

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

Volume 27
Number 4 *Parameters Winter 1997*

Article 2

11-24-1997

A Military Model for Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa

John P. J. Brooks

Follow this and additional works at: <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters>

Recommended Citation

John P. Brooks, "A Military Model for Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Parameters* 27, no. 4 (1997), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.1848.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

A Military Model for Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa

JOHN P. J. BROOKS

From *Parameters*, Winter 1997-98, pp. 108-20.

The roots of African political, social, economic, and military instability can often be found in colonial and Cold-War historical circumstance. This has made regional conflict resolution a problem so complex that it defies single-state solutions. The time has arrived, however, when Africans no longer can afford to look to external patrons to settle regional conflicts. Africans are increasingly aware of this change and exhibit a growing determination to solve their own problems.

The recent history of Sub-Saharan Africa is marked more by the existence than by the absence of conflict within and among states. And although a comprehensive method for dealing with these conditions remains elusive, one element of the problem has undergone significant change. With the return of the Republic of South Africa to the family of African nations, the assets and experience of that country can now be considered when seeking new ways to preserve peace in the region.

This article advances a concept for a new model for deterring and settling regional conflicts. The model is based on an analysis of the major source of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa--instability--and on the many conflicts that have occurred despite attempts to settle them. It reflects as well lessons learned by African military forces when confronted with the duties and responsibilities of peacekeeping, whether under the auspices of the UN or of a regional organization. Finally, the potential contribution of South Africa to new forms and functions for conflict resolution can foster new perspectives for governments frustrated by their long-standing inability to deter or resolve ethnic, religious, economic, or politically motivated conflict in the region.

Challenges of Statehood

External powers played a critical role in shaping modern Africa, and this to such an extent that it has been said, "while Africans created and continue to create their own history, they do so under conditions that, in many cases, they do not control." [1] The most dramatic phase of external involvement on the continent began with what is now called "the scramble for Africa" in the 1880s and 1890s. [2] It resulted in the advent of European colonialism and ended, as far as most Africans are concerned, with majority rule in South Africa in April 1994. Many Africans view the legacy of the colonial era as the root cause of the conflict and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa today.

To a degree, this attitude is warranted. Colonialism was inherently (though variably) exploitative. Colonial powers implemented social and economic policies that were generally contradictory to the norms of African life, yet the colonial experience was too short to thoroughly enculturate African populations to European norms. This more or less set the stage for future conflict. After decolonization, Africa was left with artificial political boundaries which in many cases divided homogeneous peoples. Countries that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s were ruled by "assimilated" [3] African elites who were frequently more concerned with their own advancement and their own continued relationship with the former powers than with the political and economic progress of their own people. [4] Stressing unity at the expense of political pluralism, a number of these new leaders adopted an autocratic approach to governing. This, in turn, stifled prospects for a "loyal opposition." Opposition was often brutally suppressed, provoking conflict among opposition parties within the same country. [5]

In conjunction with the political evolution, the colonial powers left behind a region already economically marginalized. This problem was compounded in individual countries by financial mismanagement and poor development strategies. African countries did not have the financial means for development, and frequently lacked leaders with sufficient vision to provide well for the future. This led to the accumulation of vast debt which has been

virtually impossible to service and which in turn has resulted in highly dependent or even collapsed economies.[6]

This colonial legacy--factional politics and unsustainable economies--is what most Africans refer to when discussing their problems. Educated Africans generally believe that "most of the festering regional crises that torment the continent . . . are rooted in one way or another in ill-considered decolonization strategies driven by metropolitan interests." [7]

Despite a modest but encouraging increase in commitment to market economies, transparency in governance, and progressively realistic development strategies, many serious problems afflict Africa today.[8] The most important include very limited resources, unrealistic expectations and lack of opportunity, nationalist and secessionist aspirations, inept or oppressive leadership, and proliferation of arms. Massive urbanization overwhelms national abilities to generate employment and can lead to illegal immigration to what some perceive as greener pastures. In extreme cases, these problems have led to "failed states." [9]

Other problems that will adversely affect Africa in the 21st century include environmental degradation, an increasing incidence of AIDS, the possible large-scale increase of drug marketing, and the fact that the continent is prone to natural disasters and to endemic diseases. These problems by themselves are not conducive to stability; when added to the aforementioned political and economic heritage, the mixture becomes volatile. And unfortunately, violence has a considerable precedence on the continent. The fact that independence was won by many Africa countries through armed struggle reinforces a tendency to resort to arms to solve problems.

Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa

Parts of the Sub-Saharan region of Africa have been subjected to conflict almost continuously during the post-colonial era. The first case of significance occurred in the former Belgian Congo. Belgium, the colonial metropole, was unwisely persuaded to grant independence in mid-1960 without any substantive preparation of the small national elite for its new role.[10] At the same time, Belgium sought to retain control of much of the colony's economic infrastructure. The result at independence was immediate breakdown of order, which led to chaos.

The UN deployed a force to try to preserve a fragile national integrity, which proved to be an extremely difficult task. While the initial mandate given UN forces was to help the central government, during its first year there were as many as four governments claiming legitimacy, each faction backed to some degree by outside powers that were equally at odds.[11] The UN force, despite all these difficulties, eventually put down the separatist attempts, and held the Congo together. Success, which came at a very high cost in civilian and military lives, also cost about \$2 billion to support the deployment of nearly 20,000 UN military personnel over a four-year period.[12]

Partly as a result of the "Congo experience," the UN shied away from deploying armed military forces for purposes of peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa until 1989, when it became involved with the transition to independence in Namibia.[13] In the interim, Pan-African efforts at conflict resolution had shifted to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was established in 1963 to deal with conflicts on the African continent. The Africans had to use their own means, which were extremely limited, to give substance to operations supported by the OAU. In its one major attempt at peace operations (Chad, 1980-81) the OAU proved entirely unequal to the task.

There are many continuing situations of instability on the African continent, and if current trends prevail, prospects for long-term tranquillity in many areas seem bleak. For instance, in Guinea-Bissau, opposition to the current government is becoming more militant, which has contributed to rising tensions with Senegal. In Nigeria, an increasingly vociferous (though brutally suppressed) opposition is trying to organize international sanctions against a seemingly interminable military regime. Sadly, though realistically, genocide and civil war in Burundi remain equally interminable prospects. Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), has not stabilized after the Kabila takeover to the extent where peace prevails. Current political infighting creates the potential for possible further upheaval in this war-ravaged country. In Sierra Leone the civil war continues.[14] And no one can predict with any degree of assurance what other conflicts that have been suppressed for now will erupt into violence without much warning.

All those interested in peace in the region--Africans, the UN, other nations--should take serious cognizance of the potential for continued regional instability. In light of this conclusion, it makes sense to refine existing conflict

resolution mechanisms, particularly those of the UN and regional organizations, in preparation for renewed conflict. Past and current efforts at conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance should provide relevant lessons for those who would improve the political, economic, and social conditions of many in the region. Such an analysis is the essential prerequisite for designing a military model that could support future conflict resolution measures.

Challenges of Regional Peace Operations

Sub-Saharan African military personnel have participated as observers and staff officers during United Nations peace operations throughout the world.[15] Additionally, African countries have been willing participants in peace operations in Africa and elsewhere, all of which, whether successful or not, have provided a wealth of experience in both troop deployments and the conduct of peace support and humanitarian relief operations.

Africans have, of course, encountered a variety of problems in conducting peace operations. Many of these have been identified; some were cited by participants in a South African Institute of International Affairs conference held in July 1995.[16] The problems encountered by African peacekeepers while conducting operations outside of Africa are both similar to and different from those experienced while on operations on the continent itself. Both categories are pertinent here, since Africans will continue to conduct both varieties. Operations outside the continent have highlighted problems such as these:

- . Africans engaged in peace operations have often concluded that they were treated by partners from other contingents as second-rate soldiers.[17] Consequently, international organizations have tended to deny Africans substantial leadership roles in multinational peace operations, and whether provided by other organizations or by their own countries, Africans have deemed logistic support provided them as inferior.[18]

- . Lines of communication from African countries to their contingents deployed abroad are always a problem. The longer the lines, the more costly the operation becomes, especially when sizable forces are deployed. Apart from the Africans' unfamiliarity with natural and cultural environments outside of Africa, social aspects such as feedback to one's own country, mail, and remuneration are always affected adversely. As is true of leaders everywhere, African leaders are always concerned with explaining to their own people casualties, mission creep (where this leads to protracted deployments), and ambiguous mandates.[19]

- . The biggest challenge that Africans face is the perception that multinational organizations may abandon them when a situation appears to be taking a turn for the worse.[20] Africans recognize the risk entailed in reliance on other organizations for financial and logistics support, and they fear the possibility that they could be left to their own devices in a dangerous situation.

One could reasonably argue, therefore, that Africans should preferably be deployed in peace operations only on their own continent, where they will be closer to home and will find themselves in a more familiar environment.[21] However, serving on their own continent is not without its own array of problems:

- . Economic decline is the rule rather than the exception in the region. Africans frequently encounter a "mismatch between desired ends and available means or resources to achieve them." [22] The charter of the OAU makes substantial provision for conflict resolution,[23] and sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have now included regional security in their protocols.[24] All that is lacking is sufficient material resources to support these initiatives. This deficiency can be overcome in part by improved managerial competence within regional and sub-regional organizations. These organizations do receive funds for peace activities; [25] available resources could be used more efficiently and effectively.

- . Cultural differences can affect "the ability of Africans to put aside national and individual prejudices in order to achieve the necessary cooperation." [26] An example is evident in the OAU's first peacekeeping attempt in Chad in 1981. Africans tend to view this effort as a failure because "member states were divided on the mandate." The OAU

lacked funds, which led to the contributing nations supporting their own contingents logistically, which caused the OAU to lose hands-on control of the operation.[27] Africans will have to address this issue comprehensively if future efforts at cooperation are to succeed. Dynamic leaders with considerable international credibility (such as Nelson Mandela of South Africa), are now emerging on the African continent; the solution to this problem lies firmly in their hands.

. Lack of interoperability and poor serviceability of equipment, lack of uniform peace-operations doctrine, and varying standards of expertise and performance among African armed forces can hinder peace operations. These are secondary to the problems mentioned above; once identified for correction, they are relatively easy to overcome. If Africans are correct in their perception that "the Western world is not sensitive to African concerns and affairs," they will have to overcome these problems and become the solution themselves.[28] In this light, it must be said that although Africans have at times been known for their failures, they have achieved much success during their participation in peace operations. There is reason for confidence in African success in the future.[29]

Effective military operations on the African continent require military contingents that are skilled in specialties such as tracking, anti-mine warfare, low-intensity conflict, and law enforcement activities.[30] This makes African militaries ideal for conducting operations in this environment, since many African military establishments have retained these skills from recent liberation struggles.

It seems reasonable to suggest that one major factor has been absent from efforts to bring about a more stable continent. This factor is the Republic of South Africa, which until recently has been excluded from any intensive interaction with other African countries on this issue. South Africa represents a possible, albeit a partial, alternative to the resource dilemma.

South Africa: The Key?

Before 1994 South Africa was very much isolated from the greater international community, owing to the social policies of the minority-run government. However, on 27 April 1994, when South Africa held its first truly democratic, all-inclusive election and the majority party was voted into power, a new era opened as South Africa was welcomed back into the world and African communities.[31]

The electoral process had barely been completed when the debate was started as to what South Africa's role would be in helping to solve some of Africa's problems. With South Africa having a reasonably strong economic base, at least in comparison to other African countries,[32] and a powerful and proven military machine,[33] the South African potential for good seemed unlimited. This optimism was well-founded for three reasons: established governmental mechanisms were already in place in South Africa; the attitude and approach of the South African government toward other African countries had changed, and the manner in which the international community viewed South Africa had changed.

The new government of South Africa that came to power in 1994 inherited a well-functioning, Western-style administration, and the national economy, although inhibited by sanctions, was stable and much stronger than that of any other African country.[34] The military was well equipped and experienced, and it offered the new government exemplary professionalism, nonpartisanship, support, and loyalty, contributing immeasurably to the smooth transition to majority rule.[35] The South African military establishment has considerable expertise in the African operational environment, and by 1994 it had successfully transitioned into a truly *national* defense force. Its multi-racial, multi-ethnic features have been enhanced and are very relevant to its participation in peace operations in Africa.

The South African government currently pursues a policy of cooperation, transparency, and friendship toward its African counterparts.[36] This is very much evident in the support that the South African government has provided, since 1994, to countries such as Angola, Rwanda, and Mozambique.[37] This foreign policy is clearly articulated in a "South African Draft White Paper on Defence," which states that South Africa will strive to seek defense cooperation with other states as a priority and strengthen security and defense fora in the region where applicable.[38]

South Africa still must solve many domestic problems before the transition is complete. The challenges that it faces

include internal ethnic conflict,[39] threats of secession,[40] land redistribution, integration and rationalization of seven military forces,[41] implementation of housing reform, equality of education, and affirmative action.[42] These problems must be addressed and a firm domestic base established before South Africa can engage effectively in providing aid to the rest of Africa on a large scale.

South Africa, however, is faced with a "Catch 22" situation. It cannot afford to neglect completely activities within Africa while attempting to meet its internal challenges. One authority argues that this condition is based on three key facts.[43] First, the support that South Africa can expect to receive from organizations such as the European Union and the World Bank is influenced by its willingness to cooperate with neighboring countries. Second, instability in the region could exacerbate problems such as illegal immigrants, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking, which would have an obviously negative effect on South Africa. And third, the rest of the world tends to assess South Africa's prospects in the light of trends and events elsewhere in the region. But regardless of whether conditions for regional involvement are the best they could be, South Africa is prepared now to do its part to contribute to regional stability.

A South African Strategy

South Africa would be wise under the circumstances to adopt a two-phased concept for helping the rest of Africa: a short-term strategy that can be applied almost immediately, and a long-term strategy that can be activated after its political transition has been completed.

Short-term activities would convey South Africa's good intentions in Africa to the international community, establish good relations with its African counterparts, and familiarize South Africa with Africa's problems with a view to perhaps alleviating some of them. Short-term support within the region that would not jeopardize its domestic programs could have South Africans:

- Support conflict resolution on the African continent by participating as negotiation and mediation teams with the OAU or with sub-regional organizations.
- Render support and share knowledge and experience in the domain of environmental preservation.
- Participate actively in regional and sub-regional organizations with a view to increasing managerial competence.
- Establish fora in which South Africa can share the experiences of transitioning to a democracy with other nations in Africa that are moving in a similar direction.
- Share technology in the fields of medicine, mining, agriculture, and veterinary science.
- Conduct military assistance training programs, with the proviso that assistance would have to be provided in such a manner as to not jeopardize South Africa's own ongoing military integration process.
- Foster selective military weapon system and equipment sales at reasonable prices and then only in support of the peace effort on the continent.

With these support mechanisms in place in the short term, South Africa would signal its commitment to regional conflict resolution and would give substance to the proposed "peace operations" model described below.

The Long-Term Strategy

While it is far too soon to try to predict all aspects of the second phase of South Africa's strategy for helping other African nations, one element of it seems almost self-evident: sponsor a model for military participation in peace operations. A comprehensive model would draw on the lessons learned described above and include military tasks and preparations required before, during, and after deployment in such operations. The need for the model reflects the awareness that:

- Africa has a history of conflict and instability for which there is no end in view.
- There is an increasing willingness among Africans to solve their own problems.
- A number of African countries have extensive experience in peace operations.
- Many factors inhibit Africans in conducting successful peace operations on their own continent, the most pressing of which is a general lack of resources.
- South Africa has the means and can be the catalyst, if so inclined, for successful future peace operations in Africa.

This proposed military model addresses the issue of resources, both financial and human. Financial resources are needed for equipment, remuneration of participants, and operating costs. These financial costs can be covered to a large degree by African countries committed to regional stability by purchasing equipment at reasonably low prices from, inter alia, South Africa;^[44] by acquiring serviceable but compatible, redundant equipment from the United States;^[45] and by managing the funds made available to the OAU and sub-regional organizations more effectively and efficiently than has been possible in the past.^[46] Here, South Africa can play a leading role.

Africa probably should not, however, attempt to maintain a standing peace force, for it could become an extremely expensive proposition, one that could have a variety of negative effects on all involved.^[47] Instead, this model suggests that each country should maintain its own military force, emphasizing training for peace operations so as to be able to contribute effective forces to common efforts. Countries would be scheduled on a rotation basis to have military elements on stand-by, to be able to react rapidly to any contingency. Commitment would be under the authority of the UN and sanctioned through the OAU, ensuring that sufficient human resources would be available at all times. The effectiveness of this system depends on how well five of its component features are designed and managed: preparedness, force structure, training, early warning, and command and control, each of which is discussed below.

"Preparedness" in this model relates to the availability on short notice of personnel and equipment--in effect, to a willingness to maintain personnel and materiel at the state of readiness required for rapid deployment in a crisis. The question of resources is a difficult issue with few totally satisfactory solutions to the personnel, materiel, and financing needed to develop and sustain the model. Once resources have been made available, however, it will be possible to prepare to respond to ongoing and future conflicts.

In terms of force structure for the model, a light infantry brigade should suffice as a rapid deployment force that could manage most conflicts in their initial stages. Equipment for a brigade would be broken down into sets for three battalions (each having its own headquarters) and a brigade headquarters. This equipment would be positioned and preserved in four different countries in Africa, making any conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa accessible to at least a battalion-sized force on short notice. Equipment sets for one of the three battalions could be located in east Africa, west Africa, and southern Africa respectively. The equipment for the brigade headquarters would be located at a fourth location, where it would be maintained and readily accessible to the strategic lift needed to transport it.^[48]

The initial force authorized and employed by the OAU to contain a conflict would use the equipment stored at the positioning point closest to the conflict. Should the need arise, this force would be supplemented by others using the remaining designated sets of equipment. The success of the process rests on maintaining and replacing this equipment to ensure preparedness. Managing this effort should become the responsibility of the conflict resolution cell of the OAU, although considerable additional structuring would be required before that entity could effectively perform such a role.

While attention to equipment and personnel are important, this plan also requires intensive peace operations training. Training would be divided into two categories: training within the armed forces of each participating country and combined training involving regional authorities and forces of several countries. Individual country training is the responsibility of each national command authority and will not be addressed here. Combined training in peace operations, however, is of paramount importance to success. Uniformity of doctrine is essential during multinational operations, which will be the form of most future peace operations in Africa. Various authorities have considered and advocated the establishment of a Pan-African Peace Training Center, a measure that would enhance the ideas offered here.^[49]

A further useful development would be an "African Peace Operations Council" comprised of instructors drawn from all the major military colleges and academies in Africa. Such a council could periodically meet to set up uniform doctrine, ensure that all the militaries follow common doctrine during their training, work through lessons learned during peace operation deployments, and revise the doctrine if necessary. The chairmanship of this council could rotate among participating countries. This measure may be less costly than a more permanent system.

Early warning of an impending crisis is the fourth essential feature of the model. If availability of resources, meaningful training, and professional preparedness are to bear fruit, then it is imperative that an effective early warning

system be put in place. The military component of the OAU's conflict resolution cell should set up an information center at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and use a variety of means to collect and analyze information and keep OAU management informed daily of developing problems. Useful sources include selected military attachés, sub-regional organizations and their security cells, and even the intelligence services of various countries if they are accessible. Admittedly, constructing such a capability will be an enormously complex, difficult, and unprecedented task. It will take time and much patience to build it, but its potential usefulness is so great that the effort is inherently worthwhile.

An important characteristic of an early warning system is to have forces available to deploy for peace operations on very short notice. To meet this objective, the OAU should negotiate the establishment of a stand-by duty roster with member countries. Countries could be asked on a rotating basis to place on permanent alert a maneuver force of battalion strength, prepared for deployment within a specified time. Support elements could be scheduled in the same manner. A brigade headquarters would be assembled by the OAU when and if the need arose.

The most significant aspect of scheduling would be to keep track of all available military transport aircraft in Africa so as to be able to move peacekeeping forces expeditiously. This requirement implies maintaining contact with regional civilian air fleets and external patrons with military airlift capabilities that could be leased if necessary. Establishing and maintaining these agreements and the readiness information itself would be another task of the OAU-based information center.

The last issue to be addressed by the proposed model is that of command and control. It is imperative that the UN sanction all peace operations undertaken on African soil to lend legitimacy to the operations. The model suggests that the OAU, under the auspices of the UN, will always assume direct responsibility and authority for such operations. The OAU can authorize sub-regional organizations such as SADC and ECOWAS to conduct these operations on behalf of the OAU.

The model assumes that the OAU would never divorce itself completely from any African peace operation, because it is the only organization that represents the entire continent. Military commanders would be appointed by the OAU, and these commanders in turn would be responsible to report back to the OAU directly, or via the sub-regional organization when that is the applicable sponsor. The OAU, in turn, would keep the UN informed as to the status of the peace operation. This link is extremely important, especially if additional external support is needed, which the UN would be able to authorize.

Conclusion

Sub-Saharan Africa faces many difficult challenges which often lead to conflict. The latter, in turn, produces tremendous human suffering. External powers are not likely to offer substantial assistance in the future for conflict resolution; indeed, they have been exhibiting increasing "donor fatigue." Africans realize this and are willing to deal with their problems themselves. However, they lack the resources and the structures to solve many of the problems. While it is unlikely in the intermediate future that Africans will find sufficient resources without at least some outside assistance, there are ways in which existing means could be adjusted for greater effectiveness in conflict resolution.

The Republic of South Africa, recently welcomed back into the African family of nations after years of pariah status, may have the potential to alleviate some of the resource problems. Although South Africa still has many domestic issues to resolve before it can provide large-scale assistance, it can provide limited support almost immediately. This may be sufficient to encourage Africans to conduct their own peace operations on the continent. In the long term, resources which South Africa brings to the community could support the model for peace operations outlined here.

The proposed model addresses only the military component of peace operations. The premise is that if resources, adequately trained forces, preparedness, early warning, and (above all) command and control are used effectively, then the model has the potential for early and successful military responses to conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa.

1. See Thomas O'Toole, "The Historical Context," in April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon, eds., *Understanding Contemporary Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 21.
2. See Crawford Young, "The Heritage of Colonialism," in John W. Harbeson and Donald S. Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 23.
3. This concept was used especially by the French and Portuguese. They gave selected local elites of their colonies the opportunity to be educated in return for their loyalty to the colonial masters. Many of these elites found themselves in power in their respective countries upon decolonization.
4. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "The Political Economy of African Personal Rule," in David Ernest Apter and Carl Gustav Rosberg, eds., *Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1994), pp. 292, 296.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 300-02.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
7. Young, p. 24-25.
8. Evidence of this is seen in countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, South Africa, Senegal, and Namibia. Although these countries face many challenges, they are moving in a positive direction as can be deduced from a brief overview in *Africa Confidential*, 19 January 1996, p. 3.
9. Two current examples of this phenomena are Liberia and Somalia, where UN and regional (OAU) and sub-regional (ECOWAS) peace and humanitarian operations have failed, to date, to restore a climate conducive to reconstruction, reconciliation, and development. See also Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," *Parameters*, 26 (Spring 1996).
10. See William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo," in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 316.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 330-31.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 348.
14. *Africa Confidential*, 19 January 1996, p. 3.
15. See Dan Henk, *Africans and Peace Operations: Views From Southern and Eastern Africa* (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, 1996), pp. 2, 8. Examples include Ghana during United Nations Emergency Force 2 in the Sinai; Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia during the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group in the Middle East and, except for Zambia, again during the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission; Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, and Mali during Operation Des Nations Unies Au Congo in the Congo; and Congo, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe during the United Nations Angola Verification Mission 2/3 in Angola. Other peace operations that have been extensively supported by Africans are those conducted in Liberia (solely African), Somalia, Rwanda, and Mozambique.
16. Henk, pp. 30-36. See also the address delivered by Lieutenant Colonel Katumba-Wamala of Uganda to the South African Institute of International Affairs conference on "South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa," July 1995. The address was entitled "The Concept of Peace-Keeping Operations in Africa."
17. See Henk, p. 32.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

19. Ibid., p. 30.
20. Ibid., p. 34.
21. The author, a South African military officer, has had the experience of operating with indigenous Africans in different regions. It is his observation that such soldiers performed well wherever they operated or were deployed. The author further contends that it is his experience that Africans generally "understand" Africans.
22. Henk, p. 10.
23. See *The Charter of the Organization of African Unity*, Article XIX.
24. Katumba-Wamala, p. 4.
25. See the address entitled "Africa Programs in the FY 1996 Budget: Protecting Long-Term U.S. Interests," by George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, which was delivered before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee in Washington, D.C., 28 March 1995. The address appeared in the *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, 17 (Summer 1995), 71-80.
26. Henk, p. 48.
27. Katumba-Wamala, p. 6.
28. Henk, p. 8.
29. Ibid., p. 4.
30. Ibid., p. 46.
31. See the preface by the President of South Africa in the manual *National Symbols of the Republic of South Africa*, 1995, p. 2.
32. See manual compiled by the Economics Division, Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, *South Africa: An Economic Profile*, 1993, p. 5.
33. See Steven Metz, "Pretoria's Total Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare in Southern Africa," *Comparative Strategy*, 6 (No. 4, 1987), 448-58.
34. With the ending of *apartheid*, the new government found itself in control of a country richly endowed with mineral resources and with a well-established industrial base which, although inhibited by international sanctions, had already positioned itself to some degree in the international environment.
35. See Steven Metz and Kent H. Butts, *Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa* (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), p. 6.
36. See *Africa Confidential*, 25 August 1995, p. 3.
37. See Corlize Viljoen, "It's All About Supporting Peace," *Salut*, September 1996, p. 25.
38. See *Draft White Paper on National Defense for the Republic of South Africa*, 21 June 1995, pp. 5-6.
39. There is still, at the time of this writing, ethnic conflict occurring in the Republic of South Africa, and especially in the Kwazulu-Natal region.
40. This refers to the periodic threats from the Inkhata Freedom Party, which currently controls the province of

Kwazulu-Natal, to secede from the rest of the Republic of South Africa.

41. The military forces to be integrated into the new South African National Defence Force (and then rationalized) are the old South African Defence Force; the militaries of the four independent states (only recognized by the Republic of South Africa) of Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, and Ciskei; and the liberation armies of the African National Congress (Umkonto Wi Sizwe) and the Pan-African Congress (Azanian Peoples Liberation Army).

42. Affirmative action is one of the natural steps to be taken to correct the inequalities of the *apartheid* system.

43. See E. Leistner, "Prospects of Increasing Regional Cooperation: A South African Perspective," *Africa Insight*, 25 (No. 1, 1995), 1.

44. South Africa has a sophisticated weapons industry. The author believes that South Africa would want to support peace operations in Africa.

45. Specifically, equipment made available through the US military's "Excess Defense Articles" program and policy.

46. This refers to organizations such as the UN and the European Union, and countries such the United States and others that have an interest in Africa.

47. A National Peacekeeping Force, comprising elements of all the military and police forces prevalent in the country at the time, was established in South Africa in 1993. The idea behind this concept supposedly was to provide a neutral security force to aid the transition to majority rule. It was a failure and resulted in this force being disbanded before the transition. The author is of the opinion that the flaws in that force will be inherent in any standing African force.

48. The site and the necessary equipment for such an organization are already available. Exercises regularly held there could be used in an integrated fashion to train all potential African Brigade staff officers.

49. See Metz and Butts, p. 36.

Lieutenant Colonel John P. J. Brooks, a permanent force officer in the South African National Defence Force, is a 1994 graduate of the South African Army Senior Command and Staff Course and a 1996 graduate of the US Army War College. His military speciality is in the airborne domain; he commanded the 1 Parachute Battalion Group (South Africa) and served on the staff of 44 Parachute Brigade (South Africa) as the Staff Officer Grade 1, Operations. His latest appointment is as a member of the Directing Staff of the South African Army College.

Reviewed 24 November 1997. Please send comments or corrections to carl_Parameters@conus.army.mil