood followers protesting; voters protesting; the Islamist extremist attacks at Sinai peninsula resorts; and the emergence of the political movement known as Kifaya (literally meaning, "enough!"). Americans did not view these scenes, and while policymakers may have been aware through other reporting, they were not confronted with, and therefore influenced by, media coverage.

Many Americans know that Saudi Arabians were among the September 11, 2001 (9/11), hijackers. It might not be as recognized though that the 9/11 organizer, Muhammad Atta, was an Egyptian, as is al-Qa'ida's main spokesman, Ayman al-Zawahiri. If this is all that is really known about Egypt's connections with militance, then Americans would benefit from a more detailed understanding of this Muslim, Arab, and African country in which radical Islamism emerged, retracted, and reappeared, where poverty coexists with energetic entrepreneurship and where the "NGOization" of social enterprises colors perceptions about globalization.

Egypt as a Security Concern.

U.S. policymakers should have specific concerns about Egypt for the following reasons. First, the security risks inherent in contemporary Egypt include threats to its internal stability, to Israel despite a peace treaty, to other Middle Eastern states, and possibly to its neighbor to the south, the Sudan.

Second, the country has been held up as an example of a "failed state" or a potential "failing state." Egypt specialists have argued that this is an inappropriate extension of the "failed state" model; that it better

suits the conditions of a country like Afghanistan. However, the aspect of failing states that is central to the U.S. GWOT doctrine is that the conditions of “failure,” whether ungovernability, absence of government, or poor government, lead to the development of terrorist groups, and indeed, a militant strand of Islamism evolved in Egypt. I contend that developmental problems and poor government are important to the growth of Islamic militance, but are not the sole reasons for its emergence. In the discussion below of these movements and the Egyptian government’s response, this should become more evident.

FAILING, OR FAILED?

Literature on “failed states” is not, for the most part, the production of Egypt or Middle East specialists or coming from within the Arab or Muslim world, with the exception of militant Islamic jihadists, who indeed regard their own Muslim governments as having failed in their Islamic duties. Within the works of regional specialists, the notion of a “failed state” is replaced by a different, extensive literature on political and socioeconomic development. That is because Egypt, with its gigantic bureaucracy, large population, and multiple development problems, has never failed in the sense of actually ceasing to exist, or erupting in a full-blown revolution. The 1919 Revolution was more precisely a popular protest, and the 1952 “Glorious” Revolution, a military coup. Instead of crashing to a halt, everything connected with the state bureaucracy lumbers on, while outside of its purview, things rush chaotically forward, like traffic.

Any predictability within this chaos, its black humor, perennial hope, and the complex manner in

which political events and influence take place are obscured if the contemporary Western model of the failed state is applied. Failure in this predominantly governmental and non-academic Western construct would argue, just as the scholarly political development construct does, that Egypt's unsuccessful distributive and planning functions, and its stunted political participatory features are promoting unrest, and that despite a huge security force structure, sanctuary remains for terrorists. This does not mean the West is perfect, or that Egypt lacks any democratic potential. Certainly the poor in America have long been aware that American distributive functions need better oiling, and Hurricane Katrina might have alerted other more comfortable Americans to this fact. Still, Egypt is far from an ideal model for other Middle Eastern governments, particularly in its distributive failures, but also in other aspects of governance.

The failed state notion is mostly significant in providing an explanation for terrorism, specifically Islamist terrorism, in turn encompassing terrorists and al-Qa'ida members who came from Egypt, as well as the Islamist violence that emerged from the 1970s to 1999, and sporadic violence since 2003. Many who adhere to the failed state thesis also acknowledge the evolution of Islamic radicalism and terrorism into a global jihad. That occasional radicalism and terrorism predated the contemporary Islamist movement (indeed, it dates back for centuries) is not considered too frequently. It may be attributed to a perennially militant strand of Islamism, or in a particularly damaging manner to some underlying flaws in Islam, the religion, or Islamic culture or civilization.¹ Islamism and Islamist militance has been developing in a wide variety of social and economic settings, including England, France,

Germany, and elsewhere. We might want to carefully examine ideological as well as material causes for events, and then keep track of the strategic evolution in such diasporic groups. Further, as will be made clear, such militance is not the only obstacle to political and socioeconomic development in Egypt. However, it is certainly true that better governance, distribution, planning, and enhanced political participation are desirable in and of themselves. Their realization should lead to a situation where opposition elements are less likely to resort to the tactics of terrorism, especially if we see increased liberty, political participation, and enhanced democratic and civic values.

A varying definition of failure comes when a state, as I. William Zartman suggests, either (a) cannot provide security or services to its citizens, or (b) no longer performs its basic functions.² There may not, however, be agreement on what the basic functions of the state are, or who they should serve. A state may only need to provide security and services to some of its citizens or some of the time. A much more complex model for understanding states came out of the earlier comparative politics literature³ in which one key component was the legitimacy of a regime. These ideas placed a strong emphasis on the building of political institutions that would enhance broader political participation. In countries like Egypt (or Syria), representation of the common people (the *sha`b* or *`amma*), greater social and economic equality, and "mass participation" were goals of the Arab socialist state. By the yardstick of American political sociology, that type of participation did not lead to legitimacy since it was strictly controlled by the state itself. Egypt has been "in transition" ever since the era of Arab socialism's emergence, the 1960s. However,

that transition was held hostage to the other perennial function of a state, “providing security” – in this case for the regime, more than the people of the nation.

Opposition movements almost always emerge through currents of attraction (pull factors) and the repelling, discouraging, or repressive nature of their alternative – the state. In addition to state failure (a push factor) in Egypt and the ideological attractions of activist jihad (the pull factor), there is another variable that explains how jihadist movements grew and then were contained, only to reappear. This additional variable is the state’s response to challenges from both Islamist moderates and militants. In Egypt, the energetic governmental repression of Islamists, their families, and often their communities in turn provoked a militant response, in some cases from those not previously disposed to militant action.⁴ For example, in Upper Egypt, a thoroughly underdeveloped and impoverished region, state-sanctioned violence created a *tha`r* (revenge) cycle between Islamists and police, similar to Sunni-Shi`i violence in Iraq from February 2006.⁵ More recently, Egyptian and European-based analysts have traced the Sinai attacks of 2004-06 to rampant repression of the Bedouin combined with their earlier underdevelopment and alienation.⁶

DEMOCRACY

In 2005, President Bush declared, “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.” These words appeared to support a more genuine democratization process in the Middle East; a transformation intended to deny shelter to terrorism,

and one that would inspire a new sense of entitlement and self-investment of citizens in the region. Democratization has long been a feature of U.S. policy in the Middle East. It was expressed differently for many years not only by the U.S. Government, but by other institutions as the aim to create “liberalism” in a political, economic, and ideological sense. However, President Bush had already newly prioritized democratization in his first term’s Middle East policy.⁷ The region as a whole was abuzz with the debates about “enforced democratization,” “democracy through the barrel of a gun,” “indigenous democracy,” “gradual democracy,” and so on. American democracy promotion, both in the past decades of U.S.-Egyptian relations and in the democratization program since 2005, has experienced some real problems in perception, substance, and efficacy. As Daniel Brumberg has pointed out, the hopeful official discourse of democratization in 2003 did not necessarily reflect our actual policies. For at least a decade, U.S. democracy aid programs have more often “sustained rather than undermined liberalized autocracy,” because of their formulation and bottom-up strategies.⁸ When programs fund or interact with small groups at the level of “civil society,” meaning in Egypt nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which tend to be pro-democracy in outlook to begin with, they are typically not converting people to a new way of thinking about their government. Similar NGOs run into problems with the Egyptian Security Services, which have a role in NGO registration and monitoring. And finally, by definition, this type of program is not engaged in reforms of governmental structure or procedures. Brumberg observes that the liberalization of autocracies in the Middle East, which is occurring for reasons that go beyond U.S. stimulation, has stymied, rather than forwarded democracy.⁹

THE "NEW MIDDLE EAST" AND ANTI-AMERICANISM

It should also be noted that anti-Americanism has increased in Egypt ever since the televised bombardments of Afghanistan along with the Taliban government as a response to the events of 9/11. Egyptians, like many in the region, were very concerned by declarations made about the War on Terror that appear to target Muslims and their beliefs, and that anxiety was heightened by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. President Mubarak opposed the plan to conquer Iraq and replace Saddam Hussein's government because he believed it would enrage radical militants in the region, and he went so far as to say it would create "100 bin Ladins."¹⁰ Many Egyptians, like many Muslims in the broader Islamic world, find confirmation in the media and in events in the region that the U.S.-declared War on Terror is, in their view, a War on Islam. Most were shocked and distressed by the events of 9/11. They absolutely do not want militants to overtake their streets and jeopardize their businesses and incomes. Most do not want the outlawing of alternate Egyptian ideas, books, or cultural production like the Taliban did. Still, following 9/11, many Egyptians were deeply troubled by the destruction and loss of civilian life in Afghanistan, and then horrified by the large number of civilian deaths and sectarian strife in Iraq. Populism and Muslim values mean an identification with the poor and hapless bystanders who were, it seemed to many in the region, pawns in a global campaign that went far beyond avenging 9/11.

In addition, the idea that Islam by itself generates violence has been a long-standing Western theme in literature and the study of the Muslim world, dating

back to the medieval era. The heightened, or more frequent, efforts to equate “terrorists” with Muslims, particularly those unpopular to the United States whether in their political stance toward Israel or their rejection of an American presence in Iraq, have stirred up the ire of many Egyptians. Whether it was the Western reaction to the incidents over the Danish cartoons that mocked the Prophet Muhammad and the riots that ensued in the Muslim world; or the statements made by Pope Benedict XVI that misinterpreted, erred, or oversimplified Quranic pronouncements and Muslim teachings;¹¹ or other events, the general impression in Egypt is that the negative trend in Western-Islamic relations is intensified by policies emerging from the GWOT campaign.

Similarly, there is antipathy to the American project of democratizing the Middle East. Extreme anger at the “arrogance” of American-mandated democratization was expressed in 2003.¹² Others who support President Mubarak were puzzled by some official statements and asked why the United States, which had been firmly supported by their president, should now appear to be withdrawing support from the Egyptian government. Spokespersons for the Egyptian government took the position that Bush was not really critiquing Egypt; rather the region should follow in Egypt’s footsteps in gradual democratization. Foreign Minister Ahmad Mahir nonetheless observed that even undergraduates know that democracy refers to self-representation, which by definition cannot be imposed from without.¹³ Over the last 2 years, the United States has appeared to back down from any strident calls for democratization and continued its strong support of the existing government, although slapping its wrist lightly for not more thoroughly opening the electoral process.

The Egyptian regime has made the most minimal of compromises; the dominant political party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), has drawn up its own plan to create political reforms and yet retain as much of its own power as possible. Under the leadership of the President's son, Gamal, the party actually blocks a true transition to democracy, at precisely the same time as it claims to be enacting it.

Roadblocks to Democracy in Egypt.

Meanwhile, for those who believe that increasing liberty (even a little) will decrease terrorism – certainly one aspect of the “failed state” model – Egypt simply has not become more “free.”¹⁴ One reason was that a new flurry of violence by small, new, or heretofore unknown extremists had to be dealt with, and the president refused to do away with the emergency law that empowers the security establishment. Another obstacle is the complex, unwieldy nature of the bureaucracy and the equally complex way in which privatization efforts benefit some Egyptians through rampant corruption. Other U.S. and Egyptian multinational donors support privatization, in contrast to some of the sharpest Egyptian economic critiques of the Mubarak government's performance which show that the economic changes in the country are not benefiting its people. Even supporters of privatization express numerous cautions and caveats about the way it is being enacted.¹⁵ Lack of political development also produced long-standing forms of corruption and expectations of votes for politicians in exchange for patronage, a kind of informal distribution system. These aspects of life in Egypt, along with the bribes necessary in an underpaid bureaucracy, have contributed to the

growth of an entire “second” and informal economic and political, even cultural space.¹⁶

What is important is that the government’s sluggishness to open and alter the system is now more vociferously protested by a larger number of people than in the past. That may possibly mean a larger potential for violence. Due to the perennial characterization of Egyptians as being jocular and nonviolent, or the more accurate observation that violence gets in the way of making a living, and that the large military and security services would probably not support a wave of political violence, one has to be cautious in making such predictions, but indeed, it does seem that the political mood is now different. This new wave of popular discontent ties in with Egypt’s tradition of populist discourse which repeatedly emerged in the official and unofficial descriptions of the 1919 Revolution against the British; then the 1952 Revolution, the coup that ended the monarchy of King Faruq II; in the massive demonstration against Nasir’s resignation in 1967; in the riots against the dropping of subsidies in 1977; in the Central Security Forces rebellion in 1967 (also for economic reasons); and the popular discontent shown since 2004-05 over political issues.

In the last 5 years, during which the discussion of a “New Middle East” has been the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy, a new round of sporadic Islamist violence disrupted the tourist industry in Egypt. It shook the complacency and certainty that Egypt’s 1999 truce with major Islamist groups, the Gama`at Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, had solved the country’s crisis with terrorism, and that 9/11 was an aberration, or an act by terrorists that Egypt had expelled. How Egypt will cope with a continuing sporadic jihadi challenge,

if it continues in that country, speaks to the future of the Long War.

EGYPT'S SIGNIFICANCE IN THE REGION

Egypt's population of more than 78,877,000 in 2006 (estimated by the Central Intelligence Agency at 80,335,036 for 2007, including those abroad) is more than one-quarter of the entire population of the Middle East. The country's ancient history and strong influence on the region is usually attributed to the productivity of the Nile River valley. Egypt's agricultural production of cotton, along with its strategic importance since the building of the Suez Canal, explained Great Britain's economic and political interests in the country. These interests persisted after Egypt's nominal independence in 1922, beyond a hard won treaty with the British in 1936, and an expected exodus from the Canal Zone in 1949. While the British actually hoped for a pliant leader in Gamal abd al-Nasir to delay their withdrawal, he was not their man. A series of events that drove a political wedge between the United States and Egypt led to Nasir's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Britain then plotted with France and Israel, expecting that a three-pronged attack on the country would bring down Nasir's government. Instead, the Suez War of 1956 greatly enhanced Nasir's popularity in the region, allowing him to promote ideas of Arab unity and nationalism while accepting military and economic aid from the Soviet bloc. That further blackened (or "reddened") Egypt's image into something of an "enemy state" in the Eisenhower-Dulles era. As the United States promoted the Baghdad Pact to further its interests in the area, Nasir railed against it. His

influence over much of the Arab region was very pronounced until the 1967 war with Israel. Therefore many identified with Nasirist themes—Arab unity, pride in Arab identity, Arab socialism and the intent to move the disenfranchised out of a feudal past.

Egypt's intellectual impact on the broader Islamic world was once again demonstrated as the *sahwa*, the Islamic awakening or revival, emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to the military defeat by Israel, and in response to the failures of secular nationalist parties and Arab nationalism as a political force (rather than merely a locus for identity). While a large number of figures could be mentioned, examples of both moderate and radical Islamist influences coming from Egypt that have greatly affected the Muslim or Arab worlds include Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928; Sayyid Qutb, a Muslim Brotherhood leader executed in prison in 1966 by President Nasir; Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group, the organization that assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat, whose tract, *al-Farida al-Gha'iba* (The Missing Duty), which promoted militant jihad, had a strong influence on other Islamist organizations; Ayman al-Zawahiri, Egyptian militant and "number two" man to Usama bin Ladin; and the more moderate Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an exiled Muslim Brotherhood shaykh whose popular television program on Qatar's Al-Jazeera channel has given him a huge audience (like Amr Khaled, an Islamist televangelist who is not a cleric but promotes a modern, "relevant" Islam "of the heart").

The Islamist awakening in Egypt is not restricted to the political opposition, or what we could call "political Islam." It has its proponents among ordinary citizens, teachers, professionals, government employees, and

members of the military. It has not indelibly colored the broader Islamist movement with an Egyptian style, however, because of the simultaneous development and popularity of other *salafi* or purist movements, whether coming from Saudi Arabia, or Jordan, or the Shi'i Islamist influence of Iran, the Iraqi organizations, or Hizbullah.

THE MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES

Egypt is also important to the United States because of its military strength. With a force of 450,000 active troops in addition to reserves, and paramilitary forces estimated from 405,000 up to one million depending on the source, Egypt is a major military player in the region. The country's paramilitary strength solidifies regime stability, while its potential military strength makes it one of the keys to any eventual achievement of a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab states. From 1999 to 2005, Egypt spent about half its Foreign Military Financing funds on equipment such as F-16 aircraft, *Apache* helicopters, and M1A1 tanks. Egyptian and American officials, in defending the Foreign Military Financing for Egypt, have given other examples of Egyptian support for U.S. goals, including the training of 250 Iraqi police and 25 Iraqi diplomats in 2005, the deployment of 800 military personnel to the Darfur area of the Sudan in 2004, the deployment of medical and military hospital staff to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan from 2003-05, expedited transit of 861 U.S. naval vessels through the Suez Canal and security support for these ships from 2003-05, and over-flight permission to 36,553 U.S. military aircraft from Egyptian airspace from 2001-05.¹⁷

In addition to the U.S. military troops deployed to Egypt for the biannual exercise Bright Star, there

are usually about 600 U.S. troops stationed at the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) bases at North Camp in the northern Sinai peninsula at al-Gurah, about 25 kilometers from the Israeli border, and South Camp at Sharm al-Shaykh at the southern end of the Sinai between Sharm al-Shaykh and Naama Bay, with about 30 monitoring stations in between to make certain there are no violations by Egyptian or Israeli forces, and also to ensure the navigability of the Straits of Tiran. The MFO, with troops from 10 countries, was created in 1979 after the 1978 Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979, and was set up in 1982.¹⁸ The MFO have been attacked twice in outbreaks of Islamist violence in the Sinai, which leads to questions about the vulnerability of U.S. or other foreign forces in the country.

As for Egypt's own forces, there are questions about the modernization of its military and the interoperability that could be achieved between the United States and Egypt. Egypt's own force differs greatly from that of the United States due to its required, rather than voluntary, nature. Also, the size of the military and paramilitary should raise some concerns. As one of the largest employers in Egypt, the military has benefited from, yet inhibited political and economic transformation in certain ways. Robert Springborg wrote about the military's growth in arms production and also in nonmilitary production in the late 1980s. The metamorphosis of the military into producer as well as employer is now an important chunk of the economy, and helps to assure the loyalties of the military to the government and the dominant party, the NDP. One of Egypt's most important arms customers in the 1980s was Saddam Hussein of Iraq;¹⁹ these sales were encouraged by the United States,

which at the time supported Iraq in its war with Iran. A controversial aspect of the military-nonmilitary production concerned the redirection of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funds of \$200 million to be directed to General Motors in a deal with NASCO signed in 1986. The deal, which the military hoped would establish an engine plant, required steering by then Minister of Defense Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala. The military also moved into food production, and to that end land reclamation, with the military ultimately favoring sales and transfers into the private sector, which support the ongoing patronage system funding the semi-civilian-military complex. Retired military and key business leaders similarly appropriated touristic and construction efforts. Such profit-seeking endeavors went far beyond new planned developments of housing for military and police in various parts of the capital. Interestingly, as tensions rose with the more militant Islamist groups as well as the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood in this period, the military leadership separated itself from the repressive policies of the Interior Ministry under Zaki Badr.²⁰ This protected the military, at least to a degree, in the eyes of the general population. The situation has not changed fundamentally in the intervening years—that is to say, one obstacle to any democratization shifting power away from the NDP lies with the military leadership and the civilian-military productive complex.

The security services are often referred to as the State Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), or Amn al-Dawla. They ensure the security of the state, provide intelligence, and have a stake in protecting the NDP's interests, so long as the dominance of that party is directly tied to the fortunes of the government.

While at one time, in 1973, the Egyptian military was estimated at one million and is now greatly reduced, the security forces have grown to an estimated one million members.²¹ The entire apparatus encompasses the General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI, or Mubahath al-Dawla) under the Ministry of Interior, which principally deals with matters of internal security; the Mukhabarat al-`Amma under the President, and the Mukhabarat al-Khabiya, military intelligence under the Ministry of Defense, which also provide intelligence. In addition, the security apparatus operates special courts that hear cases related to national security threats tried under both the criminal code and other types of cases under emergency laws. These may be referred to as either National Security Courts, or the Supreme State Security Courts (Mahkamat Amn al-Dawla al-`Ulya).

Since the Nasir era, the security forces have held a controversial political role in ensuring state control over dissent and opposition. Security forces also have played a strong role in other authoritarian Arab states (such as Iraq, Syria, and Jordan), but in Egypt they are far more important than the police. In Egypt, under different Ministers of the Interior, the tactics of the security services have varied. In their unleashing to more vigorously combat the Islamist threat in the 1990s, they also demonstrated brutality and determination to control civil society actors, namely NGOs working toward democratization, or which were trying to document human rights abuses of various types.

AID, NEED, AND VIOLENCE IN A "FAILING STATE"

Israel has received \$3 billion per year from the

United States. Now it will receive \$30 billion in a new ten-year military assistance agreement. The United States has in the past provided Egypt with more aid than that given to any other country with the exception of Israel. Until a reduction in aid began, Egypt was receiving an estimated \$1.3 billion in military aid and an additional amount, which in 2006 was \$495 million, tied to economic reforms. The overall plan for aid distributed through USAID for 2004-06 is shown in Table 1. The economic aid is to support the country's needs, but does not represent the total of those needs by any means. In addition, Egypt saw a substantial amount of its debt reduced as a trade-off for participation in the 1991 Gulf War.

Objectives	SO Number	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006
Creating Jobs through Trade and Investment	263-016	472,340	428,309	426,500
Infrastructure	263-018	7,400	2,000	1,100
Environment and Natural Resources Management	263-019	9,940		
Healthier, Planned Families	263-020	29,230	26,900	17,200
Democracy and Governance	263-021	37,050	34,900	25,400
Improved Basic Education	263-022	15,648	38,611	24,800
Total (in thousands of dollars)		571,608	530,720	495,000

Source: USAID, Egypt. Budget Summary. See www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ane/pdf/eg263-022.pdf.

Table 1. USAID for 2004-06.

The hefty (although reduced in recent years) U.S. military aid is intended to improve the capability of the Egyptian army. Some of it was used to upgrade or replace obsolete Soviet-made weaponry, aircraft, and vessels. Other elements support training and an important biannual multinational exercise, Bright Star.

The military financing program was studied by the U.S. Government Accountability Office in a report to the Committee on International Relations in the House of Representatives. Strong criticism for the military financing program to Egypt came from Congressional Representative Tom Lantos, who stated that there is no evidence that Egypt has actually transformed its force into the type of modernized, better-performing security instrument as intended, despite the high cost of the program. The report itself found that the assessment of this program shows that Egypt supports U.S. interests, including access to the Suez Canal and to Egyptian airspace, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace. However, the actual definitions of modernization and interoperability of the force are neither in place, nor is there an assessment of progress towards these goals by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) or the Department of Defense (DoD).²²

Nevertheless, this effort, as other previous and a more recent (2007) attempts to reduce or change the terms of this aid to Egypt, has been resisted by the DOS and the White House. The testimony given to Congress is useful in understanding the issue and how aid is actually being linked to U.S. encouragement of political reform, if we consider these remarks by former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt David Welch, now the head of Near Eastern Affairs at the Department of State:

. . . overall we have seen progress toward a more democratic society in Egypt and we strongly believe that U.S. aid to Egypt should continue. Egyptians themselves—from our government interlocutors to the democracy activists who have courageously taken to the streets—want a process of reform. We believe that it is in the U.S. national interest for us to remain involved and partnered with Egypt in what will be a generational

challenge. With a new generation of leadership preparing to emerge in Egypt, it is critical to American interests and to the lives of ordinary Egyptians, that the United States remain fully engaged in this crucial partnership.²³

The most recent congressional effort calls for withholding \$200 million of military aid until Egypt curbs police abuses, reforms its judicial system, and prevents weapons smuggling to Gaza. However, the U.S. Secretary of State promised a new ten-year \$13 billion military assistance agreement to Egypt (after this monograph was written).

Development and Violence.

Egypt's defense spending and losses in the wars with Israel, as well as serious failures in its economic development and planning (the partial implementation of socialism), left it a poor country. What is more difficult to grasp since it is so rarely discussed is the link between economic/political underdevelopment and an undercurrent of discontent and violence unconnected to the Islamist variety. Many national or local struggles, as well as most arguments and vendettas, boil down to matters of money and the need for it. Timothy Mitchell has described this legacy of violence in Egypt over economic gain and need, which has been covered over by a literature that glorified modernization and technocratic development which supposedly began in the 1960s and should have greatly improved the lives of Egyptians in Mubarak's Egypt today. Mitchell writes about the ways that large landowners utilized violence to control their peasantry, especially the growing number of landless peasants, or to gain the lands of others, using torture and even murder to create a "culture of fear."²⁴ That culture persisted as the party

that claimed to represent the masses, the Arab Socialist Union, took on a land reform policy, hoping to divert attention from ongoing popular demonstrations, marches, and protests against the government as the rural poor suffered economically.²⁵ Land reform, however, was abandoned after the 1967 war, meaning that many of the rural-based elites returned to their lands, supporting the state political structure and ensuring continuing distrust by the peasants. All of the promises made to these “people” were then overturned in the next decades of economic planning.

Economic Standing.

While no longer at the fourth-world rung of poverty, the economic situation is still very grim for the majority of Egyptians in terms of employment, housing, savings, and health services; worse than is admitted in national statistics and in business updates. Of the total, the urban population is 43 percent (rural 57 percent), and the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita appears variously as \$3,810 (Freedom House), \$4,000 (*CIA World Factbook*), and \$3,700 (the *Economist*). This puts Egypt behind Jordan’s economic indicators, but ahead of Syria or Indonesia. However, averaging may not provide the most accurate picture of the limited opportunities afforded those without what is called a “foreign language education” – meaning matriculation from institutions outside of the national system, which allows for better jobs and more income. The undercurrent of violent discontent in the country has economic as well as political roots, and this takes on a cultural coloring as well.

SUBSIDIES

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and USAID became quite involved in economic planning in Egypt during the Sadat years (1970-81). These agencies have long argued that Egypt should phase out its subsidies (food subsidies include bread and wheat flour at reduced prices for all, and cooking oil and sugar by ration card; in addition to tea and fuel),²⁶ privatize state enterprises, and create an atmosphere more conducive for foreign investment. These are vestiges of the never-fully implemented and unsuccessful state-led Arab socialism of the Nasir era. Egypt's subsidies are quite expensive. External critiques note for instance that subsidizing bread – a crucial part of the program – is expensive, and one reason is that it deflates prices on bread for people who could afford to pay more, as well as those who cannot. However, there is a psychological factor in place when a relatively cheap staple that can allay hunger is threatened. The country has struggled to achieve various goals in meeting external World Bank and IMF suggestions in reducing subsidies, but without public assistance and certain types of cost controls (housing, rents, and taxes), the extremely poor and the great numbers of near-poor would not survive.

Thus transition to a privatized system in which a free market sparks price increases has also been perilous to public security. In comparison to the closed economy that predated the "Economic Opening" in which the subsidy system first began, the Economic Opening (*infitah*) initiated in 1974 under President Sadat made a wide variety of products available in Egypt to those who could afford them. The protective tariffs in place under Nasir decreased under Sadat, as a part of this

economic liberalism. The problem is that those of lower incomes cannot afford the new goods, yet some of their consumption patterns have irrevocably changed.

The new liberalist order, to many Egyptians, reinforces the analysis of neo-imperialism that the left had emphasized, and which has been adopted to some degree by Islamists and an Islamic Left. However, these groups promote Islamism rather than socialism as the solution to the distortions in society.

Some economists complain that the progress claimed by the Mubarak regime has been mostly a case of “smoke and mirrors” or falsified success stories.²⁷ These were preceded by false development myths, i.e., Egypt’s overpopulation and lack of food. As Timothy Mitchell points out, nearly every written treatment of Egypt speaks of a large population on “too little land” – the Nile Valley – but he suggests that overpopulation was not really the problem in the 1970s and early 1980s. Nor was lack of food, although a shift in types of food, its importation, and distribution throughout society was an issue.²⁸ Others have shown that in opening the economy, the rise in consumerism has been detrimental to Egyptian values, promoting Westernization and heightening anxiety, even for those doing relatively well.²⁹ The accomplishments of the so-called “Dream Team,” (Minister of Investment Mahmud Muhieddin, Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry Rashid Muhammad Rashid, and Minister of Finance Yusuf Boutros-Ghali) have benefited foreign investors, but not necessarily poorer Egyptians. Simply put, new elites and other wealthy groups are doing exceedingly well, the middle class that depended on fixed salaries has suffered, and the poor are still poor, while some groups had benefited from the new economic rules (the *infitahiyun* – those who profited

from the Opening) that were initiated in the 1970s.

Minister for Economic Development Uthman Mohammad Uthman claimed that unemployment dropped to 8.5 percent from 9 percent in December 2006. However, a different official report showed that the “average rate” of unemployment “ranges” from 11.7 percent to 23.7 percent.³⁰ Within these figures, low or high, the government excludes persons who have real estate assets and leased land. Other estimates of unemployment in Egypt range from 25 percent to Egyptian political opposition claims of 40 percent.³¹ Considering the numbers who are underemployed and trying to obtain visas for work anywhere (Libya, the Gulf nations, Europe, or the United States) and those surviving on state funds, the highest figure appears the most accurate.

Poverty among the working poor is measured at \$1 a day, and the number of poor working Egyptians (this excludes many) has declined; in 2000, 52.7 percent of the population lived on less than \$2 a day. The shift in the numbers of Egyptians who now live on closer to \$2 than \$1 a day reflects statistics on the Middle East measured as a whole and has been held up as a “success” or indicator of decreasing poverty.³² However, inflation has also occurred, affecting the cost of living, and the “shopping basket” or items that \$2 can actually purchase has decreased, even with the much-disputed subsidies provided in Egypt.³³ Rates of malnourishment reach about 40 percent in some areas, such as the Sinai Peninsula, Upper Egypt,³⁴ and pockets of urban and Delta areas, even though overall malnourishment is declining.

Not all news is bad—NGO and micro-financing “movements” encourage income-generation (though not for sufficient numbers of Egyptians); child mortality

has decreased (thanks to projects in the private donor-funded system³⁵ and in spite of the highly ineffective, mismanaged, unpopular public health sector undergoing reform³⁶); and caloric intake of some groups is fairly constant thanks to the continuing subsidies. The problem is that much of this rests on donor aid. What would happen if the United States interrupted that aid, i.e., if a government considered unfriendly to U.S. interests were to come to power? In fact, the influence of donor aid is highly disputed within Egypt, since it is seen as a way of inculcating economic and political values into local groups that may further “international control” over Egyptians.

Poverty, Alienation, and the Link to Militancy.

Opinions are divided about the role of poverty or social alienation in attraction to militancy. The poorest of the poor are not likely to have the means or energy to get involved in organized militancy. Marx had expressed similar opinions about the peasantry, whom he regarded as too isolated and suspicious to serve as a vanguard for change and the consequent difficulty in their mobilization. On the other hand, there is reason to point to Max Weber’s notion of social anomie operating in Egypt, which is what people experience as a result of displacement, alienation, and hopelessness. In traditional social environments, networks and informal solutions helped people overcome problems that the state could not solve. To some degree, people still utilize these networks. However, other transformations, like the urbanization of peasants and villages, breakup of families, or other new negative circumstances, lead people both to reemphasis on religion, and sometimes to more extreme ideologies, according to Weberian views.

LITERACY AND GENDER INEQUALITY

The West emphasizes tolerance and equality in its definitions of democracy. In Egypt, these should apply not only to political opposition, but also to women, minorities, and disadvantaged groups like Egypt's many homeless adults and children. Freedom House has defined various factors that evince greater freedom for women. When applied to Egypt, these actually indicate a fairly low degree of freedom for men, although they are legally and economically more advantaged as compared to women. These factors are nondiscrimination and access to justice, autonomy, security and personal freedom, economic rights and equal opportunity, political rights and civic voice, and social and cultural rights.

The Egyptian state promoted literacy, believing that it aids development. Education, like health care, was nationalized in Nasir's era. Unfortunately, the national system of education is overburdened due to under-resourcing. Many students receive inferior teaching in double-shift schools, and they cannot pay for books or private lessons that are necessary to pass the examinations. University enrollments, as well as the public sector as a whole, increased dramatically in size because all Egyptian graduates were promised employment. However, the government could not keep pace with demand, and public sector employment became more and more difficult to obtain. Some students were diverted to technical schools which supposedly prepared them for manufacturing and construction sectors, yet such jobs became difficult to secure. Despite the promise of education for all, the male literacy rate is 67.2 percent, and the female literacy rate is still only 42.6 percent (meaning that nearly 45

percent of all Egyptians are illiterate, and 56.4 percent of Egyptian women).³⁷ The literacy rate for girls aged 15 to 24 is improving, but their matriculation from school does not translate into more or better-paying jobs. Although people believe that women are “taking jobs away from” men, women may make *one-fifth* of men’s salaries. The general idea is that men remain the breadwinners, yet, in fact, women head over 30 percent of households in Egypt. This is just one aspect of gender inequality in Egypt that illustrates the gaps between theory and actualization in social change.

Also part of the grand transformation of the economic opening were decreases in public subsidizations and protections, alongside large increases in rents on residences and farmland.³⁸ These various indicators of economic insecurity are significant to the school of thought that claims that support for extremist violence comes from economic desperation. Even if the most desperate are not actually the largest group of recruits, radical Islamists are able to honestly point out the lack of social and economic justice in the country. In their view, true justice cannot be provided by the Godless, or *jahiliyya* (a term for the pre-Islamic era) rulers of Egypt. Osama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri are by no means from the ranks of the economically desperate, and neither are many leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, increasing economic desperation could heighten regime insecurity and add to the cogency of Islamist appeals.

NATIONAL CHARACTER ARGUMENTS

The usual response to fears that Egypt might ultimately explode from within in the type of civil violence seen in Lebanon or Iraq is that Egyptians are not psychologically disposed to violence. (This idea

actually contradicts the Orientalist views of the crafty, violent peasants with their submissive demeanor proposed by James Mayfield³⁹). A different argument, emanating from a Marxist view of the sub-(lumpen) proletariat explains that their poverty impedes the organization and mobilization necessary for violence (or effective political opposition as mentioned above for the peasantry). True, or not, Egyptians are said to be “moderate” in temperament and religion, or very stoic, and basically inclined against violence. This stereotype is probably dangerous and inaccurate. Raucous political humor in the country shows that Egyptians may verbally protest or mock their leadership to a degree that would be unacceptable in other authoritarian states,⁴⁰ but that humor can serve as a safety valve. Certainly much anger against the regime has grown in the last few decades, and this was most frequently shown in the public’s rage over NDP machinations and vote fraud during the 2005 elections. But these public expressions are dealt with by the state’s security services.

With all of this background information, let us consider the issue of democratization and its implications for the region. When the United States began a discussion about democratization in the New Middle East, the starting point was that there were no democracies in the area, other than Israel. But in fact, there were quite obviously different sorts of political systems which had contributed to the Arab Cold War⁴¹ of the 1950s through the 1970s.

EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

Approaches to democratization in the Middle East must differ because of existing demographic,

structural, and historic distinctions between the various nation-states. (See Table 2.) Morocco and Jordan are parliamentary monarchies, but Saudi Arabia's monarchy is absolutist, though consultative. Kuwait's parliament has been obstructive on occasion to various aims of the monarch, and the parliamentary objections were finally overcome on the matter of women's suffrage. Both Egypt and the Palestinian Authority feature elected heads of state and members of a Parliament. However, the Palestinian Authority's executive is not fully sovereign, and Egypt's executive is far more powerful than any other element in the government. Egypt elects a parliament, but its transition from the legislative body of a single mass party that enacts the will of the executive to a fully independent legislative body is still underway. There is no mature or

Parliamentary Democracies/ Parliamentary Systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iraq • Afghanistan • Lebanon • Egypt (today) • Palestinian Authority • Tunisia 	Mass-Party Dictatorship <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Libya • Syria • Egypt (under Nasir)
Monarchies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jordan • Morocco • Saudi Arabia • Kuwait • Bahrain 	Islamic Republics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran • Sudan

Table 2. Systemic Differences in Some Middle Eastern States.

“loyal” opposition because the opposition parties have not been permitted full openness in determination of platforms, or in their media outlets, and do not behave as a mature opposition. While presidential candidates did run against Mubarak in the 2005 elections, they did so mostly to set a precedent but with no hope of a victory.

It should be noted that the Palestinian Authority is a quasi-state without substantive sovereign rights over its citizens or an army; it is subject to the higher authority of Israel and the Israeli military. Without commenting on all of the other Middle Eastern countries, it should be observed that due to the great variance in political typologies, there is no one path to democratization. And, when people of one country object to some expression of authoritarianism, it is always possible to point to an even more authoritarian example in a nearby country.

EGYPT’S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Egypt produced an anti-imperialist discourse earlier in the 20th century than any other actor in the region, causing other Arab populations to view Egyptian politicians like Sa`d Zaghlul as important leaders and heroic enemies of colonialism. The characterization of Great Britain (John Bull) to Egypt (a young damsel who desires freedom, a Constitution, and the right to frame her own future) was captured in political cartoons, and took primacy in memoirs and political essays early in the century.⁴² This call for freedom continued after the partial independence granted in 1922 and amplified into a cry for social and political freedoms in which the ordinary Egyptian would gain equality with the *bashawat*, the elites.

Achieving these freedoms remains a work in progress. However, because the many strands of Egyptian traditional culture and contemporary political trends are populist and critical of unfair authority as well as corruption, there is significant political critique of the overwhelming power of the executive and the legislative body. The National Assembly functioned in some ways as it was intended during Egypt's "liberal era" from 1922 to 1952. However, the legislature was still not as independent as it should have been because of the British presence and influence over the King and his cabinet. Under Nasir, the legislative body lost its independence altogether. At his death in 1970, this situation remained, and has done so until this day, since the legislature is primarily filled with the members of the President's party, the NDP. Now it can be argued that this critique derives from the opposition, and that the ordinary Egyptians do not really care and would not challenge the government's corruption or the political contributions deducted from the salaries of public servants⁴³ so long as the NDP political figures could meet public expectations. This argument, however, speaks more to the lack of political maturity in Egypt than to real resistance to reform.

In addition to the constraints on legislative authority mentioned above, the judiciary has been struggling for greater independence. The importance of law as a means for controlling the executive and the security services has been seen in increasing numbers of legal cases mounted against the government by Islamist defendants at the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court. Judicial insistence to try such cases without pressure from the executive meant that the Egyptian court system is more independent than Syria's, where the Constitutional Court has

been a very quiet place indeed. However, there is more to the freedom of the judiciary than the use of the various court levels. The most important struggle for judges has been their assumption, or attempts to assume, oversight of the electoral process. Hence, the spectacle of Egyptian judges being put on trial for challenging the conduct of the 2005 elections indicated that their independence is still in its infancy.

An overview of the disparate factors that might promote or discourage democratization in Egypt is found in Table 3. Despite the many discouraging factors in the path toward democratization and a more demonstrated balance of governmental powers, it would be astonishing if Egypt now turned toward dynastic succession in the 21st century. However, years of extremely weak (and often repressed) political opposition, a paralyzed workers' movement, and other factors have discouraged strong, potentially effective leaders from challenging the status quo, so this remains a possibility.

Democratic Trends versus Dynastic Succession.

Unlike his predecessors, President Mubarak has not appointed a Vice President, although he himself served as Sadat's Vice President from 1975 until 1981. There were calls for him to do so, especially after the 1995 assassination attempt. His failure to establish a clear line of succession has fueled speculation about a possibly hereditary succession. The speculation has been further fueled by Bashar al-Assad's succession in Syria—which prompted strong criticism from the Egyptian opposition, but less so from pro-government

Promoting	Discouraging
Prominence in regional politics and cultural expression	Years of weak political opposition and entrenched political repression
Judicial independence, though weak, grows with challenges mounted in higher courts	Low degree of legislative and judicial independence
Large population and active civil society	High unemployment and under-employment
Compromises achieved with largest groups of radical Islamists (EIJ and GI)	Economic weaknesses including stresses from privatization, subsidies, balance of trade, and low savings
Existing populist discourse	Politicized professionals (through syndicates)
No great enthusiasm for war with Israel	Lengthy “cold” peace
Active women’s movement	Weakness of and backlash to the empowerment of women

Table 3. Factors Promoting or Discouraging Democratization in Egypt.

sources – as well as the appointment of Gamal Mubarak (one of the President’s two sons, and formerly a businessman) to the General Secretariat of the NDP; both events occurred in 2000, significantly enhancing speculation about Egypt’s future.

Until Gamal Mubarak assumed a leadership role in the NDP, most observers assumed that Mubarak’s successor would come from within the ranks of the military like Egypt’s four Presidents – Naguib, Nasir, Sadat, and Mubarak himself, a pilot and Commander of the Air Forces. Initially, there were thoughts that former Minister of Defense Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, born in 1930, might succeed Mubarak. This changed when he was rather unexpectedly

removed and became a presidential advisor in 1989 and, since around 1993, he has disappeared from the political scene. Current Defense Minister (and Field Marshal) Muhammad Husayn Tantawi, born in 1935, has been constantly at Mubarak's side, and would most probably have succeeded him if the last (1995) assassination attempt on Mubarak had succeeded. However, Tantawi was rumored to be in poor health in 2000, so those speculating about succession have also mentioned 'Umar Sulaiman, the head of the General Intelligence Department, who is in his sixties. He is not as visible as a Vice-President would be but is certainly a powerful figure in the government. Another possibility could be Magdi Hatata, born in 1941, the chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces.

All of these possibilities might be suggested by those in security studies. But in the angry period that followed the extension of the emergency laws in 2006, Egyptians made many other proposals for leadership because they were disturbed by the prospect of a hereditary succession, or wanted a change to the NDP's dominance.

INDICATORS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION

Strong economic pressures may jeopardize Egypt's stability. Egypt has a huge population. Its absolute rate of poverty declined somewhat during Mubarak's rule. However, unemployment and underemployment create a range of social stressors; many individuals cannot meet the material expectations of marriage, for instance. Thus, democratization that might bring any element of fiscal risk would be opposed by business interests and, possibly, the disenfranchised who rely on state subsidies.

The politicization of professionals and intellectuals through the syndicate system (labor unions are illegal, so professional syndicates operate in their place, allowing the government to keep watch over the various professions) could guide the emergence of a new political opposition. On the other hand, the syndicates representing lawyers, physicians, and engineers were very strongly impacted by the Islamist trend until the government directly interfered in the election processes of these organizations. It is not clear how thoroughly the syndicates influence the country toward democratization, although they might.

A democratization that empowers Islamists but reverses progress made for women through legal reform, or fails to reform remaining obstacles to equity, would be very disappointing to Egypt's women's movement. Activists worked hard to achieve legal reforms that address discriminatory aspects of criminal and family law, i.e., they were finally able to eliminate the law that encouraged women to marry their own kidnapper/rapist, and they managed, with the President's support, to pass the so-called "*khul*" law of 2000 that provided women an easier method of divorce.⁴⁴ The Egyptian President had supported and enabled many of these changes included in this law, whereas the Wafd and some Islamists and conservatives opposed them and vowed to mount legal challenges to them.

EGYPT'S REGIONAL ROLE

Despite Egypt's signing of the Camp David Peace Accords, its peace with Israel is a chilly or "cold" one. Egypt suffered heavy losses in each war with Israel, and although there is bitterness over treatment of

Egyptian prisoners of war (POWs), there is no great support for war now. Some objections to the peace were procedural; though in the absence of democracy in Egypt it is not surprising that President Sadat acted unilaterally and without consultation or a referendum on the issue. This meant that opposition to the peace agreement was also a means of complaining about the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian government. Additionally, many Egyptians objected to the agreement because of its failure to address the needs and rights of the Palestinian people, i.e., that was the view of the Muslim Brotherhood from the beginning, but also that of many more secular Egyptians. In fact, Sadat himself was extremely disappointed and angry about the refusal of the Israelis to negotiate on the status of the Palestinians. After a fairly short period of time following the agreement, various elites and sectors of the population, especially intellectuals, spoke out against it. The professional syndicates agreed that they would not be pressured into contacts with Israelis and would continue a boycott of them, although there was dissension by some individuals within the syndicates on this matter. Certain intellectuals, writers, and political figures wanted to contact Israelis and yet did not give up their hopes for a just solution for the Palestinians. While some tourism, primarily Israelis to Egypt and not so much the reverse, took place early on and some cultural exchanges were arranged until 1982, these became the subject of bureaucratic and journalistic critique, and the Egyptian public was infuriated by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, turning more firmly against the compromising nature of the peace agreement.

President Mubarak eventually mended relations with the Arab world in a formal fashion in the

November 1987 Arab summit resolution that permitted Arab countries to resume relations with Egypt, and it regained its seat in the annual Islamic Conference.⁴⁵ A concomitant slowing of schemes for political and economic cooperation with Israel also took place. Paradoxically then, Egypt is able, via the achievement of the Camp David agreement and its improved relationship with the United States and the weaknesses of the very same agreement that permitted the country's re-establishment of influence with Arab states, to play an important role in efforts to diminish conflict vis-à-vis other Arab players, including the Palestinians.

EGYPT'S ROLE IN GLOBAL JIHAD

Egypt and its future must also concern the United States because of the emergence of global jihad. While al-Qa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri is essentially a renegade from Egyptian justice whose aims shifted from the Islamic Jihad organization in Egypt to the goals of the al-Qa'ida group internationally, he exemplifies a trend among radical Islamists who once operated in Egypt and fled precisely because of the state's success in repressing them. Some scholars who have studied the emergence of global jihad, or focused on militance in Egypt, noted that it was successful local counterterrorism that contributed to global jihad, both in the sense of movement and the militants' taking on the "far enemy," the United States. The ringleader of the 9/11 terrorists, Muhammad Atta, was Egyptian.

The most severe threat to political stability within Egypt came from the homegrown radical *gama`at* of the 1970s and later the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ or Jihad Islami) and the Jama`at Islamiyya (or Gama`at). These groups aimed to destabilize the Egyptian government

and establish an Islamic government based on Islamic law in its place. While a faction of the EIJ assassinated President Anwar Sadat and carried out other hostilities for about a month, they had greatly overestimated their ability to bring about the fall of the Egyptian government. There was discussion at the time of the estimated numbers of radical Islamists who might, like Sadat's assassin, be in the armed forces. In contrast to these groups whose major goal was the downfall of the Egyptian government and its replacement with an Islamic government, al-Qa'ida members were meanwhile emphasizing what Olivier Roy calls the "globalized *ummah*" (Muslim community) and deemphasizing the national identity of radicals or their opponents; rather, the world is divided into "righteous" jihadists, evil Muslims and non-Muslims.⁴⁶

ISLAMIST VIOLENCE

Islamist violence troubled the state in the late 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s. The state concluded a truce with the radical Islamists in 1999 which will be discussed later. There are differences of thought concerning the emergence of that violence, which many experts believe was exacerbated by the tactics of the Egyptian security services. In any case, the truce did not portend a complete end to Islamist violence as was generally thought at the time. Egyptians who considered themselves immune from the radical threat of any jihadists like those involved in the 9/11 attacks have been shaken by a resurgence in violence since 2004. These more recent events raise questions about the potential for victory over Islamist violence, and others about the degree to which repression begets violence in a cycle with no apparent end-state.

In 30 years of encounters between radicals and the Egyptian state, the initially small but troublesome radical groups threatened and attacked state authority. In so doing, they actually bolstered the state,⁴⁷ provided the rationale for operating under emergency regulations, and inhibited democratic changes. Egypt's transition to democracy has foundered today on this issue, and less clearly on its ongoing transformation from a populist, public-sector heavy system trying to convert itself to economic rationality without solving any of its deepest developmental problems. It is not moving in an "unwavering path" toward democracy as Egyptian Ambassador to the United States Nabil Fahmy has claimed.⁴⁸ Instead, it seems trapped and immobilized between the need for stability and tight control and Egyptians' democratic desire for liberty and increasing civic responsibility and transparency that the Bush government had verbally supported to some degree until the fall of 2006. With rising unemployment, inflation, and different types of Islamist pressures on society, standing still or "politics as usual" is also not a viable strategy.

Observers who fear that President Mubarak's son, Gamal, is being groomed to take over the country have had a very difficult time bringing their concerns to the non-Arab world because of the authoritarian powers granted to the current government. For these reasons, the small movement, Kifaya – the name means "enough!" – achieved a significant accomplishment in creating small or medium-sized public protests. In September 2005, Kifaya staged one demonstration of 5,000 and another with 10,000 people. Such expressions of public disapproval formed a contrast to earlier protest efforts which were, since the containment of

the labor movement and other political opposition groups under Nasir, illegal and punishable by the state security forces. Over the years, students and citizens had attempted to hold demonstrations and, if the purpose was to protest Israel's actions, or the first Gulf War (1991), or U.S. bombings of Iraq under the Clinton administration, the government sometimes allowed demonstrators to gather if they were not actually in an uncontained public space. For example, campus protests might either be allowed or suppressed, or both. So when Kifaya began its demonstrations and groups like the Muslim Brotherhood also led protests, the state security forces have both arrested and punished protesters, or later, allowed a degree of public expression. However, as critics observed, there were certainly limits to Kifaya's influence. It simply could not mobilize to the degree needed to more strongly shake the state (like the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups) and probably cannot encourage large numbers of working-class people to take greater political risks.⁴⁹ Hence it has served as more of a catalyst for protest than a political alternative. Kifaya tried to draw attention to the constraint over the presidential and legislative elections and to other actions of the government.

HEREDITARY SUCCESSION?

Today, many are concerned that Gamal Mubarak, Husni Mubarak's son, has been pushed forward as the leader of reform in the NDP so as to become more well-known and acceptable to Egyptians, and simultaneously aid that Party in keeping its strong hold over political life. In Egypt, where the principles of republicanism were adopted in 1952, the idea of monarchy, dynastic

succession, and elite privilege was challenged. Many Egyptians were justifiably concerned about a Mubarak dynasty in the wake of Bashar al-Asad's succession in Syria. When sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim began to criticize the President and his son's possible succession, as well the regime's suppression of civil society's efforts to democratize, report on violence against Egypt's Coptic Christians, and propose a secure judicial review of elections to make them more fair, he used a sardonic term (*gumlukhiyya*)⁵⁰ to describe Egypt's contribution to political development. This play on words—a political system that sounds both like Gamal's name and which rhymes with a favorite Egyptian food, *mulukhiyya* and the word for a monarchy—drew ire from the regime. A hereditary succession in which the current government keeps its hold over the parliamentary system, continuing to suppress the legislative and judicial functions of government at the expense of the executive branch, will certainly bring no increase in liberty to Egyptians. Reputable international advisory bodies like the International Crisis Group continue to recommend democratization from within the regime,⁵¹ apparently not grasping the government and the NDP's lack of will for true reform.

LEADERSHIP ALTERNATIVES?

When Egyptians were asked in elections prior to 2005 if they would not like a choice of presidential candidates, many answered that ever since they had become adults, "we've known no other leader." Young people did not live under Sadat's presidency and in the NDP dominated government, there were no other politicians of Husni Mubarak's stature.⁵² Without familiarity with truly outstanding personalities who

had served or could serve their country, it was difficult for them to imagine that an unknown quantity would make a better president.

Under the new electoral laws, candidates for president must come from legal parties who already hold a proportion of 5 percent in the legislative body and meet other criteria. If these laws were to be rewritten to legalize more candidates who need not represent the leadership of eligible parties, or if the Muslim Brotherhood were legalized, and if elections were fairly held, one could anticipate other candidates. In addition to those who already ran for president in 2005 like Ayman Nour (of al-Ghad [Tomorrow] Party), Nu`man Goma` (Wafd Party), or Tal`at al Sadat (the nephew of Anwar Sadat of the Ahrar Party), who was actually tried after the election and sentenced to a year in prison for “insulting the military,” it is quite exciting to hear Egyptians discussing possibilities other than a military succession, or the son of the president. Examples include a leader from within the Muslim Brotherhood including members of the Guidance Council, or Dr. `Isam al-`Arian, a medical doctor and long-time Brotherhood leader. Several individuals had intended to run for president but were disallowed under the rules that restrict candidates to “recognized” parties. These included feminist writer and former physician Nawal al-Saadawi, and sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim who opposed the government’s electoral policies and its stance of keeping silent on attacks on Coptic Christians and suppression of civil society. People also mentioned the names of Tariq al-Bishri (a judge, historian-social scientist, and Islamist) or Galal Amin (an economist). Due to disputes with the Minister of Culture over the veil, figures like Abd al-Wahhab El Messiri, a different type of Islamist intellectual, are better known. So are

Hisham al-Bastawaisy (a judge from the Court of Cassation who was tried for criticizing the elections), or Zakaria Abdel Aziz (head of the Judge's Club), to mention just a few. The commonly-heard argument that Egyptians know "no other leader than Mubarak" is being challenged today, although it is quite true that without access to the media, it would be very difficult for any but the Muslim Brotherhood candidates to gain sufficient public recognition for aggressive electoral competition.

American policymakers may well believe the Egyptian government's predictions that should it and the NDP weaken, the Muslim Brotherhood would sweep in, and that this alternative must be staved off at all costs. This assumption is incorporated in the reports of various U.S. research institutes, which explain that secular alternatives to the Brotherhood are too weak, but imply that the latter are the only proper alternative in a democratic future. This is hard to understand, both because religious parties like the Da`wah and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq have gained U.S. acceptance as legitimate actors. The discipline and lengthy experience of the Muslim Brotherhood shows that it has not participated in violent action against the government since the 1940s (the alleged plot in 1954 might have been contrived) and does seek to play a legitimate role in the existing Egyptian government rather than moving in an external route to power.

Abdul Moneim Abu El-Foutouh, a leading Brother, in response to the question of whether the Brotherhood should protest its illegal stance and give up on political participation, states "The institutions of the state are owned by the people, and if we withdraw from these institutions, we would be achieving nothing [because] Islamists will come to power when the system supports

democracy and freedom.”⁵³ U.S. observers less familiar with Egyptian politics fear groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in part because they are concerned about that organization’s anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian stance. We will consider this issue further, but it must be emphasized that rather than the Muslim Brotherhood, the most intransigent obstacles to Egyptian political reform are within the country’s existing regulations and laws.⁵⁴

True Obstacles to Democracy.

A substantial literature on the obstacles to democracy in Egypt exists. Much of it centers around the unsatisfactory outcome of the 1952 Egyptian revolution, often labeled “unfinished” or “uncertain.”⁵⁵ Social scientist Hamied Ansari wrote of a “stalled” society, unable to carry out the promises of Arab socialism; and Leonard Binder outlined the growth of a second stratum that expanded and fed on these policies like that operating in Marx’s “moment of enthusiasm,” which helps to explain the role of the military as one of the beneficiaries of the 1952 Revolution, and then, the subsequent Infitah, or Economic Opening. Under Nasir, official values had been populist, and Raymond Hinnebusch tried to explain the dissatisfying state of “post-populism,” while Aly Hilal Dessouki wrote about a state “in crisis.” Robert Springborg had originally used the terms “patrimonial and fragmented” to describe the Egyptian system. As the frameworks of these noted experts on Egypt suggest, the standard features of Middle Eastern political systems are indeed very difficult to transform. Another variety of analysis focuses on the admittedly slow transition to democracy, rather than its absence.⁵⁶

All of these obstacles should not be entirely attributed to individual authoritarian figures. Leaders did have their role in this process – Nasir who created the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) and its mass party framework; Sadat who transformed the ASU into the NDP and then created tiny opposition “platforms” while, in fact, none of these constituted truly independent political parties; or Mubarak who maneuvered reforms to the electoral system so that the least amount of change possible would take place. Beyond these leaders, the system of patronage politics, and patterns of dependence have pervaded society from the liberal but undemocratic pre-revolutionary era to the present. There are more novel features to today’s patronage system – a new format that contrasts slightly with the old feudalism – but at no time have the institutions and laws changed sufficiently so that the legislature and judiciary could operate with necessary independence. Egypt is not unique in this regard in the region.

IS THERE A U.S. ROLE IN DEMOCRATIZATION?

The United States promotes democratization as a general policy and emphasized this process more avidly as a part of the neoconservative vision of a New Middle East. Yet the United States can neither strongly promote, foster, nor demand democratization in Egypt without fundamental changes to the country’s political institutions. Historically and today, democratization programs in Egypt are not geared towards the transformation of institutions. Rather, they may strengthen civil society with the establishment of income-generating NGOs, and some programs that would enhance civic or community consciousness, as via the Middle East Economic Development (MEED)

program. This simply is not, as was pointed out above, where the most severe obstacles to democratization reside.

Further, the grave situation in Iraq may be the harbinger of what Richard Haass of the Council of Foreign Relations has called the end of U.S. dominance in the region.⁵⁷ His view suggests that anti-Americanism has increased to a point that the kind of arm-twisting that has taken place in the years of experimentation with the New Middle East is at an end. If this is the case, then the concrete example of “democratization” which was supposed to inspire the region may not emerge, or will be so imprinted with sectarian politics as to be inapplicable outside of Iraq and countries more like it. In other words, transformations that erode executive power, i.e., in Pakistan or Egypt, might weaken the suppressive capacity of the state. It may well be that despite all the U.S. talk about democratization, the country more deeply desires stability and dealing with known quantities.

Another view is that the United States has never been serious about democratization in Egypt. As evidence, commentators point to President Mubarak’s response to calls for democratization in 2005 by making certain modifications to law in the form of a referendum that was protested by many groups. The changes allowed for a multi-candidate presidential election, while severely tailoring the qualifications for candidates. Despite these restrictions, Mubarak’s government still jailed one of his electoral challengers, Ayman Nour, as well as many hundreds of opposition figures and would-be voters in the spring of 2005. When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was asked to comment on Nour’s case during her October 2006 visit to Egypt, her cautious response contrasted with previous remarks that had vigorously encouraged democratization.⁵⁸

ISLAMISM AND RADICALISM IN EGYPT

At the end of the 1990s, scholars wrote about the end of Islamic radicalism in Egypt⁵⁹ or about a post-Islamist region, although the phenomenon was still growing elsewhere. Basically, scholars argued that radicalism was untenable but that participatory politics (with Islamists participating, but the violent ones rendered inactive) could achieve change.⁶⁰

If containment had occurred in Egypt, why there, and not elsewhere? One argument is that radicals feared alienating the Muslim public,⁶¹ and had voluntarily switched tactics. Another view is that a combination of repression and cooptation had succeeded.⁶² Ultimately though, the theoretical questions asked concerning the use of repression and violence might not have been the proper questions, and the answers given are not definitive. The question of the efficacy of state repression is still an open one. If the Egyptian leadership had “succeeded” through strongly repressive tactics in containing the two largest Islamist groups, then is this containment permanent? Does it count as a success if other smaller groups rise up and engage in violence instead of GI and EIJ? And, the Egyptian internal security apparatus has also applied repressive tactics to the Muslim Brotherhood since 1995. If violence emerges from repression, why haven’t moderates reverted to violence? The questions may have been ill-framed if they proceeded from the notion that Egyptians are basically nonviolent, so why would they tolerate group actions that hurt civilians? Radical groups have engaged in such actions, but the argument went that their mobilization and recruitment efforts were damaged when the public thought them brutal. It might be wise to remember that all around

the region—in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and so on—ordinary people have been repelled by violence, yet such fringe groups have managed to go on recruiting.

Growth or Diminishment of Violence?

Mohammad Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz explained violence by emphasizing the variables of system inaccessibility, together with reactive and indiscriminate repression.⁶³ They do not examine the power of religious ideology in their model, as do most earlier works on Egypt which trace Islamic radicalism to notions of *hakmiyya* and *jahiliyya* (the sovereign nature of God, but not the ruler; and the idea that today's world is like the pre-Islamic era) from the work of Abu al-'Ala al-Mawdudi, and that on jihad and *shuhada* (martyrdom) of Sayyid Qutb, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood who was imprisoned and put to death in Nasir's era.

On the other hand, Anthony Shadid; Geneive Abdo; Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela (on Hamas); Judith Harik (on Lebanon); and Quintan Wiktorowicz (writing on Jordan)⁶⁴ have all considered the reasons that some Islamist groups pursue nonviolent means and exercise political restraint. These works on groups with broader bases explain violent militant groups who forswear violence. Raymond Baker, Carrie Wickham, and others have written extensively about moderate Islamists in Egypt, namely the Wasatiyyun who broke away from the earlier generation of Ikhwan leaders and formed a new party.⁶⁵ Observations about such second-generation movements contrast with the Jordanian case (where the second generation is less, not more moderate) in Wiktorowicz's exploration

of the issue of formal versus informal organizational structures.⁶⁶ Unfortunately, these expert views, which suggest that groups which need to keep their broad bases will moderate their behavior as they attempt to participate politically, primarily explicate just one possible direction for Islamist groups. Not all move in that direction – some move towards moderation, while new violent groups might still emerge and that is what we have seen with in newly violent actors in Egypt. At the same time, these well-documented cases of state repression of moderate or fairly moderate Islamist groups does not tell us what these groups will do in the long run, especially if the state continues repressing them.

Somehow, both in the “histories of jihadism” that start with Qutb and the 1970s movements, and political studies of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, one can lose sight of something important: that Islamic appeal in a country like Egypt (or Saudi Arabia), that is to say a political discourse based on Islamic values, is unavoidable. Western programs that aim to inculcate secularism in the region, or “help the moderates” who are battling with the extremists, are quite difficult to adopt in light of the highly Islamized public discourse. This is an essential idea to keep in mind. It is not realistic to imagine that these large Islamist groups will disappear.

ISLAM AND POLITICS IN EGYPT

For centuries, Cairo had provided education and study opportunities to clerics and religious students. Al-Azhar University in Cairo, founded in 972 A.D., and today with an enrollment of some 90,000 students from 71 countries, was originally a teaching mosque

under the Fatimid rulers. It became an influential school under Sultan Baybars who invited the Abbasid family and scholars of Baghdad fleeing the Mongols to Cairo.⁶⁷ Clerics (*ʿulama*) who were educated here, or came for a period of study, returned to various parts of the Sunni Islamic world.

Egypt was later a locus for 19th century Islamic reform, and subsequently for the emergence of modern Islamism. This, together with its leadership role in traditional, quiescent, and “educational” Islam and in the contemporary intellectual and cultural life in the Arab world, increased the country’s significance to modern radical Islamist movements.

It was not the only important country in the development of Islamic thought and politics. Wahhabism is a different purist movement that developed in the Arabian peninsula of the 18th century. One consequently notes Americans, Egyptians, and other Muslims, for instance, the Ahbash (an Ethiopian movement) leader, Shaykh Yusuf abd al-Rahman al-Harari castigating *wahhabiyun* (Wahhabis) or Wahhabism itself as being the source of contemporary Islamic extremism.⁶⁸ On the other hand, some experts blame Egypt or “Qutbism” (the philosophy of Sayyid Qutb) for the emergence of radical Islam.⁶⁹ Salafism has different origins and dimensions, and even anti-salafist figures and movements produced groups that aspired to better Islamic governance, like the somewhat ideologically rigid Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) established by Shaykh Taqi al-Din Nabhani in Jerusalem in 1953.

Prescriptive Islam—how authorities or the state should order Muslim morality and behavior, a theme of “political Islam”—has never been far from the surface in Egypt. Historically, Turco-Circassian rulers, the

Muslim clerics, and the military formed three strands of elite leadership, intermarried, and supported each other.⁷⁰ The rulers, clerics, and others utilized Islamic discourse for centuries to legitimize their actions. Thus, it is ahistorical to contrast a benign “traditional” Islam with the politicized ideas of modern radicals as some analysts do. Islam has always meant more than private religious practice. Ideas of Islamic governance did not represent a heresy from a presumed secularist norm as in the 20th and 21st centuries. Rather, the use of religion or religious discourse for political purposes was expected. This may also help us understand why Islamization has also affected the Egyptian government in the most recent period.

Western imperialism made its entrance first with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798. The shock of interaction with the French invaders as described by historian al-Jabarti exposed Egyptians to various ideas, but, in fact, the French were only briefly in the country. The military leader, Muhammad Ali Pasha, who came to rule Egypt, more deeply changed the past order with his centralizing and statist policies. A more difficult encounter with Western imperialism arrived with the British invasion and occupation in 1882. At this time, an Islamic reform movement manifested in Egypt and grappled with social ills, political weakness, educational stultification, and the crisis of the Muslim intellectual. That movement featured salafists, individuals like Muhammad `Abduh who modernized al-Azhar University, and Qasim Amin and Rashid Rida (of Syria) who provided the seeds of 20th century Islamism. Another movement of Islamic reform was the catalyst for this phenomenon in Egypt, the ideas and organization of Hasan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood. Though certain themes may

be also found in the salafism of Rashid Rida,⁷¹ an Islamist heir of the earlier reformers above, in other respects, al-Banna's movement was more broadly-based, working explicitly toward the goal of an Islamic society. No Islamist movement has been as important as the Muslim Brotherhood in spreading Islamist ideas in the Arab Middle East, inasmuch as it proposed an alternative ideology to that of the ruling groups, first in the era of liberal nationalism, until 1952, and then in the age of Arab socialism.

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (AL-IKHWAN AL-MUSLIMIN)

Hasan al-Banna, a schoolteacher, former leader of the Society for Moral Behavior and secretary to the Hasafiyya Sufi order, established the Muslim Brotherhood in Isma`iliyya, a Suez Canal city greatly impacted by the British military presence.⁷² The members of this group, formally titled the Society of the Muslim Brethren, are often referred to as Ikhwan (Brothers). Al-Banna developed a movement to promote Islamic values that he explicitly declared not to be a political party. Hasan al-Banna felt that Egyptian political and social life demanded the revival, not abandonment of Islamic principles. His movement emphasized an Islamic solution for youth as well, contrasting with the international Scouts movement, very influential in that period, and the YMCA. To Banna, the nationalist secular parties and their wealthy landowner representatives were also failing Egyptian society. These parties, which had obtained partial independence in 1922, had not been able to effect a British withdrawal and, more importantly, were not benefiting the poor, peasant, and illiterate elements

in the country. Providing youth development and educational programs, clinics, Muslim fellowship, and *da`wah* (missionary activity), and later a linked women's association, the Brotherhood grew rapidly.

Al-Banna developed an interpretation of *hakmiyya* (God's sovereignty, as opposed to temporal sovereignty) that highlighted the need for an Islamic state and participation in politics. He wrote about *shura* (consultation) somewhat differently than al-Qa'ida's theorists; that it was not incompatible with parliamentary democracy, and also about the distinction between Islamic history and Islam itself.⁷³ To al-Banna, the most important principle in an Islamic state is *tawhid*, or the oneness of God, which in a political sense implies more compromises between various factions, even between secularists and Islamists.

The organization developed a "secret apparatus," an underground militant, armed wing in the 1940s. As the Wafd Party and the monarchy of King Faruq became discredited due to the former's cooperation with the British in this period and the latter's constant scandalous personal behavior, the Muslim Brotherhood presented a viable alternative, and the government outlawed the Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood supported the 1952 revolution, a bloodless coup by a group of military officers. But the new leadership split, and an alleged assassination attempt on President Jamal abd al-Nasir by a Muslim Brother in 1954 led to the government's imprisonment of some 4,000 members, many of whom were tortured. One outcome was an extremely radical element within the prisoners whose views aligned with Sayyid Qutb's work, *Ma`alim fi tariq* (*Signposts on the Road*). This work, while possibly not as important as some of his earlier books, gained more notoriety with its prediction that jihad and martyrdom

were inevitable as Muslims strove to install an Islamic state. Western democracy, as well as Eastern-style socialism, had failed to bring justice, only an Islamic system could do that. Another point of emphasis was the way that he defined the domain of warfare, *dar al-harb*, which traditionally referred to non-Islamic states, but now could include “any state that fights religious attitudes of Muslims.”⁷⁴ That rendered Egypt, *dar al-harb*, and its government, a “near enemy.” He also wrote in a different way about necessary political changes. In *Ma`alim* and several other books, Qutb calls for a revolution, a *zalzala* (earthquake), to bring down governments and build new Islamic societies.⁷⁵ It is not clear in these books that the revolution must be violent. In the final chapter of his book, *al-`Adala al-ijtima'iyya fi-l-Islam* (*Social Justice in Islam*), the way forward for Muslims is centered on Islamic education and the debunking of Western thought.⁷⁶ In the final chapter of *Ma`alim*, Qutb refers instead to the example of the martyrs of al-Akhduḍ in the Quran (Surah 85) who were burned and unavenged. Nevertheless, these martyrs were freed from life's enslavement.⁷⁷

Other Islamists not imprisoned then, later adopted similar ideas that the Egyptian governmental leadership represented anti-Islamic values and must be overthrown. But a larger group of the Brotherhood held to their original philosophy of gradual change, and when they were released from prison by President Anwar al-Sadat in 1971, they agreed to operate according to the regime's rules. By that time, Jordanian, Syrian, Sudanese, Libyan, Iraqi, West Bank, Gazan, and other branches of the Ikhwan had been established,⁷⁸ but with no very great support in the heyday of more secular Arab nationalist political movements.

Shifts Under President Anwar Al-Sadat.

Long-term domestic transformations began in the 1970s, including attacks on the Nasirists and the left and an ouster of the Soviet advisors. The turn to the West and the need for economic aid led to a new plan, an economic opening called the *infitah*. The *infitah* broke with the principles of import substitution, and that meant that with time, many new products would be available in Egypt, although not everyone would be able to afford them. It facilitated new types of business arrangements like joint ventures, and in other ways allowed the global economy to intrude into Egypt's, undoing various types of socio-economic protections.

Although Anwar Sadat promised political liberalization, that is simply not what took place. Censorship was very pronounced under his government, and the notion that criticism of Egypt, especially from within, was a crime or treason⁷⁹ was carried over from Abd al-Nasir's day. The political system of today is essentially the product of Sadat's 1976 changes when tiny legal opposition parties were introduced alongside the renamed "mass" governmental party, deliberately balanced so that no significant alignments could take place, and the opposition would not challenge the mass governmental party. That inhibited it from developing other characteristics of a larger loyal opposition.

NEW RADICALS, AND THE NEW JIHAD UNDER SADAT AND BEYOND

Small and violent Islamist groups formed, as well as more militant groups visible to the state. Among Muslim Brethren jailed in the 1960s was a former student, Shukri Mustafa, who was imprisoned for

distributing the organization's flyers. He began to organize an underground group. Meanwhile, as Sadat loosened restrictions on Islamic organizations hoping they would balance his opposition on the left, they gained strength, especially in the universities. At this time, the government attributed the appearance of fully veiled women, who wore *niqab* (the face veil), long dresses, *khimar* (a head-covering), and gloves in the Saudi style in the 1970s, to the Brethren who had gone to the Gulf during the period when they were imprisoned in Egypt.

The Muslim Brotherhood obeyed the rules handed down by the government; it did not seek legalization nor engage in violence or sedition against the government in this period. The government passed the Political Parties Law in 1977 that specifically stated that parties could not be formed on the basis of religion, that clause aimed mainly at the Brotherhood. However, the Brotherhood was able to publish *al-Da`wa* magazine from 1976 and then *Liwa al-Islam* for a time, which gave indications of its rather comprehensive social as well as political aims.

The Islamic revival that began in the 1970s was discomfiting to many Egyptian intellectuals. Some agreed with Western views that the "awakening" (*sahwa*) was a traditionalist means of avoiding modernization, or coping with the anomie that modernization brought.⁸⁰ Certainly, the importance of Islamic groups in this period related to Sadat's new political direction, his turn to the West, economic changes, and unprecedented trip to Israel.

The first Islamist radical group to alarm the public is now known as the Military Academy Group, because of its April 1974 attempt to take over the Military Academy in Heliopolis and then assassinate President Sadat. Established in 1971 and led by a Palestinian, Salah

Siriyya, who held a doctorate in education and was a former member of the Hizb al-Tahrir movement (a pan-Muslim Caliphal movement set up by Palestinian jurist, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani). Siriyya was a triple exile (from Palestine, Jordan in 1970, and Iraq).⁸¹ Guards at the Military Academy fired on and captured Siriyya's group; he was executed by hanging in 1976. Egyptian authorities blamed the plot on Libya, unwilling at the time to admit the presence of indigenous militants.⁸²

Egyptian authorities labeled the second group (which actually used as a name for itself, *Jama`at al-Muslimun*) Takfir wa-l-Higra (Flight and Repentance, or TWH), the words "*takfir*" referring to the practice of excommunicating Muslims, and the "*hijra*" was the Prophet's exodus from Mecca to Medina.⁸³ With this title, Egyptian authorities highlighted the extremism and eccentricity of the group in its vehement rejection of Egyptian society, which it believed was as barbarous as the world before Islam (*jahiliyya*) and should be avoided, therefore it "seceded" to safe-houses and secret places to prepare for overthrowing the government and society. TWH represented one of the first jihadi groups along bin Ladin's model; similar to the `Utaybi movement in Saudi Arabia which took over the Grand Mosque in 1979. Members who attempted or wished to leave TWH were threatened with death as apostates. That meant some members were easily manipulated by the Egyptian security services, which may have committed or instigated many of the group's crimes.⁸⁴ A more fully explained account of Egyptian government *agents provocateurs* remains to be told. What is important is that such tactics were useful to the regime.

Some of the only data on the sociological profile of the TWH members and those of the Military Academy

Group were collected and analyzed by sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim⁸⁵ who, at the time, described these groups as a manifestations of social anomie and frustration, but far from the only expression of increased religiosity, as there were also moderate or apolitical groups, and Sufi organizations also gaining adherents then. Both groups, TWH and MI, were led by elder, more experienced and charismatic individuals than the membership, which, at the time, came from the *petit bourgeoisie*, or were migrants to urban areas. Shukri Mustafa, leader of TWH, was radicalized while in prison, where he first recruited members for his group. TWH operated secretly, yet authorities were alerted to its presence early on, not least thanks to mysterious disappearances of young women who simply vanished from their communities, as they moved with their men to safe-houses and rural locations. TWH kidnapped a former Minister of Awqaf (Religious Endowments), held him for ransom, and then killed him, thereby bringing the wrath of the authorities down on the group. Court transcripts indicate the members' firm commitment to the cause of jihad.⁸⁶ Mustafa was executed, 36 TWH members were imprisoned, but more than 100 members were again arrested in 1982, demonstrating the survival of the group. Under the name al-Shawqiyin, TWH operated in Fayyum in the 1980s.⁸⁷ However, the Muslim Brotherhood rejected the violence and radicalism of the Military Academy grouping, the TWH, as well as that of other emerging groups, the Jama`at Jihad Islami, and the Jama`at Islamiyya (in Egypt, where the letter 'j' is pronounced as a 'g,' most references are to Gama`at Gihad Islam and the Gama`at Islamiyya).

The Jama`at Jihad Islami, known as the Jihad (Holy War) group, (or Egyptian Islamic Jihad, EIJ,

to distinguish it from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad) adopted a revolutionary path to systemic change. A more amorphous group, the Jama`at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Groups) had evolved outside of the student associations formed in Sadat's era into at least three militant groupings, one, a *salafi* movement at Alexandria University, the second, found in Cairo University as well as Alexandria University, favored the Muslim Brotherhood, and some of its members left it and joined the Brotherhood; and a third set of groups were centered in universities and colleges in Upper Egypt. These had rejected the nonviolent stance of the Muslim Brotherhood in favor of the activism of the EIJ.⁸⁸ The Jihad was also at first two different organizations, one founded by Muhammad `Abd al-Salam Faraj and the other established by Muhammad Salim al-Rahal, a student of al-Azhar from Jordan, with some members joining in from organizations such as Shabab Muhammad. When Rahal was expelled from Egypt, leadership was transferred to a young economics graduate of Cairo University, Kamal al-Sayid Habib. The merging of these two groups came about when Habib was introduced to Faraj by Tariq al-Zumur whose brother-in law, `Abbud `Abd al-Latif al-Zumur (a major in army intelligence), was the strategist of the Faraj group. Al-Zumur urged the overthrow of the Egyptian government, and that the group should establish an Islamic caliphate to replace it.

It is sometimes suggested that the radical Islamists have a very limited program, and unclearly delineated tasks and strategy. EIJ had a well-defined structure and goals. It was governed by a *majlis al-shura* (council of consultation) with subcommittees for preparation, propaganda, and finances. The EIJ wanted to establish a state with a council of *`ulama* (clerics). Military *tarbiyya*

(training) was required and thorough. A planned take-over of the government would actually mimic the 1952 revolution by seizing the Radio and Television building as had occurred in 1952. *Tarbiyya* included first aid, knowledge of topography, vehicle training, defense, and physical exercises at stage one. Then at stage two, students learned techniques of attacks and ambushes and securing of strategically crucial sites. At the third stage, and under the supervision of Nabil al-Maghrabi, the use of weapons and explosives were taught, and simulations planned and executed.⁸⁹

First Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambuli devised a plan to assassinate Sadat after a political crackdown in 1981. His younger brother, Muhammad al-Islambuli, active in Assiut in Upper Egypt, had been arrested. That same brother later led a branch of *Maktab al-Khidmat* (bin Ladin's organization) in Peshawar and allegedly had links with Chechen militancy.⁹⁰ The EIJ plan was to achieve a state collapse, not merely Sadat's assassination. Some members disputed this plan, for instance, Abbud al-Zumur thought the organization needed more time before it could lead a popular revolution.⁹¹ Al-Islambuli, with a relatively small number of cohorts, killed the president at a military review, shooting into the stands and crying out, "I have killed Pharaoh." Al-Islambuli's assassination of Sadat on October 6, 1981, shocked Egyptians, and brought the group global recognition, but EIJ's revolutionary aims failed. Sadat's assassination was followed by nearly a month of fighting in various locations in Upper Egypt. Ultimately, this action and later violence resulted in EIJ operatives' flight from Egypt to escape the execution and trials of its leaders and membership.

With Sadat's assassination, the government reimposed the so-called Emergency Law, Law No.

162, dating back to 1958 which had been in place since 1967 except for a brief period of 18 months from 1980. Under the law, constitutional rights are suspended (though the measures have been challenged), nongovernmental political activities (including meetings and demonstrations) are tightly limited, and detention without charges or trials is allowed. Currently, about 17,000 persons are under detention, and perhaps 30,000 political prisoners held under the law. As was explained above, the law allows for a different type of trial in special courts. The law has also allowed for torture according to the international bodies monitoring such abuses like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

Islamist Methodological Arguments.

The “jihad groups” (TWH, the Military Academy group, the Jama`at al-Islamiyya, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad) shared militance and their treatment of jihad as the most important activity for Muslims, indeed, a sixth pillar of Islam, as urged by the author of *The Missing Duty (Jihad: al-Farida al-gha'iba)*, Muhammad `Abd al-Salam Faraj.⁹² There were also differences between them. Faraj critiqued the TWH and JI groups in his treatise. Jad al-Haqq, the Shaykh al-Azhar, rebutted Faraj, articulating the state’s response to the extremists. The Shaykh al-Azhar holds the most important religious office in Egypt as the spokesman for al-Azhar University, and its school system.

Faraj emphasized that active jihad is required of believers, thus TWH’s *hijra* from barbarian, non-Islamic (*jahili*) society and initial reluctance to take up jihad were incorrect. In the same vein, the Jama`at Islamiyya’s use of *da`wa* to create a mass base, while

postponing jihad is also incorrect; it is improper to substitute “populism for jihad.” He also takes up the issue of enmity to Israel and its policies by arguing that since the nearest enemy is the Egyptian government, not the Israelis, it should be overcome first. Only under true Muslims would Jerusalem be liberated, so the false Muslim rulers must be overthrown, and liberation will follow. This argument likewise distinguishes the EIJ from the Muslim Brotherhood on the same point.

Jad al-Haqq’s counterargument was that the Qur’an contains verses limiting jihad, pointing to the propriety of jihad “by the heart,” and “the tongue” in place of jihad “by the sword.” He argued that the ruler (like Sadat) could not be an apostate, because the true definition of an apostate is one who rejects all of the *shari’ah* (Islamic law), not just any part of it.⁹³

Faraj attacked al-Haqq’s refutation, explaining that the Qur’anic Sword Verses (these are the verses that advocate *jihad*) have abrogated all other verses and are as obligatory as fasting.⁹⁴ Faraj claimed that the Egyptian authorities are agents of imperialism. Moreover, they had made promises to rule according to *shari’ah*, but did not. The argument for the rule of *shari’ah*, in place of man-made civil laws, is an important Islamist theme; al-Islambuli stated that he assassinated Sadat because the *shari’a* was not applied, and to protest the peace treaty with Israel and unjustified 1981 arrests of the *’ulama*.⁹⁵ Islamists also stressed the corruption (*fasad*) in the Egyptian government, embezzlement and bribery, and its encouragement of the physical display of women (*tabarruj al-nisa’*).⁹⁶

RADICALS AND MODERATES

At certain periods during the 1980s, the radical and violent Islamist groups receded from the news,

as Islamist moderates made gains with their strength in some professional syndicates, in the national university system, and in community and private sector endeavors. These efforts continued in the 1990s, i.e., with the lawyers' syndicate. Under lawyer Sayf al-Banna (son of Hasan al-Banna), the Islamic Trend (including more Islamists than simply the Brotherhood) did very well in the 1992 elections of that organization, thanks to organized campaigning, paying overdue membership fees of some 3,000 members (who could then vote), utilizing volunteers from the Islamic Law Committees, and, most importantly, presenting a unified front.⁹⁷ As a result, the Trend won 16 out of 24 seats in these elections.

The government also had to respond to militant and moderate attacks on the "culture" it promoted in Egypt. Because Islamists posited their ideas as the "true Islam," ordinary Egyptians were drawn into these arguments about what should be worn, read, heard, or passed into law. As one of its strategies against the Islamist militants (and sometimes the moderates as well), the Egyptian government trumpeted its own neo-conservative message through the media—censorship and encouragement of certain traditional Muslim themes and attitudes. Examples of such symbolic actions include banning belly-dancing, a uniquely Egyptian form of entertainment, from television when it had been allowed for many years; cutting scenes in films or plays; and the "withdrawal from circulation" of hundreds of books, whether because their titles refer to Islam or something suggestive or to Saudi Arabia, Palestine, or contemporary Egypt, or because they actually contained religiously controversial material. Repression in universities, both public and private institutions, was achieved through censorship, a police

presence on campus, direct warnings issued to students and parents, and political appointees as administrators who policed their faculty.⁹⁸ This repression worked in two ways, to rein in Islamists, but also to censor leftist or secularist views and ideas considered aggravating to Islamists, which might then generate an anti-government protest. A wild and violent protest had taken place over a book that was published decades earlier by a Syrian author, Haydar al-Haydar.

Paradoxically, by these actions the government encouraged popular Islamic revivalism, while at the same time attempting to diminish the uniqueness of activist Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood. This government's strategy against radicalism has made it impossible for it to democratize without including moderates who have played by its rules, and thus the overall presence of political Islam has been strengthened. Nearly all political parties, including the dominant NDP, give some lip service to Islamic ideals, due to their resurgent popularity in Egypt. Successful alliances of the Muslim Brotherhood with other groups gained them seats in Parliament in the 1980s, first with the Wafd and then with the Socialist Labor Party.

In the 1980s, the "legal" or official opposition in Egypt was comprised of the New Wafd, the Socialist Labor Party, the Nationalist Unionist Progressive Party, the Liberal Party, and the Umma Party. The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest group opposed to the regime's policies, was not a legal party. The four official opposition parties were weak. Major electoral changes would be requested to strengthen them. The intent of having an opposition at all was that it should be small and unable to forge alliances that would present any meaningful challenge to the "mother party," the NDP. The NDP still held 95 percent of the seats in

1999. By 2005, ever more elaborate rules governing the establishment or campaigning of political parties excluded the Brotherhood, and continued to constrain the development of a vigorous opposition.

Islamic community endeavors such as clinics, new private schools, charitable associations, and Islamic teaching circles increased in the 1980s and 1990s. Islamist-owned supermarkets and shoe and clothing stores opened, as well as Islamic investment companies, like Al-Sharif (est. 1978), the Badr company (est. 1980), al-Rayan in 1982, followed by al-Huda and al-Sa`d the next year, and al-Hilal in 1986,⁹⁹ each promising higher rates of return than government banks. In 1988 there were more than 100 of such companies, and the assets of the 50 larger companies were estimated at \$3 billion.¹⁰⁰ In November 1988, the government closed the al-Rayan company, and panic set in as the body of the al-Rayan chief executive officer was discovered, and his widow left the country. The timing and manner of the government's intervention left many investors penniless.¹⁰¹

During these years, President Mubarak's strategy was to contain the moderates and uproot the radicals. While moderates were also arrested, imprisoned, censored, and mistreated, they managed to mount the first legal challenges to the constitutionality of the regime's actions, and tried to embarrass it through hunger strikes, publicity, and other methods.

Meanwhile, the state security services arrested militants, put them on trial, and tried to deny them havens. Many members went to the Gulf, Afghanistan, and later Albania and Chechnya. Key individuals like Ayman Zawahiri joined forces with al-Qa'ida. The Gulf War, in many ways, furthered EIJ's aim to delegitimize the Egyptian regime, when it suppressed popular

protests against Egypt's participation in the coalition with the West to fight Iraq.

A WAR WITH ISLAMISM

In a prolonged crisis of violence from the late 1980s to 1997, radical Islamists attempted or actually did assassinate a Speaker of Parliament; Ministers of the Interior; a Prime Minister; former head of the Shura Council, Rif'at al-Mahjub; judges; and other officials, as well as security service personnel and police officers including Major General Ra'uf Khayrat, Major General Ghabara, and Major General al-Shimi. An assassination attempt on Mubarak took place while he was in Ethiopia. Innocent bystanders were hurt and killed in radical Islamist attacks and counter raids. An Islamist assassinated secularist writer, Farag Foda, and even the Nobel laureate in literature, elderly Naguib Mahfouz, was attacked by a young man who said he had heard a preacher speaking on the evils of Mahfouz' work.¹⁰² Officials and foreigners employed guards for their homes. Violent radical Islamists targeted tourists as another means of destabilizing the government, carrying out major attacks that discouraged that sector. For some time, Islamists controlled an entire area of Cairo, the poverty-stricken neighborhood of Imbaba on the western side of the Nile. The government felt impelled to reconquer the area.

In Upper Egypt during this low-grade civil war, militant Islamists attacked police officers and their families, police stations, travelers on trains, and Copts (Egyptian Christians) who had been targets ever since the late 1970s. This Islamist movement of the south, as mentioned earlier, took up the causes of neglect and underdevelopment; poverty was more sharply felt

there. When the government in the late 1980s appointed new imams and preachers in the local mosques of the Sa`id, it also diverted *zakat* donations into government banks, depleting local charitable services. The government additionally attacked and mistreated those involved in Islamic development associations, as these were part of the Jama`at al-Islamiyya (its charitable arm), and in fact, such attacks sparked a civil war in Mallawi in al-Minya in 1994-95.¹⁰³

With the first bombing of the World Trade Center in Manhattan in 1993 which brought to light Shaykh `Umar `abd al-Rahman, a spiritual leader of the Islamist Jihad group, the specter of Egyptian Islamism and an international plot burst loudly into the world press. `Abd al-Rahman's preaching base had once been in the Fayyum. Due to his actions on behalf of the Muslim Brothers, he had lost his teaching position at al-Azhar University. He was put on trial following Sadat's assassination, found innocent, and released from jail in 1983.¹⁰⁴ Briefly arrested again in 1989, he made the pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and then traveled to the Sudan and from there to the United States where he preached against the secularist Egyptian government in the al-Salam mosque in Jersey City and the al-Badr mosque in Brooklyn. The Egyptian government and court system had difficulty branding him as a convenient villain because his spiritual inspiration to those involved in terrorism was no more than the `ulama's time-honored role of "commanding the good and denying the evil," the *hisba*.¹⁰⁵

The Brotherhood and the Government.

The Jama`at al-Islamiyya continued to garner support from those hoping for radical change and

opposed participation in the 1987 elections, but the Muslim Brotherhood expanded its role in these elections via an alliance with the Labor Party, and its publication, *al-Sha`b*. Just prior to the election, hundreds of people who supported the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested, and there was significant interference with voters during the election. Despite this, the group obtained 36 parliamentary seats, allowing them more of a presence in Parliament. They also obtained far more influence in the professional syndicates in these years, which the government sought to reverse via a new Law for the Guarantees of Democracy in Professional Associations.¹⁰⁶

The Egyptian government combined its attacks on the radical Islamists with an intensified onslaught on the moderate Muslim Brotherhood. This appears to have been because the regime truly feared a legitimate political challenge by this group in this period. In 1992, the *Sha`b* newspaper, then representing the Islamic Alliance composed of the Socialist Labor Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, protested the election fraud in which the NDP claimed to have won 50 slates, that were actually won by the Alliance, and up to 27 independent seats.¹⁰⁷

OTHER TYPES OF REPRESSION

The experience of political repression has also limited democratization. As noted, prior to the 1995 elections, the police arrested dozens of Brotherhood candidates, as well as certain senior members. They closed Brotherhood headquarters and handed over their legal jurisdiction to a military court citing the emergency laws. The elections were violent; 40 people were killed, and non-Islamist elements of the opposition spoke

out against the government's tactics and sentences handed down to the Brothers.¹⁰⁸ Saad Eddin Ibrahim and other political activists tried repeatedly to address repressive government practices regarding elections, and argued for the judiciary to oversee the elections. Judicial oversight was first implemented in the two-stage elections that took place in the fall of 2000. The judiciary had to fight to carry out their mandate and protested the government's efforts to punish judges in the spring of 2006.

Islamist leader, `Adil Husayn, his nephew Magdi Ahmad Husayn, and a cartoonist for their newspaper, *al-Sha`b*, were arrested and given a prison sentence for criticizing Minister of Agriculture Youssef Wali. The Court of Cassation overturned the sentence, and they were able to bring the matter to the Constitutional Court. This was a breakthrough in that it allowed for other constitutional challenges to government actions.

The government soon accused the Brotherhood of launching a campaign against *Walima li-A`shab al-Bahr*, the book by Syrian author Haydar Haydar, mentioned earlier, which Islamists had suddenly discovered (though it was published in the 1960s) and deemed "atheistic" in tone. The furor over the book led to student demonstrations and deaths in May 2000. The Political Parties Committee officially froze the Labor Party and closed the *al-Sha`b* newspaper,¹⁰⁹ thereby canceling out the fruits of the legal victory described above. Journalists engaged in hunger strikes in protest.

A further dimension of the conflicts between government and Islamists and Islamists and secularists spilled into the legal and intellectual spheres. The government has regularly censored the Muslim Brotherhood, in each case forcing cessation

of its publications, *al-Da`wa*, then *Liwa al-Islam*, and then *al-Sha`b*. In return, Islamist critics (and not only Brothers) attacked many Egyptian intellectuals on the basis of their statements, writings, or even course materials, e.g., Hasan Hanafi, Nasr Abu Zayd, Nawal al-Saadawi, and Samia Mehrez. Professor Abu Zayd's marriage was dissolved in a third party action because Abu Zayd's ideas were deemed "beyond the bounds of Islam," and the claim was made that as an apostate, he was illegally wed to his Muslim wife. The couple was forced into exile in Europe. The President supported a legal change, so that when Islamists attempted the same tactic against Nawal al-Saadawi, a well-known physician turned feminist activist, and declared her "outside the bounds of Islam" using the pretext of an interview in which she pointed to the pre-Islamic origin of one custom of the *hajj*, they were unsuccessful in two efforts to divorce her from her husband by third party action. Samia Mehrez, a professor at the American University in Cairo, was attacked in the press for using an allegedly indecent Moroccan novel in her literature course. The university tried to compel her to change her syllabus; calls were issued to expel her from the country, and Parliament debated the book.

The Brotherhood also enhanced its political appeal by condemning the attacks committed by the violent political groups. They put forth and explained revisions to their original ideological stance, such as their support of pluralism and of political parties themselves, since Hasan al-Banna had opposed *hizbiyya* (partisanship and the promotion of parties).¹¹⁰ They declared Coptic Christians to be full citizens, not *dhimma* with diminished rights, which contrasted with the militant Ji and other groups' attacks on Copts.

Their growing appeal threatened the regime. At the beginning of 1995, 82 Brothers were arrested and accused of plotting a coup and referred to military tribunals. Then following the attempt on Mubarak's life in Ethiopia in June 1995, there were further arrests. More than a thousand Brothers were arrested in 1995 and 1996. The 1995 arrests were meant to discourage the Brothers in the elections, which turned out to be extremely violent, and of the 150 Brethren candidates, only one was elected to Parliament. These attacks and detentions, coupled with differences between younger and older members (such as on the details of the role of Copts in the ideal Muslim society envisioned by the Brothers) resulted in a breakaway party, the Wasat, under Abu al-Ela Madi and others in 1996.

Fearing victory at the hands of Brotherhood candidates, the government arrested hundreds of students just prior to student elections in 1998. The government continued a strong media campaign that began in 1995, accusing the organization of terrorism, a claim it has rather successfully revived more recently in the guise of the GWOT. However, despite the continued media campaign, since 2000 the government has released many Brothers from prison. Their imprisonment actually added to their popularity, as a pattern was easily discernable—hold elections, arrest Muslim Brethren. This helped some of the released individuals in the next round of elections in 2005. The last of the original Brotherhood leadership died in 2002 and 2004, which has resulted in less authoritarianism within the organization, as evidenced by the election (rather than appointment) of the next General Guide, Muhammad Mehdi Akef.¹¹¹

CONTAINING RADICAL VIOLENCE

The Brotherhood were not aiming to overthrow the government, but to participate in it. Yet in the 1990s, the radical Jama`at al-Islamiyya drew attention to Egypt with many attacks on Egyptian authorities and tourists. The attacks on tourists were meant to hurt the economy. Among many such attacks were those on a Greek tourist group in Giza believed to be Israelis, and in October 1997, the firebombing of a bus filled with tourists parked just outside the Egyptian Museum by Islamists previously sentenced for violence, who had escaped confinement in a mental institution. Worst of all was a full-scale attack on a group of European tourists at the temple of Hatshepsut at Dair al-Bahri, in the Valley of the Queens in Luxor at the end of that year. Millions of dollars in tourist revenues were lost, and many small businesses involving the tourist trade were impacted. Most observers believed, or hoped, that the public was revolted by the violence of the extreme Islamists, who had threatened their income.

These highly publicized incidents were accompanied by less-reported attacks on police and Egyptian Christians in villages in Upper Egypt, and on passengers on the train line bound for that area. Attacks on Copts continued to be a serious matter. On January 2, 2000, there was violence in the village of Kosheh, leaving 20 Christians and 1 Muslim dead. The government condemned the official reports on this incident, preferring to take an ostrich approach, since sectarian problems in Upper Egypt appeared difficult to eradicate, and because claims of sectarian violence were damaging to the country's human rights record.

The Mubarak government hoped to stamp out militant Islam as well as its moderate opponents,

the Brotherhood, without insulting increasingly heightened Islamic sensibilities. Decrees banned the *niqab* (the Islamist face veil) in public schools or settings, and required that girls who wore the *hijab* should have parental permission. Many of these orders were ignored. Censorship over various publications continued as a means of forestalling Islamist criticism. At the same time, the government never really engaged in an open dialogue with the Islamists. The regime continued to treat the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wasat Party, a newer organization formed from breakaway Brethren along with some Copts, as illegal groups.

Truce.

After the violence of the attacks in Luxor, the government's security forces opened a full-scale attack on the Jama`at al-Islamiyya and what remained of EIJ. Eventually a truce was achieved, which opened the door for self-criticism and revisionism on the part of the EIJ and the Jama`at. Numerous explanations have been given for their members' *volte de face*. My sense is that these Islamists, fearing the loss of support by the Muslim masses, had gone through a sincerely introspective phase in which they realized that as a vanguard, they were too far from the aspirations and views of ordinary Muslims who could suffer as a result of their actions. Further, the Egyptian state's repressive capacity was quite strong. The Luxor incident truly threatened the regime by demonstrating its inability to contain the Islamist threat and the undermining of the tourist sector, hence the response, in terms of arrests, torture, detentions, and so on, were intended to be unbearable for the radicals, and they simply had to reconsider their way forward. Many believed the truce

to be just about a permanent one, so the speculation was that such truces could provide a solution to Islamist-state conflicts elsewhere in the region. Then the ground was shaken by the events of 9/11 in the United States. Since then, some of these groups' members have been critical of their own commitment to activist jihad. As we might expect, these expressions of remorse or self-criticism were denied and denounced by Ayman al-Zawahiri, as the treason of the *qa'idin*, those who sit on the sidelines.

AL-QA'IDA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPTIAN ISLAMIST MILITANTS

Whether as a result of repression at home or the growth of Islamic militancy on a regional basis, a strong connection between radical Egyptian Islamism and the al-Qa'ida group emerged.¹¹² These connections predated 9/11. Of at least 29 Egyptians connected with the al-Jihad group like Ayman Rabi` al-Zawahiri; or the Jama`at al-Islamiyya, like Rifa`i Ahmed Taha; and others like Mustafa Hamzah, many had fought in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Some of these "Afghan Arabs" later found refuge in the United Kingdom, Germany, or Pakistan. Al-Qa'ida benefited greatly from al-Zawahiri, who has served as theorist and strategist, and others like Muhammad `Atif who organized the 9/11 attacks. They, in turn, gained a financial sponsor in bin Ladin and a field for operations.

The Jama`at al-Islamiyya agreed to nonviolence following the Luxor attack. Consequently, 8,000 Jama`at prisoners were released. A section of EIJ swore to continue *jihad*,¹¹³ but the major force of the group also accepted the truce. The EIJ and the JI were essentially local jihadists, some of whom have been dubbed global

jihadists. We need to remember that:

- Every movement or nation-state can define local, regional, and international goals, and vacillate from one to the other. Thus al-Qa'ida had local goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the EIJ and JI aimed to continue jihad in Egypt, but each could and did inspire jihad elsewhere.
- The now local, now global status of Islamism is a feature of contemporary life, reflected in travel, Internet Islamist activities, text messaging, and other technologies, but local goals appear preeminent.
- We should deduce from the history of militant Islamism that the EIJ, more moderate Islamist organizations, and new small militant Islamist groups are affected and aggravated by the perceived Western crusade on the Muslim world.

Zawahiri.

Ayman al-Zawahiri personified a nexus of al-Qa'ida and Egyptian Islamism. His life shows that the Islamist tendency does not solely emerge from *sha`bi* (popular) neighborhoods or from economic desperation or social anomie. Islamist radicalism had spread to Egypt's professional classes. His forbears, unlike Usama bin Ladin's father, were privileged on both the Azzam and Zawahiri sides of his family, spelling out to Egyptians that the "enemy is within,"¹¹⁴ or more disturbingly, giving them a sense that men like Zawahiri are not really the enemy.¹¹⁵

Zawahiri's book, *Knights under the Prophet's Banner*, was serialized in the London-based Arabic newspaper,

al-Sharq al-Awsat and read all over the Arab world. He paints himself as one who educates Muslim youth to recognize the enemies of Islam. His appeal to *jihad* was very attractive to thousands of young men in prisons. He recommended a “by any means necessary” strategy, pointing to the damage that even small numbers of actors can exact and suggested targeting the United Nations, multinational corporations, the media, and international relief groups because these are covers for other operations, according to him, and are indicators of Arab and Muslim obeisance to the West. Like al-Qa’ida and many other groups, he also linked Palestine and then Iraq to the struggle.¹¹⁶ They oppose groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, and more recently Hamas, for engaging in the electoral process. In 2007, al-Zawahiri warned Hamas against accepting any deal with Mahmud Abbas and Fatah, seeing in recent events the efforts of the West to “divide and conquer” Muslims in every country.

Islamist attorney Montassir al-Zayat, who himself defended other Islamist prisoners, writes about al-Zawahiri in *Ayman al-Zawahiri As I Knew Him*,¹¹⁷ suggesting that it was the Zawahiri’s vicious torture by Egyptian officials that set him onto a path of no return.¹¹⁸ In other words, al-Zayat points to state repression as an agent in the emergence of militant Islam’s violence.

After 9/11, Egyptian authorities hoped that the truce would hold in the country, and figures like al-Zawahiri were of no immediate danger. However, new violence suggests that Islamist radical violence might be a sporadic, and seemingly an unpreventable feature of the landscape, thus casting a pessimistic light on the much-needed reforms of governance and political life in Egypt.

REEMEGENCE OF JIHAD IN EGYPT?

The string of violent incidents since 2003 included suicide attacks and car and truck bombs in the Sinai and Egypt proper. Bedouin radicalism was a new theme that piqued media interest, as this advances the notion that violent tactics are chiefly wielded by the alienated.¹¹⁹ Also novel was the advent of women's militant activism.

In September 2003, Egyptian police nabbed 23 suspected Islamist militants who intended to carry out attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq. Nineteen were Egyptians, but there were also three from Bangladesh, a Turk, a Malaysian, and an Indonesian. All had studied at Al-Azhar. In October 2004, Zawahiri issued a call for jihad (outside of Iraq) by audiotape. Then, on October 7, 2004, at the anniversary of the Ramadan War of 1973 (and close to the October 6 anniversary of President Sadat's assassination),¹²⁰ an Isuzu truck fitted with a car bomb exploded at the Taba Hilton, collapsing a part of the structure. Two other bombs were set off at a beachside campsite at Ras Shitan, killing 34 people. Israeli vacationers as well as Egyptians enjoyed this area, but its proximity to Israel signaled Israelis as a main target. A Peugeot fitted with a bomb was meant to explode at the Nuwayba Hilton where a group of Egyptian VIPs were vacationing, but instead blew up prematurely. Many more would have been killed if the Isuzu had been parked near the supporting wall, and if the Nuwayba attack had succeeded. A group called Jama`at al-Islamiyya al-`Alamiyya (World Islamic Group) claimed responsibility. Some linked the blasts to al-Zawahiri's audiotape, raising fears that al-Qa'ida could coordinate new attacks. Others tried to connect the blasts to Palestinian terrorism because of the popularity

of the northern Sinai coast with vacationing Israelis. Some Israeli sources initially stressed al-Qa'ida's planning and participation; arguing that the operation had taken 18-24 months of planning, that one of the vehicles used had been traced to Greater Cairo, and that Mubarak was withholding critique of al-Qa'ida in these attacks.¹²¹ After the attacks, 12,000 Israeli tourists in the Sinai during the Sukkot holidays fled. Then the Brigades of `Abdullah `Azzam, a heretofore unknown al-Qa'ida affiliate group, claimed responsibility.¹²² Egyptian authorities attempted to disassociate the attacks from al-Qa'ida and others in mainland Egypt, blaming the Bedouin of the Sinai, while assuring the public that this was an isolated event.

Soon after the October 2004 attack, Abu al-`Abbas al-`A'edhi, a leader of al-Qa'ida fi Jazirat al-`Arabiyya (Al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula), web-posted "From Riyadh/East to Sinai," a very significant document proclaiming a new jihad in Egypt that was to parallel attacks in Saudi Arabia.¹²³ This pronouncement underscored other statements made by al-Qa'ida strategists that their struggle would continue until they achieved victory in Iraq and spread into the Levant. Soon another group, the Mujahidin of Egypt, also claimed responsibility for the Sinai attack.

Attention focused on Bedouin radicalism, which could have emerged from the disaffection of the Bedouin for mainland Egyptian authorities, as well as their precarious economic situation. It might be difficult, however, to understand why Bedouin, especially in the north, would attack the tourist sector, which provides the only source of income outside of fishing and smuggling.

The Bedouin report extremely intense pressures on their value system, as their centuries-old pastoral way

of life has become a casualty of development. While this is true of other areas in the Middle East, the Bedouin of the Sinai are justifiably cynical about the process. As one tribal leader remarked years earlier when considering whether a discussion about smuggling included in a book could create any trouble: "And anyway, who would care? America—despite the movies [that American film producers shot here], they don't care about us. And if we weren't cheap labor or better than the [topographical] maps, neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis would care about us either."¹²⁴

The encroachments of the Israeli occupation and Egyptian re-extension of authority, as well as the influx of tourists in the Sinai produced many unanticipated changes in these tribal groups. One such change is the growth of the Islamic Movement—and this is true for other regions where Bedouin are prevalent as well—in Jordan, Iraq, the Gulf nations, the Negev, and in Egypt's northern coastal area.

In the wake of the Taba bombings, the police and security services detained up to 5,000 suspects. The detentions and poor treatment sparked demonstrations which included family members of the detained in the Egyptian city of al-Arish.¹²⁵

Then a few incidents occurred in the Egyptian capital. On March 29, 2005, an Egyptian man stabbed two Hungarian tourists who were seen kissing each other near the al-Husayn mosque in Cairo. Authorities described the assailant as "mentally unstable" and "unemployed," portraying this as an isolated incident. On April 7, 2005, a suicide bombing in the Khan al-Khalili bazaar killed three tourists and wounded 18 other people. Egyptian authorities initially announced that the bomber, Hassan Rafa`at Bashandi, acted alone, but a claim was later made by a heretofore unknown

Islamist organization, and the authorities sought the killer's accomplices,¹²⁶ arresting Gamal Ahmad `Abd al-`Al, Ashraf Sa`id Yusif, and another suspect and cousin of Ashraf's who died in police custody. Egyptian authorities claim that Ihab Yousri Yasin (aka Ihab Yousri Mohammad of Saft) learned of these arrests shortly before carrying out his own attack in Cairo. It seems likely that security forces were pursuing him when he was either blown up or blew himself up by launching himself from the bridge behind the Egyptian Museum, a major tourist attraction, onto `Abd al-Mun`im Riyadh square on April 30. The Ministry of the Interior reported that Yasin jumped from the bridge and subsequently detonated a bomb.¹²⁷ An Israeli couple, an Italian woman, a Swedish man, and three Egyptians were injured by what authorities said was a primitive type of bomb filled with nails.¹²⁸ The oddity of his method – why jump from the bridge at all – is striking. More to the point, in a different report some eyewitnesses described a heavy object falling from the bridge onto a man walking near them, who was decapitated by the explosion.¹²⁹

Later that same day, Yasin's sister, Nagat, and his fiancée, Iman Khamis, both in their 20s and fully veiled, reportedly opened fire on a tourist bus in the Sayyida `A'isha neighborhood. Sources again provide conflicting stories. One must understand that the media in Egypt are not free to report events like these in the way that they might be in the United States. Some reported that police fired on the women, killing one, while others described one woman shooting the other, and then wounded herself, dying later in hospital.¹³⁰ However, some witnesses said that police fired on the women.¹³¹ Two other Egyptians were hurt, but none of the passengers on the bus. Some 226 individuals

were arrested in the extremists' native villages and in the Shubra neighborhood of Cairo.¹³² A scrap of paper found in one woman's purse said that "we will continue to sacrifice our lives to let others live,"¹³³ — a typical characterization of "defensive" jihad. Libya subsequently extradited Yasin's 17-year old brother, Muhammad, to Egypt in connection with the April attacks.¹³⁴

A more detailed explanation of the Cairo incidents was never put forth by the government, which may have deemed the new theme of "revenge" in such incidents to be sufficient. However, the next event in the Sinai disrupted the tourist season for the year. On July 23, Egypt's national holiday that commemorates the 1952 revolution, coordinated bomb blasts killed 65 people in Sharm al-Shaykh, a tourist sea resort in the south Sinai popular with Europeans.¹³⁵ The timing of the attacks was calculated to exert maximum damage on tourists, though in fact, more Egyptians than Westerners were killed. In the first attack, militants planted a bomb in a suitcase in the parking lot of the Ghazala Gardens hotel, then drove a truck with a bomb hidden under vegetables into the hotel's reception area. When people fled the truck explosion, the suitcase exploded. Meanwhile, another truck got stuck in the Old Market area, so its drivers abandoned the vehicle and detonated the bomb. The coordination of the bombings and their timing (coming fairly soon after the July 7, 2005 (7/7) attacks in London) led some to speculate about international planning.¹³⁶

The Sinai attacks were not over, however. On April 24, 2006, three bombs were set off in Dahab, a Sinai resort further north favored by European and Israeli wind-surfers (and some say, drug-users) killing 19 people. Dahab also employs or provides income to many Bedouin who come down from the hill areas

to lead tours, fish, sell trinkets to tourists, or work in the hotels, and therefore the attack had an impact on the economic well-being of the Bedouin. While this impact does not automatically absolve the Bedouin of culpability, it does support the argument for external (at least to the Bedouin) involvement.

Two days later, two suicide bombers targeted a Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) base in the northern Sinai, but only the suicide bombers were killed. Eight months earlier, on August 15, 2005, a remote control bomb had injured two female MFO soldiers. Egyptian authorities at first denied a connection between the Sharm al-Shaykh attacks and those in Dahab and the MFO incidents, but later expanded on the idea that a new Bedouin terrorist cell affiliated with al-Qa'ida had developed, aggravated by the poor Sinai conditions and alienation of the Bedouin. Within 2 years, 11 attacks were attributed to a group that the Egyptian police called the Tawhid w-al-Jihad group. Police killed the founder, Khalid al-Masa'id, a dentist from al-Arish in 2005, then the group's other leader, Nasir Khamis al-Mallahi, a law graduate of Palestinian background born in the Egyptian delta, on May 9, 2006, in a shoot-out in the al-Arish area. Five men surrendered after hiding in caves and dunes there and subsequently were interrogated by the authorities. Fifteen were put on trial, and three were given death sentences. According to court statements, the two principals had recruited others in the area of Shaykh Zwayd, an impoverished part of the northern Sinai.

REVENGE OR UNDERDEVELOPMENT?

Egyptian officials disagreed that counterterrorist campaigns could have further encouraged jihad, but they, like others, do attribute certain attacks to "re-

venge." "Revenge" is now as frequent an explanation as the highly unsatisfying "insanity" which was offered in the past. Officially, torture, incommunicado detentions, and inadequate prison conditions in Egypt are denied by the government, though they are documented by groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International USA.¹³⁷ Torture and imprisonment in the late 1970s and 1980s led to further organizational development in prisons themselves, and the spread of "global jihad." A Jihad leader from Minya of the late 1980s, `Ali Muhammad `Ali, explained that the security forces attacked members "who prevented prayer services and pursued all of us without any apparent cause" (fulfilling the ideas of defensive jihad).¹³⁸ Human Rights Watch has documented torture, hostage taking, and abuse of detained Islamists' family members, including sexual abuse.¹³⁹ While it is possible that the emergence of several new "terror cells" since 2003 could be related to 1990's "overkill," the hiatus in violence makes this unlikely. Further, it is not clear that revenge motivations, which could explain the second and third Sinai attacks, were connected with the Taba blasts. Likewise, revenge could have played a role in secondary attacks in Cairo in April 2005, but not in the initial attacks (as in the Khan).

Other explanations of the new wave of violence in Egypt have been propagated. One approach is that new Islamist actors, unbound by any prior arrangements with the regime, have emerged. Such actors could be influenced by al-Qa'ida or global jihadism. Alternatively, the new actors may actually be or have some association with *agents provocateurs* of the regime's security services. Or these new actors are emerging due to long-standing underdevelopment combined with a need for revenge due to governmental attacks directly on them. The lack of agreement on

the cause of the new activities is clearly evident from the plethora of competing views expressed by key nongovernmental political figures. Ayman Nour, leader of the al-Ghad Party, argued that the violence was the result of the "environment of oppression and depression."¹⁴⁰ Mohammed Mehdi Akef, general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, condemned the attacks and expressed concerns about political reform. Al-Zayat, the Islamist lawyer who had known Zawahiri, said that independently operating (or freelance) jihadis are now emerging due to their sympathies with al-Qa'ida, or the struggle in Iraq or Palestine.¹⁴¹ Muslim Brotherhood leader `Isam al-`Aryan claimed Egypt had reached a "boiling point" and that the involvement of women (in April 2005) was an indicator of despair.¹⁴² Others suggested the April 30 attacks were simply acts of revenge.¹⁴³ An editorial in *al-Quds al-`Arabi* claimed the country is "sick beyond cure," and authorities are "as usual, falsifying the facts" and misleading the public while the jihadists re-emerge.¹⁴⁴

Although Egyptians are accustomed to discrepancies in such events and their media coverage, still some found it bizarre that the two women had no targets, or that there were so many versions of the two Cairo attacks circulating. Inconsistencies in the Sinai attacks also were noted.

During previous decades of low-level war with radical Islamists, the Egyptian government (through the official press) typically described isolated acts of "lunatics" or "criminals," rather than identifying coordinated radical attacks, or linking them to radical Islamism as with the 1997 attack on a bus near the Egyptian Museum in which 10 tourists were killed by Sabr Abu `Ulla. `Ulla had previously attacked and killed tourists but was placed in a mental hospital and

then released. Authorities claimed he had escaped the institute. Since new attacks tarnish the government's success rate in containing militant Islamism, a continuing lack of clarity in official messages about them is not surprising.

Other New Actors – Women.

Taking a step back to a regional perspective, 2005-06 also saw the entry of more women into militant actions in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Women had not, until the incident above, engaged in violence in Egypt, and their participation signaled something ominous to the Arab public¹⁴⁵ although women were identified with all of the Islamist radical organizations, and were often detained and even tortured.¹⁴⁶ Principles inhibiting women from taking active part in *jihad* go back to classical definitions of *mujahidin*: they should be male, adult, and without debts or, correspondingly, dependents, despite examples of early activist women. However, such restrictions were not in force during the time of the Prophet when earlier traditions of Arabian women who engaged in battle were still extant. For example, Nusayba bint Ka`b, also known as Umm `Umara fought in the battle of Uhud in 625 C.E.;¹⁴⁷ `A'isha, the Prophet's beloved wife, directed the Battle of the Camel; and Zaynab bint `Ali, the Prophet's granddaughter, fought in the Battle of Karbala (680 C.E.). Radical Islamists glorify these early Arabian warrior women, and thereby break from the traditional definitions of *mujahidin* to argue that women (and children) should join men in responding when jihad becomes an individual duty of Muslims. Analysts have warned for some time that the "typical" profile of the suicide bomber should not be restricted to

the young, desperate, uneducated, or male population. Still, Egyptians found it shocking that women would suddenly engage in such an operation.

AL-QA'DISM AND SECURITY

With the 2-year extension of the Emergency Laws in April 2006, some see a conspiracy theory in which the new violence bolstered the regime's claim that the extension was necessary. Information was withheld regarding the Ta'ifa al-Mansura, (Victorious Sect), a group of radicals from several areas of Cairo that was planning to attack tourist sites and assassinate both Muslim and Christian religious authorities. Somewhat strange was a more complete disclosure of this group and its activities released quite some time after their arrest, finally in April at a time when it compounded the threat factor posed by the Dahab bombings. This leads us to questions about these and the earlier Sinai bombings. If the current strife is caused by disaffected Bedouin and Egyptian-born Palestinians wanting to emulate al-Qa'ida, then what would be the reason for the emergence of other groups like the Ta'ifa al-Mansura or the Tala'i al-Fath (another jihadist group operative since 2003, and thought to be an offshoot of Egyptian Islamic Jihad whose members were arrested in September 2005) or the other attacks in Cairo in 2005? Is there, rather, something we can call al-Qa'idism—not global, but local, and not containable?

The Ta'ifa al-Mansura attackers have the same name as an Iraqi Sunni group (Jaysh Ta'ifa al-Mansura) that launched mortar attacks near the Kadhimiyya mosque in Baghdad in August 2005. The government detained this group of 22 young men for 50 to 90 days before announcing their capture. They came mainly

from al-Zawya al-Hamra and Tora, which is a poorer industrial area near Ma`adi to the south of Cairo. Ahmad Muhammad Ali Gabr, a 26-year-old literature student in the Faculty of Arts and Abu Bakr al-Masri, also 26 years old and a preacher, led the group. The government announced that the group had obtained information about explosives and poisons from the Internet and had planned attacks on tourists, a gas pipeline on the Cairo ring road, and against Muslim and Christian religious leaders.¹⁴⁸

Moderates: The Greater Enemy?

Just days after the April 2005 incidents mentioned above, police clashed with pro-Brotherhood demonstrators in Fayyum, Mansura, and Zagazig. Demonstrations were also held in Alexandria, the Delta, and Cairo to protest parliamentary efforts to amend a constitutional reform to election procedures that would directly impact the Brotherhood's efforts to obtain votes. They condemned the state-owned media and called for an end to the Emergency Law, and for reform. Observers believe that the Brotherhood might secure up to 30 to 35 percent of parliamentary seats in a free and fair election.

These efforts by moderate Islamists to cash in on the energy for democratization came up against the GWOT policies that now enhance the suppression of radical Islam, and the atmosphere in which vague charges of motivations and dynamics beyond Egyptian borders are sufficient for detention and trials. Conversely, some may argue that since moderate Islamists are already present in the Egyptian government and educational system, the gradual infiltration of the state by Islamists enabled the more hard-core and violent elements to escape censure and surveillance.

BEDOUIN RADICALISM

Neither the identification of a Bedouin cell nor the extension of the Emergency laws has defeated anti-government activity in the Sinai. Police and the security services have been conducting searches in northern Sinai where they located a cache of 600 kilograms of TNT close to the village of al-Rathlan on November 10, 2006, after an additional ton was located on October 29 in a different location.¹⁴⁹ While the idea that unintegrated and poorly served areas of Egypt would erupt into violence is believable, the problem with this explanation is that it does not pertain to radicalism from other more “developed” sectors of society, like al-Zawahiri’s Ma`adi suburb of Cairo, which cannot be remedied necessarily with better policies.

The Sinai coast enjoyed by well-off tourists at Sharm al-Shaykh, Taba, Dahab, and Nuwayba is quite a different setting than the northern part of the peninsula which has an Islamist presence in the town of al-Arish, and constant smuggling over the Egyptian-Gaza border.¹⁵⁰ The 360,000 Bedouin resent Egyptian authority, re-extended over the Sinai since the Israeli withdrawal. At the same time, a significant Palestinian population exists in the northern Sinai and Bedouin ties with Palestinians have sometimes formed. Islamist views have grown in both groups and even prior to the growth of these ideas, one could see the contrast between scantily-dressed Europeans, Egyptians, and Israelis frolicking on the Sinai beaches and in luxury hotels or “authentic Bedouin camp” tents and the Sinai residents. The International Crisis Group suggests that a full integration of the Sinai population and a new development strategy is crucial in solving the issue.¹⁵¹ More emphasis was given by the International Crisis

Group to Bedouin resentment of Egyptian “colonialism” than any discussion of Islamist concerns with Egypt’s tourist status. This issue needs some rethinking as well. Western and Israeli tourists require a secure zone if the Egyptian tourism sector is to operate as planned. Indeed, some scholars have written about the way that Egypt’s Pharoanic legacy, like Israel’s Biblical sites, supply additional reasons for security to provide a kind of *cordon sanitaire* for the Westerners. It may be that this type of development is no longer congruent with an increasingly angry segment of the population in some Middle Eastern countries; in any case, it is a question that must enter future planning.

NO SOLUTION?

There is no solution that will satisfy both the current Egyptian regime and its disenfranchised people, nor one that will completely satisfy both the Western security community and the Egyptians who are convinced that Islamism is here to stay and must be integrated into a new more civic culture. Caryle Murphy, in her book on radicalism and Islamism, argued for more intellectual openness, reinterpretation of Islam, and wrote, “Egyptians, including Islamists, need greater freedom to debate their future, speak their minds, and engage in politics.”¹⁵² Fawaz Gerges concludes in his study about the emergence of global jihad:

Instead of expanding the “war on terror” and embarking on new military ventures, American policy makers would be better served to exert systemic pressure on their Arab and Muslim ruling allies to structurally reform and integrate the rising social classes into the political space.¹⁵³

It is these “rising classes” that identify with Islamism.

Three and half decades of militant Islamism have taken place in Egypt. It is unfortunate that violent events are recurring, and hopefully this is not because the state has created or incited new cells on its own in order to retain control over the government and counteract the popularity of moderate Islamists. The government (and society) has accepted and replicated moderate Islamism in other dimensions (intellectual and social). Moderate Islamism is supported by many Egyptians disturbed by the sight of the Hamas government under fire in Gaza, and the all-out Israeli effort to rid Lebanon of Hizbullah. Indeed, regional survey data show that many citizens see no contradiction between Islamism and democracy.¹⁵⁴

Other Objections to Moderate Islamists.

The remaining objections to moderate Islamists and other forces of political opposition are that they are directly linked to the more radical and violent Islamists because their values (a) enable a culture of jihad and struggle for an Islamic state and (b) destabilize the current order. The first objection to moderate Islamism rests on the assertion that the Brotherhood could not be democratic and is frequently expressed by Israeli as well as Western security experts.

President Mubarak himself has suggested that some pluralism, rather than democracy, is the right way forward. He has (in the same vein as Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad) argued that Egypt’s economic needs should be addressed before heightened political liberalization. He also, however, stated that opposition forces and/or the country’s illiterate population were too [politically] immature to open the floodgates to their

whims.¹⁵⁵ More recently he declared his commitment to democracy saying, "I choose a strong and democratic Egypt; an Egypt that strives towards the future with free Egyptians," and promising constitutional reforms that would address some executive powers. At the same time, he reaffirmed the continuing threat of terrorism which has been the major argument for retention of the Emergency Laws.¹⁵⁶ While many observers do not trust the NDP, President Mubarak stated that he was not opposed to further amendments of Article 76 (which currently requires a party to have 5 percent of the seats in both parliamentary bodies to stand a presidential candidate). Independents need the support of 250 members of Egypt's parliamentary and municipal bodies,¹⁵⁷ making it nearly impossible for them to run.¹⁵⁸

The second objection, that Islamists destabilize the current order, is based on a zero-sum type of calculation, that if the government allows the Muslim Brotherhood a legal party status, they would overrun non-Islamist forces. Since the government will not allow them into the system, then they are destabilizing due to the strength of their opposition.

Even if one disputes both arguments, it is true that the Muslim Brotherhood is able to attract popular support in a way that the Kifaya protest movement and the smaller opposition parties cannot. If the rules for presidential and legislative elections were altered and the Muslim Brotherhood was legalized as a political party, it could achieve sufficient support to challenge the NDP. If President Mubarak does not run for office in 2011 (it is widely anticipated that he will not), his successor's legitimacy is contested, and the country erupts in violence, then what role would the Muslim Brotherhood play? The prospect of the huge security

services and possibly the army battling with Islamist moderates is a much more serious proposition, in a way, than the sporadic and possibly unavoidable violence of Islamist radicals that may well continue.

IDEOLOGICAL CONTAINMENT OF THREATS

The idea that Islamists in general, particularly moderates like the Muslim Brotherhood, are providing ideological fodder for *jihad* is not very credible, though a number of sources mentioned below insist this to be the case. First, the Party has essentially abandoned activist jihad and violence against the regime since its experiences of the 1940s and 1950s. Though the Party has produced other moderate Islamist groups like the Wasatiyya, it, too, proposes changes within the existing political system and abjures violence. As for inflammatory statements, one may note the existence of government preachers who are guilty of greater verbal extremism against Christians than the Brotherhood. Sticking points appear to be Egypt's ambivalence about Israel and Egyptian support for other Islamist organizations like Hizbullah and Hamas, which are recognized by most Egyptian Muslims as being moderates bent on national liberation. Although these groups are decried by Israelis as being terrorists, Egyptians do not equate them with radicals like al-Qa'ida.

Clearly, Islamism has a staying power that the West should recognize. Clear, too, is a need for dialogue in the country between moderate forces, whether pro-secular or religious. Perhaps in the absence of specific knowledge of Middle Eastern political players, some policymakers are being misled.¹⁵⁹

Climate of Radicalism?

Propaganda, or the “struggle over information” aside, there are other areas for concern brought up both before and after 9/11. These include the use of the Internet for information, the funding of militant groups, and the role of public and private mosques. The impact of these issues varies.

The Internet became more widely used in Egypt some years after its spread in the United States. While it has made a significant impact, it is very important to realize that it is not accessible by all Egyptians by any means and did not play a great recruitment role in Islamic militancy in the 1980s or early 1990s. In fact, despite much emphasis on cyber or next generation warfare today, the Internet might well be overemphasized in terms of informational value because of illiteracy, lack of computers, and fairly expensive usage fees to gain access to servers at home or to use in business offices and centers. While the Internet is certainly of value to existing organizations, the ubiquitous mobile telephones (with instant messaging and cameras) have probably had a greater political impact, and that is not restricted to Islamic militants. While the government and security services were alarmed by hacking events and the potential of the Internet for recruitment, they have also been concerned about its use for other political and social forms of dissidence.

Funding is a very difficult issue to address because of the lack of transparency, the informal economy, and inefficiencies in record keeping, even in government banks. Further, charitable activities and mosque building (*zakat*) and other funding of Islamic activities are a duty incumbent on all Muslims. As in other

countries, personal connections pertain to giving, but also, sometimes, to anonymity. In addition to the obligation of *zakat*, cutting off these funding streams is not feasible because it would, in turn, deplete a wide variety of social and charitable services, which would actually heighten tensions. This relationship was clearly demonstrated in Upper Egypt in the early 1990s. Egyptian government and Western insistence on cutting the community ties of Islamist social organizations has resulted in heightened anger against the state.

Absolutely no institution is as influential as the mosque and the ideological messages conveyed on a weekly basis through it. The Egyptian government has been accused of allowing incitement to radicalism in the mosques. Measures can be taken in those mosques controlled by a government ministry. Al-Azhar, as the key religious establishment in the country, has played an important role in regulating all processes, preachers, and activities of nationalized mosques (some 3,000 mosques were nationalized in 1962, whereas 50,000 were nationalized in 1994). However, in the same period, a huge number of private mosques were constructed in the country. Many of these were not subject to any supervision or licensing—at least 20,000 by 1994 and more than that number today, and the government has focused on controls over their construction, as well as incorporating as many as possible of the private mosques into the national system.¹⁶⁰ In at least one study, and in any careful observation of the interaction of al-Azhar and the government, one notes that the more strongly the Egyptian state attempts to exert its control over society—whether in an attempt to control religious or political discourse—the more that effort can backfire in some way; in this case meaning that

it has been difficult to reconcile liberal or “modern” moderate views with more conservative ones within the Azhar and hence within society. Also, as the Azhar cooperated with the government, the traditional independence of preachers – private ones, outside of their restrictions – was enhanced.

PERPETUAL TRANSITIONS?

Wise observers in Egypt have treated political development as a “transition,” even when systemic change has proceeded at a glacial pace. Despite the normally slow pace of change, there were definite changes in 2004-05. These began with the emergence of Kifaya and its calls along with other opposition voices to end the Emergency Law and rein in the autonomous behavior of the State Security Services, end corruption, and reform electoral campaigning and other procedures.

Following this development, President Mubarak announced his intent to allow multiple candidates in the presidential elections in February 2005. This in turn led to a constitutional amendment (via referendum) that in theory would open the door to presidential challengers. However, in typical “one step forward, two steps back” fashion, the wording of the amendment actually created additional opportunities for government repression. Because of the limits placed on participation – the amendment specified that only parties with 5 percent of the vote could promote candidates, and those candidates had to be party leaders/members of party executive groups – independents are essentially excluded because it would be impossible for them to acquire the necessary 250 legislative signatures stipulated in the amendment

to run, since they would have to obtain signatures of seated NDP officials.¹⁶¹ This differs from the types of requirements in the West which simply require voter signatures to add candidates or sometimes initiatives to a ballot. In addition, these rules exclude the Muslim Brotherhood from participating since they are not a legal party. Rather than hastening Islamist electoral victory or strengthening secularist political parties and rather than opening up the political framework to allow for larger representation of opposition parties, this electoral reform encouraged the regime to continue limiting political reform so as to prevent opposition parties from crossing the participation threshold. That said, Mubarak had done his best to at least appear democratic in coming up with an electoral proposal and holding the referendum to pass it. Egypt's small opposition parties – the Wafd, the Nasirists, al-Ghad (Tomorrow Party) the Tagammu`, the now-illegal Labor (Sha`b) Party, and the Kifaya movement, as well as the members of the Judges' Club – opposed and boycotted the referendum.

Several questions have arisen concerning the growing power of the Muslim Brotherhood. The first is whether the group is “democratic” or will support democratization. How would it treat minorities or political opposition?

While non-Islamist opposition parties such as al-Ghad and Tagammu` boycotted the referendum, they are at times as worried about growing support for the Muslim Brotherhood as the NDP. The NDP has consistently argued that if the Muslim Brotherhood were to be legalized and gain more power, it would not respect the rights of political contestants. In this vein, the government had accused the Muslim Brotherhood of underhanded tactics in the syndicates' elections in

1989 and finances as a way of explaining the groups' growing success.¹⁶² That there was little real evidence of manipulation or tampering in these elections (the charges were brought by the security services who have consistently promoted the NDP and government's interest) has little impact on the discussion.

The Muslim Brotherhood has discussed and demonstrated more concern for a democratic process, and highlighted the lack of democracy in Egypt. But opponents fear its stance in the "culture wars" will inhibit secularist or more eclectic approaches from the arts to politics. The Muslim Brotherhood has also committed to the full citizenship of Coptic (Christian) Egyptians. Yet some Muslim Brotherhood speakers have mentioned that a Christian could not be president, and would pay a different tax under Islamic law. A cumulative effect of the narrow scope for political participation is that the various parties have had little need to collaborate or function well together in government. Instead, various political forces are highly experienced in dirty tricks, public accusations, manipulation of key themes, like terrorism; or on the other side, of exclusion, disappointment, and work-arounds.

Some observers feel that international business interests would be opposed to a growth in power by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties. Although I have argued above (and elsewhere) that the economic situation for most Egyptians has worsened, it is also true that the picture is rosier for the outside investor, certainly in comparison to decades past. Outside investors differ; nonetheless European or American interests might well be scared off by NDP assertions that an Islamist-dominated Egypt would be an unfriendly investment environment as compared to

the present. Low labor costs in Egypt are a consideration for business. The prospect of occasional terrorist attacks is offset by the fact that over the last 20 years, whenever tourism has dropped for a time, it tends to regain its momentum over 12 to 24 months.

2005 ELECTIONS

The 2005 election campaign had a very short campaign period (August 17 to September 4), which worked in the incumbent's favor. However, while the government disliked the Wafd Party's use of the slogan "We Have Been Suffocated" in its campaign, it was not blocked. The government also did not successfully censor discussion of corruption, of Mubarak's finances, or Christian-Muslim relations. The Brotherhood called on its members to vote, but cautioned them not to vote for "corruption" or a "tyrant." The President for his part, promised to do away with the Emergency Law in place since 1981 (though he worked to renew the law after the campaign).

The presidential elections showed a poor turnout of 22.9 percent (7,059,010 of 32 million voters), and there were claims of vote tampering and irregularities. For instance, eyewitnesses saw the NDP bringing voters by bus to the polls. Other reported violations included, inter alia, a poll worker in Luxor telling a voter to vote for Mubarak while another worker filled out ballots for a voter, and a voter in Alexandria being promised food in exchange for a Mubarak vote.¹⁶³ In addition, the Presidential Election Commission waited until several hours after the start of voting to authorize civil society groups (NGOs)—despite some of the organizations filing court actions—and even after gaining authorization. When the NGOs went

to the polling stations, they were often either denied access or even beaten up.¹⁶⁴ A judicial request for elections to be held over several days (to allow proper supervision) was also denied.¹⁶⁵ Ayman Nour, the presidential candidate for the al-Ghad party, made additional charges – that nonindelible ink was used on votes or that no ink was applied at all. These charges are difficult to verify one way or the other.

In the end, the President was re-elected with 6,316,784 (88.571 percent) votes. Ayman Nour did not do as well as democratizers would have hoped, but better than the NDP wished for, receiving 540,405 (7.577 percent) votes. He ran against his own former party's (Wafd) leader, Nu`man Gom`a, who received 208,891 (2.928 percent) votes.¹⁶⁶ Seven other challengers received less than 1 percent of the vote, in order of their popularity – Usama Shaltut, Wahid al-Uqsuri, Ibrahim Turk, Mamduh Qinawi, Ahmad al-Sabahi (aged 90, he wore a *tarbush* (a fez) for the campaign), Fawzi Ghazal, and Rifa`t al-Agrudi. The numerous candidates were all really participating in a symbolic gesture of opposition.

The Egyptian parliament is a bicameral body made up of the People's Assembly and the Shura Council. The legislative elections held in November involved the People's Assembly and were plagued by vote-tampering and other types of corruption. The People's Assembly is made up of 444 elected members and 10 members appointed by the President. In the two-stage legislative elections, the NDP party retained its majority, but only after Party members who had run as independents rejoined the Party. Since there are now an increased number of Muslim Brotherhood members, the Assembly is now more outspoken, but it does not

have the ability to take effective actions opposed by the executive such as initiating executable legislative amendments. If there were a larger opposition, it could (and constitutionally should) move in this direction. The Shura Council, with 264 members (one third of which are presidential appointees) that serve for 6 years, is merely a consultative body.

The opposition parties created a United National Front for Change, but the Muslim Brotherhood ran candidates on its own tickets, winning 20.7 percent of the vote in the first round. The other parties won only 3.5 percent of the available parliamentary seats, consonant with their size. The government tried to harass the Muslim Brotherhood after the first round of voting, fearing the outcome. The government's record with its political challengers on the presidential and assembly level illustrates its real intent to hold onto as much power as possible, as seen in its arrests not only of Muslim Brotherhood members, but also Ayman Nour, Tal'at al-Sadat, protesters, and judges who attempted to follow their oversight process.

The Judiciary in the Recent Elections.

The judiciary again argued to uphold their duty overseeing the election in 2005, and their main complaint was that the requirement that all results be counted in 24 hours impeded their oversight. They protested, and by spring 2006, the spectacle of a government trying its own judges for attempting to carry out the measures of promised transparency truly angered different segments of the Egyptian public. Court of Cassation judges Hisham Bastawisi and Mahmoud Makki were prosecuted when they pursued an inquiry

into the electoral fraud alleged in 2005. Fifty judges held a sit-in at their syndicate's headquarters in protest, and police moved in to disband their protest, hitting one.¹⁶⁷ The 9,000-member judiciary was really protesting over something more important – the balance between the executive and other branches of government in Egypt. The struggle between the judiciary and the executive branch was dampened by the Dahab bombings, though the judiciary was not impressed with the security-based argument for the continuation of the emergency laws voted in by the People's Assembly in April 2006. Many Egyptians argued that with these bombings, the security services emphasized a politically convenient threat. The March 26, 2007, referendum on amendments to Egypt's Constitution was rushed and boycotted by the opposition. It put into place a revision to Article 88, which removed judicial oversight of elections, transferring it to an electoral commission. This change effectively squelched efforts at more open and fair elections.

Violence and election tampering took place in the first round of elections for Egypt's Shura Council on June 11, 2007. Thugs intimidated voters, monitors and voters could not enter polls, and police manhandled monitors in Upper Egypt. Violence and interference took place where Muslim Brotherhood candidates were running, especially in Giza and Imbaba.

PREEMPTIVE REFORM?

In response to criticism about the earlier elections and general direction of political reform, President Mubarak announced that he would make changes to the Constitution. In January 2007, the proposed changes to 34 articles, which had been prepared privately, were

revealed. The President's changes to the Constitution addressed several areas that sparked international and national criticism.

Judge, historian, and author, Tariq al-Bishri had predicted the revisions would not liberalize the situation, but rather tighten up possible loopholes. Al-Bishri explained that Mubarak sought to alter Article 88 so as to constrain the judiciary's oversight of elections, uphold the party slate system, and restrict the growth of any strong anti-NDP lobby within the People's Assembly.¹⁶⁸

In addition to these changes, the President intended to introduce a new anti-terrorism law, perhaps by summer 2007. This will undoubtedly attack certain protections previously maintained in the Constitution as well. In the draft amendments which were approved all at once on March 19, Article 179, which Egyptians are referring to as a "great disaster," allows for trial of civilians in military courts (the ongoing practice enshired within the emergency law), arbitrary arrests, searches without warrants, and violations of privacy previously protected within Articles 41, 44, and 45 of the Constitution. This amended Article 179 does away with the Office of the Socialist Public Prosecutor and now permits the Egyptian president to allocate a charge of terrorism to any court, thereby permitting referral to military courts.

Another revision to Article 5 blocks a party or any political activity carried out in a "religious frame of reference" (*marja`iyya*). This quite obviously targets the Muslim Brotherhood, both in its current operating mode and as a political party. The amendments grant certain novel rights to the Egyptian parliament, but Article 136 now allows the Egyptian president to actually dissolve parliament.¹⁶⁹ Along with the referendum's evidence

of devious extensions of authoritarianism rather than genuine reforms, there remains the previously mentioned antipathy to succession by the president's son. The NDP promoted this idea in campaign banners, including "Yes, to Mubarak, to the son of Mubarak, and the grandson of Mubarak,"¹⁷⁰ and the shouted slogan "*mish kifaya!*" ("not enough," meaning the people have not tired of Mubarak), countering the slogan of the protest movement, Kifaya.

Since the elections, the renewal of the emergency laws, the amendments to the Constitution, and the apparent slowdown of democratization, the Egyptian public has been distracted by a number of other issues, including a confusing new discussion about Egypt's possible initiation of a nuclear energy program. This began in response to the media uproar over Iran's showdown with the IAEA and Western nations.

The economy was more important to a larger number of Egyptians. At year's end, the failure of public-sector companies to pay promised bonuses and overtime resulted in numerous strikes and demonstrations from December 2006 to February 2007; and one, the largest shutdown since 1994, involved over 10,000 workers at the spinning and weaving factory in Kafr al-Dawwar.

CONCLUSION

Egypt's prominence in Arab political, intellectual, and cultural life should have positioned it more advantageously to launch a democratic experiment than countries reeling from war, sectarian strife, and insurgent activities like Afghanistan or Iraq. If there is indeed general public support in the region for democratization, then Egypt with its many NGOs and regional strategic importance could be expected

to continue moving in a positive direction. Yet authoritarianism and the struggle to maintain political control have slowed and interrupted this process.

As explained above, there appears to be no easy way to end sporadic militant Islamist violence. The regime's truce, or political compromise with radical Islamists, in 1999 enhanced its political confidence, and it did allow for recovery in the tourist and business sectors. These are, however, periodically shaken by continuing attacks, and the suspension of political rights through the use of the emergency laws has not ended the problem. It is clear that the Egyptian government's anti- and counterterrorist efforts to amplify state control and eradicate violence have not succeeded. Nor has the suppression of moderate Islamism strengthened the state in positive ways. Further, if Egyptian or American talk about liberty and reform is nothing but *kalam fadi* (easy talk), then Egypt's political future appears quite grim.

Authoritarianism is ill-suited to meet the novel dilemmas posed through globalization, whether these are economic, or outcomes of radicalized Islam. Thus, the United States should do more to promote increased transparency, democratization, and reform in this important Middle Eastern country. Yet it should be forewarned that Egyptians, regardless of their stance toward their own government, fiercely value their own sovereignty and independence. The following observations and recommendations may be useful.

1. U.S. policymakers can expect to see the continued emergence of radical Islamist elements such as the Sinai bombers. It is important to understand these as a confluence of different factors—the regional spread of jihadist ideology, failures in governance including elements of repression and injustice in counterterrorist

measures, and antipathy to Western and Israeli policies in the region.

2. Underdevelopment and political repression could contribute to disaffection in areas like the Sinai Peninsula, and Upper Egypt, but also in so many other areas of the country, where despite certain economic progress, too little reaches large numbers of people who subsist on very modest incomes. Worker disputes have emerged from relative wage stagnation, and, in all, the government needs encouragement to provide avenues for active citizenship, and not merely small handouts, relief, or emergency measures.

3. U.S. policymakers should look scientifically and dispassionately at the utility of moderate Islam as an antidote to radical Islamism, as suggested by a Rand report and Larry Diamond of the Hoover Institution, to mention only a few.¹⁷¹ This means a careful examination of the Muslim Brotherhood, its offshoot, the Wasat Party, and their potential. Given the continuing trend of Islamization, Islamists will undoubtedly play a role in a democratized Egypt. Just as the new Iraqi government now contains, and will undoubtedly include, Islamist parties in the future, this trend is too important to lock out in Egypt.

4. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, like its counterpart in Syria and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza, is now engaged in discussion about the implications of adopting an altered policy toward Israel. While the parties face different tensions, the Islamist stance on Israel could change in the future if a just settlement of the outstanding grievances of Palestinians could be reached. Many Egyptians who are not members of the Muslim Brotherhood actually share this position with their party. The policymaker should proceed with the caution that it would be

unwise to exclude Islamist parties— Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood—in this process. To do so would be hypocritical, given the importance of Jewish religious parties inside Israel.

5. If, on the other hand, U.S. policymakers wish to reject and counteract the growth of virtually all Islamist groups, then they must reexamine their definition of democracy and the proposal that liberty will prevent terrorism.¹⁷² They must anticipate the continued use of force against moderate as well as radical Islamists in Egypt and the possibility for increased violence and dissatisfaction as a result.

6. Policymakers should consider various scenarios that might take place in Egypt. By the year 2011, one might see (a) a peaceful political transition; (b) a military coup that will decide the form of political transition and the future leader of the country; (c) a period of violence resulting from contested political transition that could include the emergence of a more violent Islamist extremism; or (d) a situation in which the peace accords with Israel fail, perhaps due to action by Israel itself. Given all of these possibilities, we should develop more realistic stances and plans toward each, recognizing that state failure is not a one-fits-all condition.

7. U.S. policymakers should urge Egyptian policymakers to continue economic reform, but they should educate themselves about its secondary effects. Privatization and “opening” the economy had certain benefits and also brought social costs. The dream of using the desert to alleviate population pressures in the Nile Valley was promoted by Egypt’s government from Sadat City and the 10th of October City to Mubarak’s South Valley Development Project, known as the Toshka project, in the barren Western

desert near Lake Nasser. Detractors call Toshka, at a cost of \$66 billion dollars, Mubarak's Pyramid. Will it really relieve overcrowding, and will the incentives the government plans to offer provide a better life? With a large population and low supply of water per person, is it best to build in the hottest area (over 43 degrees Centigrade/122 degrees Farenheit in the summer) of the country? Most policymakers need to educate themselves about development in the Middle East to understand the challenge of planning and development, as well as other aspects of economic transformation and privatization, to comprehend the possible impact of current policies.

8. U.S. policymakers should encourage the Egyptian government to begin much more thorough reforms in other areas of the government (public education and health care) and in the creation of civic institutions that can make beneficial changes and promote cooperative decisionmaking. The overcrowding, invisible tuition in the form of private lessons, deficits in the curriculum, and promotion of vocational education mean that the poorest students fail to matriculate. Those with funds for private lessons may complete their schooling but must compete against students with a foreign language education for jobs in the enlarging private sector. Students who attend vocational schooling have far fewer options than others. The challenges facing the health care system are similarly complex. U.S. policymakers would be best advised to make recommendations in tandem with other European donors and WHO (the World Health Organization).

9. U.S. policymakers should insist that the Egyptian government ensure the political and human rights of citizens, including the political opposition and those arrested under the emergency laws. The practices

of torture, extralegal physical abuse, and irregular detentions must cease. Citizens must also be free to cast their ballots without interference. The case of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the arrest and sentencing of Ayman Nour, the past and recent arrests of Muslim Brotherhood candidates, and the electoral violence and irregularities of the last several elections have no place in a free and democratic Egypt.

10. A more difficult arena in need of reform is the uncivic culture that is a natural consequence of a troubled, if not failing state. Ilya Harik explains Egypt's "uncivic culture" as one directly deriving from a flawed development process. Cynicism, corruption, lawlessness, and individualism are all symptoms of this culture.¹⁷³ From al-Arish to the Delta and from Cairo to Minya, the local and the personal always take precedence over Egypt's national interests. That cannot be directly addressed by U.S. policymakers, but they might be able to encourage its nurturing, again through more plentiful and better information about the concerns of Egyptians which can at least be deduced from media in English from Egypt itself.

11. U.S. policymakers, officials, and informed Americans should be sensible and sensitive in the approach that they take to the "war of ideas" or communications regarding Islam, Muslims, and the appropriate way to dampen extremism. Treating Egyptian Muslims as if they are the source of the war on terror instead of an ally in that war is counterproductive.

12. Egyptians should not let themselves be shut out of the discussions on counterterrorism nor the future of the Middle East. Universities, research institutes, and NGOs should have a voice in policymaking, instead of merely reacting to documents issued about their country

from Washington-based entities. DoD officials and U.S. policymakers should forge links with appropriate bodies in Egypt outside of the U.S. Embassy, where the lengthy history of Islamic extremism has sparked debate and ideas that are seldom heard within the U.S. policymaking establishment. Such an engagement would require efforts on the Egyptian side as well.

13. The U.S. military relationship and programs with the Egyptian military are extremely important to both sides. Bright Star, the biannual exercise conducted by U.S. Central Command, the Egyptian forces, and eight to ten other nations, was not held in 2003 due to U.S. commitments elsewhere. It successfully resumed. However, in 2006 and 2007 some American policymakers cast doubt on the amount and efficacy of U.S. aid given to Egypt.

In 2007, Congress voted to withhold \$2 million in military aid until certain political and judicial reforms are made, and weapons flows to Gaza cease. This could be the only way for the United States to push for reform, but the effort is offset by the new \$13 billion military assistance agreement. DoD officials should have sufficient data about Egypt and be able to think creatively about the prospects of future conflicts in the region, including that outlined in 6 (d) above, so they neither over- nor underestimate the role of the Egyptian military. Further, the large size of the Egyptian security forces should serve as a wake-up call. The future of these forces is also inextricably tied to the political future of the state.

ENDNOTES

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5. James Toth, "Islamism in Southern Egypt: A Case Study of a Radical Religious Movement," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 35, November 2003, No. 4, p. 362.

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7. Speech at the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC, November 6, 2003.

8. Daniel Brumberg, *Democratization Versus Liberalization in the Arab World: Dilemmas and Challenges for U.S. Foreign Policy*, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, p. 12.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

10. Sherifa Zuhur, *A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency*, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, p. 1.

11. The Grand Mufti of Egypt, Shaykh Professor Dr. Ali Jum`ah (Gum`ah), is a signatory to the "Open Letter to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI," issued in 2006 in response to the Pope's lecture at the University of Regensburg, September 12, 2006.

12. Bassiouni Hilwani in *Aqidati*, November 11, 2003.

13. *Al-Ahram*, November 10, 2003.

14. Measuring “freedom” is a complicated task that rests on universal standards. Freedom House gives Egypt an overall grade of 6 in political rights (as compared to Jordan’s 5) for 2006; but it also measures women’s access to freedom, and the scores in this regard are:

Nondiscrimination and Access to Justice: 3.0

Autonomy, Security, and Freedom of the Person: 2.8

Economic Rights and Equal Opportunity: 2.8

Political Rights and Civic Voice: 2.7

Social and Cultural Rights: 2.4

See Freedom House, “Country Reports: Egypt,” 2006.

15. Ahmad Al-Sayyid al-Najjar [Naggar] in *Al-Inhiyar al-Iqtisadi fi `Asr Mubarak*, Cairo: Merit Press, 2005, shows the devastating corruption and negative effects of these policies. One may compare his critique to Ilya Harik’s stance that insufficient privatization occurred in industry, and agriculture, still a mixed sector, will be more efficient and less distorted as it “liberalizes” (privatizes). Ilya Harik, *Economic Policy Reform in Egypt*, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1997, pp. 38-85.

16. Diane Singerman, *Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 255-260.

17. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S Foreign Policy and Security Goals,” Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, April 2006, p. 17.

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27. Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-221.

29. Galal Amin, *Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? Changes in Egyptian Society from 1950 to the Present*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2000, pp. 65-75, 101-118.

30. Al-Wafd, July 4, 2006; based on an economic reform report of Egypt’s Shura Council.

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34. IRIN, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Egypt: Despite Advances, Many Egyptians Struggle to Feed Families,” February 16, 2007, available at www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=26241.

35. Thomas W. Croghan, "Road Less Traveled: Four Developing Countries Blaze New Trails to Better Health," *Rand Review*, 2006, available at www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/fall2006/road.html.

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71. The following request by an Indonesian Muslim and patriot, and *fatwa* given by Rashid Rida in the journal, *Manar*, demonstrates his broader influence on issues of the day. Rashid Rida, "Patriotism, Nationalism, and Group Spirit in Islam," in John L. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 46-59. Rida, a Syrian, was a second generation member of the reform (*salafi*) movement.

72. Richard P. Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

73. Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State*, Gainesville: University of Florida, 1999, pp. 82-131.

74. Moussalli, p. 151.

75. Sayyid Qutb, *Ma`rakat al-Islam wa al-ra`smaliyya (The Battle of Islam with Capitalism)*, Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1975, p. 28; also see Sayyid Qutb, *Fi al-tarikh: Fikra wa-minhaj (On History: An Idea and A Method)*, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1974, 23-25.

76. Sayed Kotb, *Social Justice in Islam*, John Hardie, trans., Washington, DC: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953.

77. Sayyid Qutb, *al-Ma`alim fi tariq (Signposts on the Road)*, Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1980, 7th edition, pp. 173-174.

78. Nazih N. Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, London, 1991.

79. Sadat carries the legacy of a "man of peace" in the West. He was not mourned in Egypt like his predecessor, Gamal Abd al-Nasir. Perhaps this is because he was identified with the interests of the elites (*khassa*) and not the *`amma* (or the *sha`b*, the ordinary folk), through the psychological effect of his 180 degree reversal of national and foreign policies. Also see `Abd al-`Azim Ramadan, *Misr fi ahd al-Sadat (Egypt in the Time of Sadat)*, Beirut: Dar al-Ruqi, 1986.

80. This being the Weberian thesis for the development of religious fervor.

81. Sherifa Zuhur, "State Power and the Progress of Militant and Moderate Islamism in Egypt," in James Forest, ed., *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century*, Vol. III, New York: Praeger Security, 2007.

82. Giles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, pp. 93-94.

83. Zuhur, "State Power."

84. *Ibid.*; Johannes J. Jansen, "De betekenis van het Islamitisch fundamentalisme: De Lotgevallen van de Shoukri-group in Egypte," in P. Boele et al. eds., *Naar de letter, Beschouwingen over fundamentalisme*, Utrecht: 1991, pp. 185-202; or see J. J. Jansen, "Takfir wa al-Hijrah, Jama`at al-" in John Esposito, ed., *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

85. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1980.

86. Ibrahim, "Anatomy;" also see Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2, April 1988.

87. Denis Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999, p. 78.

88. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

89. Nemat Guenena, "The 'Jihad': An 'Islamic Alternative' in Egypt," *Cairo Papers in Social Science*, Vol. 9, Summer 1986, p. 63.

90. Stephen Ulph, "The Islambouli Enigma," *Global Terrorism Analysis. Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 1, Issue 3, September 3, 2004.

91. Guenena, p. 55.

92. A 27-year-old engineer executed after Sadat's assassination. The book draws heavily on the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya, a medieval writer. See Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam, Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 103-104.

93. Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996, pp. 161-167; see also Youssef Aboul-Einein and Sherifa Zuhur, *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.

94. Aboul-Einein and Zuhur.

95. See Fawaz A. Gerges, "The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt? Cost and Prospects," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 53, No. 54, Fall 2000.

96. Guenena, pp. 43, 44.

97. Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, pp. 195-196.

98. *Human Rights Watch*, "Reading between the Red Lines: The Repression of Academic Freedom in Egyptian Universities," 2005, available at www.hrw.org.

99. `Abd al-Qadir al-Shuhayb, *al-Ikhtiraq: Qissat sharikat tawzif al-amwal (The Disruption: The Story of the Investment Companies)*, Cairo: Sina` lil-Nashr, 1989.

100. "Special Report on Egypt," *Middle East Economic Digest*, October 14, 1988.

101. Denis Sullivan, "Extra-State Actors and Privatization in Egypt," Ilya Harik and Denis Sullivan, eds., *Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 40-41; Said Aly, "Privatization in Egypt," pp. 53-54.

102. Mahfuz was attacked for the subject matter of his early trilogy (for which he won the Nobel Prize), *Children of Gebelawi*. The three novels critique Egyptian society as seen through a modest neighborhood showing the devastating cruelty of life there. The characters carry the names of Muslims in early Islam,

as is also typical of modern-day Egyptians. Islamists took this authorial choice to mean a mockery of Islamic society and mores.

103. Toth, pp. 559-563.

104. `Umar `Abd al-Rahman, *Kalimat al-haqq (The Word of Truth)*, Cairo: Dar al-Itisam, 1987, pp. 177-199; Gehad Auda, "Omar Abdel-Rahman," John Esposito, ed., *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, New York: Oxford University, 1995.

105. Zghal; or for the commonly prevailing U.S. media perspective on the Islamists, see Judith Miller, "Sheikh Emerges on TV to Deny Link to Bombing," *New York Times*, March 19, 1993.

106. Mona al-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, August 2005, pp. 379-380, 382.

107. Denis Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt*, pp. 132-133.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

109. Mandy McClure, "Stop the Presses," *Cairo Times* online archive, May 25-31, 2000, p. 4.

110. El-Ghobashy, pp. 381-383.

111. *Ibid.*, 389-390.

112. Ahmed Moussa, "Egypt's Most Wanted Egyptian Afghans," *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, October 18-24, 2001.

113. Khaled Dawoud, "Concepts of Jihad," *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, January 11-17, 2001, at weekly.ahram.org.eg.

114. Samir Rafaat, "Ayman al-Zawahri The World's Second Most Wanted Man," November 1, 2001, www.egy.com/people.

115. Zuhur, *A Hundred Osamas*.

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 38.

117. Philip Smucker, "Arab Elite Warms to Al Qaeda Leaders: Al Qaeda Biographer Stops Sales of Book Because It's Too Critical," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 30, 2002.

118. The book also offers details about organizational and personnel matters of the Gama`at, and subsequently, the al-Qa'ida connection. al-Zayyat, *Ayman al-Zawahiri kama `arifuhu (Ayman al-Zawahiri as I Knew Him)*, Cairo: Dar Misr Al Mahrousa, 2002.

Al-Zawahiri's own writing is important as well, particularly his *Bitter Harvest*, which is an attack on the Muslim Brotherhood, and his efforts to combat popular mythologizing about al-Qa'ida in *Knights under the Banner*. Here for instance, he is at pains to show that the United States did not fund al-Qa'ida, and that its money came from popular Arab organizations (not Arab governments, though, in fact, the Saudi government has been implicated in funding of the mujahidin). Zawhiri, *Knights under the Prophet's Banner*, December 3, 2001, as serialized in *al-Sharq al-Awsat*.

119. Cécile Hennion, "Les faces cachées du Sinai" ("The Hidden Sides of the Sinai"), *Le Monde*, April 26, 2006.

120. Chris Zambelis, "Sinai Bombings Mark Latest in Pattern of Symbolic Attacks in Egypt," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 3, Issue 17, May 2, 2006.

121. "Al-Qaeda Pushes Outer Limits," *Debka-Net Weekly*, Issue 177, October 15, 2004.

122. Sherifa Zuhur, "A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt?" in *Unmasking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities*, Christopher Heffelfinger, ed., Washington DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2006.

123. "From Riyadh/East to Sinai" 24/8/1425 h./October 8, 2004, posted on numerous Islamist sites. See also Sherifa Zuhur, "The New Jihad," *Terrorism Bulletin, Wilberforce Quarterly*, Spring 2006.

124. Hajj X as interviewed by Smadar Lavie. Lavie, *The Poetics of Military Occupation: Mzeina Allegories of Bedouin Identity under Israeli and Egyptian Rule*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, p. 162.

125. Jailan Halawi, "In Hot Pursuit," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, May 18-24, 2006.

126. *Al-Gumhuriyya*, April 29.

127. "`Amaliyyatan irhabitan ta'thiran al-faza' fi Midan `Abd al-Mun'im Riyadh wa al-Sayida `A'isha," *al-Ahram*, May 1, 2005, p. 1.

128. *Columbia Daily Tribune*, May 1, 2005.

129. His remains are depicted along with the official version of events in "al-Irhabi al-qatil qafaza min A`ala Kubri Uktubir," *al-Ahram*, May 2, 2005, p. 5.

130. The latter version was provided by Security Chief Nabil El-Ezabi.

131. *Columbia Daily Tribune*, May 1, 2005.
132. Jailan Halawi, "Terrorist Replay," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, May 2, 2005.
133. Summer Said, "226 Arrested after Cairo Attacks," *Arab News* (Saudi Arabia), May 2, 2005, available at www.arabnews.com.
134. *Al Jazeera*, May 8, 2005, also available at english.aljazeera.net.
135. Khairi Abaza, "Sharm al-Shaykh Bombings: The Egyptian Context," PolicyWatch #1023, Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, August 12, 2005; some reports said that local hospitals claimed there were 88 killed.
136. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez reportedly supported this view. "Egyptians Search for Three Blast Suspects," *Foxnews.com*, Sunday, July 24, 2005.
137. Amnesty International U.S.A.: "Egypt. Annual Report 2006," covers 2005, the report covering 2006 should be posted under 2007 at this site, www.amnestyusa.org/countries/egypt/document.do?id=ar&yr=2006; and Human Rights Watch, "Egypt: Award Winning Blogger Among New Arrests"; "Egypt: Police Intensify Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood," December 18, 2006; "Hundreds More Protesters Arrested," May 18, 2006; "Police Severely Beat Pro-Democracy Activists" May 31, 2006; "Egypt: Journalists Still Risk Jail under Press Law," July 11, 2006; "Egypt: MP Jailed in Latest Attack on Free Expression," November 4, 2006; all accessible at www.hrw.org.
138. John Voll, "Fundamentalism in the Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan," Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 389.
139. "The Black Hole: The Fate of Islamists Rendered to Egypt," *Human Rights Watch*, May 2005, available at hrw.org/reports/2005/egypt0505/; and see "Hostage Taking and Abuse of Female Detainees," *Human Rights Watch*, available at www.hrw.org/about/projects/womrep/General-108.htm.
140. *Al-Ghad* official statement, May 1, 2005.
141. *Arab News*, May 2, 2005.
142. Doha Al-Zohairy, *Al Jazeera*, May 1, 2005.

143. *Al-Jazeera*, May 2, 2005.
144. Editorial, *Al-Quds al-`Arabi*, London, May 2, 2005.
145. Abd al-Mun`im Ibrahim, *Akhbar al-Khalij*, Bahrain, May 2, 2005.
146. Such practices continued and were used against (non-Islamist) protesters as well. Human Rights News, "Crackdown on Anti-War Protesters," *Human Rights Watch*, March 24, 2003; "Hostage Taking and Intimidation by Security Forces," 1995; "Hostage Taking and Abuse of Female Detainees," no date.
147. *Women Claim Islam: Creating Feminism Through Literature*, New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 88.
148. Jailan Halawi, "Sects and Politics," *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, April 27–May 3, 2006.
149. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, November 11, 2006.
150. International Crisis Group, "Egypt's Sinai Question," *Middle East/North Africa Report*, No. 61, January 30, 2007, p. 8.
151. *Ibid.*, Summary, pp. 22-23.
152. Caryle Murphy, *Passion for Islam Shaping the Modern Middle East, The Egyptian Experience*, New York: Scribner, 2002, p. 279.
153. Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 275-276.
154. Amaney Jamal, "Who are the Democrats and Islamists in the Arab World?" *World Affairs*, Fall 2006. Jamal used data from the World Values Survey for Egypt and Jordan, showing that income and attitudes about gender appeared to affect stronger Islamism or democratic views; class, or at least income levels, played a role too, so that lower income and "poor gender attitudes" defined as not "pro-woman" were more strongly Islamist than democratic. Unfortunately, the World Values Survey asks only a few questions on Islamism, but Jamal's conclusions are in line with regional specialists' assessments, and contradict some ideas found in the Western media.
155. Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, p. 67. Here Wickham refers to his May Day speech of 1989 and one given at Alexandria University in 1992.
156. President Mubarak speaking at the Al-Masa'i al-Mashkura School in the Minufiyya Governorate, Middle East News Agency, July 28, 2005.

157. Gamal Essam Al-Din, "The Article That Never Goes Away," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, Issue 818, November 1-7, 2006.

158. That, in fact, was the reason that both Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Nawal al-Saadawi had to give up their efforts to run as President in the last election.

159. As in Rachel Ehrenfeld and Alyssa Lappen, "Ban the Brotherhood," *FrontPage Magazine.com*, December 27, 2005.

160. Tamir Moustafa, "Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 32, 2000, pp. 3-22.

161. Abaza, p. 4.

162. Ninette S. Fahmy, *The Politics of Egypt: State-Society Relationship*, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 136, 143-148.

163. Maggie Michael, *Associated Press*, September 7 2005, available at www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20050907-0901-egypt-election.html.

164. "Egypt Vote Monitors Beaten, Barred Access," September 7, 2005, available at www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=14479.

165. Jeremy Sharp, Congressional Record Service (CRS) Report to Congress, "Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections," September 21, 2005.

166. Chayma Hassabo, "Moubarak 'sans cravate': Un Moubarak 'démocratique'?" (Mubarak 'with No Tie': A Democratic Mubarak"? in Kohstall, Dir. *L'Égypte dans l'année 2005*, p. 49.

167. "Clashes at Egypt Judicial Protest," *BBC News*, April 24, 2006.

168. Interview with Tariq al-Bishri, *al-Dustur*, October 11, 2006, available in English at www.ikhwan.tv/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=5460.

169. Nathan J. Brown, Michele Dunn, and Amr Hamzavy, "Egypt's Constitutional Amendments," Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 23, 2007.

170. Siraj Mufti, *Muslim American Society*, September 25, 2006; also see photo of election banner posted at www.ordoesitexplode.com/me/2005/08/cairo_snapshot_.html; Jennifer Peterson, "Painting the Roses Red, White, and Blue in Egypt," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Vol. 24, September-October 2005. Posters also

said the “fetus in his mother’s womb votes for Mubarak.” Other banners denigrated Ayman Nur with a reference to Albright who he met shortly before going to prison, asking “whose son are you, Ibn al-Madeleine?”

171. “The Muslim World After 9/11,” RAND, *www.rand.org*; and as cited in “Generating Alternatives to Radical Islam,” *World Trends; The Futurist*, May/June 2005, p. 15; Larry Diamond, Remarks at “Democratizing the Middle East?” Conference, Tufts University, Medford, MA, January 26-27, 2006; and included in “Democratizing the Middle East,” Occasional Paper, No. 2, Boston: Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Tufts University, 2006, p. 48.

172. For example, F. Gregory Gause III, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005.

173. Ilya Harik, *Economic Policy Reform in Egypt*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997, pp. 212-213.

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GLOSSARY

Abu Ghazalah, Muhammad Abd al-Halim (b. 1930). A former Minister of Defense, then a presidential advisor in 1989 who departed the political scene about 1993.

Akef, Muhammad Mehdi. The General Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

`Amma. Popular social class. The ordinary Egyptian people of the lower and lower middle classes. The word for colloquial Arabic (the language of the ordinary people) *`ammiyya*, is related to this word.

`Amn al-Dawla. The ordinary name, meaning “state security” for the State Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), the internal security arm of the Egyptian government.

Apostasy. One of the most serious crimes in Islamic law, meaning the denial of one’s Islamic faith. This denial, however, cannot be coerced, and it must be admitted by the apostate, who should have an opportunity to recant.

Arab Socialism. A philosophy that developed both under the Ba`th and other groups in Syria and later, Iraq, and in Egypt under President Gamal abd al-Nasir. It differed from classic European-based socialism in its focus on Arab identity and unity as well as the aim for greater social and economic equality to be enacted by the state. Land reform, state subsidies and nationalizations of large industries and banks were all viewed as Arab socialism.

Arab Socialist Union. A political party founded in Egypt by President Gamal abd al-Nasir as the country’s sole political organization which was intended to provide a vehicle for the Egyptian people to support the goals of the 1952 Revolution, Arab unity and Arab socialism.

Arian, `Isam, al- (Esam). A medical doctor and long-time Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader arrested in 2007.

Awqaf. Plural of *waqf* which is a form of endowment in perpetuity. Muslims could designate income-earning assets or property as

awqaf, and the government was not supposed to seize this property as state land (although, in fact, that occurred). Egypt, like some other Muslim states, has a ministry that administers and deals with this type of endowment.

Azhar, al- An Islamic university in Cairo. Religious officials associated with al-Azhar may issue statements on matters of religion for the government, review publications, and credential and regulate preachers and teachers.

Banna, Hasan al- The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 and its first General Guide. Al-Banna promoted the activity of *da'wah* which means preaching, Islamic education and generally spreading the Islamic message through non-violent activities.

Bashawat. Pashas. Honorific term for the elites, especially the landed elite prior to 1952.

Bedouin. Arab tribes, pastoral or sedentarized (settled). The bedouin speak a different Arab dialect and have many customs that differ from other Egyptians.

Bright Star. A biannual exercise conducted by the Egyptian military along with the U.S. military and a number of other country partners to improve their capabilities.

Caliphate. The first Muslim political institution, created when the Prophet Muhammad died and he was succeeded by Caliph (*khalifa*, or follower) Abu Bakr. Muslims give an oath of allegiance to the caliph who should come from the Quraysh tribe and ensure the pious observance of Islamic law. The caliphate actually splintered into many smaller states, though a Caliph remained in Baghdad until the 1055 sack of the city, and then again, until the Mongol invasion. Some contemporary Muslim groups have discussed or actually aim to revive the caliphate in place of other forms of government. Other Muslims hold that the modern nation-states have acquired their own identities and it would be difficult for a caliphate to be reestablished.

Copts. Members of the Christian Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt. The church is based on the teachings of Saint Mark. The name comes from the Greek word Aigyptos. They are approximately

12 to 13 percent of the Egyptian population. Radical Islamists targeted some Copts and Coptic-owned businesses during the period of Islamist violence in Egypt.

Dar al-Harb. Literally, house or domain of war, meaning a territory controlled by non-Muslims and in which Muslims should follow Islamic law, but the requirements are, at times necessarily, different than in the territory governed by Muslims.

Dar al-Islam. Literally, house or domain of Islam, a territory governed by Muslim rulers.

Da`wah. The mission to spread Islam in the world and re-energize Muslims in their faith, causing society to function in a more Islamic manner. This mission is conducted through education, social organization and political activity.

Delta. Refers to the fertile area where the Nile River forks and splits into smaller branches in the north of Egypt.

Dhimma. Originally referred to Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, but later the Peoples of the Book to include another religion with a holy scripture. In an Islamic state, the non-Muslim scripturalists' status is that of *ahl al-dhimma*, the People of the Pact of Protection. They paid a poll tax, and had their own religious leadership, but were legally and politically subject to Muslims in certain definitions of Islamic law. Because Egyptian Copts and other Christians are equal to Muslims under Egyptian law, there has been a debate about the status of dhimma in an Islamic state. As the Coptic Church experienced a religious revival alongside the one occurring with Muslims, some tensions emerged over the rights to build churches or mosques and in intergroup relations.

Faraj, Muhammad Abd al-Salam. A leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group, the organization that assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat. Faraj's tract, *al-Farida al-Gha'iba (The Missing Duty)* which promoted militant jihad, had a strong influence on Islamic Jihad and other jihadist organizations.

Faruq, King. King of Egypt from 1936-52 when the Egyptian Revolution (a military coup) forced him to abdicate. He was the son of King Fu'ad I, and his family had ruled Egypt as viceroys in

the 19th century, and continued their rule as the British retreated from direct rule of the country.

Ghad Party, al- New party whose leader, Ayman Nour, broke off from the Wafd Party. Ghad means tomorrow.

Hajj. The annual pilgrimage to Makka in Saudi Arabia. Required of Muslims at least once in their lifetime if they can afford the journey.

Hakmiyyah. The idea that the sovereign can only be God (Allah) and not a temporal authority, especially if that authority supports un-Islamic laws and actions. Hasan al-Banna as well as Abu al-`Ala al-Mawdudi wrote about this concept.

Hatata, Magdi. Chief of Staff of the Egyptian armed forces.

Hijrah. Emigration. Refers to the Prophet Muhammad's flight from Makka to Yathrib (later Madina) with the early Muslims. It also refers to emigration in general.

Hijab. Islamic covering for women. Refers specifically to the head-covering adopted by many Muslim women since the 1970s that covers the hair and neck, but reveals the face. Earlier and alternate veiling traditions exist. Sometimes women also wear longer, more concealing clothing, in addition to head scarves.

Hisba. The general injunction to command the "good" (that which is Islamically lawful) and forbid the "evil" (that which is disallowed in Islamic law). The ruler of an Islamic state should uphold the *hisba*. However, in many modern states, no punishments for infractions of Islamic law are meted out. In others, like Saudi Arabia, they are, and a volunteer force, the *mutawa'in*, deputize themselves to warn or punish offenders.

Hisb al-Tahrir al-Islami. Islamic Liberation Party established by Shaykh Taqi al-Din Nabhani in Jerusalem in 1953.

Hizbiyya. Partisanship. A focus or emphasis on political party membership. This type of allegiance was denounced by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood because he thought that Muslims should not be divided and factionalized in

this way, and also, that the Ikhwan, the Brotherhood, should be more encompassing, and operate on social, educational, cultural, economic, legal fronts, and not only with regard to political activity.

Id al-Fitr. The feast at the end of the month of Ramadan, during which Muslims fast during the daylight hours. Id al-Fitr and the Id al-Adha, the feast of the sacrifice are major holidays in the Muslim world.

Infitah. The policies of “economic opening.” President Sadat initiated a new law and policies intended to allow more foreign imports at lower tariffs (not always low) in contrast with the protective policies under Abd al-Nasir; privatization, in contrast to the public ownership policies and large public sector areas; allowing for rent increases and changes in land and property rents; encouraging of joint ventures which could include non-local partners; and overall conversion of the economy to a more liberal or laissez-faire system.

Infitahiyyun. Persons and social groups who benefited from the policies of the Infitah. These included certain types of tradesmen, those investing in construction, businessmen, and many others, but not professionals who drew a modest salary from the public sector which decreased in value due to inflation.

Islamist. Term that refers to Muslims who would prefer a more religiously conservative government in Egypt, or one based entirely on Islamic law. Some Islamists may not oppose the government while others may, hence the term is NOT synonymous with “political Islam.” As Islamist views are broader and more disparate than the word “fundamentalism” would imply, this term is preferred in academic or scholarly materials. However, Islamists may not like the term and say they are merely “Muslims.” In Egypt, some refer to Islamists as “*sunniyyun*,” “*islamiyyun*,” or “*salafiyyun*.”

Istishhad. The action of martyrdom. Whereas, martyrs should not commit suicide or kill innocents, radical Islamists and others refer to suicide attacks as acts of martyrdom.

Jahiliyya. The pre-Islamic era, considered an age of barbarism. Contemporary Islamist militants charge the Egyptian government

and leaders of recreating *jahiliyya* because they do not follow Islamic law, the *shari`ah*.

Jama`at Islamiyya. (Gama`at al-Islamiyyah) Literally means "Islamic Groups," and referred originally to Islamist student organizations, study groups, and also a militant organization with root both in southern and north-central Egypt. By the 1980s, the term was used most often to describe that umbrella militant organization, whose spiritual leader was alleged to be `Umar ibn Abd al-Rahman. The JI declared a truce in their hostilities with the Egyptian government in 1999.

Jihad. Struggle or war "in the path of Allah." Frequently defined in English as "holy war," Muslims distinguish between the greater jihad, the daily struggle to fulfill the requirements and ideals of Islam and the lesser jihad, which is fighting to defend Islam, or for the faith.

Jihad, Egyptian Islamic. (Gihad Islami) A militant Islamist organization whose members assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. Many Jihad members were put on trial or tried in absentia in Egypt and some fled the country like Ayman al-Zawahiri who joined forces with Usama bin Ladin in Afghanistan. Other Jihad members declared a truce in their conflict with the Egyptian government in 1999. This organization should be differentiated from Palestinian Islamic Jihad based in Damascus, currently led by Ramadan Abdullah Shallah.

Kalam fadi. Literally, empty talk, or easy words. Equivalent to empty promises, or "all talk, no action," in English.

Khalid, `Amr. An Islamist preacher and televangelist who became very popular, and was forced to leave the country, charged with being a sort of Islamist Rasputin. He was especially attractive to youth because he spoke plainly about contemporary issues. Not a cleric, he wore a suit and did not radiate an aura of extremism. His ideas included self-motivation, self-improvement and sincerity. He continued his programming after moving from Egypt to Lebanon to London.

Khassa. Elite groups in society. In Egyptian history these included the ruling dynasties of Mamluks, and other Turko-Circassian

families, as well as the military and some of the merchant groups. In the contemporary period, Egypt has a small ultra-wealthy elite, and a somewhat larger group of *nouveaux riches*.

Kifaya. A political movement that took the name “Enough!” to demonstrate frustration with the political status quo in Egypt. Kifaya is not a large political party, but more of a protest movement. For many years, public demonstrations were not permitted in Egypt, although they were occasionally held. Thus, merely demonstrating about a political issue is an important statement.

Khul`. A means of divorce initiated by women who agree to give up the normal bride price, or *mahr* paid in an Islamic marriage which is usually given one-half at the contraction of the marriage, while one-half is deferred in case of divorce. The *khul`* is like a ransom payment, as the woman also gives back to the groom the jewelry and gifts that are a typical part of the marriage. The “*khul`* law” was actually a package of reforms for women that included this method of easier and swifter divorce for women.

MFO. Multinational peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the United Nations situated in the Sinai peninsula to observe and prevent violations of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. These forces have about 30 observer locations and two base camps, one in the north not far from al-Arish and the Israeli border and the other in the southern part of the Sinai at Sharm al-Shaykh.

Mubarak, Gamal. Son of President Husni Mubarak of Egypt. A leader in the National Democratic Party.

Mubarak, Husni. President of Egypt from 1981 to the present (2007). Mubarak assumed power after Sadat’s assassination. He moderated both the economic opening of Egypt and the implementation of coordinated activities with Israel as neither policy has been entirely popular. He is also the head of the Democratic National Party, the largest political party and heir to Nasir’s Arab Socialist Union.

Muslim Brotherhood. Also referred to as Ikhwan al-Muslimin, or simply Ikhwan (Brethren). An Islamist organization founded in Isma’iliyya, Egypt, in March 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, a

schoolteacher to promote an Islamic way of life through education and organized activities. The Brotherhood developed separate and autonomous branches in many other countries. A secret military wing of the organization was operative in the 1940s and allegedly in the 1950s leading to the outlawing, imprisonment and exile of members in the Nasir years. Muslim Brotherhood members were released from jail in the 1970s and have continued a wide range of social and political activities until today.

Nasir, Jamal (Gamal in the Egyptian dialect) abd al-. President of Egypt from 1954 until his death in 1970. Nasir formed a group within the military known as the Free Officers to overthrow the Egyptian monarchy and evacuate British troops from the country. They carried out their plan in 1952. Some of his policies and positions were very popular, including Arab unity and his emphasis on the needs and rights of the ordinary Egyptian. But land reform policies and state seizures of private holdings were not popular with the elites they disempowered, and his Arab socialist policies were not ever fully nor successfully enacted in Egypt. He supported nonalignment, yet obtained arms and military advisors from the Soviet Union and Bloc.

National Democratic Party. Formerly the Arab Socialist Union and established in 1978 by the late President Anwar Sadat. After his death, President Husni Mubarak headed the Party. The Party no longer supports Arab socialism, but instead the importance of the private sector. Its basic principles are somewhat vague, in that it affirms the state, and was, until 2005, nearly inseparable from it. It upholds Egyptian identity and Egypt's links with Arab and Islamic nations.

Niqab. A face veil worn by Muslim women in addition to garments that cover their hair and conceal their bodies. The niqab became an important marker of more conservative Muslims as well as those identifying with Islamist groups. It is also popular in the countries of the Arabian Gulf. Islamists and non-Islamists who wear it believe that it is required under Islamic law, but other Muslim women disagree.

Nour, Ayman. Leader of al-Ghad Party. Ran for president in 2005 and was jailed on what his supporters say are trumped-up charges.

Qa'iduna (or qa'idin). Those who "sit" and do not participate in jihad, though they know it is required.

Qaradawi, Shaykh Yusuf al-. A long-time member of the Muslim Brotherhood living in exile in Qatar where his extremely popular television program airs on Al Jazeera Television. Al-Qaradawi is an Islamist, but more moderate than many others. His position on women's rights is protested by Arab feminists and he is a strong proponent of the Palestinian cause.

Qutb, Sayyid. A Muslim Brotherhood leader executed in prison in 1966 by the government of Gamal abd al-Nasir. Sayyid Qutb studied for three years in the United States. His most important written work is probably *Fi Dhill al-Qur'an (In the Shade of the Qur'an)*, a work of exegesis (*tafsir*) which demonstrates his Islamist ideas, but he is perhaps better known outside of the Middle East for his last book, *Ma'alim fi Tariq (Signposts on the Road)*, because of its dark assessment of his era and assertion that jihad and martyrdom are necessary to fight un-Islamic governments.

Qutbism. A term some use to attribute Islamist extremism to ideas in Sayyid Qutb's final book. The attribution is too narrow.

Sadat, Anwar al-. Vice President of Egypt (1966-70) and President, 1970-81 when he was assassinated by Islamist militants. Sadat like Nasir was a military officer and member of the revolutionary Free Officers. He reversed some of Nasir's domestic and foreign policies, notably opening Egypt's economy and traveling to Jerusalem, and signing the Camp David Accords with Israel.

Sahwa Islamiyya. Islamic awakening. A Muslim way of referring to the religious revival and growth of Islamist groups that began in the 1970s.

Salafi. Purist, or reformer. This could refer to different reform movements, including that led by Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian reformer and jurist who called for a modernization of Islamic thought and education, but today it more often means followers of the movement led by Muhammad abd al-Wahhab of the Arabian peninsula or other purists, some of whom want a return to the practice of the first generations following the Prophet Muhammad.

Sha`b. Like *`amma*, this word may mean the popular classes, but it can also refer to the entire Egyptian or Arab people as in Nasir's famous statement, "The Arab people are one [united] people."

Shahada. Martyrdom. Linked to jihad in the thought of Sayyid Qutb and other jihadists. The argument in classical Islam is that one cannot choose, or set out to be a martyr, but martyrdom is desirable.

Shari`ah. Islamic law which is formulated by referring to the Qur'an, the *hadith*, (short texts about the Prophet Muhammad's life and practices), *qiyas* (analogy) and *ijma`* with variations in each of four different schools of law in Sunni Islam. The Shi'i jurists also use a principle called *ijtihad*, a special technique for jurisprudence.

Shaykh al-Azhar. The most important Islamic official clerical office in Egypt as the chief representative of the al-Azhar University and educational network. The Shaykh al-Azhar may issue *fatawa* (legal responses), or explain a particular Islamic legal stance; that in recent years, is usually in tandem with the government's position, or a position the Egyptian government wants its citizens to accept.

Shura. Consultation. The key principle for Islamic government. One house of the parliament in Egypt is the Shura Council, and quite a few other Muslim countries call their legislative body the Majlis al-Shura.

Sukkot. The Jewish Feast of the Tabernacles. A harvest celebration recognized as a national holiday in Israel. At Sukkot, and other Jewish holidays, Israelis like to travel to the beaches of the northern Egyptian Sinai in addition to their own seaside city of Eilat.

Sulaiman, `Umar. The head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Department.

Syndicates. Egypt's syndicates are organizations for professionals in the same occupation. The advocates' (lawyers'), physicians', judges' or engineers' syndicates elect representatives and take up certain political actions vis-à-vis the government. Labor unions were outlawed in 1954, and strikes and demonstrations are illegal,

although they have been held more and more frequently in recent years.

Ta'ifa al-Mansura. Literally, the Victorious Sect; a group of radicals from several areas of Cairo that were plotting to attack tourist sites and assassinate both Muslim and Christian religious authorities and were captured in the spring of 2006. The group was led by Abu Bakr al-Masri (Ahmad Basyuni) and Abu Mus`a (Ahmad Muhammad Ali Gabr), according to a jihadist website.

Takfir. The act of calling someone a non-Muslim, or an enemy of Muslims. *Kufr* refers to those who “cover” the truth, and is the opposite of *islam*, or submission and surrender to God. The idea that a Muslim could deny the Muslim legitimacy of the ruler through *takfir* came from the medieval writer Ibn Taymiyya, and was expounded on by many other Muslim writers and preachers, past and present.

Takfir wa al-Hijrah (Higrah in the Egyptian dialect). The name Egyptian authorities gave to a violent Islamist sect that believed all of Egyptian society as well as its President were *kufr* (non-Muslim) and they should “migrate” away from society to build their opposition movement.

Tali`a al-Fath. An Egyptian jihadist group captured in September 2005. The group emerged in 2003 and was alleged to be an offshoot of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The name of the group means the Vanguard of Victory and is the same as that used by the training camps that al-Qa`ida had established.

Tantawi, Muhammad Husayn. Defense Minister of Egypt and Field Marshal, born in 1935.

Tarbiyya. Training. As in all cultures, education carries the ideas of imparting knowledge, *ta`lim*, and also training, in a professional, vocational sense and in terms of survival or human development. While Islamist *da`wah* activities or Islamic study circles are intended to enlighten or provide *ta`lim*, the radical Islamist groups training programs are much closer to the normal military activity of training.

Tawhid. The unity of Allah (God) in Islam. The fundamental expression of monotheism.

Tha`r. Revenge. Expressed through vendettas between families, or between Islamists and police.

Ulama. Religious scholars, or Muslim clerics. They should possess *ilm*, enlightenment or knowledge and be formally trained.

Ummah. The Muslim community as a whole.

Upper Egypt. Southern Egypt. A poorer and underdeveloped area, which includes some important Pharaonic sites.

Wafd Party. A nationalist political party that initially sought to be a delegation (*wafd*) at the 1919 Paris Peace conference, but the British denied it that role. Under the leadership of Sa`d Zaghlul, it became a major party when Egypt obtained independence in 1922. President Nasir dissolved the party in 1952. It reemerged as the Neo- or New Wafd Party—a nationalist, liberal party—in 1983.

Wasat Party. Wasatiyun has come to mean moderate Islamists or those who seek a middle ground—not only in Egypt, but also in Jordan and some other countries. In Egypt, this group broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore has somewhat younger figures than the leadership of the parent party.

Zaghlul, Sa`d. Nationalist leader and politician early in the 20th century who became the first Speaker of the National Assembly and, although the British subsequently ruined his career, was regarded as a hero in the Arab world.

Zakat. A duty incumbent on all Muslims that requires them to give a set portion of their income and assets to the poor or to Islam.

Zawahiri, Ayman al- Referred to as Usama bin Ladin's spokesman or the second highest figure in al-Qa'ida. Al-Zawahiri was educated in Cairo as a physician and was jailed and tortured for his activities in Islamist organizations in Egypt. He fled the country, made his way to Afghanistan and gave his allegiance to bin Ladin.

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