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By Blood, Not Ballots: German Unification, Communist Style

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On 13 May 1990, the Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, Yuli Kvitsinsky, left Bonn for Moscow to receive instructions on how to handle the growing drive for German unification. The four powers with residual rights in Germany as a result of their victory in World War II had just ended their first meeting on that topic, and Kvitsinsky realized that the Soviet government had yet to work out its own approach to this burning issue. "The existence of the DDR [or GDR, German Democratic Republic] was only a question of months, and we faced the choice in the time remaining whether to engage actively in the solution of the issue or to simply accept what those in the West would create without our contribution."¹

Although Kvitsinsky's boss, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, had realized as early as 1986 that "in the near future the German question would define Europe," Kvitsinsky found little support for a diplomatic solution outside his own ministry.² "It was disturbing that . . . many deputies of the Supreme Soviet did not wish to accept the developments, that a massive attack against the foreign minister appeared in the press, and we were overwhelmed with criticisms from other government departments, especially from the military."³

Apparently unknown to the Soviet Ambassador were the far-reaching plans drafted decades earlier by communist leaders for an alternative, more "favorable," and most bloody solution to the German question. These plans called for a rapid military strike across the German plains to the Atlantic if and when possible. The plans were premised upon the retention of East Germany within the Warsaw Pact and the use of East German territory as the key staging area for a massive nuclear and conventional attack. Eleven well-trained East German divisions (five of which were unknown to the West) were assigned to

the attack. Their mission entailed offensive action followed by unification of West and East Germany under a common communist regime. These well-developed plans help to explain why the hopes of Kvitsinsky and Shevardnadze for a diplomatic solution met such strong resistance.

The details of the extensive Warsaw Pact offensive plans, designed to destroy NATO forces in West Germany and, if possible, effect total domination of Western Europe, now are emerging from documents found in East German files following peaceful unification in 1990. Despite the destruction of many papers in the archives of the East German army, some 25,000 files remain, containing more than 500,000 classified documents. When combined with interviews of former East German officers, these sources "show unambiguously how, through political decisions made by the highest officials, the forces of the former Eastern Bloc were so organized that a sole option was given for an offensive and how, through regular exercises, [this plan] was refined."⁴ Equally disturbing, Pact exercises of this basic offensive doctrine, complete with the simulated use of nuclear weapons, continued until 1990—long after Gorbachev had pledged to restrict Soviet doctrine to one based upon "Defensive Sufficiency," and three years after the Warsaw Pact's formal renunciation of offensive plans.

The Planned Attack

In 1992, a year after the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev provided his own confirmation of the detailed planning which supported the offensive nature of this former military alliance:

As you know, there used to be the Warsaw Pact, and it provided the basis for creating the first and foremost strategic line, a springboard for further offensive operations. This line ran along the borders of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]. *Corridors were set up there, with powerful groupings of troops in place, meant to break through defenses. It was estimated that in order to overcome the main line of defense, it was necessary to have at least sixfold superiority over the opponent.* The breach of subsequent defense lines required only a threefold superiority. It is obvious that in preparation for the performance of such tasks, there should have been a concentration of the appropriate troops, not just "large in numbers" but also excellently drilled and perfectly trained. *Elite troops, to put it briefly. Indeed, such elite troops were actually concentrated along the main strategic line.*⁵

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Jim Kistler, USARMC

Figure 1. The axes of the planned Warsaw Pact attack.

The East German documents and extensive interviews reveal that Warsaw Pact forces planned a massive offensive through West Germany along five different axes, with a sixth possible under certain conditions.⁶ It must be emphasized that these were not merely contingency plans—the kind which most military establishments prepare to cover possible outbreaks of conflict. Pact offensive plans had the participating units *already assigned*, the goals specified, and the potential nuclear targets identified. All that was required for execution was last-minute updates and mobilization of the required units.

The East German army was to play a major role in attacks on four of the six axes. It was expected to mobilize 11 divisions, 2500 artillery systems, 2300 main battle tanks, and more than 5000 armored fighting vehicles. Six of the East German divisions were capable of achieving full

combat readiness within 24 hours, in part the result of strict military regulations which required that between 70 and 80 percent of all army personnel be physically present in garrisons at all times. The remaining five East German divisions would be ready for battle within one week.⁷

The mobilized East German forces possessed munitions adequate for 90 days of combat with a 100-percent redundancy. Once the borders of West Germany had been cleared of enemy troops, the East German units would begin occupation duties in the long-coveted reunited fatherland.⁸ At that moment, a central goal of the East German regime would be realized. Other Pact troops, however, would continue their drive westward. Among the main objectives, as East German Defense Minister Heinz Hoffman reported to his National Defense Council, was "to reach the Bay of Biscay and the Spanish border on the thirtieth and thirty-fifth day."⁹

Axis One of the grand offensive consisted of a two-pronged thrust along the Baltic Coast in the direction of Jutland, with the objective of conquering the northwestern German region of Schleswig-Holstein, establishing control of the Baltic Sea, and seizing existing NATO air bases for use in subsequent operations. The designated objectives were to be attained within 100 hours after the outbreak of hostilities. Three East German, one Soviet, and one Polish division, accompanied by various support units, would bear the brunt of the fighting.

Lothar Ruehl, former head of the West German Ministry of Defense Planning Staff, noted perceptively that such a stringent deadline for reaching the contested objective—100 hours—implies extraordinary effort and the rapid destruction of NATO forces positioned to block such an offensive: "Staff officers of the *Bundeswehr* who are familiar with Warsaw Pact operational planning maintain that it would have been difficult to conduct an . . . offensive such as this . . . [and that] in order to be successful, the Warsaw Pact would have needed much larger forces and it would have had to use chemical and nuclear arms at an early stage of the campaign."¹⁰

East German documents reveal that between 78 and 90 tactical nuclear weapons with warheads ranging from three to 100 kilotons were available to support the East German troops. Delivery systems included SS-21 and Scud B missiles as well as a number of nuclear-capable Soviet aircraft. First and follow-on use of such weapons was planned, with targets already selected deep in NATO's corps areas. Unfortunately, no information has yet been discovered to shed light on the precise political decisionmaking process involved in the final authorization for nuclear strikes. It is assumed that the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party would make the basic decision to use nuclear weapons.¹¹ Such crucial decisions would hardly be delegated to East German authorities.

East German forces also were assigned prominent roles in the three axes to the south of the Jutland offensive. Axis Two encompassed the northern section of West Germany in the area of Bremen and Hamburg, continuing on

“First and follow-on use of tactical nuclear weapons was planned, with targets already selected deep in NATO’s corps areas.”

into the Netherlands. Axis Three proceeded from the East German region of Magdeburg toward Hannover and Braunschweig, into the Ruhr and further into Belgium. Axis Four traversed the famous Fulda Gap toward Frankfurt am Main and on to the Rhine, with possible expansion into the French regions near Reims and Metz.

In addition to these planned assaults, a fifth route of advance would take Pact forces without East German participation through Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, over the Rhine, and into France. A sixth route, apparently not fully worked out, would take Pact forces through neutral Austria and Switzerland (Lake Constance, Basel) into France in the area of Besançon. A follow-on stage of the southern two axes, operating without East German forces, would take Pact forces into the interior of France in an effort to destroy suspected NATO reserves, with the Bay of Biscay and the Spanish border representing the limits of advance.¹²

Occupation

The conquest of West Germany would be the signal for East German forces to commence their occupation of the conquered land, a goal for which detailed plans had long been made. East German intentions concerning West Berlin provide an example of the meticulous attention to detail in East German plans for the occupation.

West Berlin was divided into two sectors for the initial assault, with designated East German units assigned to take the western area (District One), and to provide assistance to Soviet forces engaged in District Two. Approximately 32,000 Pact forces and East German policemen would confront 12,000 NATO soldiers and 6000 West Berlin police. Early in the conflict, Tempelhof and Tegel airports would be taken by parachutists. Allied casernes and strongholds, including the Allied *Kommandantur* on Kaiserswerther Strasse, the US Mission on Clayallee, and the Turner caserne, were to be seized and turned over to the invading Pact forces for their use.¹³

Details for the ensuing administration of West Berlin, drafted as early as 1985 and signed by the head of the East German district administration (*Bezirksverwaltung*), Lieutenant-General Schwanitz, provided a key role for East German security forces. The initial task was to seize and intern “enemy forces,” which in this context meant leading politicians, bureaucrats, and well-

known economists, scientists, and technology specialists. The list also included individuals particularly odious to the East German authorities, such as secret agents employed by the West German military, leaders of disliked organizations, and journalists who had been critical of the East German state.

“The most significant enemy centers,” were to be occupied and secured, with General Schwanitz confirming a list of some 170 installations originally identified in a 1978 document. The objectives mentioned just in the district of Kreuzberg give an indication of the East German thoroughness. Here, the police weapons depot, the main Customs Bureau, the Customs Investigator Bureau (*Zollfahndungsamt*), the State Printing Shop, the Telecommunications Bureau, the Artisans’ Chamber of Commerce (*Handwerksskammer*), and the sewage treatment plant were to be immediately taken.

The 12 existing West Berlin Districts were to be controlled through the institution of District Administrative Centers (*Kreisdienststellen*), long in use in East Berlin. Each center was assigned 40 to 47 high-ranking officials who would direct activities in the reunited sections of Berlin. These, in turn, were subordinated to a Command Group complete with 80 appointed officials. Four areas of responsibility within the Command Group corresponded to identical bureaus within the East German secret police, and were to be responsible for counterespionage, security of ministerial organs, security in the economy, and security of transportation. The fifth of these “Operative Groups” had a more general task: It was to combat “political-ideological diversions” and “underground activities.” Based upon the organization of a similar East German department, it would form a network of secret agents capable of supervising every activity of the conquered population.

The organizational plans for the occupied city, in which many of the positions already carried the name of the intended office-holder, aimed both at creating communist rule as soon as possible and defeating any resistance which the local citizens might attempt. Until such anticipated civilian resistance was crushed, the Berlin Wall would remain in place, and security forces in both East and West Berlin would stand at the ready. When this threat had passed, the long-sought unification would be complete.

As another unambiguous sign of its determination to integrate West Berlin into the East German economy, the communist government, as early as 1980, printed and stored for future use 4.9 billion marks in occupation currency to be introduced immediately upon termination of the fighting. In 1985, 8000 special military medals to be awarded for bravery (*Tapferkeit*) to the victorious East German units were struck and stored in a special “medals-cellar” awaiting the day of decision.¹⁴

Given the attention to detail included in plans for the occupation of West Berlin, one suspects that equally painstaking efforts were made for the assimilation of the Federal Republic as a whole. With the well-known communist penchant for large, centralized structures of administration, it seems

“In 1985, 8000 special military medals to be awarded for bravery to the victorious East German units were struck and stored . . . awaiting the day of decision.”

unlikely that the federated forms of rule characteristic of West Germany would have remained as we knew them. Perhaps one or more “supra” German provinces would emerge, similar in size to Prussia in the prewar period of German history. Unfortunately, such plans, if indeed they escaped the shredders’ efforts, have not yet been released to the public.

Diplomacy and the Nuclear Question

The evidence already available supports the conclusion that an alternative plan for German unification—and in propitious circumstances, the conquest of Western Europe—existed at the very moment the Gorbachev government was negotiating a peaceful solution to the German issue. The painstaking care and completeness of the Pact’s alternate plan, however, raises two issues which require further analysis. First, the exact decisionmaking process for approving the use of nuclear weapons by Pact forces has not been found among the many files already examined. What, therefore, leads Western analysts familiar with the documents to conclude that nuclear war was intrinsic to Pact plans? And second, how is it possible—three full years after the Warsaw Pact officially announced it was moving to Defensive Sufficiency as the basis of its military strategy—that such clearly offensive plans as detailed above continued to form the basis of Pact thinking? Curiously, these two issues may be closely related.

The grounds for concluding that Pact forces would indeed have received permission to employ nuclear weapons from the beginning of their offensive lie in the numerous war games practiced by the Warsaw Pact and followed closely by NATO observers. As the former German Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg concluded in a 1992 press conference:

The employment of tactical atomic weapons was an integral component in the [military] exercises of the [Warsaw Pact] at the Army Command-level [*Fuehrungsebene Armee*] and higher. In the conceptions of the military command, their [nuclear weapons’] employment should above all serve the goal of breaking through the opposing defenses. Examples were the 1979 Staff Exercise “Attack of the Front with or without Nuclear Weapons,” or the 1981 Command Staff Exercise of the Front “Soiuz 81” with the exercise goal of “Command of the strategic offensive operation with the use of nuclear weapons,” led by the then commander of the [Warsaw Pact], Marshal Kulikov.¹⁵

In 1980, a Pact exercise entitled "Weapon-Brotherhood" (*Waffenbruederschaft*) provided detailed insight into Pact nuclear plans. The East German, Soviet, and Polish army commanders were required to decide upon the employment of nuclear weapons. The decision was conveyed to the East German Defense Minister since East Germany had specific responsibility for conducting this particular exercise. As a result of a positive decision, the first echelon of the participating troops were issued 20 Scud missiles, 55 FROGs, and ten nuclear bombs. In addition, the air forces of the Front were allotted 125 nuclear bombs while the rocket brigades received 60 Scuds and 50 FROGs.

The targets for the offensive employment of these nuclear forces included NATO nuclear storage depots, installations housing NATO air forces and air defenses, division headquarters and their communications networks, troops, and fleet command centers of the West German navy. In reserve stood four air divisions equipped with nuclear weapons as well as other nuclear reserves.¹⁶ The planned use of nuclear weapons promised such devastation that Warsaw Pact Commander Marshal Kulikov noted at the conclusion of the 1983 Pact exercise Soiuz 83: "This war will be carried on to the complete destruction of the enemy and without compromise. This war forces us to use our entire arsenal irrespective of the uncontrollable results of strategic actions."¹⁷

In the mid-1980s, Pact exercises appeared to forego nuclear operations, but in 1988 such activities once again dominated Pact training. In the 1989 staff exercise, the nuclear devastation of the West German region of Schleswig-Holstein was practiced through the simulated use of 76 nuclear weapons. Two final exercises by the East German forces utilizing nuclear weapons occurred in 1990, *after* the Berlin Wall ceased to divide the city. In June of that year, following the democratic election of the De Maiziere government, Soviet and East German forces conducted a simulated nuclear attack upon NATO forces.¹⁸ The following year the Warsaw Pact dissolved, ending once and for all plans for the conquest of West Germany.

The continuation of Pact exercises with simulated use of nuclear weapons stands in sharp contrast to the extensive Pact promises of reorienting their military doctrine to one emphasizing defensive preparation. At its May 1987 Berlin meeting, the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee proclaimed that "a world war, especially a nuclear one, would have catastrophic consequences not only for states directly drawn into the conflict but even for life itself on earth."¹⁹ As Andrei Kokoshin, then Deputy Director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, and subsequently Russian First Deputy Minister of Defense, explained in 1988, the importance of the Warsaw Pact's new military doctrine lay

in the impermissibility of both nuclear and conventional war. . . . [The doctrine] is directed not to preparations for war but against war, towards strengthening the structure of international security. Earlier military activities of the Warsaw Pact

foresaw a struggle for the impermissibility of war; but now *this problem has been moved to first place in the doctrine, it has become primary and defining.*²⁰

By the following year, Soviet theoreticians were proclaiming that

Defensive Sufficiency [*Oboronnaia dostatochnost'*]—the most important element of [the] military doctrine of socialism, functions as the essential foundation of all its military construction, presupposing, in the first instance, *a refusal to be first to begin military activities*; maintenance of the military-strategic balance at levels as low as possible; mutual reduction of arms to such a point that neither side has the physical possibility to undertake an attack; bringing the structure of the armed forces, their equipment, and their location into line with defensive tasks; and undertaking strict control over the reduction of military forces and likewise over military activities.²¹

Were these strident, insistent proclamations by Pact leaders and Soviet theoreticians of their new defensive orientation simply efforts to deceive Western observers? This seems unlikely; NATO intelligence continued to monitor Pact exercises, noting, as mentioned above, the simulated use of nuclear weapons well into 1990.²² Certainly it is possible, although unlikely, that Pact commanders were involved in a massive deception of their own political leaders, reflective of a distaste for Gorbachev's policies which surfaced more clearly in the August 1991 attempted coup. But it is more likely that the Pact's announced defensive position was more in the realm of intent—more attuned to a desirable posture one day attainable, than to an immediate reform. Interestingly, the Soviet articles which describe the desirability of Defensive Sufficiency also provide reasons why renunciation of a pro-nuclear offensive posture should be postponed indefinitely.

In a 1988 essay entitled "Military Doctrine and International Security" (*Voennye doktriny i mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost'*), General-Major Lebedev and historian Aleksei Podberezkin recited all the usual reasons why a defensive doctrine was required in the contemporary European situation. More interesting, however, was their belief that a radical revolution in military technologies threatened to make conventional war as devastating as nuclear:

The intrusion of the most recent successes of the Scientific-Technological Revolution into the military realm has led in recent years to a revolutionary change in the material foundations of conducting war. This is especially true in recent utilization of the newest advances of micro-electronics and electro-computing techniques. The growth in the military effectiveness of weapons received a powerful push already in the second half of the 1970s. In one decade, the military effectiveness of nuclear systems augmented ten to 15 times, *but conventional weapons even more*. The new [conventional] systems will become even more effective. . . . By its very nature, we now stand on the edge of a new stage of the military-technological revolution, as a result of which the military effectiveness of weapons is able to multiply dozens of times.²³

The application of conventional weapons technology by US forces during Operation Desert Storm would tend to support the Soviets' conclusions.

To these Soviet analysts, the West had not hesitated to reformulate its own military doctrine to take account of the new potential of conventional war, as the Gulf War later would prove. And although the West paid lip service to the traditional doctrine of flexible response, Soviet analysts charged that NATO in the 1980s in fact had moved to an offensive doctrine foreseeing "a massive application of weapons, including nuclear from the start, aiming at conducting offensive operations with the goal of 'terminating the war on favorable conditions.' *Therefore, the question about the possible character of war from the point of view of the USSR and its allies . . . demands the most careful study both in theory and in practice.*"²⁴

An objective observer could understand if the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies decided not to implement the declared defensive posture. The rapid incorporation of technology throughout NATO merely underscored the Pact's inferiority in certain aspects of conventional operations and the absence of technology innovations in their forces. It was the moment to state peaceful and defensive intentions accompanied by renewed calls for joint East-West conventional disarmament in an effort to reduce the growing and menacing advantage accruing yearly to NATO forces. In the face of a radical technological revolution in conventional weapons, the more conservative members of the Pact leadership may have insisted that the traditional offensive nuclear plans be retained as a necessary means of neutralizing what was increasingly perceived as a superior enemy. At least such retention would be justified until the negotiating posture of the American administration became more clear.

And if, in the interim, an opportunity presented itself—if the NATO alliance showed signs of disintegration or the American arms buildup faltered—a possibility might emerge for a rapid thrust westward and the unification of Germany by blood and not ballots. So through the summer of 1990, Pact forces continued to exercise plans for a nuclear-supported attack to the west. Soviet and Pact leaders remained intent upon at least a temporary retention of plans for an offensive, while East German officials, whose medals-cellar was full of decorations, awaited victory ceremonies after the conquest of West Germany.

In Retrospect

Throughout the period of negotiations over German unification, Soviet Ambassador Kvitsinsky was amazed at the hard-line posture adopted by conservative members of the Soviet elite. His predecessor as Ambassador to Bonn had seemed to avoid confronting reality; the sharp criticism of the Soviet Foreign Ministry continued. At the end of 1990, Foreign Minister

Shevardnadze himself resigned, charging that conservative forces were attempting to roll back progressive change. Kvitsinsky remained involved until the final expression of conservative counterrevolution, the attempted putsch in August 1991, forever changed the face of Russian and Soviet politics.

By the time of the unsuccessful coup, the peaceful unification of Germany had been completed, the Warsaw Pact had disappeared, and the military plans for creating a united communist Germany by force had been relegated to an unfulfilled dream.²⁵ Efforts to devise an offensive strategy for the conquest of West Germany were replaced by attempts to destroy the documents that detailed the Pact's past intent. Fortunately, these efforts also met with little success.

It is the task of diplomats such as Ambassador Kvitsinsky to make the effort needed to conclude difficult negotiations successfully, and, having achieved that objective, to then move on to new areas of dispute. And it is the task of historians to ponder the pitfalls and uncertainties which attend even such evident victories as the peaceful German unification. What, one wonders, should be made of the durability of Pact plans for an alternative unification, a unification to be accomplished by such repugnant means? Is it possible that a degree of autonomy existed within the Warsaw Pact command structure which permitted it to formulate and exercise offensive doctrine so at odds with the apparent desires of the Soviet political leadership? Perhaps control over the initiation of nuclear attack lay at a lower level of command than heretofore believed, allowing the commanders of the Theaters of Military Action (TVD) to retain the right to act as they saw best, independent of official declaratory policy.

And yet another, perhaps more simple explanation comes to mind. If the revolution in military science and in weaponry made it increasingly unlikely that Pact forces would hold their own in a conventional conflict, what better way to avert such trials than by convincing NATO that nuclear weapons would be employed at the very outbreak of war? In a period of rapid technological change, what better means of protection than to exercise, in full view of Western observers, the most frightening possibilities of an all-out nuclear conflict if war should take place. In short, Pact exercises and plans may have had a healthy component of deception designed to delay the outbreak of conflict until the East Bloc too might master the new advances in warfare. Such a deception would assuage those officials who were fearful of conflict with the West, yet were willing to support the Gorbachev government in its new policy of *détente*. As for the more hard-line Pact leaders, if the West were to let down its guard during the ensuing period of military and political change, or if massive domestic turmoil attended German unification, an alternative plan remained close at hand.

Annual renewal of plans to unify Germany by force permitted Pact military and political leaders, increasingly polarized by the demands of

Gorbachev's "New Thinking," to function in harmony during a difficult and uncertain period of domestic transition. Formerly the heart of Pact doctrine, the offensive remained a perfect compromise position even as the Berlin Wall fell. And if the August 1991 coup in Moscow had come a bit sooner, and had been more successful, this apparent compromise might well have become once again the preferred solution.

NOTES

1. Julij A. Kwizinskij, "Von deutschen Torschuetzen und sowjetischen Querpaessen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 March 1993, p. 12.
2. Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 131.
3. Kwizinskij, p. 12.
4. *Militaerische Planungen des warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa: Pressekonferenz von Verteidigungsminister Stoltenberg am 13 January 1992* (Bonn: Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, February 1992), p. 2.
5. Interview with General P. S. Grachev, Russian Minister of Defense, *Izvestiia*, 2 June 1992, p. 2. Emphasis added.
6. Descriptions of the Pact plans are contained in *Militaerische Planungen des warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa*; Lothar Ruehl, "Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact," *Survival*, 23 (September-October 1991), 442-50; Lothar Ruehl, "Die 'Vorwaertsverteidigung' der NVA and der sowjetischen Streitkraefte in Deutschland bis 1990," *Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift*, 29 (January-February 1991), 501-08; and Colonel EMG Fritz Stoeckli, "L'heure de verite," *Revue Militaire Suisse*, 137 (October 1992), 5-13.
7. Heinz Schulte, "Germany: The Aim of Military Intelligence," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 3 (June 1991), p. 280.
8. Ruehl, "Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact," p. 446.
9. Otto Wenzel, "So sollte in West-Berlin einmarschiert werden," *Berliner Morgenpost*, 18 April 1993, p. 93.
10. Ruehl, "Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact," p. 446.
11. *Militaerische Planungen des warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa*, p. 5.
12. Stoeckli, pp. 11-12.
13. The best source for occupation plans for West Berlin is Wenzel, p. 93.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Militaerische Planungen des warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa*, p. 4.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
17. Quoted in Julian Isherwood, "Warsaw Pact Planned to Nuke Its Way Across Europe," *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1993, p. 15.
18. Ruehl, "Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact," p. 448.
19. Quoted in Iu. Lebedev and A. Podberezkin, "Voennye doktriny i mezhdunarodnaia bezopastnost'," *Kommunist*, 13 (September 1988), p. 112. See also "O voennoi doktrine gosudarstv-uchastniko varshavskogo dogovora," *Pravda*, 20 May 1987.
20. A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "Protivostoianie sil obshchego naznacheniia v kontekste obespecheniia strategicheskoi stabil'nosti," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (No. 6, 1988), 23. Emphasis added.
21. Iu. Lebedev and A. Podberezkin, pp. 117-18. Emphasis added.
22. I well remember a talk before members of the Atlantic Council in the summer of 1988 at which the NATO Commander, General Galvin, noted that the only evident change in Pact tactics was a slight "defensive" delay before they began their grinding offensive into West Germany.
23. Iu. Lebedev and A. Podberezkin, p. 113. Emphasis added.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 113. Emphasis added.
25. Kwizinskij, p. 12.