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Stephen J. Blank Dr.
American Foreign Policy Council

Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

William T. Johnsen Dr.

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**EUROPEAN SECURITY:
WASHINGTON'S SHAPING STRATEGY
IN ACTION**

**Stephen J. Blank
William T. Johnsen
Thomas-Durell Young**

March 2000

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FOREWORD

Notwithstanding the claims of some in the United States, European affairs continue to dominate U.S. foreign policy and strategic thinking. The end of the Cold War has not seen any blurring of the focus of U.S. officials on European affairs. Managing the implications of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the seemingly never-ending conflicts in the Balkans, encouraging the growth of Western norms and institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, and expanding and reforming the North Atlantic Alliance are just some of the issues that require firm and consistent U.S. leadership.

How the United States has, and should continue, to deal with these issues is the subject of this collective effort. In addition to assessing past and present challenges to U.S. and Western security interests and objectives in Europe, the authors also analyze the strategies and policies of the Department of Defense in this crucial region of the world. Recommendations for consideration by officials include the need for a lighter leadership "touch" in some areas and for stronger encouragement in others. However, let there be no doubt that a U.S. policy toward Europe of stasis or benign neglect should be rejected. The United States is a European power by virtue of its history, current commitments, and strategic and political exigencies. Finding the most efficacious means of achieving these national objectives, while working to effect a "Europe whole and free," is the daunting long-term task to be faced.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this essay as a contribution to the debate on the future direction of U.S. policy toward Europe.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Interim Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies Institute's expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of *Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Position in Asia*, coeditor of *Soviet Military and the Future*, and author of *The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924*. He has also written many articles and conference papers on Russian, Commonwealth of Independent States, and Eastern European security issues. Dr. Blank's current research deals with proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia. He holds a B.A. in History from the University of Pennsylvania, and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago.

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN currently is the Associate Dean for Academic Policy at the U.S. Army War College. Previously he served for 7 years in the Strategic Studies Institute, where he specialized in U.S. and European security issues. He also held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College from 1994-97. A former Infantry officer, Dr. Johnsen served in a variety of troop leading, command, and staff assignments. He also served as an Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control Analyst at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe. Besides his numerous SSI studies, Dr. Johnsen contributed to *Beyond East-West Confrontation; Searching for a New Security in Europe* and has published journal articles on European and U.S. security affairs. He holds a B.S. degree from the U.S.

Military Academy, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from Duke University. Dr. Johnsen also is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.

THOMAS DURELL-YOUNG was Research Professor of National Security Affairs with the Strategic Studies Institute from 1992 until 2000. He is currently at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

EUROPEAN SECURITY: WASHINGTON'S SHAPING STRATEGY IN ACTION

Whether the already close links between the United States and Europe will draw tighter in the 21st century is an open question. Indeed, some observers argue that the relationship may weaken somewhat over time.¹ But no one has argued persuasively that the trans-Atlantic link will be broken. Anticipated conditions, moreover, indicate that, while the strength of the relationship may wax and wane, ties will remain close. Information-age technologies will entwine U.S. and European economies more inextricably than in the past. Despite increasing extra-European ethnic diversity, many Americans will still trace their roots to Europe, and American culture and norms will remain predominantly European-based.

In the security arena, the Atlantic Ocean long ago ceased to provide a protective moat. No longer mentally or physically isolated, events in Europe almost immediately affect the United States. Furthermore, the United States also has learned from experience that remaining aloof from European security issues or merely reacting to events can be extremely costly. The articulation of preventive defense and engagement strategies in the last few years augurs for continued, albeit different, close cooperation between the United States and its European allies, partners, and friends to shape the future security environment to their mutual benefit.²

This confluence of U.S. and European economic, cultural, and security ties ensures that the continued security and stability of Europe will remain a vital U.S. national interest, as demonstrated during the recent conflict in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. This conclusion should not be surprising. Successive U.S. administrations have remained consistently engaged in European security

affairs for six decades. More recent administrations have made engagement with Europe a keystone of U.S. policy.³ Such policies can be expected to extend and deepen into the future.

This monograph offers observations on how the United States can positively shape the European security environment of the next century. It first outlines a preferred U.S. vision of a future Europe. The discussion next identifies potential obstacles to that goal, and then assesses risks to U.S. national interests if these obstacles cannot be overcome. Political, economic, and military initiatives for achieving the U.S. vision for a future Europe then follow. As part of the military initiatives, the discussion specifically assesses the current Commander-in-Chief (CINC) U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) Strategy of Readiness and Engagement. Conclusions and recommendations close the monograph.

DEFINING EUROPE

Before outlining a future vision of Europe, developing a common understanding of what constitutes Europe is important. This is not a straightforward proposition, however, as even Europeans do not always agree on what constitutes the "common European house."⁴ Within this monograph, we define Europe broadly and inclusively: from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean, Black, and Caspian Seas.⁵ That having been said, discussion of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus focuses on the effects of those nations on the overall security of Europe.

Arguing where the dividing lines fall between Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Europe, and the clarity of those lines varies considerably depending upon one's nationality or worldview.⁶ The fact that many countries fall under more than one grouping (e.g., the Balkans, the Baltics, Iberia, and Transcaucasia) only complicates matters. Rather than getting bogged down in

debates over who should or should not be part of a particular region, therefore, our definitions will be encompassing and overlapping.⁷

A FUTURE VISION OF EUROPE

As the British statesman, Lord Palmerston, noted 150 years ago: “. . . interests are enduring and perpetual”⁸ Thus, the underlying durability of U.S. national interests identified in *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* can offer insights into U.S. national interests in Europe 20 years hence.⁹ European stability will remain foremost a vital U.S. national interest.¹⁰ This includes continued stability in Western, Central, and Southern Europe, as well as the more difficult objective of increasing governmental and economic stability in Southeastern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Transcaucasia. Two strategic goals predominate. First, to assist in the building of a Europe that is democratic, prosperous and at peace, i.e., truly integrated. Second, to work with allies and partners to meet future challenges to collective interests that no nation can confront alone. Of particular import are the Newly Independent States (NIS) of Eastern Europe, where the United States has vital security interests. Specifically, the United States wishes Russia, Ukraine, and the other NIS to evolve peacefully into democratic market economies and become prosperously integrated into the world community. This also includes democratic and economic reform in the NIS, as well as the other maturing democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, that will contribute to continued independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of these states. The means by which the United States meets these challenges is through a robust and reformed NATO, thereby providing “the anchor of American engagement in Europe.”¹¹

Maintaining stability in Europe does not connote, however, an intent to sustain the existing status quo. To the contrary, the United States seeks continued transformation

of Europe that increases the number of democratic, market-based economies, founded on the rule of law and respect for human rights.¹² Such major changes in many fragile states can generate considerable instability. The United States seeks to dampen instability and keep transitions within peaceful bounds.

Extending these interests into the future, we propose a desired U.S. vision of a future Europe 20 years hence that includes:

1) A politically pluralistic Europe whole and free and governed by the rule of law.

2) Individual human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities protected through international norms and rule of law.

3) The free movement of peoples, ideas, capital, and goods.

4) Expanded and more sophisticated institutional mechanisms to prevent conflict, and, if conflict should arise, resolution through peaceful means.

5) Increased economic liberalization and integration of Europe through, inter alia, expansion of the European Union (EU).

6) Expanded European role and responsibility for leadership in European security matters.

7) Increased military integration within NATO and participation in the Partnership for Peace program (PfP).

8) Full control and accountability of materials from the former Soviet Union and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO THE FUTURE VISION OF EUROPE

To shape successfully conditions to the mutual benefit of the United States and Europe first requires identifying and overcoming potential obstacles to achieving our common vision. In this manner, the United States, in conjunction with its European allies, partners, and friends can take active steps to produce desired outcomes rather than simply reacting to events as they occur. This also should be a more effective and efficient means of using constrained resources to attain mutual goals. Potential obstacles to the vision of the future Europe fall under the general categories: economic, political, and security issues.

Economic Obstacles.

Within the economic arena, the failure of Europe—whether as a whole or several major powers—to adjust to changing economic conditions poses the greatest potential problem. For European Union (EU) countries and the remainder of Northern, Western, and Central Europe, this could result from a failure to transition to what the current vernacular describes as information-based economies. This is not a call for wholesale overturning of the existing European industrial base. That portion of the economy will remain essential for prolonged economic health, but it probably should not continue at the current scale or in its present form. Greater emphasis will have to be placed on preparing for the demands of global competitiveness by making economics more flexible and dynamic.¹³

For example, if European national and pan-European economies are to remain competitive on a global scale, they must address a number of structural issues. These will include significant changes in labor laws and employment practices, especially reducing the high degrees of rigidity in labor markets. This will be particularly true in France and Germany which must confront workplace reform if the EU

collectively is to be competitive internationally. The close, indeed sometimes incestuous, relationship among business, labor unions, churches, and political parties also will have to be loosened if Europeans are to achieve the higher levels of productivity necessary to compete globally. Relations among businesses, banks, and government also must undergo similar reform. Increasingly burdensome social welfare and state pension systems, let alone intractable structural unemployment, also will have to be addressed. If Europeans cannot address these critical issues, they risk being left behind globally, at best. At worst, economic stagnation or relative decline could lead to domestic political instability in some key countries in Europe.¹⁴

The emerging democracies in Central, Eastern, Southern, and Southeastern Europe will have to complete the transition from centrally controlled to market economies.¹⁵ This will be a difficult transition. Many of these countries have limited, if any, recent experience with market-based economies, and have great difficulty dealing with normal market cycles.¹⁶ Frequently, they lack even rudimentary tax, property, or business laws. Banks and credit institutions are limited in number, and often are viewed with suspicion. There is also considerable potential for organized crime to flourish or less than legitimate organizations to move into the gaps in laws and governmental regulations. Finally, many of these countries will have to shake off the 50 years of experience with state-controlled, centralized planning and financing and effect policies that encourage market forces to shape the economic environment.

This transition to greater reliance on the private market place will not be easy. Many countries have little historical practice with developed market economies, and some have hardly any relevant experience at all.¹⁷ This lack of experience leaves them vulnerable to modern day carpetbaggers, to corruption within government, to the potential for robber barons (à la the U.S. experience in the late 19th and early 20th centuries), and to criminals who

will exploit gaps in legal systems that have not yet fully matured. This may require a more incremental approach to the privatization of industry and transition to market-based economics than some outsiders originally may have believed desirable.¹⁸ The vulnerability of Europe's new states to criminality and corruption could, in some instances (notably Romania and Bulgaria), become a threat to their internal security, especially if internal criminality links up with foreign networks, e.g., the Russian Mafia's international crime links.¹⁹

Many of these states also face the daunting challenge of moving from an obsolescent, if not antiquated, industrial base that focused for over five decades on military production to an information age economy that can compete in the global market place. They must do all this while providing levels of consumer goods and services sufficient to satisfy their populations, while coping with market fluctuations. Under the best of circumstances, this transition period could lead to short-term economic contraction in many countries.²⁰ If not handled carefully, severe economic dislocation could occur, leading to considerable political backlash. Faced with dashed expectations, severely reduced buying power, bare shelves, and unemployment, many publics may long for return to authoritarian rule and controlled economies that once provided minimum levels of support (food, housing, medical care, and pensions) and for times when disparities in wealth and treatment were not as well-known. This chimera, however, will only lead to further deterioration in economic conditions.

On the other hand, some evolving countries and societies may learn from past successes or failures to take the best and avoid the worst of the transition. They may weather some intense short-term pain for long-term economic payoff.²¹ If they can make this significant leap, they may be able to move more directly into the global, information-age economy.

Failure to incorporate Russia and the NIS into the European and global economies is perhaps the greatest potential economic obstacle to realizing the proposed vision of Europe. The remainder of Europe and the United States can try to fulfill the twin requirements of absorbing goods from these countries and providing investment capital, but unfortunately there is only so much they can do. Moreover, there is only so much expertise and capital these countries can effectively absorb.

This will be no easy task. Russia, especially, will have to revolutionize itself all over again. The government must enact and enforce laws and policies that foster economic growth and protect property. It will have to demilitarize the economy and allow prices and values to seek their natural levels. Support for public sector investment will be key, as will the creation of a fair, equitable, and enforceable tax system that supports public and private sector goals. Support for private enterprise will have to be greater than heretofore has been the case. This especially may be true of agriculture and land ownership. Last, but not least, Russia must foster an economic climate that provides an incentive for foreign investment.

Western initiatives will necessarily depend on Russian policies and their implementation. But even before Russia makes these decisive transformations, there are major opportunities for successful public and private programs in Russia. For example, U.S., European, and Russian initiatives need to confront Russia's ecological and public health crises. This would include long-term initiatives, such as building hospitals, training medical personnel, and providing modern diagnostic and treatment equipment. But, it also could include rudimentary, but important short-term programs: furnishing disposable hypodermic needles, offering vaccines and medicines, ensuring clean water for hospitals, and preventing malnutrition. Such programs not only can win enormous public support, they can help prevent or mitigate future health crises. There is

no reason why these and other initiatives cannot be undertaken now.

Beyond economic conditions in Russia and the NIS, three additional and interrelated issues stand in the way of realizing the desired European economic end state: chronic un/underemployment, bloated state welfare systems (coupled with declining populations in some cases), and immigration. These problems are due largely to the fiscal costs inherent in the deeply ingrained social welfare mindset and bureaucracy within many European states, especially expectations of "cradle to grave" state support. Anticipated immigration trends will only further challenge many already stressed social welfare systems. Moreover, because publics often view newcomers, refugees or ethnic minorities as the source of much unemployment and strain on social welfare systems, this may create or exacerbate ethnic, cultural, or religious animosities in many societies.

The United States may be able to offer only limited assistance in these matters. In most countries, these issues are entangled with internal political issues, and any U.S. influence is likely to be limited. Indeed, most nations are likely to view U.S. actions as interference in their sovereign affairs. The best the United States can do is to serve as an example of how economic progress through market economics eventually offers a way out of such dilemmas, occasionally offer government funds, and, if asked, provide advice. The U.S. Government also could encourage private investment which may appear less intrusive and, therefore, more acceptable. Moreover, the demands of the marketplace and profit motives may make private investment more effective over the longer term.

Although remote, one cannot ignore the potential for a EU-U.S. trade war that could sidetrack the preferred vision of a future Europe. Such an outcome would require a series of blunders on both sides of the Atlantic, but U.S. and European leaders cannot afford to dismiss such a possibility. The perception of fewer and less important

mutual economic interests, failed or significantly delayed European economic integration, contraction of economies on either side of the Atlantic, an oil crisis with Europe and the United States on opposite sides (especially in conjunction with other economic declines), or intense competition for information-age markets could lead to a trade war.²² Undoubtedly, cooler heads would ultimately prevail, but damage could be extensive, hindering the attainment of desired outcomes for Europe.

Political Hurdles.

The greatest political hurdles to achieving our vision of the future Europe stem from the reversal of representative government in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., as has happened in Belarus). The most obvious case is Russia, but Ukraine follows in close order. Moderate-sized states like Bulgaria and Romania also could hinder European integration if their countries reverted to authoritarian rule. As the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans demonstrate, authoritarian regimes in even small countries can adversely influence the entire European security climate. Should this occur in Central or Southeastern Europe (e.g., Czech Republic or Hungary, and Bulgaria or Romania, respectively), the shock waves would reverberate throughout most of the Continent.²³

Another potential political problem concerns the erosion of state sovereignty, which could emerge from several causes. Multinational organizations, such as the EU, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could take on aspects of traditional state responsibilities for economics, political representation, and security. Concomitantly, the rise of regional organizations, particularly economic or trade groups, could further undermine the power of the state.²⁴ Thus, in pursuing increased integration, the United States and its European partners must tread the fine line between yielding too much or too little power to these organizations.

Reductions in state sovereignty do not necessarily lead to adverse consequences. Regional trade partners, consortia, and complementary business organizations can work to the advantage of the regional organizations and the countries involved. The danger is that regional groupings could undermine state unity leading to dissolution of current states.²⁵ Again, this is not deleterious in and of itself. The devolution of state authority could be managed to avoid adverse outcomes, even to promote economic growth. But it is a delicate process, especially ensuring that it does not lead to political instability or a security vacuum.

A rise in nationalism or ethnic separatism also could inhibit the political portions of the desired end state. Such issues continue to hold considerable appeal, especially in Eastern and Southern Europe where young democracies may not yet possess the maturity to weather severe economic or political stress. Even within well-established democracies in Western and Central Europe, there are sizable nationalist or ethnically driven parties that have exerted considerable influence in recent elections.²⁶ A severe economic downturn could further increase the influence of such groups.

Erosion of the key Franco-German relationship also could upset European political integration. This special association was the catalyst and has been the glue that has facilitated much of West Europe's successful political and economic integration.²⁷ A substantial lessening of these bonds could fracture the consensus that has driven ever-increasing pan-European integration.²⁸ Such an erosion could occur in two general ways. Over time, the Germans and the French (or other Europeans) may perceive that conditions have improved to the point that the relationship no longer holds the same level of importance. In this case, there would be little cause for alarm, as a unified Germany would be firmly anchored into European political, economic, and security institutions.

Another potential pitfall concerns who will lead this partnership and how that leadership will be exerted. For the last 50 years, Germany has deferred not only to France but to most of its transatlantic partners. Recovery of full German sovereignty, coupled with Germany's economic power and the passing of the torch to the post-World War II generation of political leaders, may result in greater German assertiveness in foreign affairs.²⁹ This does not argue that Germany will be less cooperative, but the relationship will be different than it has been in the past, and France and the remainder of Europe will have to accommodate themselves to these new conditions.

More ominous would be Central and Eastern European issues drawing German attention and aspirations away from Western and Central European institutions. This could stem from a collapse within Russia, ethnic conflict within Ukraine or the Baltic states, or an economic collapse that overwhelms Central European institutions. In such cases, the United States and other European allies and partners would have to take steps to ensure that Germany remained firmly tied to the EU and NATO. Such an adverse outcome is unlikely, however. The Franco-German relationship has endured despite perennial contretemps and crises. At this point, it appears to be functioning, in fact as strongly as during the 1980s. The intent here simply is to acknowledge that less than optimistic outcomes are possible, and to ensure that such possibilities are factored into efforts to shape the future security environment.

Security Obstacles.

A broad range of security issues could hinder achieving the overarching goals of peaceful European integration. Conflict within the Balkans is one obvious hurdle. Long-standing Greek-Turkish tensions over a wide spectrum of issues could seriously disrupt the entire future European security environment.³⁰ A wide range of potential trouble spots along the Mediterranean (due to cultural,

economic, and religious differences; possibility of northward migration; proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons and WMD, as well as the means to deliver them—especially, ballistic and cruise missiles) could overturn a peaceful European security environment. Continuing conflict in the Transcaucasus region already is troublesome and tensions over control of oil in the region could exacerbate pressures. Individually, each issue could generate considerable repercussions; collectively they could have devastating effects on European stability. The United States must work with its European allies, partners, and friends to preclude such a detrimental confluence.

The road to a Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) contains a number of potential potholes. On the one hand, Europeans could fail to create the necessary consensus to forge and sustain a CSFP.³¹ Presently, for example, many European states are preoccupied with internal economic and political issues. This could result in differing perceptions of threats, with the potential for divisive debates over whether a CSFP is needed. Even should a CSFP emerge, considerable interpretation over its implementation might occur. Again, differing threat perceptions could lead to dissonance over security burdensharing. Such outcomes could lead to national or regional rifts. Under worst-case conditions (e.g., severe economic or political setbacks), this might even precipitate the renationalization of defense structures by some countries. One should recall that the integration of European defense forces within NATO has had the important result of acting as an effective confidence- and security-building measure, i.e., providing reassurance of benign national military intentions. Obviously, where renationalization might occur would make considerable differences, but the consequences could be significant.

A strong, cohesive CSFP and ESDI also could have consequences that would require careful management. The United States might reduce its presence in Europe, for

example. While this outcome is not inherently detrimental to U.S. national interests, the United States and Europe will have to manage carefully the level of U.S. residual presence, as well as reexamine current stationing arrangements (i.e., permanently shifting U.S. Army forces from Germany to the Balkans?) to preclude a European perception that the United States no longer judges its interests in Europe as being vital. Similarly, U.S. leaders must ensure that reduced presence does not lead to disengagement from Europe, or some form of neo-isolationism.

A robust ESDI might have a number of additional consequences. Calling upon Europeans to become greater partners also means that the United States must accept Europe's larger decisionmaking role in the partnership. There may be times when it would be judicious of the United States to temper the predominant leadership role that it practiced during the Cold War. Concomitantly, this also will require Europeans to assume greater responsibilities than they have been willing to take on in the past.

Shared leadership also will complicate consensus development. The United States frequently arrives at its internal decisions through the long, convoluted, and arduous inter-agency process. Other governments develop their own policies using similar mechanisms, as vividly demonstrated during the build-up to the Kosovo conflict. It is unrealistic to expect allies and partners to react more quickly than can the United States. This will require some adjustment, at times considerable, to the U.S. penchant for deciding first and seeking consensus later. As seen during the NATO response to the crisis in the Balkans in the early 1990s, difficulties in forging consensus prolong decision-making, especially when there may be disagreement over interests, objectives, and the ways and means to achieve them. This does not argue against the United States encouraging a strong European defense pillar; it simply means that the United States will have to adapt its leadership methods to accommodate change.

Last, but certainly not least, the proliferation of WMD could considerably upset the European security environment. While proliferation within Europe undoubtedly would be highly detrimental, current conditions argue against such an outcome. That having been said, Russia and other NIS states have many scientists with great expertise in WMD who are inadequately employed and could be a source of expertise for a nation embarked upon a WMD program, as a result of resurgent nationalism and denationalization of defense, for instance.³²

The development of WMD outside of Europe, but which could be used in Europe or against European interests, however, is a cause for alarm. A number of nations on Europe's periphery may have nascent WMD programs and may be working on the sophisticated means to deliver them. Additional states could acquire such capabilities within the next 20 years.³³ Moreover, technological advances almost certainly will permit nations currently out of range of effective delivery to perfect adequate means for reaching European targets. Such conditions undoubtedly would influence security matters in Europe, and affect U.S. national interests.

Nor is it necessary for states or groups to develop a weapons-grade device and delivery system. Attaching chemical or nuclear materials to a simple car bomb would be sufficient to cause considerable short-term physical, as well as significant longer-term casualties. The tremendous potential for cascading effects of WMD on economic and political conditions is obvious. Increased efforts to support nonproliferation of WMD, and to safeguard existing nuclear materials, therefore, should be a matter of high priority.

REDUCING RISKS TO U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

If the United States and Europe in partnership cannot overcome these obstacles, prospects are dim for achieving our preferred vision of a future Europe. We propose a

number of political, economic, and security initiatives, therefore, to help turn our proposed vision into reality. We do not present these policy options as stark choices: implement these initiatives or face failure. No one can forecast the outcomes with a high degree of detail. Indeed, even if all initiatives were partially or fully implemented, circumstances could lead to outcomes detrimental to U.S. national interests. Our thrust is that these initiatives offer a reasonable opportunity for success. The analysis points out the possible (and in some instances, worst case) outcomes that the United States seeks to avoid by taking active steps now to shape the future European security environment to the mutual benefit of Europe and the United States.

Political Initiatives.

Perhaps the most significant political initiative has more to do with the United States than it does with Europe per se. As indicated earlier, the United States may have to adopt a new leadership style for dealing with its European counterparts. This will be most apparent within NATO, but will extend to other arenas as well. The United States must examine whether it routinely will seek to build consensus or generally will rely on unilateral action. It must examine whether it seeks to remain *primus* or is more willing to share greater power in decisionmaking. Obviously, the ultimate outcome will depend heavily on how much responsibility Europeans are willing to assume, and how consensus builds within Europe for CSFP, ESDI, and EU political integration. An important indicator of "Europe's" ability to assume such a position will be how these countries accept the lessons of the Kosovo conflict in modernizing their militaries to enable them to have the necessary capabilities to project and sustain military power, independent of U.S. assistance.³⁴ But, the decisive factor will depend upon the role that the United States sees for itself in Europe, and how it fulfills its vision of a future Europe. There will be growing pains in this new relationship, on both sides of the Atlantic. But, if Europe is

to be a greater partner—not simply in Europe, but in support of mutual interests around the globe—then the United States at some point will have to relinquish some power.

In some cases, the United States may have to pressure reluctant Europe to assume that power and the responsibility that goes with it. This may be especially true for regions outside of Europe.³⁵ But, as the world economy becomes more interdependent, European businesses and governments will find that stability in key regions will be key to continued economic health in Europe. This may well bring about a greater convergence of U.S. and European interests in promoting stability around the globe.

At the same time, Europeans must wean themselves from overdependence upon the United States and take greater responsibility for the course of events in Europe. This will require building European consensus on long-term structures and policies (e.g., CSFP, ESDI), as well as the ability to reach agreement during short-term crises without relying on the United States to be the ultimate arbiter of European squabbles.³⁶ Equally, this will require European nations to reconcile national interests to solve largely European problems (e.g., violence in the Balkans, Greek-Turkish issues, or conflicts in Transcaucasia). This also will require the United States to exercise patience and allow Europe the time necessary to forge such consensus.

In this regard, the United States should continue support for the evolving European CSFP. While this is a natural consequence of increased political and economic integration, a CSFP also would simplify (theoretically) U.S. dealings with Europe. Because of the diverse national interests within the EU, much less within Europe as a whole, the development of such a policy is likely to proceed with fits and starts, will frustrate Europeans, and, occasionally, aggravate the United States which will want to deal with a more cohesive partner. At the same time, the

United States must understand that a CSFP may not always coincide with U.S. policy.

Less contentious is continued U.S. support for further political, as well as economic, evolution of the EU. This includes increased integration, as well as support for further enlargement. The EU must ensure, however, that membership is available to all that qualify. To create a Europe, united and whole, the EU will have to ensure that the door to the "common European home" remains open to all that qualify. The United States must encourage such openness, and, when necessary, coax the EU to ensure opportunities for accession.

Support for individual human rights should remain a key pillar of a future vision of Europe. States emerging from decades, even centuries, of authoritarian rule may not yet have grasped fully the principle that safeguarding individual human rights is a fundamental responsibility of democratic governments. Monitoring human rights, providing economic and political rewards and incentives, and, if necessary, punishing human rights abuses must be a joint U.S.-European responsibility and a high priority. For the moment, the United States should support efforts to give the Council of Europe more teeth in dealing with human rights issues within its member states.

Similarly, minority rights must be protected if there is to be long-term stability and security in Europe. Although the Balkans and the Transcaucasus are the current hot spots, other regions of Europe are not immune from these debilitating crises.³⁷ Migration, economic dislocation, and unemployment oftentimes are perceived through a majority-minority lens that all too frequently generates animosity that spills over into violence. In many European countries, this will be an extremely sensitive, even divisive, issue. Some states will view outside concern for minority rights as unnecessary and unwanted interference in their internal affairs. Other European states may hesitate to criticize or counteract minority discrimination in other

countries out of fear of stirring ethnic unrest within their own borders. U.S. and European governments, however, must respond quickly and vigorously to any abuses. If not, they risk highly destabilizing ethnic conflicts.

Lastly, the United States, within the OSCE framework, should energize all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Successes within the so-called "security basket" are well-known.³⁸ That success may allow the OSCE and its constituents to devote more time, effort, and resources to the other two "baskets": human rights and cooperation in economics, science and technology and the environment.³⁹ This will not require new initiatives, necessarily, but the United States could use the OSCE forum to focus attention on key political initiatives that support desired U.S. goals for Europe.

Economic Initiatives.

While the United States also should pursue initiatives in the economic arena, most of the impetus for these efforts will have to come from within Europe. Similar to political efforts, much of the economic work will occur within the EU or will result from EU efforts. U.S. support for EU enlargement will contribute to the economic well-being of Europe, as a whole, with consequent effects on the global and U.S. economies.

The United States also should continue to assist in reforming and facilitating the integration of the Russian and Ukrainian and European economies. Here, the United States can lend direct assistance to Russia by assisting in the development of basic property and fiscal law. In conjunction with EU expertise, U.S., Russian, and Ukrainian interlocutors can ensure legal compatibility with EU regulations, national laws, and international law to shape an environment that supports prolonged economic development. These same groups could help develop legal procedures and organizations to combat criminal activity in the economic arena. Contingent upon the success of these

initiatives, the United States could offer additional capital investment in Russia and Ukraine that supports integration efforts. This also would be contingent upon greater confidence that such funds would not fall into the hands of corrupt or criminal elements.

Some may argue that, given the current state of economic reform in Russia and Ukraine, there are no sound policies to reward and that the United States has done all that it can. There may be merit to this conclusion.⁴⁰ However, the stakes are simply too high to let matters run their course. The United States, in conjunction with major European economic powers, will have to undertake efforts to develop an economic climate within Russia that is capable of at least minimal integration with Europe. Without such integration, Russia, and perhaps Ukraine, could slip into economic chaos that would have grave repercussions for Europe and beyond.

While assisting the Russian and Ukrainian economies is a top priority, the United States also must provide support to the other NIS, as well as emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. While support need not necessarily be on a scale equal to the two major powers, relatively limited investment could result in significant economic and political pay-offs. This could be done unilaterally, but preferably should be accomplished in conjunction with our European allies and partners. At the very least, the United States should support International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank efforts in Central and Eastern Europe. This may require the United States to increase its contributions (both relatively and absolutely) to achieve the desired ends. This may be a difficult sell to some elements of Congress and the U.S. public, but it is a short-term investment with considerable potential for long-term gain.⁴¹

The United States also should consider incentives that continue to encourage greater private investment in these nations, as well as their neighbors. This could be in the form of tax credits, subsidies or partial loan guarantees. Again,

the purpose behind such initiatives would be to exploit the energy and discipline of the marketplace, vice statist, practices. For instance, largely through private investment, the United States may be able to directly assist in the development of Caspian and Central Asian oil reserves. This could have several consequences beyond private sector profit or loss. First, it may make the nations in Central and Eastern Europe depend less on Russian petroleum products (and preclude potential economic coercion). Second, it could produce considerable revenues for poorer countries in the region that desperately need it. Third, the prospects for economic generation hold the potential to dampen long-standing animosities in the region, although this is an optimistic hope.⁴² Fourth, significant production could reduce European (and perhaps global) dependence upon Middle Eastern oil.

Security Initiatives.

The United States has significant interests and responsibilities around the globe. This leads to high demands on U.S. armed forces in Europe and beyond. Moreover, U.S. forces possess unique capabilities (e.g., satellites, intelligence, and command, control, and communications) or have capabilities that greatly exceed others (e.g., power projection and logistics support). The combination of wider interests and greater military capabilities translates into increased demands for U.S. forces around the globe.

To ensure that demands do not strain the U.S. armed forces or the U.S. Treasury, Washington must continue to encourage our European allies to assume greater responsibility for maintaining stability and security in Europe. An agreed ESDI would be a first step in providing the capabilities necessary for Europe to assume a larger role in providing for its own security.⁴³ It also is a prerequisite for more effectively modernizing and transforming European forces from their Cold War preoccupation with territorial

defense to forces capable of protecting national interests. Such changes also could better prepare European military forces for increased participation in shaping activities. Most importantly, ESDI offers the opportunity for creating the power projection capabilities needed to handle smaller-scale contingencies within Europe, as well as along its periphery. Certainly, when interests dictate, the United States must be prepared to assist its allies and partners in these matters. But, Europe must progressively assume greater responsibility for its own security.

An effective ESDI can be a two-edged sword for the United States, however. Beyond the benefits outlined above, an effective ESDI coupled with improved conventional capabilities could translate into increased European independence in foreign and military policy. This may offer Europeans greater latitude of policy and military operations than has previously been the case. Within the military sphere—as in the political arena—therefore, the United States may have to adapt its leadership style to reflect shifting power relations within NATO, as well as between Europe and the United States.

At the same time, the capabilities needed for ESDI also could serve European interests beyond the Continent, should that be necessary. These same capabilities also could support common European-U.S. interests in other key regions of the globe. This could permit a rationalization of defense responsibilities and liabilities that keeps the U.S. defense burden within manageable limits, avoiding what historian Paul Kennedy refers to as “imperial overstretch.”⁴⁴ Thus, while leadership “costs” may be inherent in the formulation of an effective ESDI, the cost-benefit analysis is favorable.

Even with a developing ESDI, the United States will have to maintain an adequate military presence in Europe for the first decades of the 21st century. This does not contradict the need for supporting ESDI. The fact remains that building an effective ESDI will not occur overnight and

Europeans will need time to create the requisite capabilities and to transform military organizations shaped by four decades of the Cold War. The United States will have to sustain its presence over this period of transition. Thus, while the United States should wean Europe from too strong a dependence upon U.S. military power, a precipitous U.S. withdrawal at this time could leave a leadership vacuum that Europeans are not yet prepared to fill. How quickly and to what degree this should occur undoubtedly will be the subject of considerable debate in Washington and European capitals.

One point of that debate may depend on how NATO nations respond to the integration of the armed forces of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and any future invitees. The United States may have to ensure that the addition of these forces is not used as an excuse for existing NATO members to decrease their own respective forces. Moreover, as these forces are integrated into the Alliance's military structure, the United States and its NATO allies must ensure that current capabilities are suitably restructured and modernized to meet the demands of the anticipated future security environment.⁴⁵

The size and focus of the U.S. presence in Europe undoubtedly will change. Force size, structures, and organizations will adapt to accommodate evolving security conditions. Most important may be the shift from the Cold War focus on Central Europe to greater attention to smaller-scale contingencies along Europe's southern and southeastern borders. Increased levels of peacetime engagement activities to shape the European security environment will be important, as well. This will require different capabilities, or at least a different proportion of capabilities, than was case during the Cold War.

That having been said, forces remaining in Europe will have to retain credible combat capability. To contribute to deterrence and reassurance roles in Europe, these forces still will need adequate levels of combat power. Despite the

obvious improvements in the European security environment, these forces undoubtedly will be called upon to respond to smaller-scale contingencies in Europe or along its periphery. They also must remain capable of responding rapidly to a major conflict in another theater of operations beyond Europe. To maintain an adequate balance between shaping and responding missions will require deft restructuring of U.S. forces in Europe.

The United States also can use support for ESDI as a means of improving modernization and interoperability with its European allies and partners. This could help avoid unnecessary and debilitating intra-Alliance debates over standardization, rationalization, and interoperability that have plagued the Alliance in the past.⁴⁶ Used properly, ESDI could lead to pooled research and development efforts that conceivably could save the United States and Europe time and resources. Obviously, increased military integration should accompany these overarching security changes. While it is still too early to say when and where the North Atlantic Council might invite other European states to join the Alliance, prudence dictates that Alliance structures and practices must continue to evolve to prepare NATO for such eventualities.

U.S. support for further enlarging NATO will require further adaptation of the Alliance's integrated military structure. In the near term, this will require integrating the declared forces of the several armed forces from the new accessions to the Alliance (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). To assist this effort, the U.S. Government will have to convince a somewhat skeptical Congress to continue supporting infrastructure spending in NATO to assist new members.⁴⁷ The U.S. Government also will have to ensure that European allies shoulder a fair share of that burden.

Perhaps more difficult will be U.S. efforts to adapt the military command and control structure of the Alliance. Such efforts, to date, have borne limited fruit.⁴⁸ The crux of future adaptation hinges on determining how best to return

France to the Alliance's military structure without debilitating military planning and execution capabilities. As the recent brouhaha over command of Allied Forces Southern Europe demonstrates, this will be no easy task.⁴⁹ For the moment, this may mean implementing current initiatives, and letting the French grasp in their own time the advantages of halting their obstructionist behavior. Over the longer term, especially if ESDI becomes a reality, the United States may have to soften its current hard-line stance on who occupies key command positions within the integrated military structure.

Further enhancements of the existing PfP program also will benefit the European security climate. On the one hand, new initiatives may assist nations in preparing for ultimate NATO membership (should they desire). On the other hand, should a nation not opt for NATO membership, such program enhancements could increase cooperation between NATO and nonmembers. Some potential initiatives include:

- 1) Designation of PfP "deployable forces" and some as yet undefined relationship with existing NATO-declared multinational headquarters;

- 2) Greater detail in the current "Planning and Review Process" to make it more similar to the Alliance's force planning process;

- 3) Increased "Partner Staff Elements" participation with the International Military Staff and the top two levels of the integrated command structure;

- 4) Increased numbers of international posts in the Partnership Coordination Cell; and,

- 5) Additional partner diplomatic missions accredited to NATO Headquarters.

In addition to the highly successful PfP Program, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council provides the education and experience necessary for potential members to learn how to work inside NATO. It also enhances multinational

security cooperation and allays Russian fears should Moscow participate in it. The program also allows for the integration of Ukraine and the Baltic States into the European security agenda and provides reassurance and some form of tangible or visible concern for their security.

Most of these initiatives hold the promise of helping meet U.S. objectives not only in Europe but also in responding to future crises outside Europe. Using PfP to ensure that partner states are compatible with ESDI will help ensure that Europeans will be better prepared to cooperate with the United States when mutual interests will benefit. This will not only reduce the U.S. defense burdens in Europe, but also globally, while increasing the effectiveness of potential coalitions.

At the very least, these programs singly or in combination should increase transparency in security affairs. Within NATO, they will help prevent the renationalization of members' defense policies. Outside NATO, these measures should reduce the incentives for individual nations to pursue unilateral security policies that might cause anxiety among their neighbors. At best, they can contribute to increased defense integration within NATO, as well as Europe as a whole.

CINC USEUCOM's *Strategy of Readiness and Engagement*.

Support of CSFP, ESDI, NATO enlargement and adaptation, and PfP are longer-term initiatives. To support U.S. interests and policies in Europe in the near term, USEUCOM has outlined a number of strategic objectives in CINC USEUCOM's *Strategy of Readiness and Engagement* (1998). The intent here is not to examine each objective in detail. On their face, these objectives support U.S. interests, goals, and policies. The task here is to assess their ability to contribute to the vision of a future Europe.

Seven (of eleven) USEUCOM objectives directly relate to shaping Europe's 21st century security environment:

1) Maintain, support, and contribute to the integrity and adaptation of NATO.

2) Help prepare the militaries of invited nations to integrate with NATO.

3) Promote stability, democratization, military professionalism, and closer relationships with NATO in the nations of Central Europe and the NIS.

4) Support U.S. efforts to ensure self-sustaining progress for the Dayton process; develop military institutions in the former Yugoslavia adapted to civilian control.

5) Ensure freedom of maritime and aeronautic lines of communication.

6) Provide prompt response to humanitarian crises.

7) Maintain a high state of readiness in EUCOM forces.⁵⁰

Within the USEUCOM strategy, NATO remains the centerpiece of U.S. engagement in Europe. The Alliance is uniquely positioned to meet the continued demands of collective defense of its members, and through NATO enlargement, chartered relationships with Russia and Ukraine, and PfP activities to support inclusive mutual security arrangements throughout Europe⁵¹. USEUCOM efforts to support the Alliance, therefore, are considerable. Within NATO, USEUCOM helps fulfill the military aspects of enlargement. It contributes to further evolution of command and control arrangements and provides substantial forces and capabilities—especially intelligence, communications, and power projection—to Alliance military authorities.

External to the Alliance, USEUCOM supports PfP activities and uses bilateral activities to assist invited nations to prepare for NATO membership.⁵² These activities also foster increased professionalism within Central and

Eastern European armed forces and civilian control over those forces.⁵³ USEUCOM also promotes closer relationships with friendly democratic neutrals that support NATO efforts to increase stability and transparency in defense matters in the rest of Europe. Moreover, USEUCOM uses bilateral contacts with Russia and Ukraine to bolster the chartered relationships between those two countries and NATO.⁵⁴ Four particular initiatives deserve special note: the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, the Joint Contact Team Program, the State Partnership Program, and the Department of Defense's security assistance program.⁵⁵ These efforts build trust and confidence that contribute to increased understanding and stability in Europe.

USEUCOM also plays a major role in supporting U.S. efforts to ensure self-sustaining progress for the Dayton peace process. Providing the bulk of the U.S. force contribution to the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations and the National Support Element in Hungary, alone, is a significant achievement. Adding to these challenging deployments has been the U.S. contribution to the NATO-led Allied Force campaign against Yugoslavia and the subsequent contribution of U.S. forces to the Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR). U.S. forces (largely drawn from USEUCOM units) participating in IFOR, SFOR and KFOR have made signal contributions beyond the requirements laid out in the various peace implementation agreements. These include assistance in infrastructure restoration, economic restructuring, serving as role models for professional armed forces that are subject to civilian control, and assisting in elections at all levels of government over the course of the past 3 years.⁵⁶ These initiatives have directly contributed not only to the restoration of a safe and secure environment in Bosnia, but also have directly assisted in that nation's recovery from the depths of a vicious civil war.

In addition to its work inside Bosnia, USEUCOM also has launched peacetime engagement and shaping activities

in the remainder of the Balkans, as well as in Central Europe that have contributed further to the prospects for a self-sustaining peace in the region. USEUCOM has supported the U.N Preventive Deployment Force (Operation ABLE SENTRY in U.S. parlance) along the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The success of this deployment has been noted nearly universally.⁵⁷ Moreover, USEUCOM units are in the forefront of combined U.S.-international efforts to stabilize the post-conflict situation in Kosovo. Together, these actions not only have contributed significantly to short-term stability in the former Yugoslavia, but also may serve as the foundation for longer-term stability within the Balkans, as a whole.

Some observers may view “ensure freedom of maritime and aeronautic lines of communication” as being more a response than a shaping activity. Such an interpretation may be unnecessarily narrow, however. Responding to a particular crisis occasionally may overlap with long-range shaping activities. Thus, responding and shaping can have complementary purposes. Creating the conditions that allow for the free and unfettered use of lines of communication within USEUCOM's area of responsibility, for example, certainly contributes to a positive future security environment. Thus, a freedom of navigation exercise in the Gulf of Sidra or exercises in the Black Sea establish precedents that will shape future actions and security conditions.

Providing prompt response to humanitarian crises also would appear to fall more under responding than shaping. But there is still a portion of such missions that support engagement. First, rapid response helps shape conditions for peaceful resolution of an ongoing crisis, or prevents humanitarian conditions from expanding into a conflict, whether internal or external. Second, by mitigating dire economic consequences, such humanitarian responses help eliminate or mitigate conditions that might contribute to

future instability or conflict. Third, humanitarian responses contribute to a well of goodwill that the United States may find useful some day. Lastly, the U.S. position as a world leader demands that the United States take the lead in many humanitarian efforts. Indeed, in some cases, the United States may be the only nation that possesses the requisite capabilities needed to conduct such operations (e.g., long-range transportation, global communications, and logistics).

None of these initiatives will bear fruit, however, unless USEUCOM forces maintain a high state of readiness. This applies to combat and noncombat roles. Readiness provides the *sine qua non* for maintaining USEUCOM's ability to fight and win a major theater war, and to respond effectively to the full range of potential crises. These capabilities also undergird USEUCOM's contribution to deterrence, as well as its ability to support operations in other theaters of operation. In short, without adequate attention to readiness, USEUCOM will have great difficulty carrying out the initiatives, planned or potential, that will shape Europe's 21st century security environment to the mutual benefit of Europe and the United States.⁵⁸

To help ensure readiness, while fulfilling the *National Military Strategy*, CINCEUR recognized the need to plan theater-wide peacetime activities. As a result, EUCOM developed a unique process for planning and executing what has become known as "shaping" activities, conducted under the strategy of engagement. The Theater Security Planning System produced strategy documents at all levels (theater, region, and country). The purpose of this process was to vet the objectives that support strategies. Using the USEUCOM's Theater Security Planning System as a model, the Joint Staff developed the Theater Engagement Planning System, which is currently used throughout the combatant commands to develop shaping strategic concepts and shaping activities.⁵⁹ Currently, EUCOM conducts approximately 3,000 engagement activities annually, within some 30 different categories of "activities."⁶⁰

Finally, the 1998 revision of the Unified Command Plan has assigned to EUCOM the following new countries for planning and shaping responsibilities: Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as well as the Black Sea.⁶¹ This has increased significantly the command's responsibilities, particularly for planning and executing shaping activities. Ukraine now becomes USEUCOM's largest shaping program.⁶²

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The importance of U.S. national interests in Europe is unlikely to abate in the period under examination. Increased cooperation between the United States and evolving European political, economic, and security organizations could lead to even greater trans-Atlantic bonds. The United States, therefore, has a considerable stake in bringing to fruition the vision outlined above (or one similar to it). Despite the obvious fact that posited conditions will benefit the United States, Europe and its citizens also would garner tremendous advantages. Thus, Europe, too, has a stake in such a positive outcome.

But such an outcome is not guaranteed. U.S.-European cultural affinities may diminish. In the absence of a massive external threat, perceived mutual U.S.-European interests may lessen. Economic competition between the United States and Europe or among large regional trading blocs for global or regional markets could be intense, further magnifying the divergence of interests. For this vision to become reality, therefore, will require mutual efforts and, sometimes, substantial changes on both sides of the Atlantic.

Nonetheless, we generally do not see any need for dramatic changes in the ongoing economic, political, and security evolution of Europe. Certainly, we would welcome any acceleration of positive trends that will increase the number of market democracies that seek to resolve disputes through peaceful means. But this does not call for wholesale

overhaul of current systems. Indeed, too rapid a change may create instability that the United States and Europe hope to avoid. Thus, we support evolutionary initiatives and continued progress along foreseeable lines.

On the economic front, Europe must continue to widen and deepen its economic institutions. Accession to the EU, particularly, must remain a viable option for all eligible countries. The important decision made at the EU Helsinki summit in December 1999 to open membership accession negotiations to expand the community from 15 to 28 or more countries is noteworthy for European security.⁶³ That said, economic integration does not have to occur strictly through the EU. The EU and nonmembers should be free to pursue a "variable geometry" that accommodates national and regional differences within the larger organization. The intent, rather, is to pursue options that make national economies more open and to preclude a catastrophic economic failure that affects large portions of the European and global economies.

This last point underscores the importance of ensuring that Russia, especially, but also Ukraine and the other NIS states merge their economies into the European economic system. The inability to effect such integration risks creating a tiered system of "haves" and "have-nots," where the latter group may perceive that it has no stake in supporting European stability. Indeed, such "have-nots" may conclude that they have tremendous incentive to overturn existing European economic, political, and security institutions, architectures, and systems.

European economic integration should occur in close partnership with the United States. Much more can be accomplished, for example in integrating Russian and NIS economies into European and global economies, if the United States and key European nations and institutions cooperate. Equally, hostile trade competition or, worse, debilitating U.S.-EU trade wars could significantly damage

long-term U.S. and European national interests not only in the economic sphere, but also in security matters.

Recommended changes in European political institutions generally parallel the economic transformations outlined above. Increased political integration that includes all European nation-states is a desirable and achievable goal. More important, perhaps, than increased pan-European institutions is a greater focus on ensuring individual and minority rights. Redressing real or perceived inequities in minority rights, in particular, will greatly improve the potential for long-term stability within Europe.

In the security arena, Europe should strive to create an effective European Security and Defense Initiative. The United States should support such efforts. This should not require, however, creating new mechanisms or erecting new "institutions," if they are at the expense of creating needed military capabilities. Europe should evolve its role in security affairs within existing structures, such as OSCE, EU/Western European Union (WEU), NATO, PfP, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), for example. These organizations, if properly adapted, can resolve impending conflicts or, if violence breaks out, take the necessary steps to halt conflict and achieve a lasting political settlement. An excellent example of this capability and potential results is the ongoing significant internal adaptation of NATO.

This adaptation will have to include changed roles and participation in security institutions. European states will have to take a larger role in ensuring their own security. This will mean, as well, taking the steps necessary to ensure that they possess the military capabilities needed to meet the potential challenges of the 21st century security environment. This also will mean less reliance on the U.S. political leadership within European security organizations, as well as during crises. A stronger European security role also should lead to improvements in military capabilities, which many European states have let languish

over the last decade. At the same time, these changes will require the United States to alter how it cooperates with Europe, relying more heavily on prior consultation and developing consensus prior to rather than after the fact. It also may mean that the United States must let go of some of its authority and leadership positions. While psychologically difficult, these changes can occur without damaging U.S. or European national interests.

A continued U.S. military presence in Europe will remain an essential element of the European security environment for the foreseeable future. Partially, this is to reassure allies and partners of the continued U.S. commitment to Europe, which will be especially important during this period of transition. These forces also will play a key role in shaping the future European and global security environments through a broad range of peacetime engagement and shaping activities. Especially important may be helping former communist militaries transform themselves into defense establishments that conform to the norms of democratic civil-military relations. Should a crisis arise in Europe, U.S. military units also would be positioned to respond quickly. They also could foster compatible, if not common, doctrine and operational procedures among potential coalition partners to facilitate combined operations within or outside Europe. Lastly, forces stationed in Europe will be positioned to respond quickly to crises that may erupt in other areas of the world or to support operations in other theaters.

While all elements of the U.S. armed forces will contribute to a future presence in Europe, land forces will play the more dominant role. Land forces are less transient than sea or air forces, and, therefore, provide greater reassurance to allies and partners. Equally, land forces are most appropriate for performing the broad range of missions that fall under peacetime engagement and shaping activities. Because most emerging democracies depend most heavily on land forces, moreover, U.S. Army units and personnel offer the better role model for

appropriate civil-military relations. Similarly, land forces offer the best means for facilitating the development of common doctrine and operational procedures. Lastly, because of the nature of probable crises in Europe, land forces may predominate in any responses.

Achieving desired political, economic, and security conditions in Europe that benefit both Europe and the United States will not happen on its own. As indicated above, a number of obstacles will have to be overcome, not the least of which will be the integration of Russia, Ukraine, and the NIS into Europe's political, security, and, especially, economic systems. But while difficult, these challenges are not overwhelming. Progress may come in fits and starts, and occasional strains in trans-Atlantic relations will occur. But none of these difficulties will be insurmountable. With perseverance and close cooperation the United States and Europe can turn the vision into reality.

ENDNOTES

1. See, for example, Stephen Walt, "The Ties That Fray," *The National Interest*, Winter 1998/1999, pp. 3-11.

2. Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry introduced preventive defense at a speech at Harvard University (Remarks at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, May 13, 1996). The most complete articulation of the concept is found in William J. Perry, "Defense in an Age of Hope," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6, November/December 1996, pp. 64-79. Preventive defense evolved into the concept of shaping outlined in William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], May 1997, pp. 7-10.

3. As a review of the published national security strategies of the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations clearly indicates.

4. For example, conservative West Europeans may draw the eastern borderline along the Oder-Neisse, while more liberal viewpoints might include Poland and even the Republic of Georgia! Debate could be boisterous over the inclusion of Ukraine and Russia. Turkey's repeated rejection by the EU is an example of where others might draw the line.

Central Asian republics, while members of the OSCE, owe their membership to their relationship within the former Soviet Union, and do not always see themselves as "European." For information on the OSCE, see <http://www.osce.org>. Responsibilities assigned to U.S. CINCs illustrate this problem, as USEUCOM includes most of Africa, as well as portions of the Middle East, but excludes Russia. Problems associated with the Unified Command Plan (UCP) are discussed below.

5. Currently, the OSCE has 55 members, although the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been suspended since July 1992.

6. The Cold War division between "East" and "West" further exacerbates this difficulty.

7. For instance, Germany could fall within Western or Central Europe or could be grouped with the Baltic states depending upon the context.

8. Charles W. Freeman, Jr., ed., *The Diplomat's Dictionary*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994, p. 186.

9. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, [hereafter *NSS*], Washington, DC: GPO, December 1999, pp. 29-32. See also, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, <http://www.defenselink/pubs/europe/index.html>, parts 1 and 2; and Department of State, *United States Strategic Plan for International Affairs*, Washington, DC: Department of State, September 1997.

10. *NSS*, p. 29. The *NSS* defines U.S. national interests as vital, important, humanitarian and other. See *ibid.*, pp. 1-2. For an explanation of the varying degrees of national interest, see Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s*, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1985, Chapter 1. For a slightly different view, see Robert D. Blackwill, "A Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Interests in the 1990s and Beyond," in Verner Veidenfeld and Josef Janning, eds., *Europe in Global Change*, Gutersloh, Germany: Publisher Bertelsmann, 1993, pp. 100-119.

11. *NSS*, pp. 29-32.

12. *Ibid.*

13. That said, key European economies experienced noteworthy growth rates in 1999. See *The Economist* (London), August 14, 1999, p. 41.

14. See, for example, Lowell Turner, *Fighting a Partnership: Labor and Politics in Unified Germany*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.

15. This especially will be true of labor laws, which need reform to allow greater flexibility.

16. Russia, for example is struggling with how to handle market forces after 70 years of state controlled economy. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, "One Patch of Russia's Economic Crazy Quilt," *The New York Times*, Internet version, September 23, 1998, at <http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/092398russia-lebed.html>

17. This lack of knowledge can be compounded by outside advisors who do not have an adequate grasp of the neophytes' levels of understanding. Thus, advisors occasionally may assume a level of understanding that while rudimentary for them is beyond the ken of their interlocutors.

18. See, for example, the discussion in Janine R. Wedel, *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989-1998*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 21-22. Wedel's work should be required reading for anyone involved in economic assistance and advice in other countries.

19. See, for instance, Robert D. Kaplan, "The Fulcrum of Europe," *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 1998, pp. 28-36; and *idem*, "Hoods Against Democrats," *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 1998, pp. 32-36.

20. For example, after nearly a decade of transition Russia (-5.3 percent), Ukraine (-9.9 percent), Bulgaria (-9.2 percent), and Moldova (-10 percent) still are experiencing negative growth. Internet, http://www.worldbank.org/data/pdfs/tab1_1.pdf

21. See Elizabeth Pond, "Miracle on the Vistula," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 209-230.

22. One need only look as far as European reaction to the Helms-Burton Amendment, competition between Europe's Airbus consortium and U.S. airplane manufacturers, or U.S. resentment of European industrial espionage. Or, the recent case (December 1998) where the United States slapped trade sanctions on the EU over

bananas. See Associated Press, "US Slaps Trade Sanctions on Europe," *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/w/AP-BananaTrade-War.html>, December 21, 1998.

23. Regressive political trends, even in smaller European states such as Slovakia, could have considerable effects on overall European stability.

24. See, for example, the discussion in William Drozdiak, "Regions on the Rise," *The Washington Post*, October 22, 1995, p. A22. For a more general discussion of this global phenomenon, see Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region State," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 78-87.

25. For instance, the Flemish and Walloon regions of Belgium, Catalonia and Andalusia in Spain, or the Lombard League in Italy, to name but a few in Western Europe alone.

26. See, e.g., the series of articles on right-wing politics in Austria, France, Germany, and Italy in *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 23-24, and 26-27, 1998; and *New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*, Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall, eds., New York: St. Martins Press, 1998.

27. Beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community (1950), the EC, EU, WEU, and NATO.

28. The election of Gerhard Schroeder as Federal Chancellor in Germany, for example, sent shudders through French policymakers who fear a lessening of the Franco-German relationship. See, for example, Craig R. Whitney, "France Worries as New German Leader Stresses Ties to Britain," *The New York Times*, Internet ed., <http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/093098germany-france.html>, September 30, 1998; Christopher Noble, "Schroeder Visits France to Reassure Anxious Paris," *The Washington Post*, <http://www.pointcast.com>, September 30, 1998.

29. Such an approach is advocated by Michael J. Inacker, "Power and Morality: On a New German Security Policy," Daniel Weisbaum, trans., in *Force, Statecraft and German Unity. The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Thomas-Durell Young, ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996, pp. 101-114.

30. Cyprus is the obvious Greek-Turkish flashpoint, but others include control of the air and sea space in the Aegean, Balkan relationships, and Turkish membership in the EU.

31. Presently, for example, most European states are fixated on internal economic and political issues. This could result in differing perceptions of threats and the consequent issue of whether a CSFP is needed to address them.

32. See, for instance, Walter Pincus, "Funds to Scrap Ex-Soviet Arms Boosted," *The Washington Post*, September 25, 1998, p. A6.

33. See Table 1 in *Strategic Survey, 1996/97*, London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1997, pp. 23-25.

34. See "The Future of Kosovo: An Indefinite NATO Presence," *IJSS Strategic Comments*, Vol. 6, Issue 1, January 2000.

35. This stems from the reality that Europeans have come to rely heavily on U.S. defense capabilities, especially power projection capabilities, to safeguard mutual national interests in, for example, the Middle East.

36. For an excellent assessment of the challenges facing the EU, see "A Work in Progress," *The Economist: A Survey of Europe* (London), October 23, 1999.

37. For example, tensions within France over (largely) Maghreb immigrants. Or the strain placed on welfare systems throughout Europe, but most pronounced, perhaps, in Germany that has generated a nationalist backlash against foreigners.

38. For instance, The Treaty of Paris (1990), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) (1990), and the several Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) regimes.

39. A copy of the Helsinki Final Act can be found at <http://www.mygale.org/04/fogazzid/politics/padania/helsinki.htm>

40. See, for example, "The Cash Don't Work," *The Economist*, December 19, 1998, pp. 98-100.

41. While current conditions differ from the immediate post-World War II period, one cannot help but draw the analogy to the European Recovery (Marshall) Plan. Costs then were significant, but the gains reaped have been uncountable.

42. Indeed, unless deftly handled, perhaps with assistance from the United States, increased disproportionate wealth among states in the region may exacerbate existing tensions.

43. See Antonio Missiroli, "Enhanced cooperation and flexibility in the second pillar: an obstructed path?" in *WEU at Fifty*, Guido Lenzi, ed., Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1998, pp. 35-50.

44. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000*, New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 514-515. These arguments are not new. Walter Lippman made similar ones in *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York: Harper, 1947.

45. Two key capabilities are the ability to project power beyond national and regional areas to reinforce against risks in other regions and the combat support and combat service support capabilities needed to sustain such deployments over time. Command, Control Communications, Computers and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities also will need improvement.

46. See Simon Duke, *The Burdensharing Debate: A Reassessment*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

47. Thomas-Durell Young, *Reforming NATO's Military Structures: The Long-Term Study and its Implications for Land Forces*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 15, 1998.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-16.

49. See, for example, Craig R. Whitney, "At Odds with U.S., France Says No to NATO Role," *The New York Times*, October 2, 1997, p. A4; Joseph Fitchett, "France and U.S. Sidestep Friction," *International Herald Tribune*, October 7, 1997, p. 1; Giovanni de Briganti, "Jospin Reiterates Demands to Alter NATO's Structure," *Defense News*, September 8-14, 1997, p. 12; Young, *Reforming NATO's Military*.

50. USEUCOM, *Strategy of Readiness and Engagement*, 1998. Internet at <http://www.eucom.mil/strategy/98strategy.pdf>, pp. 16-21.

51. USEUCOM, *Strategy of Readiness and Engagement*, p. 18.

52. USEUCOM, "USEUCOM 1998 Posture Statement," n.d., Internet at <http://www.eucom.mil/posture/engagement.htm> pp. 3-5.

53. For details, see "Elements of the EUCOM Strategy," Internet at <http://www.eucom.mil/strategy/elements.htm> pp. 3, 5-7.

54. Specific events and programs are outlined in "USEUCOM 1998 Posture Statement," Engagement Section; USEUCOM, *Element of the*

USEUCOM Strategy, and USEUCOM, "Joint Contact Team Program Background Paper," August 31, 1998, <http://www.eucom.mil/programs/jctp/backgrnd.htm>

55. For specific information on these initiatives, see <http://www.marshall.adns.int/Marshall.html>; USEUCOM, "Joint Contact Team Program Background Paper"; USEUCOM, "USEUCOM 1998 Posture Statement," pp. 6-7; and USEUCOM, "USEUCOM 1998 Posture Statement," pp.9-10, respectively.

56. For the military requirements, see *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 1A*(Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Agreement).

57. For a description of Operation ABLE SENTRY, see http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_b.htm For assessments of the success of UNPREDEP, see, e.g., International Crisis Group, "Macedonia: The Politics of Ethnicity and Conflict," <http://www.intl-crisis-roup.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/mac01rep.htm#2c>; Council on Foreign Relations, "Toward Comprehensive Peace in Southeast Europe, Conflict Prevention in the South Balkans," Executive Summary, <http://www.foreignrelations.org/studies/transcripts/recommend.html>; Sophia Clement, *Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia* Chaillot Papers No. 30, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, WEU, December 1997, pp. 25-26. Examples of PfP activities in the remainder of the Balkans can be found in, for instance, "USEUCOM 1998 Posture Statement," pp. 3-4; and the many PfP documents located at <http://www.nato.int/pfp/pfp.htm>.

58. It is interesting to note that the revision of the manual governing the Theater Engagement Planning process now stresses that shaping should not be carried out at the expense of sacrificing warfighting capability. See, "Theater Engagement Planning," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01, Final Coordinating Draft Revision, August 1999, p. A-1.

59. *Ibid.*

60. Information provided by J-5 Strategy, U.S. European Command, September 1998.

61. See Dennis C. Blair, Memorandum to the Service Chiefs and CINCs, Subject: Implementation of the Unified Command Plan (MCM 24-98), Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 9, 1998, para. 18.

62. The 1999 revision of the Unified Command Plan, effective October 1, 2000, increases CINCEUR's AOR in the Atlantic, particularly the South Atlantic out into the Indian Ocean. See, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-5, *Unified Command Plan (U)*, Washington, DC, September 29, 1999, para. 18.

63. *The Economist* (London), January 15, 2000, pp. 51-52.

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Commandant**

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

**Interim Director
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**Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.**

**Authors
Dr. Stephen J. Blank
Dr. William T. Johnsen
Dr. Thomas-Durell Young**

**Director of Publications and Production
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling**

**Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel**

**Composition
Mrs. Christine A. Williams**

**Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler**