2006 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL)

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SSI

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FOREWORD

In today’s dynamic strategic environment, political changes can become challenges very quickly. Yet, the gravity of major undertakings such as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM can cause us to overlook other significant events or developments. Any list of key strategic issues must, therefore, include the broadest array of regional and functional concerns. The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL), published annually by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army War College, is just such a list; it is a catalogue of significant issues, arranged as potential research topics, of concern to U.S. policymakers. As such, the KSIL is a ready source of topics that members of the defense community and academia can use to focus their research efforts.

The KSIL is developed in draft form, and vetted through the faculty of the U.S. Army War College, the Army Staff, Major Army Commands, Army Component Commands, and the Joint Staff. The present list represents the collective input from all of these organizations. A number of sponsors also submitted issues of specific concern to their organizations; those issues appear in the Expanded KSIL, and are arranged according to the sponsoring organizations. KSIL entries are intended to be general enough for researchers to modify or expand appropriately, and to adapt to a variety of methodologies. While the list of general topics is broad, it is neither comprehensive nor restrictive.

Researchers are encouraged to contact any of the SSI points of contact, or those found in the Expanded KSIL, for further information regarding their desired topics. These points of contact are not necessarily subject experts, but can recommend experts or additional sponsors.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

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1. Revising U.S. global strategy for the war on terrorism
2. Understanding the “enemy” in the war on terrorism
3. Challenges confronting the coalition in Iraq and developing appropriate responses
4. Building coalitions and maintaining effective alliances
5. Strategic and operational measures of effectiveness for the larger war on terror
6. Countering ideological support for terrorism through domestic and foreign means
7. Recognizing progress and victory in counterinsurgency operations
8. What proportion of U.S. land power should be focused on counterinsurgency operations?
9. Training international security forces
10. Assessing the Quadrennial Defense Review:
   a. Assessing force levels for counterinsurgency operations
   b. Potential impact of repeated rotations on Army and USMC personnel (AC and RC)
   c. USN and USAF potential for relieving Army and USMC operational burdens
   d. Balancing roles and missions for active and reserve components
11. Balancing political and military responses in counterinsurgency operations
12. Challenges and opportunities in using nongovernmental militias in counterinsurgencies
13. Integrating the War on Drugs with the war on terrorism
14. The military role in counterproliferation
15. Military roles in diplomatic, informational, and economic lines of operation
16. Military roles in the collection of foreign intelligence in areas of interest and the linkage to, and collaboration with, other nonmilitary collection assets
17. Do current domestic law and international laws of war accommodate evolving security challenges?
1. Does the U.S. homeland have a center of gravity?
2. Assessing, countering, and responding to WMD threats
3. Intelligence gathering requirements and restrictions in homeland security
4. Information sharing among intelligence, law enforcement, and other federal, state, and local agencies
5. Strategic implications of missile defense as a component of homeland defense
6. Active and reserve components’ roles in homeland security
7. Combining federal, state, and local resources for combating homeland threats
8. Identifying and protecting DoD and/or non-DoD critical infrastructure
9. Implications of the North American Defense Agreement (U.S., Canada, Mexico)
10. Implications of dual Title 10 and Title 32 responsibilities for State Adjutant Generals given operational control of federal assets for local event support.
11. Interagency planning for pandemics.
1. Evolving regional security matters in **North Africa and the Middle East**
   a. U.S. interests with respect to a sovereign Iraq
   b. Changing the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf
   c. Security issues created by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
   d. U.S. strategy toward Iran
   e. U.S. strategy toward Libya
   f. U.S. strategy toward Syria
   g. Implications of a nuclear Iran
   h. The impact of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) on U.S. national security
   i. Strategic implications of a changing Egypt
   j. The future of Saudi Arabia and Middle Eastern security
   k. Strategic implications of democratic, but anti-U.S. governments, in the Middle East
   l. Strategic implications of increasing Chinese demand for Middle East oil
   m. Future role of NATO in the Middle East
   n. Emerging and evolving military relationships among Middle Eastern states.
   o. Strategies regional states have for dealing with the United States and its allies in the Middle East and North Africa
   p. Deterrence strategies in the Middle East and North Africa.

2. Evolving regional security matters in the **Asia-Pacific Region**
   a. Balancing U.S. security interests in China and Taiwan
   b. The future of the Japan-U.S. security relationship
   c. Implications of China’s growing economic and military power in the region
   d. Security concerns in Southeast Asia and implications for the United States
   e. Strategic response to North Korea’s intentions and capabilities
   f. Evolving Republic of Korea-U.S. security relations
   g. Evolving Japan-U.S. security relations
   h. Japan’s relationship with Asian nations
   i. Future of ASEAN and U.S. strategic posture in the region
   j. The role of the U.S. military on the Korean Peninsula
   k. Future of the U.S. alliance with Australia and New Zealand
   l. Sources and dimensions of anti-Americanism in Asia: policy implications
   m. Chinese-North Korean relations
   n. Politics of history and memory in South-North Korean relations
   o. Role of nationalism in Asia and implications for U.S. policy
   p. Role of ideology in Asia and implications for U.S. policy
   q. China’s regional and global grand strategy
   r. China’s military transformation
   s. Russia’s interests, policy and actions in Asia
t. Transformation of U.S. forward deployment in Asia
u. Toward U.S. energy security strategy for Asia and the Pacific

3. Evolving regional security matters in **Sub-Saharan Africa**
   a. The role of the African Union in African peacekeeping operations
   b. Army international activities programs in Africa
   c. Sub-Saharan Africa and the war on terrorism
   d. Implications of continent-wide failure due to AIDS and political strife
   e. Forming regional cooperative security arrangements
   f. Security effects of the exploitation of Africa’s natural energy resources
   g. Professional development of African militaries
   h. Strategic implications of Chinese activity in Sub-Saharan Africa
   i. How should the U.S. respond to acts of genocide (e.g., Rwanda, Sudan)?

4. Evolving regional security matters in **Europe**
   a. U.S. Army roles in future Balkan security
   b. A roadmap for future security in the west Balkans
   c. The revival of the Russian military
   d. Prospects for Russo-American security and/or defense cooperation
   e. Russia’s future relationships with Europe and the United States
   f. Russia, the Middle East, and energy security in Europe
   g. Democratization and instability in Ukraine and Belarus
   h. Impact of growing Muslim populations on Western European security policy
   i. The U.S. military’s role in Eastern Europe
   j. Reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in Europe
   k. Implications of a changing NATO
   l. U.S. leadership in NATO: The role of the U.S. Army
   m. NATO and EU defense initiatives: competitive or complementary?
   n. EU civil-military cell— a useful model for joint/interagency operations?
   o. Is the U.S.-Europe capabilities gap still growing?
   p. Implications of OIF for European cooperation in the war on terrorism
   q. EU expansion while excluding Turkey from membership
   r. Drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe: strategic implications

5. Evolving regional security matters in **Southwest Asia**
   a. Balancing U.S. security interests between India and Pakistan
   b. Role of India in world events and U.S.-Indian military-strategic relations
   c. Maintaining stability and security in Afghanistan
   d. Long-term implications of maintaining the OIF coalition
   e. Implications of major changes in Pakistan’s domestic conditions

6. Evolving regional security matters in **Central Asia**
   a. Growing U.S. security interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia
b. Russian-China-U.S. competition in Central Asia

c. Implications of energy development in the Caucasus and Caspian regions

d. Synchronizing security cooperation and political reform in Central Asia

e. The role and structure of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia

7. Evolving regional security matters in the **Western Hemisphere**
   a. U.S. interests in Caribbean security issues
   b. Hemispheric security forces (military and police) and new threats
   c. Improving security ties with Brazil
   d. Lessons from the Colombian insurgency
   e. Transformation of the Colombian armed forces during war
   f. Reemergence of Sendero Luminoso
   g. Ungoverned space and implications for territorial security
   h. Military role in securing a stable Haiti
   i. Venezuela as an exporter of political instability
   j. Narco-funded terrorism networks
   k. Instability and disenfranchised indigenous and poor populations
   l. Implications of the rising threat of populism in the region
   m. Implications of the return of the Latin American Left
   n. Long-term implications of Chinese engagement in Latin America
   o. Implications of economic integration such as the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
   p. Impact of the American Serviceman’s Protection Act of 2000 (ASPA) on hemispheric security relations
   q. Maintaining the viability of hemispheric security forces during a time of declining budgets
   r. Implications for U.S. security of a post-Castro Cuba

8. Integrating regional security cooperation plans and basing and presence policies

9. Identifying and responding to regional irregular challenges

10. The international criminal court and American military operations


12. Environmental issues as a basis for enhancing security cooperation

13. Social, cultural, political, economic, and governance trends and their effects on the evolving strategic environment

14. Revising the boundaries of the geographic Combatant Commands

15. Implications of concentrating U.S. military units in specific regions
MILITARY CHANGE

POC: Dr. Douglas V. Johnson (717) 245-4057
Douglas.Johnson@carlisle.army.mil

1. Understanding revolutionary change in warfare
2. Analyzing developments in contemporary warfare
3. Historical responses to unexpected technological breakthroughs
4. Alternative paths for transforming the U.S. military
5. Preparing for fog and friction on the future battlefield
6. Land force requirements for full spectrum dominance
7. Future force capacities for peacekeeping and stability operations
8. Networks and Warfare:
   a. Leadership in a network environment
   b. Command and control (Battle Command) in a network environment
9. Strategic implications of future operational concepts:
   a. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and family of Joint concepts
   b. The Army in Joint Operations, and Army future force operational concepts
10. Evaluating the themes in the Army’s 2006 Strategic Planning Guidance:
    a. Assessing force proficiencies against irregular challenges
    b. Assessing force capabilities for stability operations
    c. Assessing force capabilities to dominate in complex terrain
    d. Assessing capabilities for strategic responsiveness
    e. Assessing the Army’s Global Force Posture
    f. Assessing force capabilities for Battle Command
11. Impact and fundamental requirements for interdependence
12. Future force vulnerabilities to technology failures and surprises
13. Managing sensitive and classified information in an information-pervasive digital world
14. Inter- and intra-theater mobility
15. Transforming logistical support for U.S. Army, allies and coalition partners
16. Transforming OSD, the Joint Staff, and the service staffs
17. Transforming the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve
18. Women in combat: laws and norms
19. Modular force performance within existing and/or emerging joint doctrine
20. The mix of heavy, medium, and light elements in future forces, both AC and RC
21. Savings and costs of the Future Force, both AC and RC
22. Transformation in light of OIF and other ongoing operations
23. The risk of technology maturation versus stable investment strategies
24. Resource conflicts between operational and institutional transformation
25. Advantages and disadvantages of transforming toward lean efficiency
26. Should lean six sigma be applied across DA or DoD; if so, where?
27. Operating in cyberspace
28. Streamlining the business of DoD’s business: Is Dod’s governance responsive enough in today’s fast-changing world?
1. National Security Strategy (NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Defense Strategy (DS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), Unified Command Plan (UCP), and Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG):
   a. Assessing the NSS, DS, NMS, SPG, UCP, and CPG
   b. Alternatives to the NSS, DS, NMS, SPG, UCP, and CPG
   c. U.S. national security strategy and projected demands for energy
   d. Determining acceptable strategic risk

2. Scoping the irregular and catastrophic challenges and their strategic implications

3. Deterrence and U.S. national strategy

4. Nonproliferation and counterproliferation in a globalized world

5. Integrating military and nonmilitary tools in coercive diplomacy

6. Implications of U.S. missile defense for allies and potential adversaries

7. Improving interagency cooperation in all phases of conflict prevention and resolution

8. Implications of preemptive and preventive war doctrines

9. Responding to the collapse of strategically significant states

10. Implications of long-term post-conflict stability and support operations

11. Implications of long-term peacekeeping and nation-building activities

12. Implications of long-term security assistance efforts

13. Alternatives to the current spectrum of conflict model

14. Is a full-spectrum force required for the future; is it possible to sustain?
1. The Army and irregular challenges:
   a. Given some success in defeating IED challenges, what other measures might insurgents or terrorists take?
   b. What steps should U.S. forces take to minimize the effectiveness of those measures?

2. Requirements for counterinsurgency operations

3. Requirements for military operations in complex terrain

4. Assess the importance of information superiority in military operations

5. Conducting combat operations, security operations, and stability operations concurrently: how to transition, where to focus?

6. Changing landpower roles in stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian operations:
   a. Information and intelligence sharing between military and coalition partners
   b. Integrating military and civilian logistics
   c. Definitions and policies for establishing a “safe and secure” environment

7. Improving joint, combined, interagency, NGO and IGO cooperation in humanitarian and counterinsurgency operations

8. Evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy execution by combatant commanders and country teams
1. Changing requirements versus legal constraints for military and interagency mobilization

2. Assessing the effectiveness of the War Reserve Materiel Program

3. Impact of force protection requirements on power projection and force employment

4. Globalization’s impact on the military-industrial base

5. Strategic implications of implementing base closures

6. Overcoming anti-access and area-denial strategies

7. Planning for operations in areas with primitive and austere infrastructures

8. Tradeoffs with respect to power projection, prepositioning, and forward stationing

9. Planning for protracted conflicts

10. Logistics for dispersed/distributed combat operations

11. Expanded roles of civilians in defense operations and the impact on force structure

12. Adapting the reserve components to continuous mobilization

13. Landpower’s role in seabasing as a logistical and operational concept

14. Sustaining a modular, capabilities-based Army

15. Establishing a single Army logistics enterprise

16. Managing support for joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) commodities

17. Incorporating LOGCAP and other augmentation agreements into DoD and DoS strategies

18. Implications for manning, equipping, and sustaining functions in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model:
   a. Generating force roles and missions: In a resource constrained environment, how do we balance the roles of the generating force
and the operating force? Strategically is it more effective to give generating force tasks to the operational force or extend the capacity of the generating force? What are the relative risks involved?

b. Title 10 and generating capabilities for the Joint Force Commander: What changes in Title 10 and other authorities are required to enable the Army to support operations that span the entire range of military operations in a battlespace which encompasses the whole world (including the U.S. homeland)?

c. Exporting generating force capabilities: How will the evolution of the Army’s generating force integrate with analogous changes in Joint, Interagency and Multinational partners to enable successful adaptation and generation of national capabilities?

d. The generating force in the Modular Army: How should we address new generating force requirements in the context of Total Army Analysis, or its successor? Does the generating force become a modular force as well?

e. The generating force in the long war: How will we attract and retain people of even higher quality than the current force under conditions of continuous conflict? How will they accumulate the full range of developmental experiences that includes increased education, frequent deployments and alternating operating force and generating force assignments?
LEADERSHIP, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, AND CULTURE

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1. Retention and readiness of active and reserve forces
2. Developing forces and doctrine for expeditionary operations
3. Developing forces and doctrine for security cooperation, assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence
4. Developing soldiers and leaders for the future force
5. Teaching strategy for 21st century conflict
6. Changing the continuum of service
7. Assessing the gap between civilian and military cultures
8. The U.S. military and American society:
   a. Demographics: who is in it, and who fights?
   b. Civilian control over the military in the 21st century
9. Identifying, managing, and sustaining the Army’s intellectual and technological talent
10. The status of the Army as a profession
11. Sustaining public support for the U.S. armed forces
12. How the Army develops and responds to “lessons learned”
13. Obtaining Joint synergy despite different service cultures
14. Establishing and maintaining a culture of innovation
15. Implications of adopting commercial best business practices for the military
16. Managing changes in temporary end strength
17. Implications for the All-Volunteer Force fighting the “long” war
18. Implications of DoD reorganization initiatives and military reform
19. Managing deployed civilians and contractors
20. Managing nondeployable soldiers
21. Strategic purpose and effectiveness of the Individual Ready Reserve
22. Examining the pre-commissioning program
23. Revising the military decisionmaking process
24. Determining a steady-state force structure and requisite surge capacity for the war on terrorism
25. Implications of DoD use of bio-enhancements and/or bio-regulators.
27. How will the fact that fewer members of Congress have served in the armed services affect future Defense policy?
WAR AND SOCIETY

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1. American Society:
   a. Balancing individual civil rights and national security requirements
   b. Debating America’s place in the world
   c. America’s changing perceptions of other nations
   d. The purpose of war: historical interpretation and debate
   e. The U.S. media and political and social mobilization
   f. American civil-military relations in wartime
   g. Changing notions of liberty and freedom
   h. Role of religion and faith in the American way of war
   i. Changing views of patriotism in America
   j. Public perceptions of who serves, and dies: strategic implications

2. International Society:
   a. Rethinking the “Clash of Cultures” debate
   b. Strategic implications of the “unipolar” moment
   c. Anti-Americanism and U.S. foreign policy
   d. International views of the United States
   e. Understanding centers of power in other societies, cultures
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1. What are the effects of the DoD Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)/Investment Review Board (IRB) certification process for Human Resources Management (HRM) Domain’s information technology systems? Has the certification program provided any cost savings or cost avoidance to the domain or the Army? How can the HRM Domain make this certification process more efficient or effective? (LTC Barrington, CIO)

2. Identify the changes and efficacy of Army bonuses and incentive programs in maintaining all-volunteer force during wartime. How do current enlistment retention bonuses stack up historically with previous wars? What do results of such study imply with regard to initiatives to grow Army end strength by 20-30K? (LTC McSherry, PR)

3. Identify the marginal cost and benefit curves for recruiting’s main levers such as advertising, recruiter strength, and financial incentives. Can the lever’s impact be captured in an equation? How strong is the correlation? Example: # additional recruiters = # additional recruits. What is the optimal mix? (LTC McSherry, PR)

4. Investigate and recommend ways to reduce Army divorce rates (given no additional funding and no change to the Army’s missions). Causes for divorce in the enlisted female ranks; why does this population have more significant increases in divorces when compared with other demographics? What are the most effective services, according to soldiers, that the Army provides to reduce its divorce rates in officers and enlisted soldiers? (Dr. Betty Maxfield, HR, 703-696-5128)

5. What does “right” look like as it relates to Army workforce diversity for all components of the Army? (LTC Tracy Smith, HR, 703-693-1850)

6. How effective is mentorship in today’s Army? Is the current voluntary mentorship program sufficient to meet the needs of tomorrow’s leaders or do we need to structure our program in the same manner as found in the corporate arena? (LTC Lynn Jackson, HR, 703-695-5248)

7. Implementing and operating a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program in a deployed environment. What are the challenges of operating a SAPR Program in a deployed theater, and what are possible methods to overcome them? How should the hand-off of cases/victims after redeployment be managed? (Ms. Carolyn Collins, HR, 703-696-5139)

8. What is the relationship between soldier drug or alcohol abuse rates and other measures of indiscipline and the measured unit performance
in externally-evaluated training exercises (i.e., NTC or JRTC rotations, BCTP-evaluated training exercises like Warfighters or Brigade/Battalion simulation exercises, etc.)? (Dr. Les McFarling, HR, 703-681-5577)

9. The soldier life cycle includes recruiting, training, and, ultimately, separation and retirement. How effectively does the Army communicate with the soldier and spouse and prepare them for retirement? To what degree are soldiers and spouses taking the initiative to begin planning for retirement years prior to their actual date of retirement? What can be done to enhance communications in this important life cycle process? (Mr. John Radke, HR, 703-325-2699)

10. The Secretary of Army has directed that the Army needs to incorporate continuum of service as part of the Human Capital Strategy. What are the most significant obstacles, in policies, laws, regulations, etc., that must be addressed in order to achieve Continuum of Service? (LTC Jeff Sterling, DMPM)

11. Complete a review of the ROTC accession program (i.e., scholarship award process, PMS management, school selection, curriculum, etc.). How can the Army better recruit for reserve component officers? Review how scholarships are distributed. Review the commissioning rate of scholarship recipients and suggest improvements. Review the course curriculum to determine whether we preparing future officers correctly. Is the intensity of training (e.g., PT, field exercise, etc.) affecting our ability to recruit cadets? Are there improvements required in the curriculum? (CÔL Patterson, DMPM)

12. What are the characteristics of organizations where pay for performance concepts worked over time? Right now, pay for performance seems to work well in lab demonstration projects. What does the literature say about implementing such a system in a broad, heterogeneous environment like the total civilian Army? What kinds of interventions are called for and when should they take place to create an environment that fosters cooperation and trust, even within a concept that, on the surface, seems to reward competition within groups. (Ms. Jeannie Davis, CP)

13. Lifecycle manning and the Global War on Terrorism--will it work? Will the war on terrorism interfere with life cycle manning? (HRC-EP)

14. How will the ARFORGEN model affect soldier dwell time? (HRC-EP)

15. What are the capabilities and limitations of the modular (plug and play) Army? (HRC-EP)

16. What are the disconnects between ARFORGEN and monthly accessions mission? (HRC-EP)

17. Assess current RC policy to determine if the numerous categories of soldiers are required, and how we can effectively track, monitor, and use the categories when needing the IRR soldiers. (HRC-TAGD)
18. Assess the Defense Business Board’s recommendation to the SECDEF to outsource all military postal operations and outline a plan of how postal operations could be contracted throughout the Army to include during wartime. (HRC-TAGD)

19. Assess the effectiveness of the command and control relationships of the Human Resource Sustainment Centers with the Theater Support Commands and the HR companies. (HRC-TAGD)

20. Analyze the readiness reporting nonavailable and nondeployable criteria and make recommendations to reduce the number of nondeployable soldiers. Evaluate and make recommendations concerning the DoD policy and the Physical Disability Agency’s practice that allows nondeployable soldiers to be found fit for duty and retained in the service. (HRC-TAGD)

21. Analyze alternatives for one DoD postal budget and recommend how to handle shortfalls if the budgeted amount is less than the bills. (HRC-TAGD)

22. Analyze alternatives for one DoD postal organization with organizational chart and positions for each level within the organization. (HRC-TAGD)

23. Analyze alternatives for postal planners to be integrated into the COCOMs from MPSA or stand-up a joint postal cell for contingency operations. (HRC-TAGD)
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. U.S. long-term economic ability to prosecute the war on terror—what needs to be done?
   b. Strengthening indigenous paramilitary and police forces for the war on terror—whose responsibility, size of the problem?
   c. Integration of combat information in war on terror tactical operations—is it working?
   d. Maximizing DoD intelligence and counterterrorism integration in the war on terror
   e. Measuring U.S. civilian support for the war on terror, and what influences it.

2. Homeland Security:
   a. Policy, regulations, doctrine, and executive orders which affect intelligence operations in the U.S. conducted by U.S. intelligence organizations
   b. The growing influence of al Qaeda in Central and South America and its looming impact on our homeland

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Examine the continued manipulation of currency through 2015 timeframe, while increasing exports to countries in Latin America, S/E and S/W Asia
   b. Examine technology and fuel alternatives to reduce western reliance on fossil fuels while the modernization of countries in S/E and S/W Asia increases requirements
   c. Examine China as a power projection state with the capability of achieving greater influence in S/E and S/W Asia allowing for greater economic flexibility and the capability through political (agreements concerned with nuclear arms and the exchange of technology) and economic (technology after the annexation of Taiwan) ties to impact oil production and pricing
   d. Examine the implications of U.S. technology and telecommunications expansion in S/W Asia and opportunities to enhance regional security
   e. Examine the adequacy of intelligence focus on Latin America
   f. Examine potential strategic responses to Chinese military action against Taiwan

4. Military Change:
   a. Optimizing military linguists
   b. Integrating civilian linguists into military operations
   c. The new national intelligence architecture and its impact on DoD intelligence
   d. Leveraging strategic intelligence capabilities to support tactical operations
e. Redefining the tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence continuum
f. Networked robotics employed within urban and complex terrain environments to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, breach obstacles, and defeat point targets
g. The development, integration, and employment of technology in support of deception operations to counter access and deny entry of joint/combined forces

   a. Implications of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 for Army intelligence activities
   b. Changing roles and relationships caused by creation of the Director, National Intelligence and Office of the DNI

6. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
   a. Exhaustion of low density, high demand linguists due to continuous, prolonged deployment and redeployment in the Global War on Terrorism
   b. How should we select, train, and develop interrogators, and maintain discipline in interrogation organizations?
   c. Leadership and structure in a future conscripted U.S. Army—what would we do differently?
Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3

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Research topic personally guided by the G-3: Sustainment of ARFORGEN and its impact on the future of the Army
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. What are the implications of the Global War on Terrorism on logistics/sustainment strategy for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force?
   b. What are the issues related to coalition support (reliance and dependence) for the Joint Force? What are the logistics implications of a coalition force?
   c. What are the issues related to logistics support for special operations forces in their global commitment to the war on terrorism?

2. Homeland Security:
   a. What should be our concept of logistics/sustainment support in defense of the homeland? What are the implications regarding the integration of local, state, federal, and commercial logistics capabilities?
   b. What is NORTHCOM’s relationship to the Army’s logistics capabilities, and what is the concept to ensure effective command and control of logistics/sustainment operations?

3. Regional Security Issues:
   a. Integrating Army logistics concepts with focused logistics
   b. How can we leverage the commercial capabilities that are already in place across the globe to facilitate logistics/sustainment support for regional operations?
   c. Are there opportunities to develop regional sustainment platforms that can support the joint force? What are the implications on Service logistics and Title X responsibilities?

4. Military Change:
   a. How can we best leverage emerging technologies/capabilities to enhance the capability of the joint sustainment process?
   b. What does “modularity” mean to Army logisticians?

5. NSS/NMS:
   a. What are the sustainment implications of long-term commitments to SRO, PKO, and war on terrorism?
   b. How can the joint force leverage the concept of a sea base, and enable a more globally flexible sustainment capability?

6. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
   a. What are the sustainment implications of the simultaneous deployment and employment of the joint force?
   b. Examine the Army logistics enterprise, its role in LANDWARNET, and the challenges to its implementation
   c. Implications for sustainment in the current operational environment
   d. Commander’s intent--distribution planning and executing--developing unity of effort
7. Force Management and Leadership:
a. How can we know what it really costs to sustain a specific force in an operational environment? As part of this discussion, how can we know the resource requirements in near-real-time as force structure and operational needs change?
b. What are the force management and leadership implications of the expanding use of contractors?

8. Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational:
a. What are the implications for supporting JIIM and what can we learn from past operations.
b. How can we best leverage joint and strategic partners from the National Sustainment Base? Does this justify a Joint Logistics Command?

9. Distribution Process Owner: Define the role of the United States Transportation Command as the Distribution Process Owner?
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. Assessing the opportunities and risks with interoperability of communities of interest (COI) networks to facilitate information sharing in support of the war on terrorism, e.g., Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN)
   b. Balancing information sharing between agencies (JIIM) environment across the full spectrum of engagement--local, state, federal, and international--with protection of information
   c. Assessing the role of technology in a modern, net-centric warfare--is the “Network” a force multiplier or an Achilles heel? “It was the ‘Network’ that caught Zarqawi” [ADM Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., USN, VCJCS¹]
   d. What changes in acquisition policy will enable the rapid fielding of COTS solutions to the warfighter while still ensuring the products delivered are capable of operating in the intended environment? Specifically, what changes in test and evaluation requirements are needed?

2. Homeland Security:
   a. Providing access to classified networks and information by nonfederal agencies (local and state emergency management employees, e.g., state governors and their staffs, local first responders)
   b. Assessing the current and future use of biometric technologies for identity management in support of the war on terrorism.
   c. Communications support. In reference to the Active Army (Title X) providing national disaster support, what are the challenges of a Title X agency providing support in a Title XXXII environment, and what are some potential solutions to overcoming these legal barriers?

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Western Hemisphere, specifically CONUS. Assessing the roles and missions of NORTHCOM in light of the war on terrorism and recent regional natural disasters.
   b. Are STEP/TELEPORT sites strategically located to provide the best global coverage?

4. Military Change:
   a. Balancing near-term information technology insertion within a long-range investment strategy

¹ 19 Jun 06 AFCEA TechNet Washington, DC. In the context that it was organizations and personnel connected by technology [the Network] that enabled the rapid movement of intelligence across the battlespace, significantly reducing the time between target acquisition to target destruction.
b. Achieving DoD’s netcentricity vision of ubiquitous access in light of the cultural biases among people and organizations to control information

c. Data Strategy – what are upcoming on the horizon methods, protocols and techniques that will aid in achieving national data standards to achieve true interoperability between inter- and intra-service, joint and coalition command and control systems.

d. How can the Army rapidly leverage the latest commercial wireless technology to expand the network down to the individual soldier--latest 802.11 series, 802.16, 802.20, and 802.21?

5. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
   a. The implications of migrating to everything over Internet Protocol (EoIP)
   b. Soldier vs contractor operated and maintained tactical equipment. Are the new soldier systems so “high tech” that we cannot fight wars without contractors on the battlefield?
   c. What are the scales of efficiency that we see once we extend the network down to the soldier?

6. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
   a. What is the future of telecommuting in the Army and its implications on performance and productivity?
   b. On Shore, off Shore: Where should the United States invest in technology human capital?
   c. Every soldier a shooter-sensor-communicator--is the training and compensation commensurate with the requirements and expectations?
1. Should we reconsider/redefine the roles of the Active Army and reserve component forces within the overall context of our national strategy?

2. How do we determine an Army investment strategy that is most likely to succeed in a competitive market across the Services and on Capitol Hill?

3. How do we manage portfolios of capability across DOTML-PF as we transition from current to future force?

4. How can we synchronize JCIDS analysis with acquisition and programming to ensure that solutions to required capabilities are feasible, affordable, and sustainable?

5. Are the current JCIDS products and decision points adequate to facilitate synchronization with acquisition and programming?

6. How can JCAs be used to help in planning and decisionmaking in the Army in support of the Army?

7. Is there still relevancy for The Army Plan (TAP)?

8. Based on the recommendations of the Joint Defense Capabilities Study, also known as the Aldridge study published in 2004, how should the Army implement the recommendations into its resource process?

9. How should the JCAs be incorporated into the POM process and what is the role of the JCAs in the process?

10. How should the AR2B, AWPB and other processes that were developed to add responsiveness and flexibility to the resourcing process be incorporated into the programming process to ensure sustainment and visibility of resourcing requirements for the long term?

11. If we are to move to a capabilities-based resource processes how do we ensure a cross functional view to achieve Army strategic goals and objectives?

12. How could the POM process be eased if we went to a continuous resource process throughout the year?

13. How does the defense transformation affect force management?

14. What is the role of the force management officer in stabilization, humanitarian, peacekeeping, and counterinsurgency missions?

15. What should be the force management doctrine for expeditionary operations or for the future force?
16. What is the changing role of force management functions within the RC?
17. How do FA50s (Force Management Officers) integrate combat capabilities?
18. What is the ideal mission of the Force Management Division (FMD) in the ASCC?
19. How does ARFORGEN affect the duties of the Force Management Officer at the strategic level?
20. How does the Army address its business practices with the emerging reality that the lines between Operating and Generating Force competencies are blurring?
21. What adjustments or adaptations must the Army make to address the changes required in the force management processes as the role of the Generating Force becomes more operational?
22. Should we build the POM and, therefore, force modernization/transformation using six modular packages?
24. Regional Strategic Issues: What are the implications of a failed Iraq / Iran?
25. Military Change: What are the impacts and possible counter actions for disruptive challenges?
27. Landpower Employment: What is the Army’s role in irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges?
28. Leadership, Personnel, Management and Culture: What is the impact on the Army’s intellectual capital of eliminating BCTs.
29. War and Society: What is the impact of losing or not even engaging in the “war of ideas”? 
Joint Staff, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5

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1. By what metrics should progress in the war on terrorism be measured?
2. What are the policies and actions the U.S. Government needs to establish and support in order to shape conditions for regional security?
3. When regional security fails, what are the policies and actions the U.S. Government needs to establish (process and procedures) to achieve rapid building and sustaining of coalitions?
4. What should be the long-term strategy for Iraq?
5. What should be the long-term strategy for North Korea?
6. What should be the long-term strategy for India/Pakistan?
7. Would an interagency “Goldwater-Nichols-type” initiative enhance integration of all U.S. Government elements of power? What would such a program or process look like?
8. How can we better focus U.S. Government long-term security assistance efforts? Currently there is no coherent focused methodology for coordinating security assistance efforts and resources across the interagency arena based on U.S. Government priorities.
9. What should long-term U.S.-Russia strategic relations look like?
10. What should long-term U.S.-European Union relations look like?
1. Global Strategy for the War on Terrorism:
   a. The role of the nation-state in the war on terrorism
   b. Balancing democratic reform and internal security: Short- and long-term implications for the war on terror. Transition to democracy is a fragile and often unstable period--what level of instability is expected and/or tolerable when transitioning from an autocratic regime to a democratic form of government? General and specific [individual nationstate] case studies
   c. Implications of expanding war on terrorism to state-sponsored terror groups: Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah
   d. The role of the war of ideas, especially radical religious ideas, in the war on terrorism
   e. The role of perception management as it relates to worldwide perceptions of U.S. power and actions
   f. Lessons from the “War on Drugs” that apply to the war on terrorism
   g. Evaluation of US SOCOM’s role in the war on terrorism

2. Evolving Regional Security Arrangements:
   a. Musharraf’s enlightened moderation--Is it the new national security strategy for Pakistan? Arguably, all major policy priorities are related to Musharraf’s vision of enlightened moderation (economy, education, political reform, economic development, western influence, federalization of tribal areas in NWFP and Baluchistan). Is EM more than just a path to moderate Islam for Musharraf?
   b. The strategy and future role of the PRC in Central and SW Asia
   c. The strategy and future role of India in Central and SW Asia
   d. The strategy and future role of Russia in Central and SW Asia
   e. Analysis of the interrelationships of the logistic train for narcotics trafficking, WMD, weapons, and people trafficking
   f. Developing a democracy in the Middle East in the 21st century: What roles should the military play?
   g. Viability and implications of an OSCE-like organization/process for the Gulf Region (to include Iran and Iraq)
   h. Given limited U.S. resources, is a “pivotal states” strategy for the AOR feasible and acceptable?
   i. Plans, programs, and policies to help Pakistan, KSA, and Egypt help themselves
      i. Military
      ii. Economic
      iii. Political
   j. Nuclear Iran
      i. Ways to deter going nuclear
      ii. What is Iranian strategy following the achievement of nuclear capability to do if/when Iran does go nuclear?
      iii. How do Iran’s neighbors react in terms of capabilities?
iv. Strategy for deterring Iran following its achievement of nuclear capability
v. What does a nuclear weapon capable Iran look like? How does the international community react/respond?

3. National Security Strategy:
   a. Interagency strategy for transnational insurgency
   b. Improving the planning and execution of national strategy for the war on terrorism:
      i. Structure
      ii. Process
   c. An update of the National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater-Nichols
   d. Operationalizing the interagency process—converting policy decisions to interagency operations:
      i. Role of the Joint Staff and role of the Combatant Command staff in interagency integration and planning
      ii. Integration of DOS support into military operations (planning phase and operational Phase)
   e. Role of strategic communications in prosecuting activities in USCENTCOM AOR

4. Landpower employment: Evaluation and recommendations for individual and collective cultural awareness training in support of COIN/stability mission deployments:
   a. Precommissioning, esp. language requirements and major/minor fields (area studies, history, international relations)
   b. PME (esp. ILE, SSC, JPME)
   c. NCOES
   d. Predeployment collective training
   e. Feasibility/desirability of establishing advisor training similar to that used for personnel assigned to advisory duty in the RVN
1. Terrorism:
   a. The spread of Islamic fundamentalism within Europe
   b. How nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are used to provide funding to terrorist groups
   c. Iranian intelligence’s use of NGOs to conduct intelligence activities
   d. Case study: Iranian intelligence double agent operations against other intelligence services
   e. How Iranian intelligence uses businesses to conduct intelligence activities
   f. How Iranian intelligence uses businesses to forward dual use technology to Iran
   g. Iran: Are they trying to build a nuclear bomb and how close are they?
   h. What level of cooperation is the IRGC/QF, MOIS and senior leadership of the Iranian theocracy giving to the terrorists in Iraq
   i. Case Study: How the Iranians have quelled internal opposition since the 1979 revolution and ended with the disqualification of thousands of reformist parliamentarian candidates in February 2004
   j. Iranian dissident operations (assassinations, intimidation, infiltration) around the world since 1979
   k. MOIS and IRGC/QF support to the Palestinian rejectionist groups and Hizballah
   l. Will Israel attack the Iranian nuclear facilities as they did with the Iraqi Osirak nuclear facility in the early 1980s?

2. Africa:
   a. Security issues impacting oil producing countries
   b. Religious conflict and its implications for regional stability in Africa
   c. African contributions to peace keeping operations
   d. Long-term regional security impact of African regional organizations such as the Maghreb Arab Union, COMESSA, ECOWAS, etc.
   e. Libya’s future security role in the African Union
   f. Security interests by North African states in Sub-Saharan Africa
   g. Islamic and Islamist movements in the Sahel region of Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa
   h. Foreign sponsorship of Islamist movements in Africa
   i. Border control efforts by North African and Sahelian states
   j. Mediterranean security issues and North African states
   k. Impact of economic migration on North African security
   l. Chinese security and economic agendas in Africa
   m. Russian security and economic agendas in Africa
   n. Future changes in the Euro-Mediterranean (or Barcelona) process, and their impact on North Africa
   o. The future of Arab nationalism in North Africa
   p. Bilateral security cooperation between European and North African states (e.g., Italy and Libya).
q. Security impact of improved LOCs (highways, air routes, etc.) between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.

r. Evolution of professionalism in African militaries.

s. The future of force modernization in African military forces.

t. Impact of drought on Saharan and Sahelian security

u. DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) programs around the continent successes, failures, lessons learned

v. Arms trafficking and ease of access across porous borders

w. Inflaming ethnic animosities to instill fear and solicit support for unscrupulous leaders

x. Diamonds, gold, and coltan: Competition for access to Africa’s mineral wealth and the use of that wealth to finance armed movements from the warlord to the state level

y. Oil and security outlook in the Gulf of Guinea

z. Equatorial Guinea: Future stability and oil wealth

aa. Sao Tome and Principe: Considerations for U.S. basing

bb. Nigeria: The future of international oil operations in the Delta

cc. Nigeria: Outlook for internal stability--a looming failed state?

dd. Nigeria’s political and military goals vis-à-vis its Gulf of Guinea neighbors

ee. Gulf of Guinea: How two mini-states will cope with regional pressures

ff. Nigeria-Cameroon: Outlook for Bakassi Resolution since the ICJ ruling

gg. The role of Morocco’s civilian security forces

hh. The Moroccan monarchy and the structure of the Moroccan military

ii. Morocco’s military cooperation with Sub-Saharan African countries

jj. Tunisia’s security apparatus

kk. North African naval modernization issues

ll. Libya and COMESSA: Security role in Sub-Saharan Africa

mm. Impact of succession to Qadhafi on Libyan allies and aid recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa

nn. Prospects for Libyan-American security cooperation in the Mediterranean

oo. Prospects for Libyan-American security cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa

pp. Algerian Interior Ministry forces and their role in internal security

qq. Algeria’s Berbers and internal stability

rr. Ethnic tensions in Mauritania and future stability

ss. Role of France in North Africa

tt. Role of France in the Sahel

uu. Role of China in North Africa

vv. Role of China in the Sahel

ww. Role of Russia in the North Africa-Sahel region

xx. Regional security arrangements among North African and Sahelian states

yy. Relations of North African countries with Nigeria

zz. Relations of Morocco with Gulf of Guinea countries

aaa. Relations of Mauritania with Senegal, Mali, and Algeria

bbb. The Palestinian expatriate community in North Africa and the Sahel
ccc. The North African expatriate community in Europe and the Middle East
ddd. Life after Mugabe: Will Zimbabwe recover?  
eee. The Future of the Mano River Union  
fff. Great Lakes regional stability  
ggg. Democracy: success or failure in Sub-Saharan Africa  
hhh. South African military in the future  
iii. Equitorial Guinea: the last Kleptocracy in Africa?  
njj. Interested in any topics addressing means of exposing and/or ending corruption in Africa

3. Eurasia:
a. Generational changes of attitude in the Caucasus  
b. Long-term Iranian interests and objectives in the Caucasus  
c. Crime networks in any or all: Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia  
d. Corruption networks in any or all: Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia  
e. Progress toward and prospects for European or NATO integration for: Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan  
f. Russia-Asia relations (especially China)  
g. Implications of Russian demographic changes  

4. Balkans:
a. Role of Serbia in regional stability  
b. Impact of Kosovo final status on Balkan stability  
c. Influence of Islamic extremism in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
d. Impact of Albanian nationalism on regional stability  
e. Influence of Islamic extremism in Kosovo and Macedonia  
f. Threat of Balkan organized crime on Europe  
g. Future stability of Kostunica minority government in Serbia  
h. Influence of organized crime on Balkan society  
i. Integration of Balkan States into EU and NATO structures  
j. Impact of Union of Serbia Montenegro split on regional stability  
k. Influence of organized crime on Albanian governmental institutions  
l. Role of clan demographics on Kosovo and Albanian democratic institutions  
m. Future of Dayton implementation by EUFOR on Bosnia-Herzegovina

5. Kurds (Kongra Gel/PKK):
a. Case study of the potential impact and implications, both to Turkey and to the Kongra Gel/PKK, of the transition of the Kongra Gel from an insurgency to a political movement supporting the Kurdish cause  
b. Case study of factors enabling the Kongra Gel, as a Marxist insurgency made up of primarily of Muslims, to mitigate pressures to adopt more of a radical Islamic agenda and maintain its focus on the basic Marxist (secular) tenets of the organization  
c. Case study of Kongra Gel/PKK insurgency from the basis of its ability to avoid/prevent serious schisms or splintering, even after its leader’s imprisonment, at least up to the current potential split. What are the
potential implications of the apparent division of the Kongra Gel into “reformist” and “hardline” camps?

d. Case study of the effectiveness of Turkish Jandarma paramilitary police forces in combating the Kongra Gel/PKK

e. Case study of the effectiveness of Turkish military operations against the Kongra Gel/PKK inside northern Iraq from the 1990s to present. Were these operations successful in disrupting the KGK/PKK, for the long term, short term, or has there been little actual disruption to Kongra Gel operations?

6. NATO:
   a. Should NATO have a JIC-like organization?
   b. In a peacetime environment, how can NATO best provide intelligence for out of area operations?
   c. Role of U.S. intelligence support to EU and Eurocorps in and out of NATO operations
   d. Future application of bilateral/multilateral intelligence systems in EUCOM AOR to support existing information sharing agreements as well as war on terrorism
   e. Cross-command intelligence security cooperation (engagement) in an increasingly complex allied/coalition environment
   f. The impact of NATO expansion on the intelligence/information sharing environment of old members
   g. Moving NATO intelligence beyond reliance on the member nations: NATO collection assets needed?
   h. Multinational coalition intelligence architectures and intelligence sharing: How do NATO, CENTCOM, ISAF, play together?
   i. NATO Intelligence: Does it function?
   j. Intelligence sharing with NATO partners in non-NATO and out-of-area operations
   k. Intelligence support to operations: How can NATO best do this?
   l. Develop a “dream” intelligence architecture and intelligence community structure for the NATO of tomorrow; where should it be in 10 years?

2. Leadership, Personnel Management and Culture: Examine the issue of understanding cultural intelligence (CQ) and its implications in conflict and the war on terrorism.


4. Pros and Cons of establishing an intelligence community lessons learned data base.
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. How can we take a holistic view of metrics for determining progress as opposed to a matrix approach? (G-3, ACD)
   b. How can we better get our strategic communications message about war on terrorism out to the world to garner world support? (G-3, ACD)
   c. Have the legislated requirements of Nunn-Lugar improved the safety of U.S. citizens or impacted our ability to address a WMD attack in the Continental United States? (CSG)

2. Homeland Security:
   a. What emerging capabilities can enhance mission effectiveness of Army units committed for disaster relief, particularly in terms of communication and relief supply distribution? (CSG)
   b. In what new ways can NORTHCOM and ARNORTH contribute in supporting civil authority during WMD consequence management? (CSG)
   c. Can traditional campaign planning and theater design improve planning for support to civil authority? (CSG)

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. How can the Army better prepare soldiers and units for language and culture sensitivity requirements prior to deployment into theaters of operation? (CSG)
   b. What are the implications of China’s growing military power on China’s willingness to extend its strategic reach? (G-3 ACD)
   c. How will DoD 3000 and the interagency missions impact Army in-country logistics? (G-3 ACD)

4. Military Change:
   a. In what ways can the military construction (MILCON) process be changed to increase flexibility and responsiveness to the combatant commander and component commanders? (CSG)
   b. How can PPBES be made more responsive and agile in reacting to requirements that come out of cycle or result from ARFORGEN sync conferences than currently seen with the traditional PPBES timelines for POM, BES, President’s Budget, and Appropriations? (G-8)
c. How can Lean Six Sigma be applied to the POM build process? (G-8)
d. How can traditional operational testing in support of materiel acquisition be changed or modified during time of war, given high OPTEMPO in training and deployment schedules and statutory requirements? (CSG)
e. How can successful Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) be fielded faster and more efficiently? (CSG)
f. In a brigade-centric Army, should the mission of the Corps -- while in garrison or in support of the war fight -- be changed? (CSG)
g. What will the role of the Senior Mission Commander be in 2013, and how will it be executed when he and his headquarters fully deploy? (CSG)
h. How should the Capstone concept for joint operations be tailored to feed into the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS)? (G-3 ACD)
i. How can we improve the use of the military/civilian/contractor mix at the unit level? What tools, flexibilities, controls might be needed to reduce costs or improve output by varying the mix currently generated through the current cumbersome, somewhat disconnected, process? (G-8)

   a. Should combat operations be funded through the budget supplemental process? If yes, how can the POM process accommodate contingencies and other unforecasted requirements? (CSG)
   b. How can the Army both increase and improve inter-agency involvement in combat operations in theater and in the Army's planning and exercise programs? (CSG)
   c. How do we tailor deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors? (CSG)
   d. How can the military better leverage other elements of DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) for the long war? (CSG)
   e. Should other elements of the U.S. Government be required to partner with DoD to achieve victory post-conflict in emerging democracies? (CSG)

6. Landpower Employment: Given the enhanced capabilities and the changing tactics and operations of all actors (combatants, institutes and instruments of civil government, and indigenous and non-indigenous personnel) in the current theater of war, how can this new complexity of warfare be better handled by U.S. forces? (CSG)

7. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
   a. Should ARFORGEN requirements determine force structure and end strength? (G1)
   b. With Army Transformation, are we modular enough? Is there a need for greater modularity smaller than the Brigade Combat Team (BCT)? Is there a need for greater modularity within CS/CSS units? (G1)
c. Is Army end strength sufficient to support the life cycle management requirements of ARFORGEN? (CSG)
d. How does the Army move from a system of unit-centric accountability and maintenance for equipment to a fleet-centric/Army-wide management system? (CSG)
e. How do FORSCOM and AMC manage equipment training sets in and out of ARFORGEN? Do we need new business practices to better manage this process? (CSG)
f. Given the three year ARFORGEN cycle, should the Army training strategy by more prescriptive or descriptive? (CSG)
g. Does the Army need to make changes in resourcing programatics to better support the ARFORGEN process? (CSG)
h. Is DoD Directive, Equipping the Reserves, compatible with ARFORGEN? (G4)
i. How can Lean Six Sigma be applied to worldwide asset visibility? (G4)
j. How can the backhaul be used more effectively to reduce stock piles of equipment requiring retrograde to CONUS? (G4)
k. Can the Army meet the equipping goals given the high operations tempo (current operations, modularity equipment requirements, and future operations)? (G4)
l. What are the implications of ARFORGEN on PPBES within the Army? (CSG)
m. Can ARFORGEN be utilized to justify and obtain resources? (CSG)
n. How do the USAR and ARNG utilize and manage their respective TTHS accounts? (CSG)
o. What is the impact on Army logistics in supporting simultaneous SSTRO and combat operations? (G-3 ACD)
p. How to we affect the terrorist state and nonstate player’s access to higher capability military hardware? (G-3 ACD)

8. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
a. What are the impacts of transformation on Army traditions and culture? (CSG)
b. Has the Army achieved AC/RC integration? (CSG)
c. Is the institutional Army structured to manage a contracted workforce? (CSG)
d. What can the Army do to better assist RC recruiting efforts and to alleviate RC lieutenant and captain shortfalls? (CSG)
e. How do we meet the increasingly rapid acceleration of technology that requires innovative training approaches to meet the high tech skills demanded by our transformation TOEs? (G-3 ACD)

9. War and Society:
a. Has the Army adapted from Industrial-Age to Information-Age warfare? (CSG)
b. Is America preoccupied with spreading democracy? (CSG)
c. Does “Shock and Awe” affect our ability to “Win Hearts and Minds”? (CSG)
1. What is the threat posed to CONUS by the flow of special interest aliens across the borders and what can USNORTHCOM do to counter the threat?

2. What centers of gravity are associated with Homeland Security and Homeland Defense? Does the United States have a center of gravity? What should be done to protect it?

3. What nonlethal weapon capabilities does DoD require to conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions?

4. How can we improve interoperability in command, control, communications, and computer systems to support the Canadian and U.S. transformation strategies and protect vulnerabilities to our economies, security, and environment?

5. What threats and challenges are associated with untracked air threats (general VFR aviation, low-altitude, low-observable vehicles), and what can NORAD do to address them?

6. What are the potential issues and implications of NORAD’s adoption of maritime roles?

7. What is a useful framework for understanding and evaluating the CBRNE threat from a red force perspective?

8. What metrics and/or measures of effectiveness can be used to measure USNORTHCOM’s mission of deterring, preventing, and defeating clandestine attacks?

9. What psychological effects of a terrorist attack are likely?


11. What levels of risk are acceptable in conducting CBRNE-remains recovery and processing?

12. What are the most effective techniques and protocols for protecting hospitals against introducing CBRN contaminants during post-attack operations?

13. How should NORAD/USNORTHCOM ensure continuity of operations in the event of catastrophic failures or loss of ability to operate?
14. How can USNORTHCOM effectively, efficiently, and legally develop and implement comprehensive collection of Homeland Defense and Civil Support threat information consistent with U.S. privacy law?

15. What key theater security cooperation initiatives are required to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance the overall Homeland Defense posture of the United States?

16. What is the appropriate USNORTHCOM involvement in federal, state, tribal, and local government exercises?

17. How can we improve the interconnectivity of U.S. efforts to reduce the WMD/E threat with international efforts?

18. Operational Control of U.S. Borders--Is the Nation on the right track? Given the threat nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism highlighted in HSPD-25 and the rapidly growing drug manufacture and trafficking presence in Mexico, what should be the USNORTHCOM role in ensuring operational control of U.S. borders in the land domain?

19. What relationships should DoD establish with Canada Command? The Canadian military recently formed a new command with similar responsibilities as U.S. Northern Command. As Canada Command matures, U.S. Northern Command should strengthen the partnership between the two commands. DoD needs to work out the relationships between U.S. Northern Command, NORAD, and the new Canada Command. Some of the questions that need to be answered include: How do USNORTHCOM and Canada Command ensure coordination and integration of plans and operations? Should the United States and Canada enter into any new formal agreements or treaties with respect to North American security or civil support cooperation? Does NORAD need to transition into some other type of organization with new missions and responsibilities and possibly even a new structure?

20. How can the U.S. Government more effectively synchronize and create greater unity of effort between interagency, NGO and DoD on the war on terrorism, while maintaining a balance of freedom for U.S. citizens? There is a rightful tension between the freedoms that citizens of the United States enjoy and the need to provide security for the nation as a whole. There are a host of legal restraints (posse comitias, DoD surveillance restraints on U.S. citizens, etc.) that are intended to prevent infringement of individual freedoms. Terror organization and transnational threats operate globally, and the United States has a long porous border allowing these threats access inside the United States. How can the DoD, with the largest share of the budget and capability, and other U.S. agencies be better integrated and synchronized to achieve national security yet maintain U.S. citizen’s freedoms?

21. How can DoD effectively carry out its catastrophic response roles and responsibilities? Numerous entities criticized the Federal Government’s
response (including DoD’s) to Hurricane Katrina. In the aftermath of the hurricane, several reports detailing lessons learned have been published. It is appropriate to review DoD’s roles and responsibilities during truly catastrophic events where it is extremely likely that local and state authorities will quickly be overwhelmed. Some examples may include any CBRN event or severe natural disasters that meet certain criteria such as high magnitude earthquakes or hurricanes. This review should address the appropriate authorities that combatant commanders with domestic responsibilities have and what responses would require SecDef approval. It should also address appropriate trigger points for responding and what the appropriate combatant commander response would be once these triggers occur. Finally, it should address what resources should be made available to combatant commanders during the response (transportation, supplies, communications, etc.).

22. How can the U.S. Government effectively carry out information and intelligence sharing between DoD and non-DoD organizations and agencies? USNORTHCOM has been assigned Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions. USNORTHCOM mission preparation, planning and execution necessitate coordination and working with multiple organizations and agencies both within and outside DoD to include other government and civil agencies. Current laws, regulations and policies preclude the effective sharing of this data with these organizations to the detriment of mission accomplishment.

2. Homeland Security: Counterproliferation of WMD: When is preemption appropriate? (J57)

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Asia-Pacific:
      i. Reversing rising anti-Americanism: From exporting fears and anger toward a vision of hope and opportunity (Rosenberger)
      ii. Transforming Army C2 in the Pacific: Reexamining the roles and missions of 8th U.S.A, U.S.ARPAC/UEy, and I Corps/Uex (J53)
      iii. China’s expanding influence in Asia: Conflict with U.S. strategic aims? (J51)
      v. Strategic options in South Korea: Permanent presence or redeployment? (J51)
      vi. Biological warfare countermeasures: The race is on in the Asia-Pacific (J57)
      vii. Homeland Defense in the Asia-Pacific: The tyranny of distance (J57)
      viii. China’s rising appetite for energy: Collision in sight? (Rosenberger)
      ix. The rise of Asian democracies: Are they permanent? (Rosenberger)
      x. The Malacca Straight: Funnel for disaster? (J52)
      xi. Assessing Theater Security Cooperation (LTC McGuire)
      xii. China’s economic rise: Implications for Southeast Asian businesses? (Rosenberger)
      xiii. Rising Chinese military superiority over Taiwan: Strategies to close the gap (J54)
      xiv. Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI): Toward private sector involvement and ownership (Rosenberger)
      xv. Nuclear and Non-nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): Potential impacts on theater operations (J57)
b. Southeast Asia:
   i. Nepal’s counterinsurgency: Formulating a holistic U.S. strategy (J52)
   ii. SE Asia multilateral cooperation: The future of the ASEAN regional forum (J52)
   iii. Improve U.S.-Philippine counterterrorism strategy given constitutional realities (J52)

c. Southwest Asia: Improving India-Pakistan relations--Can we improve the process? (J52)

4. Military Change:
   a. Transforming the Army in Korea: Building a force for rapid regional and global employment (J53)
   b. Methodology for disaggregating OPLANs into critical effects (J54 & J55)
   c. Unique and complementary utility of operational and functional taxonomies in capabilities-based planning (J55)
   d. Transforming the nature and extent of U.S. Marine Corps presence in Japan (J53)
1. Examine the range of economic policies and their results in key countries throughout the region. Assess these policies with respect to their ability to provide long-term sustainable growth that addresses poverty and income equality while maintaining fiscal discipline.

2. What reforms are necessary to make Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) beneficial to all sectors of society? How can nations seek ways to benefit creatively and create sustainable long-term growth using FTA’s as a tool for economic development?

3. Examine the security implications of CAFTA-DR and Central American regional integration initiatives, such as those proposed by the Central American Integration System (SICA) (example: border control/security issues).

4. Analyze defense/security spending and social investment by country over the past 5 years (10 years if possible).

5. Assess the types of threats the region will face circa 2015-20.

6. Examine and present frameworks that will serve to engage and defeat enemies that employ asymmetric warfare. (The study should encompass all types of actors: those from outside the region as well as those from within).

7. Examine the “costs” of terrorism and illicit activities on governability, security, economics, etc.
   a. Assess the “total costs” of terrorism and other illicit activities—not only the obvious costs, but also the less tangible ones such as the erosion of public confidence in governments (at all levels) due to corruption, etc.
   b. Assess the varying degrees to which most nations in the Western Hemisphere have paid a price in the GWOT.

8. Assess the relationships between transnational threats and those threats traditionally viewed as internal security challenges.
   a. Assess the deliberately transnational nature of contemporary Latin American populist movements and their impacts on regional governability and security.
   b. Do threats traditionally viewed as internal security challenges possess a transnational component?

9. Identify strategies to eliminate or significantly reduce illicit trafficking throughout the Western Hemisphere.
   a. Assess the impacts of the human trafficking problem in Latin America
10. Can the United States build and maintain positive relationships with existing, as well as newly elected governments in the region who oppose U.S. policies? If so, how? (note: propose either broad, regional solutions or more pointed recommendations for single nations).
   a. How can the United States negotiate basing rights in partner nations with governments that may not support our regional policies (for example, a Cooperative Security Location (CSL) in Manta, Ecuador)?
   b. What specific role can regional military-to-military engagement play in engaging these governments?

11. Examine successful models for reducing state corruption.

12. Examine predictive models that forecast the migration of coca cultivation in response to eradication efforts. What are the implications for national policy formulation and strategic security planning?

13. Analyze the history and impacts of extra-hemispheric actors (both state and nonstate) in the region. Is there a discernible trend away from inter-regional relations? If such a trend can be established, does it have precedents and what have been the results?

14. Trace the evolution (changes and growth) of regional military professionalization since the mid-1960s (changes and growth of civil military relationships).

15. Examine the most successful instances of U.S.-Latin American engagement/cooperation (government-sponsored or not) of the 20th and 21st centuries.

16. Examine the eventual restoration of U.S.-Cuba military-to-military relationships (for example, survey applicable lessons from the restoration of military-to-military relationships with Eastern European states following the end of the Cold War).

17. Examine U.S.-Latin American economic interdependence:
   a. Assess present and future U.S. dependence on Latin American energy sources (including, but not exclusively, Venezuelan and Mexican petroleum).
   b. Forecast the total impacts (beyond economic) of CAFTA on Central America and the United States (with emphasis on regional security and stability).

18. Is liberal democracy good for Latin America?
   a. What is the future of democracy in Latin American nations with significant indigenous populations?

19. Unified Command Plan (UCP) and its inherent seams: Is there a better way to organize combatant command theaters?
   a. Should the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the mission responsibilities of the Unified Commanders be revised?
   b. Responsibility for Cuba, Mexico NORTHCOM or SOUTHCOM?
20. Explore alternative means to meeting traditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements in the region.

21. What are the future USAF contributions to theater security cooperation for emerging nations?
   a. How can the world’s most advanced air and space team contribute to strategic alliances with our western hemisphere neighbors?
1. Are we fighting one global insurgency or regional insurgencies along a common theme?

2. USSOCOM, DoD, and the interagency--collaboration in the war on terrorism.

3. Clarifying the lines under the authorities of Title 10 and Title 50 with respect to intelligence activities and the implications in terms of prosecuting the war on terrorism outside designated combat areas.

4. Global posturing of all Special Operations forces--specifically synchronizing integrated training prior to deploying components as an integrated SOF task force.
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. Military role in developing partnerships with allies in war on terrorism. The Army’s role in developing these partnerships. (USASOC G-2)
   b. Military contributions to information operations in war on terrorism. This issue is embedded in item 17, page 2, however, because of the criticality, information operations deserves to be a stand alone item. (USASOC G-2)
   c. Special Forces (SF) may be the only U.S. Forces operating in a region and by default become the “face” of U.S. policy and actions to the local populace. What is the national strategy that incorporates SF presence into national-level strategic communications and information operations? How can SF better coordinate with and support other U.S. Government agencies in strategic communications and information operations? (USASFC)
   d. Study information operations in terms of whom within the U.S. Government should have the lead and proponentcy for information operations, and what should DoD’s role be? (USACAPOC)
   e. How do we prosecute the war on terrorism in the GCC and U.S. Government seams? What special command structures are required? Is the JIATF structure appropriate? (USASOC G-35)
   f. Study the willingness to exploit surrogates to further U.S. foreign policy. (USASOC G-3X)
   g. Sustainment of the war on terrorism including:
      i. How the Army and Joint Forces will support and conduct a large-scale, long duration irregular warfare campaign spanning several countries or regions. (USASOC G-8)
      ii. The full spectrum of operations in an irregular war to counter that opponent (counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, stability, security, transition and reconstruction civil-military operations, psychological operations, information operations, and intelligence operations). (USASOC G-8)
      iii. What the roles and missions for the Army and Special Operations are in an irregular war, recognizing the full spectrum of operation necessary to counter the asymmetrical opponent in an irregular war. (USASOC G-8)
      iv. Study the relationship between DoD and DoS as the war on terrorism expands beyond OEF and OIF. Who is the lead/focal point for the combined DoD and DoS operations? (USASOC G-8)
   h. What the influence of religious beliefs and religious radical groups is in the present development of the war on terrorism. (Chaplain)
i. Examine the context of the War on “Terrorism” and evaluate the associated risk of defining a strategy that potentially fights the “Tool” and not the people, ideologies and movements that employ terrorism as a means of propaganda or a method to influence political change. (75th Ranger Regiment)

j. Examine the roles of nonstate actors in challenging the authority and sovereignty of the established nationstates. (75th Ranger Regiment)

k. The challenge of synchronizing the UN, NATO and other regional security forces in support of the war on terrorism. (75th Ranger Regiment)

l. Prioritize the information war. The challenge of influencing or challenging Muslim fundamentalist ideology. (75th Ranger Regiment)

m. How we can refine processes and approvals needed for the successful execution of clandestine operations. (75th Ranger Regiment)

n. Evaluate the methods to improve SOF human intelligence capabilities to fight terrorism in restricted and denied countries. (75th Ranger Regiment)

o. How current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq--and their potential outcomes--will affect regional security in the greater Middle East and East Asia. (75th Ranger Regiment)

p. How to build and maintain collations in a manner that does not dilute the will of America to take decisive action in the international arena (in some cases, success will require the United States to have a low profile)? (75th Ranger Regiment)

q. Define U.S. policy with respect to preemptive, preventive and retaliatory measures in support of the war on terrorism. (75th Ranger Regiment)

2. Homeland Security:
   a. Does DoD need to reexamine Posse Comitatis and traditional roles in response to 9/11 and future homeland security threats? (75th Ranger Regiment)

   b. Enhancing situational awareness without becoming a police state. Evaluate measures required to preserve liberties and institutions central to American culture. (75th Ranger Regiment)

   c. Execution of war-gaming exercises at the national level to establish operational working relationships and identify critical vulnerabilities. (75th Ranger Regiment)


3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Study the implications of strategic water control to the economic, political and military stability of critical regions. (USASOC ARNG Advisor)

   b. North Africa and the Middle East. What is the U.S. long-term strategy towards Hamas as a legitimate governing body? (USASOC G-3X)
c. How do we--and who does this (i.e., the UN)--professionalize regional security forces in areas currently not identified as central battlefields in the war on terrorism? (75th Ranger Regiment)
d. Examine the role of the media in rebuilding failed states (venue for fair representation of information). (75th Ranger Regiment)
e. Examine the need for justice and reconciliation programs within the process of rebuilding governments of failed states. Examine impacts on continued coalition operations within this construct. (75th Ranger Regiment)

4. Military Change:
a. Change item 5 to read: The probable impact of fog and friction of the future force and suggested lubricants. (USASOC ARNG Advisor)
b. Integration of traditional law enforcement tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) into military TTP. Such “cross-over” skills are needed to target terrorist rings and support networks. (USASOC G-2)
c. How do we streamline the POM process to make it more responsive to immediate needs as we continue to prosecute the war on terrorism? (75th Ranger Regiment)
d. Determine the effects of technology on the Principles of War. Has technology truly enabled smaller combat formations, or is the individual soldier, and the ability to mass when required, still as important as ever? (75th Ranger Regiment)
e. Considerations with respect to actions directed against enemy computers and networks. (75th Ranger Regiment)
f. Method to compress time associated with cultural change that fosters innovation and flexibility in a time of war. (75th Ranger Regiment)

a. In paragraph 1, change references to the Defense Strategy (DS) to the National Defense Strategy (NDS). (USASOC ARNG Advisor)
b. Revision of Foreign Assistance Program (circa 1961) in support of the National Security Strategy. Reduce from 30 objectives to a less cumbersome, more focused effort. (75th Ranger Regiment)
c. International recognition for emerging states (or nonstate actors). (75th Ranger Regiment)
d. 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap. (USASFC)
   i. Implications of the document on Army Special Operations Forces and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne). (USASFC)
   ii. Analysis and study of what is required in mission sets, organizational structure, force structure, equipment, technology, and stationing to conduct “long-duration, low-visibility and multiple” irregular warfare campaigns. (USASFC)
   iii. Integration of a long-duration irregular warfare campaign with Joint, conventional, and multinational forces. (USASFC)
6. Landpower Employment:
   a. What is the role of SOF in urban warfare? (USASOC G-8)
   b. What are the roles for and the implications of using surrogates in urban warfare? (USASOC G-8)
   c. What is the role of SOF in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations? (USASOC G-8)
   d. How are Future Force sustainment operations conducted across noncontiguous LOCs in separate nations? (USASOC G-8)
   e. Should unity of command or unity of effort be the governing paradigm for interagency operations? (USASOC G-3X)
   f. A measure to increase DoD influence or communicate with the State Department with respect to infrastructure improvements in failed states (i.e., improve utilities in cities and rural areas). (75th Ranger Regiment)

7. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
   a. Expand planning for projected conflicts and logistics for dispersed/distributed combat operations to include protracted conflicts in multiple countries and regions simultaneously. (USASOC G-8)
   b. Include implications for logistical support to surrogate forces as they are employed by the United States during an irregular war. (USASOC G-8)
   c. Include the role of the support Brigade Combat Team in irregular war as it is conducted in multiple regions and countries simultaneously. (USASOC G-8)
   d. Identify unique force protection capabilities required to conduct sea-basing operations. (75th Ranger Regiment)
   e. Role of industry in support of the “Long War.” Examine the relationship of the U.S. economy and extended military operations. Can industry increase efficiencies in this regard? (75th Ranger Regiment)

8. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
   a. Maintaining the necessary cultural awareness and linguistic competence to deal with multiple active and potential conflicts within the wide-ranging Islamic world. (USASOC G-2)
   b. Developing imaginative leaders who are able to produce creative solutions to complex problems. (USASOC G-3X)
   c. Study the impact of service members not paying Federal taxes. (USASOC G-3X)
   d. Evaluate the existing Joint Planning models with respect to both deliberate and crisis action planning. (75th Ranger Regiment)
   e. How can we develop more adaptive leaders? What is the feasibility of incorporating “social intelligence” into soldier and leader development and education? (75th Ranger Regiment)

9. War and Society:
   a. Assume there will be no major technological advancements in alternate fuels that would lower U.S. dependence on oil. How high will fuel costs have to be and/or how low will fuel supplies have to be before the low costs of foreign labor are offset and production of goods made
in the United States (clothes and electronics, for example) becomes economically feasible again? In other words, when will the costs and availability of transportation begin to work against a global economy and for a regional economy, and push the United States toward an isolationist policy? (USASOC G-35)

b. Prioritize “Public Diplomacy” in the foreign policy process. Grant interviews to foreign media. (75th Ranger Regiment)
c. Strengthening of public opinion research (including within foreign countries). (75th Ranger Regiment)
d. Development of rapid response capability to respond to misinformation. (75th Ranger Regiment)
e. Expanding and empowering the roles of ambassadors and military liaison elements. (75th Ranger Regiment)
f. Sustaining foreign exchange programs and providing visibility at the local and national levels. (75th Ranger Regiment)
g. Development of message campaigns with support of the private sector. (75th Ranger Regiment)

10. Other:
   a. Military working dogs (MWD.) WMDs are related to IEDs, but are capable of tracking and patrolling. What is the DoD position on contract dogs in offensive operations? What agency sets the standards for contract dogs? Is the current inventory of MWDs sufficient to support all war on terrorism and Homeland Security requirements? (USASOC G-35)
   b. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat. Can technology defeat IEDs? Is counter-IED a force protection question or is it offensive operations? What agency is responsible for writing counter-IED doctrine? Is the MWD (Special Search Dog or Patrol Explosives Detector Dog) the appropriate tool to defeat IEDs for mechanized units? (USASOC G-35)
   c. Asymmetric Warfare. This is associated with IEDs, but of a greater scope. Is asymmetric warfare simply management, training and coordination of actions in response to threats? What is the offensive (vice reactive or defensive) posture of asymmetric warfare? Is irregular warfare simply the continually changing nature of warfare, the “revolution of military affairs,” or is it the future of war? Is the real problem one of semantics? Are U.S. forces trapped in a status quo mentality, or are they ready to redesign themselves to confront the current threat at the expense of confronting a peer foe in the future? (USASOC G-35)
   d. Explore the second and third effects of the AC/RC Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations split. (USASOC Futures Center)
   e. Explore the advantages of moving RC SF units from the NGB to the USAR. (USASOC G-35)
   f. Can science develop robotics that protect or reduce our vulnerability? (75th Ranger Regiment)
   g. Where can “lesser technologies” improve efficiency? (75th Ranger Regiment)
h. Who should control Civil Information Management (CIM) and have the lead for it in the different theaters? Study how to develop a Common Operating Picture for CIM. (USACAPoC)

i. After nearly 20 years, is it time to reexamine Goldwater-Nichols in view of the following questions? (USASFC)

   i. Does Goldwater-Nichols maximize Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and integration in the interagency and multinational spectrum? (USASFC)

   ii. What are the relationships in ARSOF and other government agencies, while facing the 21st century challenges and defeating enemies in the war on terrorism? (USASFC)

   iii. What is the impact of command climate/human relations environment on retention and recruiting?

   iv. How can equal opportunity (EO) programs be tailored and leveraged to create a positive human relations environment/command climate?

   v. Do deploying/deployed EO Advisors have the appropriate training and are there enough per unit in consideration of supporting reserve units and civilians on the battlefield? (Many reserve units have EO advisor positions as required, but not authorized. Therefore they never receive the 10 week qualification training).
United States Strategic Command

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1. Global War On Terrorism:
   a. National Implementation Plan and the way ahead for DoD/SOCOM
   b. Counterproliferation initiatives
   c. Interoperability with interagency
   d. Deterrence and nonstate actors
   e. Nation and rogue state sponsorship of terrorism
   f. Countering ideological support to terrorism
   g. Proliferation Security Initiative

2. Homeland Security:
   a. Missile Defense--theater and global
   b. QDR--global deterrence
   c. What deters the United States and how does that impact security decisions

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Interdependence on allies and friends
   b. Information sharing

4. Military Change:
   a. Transforming from asset to requirements based capabilities
   b. QDR force construct and sizing
   c. Impact of BRAC

   a. Integrating information operations--vertically and horizontally
   b. Leveraging and integrating existing analytical capabilities
   c. Operations in cyberspace/netwarfare/NETOPS
   d. Way ahead for strategic communications/information operations

6. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
   a. Leveraging government/agency expertise--birth of Joint Functional Component Commands at STRATCOM
   b. Using collaborative tools--changing culture from “need to know” to “need to share”
   c. Establishing distributed collaborative, interdependent organizational environment

7. War and Society:
   a. Role of nuclear weapons in deterrence
   b. Emerging powers
The Defense Intelligence Agency

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1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. The spread and role of radical Islam and international terrorist group capabilities
   b. International counterterrorism (CT) capabilities and worldwide perception of U.S. power and CT actions

2. Homeland Defense:
   a. Homeland defense and homeland security cooperation in assessing, countering, and responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats and consequences
   b. Obstacles to information sharing among intelligence agencies, Federal, state and local law enforcement officials
   c. Examining current laws and statutes that enhance or impede information sharing, coordination, and cooperation among homeland defense and homeland security agencies
   d. The military’s role in responding to natural disasters in the United States—lessons to be learned from the 2005 hurricane season

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Responses (North Africa/Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Southwest Asia) to the presence of militant Islam, challenges to internal and regional stability and the U.S. global defense posture
   b. Assessing national strategy, security policies, and decision-making in the Caucasus and Asia
   c. Prospects for regional instability generated by politically and economically disenfranchised indigenous populations in Latin America
   d. The regional strategic goals and ambitions of North Korea and China and their ability to achieve them through military and economic capabilities
   e. Requirements for advanced infrastructure and network analyses that broadly examine command and control processes used by U.S. planners, policymakers, and warfighters

4. National Security Strategy: Review in-theater intelligence organizations such as joint intelligence centers (JICs), joint analysis centers (JACs), and counterintelligence operations centers (CIOCs) in order to determine if they are meeting the objectives of the National Intelligence and National Security strategies, combatant commanders’ operations plans, and other requirements.

5. Leadership: Examine how Department of Defense and service intelligence agencies are modifying training, education, management, and leadership principles to meet new Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Intelligence Reform Act requirements.
United States Transportation Command

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1. What is the appropriate type and mix of transportation assets (air, land, and see) to support the National Military Strategy/Future Force?

2. Achieving unity of effort across the joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE).

3. Prior to opening a theater, does the logistics planning process need to identify, model, and simulate a detailed distribution network?

4. Forecasting supply requirements for the war on terrorism.

5. Retrograde management and return within the distribution pipeline.

6. Logistics integration with multinational, interagency organizations, nongovernment organizations, and civilian contractors.

7. How will the growing global economy affect the government’s use of the elements of national power (DIME) over the next 5, 10, 15 years?
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. Which Islamic factions worldwide will emerge to challenge existing governments, both democratic and authoritarian?
   b. Which adversaries will likely form alliances and coalitions to oppose U.S. interests?

2. Homeland Security:
   a. What are the WMD/WME military capabilities of potential adversaries?
      How will they get access to and develop these capabilities?
   b. Will potential adversary states and/or groups continue investigating chemical and/or biological agents with the potential to be used as WMD/WME?
   c. How does the Federal Government enhance ongoing interagency/intergovernmental and nongovernmental agency interaction in preparation of and during wartime and/or onset of major crises, disaster, or similar events?

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. What are the governance/political trends--global, regional, and domestic--driving the future Joint Operational Environment (2012-2025)?
   b. What are the social/cultural trends--global, regional, and domestic--driving the future Joint Operational Environment (2012-2025)?
   c. What are the demographic trends--global, regional, and domestic--and impacts of population growth and urbanization driving the future Joint Operational Environment?
   d. What are the requirements for interoperability with multinational organizations, coalition and/or indigenous forces, IPIs, IOs, NGOs, and OGAs to control humanitarian assistance related to population movement?

4. Military Change:
   a. What state or nonstate actors have or will have access to space?
   b. How will emerging or new technologies in space and near space impact military land operations in the far future?
   c. What should doctrine education and training consist of in the future?
   d. What organization and capabilities are required of a division, corps, or theater headquarters to establish and secure theater bases and conduct Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration (RSOI)?
   e. How should UIC and TO&E designs be modified to more fully support strategic response?

5. Landpower Employment:
   a. How does the FF participate in/contribute to the joint IO campaign to shape the battlespace?
b. What type/mix of asymmetric strategies will future adversaries employ to challenge the U.S. military element of National Power (across the four challenges)?

c. What manning, training and equipping changes are necessary to transform a Service Headquarters into a JTF more rapidly and effectively?

d. How can an emphasis on operations in a contaminated environment be addressed, moving beyond the current, tactical perspective, to one that incorporates strategic and operational concerns, given the growing concerns regarding the uncontrolled proliferation of WMD capabilities?

e. What are the best adjustable prepositioning strategies, to include a review of what is contained within each Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), that complement new operational concepts and acquisition of new lift assets?

6. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

   a. What anti-access capabilities will challenge U.S. ability to operate in areas of interest?

   b. What are the sustainment requirements, and what are the most effective means to support Maneuver Enhancement assets?

   c. How should home station operation centers (HSOCs) be organized, trained and equipped to support the Future Army Modular Force?

   d. What are the conditions in the operational environment under which Future Army Modular Force commanders and tactical operations staff, units, and soldiers (i.e., warfighters) must perform missions and tasks? What changes to the strategic environment will affect the Army’s leader development and training requirements?

   e. Deployability/transportability: How do strategic deployment and transportability affect the FBCT?

   f. How is strategic sustainment blended with campaign execution to support the future Army Modular Force directly in forward operating areas?

   g. How can DOTMLPF solutions provide linkage from home station, to combat training centers, and to other geographic locations to participate in collaborative strategic, operational and tactical war games?

7. Force Management and Leadership:

   a. Language and culture: Some analysts have indicated that the future Army Modular Force will require more language skills and increased cultural sensitivity. How should the Army proceed to make this a reality?

   b. What cultural and structural (including law and policy) impediments exist that prevent efficient and effective cooperation between future Army Modular Force commanders and interagency partners, and international, private and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), in military operations?

   c. How do we recruit and retain quality, culturally attuned, technically savvy officers and enlisted soldiers in an economic environment that
will have a tremendous demand for culturally attuned, technically savvy men and women? What attributes of service will overcome economic incentives offered by a robust and growing economic environment?

d. How will emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, virtual presence, and reach back capabilities impact the decision-making process for commanders in the future?

e. What organizational changes to the division and corps headquarters are necessary so that those headquarters are capable of command and control of Army, joint, and multinational forces?

f. What organizational changes to the division and corps headquarters are necessary so that those headquarters are capable of interacting effectively with multinational forces as well as with interagency, nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer organizations?

g. The Army force pools must be large enough to provide the flexibility needed for strategic responsiveness and small enough to distribute the management challenge of force pooling across the Army overall. What is the right balance?

8. Science and Technology:
   a. What are the scientific trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving the future Joint Operational Environment?
   b. Which ongoing scientific efforts would, if successful, fundamentally alter the global environment?
   c. What are the emerging or new technologies with military utility in the far future?
1. Homeland Security:
   a. The viability of a ground centric (Army) Sustainment Support Command integrating U.S. Army Reserve assets
   b. Opportunities for technology transfer from the military to the Department of Homeland Security and/or dual-use technologies
   c. Army support for domestic disasters

2. Realizing the Potential of Network Centric Warfare:
   a. Evaluating new information assurance requirements in a net-centric army or analyzing effects of a transforming army at war on information assurance
   b. Strategic implications for combat service support operations given planned mix of FCS systems and current systems that will equip the BCTs of the near future
   c. Operational and cost benefit opportunities from leasing of Combat Support/Combat Service Support equipment to include: cost effectiveness, impact on national security/military operations, logistics management of leased equipment (safety implications, transportability implications, supportability considerations)
   d. Implementation of sense and respond logistics concepts integrated with AIT technology, demonstrating improved warfighter support from supply chain management, fault isolation, and maintenance technical data usage for logistics
   e. Increasing and changing role of contractors in forward areas (interacting with military force)
   f. Strategic and logistical planning for increasing numbers of contractors who will accompany the military force.
   g. Maintaining Army industrial support (organic/private) for transformation
   h. The role of the Army’s organic manufacturing base in transformation
   i. Evaluate the demands of increased bandwidth requirements and the ability of technological improvements to meet those demands

   a. The impact of raw material for Class V production
   b. Viability of a CONUS ground-centric sustainment/support structure
   c. Risk of offshore production of tires, electronics, ball bearings, etc.
   d. LOGCAP/other augmentation agreements as a part of DoS and DoD strategies
   e. The impact of certain strategic materials only being available from foreign sources
   f. The impact of declining rotorcraft technology investment in the United States as compared with foreign governments and industries
   g. The impact of multinational corporate teams and/or foreign owned corporations providing military materials and/or expertise
4. Landpower Employment:
a. LOGCAP and other similar instruments in stabilization and reconstruction operations
b. Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army
c. Joint applicability of Army weapon systems

5. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
a. Implications of “sea-basing”
b. Impact of all civilians (government and contractors) on the battlefield
c. Implementing “sense and respond” logistics in an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) environment
d. The role of the Army’s ground systems industrial base (organic/private) in supporting land power generation and sustainment
e. Joint Theater Logistics Management
f. Development of a national level Global Logistics Command
g. Establishment of a single Army Logistics Enterprise
h. The Army planning, budgeting and funding schema for new systems in light of the extended contractual periods associated with performance based logistics
i. Logistics operations in dispersed/distributed combat operations against predominantly insurgent forces
j. Changing materiel requirements as operations transition from combat to stabilization to reconstruction/nation-building
k. New requirements for the organic industrial base given the changing force structure and nature of conflict
l. Implications for reliance on the commercial industrial base given changing force structure and nature of conflict
m. Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army
n. Joint applicability of Army weapon systems
o. Methods to reduce reliance on contractor support on the battlefield
p. Implication of centralized/single fact to warfighter nontactical maintenance
q. Implication of central control of all Reset
r. Requirements for, and implications of, an Army logistics component of a Joint Logistics Command
s. Desirability of single control of logistics systems from factory to foxhole–acquisition, fielding, maintenance, distribution, etc.
t. Assess how the new active and reserve component force generation models will change the way the Army manages, maintains, and accounts for materiel. Consider both Title 10 and Title 32 requirements for the respective components
u. The emerging growth of radio frequency identification technology and the required uses and security implications for DoD
v. What are the role and impact of contractors on the battlefield?
w. What are the role and impact of nongovernmental organizations on the battlefield?
x. Will the Logistics Management Program (LMP) enhance supply chain management?
y. Assess how to implement BRAC decisions while not impacting readiness
z. Consider the difficulties created within the prepositioned stock program by how quickly the equipment needs of the Army changes

aa. What is the military’s role in controlling environmental impact on the modern battlefield?

bb. Assess the implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)

c. Assess whether indemnification is still a good strategy for GOCOs when using performance based acquisition principles

dd. Has the integration of Automated Identification Technology (AIT) into logistics tracking systems used for visibility and accountability of Class V, VII, and IX lived up to Army/DoD expectations during the most recent deployments into Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines? If not, what have been the shortcomings?

e. Transformation of the Army’s Requirements Process focusing on joint warfighter readiness

6. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. Overarching, integrated analysis of terrorism funding, including narcoterrorism, sale of diamonds, etc.
   b. Technological advances and/or dual-use technologies that can bolster border protection and homeland security

7. Military Change:
   a. Analysis of the issues associated with implementing the Army’s data strategy and products to improve NETOPS functionality
   b. Analysis of Multi-Level Security (MLS) issues for systems being developed for the Future Force
   c. Discussion of IPV6/IPV4 translation issues and implementation pilots/demos required
   d. Development of strategic options for providing an acceptable level of protection for information systems and networks using fewer resources. Problem is balancing the manpower, time and materiel costs of protecting U.S. information systems from enemy exploitation so we can provide an acceptable level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the information in U.S. operational and tactical systems and networks with the requirement to conserve scarce resources
   e. The impact of the growing requirements to use wireless technology to communicate on and off the battlefield

8. Force Management and Leadership:
   a. The Arming of Civilians--What are the implications from an international law perspective and what protections/safeguards exist for the individual?
   b. Deployment Incentives--What compensation should be provided to deploying DACs, including necessary legislative changes (i.e., tax exemptions, recruitment bonuses, increased life insurance, etc.). What can be done to encourage more civilians to deploy in the face of an aging workforce? What recruitment and retention incentives should be considered for emergency-essential personnel?
c. Special Needs--What special needs exist for civilians and contractors who are deploying and/or on the battlefield? The CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) does not have enough uniforms in unusual (larger) sizes to allow everyone to deploy in a timely manner.

d. Disciplinary and Performance Issues--How should disciplinary and performance issues be handled for deployed DACs? AR 690-700, Chapter 751, states that the on-site chain of command has the authority and the discretion to initiate appropriate administrative action against a civilian employee for misconduct or disciplinary issues. Generally speaking, the easiest course of action is to send the employee back to the home station, many times with no documentation of the infraction or problem. This often results in no action being taken because the home station does not have the information necessary to take the disciplinary or performance action.

e. Post-deployment issues--What physical/psychological services should be available to DACs and contractor employees for injuries suffered on the battlefield, including post traumatic stress syndrome, etc.?

f. Attracting and developing senior civilian leadership.
1. Homeland Security, Army, Iraq:
   a. Securing the southern border of the United States from illegal immigration
   b. Ramifications of the North American Defense Agreement
   c. Budgetary politics: the problem of allocating funds for Homeland Security
   d. Evolution of civil-military relations
   e. Motivations for service in the U.S. armed forces
   f. Growth of the gap between the U.S. military and American society
   g. The level of civilian support for the war on terrorism: key determinants
   h. The nature and quality of American patriotism and nationalism
   i. The state of the military as a profession
   j. Best practices for the U.S. Army in nation and state-building in Iraq
   k. Best practices for the U.S. Army in post-hostility operations
   l. Best practices for the U.S. Army in the war on terrorism
   m. Best practices for the U.S. Army in counterinsurgency strategy
   n. The process of military reform: What are the components of a successful strategy?
   o. Preemptive versus preventive war: evolution and legitimacy of concepts
   p. The evolution of the Army Field Manual

2. International Issues:
   a. The roots of anti-Americanism and regional variations
   b. The utility of public diplomacy; best practices
   c. Democratization as a response to terrorism
   d. Cooperation between the United States and the EU (also individual countries) in the war on terrorism
   e. The erosion of Latin American democracy over the past decade: undermining U.S. security interests in the region.
   f. The anti-American message of Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. Howe strongly does it resonate the region? Does Brazil offer a middle way?
   g. The growth of Islamic radicalism in Latin America
   h. Sources of democratization in the Arab world
   i. Prospects for political instability in Turkey; prospects for EU membership
   j. Sources of liberalism in the Arab world: role of the mosque, NGOs, etc.
   k. Hezbollah: its role in Lebanese politics and perceptions of the United States
   l. Palestinian and Israeli politics: prospects for an authentic 2-state solution
m. Prospects for success in Afghanistan under NATO
n. Prospects for democratization and state-building in Afghanistan
o. Social, political, economic, and cultural obstacles to democratization in Iran
p. Rise of Islamic radicalism in Africa (Somalia, etc.)
q. Politics of oil in Africa. Threats to the free flow of oil to the United States
r. Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan: prospects for successful democratization
s. Ukraine and Georgia: prospects for membership in NATO
t. Russia’s response to “regime change” on its borders
u. Russia as a partner in the war on terrorism
v. Politics of leadership succession in Russia
w. Politics of oil and gas pipelines in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and western China.
x. Problems of human security as obstacles to building sound states and promoting democratization.
y. De-escalation of tension between India and Pakistan: how durable?
z. Political instability and political radicalism in Indonesia
The ramifications of the nation’s aging lock and dam infrastructure for national security.
POC: Steve Stockton, SES, Deputy Director of Civil Works

Civil Works in the Army: Is this an outdated approach?
POC: MG Don Riley, Director of Civil Works

Army Transformation: The operational and infrastructure impacts for likely scenarios associated with accomplishing transformation in the current resource constrained environment.
POC: J. Joseph Tyler, SES, Deputy Director of Military Programs.

DoD Reconstruction and Stabilization: Engineer capabilities and limitations of infrastructure improvements.
POC: Ted Kanamine: USACE Liaison to Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
1. **Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations:**
   a. Assess the effects of long-term SSTR operations on recruiting and retention in the reserve components.
   b. Define the skills required for SSTR operations, and identify those which should reside within civilian agencies, rather than the military.
   c. Assess the limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) in SSTR operations.
   d. Examine the effectiveness of the U.S. military in training foreign civilian police forces.
   e. Examine the relationship between combatant commanders and force providers to support SSTR operations on a long-term basis.
   g. Assess the relevance of the Geneva Convention to SSTR operations.
   h. Assess the value of civilian-acquired skills in SSTR, and specifically, in Civil Affairs units.
   i. Compare the skills required for SSTR against the demographics of the military.

2. **Domestic Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA):**
   a. Examine the role of the Army Reserve in DSCA
   c. Assess the effectiveness of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) in DSCA.
   d. Assess the impact of the ARFORGEN training and equipping strategies on DSCA.

3. Assess the effectiveness of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act (ANGCRRRA), commonly referred to as Title XI, on the readiness of Army Reserve units relative to Army Reserve manpower dedicated to National Guard unit training support and in relationship to officer accession trends.

4. Examine the balance of Army forces in regard to the changing roles and missions of the National Guard. Specifically, is the mix of forces in each component optimum for its primary mission?

5. Examine the effect of contracting (contractors on the battlefield) on recruiting and retention in the Army.

6. Assess the changing role of information operations, its relationship to PSYOP (psychological operations), and evaluate whether the Joint Role of USSTRATCOM is having a positive effect on the relationship.
National Guard Bureau

POC: Colonel John D. Renaud (703) 607-9127
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1. What are the appropriate roles and missions for the Army’s components?
2. What is the future force structure of the Army National Guard?
3. What is the future of the All Volunteer Force?
4. How can the Army National Guard personnel system transform?
5. What is the future of training simulation in the Army National Guard?
6. How should the mobilization and deployment processes be changed?
7. How can the National Guard expand the State Partnership Program?
8. How should the ARNG develop commission and warrant officers?
9. How should the ARNG implement the Army Force Generation Model?
10. Future ARNG force structure: What can we sustain?
11. Impact of the Global War on Terrorism on officer and NCO career development?
12. What levels and forces will the ARNG require to fight war on terrorism for 10 to 20 years?
13. Can the ARNG continue to provide its own replacements for extended periods under the current Partial Mobilization Authority?
14. What is the Joint Force HQ--State role and interaction with NORTHCOM?
15. What is the impact of remobilizing ARNG soldiers for a second deployment?
16. Define requirements and resourcing criteria for the ARNG in each ARFORGEN cycle.
17. What is the National Guard role in a post-Katrina Homeland Defense environment?
18. Can the ARNG form units of volunteers which will serve between 30-90 days a year?
19. What is the National Guard Bureau’s role and interaction with NORTHCOM and ARNORTH?