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Richard Halloran

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Japan's Military Force: Return of the Samurai?

RICHARD HALLORAN

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For the first time in 50 years, the Japanese are showing signs that they might build an armed force that would be commensurate with their economic strength and size of population. Those signs are no bigger than the proverbial hand on the horizon and, in any event, would lead only to a self-reliant defensive force intended to ensure regional security and support United Nations operations. The chances of a resurgence in the ultranationalistic militarism of yesteryear are somewhere between remote and nil.

Even so, the indications are in subtle contrast to the situation a year ago, when it was possible to say there was little evidence that Japan would acquire military power befitting its economic prowess.¹ Why the change?

Most important, the credibility of the United States as the protector of Japan has been eroded by continuing economic friction, political Japan bashing, and cutbacks in American military power. Japanese and American strategic thinkers have long asserted that Japan would not need more than its present small force so long as it could count on the United States under the mutual security treaty between the two nations. Thus the key to a Japanese decision to forge a large military force lies more in Washington than in Tokyo, and Japanese have begun to question whether Americans would sacrifice blood and treasure to defend them. Japan's Ambassador to the United States, Takakazu Kuriyama, said in Honolulu in June: "I am seriously concerned with the erosion of trust."²

For their part, Japanese have become nervous as China has modernized and enlarged its armed forces, notably at sea. Japan's 1995 White Paper on defense indicates that the Japanese worry about Chinese threats to the South China Sea, through which passes Japan's oil lifeline from the Persian Gulf. Tension on the Korean peninsula next door causes more anxiety, as does the still formidable Russian force in its Far East.³

Further, Japan has been politically paralyzed since the death of Emperor Hirohito, known posthumously as the Showa Emperor, in 1989. The nation's politics have been wracked by the corruption that led to the downfall of the Liberal Democratic Party, which had ruled for most of the postwar period, and by the inability of subsequent coalition governments to rule effectively. Voter apathy was evident during gubernatorial elections in April and Diet elections in July 1995, when a record low of 44 percent of the voters went to the polls; usually, 70 percent of Japanese voters turn out.⁴ This has raised the question of whether the Japanese might turn to a strong-arm leader to escape from their political morass. Some Japanese of the wartime generation worry that younger generations, not having been well-educated on Japan's mistakes of the 1930s and 1940s, may stumble down the same path.

Similarly, Japan has failed to recover from the excesses of the "bubble economy" of the late 1980s. Banks that made bad loans then are on thin ice now, with one bank and a credit union being the first to have failed since World War II; pension plans are also weak; the stock market has gyrated downward; small businesses have failed by the tens of thousands; unemployment is up. The Japan Economic Institute (JEI), a research center in Washington financed by the Japanese government, reports: "Japan now has endured more than four years of economic performance far below what it enjoyed prior to 1991." The outlook is for "continued slow growth by historical standards for the rest of the decade."⁵

Nationalism may drive Japan into assembling a major military force if that is seen as the price of admission to the world's high councils. The Japanese want international recognition for their economic accomplishments and have mounted an insistent campaign to be given a permanent seat along with Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States on the United Nations Security Council. Nationalism manifests itself in Japan's continuing ambivalence about its responsibility for aggression and atrocities before and during World War II, which implies that military power again would be acceptable to the Japanese, although not for aggressive purposes. The JEI pointed to "the pronounced split between those Japanese who regard their country's behavior from the late 19th century through the mid-1940s as a

Richard Halloran writes about Asian security, US policy toward Asia, and other Asian and Pacific issues from Honolulu for publications in America and Asia. He was formerly with *The New York Times* as a foreign correspondent in Asia and military correspondent in Washington, D.C. Before that, he worked in the United States and in Asia for *The Washington Post* and *Business Week*. He was Director of the Program in Journalism and Communications at the East-West Center in Honolulu from 1990 to 1994. He earned an A.B. from Dartmouth and an M.A. in East Asian studies at the University of Michigan, and held a Ford Foundation Fellowship in the East Asia Institute at Columbia University. He enlisted in the Army in 1952, was commissioned through OCS, served with the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., and was assigned to military advisory groups in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan. He is the author of four books.

source of shame” and those who contend that Japan was only engaged in the same empire-building as Western nations then.⁶ That was borne out by the marked differences among Japan’s political parties in their August statements commemorating the end of World War II. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party said only, “We must reflect upon the past war.” The Social Democratic Party acknowledged that Japan committed a “war of aggression against China and other Asian nations” and should apologize. One of the new parties, Sakigake, said: “We cannot build trust with Asia and the world without reflecting upon Japan’s past actions and apologizing frankly.” Another new party, Shinshinto, called for reflection on “past actions of aggression and colonial rule” that brought “great suffering” to Japan’s neighbors.⁷

Lastly, what is known as the Okinawa rape case has weakened the already frayed cords that tie Japan to the United States; if they are broken, that would add one more reason for Japan to enlarge its armed forces. Two US Marines and a sailor have been accused of raping a 12-year-old Okinawa girl, causing an eruption not only of rage for that alleged crime but of deep-seated resentments generated by the 50-year US military presence on the island. Okinawan political leaders have fanned emotions to enhance their campaign against the national government in Tokyo for what Okinawans consider second-class treatment by mainland Japan. In Tokyo, the political left has further aggravated emotions to generate anti-American sentiments. The damage is likely to be felt for a long time, even if it is not fatal.

Altogether, the economic, political, and security perils confronting Japan, while still relatively bland, are just reminiscent enough of the troubled 1930s to cause anxiety. In those days, resentment against the United States for imposing trade embargoes, threats to the oil lifelines, political unrest, and economic depression gave rise to the militarists who led Japan into World War II and disaster. The chances of this tragedy repeating itself are far distant—but Japan’s Asian neighbors continue to express anxiety over a possible return of the samurai. They would have little to fear from the samurai of old, the soldiers of the 12th to 19th centuries who were governed by an evolving code of ethics that came to be known in the 17th century as “bushido,” the way of the warrior that emphasized honor, duty, loyalty, self-sacrifice, and other attributes that American soldiers today would applaud. In contrast, Asians have every reason to remember with horror the corrupt militarists who led Japan into aggression, atrocities, and eventually disaster in the modern period.

With half the population and an economy 60 percent of that in the United States, Japan has the people, technology, industry, and funds to assemble an armed force of one million men and women equipped with modern conventional and nuclear weapons. It would take an estimated \$250 billion a year, five times current spending, for ten years to get there.⁸ Japan’s social order would be wrenched because conscription would be necessary. The economy would be stressed because military spending would rise to three to

Military Budgets: Where the Dollar & the Yen Go

(Percentages of Defense Budget FY95)

Expenditure	United States	Japan
Personnel	27.9	43.9
Support US Forces	0.0	11.2
Operations & Maintenance	37.3	17.6
Procurement	17.6	18.4
Research & Development	14.0	3.0
Military Construction & Family Housing	3.5	4.6
Other	0.1	1.3

Numbers may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. Sources: US, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress 1995*. Japan, *Boei Hakusho, Heisei Nananen-ban* (Defense White Paper, 1995 edition).

Table 1. Comparison of US and Japanese Defense Expenditures.

five percent of gross national product from its current one percent of GNP, putting Japan at the same percentage as other industrial countries.

On the other hand, Japan lacks the natural resources to sustain a modern military force independent of external sources of supply. The Japanese know, too, that geography works against them; they live in a tight, island nation that is highly vulnerable to conventional and nuclear attack from large, powerful neighbors.⁹

The main obstacle to an expansion of Japan's Self Defense Forces, as the Japanese army, navy, and air force are called, is a severe lack of political will among Japan's leaders and public. Despite the tiny warning signs, little in government policy or public indicators suggests that more than a handful of Japanese seek a return to the militaristic past. "The Japanese people were traumatized by World War II and the humiliation of Japan's defeat," says a report from the Pacific Forum in Honolulu. "Post-war educational pacifism has insured that the vast majority of Japanese people still maintain a strong aversion of anything military."¹⁰ Everyone over the age of 60, including many of those who are prominent in Japan today, remembers the devastation of 1945.

Equally important, so long as the American shield remains in place, the Japanese have no real need for a large military force. There is no place for it to go nor anything for it to do unless the Japanese decide to invade other parts of Asia as they did in the 1930s—and they have no reason for that, given their economic preeminence in Asia. If Japan sought to invade other nations in Asia today, it would clash with four of the world's strongest armed forces in Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and China, plus the modern forces of Taiwan, Vietnam, and others in Southeast Asia. As Robert Scalapino, the prominent scholar on Asia at the University of California in Berkeley, has said: "The Asia of the 1990s is not the Asia of the 1920s and 1930s. There is no vacuum of power

on the continent. There is no physical Japanese empire to defend. And there is no region to liberate from Western imperialism. Moreover, to 'go it alone' is less and less feasible for any nation, even the United States."¹¹

Arrayed against such an expansion are a constitution that forbids a militarized Japan, law that precludes it, and political leaders and an adamant public who oppose it. Only last year did the Social Democrat Party, part of Japan's ruling coalition, reverse itself and declare the nation's Self-Defense Forces to be constitutional. At the same time, the party called for cuts in personnel, weapons, and defense spending over the next ten years. Even Ichiro Ozawa, a controversial conservative seen as perhaps the most forceful advocate of a greater Japanese role in security, says: "The only overseas uses of force that we can permit our nation are peace-keeping activities that take place under the flag of the United Nations."¹²

This opposition is rooted in Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, the famed "no-war" clause, adopted in 1947. It says:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency will never be maintained.

Article IX has been open to many interpretations, most of them asserting that Japan has retained the right of self-defense—but no more. General Douglas MacArthur, who commanded the American occupation under whose auspices Article IX was drafted, said in his 1950 New Year's message: "By no sophistry of reasoning can the constitutional renunciation of war be interpreted as complete negation of the inalienable right of self-defense against unprovoked attack." More important, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952 recognized Japan's right to self-defense.

The first Basic Policy for National Defense, written in 1957, said: "The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression but, once invaded, to repel such aggression." Japan took the unusual and perhaps unique position that it would depend on another nation, the United States, for its defense. The policy said Japan would deal "with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-US security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations."

The legitimacy of the Self-Defense Forces has long been fought in Japanese courts. The Supreme Court said in 1959: "Certainly there is nothing in [the Constitution] which would deny the right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power." But the District Court in Sapporo, on the northern island of Hokkaido, ruled in 1973 that the Self-Defense Forces violated Article IX. That view has not prevailed.

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In 1967, the cabinet of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato said Japan would not make, acquire, or allow nuclear weapons to be introduced into Japan. The Japanese, however, did not agree to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until 1976 because Tokyo asserted that the treaty discriminated against non-nuclear nations and would inhibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, a tacit transit agreement with the United States made in 1960 permits American warships to carry nuclear weapons in and out of Japan, but not to store them there nor to deploy them from Japan.¹³ That issue became moot when President Bush ordered nuclear weapons removed from US warships.

The cabinet of Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976 limited military spending to one percent of national wealth. Successive cabinets have kept it in that range. Mr. Miki's cabinet also forged a National Defense Program Outline; it said Japan would acquire only enough military power that would be needed, with the help of the United States, to repel an armed invasion. Under American pressure, Prime Minister Zentaro Suzuki pledged in 1981 that Japan would acquire sufficient forces to defend its sea lanes for 1000 miles from shore. Japan has been slow to fulfill that commitment.

President Reagan's Administration applied mild pressure on Japan to assume a greater share of the military and financial burden for defense. Japan's defense spending thus began to creep up. In 1988, it went over one percent—1.004 percent, to be exact. That Tokyo carried the figure out three decimal points indicated the sensitivity of the issue. For the next two years, defense spending was in that range, then slipped back under one percent in 1990 and has remained there since.¹⁴

A debate over Japan's role in Asian and global security was triggered partly by the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989, which marked the passing of Japanese wartime leadership. New leaders with no memories of World War II began coming to the top in politics, the bureaucracy, business, the universities, and the press. Many thought that Japan's economic strength entitled their nation to more respect among the world's other leading nations.

Mr. Ozawa reflected some of the new generation's sentiment in his book, *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation*. “Like it or not,” Ozawa said, “it is clear that Japan has become a global power that cannot avoid the responsibilities that come with power.”¹⁵ Many Japanese—and other

Asians—have expressed the fear that the United States was becoming protectionist and isolationist and therefore could not be relied on to keep its commitments in Asia. Further, some thought a sovereign nation should not rely on others for its security. That idea, however, has not gained much currency. As Mr. Ozawa wrote: “Japan does not have the capability to assume the defense of the nation independently.”¹⁶

Deliberations accelerated during the Persian Gulf crisis when Japan was embarrassed by the derision with which its low profile was received internationally. After nearly two years of debate, a law enabling Japanese troops to take part in peacekeeping operations was passed in June 1992. Even so, such deployments are closely constricted. A cease-fire must be in place at the site in question, the Japanese must be invited by the parties involved, and the operation must be sponsored by the United Nations. Japanese troops are limited to nonmilitary assignments, such as humanitarian relief, but have served well in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Rwanda. Japan is scheduled to dispatch a 50-man peacekeeping unit to the Golan Heights in February 1996.¹⁷

Even so, Japanese anxieties erupted when two Japanese on peacekeeping missions were killed in Cambodia in 1993. The press called for Japanese forces to pull out, but an appeal by the father of one of the young men, who said he was proud that his son had sought to bring peace to Cambodia, calmed things down.

A fresh statement on Japanese defense came in August 1994, when a blue-ribbon commission of senior business executives and retired government officials recommended only moderate changes in Japan’s 40-year-old security posture.¹⁸ The Advisory Group on Defense Issues, led by Hirotaro Higuchi, chairman of Asahi Breweries, said Japan should continue to rely on the United States. The group recommended, however, that Japan also become active in regional security and United Nations peacekeeping operations.

In a shift in nuance from the Defense White Papers, the commission said: “The ultimate foundation of security lies in the determination of a people to defend themselves and in holding the appropriate means of doing so.” For Japan’s own part, the group suggested that the Self-Defense Forces improve intelligence operations, including the use of satellites, and build a missile defense. The Self-Defense Agency announced in August that it would develop an air defense missile like the Patriot and deploy it in 2003 at a cost of \$1.3 billion.¹⁹ To protect sea lanes out to 1000 miles, the commission said Japan should acquire aerial tankers to refuel patrol planes, buy AWACS warning planes, and expand its fleet of destroyers.²⁰ The government decided, however, to cut back the production of the new FSX fighter, which is being developed jointly with the United States, to 80 planes from the 120-130 that had originally been planned.²¹

Public opinion, as measured in polls, is set against Japan acquiring a large armed force. Those polls have consistently shown that large majorities of

Military Forces: The World & Asia

Rank.	Nation	Armed Forces	
1.	China	2,930,000	
2.	Russia	1,714,000	
3.	United States	1,650,000	
4.	India	1,265,000	
5.	North Korea	1,128,000	
6.	South Korea	633,000	
7.	Pakistan	587,000	
8.	Vietnam	572,000	
9.	Ukraine	517,000	
10.	Iran	513,000	
11.	Turkey	503,000	
12.	Egypt	440,000	
13.	Taiwan	425,000	
14.	France	409,000	
15.	Syria	408,000	
16.	Iraq	382,000	
17.	Germany	367,000	
18.	Brazil	336,800	
19.	Italy	322,300	
20.	Myanmar(Burma)	286,000	
21.	Poland	283,000	
22.	Indonesia	276,000	
23.	Thailand	256,000	
24.	Britain	254,000	
25.	Japan	237,700	
26.	Romania	230,500	
27.	Spain	206,500	
28.	Morocco	195,500	
29.	Mexico	175,000	
30.	Cuba	173,000	
31.	Israel	172,000	
			Other Nations in Asia and the Pacific
	Sri Lanka	126,000	
	Bangladesh	115,500	
	Malaysia	114,500	
	Philippines	106,500	
	Cambodia	85,500	
	Canada	78,100	
	Australia	61,600	
	Singapore	54,000	
	Laos	37,000	
	Nepal	35,000	
	Mongolia	21,250	
	New Zealand	10,000	
	Brunei	4,400	

Source: *Military Balance 1994-1995*
(London: International Institute of
Strategic Studies, 1994)

Table 2. Relative Sizes of Armed Forces.

the Japanese think the Self-Defense Forces should be kept at the present level or reduced. In one poll, 69 percent said Japan should continue to rely on the United States and the SDF for the nation's defense. Some 20 percent said they didn't know, while seven percent said Japan should seek unarmed neutrality and only four percent thought Japan should go it alone.²² Large majorities have said the most useful function of the SDF was not defending the country but helping to recover from a natural disaster. Yet the SDF was reluctant to respond to the earthquake in Kobe in early 1995 for fear of criticism for interfering in a civilian matter. Emperor Akihito made clear during his coronation in 1990 that he fully embraced the Constitution and its spirit, including the antimilitary clauses, for which most Japanese have applauded him.

Numbers are not everything in measuring military strength, but they do count, and they show little Japanese inclination to become a military power. Japan's armed forces today have an authorized strength that places them 25th on a list of world military forces, in the neighborhood of Thailand, Britain, and Romania.²³ Japan has no forces that would enable it to project military power, no long-range bombers, no long-range missiles, no aircraft carriers, and little transport to carry ground forces. Japan's high-technology weapons, such as F-15 fighters, are configured for defense, not offense.

Moreover, Japanese enlistment figures are consistent with public apathy. Their volunteer force, which was authorized 273,800 men and women in 1995, is 12.5 percent under strength. The ground force accounts for most of the shortage, having only 151,155 soldiers, only 84 percent of its authorized 180,000 people.²⁴ Acknowledging this, the Advisory Group on Defense Issues recommended that total authorized strength be reduced to 240,000.²⁵

Much is sometimes made of Japan's defense budget, which is on a par with those of Britain, France, and Germany. Any discussion of Japanese statistics in dollars these days must be viewed warily, because gyrations in the yen-dollar exchange rate make Japanese costs seem even higher than they already are. Nonetheless, the numbers are useful gauges so long as they are not taken literally.

Japan's defense costs are astronomical, and Japanese get less military power for their money than any other major nation. Japan spent 43.9 percent of its \$52.5 billion defense budget in 1995 on personnel and another 11.2 percent to support the 47,000 American troops in Japan.²⁶ Thus, Japan had spent 55 percent of its military funds before it bought the first bullet, bean, or band-aid. In contrast, the Pentagon spent only 28 percent of its 1995 budget on personnel, with 37 percent spent on operations and maintenance, and 17.6 percent on procurement of weapons and equipment.²⁷

Procurement costs are extraordinarily high in Japan because the SDF is deprived of economies of scale. Procurement took 18.4 percent of the budget in 1995 and orders for weapons were small. Moreover, Japanese law forbids the sale of weapons to other nations, which further increases unit costs. Thus, 20 Type 90 tanks cost \$10.5 million apiece, or about twice what a comparable tank would have cost in the United States. The same was true for Japan's five F-15 fighters priced at \$120 million each and one destroyer at \$714 million.²⁸

In other elements of modern military power, Japan has attained a world-class reputation for developing technology, much of which could be transformed into military equipment. In communications, where Japan's Self-Defense Forces are said to lag, a particular effort would be required. At least one analyst, however, is skeptical of Japan's ability to take part in the so-called "revolution in military affairs" that has caught the imagination of strategic thinkers in the United States. This revolution centers on sophisticated sensors, swift gathering and dissemination of intelligence, and weapons that strike with precision.²⁹ Arthur J. Alexander of the Japan Economic Institute has written:

“The pacifist environment of today’s Japan severely compromises the ability of both industry and the military to conceive of and design advanced systems and concepts. The feedback necessary to inform military judgment is missing.” He concludes that Japan “is an improbable source of a military-technical revolution in the future.”³⁰

In the nuclear field, it is widely accepted that Japan could acquire nuclear weapons quickly if Tokyo decided to do so. Seizaburo Sato, an influential analyst of foreign and security policy, has asserted that “we could build a nuclear bomb within six months.”³¹ Today, 28 percent of Japan’s electrical power is generated by nearly 50 nuclear power plants; Japan plans to generate 45 percent of its electricity from nuclear power by the year 2010. Japan has begun to import plutonium waste to reprocess it into nuclear fuel; critics fear Japan may be stockpiling material that is near-weapons grade. In August, the Japanese began operating a prototype fast breeder reactor that produces plutonium, the critical ingredient in nuclear weapons.³² At the same time, Japan decided to postpone plans to build an advanced thermal reactor that would lead to reactors producing more plutonium than they burn; the advanced thermal reactor was too expensive for now.³³ Some Americans have speculated that Japan would go nuclear if North Korea was proven to have built nuclear weapons. Senior Japanese officials, however, scoffed at this so long as the American nuclear deterrent remained credible. One official said: “We have lived next door to a nuclear-armed China for years, and Russian submarines with nuclear weapons regularly cruise down our coasts—only not so much anymore. The North Koreans would be nothing new.” Many Japanese, however, worry that hostilities on the Korean peninsula could produce a flood of refugees headed for Japan by boat.

To field a capable force armed with conventional weapons, Japan can produce almost everything that would be needed. The Japanese turn out fighter planes, warships, diesel-electric submarines, tanks, trucks, and electronic apparatus. The defense industry in Japan is small, with arms makers incorporated within large companies whose main business is civilian goods. Those factories could be converted to produce weapons, but not without wrenching industry and the economy, with its consequent political and social disruption.

Even with its economic problems, Japan could raise the funds for a first-class military force. Its foreign exchange reserves are among the world’s highest, its savings rate is high, and its balance of international payments runs heavily in Japan’s favor. Without question, Japan could raise its defense spending to three percent of gross national product. The financial disruption would be painful, however, as the Ministry of Finance would require a hefty raise in taxes. That would cause a large drain on funds that otherwise would go into investment, social welfare, education, and public works.

A modern armed force requires young men and women who can read with comprehension, master complicated technology, and think under pressure. Japan’s high standards of education, which make more than 99 percent of the

people literate, and the discipline of everyday Japanese life, would make training a competent armed force relatively easy. If the United States can field a force of two million, Japan, with half the population, could reasonably produce a force of one million, which would make it the world's sixth largest military force. Perhaps the biggest factor to overcome would be a projected drop in the number of young men and women of military age, usually considered between the ages of 18 and 26. Young men of military age in Japan peaked at nine million this year; projections show that number dropping to about 6.4 million in the year 2008. For that reason, Japan has recruited more women into the Self-Defense Forces. A naval training ship calling at Pearl Harbor in October included, for the first time, 13 newly commissioned female officers in the ship's complement.

Japan's natural resources are limited and must come from overseas; that was among the primary causes of Japanese military ventures during World War II. Japan remains as vulnerable as it was then, when American submarines cut its oil, raw material, and food lifelines to Southeast Asia. Japan today imports all but a teacup of its oil, all of its iron ore for steel, most other metal ores and raw materials, and large quantities of food. Contrary to a widespread view held in the United States, Japan's economy is driven by imports, not by exports.

As Japan's neighbors have acquired ever greater military power, Japan has geographically become even more vulnerable. It has few natural defenses beyond the narrow straits that separate it from the mainland. Japan is especially vulnerable to conventional and nuclear attack from the air and sea because the nation's people, industry, and agriculture are concentrated in a belt about 100 miles wide running from Tokyo to Nagasaki. Nuclear weapons could rain down on that area like an artillery barrage.

With all this, a Japanese decision to acquire military power will still depend greatly on what Washington does. Thus the question of Japan's alliance with the United States flowed through a symposium arranged by the Japan-America Societies of the United States and the America-Japan Societies of Japan in Honolulu in June 1995. Specifically, the recurring issue was whether bitter economic disputes would spill over into the realm of politics and security.

During the Cold War, conventional wisdom held that politics and security took precedence over economics because of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. With the end of that conflict, critics of the Washington-Tokyo connection argued that the rationale for an alliance had disappeared. That was contrary to the view held in the symposium; both Americans and Japanese believed the national interests of their respective nations were best served by a strong trans-Pacific alliance.

The concern expressed by Ambassador Kuriyama reflected a widespread fear that an erosion has already started. The recent agreement on exports of American automobiles to Japan is not likely to alleviate the problem as other trade frictions, such as that over photographic film, will continue.

This is “a dangerously volatile situation,” said Nagayo Homma, executive director of the Japan Foundation’s Center for Global Partnership, a grant-making foundation in Tokyo. He blamed “weak political leadership and short-sighted bureaucracy” on both sides of the Pacific.

In a similar vein, James A. Kelly, the president of the Pacific Forum, a research organization in Honolulu affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, contended that “the reasons for preserving and strengthening the alliance that we have are compelling.” He lamented that “these reasons have not been aired thoroughly—on either side of the Pacific.”

Yukio Okamoto, a former diplomat and now a consultant in Tokyo, was forceful: “Our future is precarious, to say the least. The present inflammatory rhetoric across the Pacific is a body blow to the basic fabric of the relationship.” He concluded: “We are almost in a fist-fight with each other.”

There were some voices of cautious optimism. Professor Scalapino said “there are good reasons to believe that for both countries, a close working relation will remain of critical importance despite the difficulties.” For the future, he said, “while this will be a troubled marriage, there cannot be a divorce.”

Another prominent scholar, Akira Iriye of Harvard, contended that “the partnership has been as solid and durable as it has been because it has been built not just on the mutually felt security needs of the two nations.” He emphasized “the sharing of cultural experiences by Americans and Japanese.” Yukio Matsuyama, former chairman of the editorial board at the Asahi newspaper, agreed and concluded: “What is needed now is not more economic negotiations but more gatherings like this.”

Even so, anxieties won the day. Sozaburo Okamatsu, former vice-minister for international affairs in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, said that trade disputes have become politicized and emotional. As a result, he said, “mutual distrust between Japan and the United States [has] gradually increased.”

James Auer of Vanderbilt University, a specialist on Japanese defense issues, was critical of both governments for having focused too much on economic matters. Therefore, he said, “security ties have been endangered.” Instability in various parts of Asia, he argued, “makes the US-Japan [Mutual Security] Treaty more important for Washington, Tokyo, and the rest of the world.”

Toward the end of the conference, Ambassador Kuriyama was pressed on the question of whether trade disputes would affect political and security ties. At first he was exquisitely diplomatic, noting that the question had come up in the summit meeting in Halifax, Canada. “Prime Minister Murayama and President Clinton agreed not to let trade disputes affect the whole range of relationships,” he said. Then the Ambassador reverted to the candor for which he is known: “It is one thing for the President and Prime

Minister to say that trade disputes should not spill over into politics and security. It's another thing to say that they will not. It naturally will affect the security relationship."

NOTES

1. See Richard Halloran, "Is Japan a Military Threat to Asia?" *Arms Control Today*, November 1994, p. 12.
2. At the Japan-America Society Symposium, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 1995.
3. *Boei Hakusho, Heisei Nananen-ban* (Defense White Paper, 1995 edition).
4. *JEI Report*, 28 July 1995.
5. *JEI Report*, 11 August 1995.
6. "War Resolution Falls Short of Settling Japan's Historical 'Debt,'" *JEI Report*, 7 July 1995. For a thoughtful essay on the same issue, see "The Japan that Cannot Say Sorry," *Economist*, 12 August 1995, p. 31. See also *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 August 1995, pp. 18, 30-31, and "Memory and Apathy," p. 36.
7. *Japan Times Weekly International Edition*, 21-27 August 1995.
8. I have been unable to find an authoritative Japanese or US estimate of what it would cost to build a Japanese military force roughly 60 percent the size of the US armed force. Therefore, I constructed a notional Japanese force, weighted slightly in favor of naval forces for a maritime nation, and assigned to it US costs. That produced a conservative estimate because American military costs are far lower than those in Japan. Thus the \$250 billion figure should be taken as indicative, not as precise. Ten years is calculated on the time it would take Americans to design, build, and stand up seven aircraft carriers, 50 nuclear powered submarines, a fleet of bombers, tankers, and transports, and the other weapons and equipment of modern armed forces. Thus, suggestions that Japan could expand its armed forces swiftly are well off base.
9. "Strategy and Force Structure Responses of Japan and the United States to the New Security Environment in Northeast Asia," *Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report*, June 1995, p. 24.
10. *Ibid.*
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