Opening Pandora's Box: Ethnicity and Central Asian Militaries

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FOREWORD

Studies on ethnicity and the armed forces flourished during the Soviet era, but relatively little attention has been paid to the issue within the successor states. The republics of Central Asia are ostensibly ethnic—they are named after the “titular” ethnic group that supposedly predominates in each. But, in truth, they are artificial creations, the product of Soviet gerrymandering and various waves of ethnic emigration.

A major facet of nation-building in Central Asia has been the development of republican armed forces independent of the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The mission of the Central Asian regimes is to create new national institutions such as the armed forces that can accommodate and integrate the various ethnic compositions. Each republic has had varying success in this process, in part because of the relative weight of various ethnic mixtures, but also because of the heritage of Soviet ethnic politics.

The author examines whether ethnic consciousness affects military service and the specific roles played by ethnic groups within the armed forces, or if military institutions affect ethnicity. The Soviets used military service as a tool to break down ethnicity and create a “New Soviet Man.” They failed. Do Central Asian armed forces break down ethnic divisions and serve as a vehicle for social integration or do they reinforce ethnic consciousness within minorities and therefore sharpen ethnic polarization? Ethnicity tore the Soviet Union apart. Can the Central Asian states avoid that fate? Will their military forces help or hinder that process? Can the U.S. armed forces, which have a well-merited reputation for managing diversity, provide a role model to help promote stability in this increasingly important, energy rich, region?

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SUMMARY

Race. Ethnicity. Religion. The decade following the collapse of the Soviet bloc has not witnessed the creation of a New World Order, but a New World Disorder in which conflicts involving race, ethnicity, and religion have resulted in the deaths of over one million people. Breaking the constraints of totalitarianism has opened a Pandora's Box around the world. Early fears that the Central Asian states also would fall victim to ethnic hatred have so far largely proved false. But Central Asia is a region of great wealth and great instability—more so following recent victories by Afghanistan's radical Taliban which shares a religious and ethnic heritage with many of its northern neighbors.

Ethnicity is defined as the basis for groups whose membership is determined by ties of kinship, language, religion, race, or culture. Supposedly the Central Asian states are ethnic creations, named after the “titular” majority, e.g., Kazakhs in Kazakhstan. But that is a false illusion. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan did not exist prior to the drawing of Soviet republican boundaries. Their independence in 1991 was just as artificial—the result of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the birth of sovereign states from internal Soviet administrative boundaries. As a result, each was faced with the immediate tasks of identifying its national identity and nation-building.

This study examines the impact of ethnicity on the armed forces of the Central Asian states by first summarizing the ethnic composition of the five new republics, then examining the legacy of Soviet ethnic policy upon Central Asia. It then considers ways in which different newly-independent states have created their military institutions and handled the issue of ethnicity within their armed forces. Finally, it examines the possible role the
United States can play in assisting the armed forces of Central Asia to learn how to manage diversity and thus promote stability in this energy rich, but inherently unstable, region.

The “nation-states” of Central Asia suffer from the dysfunction that occurs when territorial and ethnic boundaries do not coincide. All five republics are the artificial creations of Soviet cartographers who deliberately cut across nationalities to generate ethnic tensions, to make each republic a sort of Matreshka-doll with minorities inside minorities—all dependent on Moscow. Thus, the new republics created with the breakup of the Soviet Union reflect the tension between nation-building and self-determination—between making do with the hand dealt you and trying to reshuffle the deck.

“Making do” means trying to create viable armed forces from the remnants of Soviet forces stationed within the boundaries at independence. “Making do” means trying to create a professional officer corps to reflect the titular nationality for which the state was named (e.g., Uzbeks in Uzbekistan) when the officer corps inherited at independence was not just “predominantly” Slavic, but uniformly Slavic. “Making do” means overcoming the Soviet heritage of ethnic stereotype and discrimination and the hatreds fostered during outbreaks of violence in the waning days of empire. “Making do” means trying to identify a historical military heritage to build upon. “Making do” means trying to recruit, train, house, feed, and field armed forces with Soviet leftovers. “Making do” means trying to succeed at ethnic integration when a richer, more centralized, and more powerful Soviet Union failed.

But the Central Asian states do not necessarily have to “make do” on their own. This region is becoming increasingly more important to the United States, both in terms of access to its energy and mineral resources and in securing stability in a central core around which regional powers such as Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey (and destabilizing
regimes such as the Taliban) jockey for position. Alleviating ethnic tensions within the armed forces of the Central Asian states and helping them manage diversity, therefore, is of great importance to the United States. The U.S. armed forces, by providing a successful model for that process and engaging these forces during their formulative period, can promote regional stability.

Ethnic politics may yet tear apart the Central Asian republics as it has many of their neighbors (and the Soviet Union). Whether the Central Asian states can prevent ethnicity from shaping or distorting their armed forces will be a key indicator of their ability to manage diversity within society as a whole. Whether the Central Asian states can ultimately use the military as a force for social integration will reveal their ability to create tools to shape their own future.
OPENING PANDORA'S BOX?
ETHNICITY AND CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARIES

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union created five new republics in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. They were ill-prepared for independence. Each possessed executive and legislative institutions (to include a Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as ostensibly self-standing republics voluntarily formed into a larger union, but there was no republican-level military framework, and local economies were all subordinate to centralized planning and direction from Moscow. Each state, therefore, was immediately faced with the serious business of nation-building.

The “nations” of Central Asia had no tradition of statehood prior to their creation by Stalin in the 1920s and 1930s. Each Soviet Socialist Republic was named after one specific (supposedly predominant) ethnic group, but in reality, as a result of centuries of transmigration, the republics instead bore a decidedly multi-ethnic character. Moscow’s attempts to create a “Soviet” identity which transcended ethnicity, nationality, and religion failed. When Boris Yeltsin unleashed and encouraged ethnic nationalism to wrest central power from the Communist Party, he succeeded instead in destroying the Soviet Union and breaking it along ethnic lines. Thus, as the new states try to come to grips with their own identity, each struggles to build institutions that integrate and assimilate often antagonistic ethnic groups. The armed forces are particularly affected by this process.

Studies flourished during the Soviet era on ethnicity and the armed forces, but relatively little attention has been paid to the issue within the successor states. Ethnicity (here
defined as the basis for groups whose membership is determined by ties of kinship, language, religion, race, or culture) interacts with other sources of identification—gender, class, occupation, locality, and institutional affiliation—to produce the complex social and political fabric of the new republics. Ethnicity is passive, like gender or race. When cognizance of ethnic background becomes a vital part of self-identity, ethnicity is elevated to ethnic consciousness. When ethnic consciousness becomes an active factor in decisionmaking, it then becomes ethnic politics. Ethnic politics is reflected within Central Asia in four main areas: between Moscow (which has appointed itself defender of diaspora Russians living outside Russia's borders) and the new republics; among the five republics; among ethnic groups within each republic; and among individuals in their neighborhoods, schools, military units, and workplaces.

The issue of ethnic politics and the armed forces can be considered from two perspectives. How does ethnicity influence the armed forces? Does ethnic consciousness affect military service or the specific roles played by ethnic groups within the armed forces? On the other hand, how have military institutions affected ethnicity? Are the armed forces a tool to break down ethnic divisions or a vehicle for social integration? Or do they reinforce ethnic consciousness within minorities and therefore sharpen ethnic polarization? The military can play a variety of negative or positive roles when the state is playing ethnic politics—as an integrating institution, as a force to suppress ethnic unrest or secession, as a participant in unrest, or as a political force to intervene in civilian politics (especially if its ethnic composition does not mirror that of the existing regime).

This study examines the impact of ethnicity on the armed forces of the Central Asian states by first summarizing the ethnic composition of the five new republics, then examining the legacy of Soviet ethnic policy upon Central Asia. Next, it considers ways in which differ-
ent newly-independent states have created their military
institutions and handled the issue of ethnicity as it relates
to their armed forces and explores the use of armed forces as
a tool of ethnic politics. Finally, it discusses the implication
to the United States of ethnicity within Central Asian
armed forces and suggests ways in which the U.S. military
can engage these forces and help them to learn how to
manage diversity.

THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF
THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

The “nation states” of Central Asia suffer from the
dysfunction that occurs when the territorial boundaries and
ethnic boundaries do not coincide. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan did not exist
prior to the drawing of Soviet republican boundaries. Before
that the mass of Central Asians distinguished themselves
mostly as urban versus rural, nomadic versus sedentary,
Turkic-speaking versus Persian-speaking, or by the clan
they belonged to:

To a great extent, drawing the boundaries for the five
republics “created” the peoples for whom they were named,
mandating new ethnic identities that earlier had been only
one part of the many ways members of various Central Asian
tribes had identified themselves and their kin. Closely related
nomadic families who had differed from one another primarily
in the manner of their migrations suddenly received passports
that identified them as “Kazakhs” or “Kyrgyz,” and found
themselves living in neighboring republics. Similarly sedents
who farmed in essentially the same way but spoke Turkic or
Persian dialects at home now became “Uzbeks” and “Tajiks,”
respectively. All these peoples had small national elites for
whom national identity was primary, but they were in a clear
minority. . . .

Since no nation-states existed in the centuries before
Russian conquest, substantial transmigration of ethnic
groups characterized the region. As a result, major
concentrations of ethnic minorities now reside within
countries other than their titular nation, to include: one million Uzbeks in the Khojent province of Tajikistan, half a million Uzbeks in the Osh area of the Fergana valley in Kyrgyzstan, and 280,000 Uzbeks in the Chimkent region of Kazakhstan; one to two million Tajiks in Samarkand and Bukhara, Uzbekistan; nearly a million Kazaks in Uzbekistan; and roughly eight million (a number daily declining) Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans in the northern part of Kazakhstan. Thus,

Kazakhstan is a Turkic state, but also a Russian one; Tajikistan is a Persian state, but also a Turkic one; Uzbekistan is a Turkic state, but also a Persian one. In the end, all are in fact multinational states, formed from a multinational society that dissolved after its ideology was discredited.

Stalin’s “cartographic exercises” purposefully cut across nationalities, to “divide and conquer”; borders were drawn deliberately to generate internal ethnic tensions, to make each republic a sort of Matreshka-doll with minorities inside minorities—all dependent on Moscow. Central authorities meant these borders as internal administrative control mechanisms; no one dreamed that Soviet Socialist Republics would ever become actual states. As a result, each state claims territory from its neighbors. A sample of ethno-territorial disputes between Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan is provided in the Appendix.

Powerful external forces also complicated the ethnic mix within Central Asia. The region became a wartime dumping ground for exiled nationalities, such as Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Koreans, and Meskhetian Turks. Stalin relocated war industries (and their work forces) from European Russia during the early days of World War II. Khrushchev’s Virgin Land program of the 1950s and Moscow’s systematic immigration of ethnic Slavs (to dilute the titular nationality) after Stalin’s death contributed as well.
A final complication was the strata of well-educated, Sovietized, urban Central Asians who had scaled the Soviet Union’s military, business, administrative, and governmental hierarchy. Educated in Moscow, fluent in Russian but often mute in their mother tongue, the bulk of their adulthood spent outside their home republic, they were the ethnic elite destined to return and build the new nations. But, they were often also the Soviet elite who had the least familiarity with their own homeland.

Turkmenistan.

The ethnic composition of Turkmenistan (population 4.1 million) is approximately 74 percent Turkmen, 7 percent Russian, 9 percent Uzbek, 2 percent Kazak, and 6 percent other.\textsuperscript{11} The main tribal unit is the Ahal-Tekke (with ties to Khorezm and Bukhara in Uzbekistan), which dominates the government. Other groups include the Ersary and Yomut which now interact with fellow tribesmen in Iran and Afghanistan. Russian emigration from Turkmenistan has been much smaller than in other republics, especially among the well-assimilated, second- or third-generation Russo-Turkmen with good jobs in the energy sector. A December 1993 agreement establishing the principle of “dual nationality” sought to ease the fears of ethnic Russians.\textsuperscript{12} But, it is only valid with Russians; it is not accessible to other Central Asian nationalities.

Uzbekistan.

The ethnic composition of Uzbekistan (population 23.4 million) is approximately 71 percent Uzbek, 8 percent Russian, 4 percent Tajik, 4 percent Kazak, 4 percent Tatar, and 9 percent other (including 2 percent Karakalpak).\textsuperscript{13} People declaring themselves “Uzbek” also include subcommunities of Kipchaks and Kuramas.\textsuperscript{14} There has been a steady increase in the percentage of Uzbeks within Uzbekistan; in 1959 they comprised only 62 percent and the Russians 13.5 percent.\textsuperscript{15} Tashkent has declared that
Karakalpakstan is an “autonomous region”; constitutionally it can function apart from the national Uzbek government as long as it complies with Uzbek law. Not content, the Karakalpaks have declared their own sovereignty and more nationalistic elements demand full independence. Samarkand and Bukhara are predominantly Tajik, but were given to Uzbekistan in 1924. The Fergana Valley, divided between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, is also an area where ethnic tensions are high.

Kyrgyzstan.

The ethnic composition of Kyrgyzstan (population 4.7 million) is approximately 53 percent Kyrgyz, 22 percent Russian, 13 percent Uzbek, 2.5 percent Ukrainian, 2.5 percent German, and 8.5 percent other. The three major clans are from Naryb (President Akayev’s home base), Talas, and Osh. Tension exists between the southern clans who resent the northerner’s dominant role in government. But, there is also tension among resident Uzbeks, especially in the Osh region; some have even attempted to establish an autonomous territory in Osh Oblast. The plummeting economy and the collapse of the defense industry which employed many Slavs has caused a sharp exodus in recent years. Net Slavic outmigration from Kyrgyzstan skyrocketed from 2.4 thousand in 1989 to 55.9 thousand in 1992. By 1996, some 200,000 Russians had left. Efforts to accommodate the Russians such as creating a Slavonic University in Bishkek have been unsuccessful. Kyrgyzstan refuses to grant dual citizenship arguing that if Bishkek granted it to one they would have to grant it to all. If Bishkek gave it to Slavs and Germans, then they would have to give it to Uzbeks and Tajiks as well, which “would lead to unpredictable consequences.”

Tajikistan.

The ethnic composition of Tajikistan (population 6 million) is approximately 65 percent Tajik, 25 percent
Uzbek, 3.5 percent Russian, and 6.5 percent other. Tajikistan is the only predominantly non-Turkic Central Asian state. Its people are ethnically related to Persians (Iran) and speak a language similar to Farsi. Tajikistan has two main clans: the (mainly Uzbek) Leninabad-based Khojent group, who border on Uzbekistan and the Fergana valley, and the Kurgan-Tyube-Kulyab clan from along the southern border with Afghanistan. There are now more ethnic Tajiks across the border in Afghanistan than in Tajikistan itself. Russian emigration from Tajikistan began before independence; many left after the 1989 law which declared Tajik the state language, including professional and skilled workers. By April 1993, about 300,000 ethnic Russians (or 77 percent of the pre-war Russian population) fled Tajikistan, as the Dushanbe riots, then the civil war, erupted. By 1996 over 450,000 of Tajikistan’s pre-war 560,000 Russians had fled.

Kazakhstan.

Kazaks do not form a majority in their republic, and as a result, the state’s attempts to define its character are more complex. The ethnic composition of Kazakhstan (population 17 million) is approximately 43 percent Kazak, 36 percent Russian, 5 percent Ukrainian, 3 percent German, 2 percent Uzbek, 2 percent Tatar and 9 percent other. Although Kazakhs still retain only a plurality within Kazakhstan, their proportion is increasing as a result of outmigration by other groups; Russians comprised 40 percent of the total population at independence. Their numbers are slowly declining as a result of out-migration; more than 500,000 have left since independence. This is somewhat offset by intra-regional migration of ethnic Russians from other Central Asian states to Kazakhstan. Russians are grouped in the north and in the capital city of Almaty. Nearly half resided in the republic’s capital city and over 95 percent lived in urban areas. The German population in Kazakhstan has almost halved since 1989 when it numbered 958,000. This has been offset to a small
degree by some in-migration of Kazaks from Russia and countries to which Kazaks fled in the 1930s such as Mongolia and Iran; in 1992 alone over 100,000 Kazaks returned.31

The fallout from the December 1986 riots32 had a profound impact on Kazakstani society. While the original demonstration was not anti-Russian, it did mark a watershed in ethnic relations in Kazakhstan. Many felt betrayed that ethnic Russians, including liberal, pro-democracy leaders, did not protest the repression of Kazaks:

This sense of exclusion, rejection, and betrayal was the starting point for a fundamental reappraisal of the ‘great friendship’: the consequences of this shift were not immediately apparent but eventually it led to a distinct divergence between the political interests of the two groups. In the case of the Kazaks, this merged with the growing awareness of ethnic identity, providing the impetus for the emergence of a nationalist trend in public opinion.33

Attempts to define a national identity have become increasingly polarizing as the state waivars on whether to develop a supra-national Kazakstani identity or emphasize the predominance of ethnic Kazaks. The bill on sovereignty, adopted on October 25, 1990, acknowledged the “special position” of the Kazak people. The 1993 constitution guaranteed all citizens equal rights, but specified that the republic was founded on the principle of “Kazak self-determination.” The 1995 Constitution unequivocally designated the territory of the republic as “primordial Kazak land,” pushing Kazak predominance.34 This constitution guarantees full citizenship rights for Kazaks and non-Kazaks alike, but implies that the latter are foreigners, voluntarily settled on Kazak territory, who must accept the norms set by the titular group (Kazaks). Almaty’s continued use of Russian as the “official medium of communication” is a concession to minorities and not an attempt to create a polyethnic “Kazakstani” identity.35
Russians in the “Near Abroad”: Fright and Flight.

The last decade has been marked by the migration of nationalities (especially Slavs and Germans) within Central Asia and to other republics. Ethnic Russians never made up more than 10 percent of the population except in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Large-scale emigration of ethnic Russians to, from, and within Central Asia has occurred since 1992, although the process began as early as 1988-89 when the massacre of Meskhetian Turks in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan led to a voluntary Russian outflow as well.\(^36\)

The flight of European ethnic groups from Central Asia derives as much from perception and expectation as actual persecution.\(^37\) Departing Russians blamed danger from armed conflict, discomfort at living in a newly constituted state that was introducing national legislation that favored the titular nationality over the Russian population, and creeping Islamization as reasons for their departure.\(^38\) Fear of spillover from the civil war in Tajikistan also caused many to flee.

THE SOVIET LEGACY

As each country grapples with creating military forces, it builds upon the mixed legacy of Tsarist, then Soviet, rule in Central Asia: military tradition, a post-war manpower policy of stereotype and discrimination, and outbreaks of violence in the waning days of empire.\(^39\)

Military Tradition.

Military institutions place great value on ceremony and tradition. Armies seek continuity with their military past. Thus, unit colors (flags) bear streamers of past victories. Military schools study the nation’s battles, campaigns, and great captains.
Central Asians may harken back to the glory days of Tamerlane, but their most recent heritage dates from the earliest days of the Bolshevik Revolution. Although many previously-exempt Central Asians (especially Kazaks and Kirghiz) revolted in 1916 when faced with Tsarist conscription, some later did form voluntary military units, such as the auxiliary cavalry “Wild Division” raised from the tribes of Turkmenia and the North Caucasus. During the Civil War, Muslim nationalists raised armed forces which the Red Army sought to neutralize and absorb. As early as January 1918 the Bolsheviks began to create their own Muslim Red Army under Sultan Galiev, estimated at 250,000 men, which fought in Siberia.  

The 1924-25 Red Army reorganization was a major military reform. It created three types of national units: larger “national military divisions,” smaller “ethnic units” that were part of regular formations within the standing army, and reserves organized in territorial divisions of the militia. Stalin was disbanding ethnic units in the late 1930s when the immediate need for manpower during World War II (the Great Patriotic War, 1941-45) mandated the mobilization of ethnic groups that spoke little or no Russian at all. By grouping them into locally recruited units, using their own native language but commanded by Slavic officers, Moscow was able to exploit the same revival of nationalist feelings among non-Slavs and Russians to defend the Soviet state. Titular nationalities comprised a plurality or majority of the unit personnel. As the war progressed and manpower losses (in battle and by desertion) were replaced piecemeal by Slavs from newly-liberated areas, the titular nationality fell to a token amount. The record of some units, such as Kazakstan’s Panfilov Division, was quite distinguished. Over a million men joined such units; with the end of the war, however, these ethnic units were gradually phased out.

Wartime mobilization plans remained the modern exception to all-Union, polyethnic Soviet divisions. As local reservists rounded out permanent cadres in reserve units,
they provided an overwhelmingly local, ethnic character. Thus, when the Central Asian Military District activated reserve units to invade neighboring Afghanistan in December 1979, many foreign observers were struck by the large Central Asian makeup of the lead elements.\textsuperscript{42}

Regional military history is revamped for modern purposes. Emerging Central Asian armies exploit the Soviet experience of national heroes. New military schools include exhibits of local soldiers awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union within their classrooms. Sometimes judicious editing of facts supports the cause. Therefore, Tamarlane, the Mongol conqueror, is slowly being transmogrified into the First Uzbek to glorify that state’s military past.

**Post-war Manpower Policy.**

Soviet manpower policy after World War II is well documented.\textsuperscript{43} Moscow regarded military service as a tool to socialize ethnic minorities, teach Russian, break down nationalist loyalties, submit troops to political training, and create the “New Soviet Man.”\textsuperscript{44} Ethnic Russians made up barely half of the Soviet population, but they predominated in high technology services (such as the Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Forces) and security forces (such as the KGB Border Guards). Slavs, especially Eastern Ukrainians, dominated the career non-commissioned officer ranks. Slavs also made up nearly 95 percent of the officer corps, although isolated examples of non-Slavic officers reaching general officer rank existed. Combat units included all 120-plus ethnic groups of the Soviet Union, but Central Asians increasingly found themselves segregated in non-combat support units such as construction battalions or internal security forces.\textsuperscript{45} Central Asian minorities suffered through dedovshchina (hazing by senior conscripts) and barracks-slang ethnic slurs.

The consequences of Soviet recruitment practices are evident today:
By definition, recruitment governs composition. Because individual careers may span twenty or thirty years, the composition of a government body is difficult to change without taking drastic, irregular, and sometimes provocative steps. Once heavy recruitment of certain ethnic groups begins, it is likely to continue... The pool of applicants from the group already serving may become larger and better qualified than the pool of applicants from other groups, whose more able members begin to sense better opportunities in other directions. What began as ethnic favoritism is thus sustained... 

Ethnic Conflict in the Waning Days of Soviet Rule.

One of the unexpected (at least to Mikhail Gorbachev) consequences of glasnost' and perestroika in the late 1980s was the outbreak of ethnic violence within the Soviet Union. Inter-ethnic conflict reflects the multitude of individual decisions—individual mechanisms for coping with the stresses and frustration of modern society—that merge in short bursts of frenzy and bloodshed. That spontaneous outbreaks based on ethnic lines should occur was a shock to those who believed the Party line of “internationalism” within Soviet society; it did not suprise non-Slavs who realized that the ethnicity listed in a Soviet passport molded every event in their life. But the pattern of ethnic conflict in Soviet Central Asia soon shifted from spontaneous outbursts to violence with hints of organization.

The first major, reported incident of rioting occurred in Alma Ata (present Almaty), Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), over the replacement of ethnic-Kazak Communist leader Dinmukhamed Kunyaev by Russian Gennady Kolbin in December 1986. Official sources reported three dead (unofficial, but unsubstantiated, sources put the number at over 1000). International attention then shifted to the Baltics and the Caucasus, but a series of ethnic clashes continued in Central Asia which were elevated to pogroms by virtue of their seeming organization and barbarity. Riots broke out in Dushanbe, Tadzhik SSR in February and March 1989. Then came riots in Ashkhabad and Nebit-Dag, Turkmen SSR, in May
In June 1989 Meskhetian Turks, political exiles from Georgia who had settled in the Uzbek side of the volatile Fergana valley, were set upon and murdered by Uzbek mobs, leaving over 200 dead and hundreds injured. Soviet authorities were forced to airlift the remaining 15,000 Meskhetian Turks out of the republic. In June local Kazaks in Novyi Uzen', Kazakh SSR, attacked Caucasian nationals who had long lived in the region. Ethnic tension between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on the Kyrgyz side of the divided Fergana valley sparked a massacre of Uzbek men, women, and children in the ethnic enclave of Uzsen. In 1990 disturbances occurred in Dushanbe, Tadzhik SSR (February); in Buk, Parkent, Andizhan, and Namagan, Uzbek SSR (February, March, May and December respectively); and Osh, Kirgiz SSR (June), leaving over 350 dead and 2,000 wounded.

The causes for the rioting are hotly debated. Yacoov Ro’i argues that many of the riots—if spontaneous from below—were manipulated from above. He contends that they seem to have been largely “aggravated, if not actually instigated by the powers-that-be in Moscow and the republican capitals in an attempt to consolidate their positions and weaken those of their political opponents.” However, the authorities were playing with fire, for “once unleashed, disturbances were not always controllable and could in the final event misfire.” If instigated, the local authorities were playing upon existing tensions and public perceptions of favoritism in housing allocation, employment, and land distribution, in regions faced with land shortages, high unemployment, and problems with water rights.

This bloody heritage has been passed on to the new republics. The Soviets divided the Fergana valley among Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have long-standing disputes over water rights and grazing along their common border, the course of which Tajikistan has refused to ratify by treaty; they even briefly came to blows over border demarcation in the summer of 1989. The influx of refugees from war-torn Tajikistan (and
exiled opposition figures) has exacerbated the tension.

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also dispute the status of the “Uzbek” cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, former centers of Tajik intellectual and commercial life. Tajiks resent being left with the then-backwater town of Dushanbe for their republican capital. In return, many Uzbeks claim Tajiks are simply Uzbeks who speak Persian; indeed the original boundaries drawn in 1924 included Tajikistan as an Autonomous SSR of the Uzbek SSR. Uzbeks have periodically staked claim to all of the Fergana valley, which includes Kyrgyzstan’s Osh oblast and part of the Khojent oblast in Tajikistan. The Uzbeks also argue that part of southern Kazakhstan and eastern Turkmenistan rightly belong to them as well.

This history of ethnic conflict acts as an albatross around the necks of Central Asians. Bloodletting is easier once the threshold has been broken. Victims seek revenge; survivors view their neighbors with suspicion. Ethnic, clan, and subregional tensions lie just below the surface—witness Tajikistan—just waiting for the spark to set it off. As a result, ethnic tensions exist between the Central Asian states at the very time they need to think collectively to safeguard their national security. Ethnic tensions exist between Central Asians when they must work together to form new state institutions, such as armed forces.

**CREATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARIES**

**Creating National Armies.**

Ethnicity becomes a problem when creating national armies. A central issue confronting each Central Asian state is how to develop an officer corps—preferably one that is indigenous—which is loyal to the new regime. Several approaches are possible. First, the new republics can encourage ethnic officers serving abroad to return, take up the new citizenship, and assume leadership positions in the new armed forces. This has limited prospects for success in Central Asia because of the disproportionately small
number of Central Asian military officers, and their scarcity in important specialties and higher ranks.

A second approach is “attestation.” If there are more officers available than needed, the process of eliminating less proficient officers may be used also to eliminate non-citizen (and potentially disloyal) officers. The small number of indigenous officers basically cancels out this method.

A third approach is to train a completely new officer corps to replace the old one. This is a lengthy process that requires the new state to develop, man, and finance local officer training institutions. Most of the new states, therefore, remain dependent upon Russian academies to educate their officer cadres.

Not all states made an effort to alter the ethnic composition of the armed forces upon independence, seeking accommodation for existing minorities (e.g., Russians) while gradually broadening the indigenous ethnic base. These states concede that there is little prospect of forming an indigenous officer corps in the short run and prefer to retain the existing officers.

There are negative aspects to this option: the officer corps may come to resemble a mercenary formation with questionable loyalty and a large gulf may develop between officers and native enlisted personnel. Tension may also develop between the new government and the foreign officers over financing and civil rights. On the other hand, such a mercenary force would hopefully be immune from local political intrigues. Regardless of which option is adopted, the process of developing true professionals will take at least two decades, if not more, as officers just now entering the armed forces rise to senior rank.

Similar problems exist in creating enlisted ranks. An all-volunteer force might allow the republic to man the new armed forces predominantly with the titular nationality, but such a force is cost prohibitive for all the successor states.
of the Soviet Union (to include Russia). Therefore, conscription, drawing from all the ethnic groups in the new republic, must continue. This, unfortunately, puts rival ethnic groups in close quarters where the Soviet tradition of dedovshchina continues—but this time by the titular nationality. \(^6\)

Another prominent factor in creating national forces is that Central Asian forces adopted the Soviet model of what Dr. Jacob Kipp calls “multiple militaries.” In Soviet terms, “armed forces” refers not only to troops subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, but also to a variety of other military forces subordinate to non-Defense agencies, to include internal security forces, borders guards, and president/national guards. They all have a military role, but the Central Asian regimes prefer smaller interior forces as a tool to suppress political and ethnic dissent. As a result, to date the ground forces have avoided this debilitating role. An added advantage is that smaller interior forces can target their recruiting to groups whose loyalty is not in doubt and avoid the ethnic sweep of national conscription. This is a classic compositional technique.

**Compositional Techniques.**

Social scientists examining the process of building new military forces among the newly-independent colonies of Asia and Africa during the last half-century have identified five main compositional techniques used by new armed forces to integrate opponents, segregate supporters, and deploy them accordingly:

Homogenization of the army. Alter the internal composition of the main regular units, especially the officer corps, to achieve ethnic congruence between the officer corps and the regime.

Balance inside the army. Redress unfavorable ethnic ratios within the officer corps by placing divergent ethnic
memberships in close proximity, so that they counterbalance each other.

Balance outside the army. Create wholly new units outside the main regular army units, often outside the army itself, or greatly bolster such units of this kind as already exist (e.g., with an internal security mission).

Foreign forces. Employ foreign forces inside or outside the regular army. Foreign commanders can be positioned at sensitive points ranging from chief of staff to commander of field units. Alternatively, foreign troops can provide personnel for units outside the regular army that serve as a counterpoise to regular forces.

Kinship control. Place close relatives in command of key units, especially those units already packed with troops ethnically akin to the rulers of the regime.62

As each of the new Central Asian states struggled to create republican forces, various adaptations of these techniques are apparent. See Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Size (Square Miles)</th>
<th>Population (Millions)</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
<th>Border Troops</th>
<th>Internal Security Forces</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>447,400</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Central Asian Armed Forces.63

Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan was among the first of the Central Asian states to establish its own armed forces, but within the context of the unified command structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On August 31, 1991, Tashkent declared national sovereignty and the right to defend its own borders. A week later the new President
announced creation of a Ministry for Defense Affairs and appointment of the first Defense Minister—Lieutenant General Rustam Ahmedov, an Uzbek. On January 14, 1992, Uzbekistan assumed jurisdiction over all former Soviet ground, air, and air defense units, formations and installations deployed on its soil, with the exception of those strategic forces retained under the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

But, within six months, Ukraine opted out of the CIS military structure and Russia decided to create its own national forces; the process of creating national forces outside the CIS structure had begun. Other Central Asian states resisted or drug their feet, but Uzbekistan immediately began to throw off the trappings of Soviet rule. The ex-Soviet Turkestan Military District was abolished on June 30, 1992, and its headquarters appropriated for the new Uzbek armed forces. A month later Tashkent created a full-flung Ministry of Defense and brought all military units under its authority. A National Border Guard force took over from the ex-Soviet Central Asian Border Troops District. A National Guard replaced former Soviet Interior (internal security) troops (Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del or MVD). Uzbekistan alone guards its external border (with Afghanistan) without the aid of Russian border troops. Finally, Uzbekistan oversaw the removal of all Russian forces from its territory; the last unit was “deported” to Tajikistan in early 1995.

Creating institutions was easier than producing the cadres to fill them. Few Uzbeks were actually serving in the Soviet Armed Forces and not many of them were actually stationed within Uzbekistan. Even before July 1992, President Karimov had begun the process of recalling ethnic Uzbeks not under contract serving abroad in non-CIS republics (e.g., the Baltic states, Azerbaijan) to return to Uzbekistan and declaring that the remainder of Uzbekistan recruits would serve in the Turkestan Military district, republican MVD troops, National Guard units or perform alternative service locally. Later this “homecoming"
process became even more severe; Uzbeks who continued to serve abroad, even in CIS forces, forfeited their citizenship. Tashkent then limited service to citizens of Uzbekistan. It is the sole Central Asian state which does not allow Russian Federation citizens to serve in its armed forces.

Uzbekistan has embarked on a policy of homogenization of the armed forces. In the short term it is producing a more balanced ethnic mix in the officer corps. With the nationalization of Soviet forces, the Uzbek Army was characterized by a overwhelmingly-Slavic officer corps and predominantly Uzbek enlisted forces. That soon strongly shifted, as a result of Slavic migration, the Uzbek refusal to grant dual citizenship, and a conscious government program to put Uzbek officers in charge. At independence, Russian-speaking personnel comprised 70 percent of the officers corps of the Soviet forces in Uzbekistan. The headquarters of the Turkestan Military District provided a (mostly-Slavic) pool of officers for senior positions; of the 15 generals serving in Uzbekistan in 1992, only 5 were Uzbek. Tashkent acquired senior Uzbek officers by rejuvenating the careers of a group of Uzbek officers whose careers seemingly had dead-ended in the 1980s. For example, Rustam Akhmedov, a lieutenant colonel with 24 years service but shunted aside to Civil Defense, was promoted to Uzbek major general and appointed Defense Minister. Russians appointed as deputies (including the Army Chief of Staff) monopolized officer positions in the short term, but within a year, appointments became more balanced. Ethnic Slavs who remained accepted Uzbek citizenship.

It will take time to create an indigenous officer corps at all ranks, but Tashkent was fortunate that three major Soviet educational institutions (the Tashkent Higher All-Arms Command School, the Tashkent Higher Tank Command School, and the Samarkand Higher Military Automobile Command), four military lyceum prep-schools, and the Tashkent Special Military Gymnasium (Internat) were located in Uzbekistan. In 1993 Uzbekistan began its own air cadet training program with a group at the
Tashkent Combined Arms School. Now there is an Air Academy at Ozizak. In 1994, Uzbekistan established in Tashkent the new Armed Forces Academy, a joint institution to train officers for brigade- and corps-level command and staff assignments. It is the first such institution in Central Asia, and reflects Tashkent’s decision to forego sending its officers to Russia for advanced military training.

Within the Uzbek military (and society as a whole), the Uzbek “national” language is slowly gaining ground. For example, Uzbek is now a requirement for non-Uzbek speakers at the Tashkent Combined Arms School. However, Russian remains the military language of instruction and command and control. Part of the difficulty is that military manuals are in Russian, and it is too difficult and expensive at this stage to translate them. Also, many Central Asian Turkic languages simply lack the vocabulary for military operations.

As Uzbekistan has distanced itself from Russia and junior officers move up in rank, it is expected that preference for Uzbek officers will become increasingly common. Such officers should support President Karymov. They are not bound to him by kinship ties per se, but by personal bounds of loyalty because they owe their position in the new regime to him.

**Kyrgyzstan.**

Bishkek originally made little effort to establish a national force, giving strong support to the CIS unified command movement and relying on Russia’s 40th Army (headquartered in Almaty) to fund ex-Soviet forces in Kyrgyzstan. During the early months Kyrgyzstan continued to call up conscripts to serve in the CIS unified forces; a March 1992 agreement with Russia allowed approximately 70 percent of Kyrgyz recruits to serve “in the territory of other republics.” The law “On Military Service” stated that 1992 draftees would serve only in “strategic
forces” deployed in Russia; service outside Kyrgyzstan would be on a contractual basis.\(^73\)

Kyrgyzstan eventually created national forces, but not of its own free will. According to one official, “in May 1992 Akayev received a telegram from [CIS Defense Minister] Shaposhnikov telling him to take control of the forces on Kyrgyz territory because the center would no longer pay for them.”\(^74\) On May 29, 1992, President Akayev issued a decree setting up the Kyrgyz Army, using a Soviet motorized rifle division (MRD) stationed in Osh as the core. Only a year later, on August 18, 1993, did Bishkek announce the creation of a Kyrgyz General Staff.\(^75\)

Bishkek’s primary military problem is cadre, both enlisted and officer. Once the unified command concept collapsed, Kyrgyzstan set up regulations to create a conscript force of nearly 20,000—a target it has not been able to meet. Within a year it was apparent that these plans were overly ambitious, especially because Bishkek could not finance such a force following the collapse of the Kyrgyz economy. Today’s conscript force consists of 14,000 men. Life in the ranks is arduous. Impoverished Kyrgyz recruits lack food and clothing; some even risk starvation. Bullying in the barracks continues. No longer the predominant ethnic group, Kyrgyzstan-born Russian conscripts face the same type of harassment they used to inflict on Kyrgyz. If discipline collapses in the barracks, ethnic tensions, especially among those who have already come to blows such as the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, threaten to destroy unit morale and cohesion. Is it any wonder that parents do not want their sons to join the armed forces and draft dodging and desertion flourish?\(^76\)

Serious problems also confront the officer corps. The Kyrgyz are the second smallest titular population; they make up barely half of Kyrgyzstan’s population. Like the Kazaks, they were a nomadic people and did not seek out military careers. Of 4,000 Soviet officers stationed in Kyrgyzstan “at the inception,” about 90 percent were
Russian; not one regimental commander and only one battalion commander were Kyrgyz. Around 1,700 Kyrgyz officers were serving outside Kyrgyzstan in 1991, many of whom returned to serve in the new Kyrgyz forces. But numbers alone do not ensure sufficient experienced veterans for specific ranks and military specialties. Bishkek appointed an ethnic Kyrgyz as its first Defense Minister, but the Chief of the Main Staff was Russian. Additional appointments included experienced Russian and Ukrainian officers, with many Kyrgyz officers appointed to deputy positions.

The Kyrgyz forces have become increasingly homogenized only because efforts to retain skilled Russian officers have not been successful. An interstate treaty allows Russian soldiers to serve in the Kyrgyz armed forces on a contractual basis through the end of 1999. A 1994 agreement enables contract Russians to transfer to Russian or Kyrgyz service “without any obstacles.” But such efforts have failed to halt the hemorrhage of skilled officers following the collapse of the Kyrgyz economy.

Yet, even so, internal tensions have also appeared among those Kyrgyz who make up the officer corps. Press reports have noted within the armed forces the north-south division visible in national politics. Northern officers have been reluctant to serve in the south.

To protect its external borders, Kyrgyzstan has been forced to rely upon “foreign forces.” At independence the “Kyrgyz Border Guards Command” (subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and commanded by a Kyrgyz general officer) administratively replaced the Kirghiz (Kyrgyz) Directorate of the former Central Asian Border Troops district of the USSR KGB. In 1992, when Almaty took over the ex-Soviet Eastern Border District, Bishkek found the Border Troops on its territory were without leadership, support, or even medical supplies. Bishkek appealed to Moscow for help and under an October 1992 bilateral treaty, Russia assumed responsibility for guarding Kyrgyzstan's
borders. A “joint” Kyrgyz-Russian Border Troops Command was established, commanded by a Russian. The Group of Russian Border Guards in Kyrgyzstan (GRBGK) serves Kyrgyzstan, but it is subordinate to the Russian Federal Border Guard Service and Moscow finances 80 percent of its budget. Just as the Roman legions along the Rhine became increasingly Teutonic, so the GRBGK has become increasingly Central Asian. Under recent recruitment, more than 60 percent of the enlisted inductees into the “Russian” border forces are now ethnic Kyrgyz.

Severe financial constraints have forced massive reductions in the size of Kyrgyzstan’s armed forces, yet it is unable to man even those positions with ethnic Kyrgyz. Kyrgyzstan relies upon foreign officers not as a management tool, but because it is incapable of manning its small armed forces domestically. The shift toward a more equal balance between Slavs and Kyrgyz is not part of a systematic program of officer development, but reflects migration of ethnic Russians out of the republic.

**Tajikistan.**

It is difficult to discuss ethnicity within Tajikistan’s military, because indigenous forces are almost nonexistent. Tajikistan’s new armed forces failed to defend the regime, and as a consequence the country has been wracked with civil war and cross border incursions. Failure to produce viable armed forces has resulted in a security policy totally dependent upon the willingness of other states to accept responsibility for Tajikistan and to expend men, money, and materiel to prop it up. The continued existence of the Rakhmanov regime depends upon military support from the Russian Federation and fellow Central Asian CIS members; if the political decision were made to withdraw that support, the regime would likely cease to exist.

The Tajik civil war (May 1992 to early 1993), labeled by many as the work of Islamic fundamentalists, more accurately reflected the domestic conflict between rival
ethnic groups, regions, and clans, for access to political and economic spoils. Over 100,000 perished in the civil war, some 380,000 persons were displaced by the fighting, and 110,000 Tajiks fled across the Amu Darya into Afghanistan. The Dushanbe government survives only because Russia sided with the current regime during the civil war, signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Cooperation with Dushanbe in May 1993, and bases some 22,000 to 25,000 border guards and peacekeeping forces in the republic.

The initial pattern for Tajikistan’s armed forces was similar to that of its neighbors: form a National Guard, establish a National Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) to oversee nationalization of Soviet units deployed in Tajikistan, and create indigenous units. The most significant decision to shape Tajikistan’s early forces was Dushanbe’s declaration that the main Russian force deployed in Tajikistan, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) would not be nationalized to form the basis of the new Tajik Armed Forces. A subsequent visit by Russian Defense Minister Grachev confirmed that the division would not be disbanded or withdrawn, although local recruitment would increase the proportion of ethnic Tajiks and all Russians serving would be on contract. Instead, the 201st MRD would remain in Tajikistan until at least 1999 in support of the Tajik Army.

Without that trained, well-equipped core, Tajikistan was forced to rely on leftovers to form its conventional forces, and leftovers they were. The first sub-units of the new national army which took the oath of allegiance in Dushanbe’s main square on February 23, 1992, were a mixture internal security, local militia (police), and KNB (KGB successor) troops. The first five “battalions” were also unconventional, formed from paramilitary Popular Front volunteers. In June 1992 Dushanbe announced a conscription system, but proclamations could not resolve the real issues stonewalling development of operational forces: a shortage of experienced ethnic Tajik officers and
non-commissioned officers, reliance on Russian training facilities (of the 201st MRD), the inability to enforce conscription, and a nonexistent military doctrine to pull it all together. It also did not solve the most crucial issue: lack of funds to pay for such forces. During the Soviet period, “subsides from the center used to make up at least 50 percent [of the budget], and in some years they were as high as 80 percent.” Without that support, combined with civil war and the exodus of nearly 500,000 skilled Russians, the Tajik economy went into a freefall following independence from which it has yet to recover.

Any real efforts to create a genuine armed forces awaited the appointment of (ethnic Russian) Colonel Alexander Shishlyannikov as Defense Minister in January 1993. A year after independence, Shishlyannikov was still starting from scratch. The government admitted that the call-up of the previous fall “was to all intents and purposes wrecked because of the tense sociopolitical situation.” The army would form anew from another call-up of conscripts and existing Popular Front formations.

Russian assistance helped to create a Tajik Defense Ministry, special purpose troops, internal troops, and a helicopter squadron by early 1994. Shishlyannikov hoped to create a “small, highly mobile, professional and dedicated army,” but without a viable conscript system he had to rely upon troops of the so-called Popular Front of Tajikistan—paramilitary, pro-communist forces raised during the civil war. It was a poor foundation upon which to build. By April 1995, Tajik armed forces, totalling 11,500, were organized into one incompletely-manned spetnaz (special operations) unit, four infantry battalions, and two motorized rifle brigades.

Current forces cannot insure Tajikistan’s security. Therefore, the Rakhmonov regime has come to rely upon two foreign armed forces: the Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan (GRBTT) and the Joint CIS Peace-keeping Force in Tajikistan.
Tajikistan lacks resources to maintain forces along its 2,000-kilometer border. During the CIS Kiev summit in March 1992 Tajikistan confirmed that Russian Border Guards would maintain Dushanbe's borders. In late August 1992 a reorganization of former-Soviet border forces districts occurred and jurisdiction for the “southern border of the CIS” was transferred to the GRBTT. Tajikistan had no border troops of its own until May 1994, when the Tajik Supreme Soviet created a small indigenous “Border Troops of the Republic of Tajikistan” to support the GRBTT. The three border brigades then formed (and a fourth in 1995) are used independently in rear areas and jointly with Russian forces in the mountain regions. Tajik border guards are commanded by Russian officers. Given the choice, however, over 80 percent of Tajik officers and warrant officers choose duty in the Russian border troops because of the better pay.\textsuperscript{95}

The ethnic composition of this force has altered since its formation. After 6 years of local recruitment, the term “Russian” border forces refers more to its chain of command and subordination to Moscow than its ethnic composition. Of the GRBTT's approximately 18,000 men, about 12,000 are Tajik and the remainder made up of some 4,000 Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians and some 2,000 Kazaks, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.\textsuperscript{96}

The second external force to provide security to Rakhmonov's regime is the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan (CCPFT), created under the collective security provisions of the Tashkent accord, to separate warring factions and safeguard the newly appointed coalition government.\textsuperscript{97} The 201st MRD was not part of the originally-designated force and was tasked to guard key installations and military facilities, but was drawn into the CCPFT once the magnitude of the mission and the lack of resources became apparent. It was not until October 1993 that an actual CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force was finally dispatched to Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{98} Limited contingents from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan joined Russian
troops from the 201st MRD; all were commanded by a Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

Ethnic tensions within Central Asia affected the willingness of Tajikistan’s neighbors to send forces to the CCPFT.

The participation of regional powers in peacekeeping . . . is extremely sensitive in Central Asia, where frontiers are often artificial, ethnic groups are divided and deep-rooted rivalries have recently re-emerged. Peacekeeping operations by Central Asian states in neighboring states, in which they might have an ethnic minority or territorial claims, could put further strain on the fragile inter-ethnic relations in the region. Thus, many Tajiks, who, as the only non-Turkic peoples in Central Asia, have a historical fear of being subjugated by the Turkic majority, view with suspicion the deployment of Uzbek or Kyrgyz peacekeeping troops in Tajikistan, particularly in the south. Not surprisingly, the leaders of the other Central Asian states are aware of these ‘nuances’ and are concerned about the possible boomerang effects of meddling in Tajik affairs. 

This use of foreign forces to defend Tajikistan was necessary because Tajikistan also never succeeded in developing an indigenous officer corps or a conscript force to serve under it. The first Chairman of the Defense Committee was an ethnic Russian. As units were gradually transferred to Tajik control, another Russian, Shishlyannikov was named Defense Minister.

The appointment of a non-Tajik to create and control the development of the Tajik Armed Forces was a further indication of the dearth of senior native qualified military commanders in the Central Asian republics on which to build a national command.

At his first meeting with Tajik defense officials, Shishlyannikov discussed the future of 513 ethnic Tajiks serving with other armies of the CIS. They, too, lacked staff and command experience. It was not a big pool to build upon and not all chose to return. The situation did not
improve as civil war engulfed the nation and military operations fell under the sway of the Russian 201st MRD and the CCPFT. “Tajikization” of Russian ground and border units also has drawn Tajik candidates into the better-paid Russian forces.

The distinction between Russian border forces, the Russian 201st MRD, and the Tajik Army remains blurred. Some Russian officers from the 201st MRD have transferred to the Tajik military; an October 1994 agreement provided Russian military advisors to the Tajik Armed Forces. New Tajik recruits since 1993 have been used to boost manpower in CIS (that is, Russian) units on Tajik territory, to include the 201st MRD and border troops. By this means the “Tajikization” of existing Russian units began. This “localization” of the 201st MRD might make eventual withdrawal of “Russian” forces difficult.

Tajikistan, therefore, also relies on foreign troops for its security not as a management tool but because it is incapable of creating a viable indigenous force. It totally depends upon the foreign forces, especially Russian. Tajik forces are trained by the 201st MRD; no domestic educational infrastructure exists. It has no external outlet to bypass Russian authority; Tajikistan is the lone Central Asian state not to join Partnership for Peace. It differs from Kyrgyzstan in that Russian forces are stationed in Tajikistan rather than individual officers on a contractual basis. Therefore, ethnicity issues relate less to inter-ethnic tensions within the Tajik Army, than inter-ethnic tensions of Tajiks serving with foreign forces on its soil or between Tajik forces and Central Asian neighbors sending forces to defend it.

On June 27, 1997, Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov and Sayed Abdullo Nuri, the leader of the Islamic opposition, signed (in Moscow) a peace accord known as the General Agreement of National Reconciliation and Peace Establishment. As refugees return and the disparate
political factions attempt to rebuild (or really start to construct in the first place) a unified Tajik state, the position of the CCPFT and GRBTT must necessarily change. “Russian” forces will still be needed in the short term in border regions, but in what role and in what number is yet unknown. However, given the significant number of locally-recruited personnel, it may not be a matter of Russian forces returning home, but ethnic Tajiks shifting to Tajik authority. On the other hand, Dushanbe needs to use its finite funds for rebuilding and it can finance reconstruction by cutting the defense rolls; therefore, an immediate Russian exodus may not result. Regardless, the next stage in the creation of Tajikistan’s armed forces is just beginning, and it is too early to suggest whether central authorities will be successful in weaning themselves from foreign support and overcoming a decade of tribalism and warlordism to form a viable national armed forces capable of ensuring national security.

Turkmenistan.

Ashgabat was also originally a firm supporter of a CIS unified force until the pace of nationalization by Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova forced it to confront creation of a Turkmen Armed Forces “even though it will require substantial financial and material resources.” But, Turkmenistan, listening to its own “different drummer,” followed a unique path within Central Asia.

First, although it set up its own Ministry of Defense Affairs (January 1992) and created a ceremonial National Guard (October 1991), the bilateral Russo-Turkmen Agreement of July 1992 stated that formations and units on Turkmen soil would be under Russo-Turkmen “joint jurisdiction” with the Russian Defense Ministry retaining sole control over certain air defense and long-range bomber units and the two defense ministers coordinating the activities of joint armed forces deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan. Of approximately 300 Soviet units
stationed in Turkmenistan in December 1991, about 200 units and formations were transferred to Turkmen control.\textsuperscript{106}

There was an acute shortage of trained, senior Turkmen officers from the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces, forcing the new Turkmen Defense Ministry to rely on ethnic Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussians assigned to the Soviet army corps at the time of transfer to Turkmen control. Of the approximately 80,000 soldiers stationed on Turkmen territory prior to August 31, 1992, about 95 percent of the enlisted troops were Turkmen and about 90 percent of the officers were Russian.\textsuperscript{107}

The experiment of joint command was unsuccessful and ended on January 1, 1994; only about 45 members of the Russian Ministry of Defense (for coordination and consultation), a small number of troops at strategic facilities, and border guards would remain. Funding would no longer be shared, but would fall fully on Turkmenistan. Henceforth, all Russian citizens serving in Turkmenistan would have to sign a contract; as an incentive, such contracts generally guaranteed a higher salary than they could get in Russia, official privileges, career advancement and a pension.\textsuperscript{108} To alleviate problems for those who remained on contract, Turkmenistan created dual citizenship in 1993.

The government also attempted to persuade native ethnic Russians to remain in Turkmenistan. In a September 1996 speech, President Niyazov stated,

\begin{quote}
All Russians living, working and serving in Turkmenistan must understand that you are not just temporary residents here. This applies first and foremost, perhaps, to military personnel. You are protecting your Homeland; after all, it is here that your children were born and here that your ancestors lived and contributed. You must feel yourselves to be at home. . . . Turkmenistan is a Homeland to you, and you are free citizens and may accept dual citizenship; no one is going to infringe you in any respect.\textsuperscript{109}
\end{quote}
The second way in which Ashgabat listened to its “own drummer” was Turkmenistan’s refusal to approve the collective security agreement at Tashkent and its decision to sign a series of bilateral agreements with Russia instead. Niyazov has also refused to send peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan. Ashgabat has refrained from sending delegates to CIS meetings except those concerning drugs and international crime. With great fanfare Turkmenistan adopted a policy of “positive neutrality” in 1995, stating “for us, permanent neutrality means permanent political sovereignty and permanent economic independence.” Turkmenistan was also the first Central Asian nation to join Partnership for Peace (in May 1994).

Ashgabat has slowly developed a training infrastructure for Turkmen officers. At independence no military schools or officer academies existed in Turkmenistan. A 1993 agreement permits Turkmen officers to be trained in Russian military schools. That same year, however, the first Turkmen Military Institute, a 4-year program for armor, air force, logistics, and communications specialists, opened in Ashgabat. Border forces have been trained at the Nebit-Dag Training Center since September 1992.

From the beginning, even during the period of joint command, Turkmenistan sought a distinctive Turkmen identity in military affairs. President Saparmurad Niyazov had himself appointed Commander-in-Chief of the (then nonexistent) Armed Forces and named “Hero of Turkestan.” He named units in his honor and by the end of 1992 promoted himself to four-star general. He appointed Turkmen to key leadership positions including Defense Minister, First Deputy, and Chief of the Main Staff. When the former Soviet army corps was transferred to Turkmen control in August/September 1992, four senior Russian officers from the corps were promoted to general rank. Three further waves of promotions in October featured Russians, some Ukrainians and Belorussians, and a few Turkmen.
Such preferences did not sit well:

The promotion of Russian and other Slav officers by Decree of the President of Turkmenistan was above all a ploy to retain their services and loyalty for the time being throughout the first crucial stage of the build-up of national Armed Forces. It is possible that the preference given to Slav officers in an Army of which 86.6 percent of all servicemen are Turkmen was causing friction within the senior Turkmen officer corps. This may be the explanation for a rather bizarre reshuffle announced in early April 1993.

The firing of senior ethnic Russian officers was matched with reports of the abrupt removal from active service of some 180 Russian platoon/company commanders by the Turkmen military leadership.

Other sources of friction have emerged. For example, Ashgabat appointed non-Turkmen speaking Russians to command non-Russian speaking Turkmen battalions, regiments, and brigades. Russian and other Slav officers on contract were not required to take Turkmen nationality or the oath of loyalty to the President. Complaints were voiced that Russian officers were subject to constant surveillance, bugging of their offices and quarters, and frequent physical harassment, including interrogation by Turkmen security officials.

It is too early to assess the success of these programs. True, the outflow of Slavs has been less severe in Turkmenistan. However, the true gauge will be how many Russian officers renew their contracts. The experiment of a joint command with foreign forces failed. Attempts to balance forces inside the army also face problems, although dual citizenship helps retention.

Kazakstan.

Kazakstan was the last Central Asian state to give up the idea of a unified command. On May 8, 1992, one day after Boris Yeltsin announced the creation of a Russian
army, President Nursultan Nazarbayev declared himself Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan. His initial moves were more limited. He established a National Security Council and the State Committee of Defense (a de facto Defense Ministry); restructured the Soviet internal security apparatus; created a Republican Guard to protect the President and senior officials; and transferred control of the Internal Troops (responsible for maintenance of public order and suppression of public disturbances) to republican control. A Presidential decree of April 16, 1992, transferred the bulk of the ex-Soviet 40th Army to the jurisdiction of the Kazakstani government, which redesignated it the “All-Arms Army.” Three weeks later the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan and a Defense Ministry were proclaimed. In the end, Kazakstani military forces included Ground Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, Naval units, and the Republican Guard.

Kazakhstan did create a wholly new unit outside the regular army to provide balance outside the army. The newly-created National Guard had both Russian and ethnic Kazak personnel, but approximately 68 percent of the officers are Kazak, an unusual (but understandable) proportion. However, its size was too small to be a true counterbalance.

Within the armed forces, the pattern was more familiar: 97 percent of the new Kazakstani officer corps was ethnic Russian. There was a serious shortage of national cadres; the number of former-Soviet, active duty Kazak officers numbered only about 3,000 from lieutenant to general officer—“not enough to wash one’s hands with”—and insufficient to man a single division because of rank and specialty dysfunction. There was not a single Kazak general commanding a division, army or military district among the 3,000; colonels numbered only about 50, mostly in support roles. Until December 1, 1990, there were only 99 Kazak officers attending Soviet institutes and academies. Kazakhstan hosted only three military prep-schools, two
military secondary schools (as opposed to 34 in Ukraine), and two ex-Soviet Army military schools: the Almaty Higher All-Arms Command School (only six Kazaks among the faculty and 84 Kazaks out of 1000 students at independence) and the Border Guards Academy. Social restraint also prohibited ethnic Kazaks from joining the military. “One does not hear the words ‘become a commander, become an officer’ from the mouths of parents in local areas. On the contrary, what they say is, ‘If you become an officer, you will become too Russian and move away.’”

Kazakhstan was unique in that a distinguished Kazak existed to become the first Defense Minister; General Sagadat Nurmagambetov, Hero of the Soviet Union during World War II and former division commander, had attended the short course of the General Staff College. His deputy defense ministers were experienced Russian officers, soon joined by bright young Kazak colonels promoted to general rank. Elderly General Nurmagambetov was replaced as Defense Minister in October 1995 by 41-year old Lieutenant General Ailibek Kasymov, a graduate of the Frunze Academy and former Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, who had served since November 1992 as Chief of the Main Staff.

The percentage of ethnic Russians in the new Kazakstani armed forces did not exactly mirror conditions in other Central Asian states. The question of ethnic composition in Kazakistan is complicated by the fact that nearly 40 percent of the population is ethnic Russian—mainly the result of drawing Kazakistan’s borders in the 1930s to include areas of Mother Russia dating back to the 16th century. No one expected the artificial boundary to actually create an independent state which would break off such a huge chunk of the historical Russian Empire. Therefore, one must be careful when discussing ethnic Russian officers in the Kazakstani armed forces, because they may include those who have accepted Kazakstani citizenship based on their residence in northern Kazakistan.
It was hoped that indigenous Russian officers would remain in the military. It is difficult to determine if that occurred. There was a sharp exodus of ethnic Russian officers following the shift to Kazakstani service, but whether they returned to Russia or merely left military service for civilian life in Kazakstan has yet to be identified.

Moscow did attempt to assist Almaty in stopping this exodus; in July 1993 Moscow amended its Law on Conscription and Military Service to ensure that Russian citizens undergoing their military service on the territory of other republics (e.g., Kazakstan) would continue to receive legal rights envisaged by the Russian laws until December 31, 1993. This was later extended to December 31, 1999. Those officers and warrant officers who remained were not obligated to take Kazak citizenship or swear an oath.\textsuperscript{123} This move was unsuccessful.

The failure of legislation to halve the exodus of Russians is perhaps explained by attitudes about service in Kazakstan as portrayed by Russian officers to journalists. “A wall of mistrust is gradually being erected between the officer corps and the top army command.” Russian officers complained that although the Russians made up the majority of officers, only ethnic Kazaks were promoted to the rank of general. They resented serving under senior Kazak officers whose “rampant incompetence” resulted from “promotions based on the factor of ethnicity and capability for political maneuvering rather than expertise... It is not surprising that more and more ethnic Russians are abandoning military service. . . .” leading to cases where only 30-40 percent of the officer slots are filled. This is in spite of the fact that many ethnic Russians regard Kazakstan as their “historic native land.” Refusal to continue service was usually based on alleged “creeping discrimination” against Russians and insufficient pay compared to what their counterparts in Russia and other republics made.\textsuperscript{124}
Kazakstan also had to face the question of language. Few of the 60 percent non-Kazak populace spoke Kazak at independence. This was especially true for those ethnic Slavs making up the officer corps (even those born in Kazakstan). The desire to push the Kazak language was hindered not only by the embarrassing number of Russified Kazak intellectuals who did not speak Kazak, but the knowledge that until domestic military educational institutions could be established, personnel would have to continue to train in Russia—where they needed the language.\(^{125}\)

The greatest ethnic challenge to creating a new armed forces is in Kazakstan. Kazaks still hold only a plurality in their own country. They struggle to determine whether they want to form a Kazak armed forces or a Kazakstani armed forces; until they resolve that issue, ethnic policy cannot be confirmed.

THE NEW MILITARIES AS A FORCE OF ETHNIC INTEGRATION

The opposite perspective asks how military institutions have affected ethnic consciousness? Have the armed forces been used to break down ethnic divisions and serve as a vehicle for social integration? If so, how successful have they been? If not, have they reinforced ethnic consciousness and thereby intensified ethnic polarization?\(^{126}\)

Military duty is dominated by the concept that service to the state and an oath to defend the regime outweigh all other loyalties.

Membership in the army . . . is supposed to give rise to loyalty transcending obligations to ethnic collectivism at least within the realm of military duty. The military emphasis on duty and the untrammeled obligation to obey presuppose at least the soldier’s ability to compartmentalize his ethnic affiliation.\(^{127}\)

In polyethnic societies, the regime may attempt to use the military as a force for ethnic integration, hoping to break
down barriers of individual identity and build in their place a higher identity to the nation.

Many studies on the Soviet ethnic policy focused on the Moscow's use of the military as a force of social integration. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone talked of a process of sblizhenie (rapprochement)—the on-going process of modernization and "internationalization" (cultural and ethnic mixing) of Soviet society to transfer ethnic specificity from the "traditional sphere of material culture" to a new "spiritual and mainly professional" (i.e. modern) culture. By such means they would substitute a new Soviet urban culture (basically Russian) for the traditional cultures of non-Russians.\textsuperscript{128}

The Soviet military actively pursued ethnic assimilation. Political training was mandatory, run by a cadre of professional political officers who also fereted out suspect behavior. Party membership (or at least participation in Komsomol, or the Communist Youth organization) was pushed for recruits; membership was essential for those seeking senior rank and positions of authority. The best and the brightest were lured away from their home republic; non-Slavs were rarely allowed to serve in their native republic during their military career.

The new Central Asian republics have yet to reveal a similar program. Not all have even revealed whether they desire (or intend) to do so. For example, does Almaty want to create a new "Kazakstani" identity, impose "Kazak" culture upon all its citizens, or simply "write off" non-Kazak? Nor is it yet apparent that any purposeful assignment policy attempts to station men throughout each state based on their ethnicity, e.g., for Bishkek to avoid assigning ethnic Uzbek officers to Osh where riots occurred between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks during the Soviet era.

Social integration involves both attitudinal and functional integration. Attitudinal integration implies commitment to the preservation of the new republic and its (e.g., Kazakstani) norms; this is incompatible with greater
loyalty to an ethnic (e.g., Russian) identity. Functional integration assumes outward conformity with the requirements imposed by these norms; this does not preclude ethnic loyalty as long as it is not projected and does not result in actions inimical to the new regime. In military terms, attitudinal integration is the ultimate goal of political-military indoctrination and the guarantee of loyalty under stress. Functional integration is acceptable as long as it guarantees assured responses to command. Management of military manpower attempts to maximize conditions that promote functional integration. Military training should promote attitudes (and actions) in service personnel that reflect shared norms and values—and thus promote attitudinal integration.\textsuperscript{129}

By such criteria, one can divide Central Asian officers and soldiers into three main groups. Those integrated in attitudinal and functional terms generally comprise the titular populace and other Central Asian groups without their own republic who are fluent in (or willing to learn) the titular language. Those integrated functionally generally comprise non-titular groups such as ethnic Russians who have decided to remain in the new republics and are making the best of it or other titular nationalities who remain due to personal reasons, e.g., intermarriage or “they found a home in the Army.” Some will make the effort to learn the new language. Non-integrated include those groups such as ethnic Russians who desire to return to Russia but who cannot due to personal or financial reasons. They will remain clustered in their own ethnic strongholds such as northern Kazakstan and make no effort to learn the new national language.

The problem with such neat distinctions is the fact that Russian remains the military language. If the respective militaries shifted to the titular language, they would have to initiate language programs similar to those of the old Soviet Armed Forces in reverse. Likewise, using language as a tool of integration risks alienating those Slavic officers and
non-commissioned officers upon whose continued service each state (except Uzbekistan) relies.

Other factors have limited the new nations using the military as a tool for social integration. For such a policy to work, there must be systematic implementation within an overall training program; most of the Central Asian forces are hard pressed to conduct training in basic military skills, let alone social engineering. A major target audience—indeed those needing the instruction most—cannot be trained because they are absent from duty due to draft evasion and desertion. The outmigration of ethnic Slavs and Germans, among other factors, has wreaked havoc on local economies as large segments of highly trained and highly educated managers, professionals, and bureaucrats depart the new republics; the resultant decline in economic standards within the republics means less money for the national budget. Faced with finite funds and competing demands, the military budgets have suffered. Precious revenues must be used to feed and compensate troops, not for political training.

Before precious time and energy were expended, military staffs would have to look squarely at the failure of similar programs within the Soviet Army. With abundant committed resources, a cadre of skilled and highly trained political officers, and the full support of the Communist Party and the Soviet High Command, socialization failed to create New Soviet Men within the ranks of Central Asian recruits. Indeed, it not only failed to win acceptance of a supra-“Soviet” identity, but when Gorbachev’s reforms opened Pandora’s box, ethnic strife was the knife that cut apart the Soviet Union. If the Central Asian states wanted to adopt such a program, an alternate, successful model would have to be found.

Finally, the Central Asian states risk provoking the very stratification of society based on ethnic identity that they hope to prevent—not due to the reaction against any organized program stressing ethnicity, but because Central
Asian commanders have failed to address abuses at the most basic level. Insufficient attention has been spent to abolishing the dedovshchina system. Bullying of Central Asians by Slavs has been replaced by bullying of each other—and one can expect that titular nationalities would be among the most active players of such a system.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY**

The greatest threats to Central Asian security are internal. The core issue is the ethnic composition of each state. The painstaking process of nation-building, the legitimacy crisis, rapid social and economic transformation, decolonization, border disputes, and a catalogue of other issues are all sources of instability in the post-Soviet republics. The last decade has witnessed riots, pogroms, or civil war in all five republics; regardless of the apparent cause, ethnic animosity has played a major role in provoking violence in each of them.

Although the United States has no vital interests in Central Asia, the primary focus of Washington’s policy in the region is damage control—to prevent existing problems from escalating into crises that might engage more powerful neighbors. The external territorial integrity and political security of the Central Asian states are less vulnerable to the threat of foreign attack than susceptible to the threat of internal disruption. Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey have all shown restraint in supporting the status quo, but that might change if successful means of managing diversity are not developed—and they fear their ethnic groups are threatened.

The American policy of Engagement recognizes that the key to Central Asian security is economic. A strong, vibrant economy is a prerequisite for political stability. Economic dislocation breeds and exacerbates ethnic, religious, and political extremism. Economic development cannot occur, however, if the country is torn apart by ethnic strife. Such growth will be derailed if those social institutions known as
the "pillars of power"—to include the military—cannot
develop means of integrating the various ethnic groups and
creating mechanisms for conflict resolution.

The United States has little "leverage" to directly
influence events or push our own social agenda on Central
Asian society. Nevertheless, peaceful solutions to social and
ethnic problems are in the vested interests of all the
republics. The United States cannot directly affect social
attitudes, but it can help resolve the issues which become
flashpoints for ethnic strife. Successful techniques for
managing diversity from American business, government,
and the military can be offered. The United States has
succeeded where the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
failed—immigrants from over a hundred lands willingly
share an identity that supercedes any ethnic heritage. The
blue passport identifies the bearer as an American. Period.

The U.S. Armed Forces have long been regarded as
among the most successful institutions in American society
for integrating ethnic, gender, and racial minorities.
America's success is rooted in the recruitment of quality
minority recruits, a systematic program of professional
development, access to pivotal assignments, fair treatment
by promotion boards, and equal compensation. As qualified
minorities advance, their competence and experience dispel
negative stereotypes and accusations that promotion was
unwarranted. Equal Opportunity offices and the Inspector
General investigate abuse of the system. Successful
diversity programs in the U.S. Armed Forces can prove to
the Central Asian militaries that ethnic integration can
work.

The Department of Defense already provides a variety of
training programs to military and civilian leaders from
Central Asia through the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) program. Courses at the European
Command's George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies
(in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany) and at service
schools such as U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at
Hurlbert Field, Florida, already provide courses on defense resource management, military justice, civil-military relations and human rights. Central Asian officers attend these courses. Participation in Partnership for Peace operations and military-to-military contact programs teach diversity management by example.

For Central Asians, however, the key to managing diversity and defending soldiers from ethnic abuse is the development of a professional, well-trained non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. Recruited from indigenous nationalities, such NCOs would restore order in the barracks and crush the dedovshchina system. Only when soldiers feel safe during military service will the plagues of draft dodging and desertion diminish. Only when soldiers are made to feel proud of their military service and transfer loyalty to their unit and bunkmates will a higher authority prevail over ethnic identity. Assisting the development of indigenous NCO ranks is a priority for military-to-military contact programs.

Soldiers develop pride in their unit when it excels in training or combat. With the severe budget crunch most Central Asian militaries have little opportunity for other than low-level unit training. Multinational training exercises through military-to-military contact programs or Partnership for Peace are valuable tools for creating unit integrity and esprit d’corps.

Finally, the U.S. Armed Forces can assist Central Asian forces to develop indigenous officer-training facilities and provide slots for key middle-and senior-level officers in American military schools such as the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College. Attendance has so-far been hampered by lack of English-language skills and a reluctance to release exceptional officers for overseas training. Priority must be given to providing English-language instruction and teaching laboratories both domestically and in the United States.
CONCLUSION

Military forces recruit, train, assign, promote, evaluate, retain, compensate, and retire the personnel who serve within them. Each personnel action is affected by the prejudices and value judgements of those in authority. Manpower decisions may be the result of stated policies or the unconscious (or conscious) bias of those in their chain of command. Ethnicity will always be a factor in personnel actions no matter how “color-blind” or impartial the stated objective. But methods can be provided to lessen the impact of such prejudices and to manage diversity wisely. You cannot control what people think, but you can control behavior.

The states of Central Asia are the hostages of their Soviet legacy. They struggle to create nations within borders artificially drawn as much to divide as to unite. They struggle to integrate diverse cultures into a new national identity. They struggle to create armed forces from building blocks shaped by discrimination and prejudice. They struggle to make dysfunctional economies pay for these forces. They struggle to train their new cadres and develop domestic institutions separate from Russia. They struggle to free themselves from reliance on expatriate Russians.

Ethnic politics may yet tear apart the Central Asian republics as it has many of their neighbors (and the Soviet Union). Whether the Central Asian states can prevent ethnicity from shaping or distorting their armed forces will be a key indicator of their ability to manage diversity within society as a whole. Whether the Central Asian states can ultimately use the military as a force for social integration will reveal their ability to create tools to shape their own future.
APPENDIX

LIST OF ETHNO-TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN CENTRAL ASIA

The following is a sample of suggested ethno-territorial changes in Central Asia:

1. Transfer of the Zeravshan, Kashkadaria, and Surkhandaria oases from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan.

2. Secession of Karakalpakstan from Uzbekistan.

3. Transfer of Karakalpakstan to Kazakstan.

4. Transfer of Karakalpakstan to Russia.

5. Transfer of the Amu Daria delta in Karakalpakstan to the Khorezm Oblast of Uzbekistan.

6. Transfer of the mountain pastures of the southern slopes of the Altay and Zaalay ranges of Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan.

7. Transfer of the upper reaches of the Surkhob valley of Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan.

8. Transfer of the northern sections of Karateghin of Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan.

9. Transfer of parts of the Tajik section of the Fergana basin to Uzbekistan.

10. Transfer of the Tajik Zeravshan to Uzbekistan.

11. Secession of Gorno-Badakhshan from Tajikistan.

12. Creation of a Kyrgyz autonomous territory in the northern Pamirs of Tajikistan or the transfer of this territory to Kyrgyzstan.

13. Transfer of the Batken district of Osh Oblast from Kyrgyzstan to Tajikistan.

14. Transfer of the high-mountain pastures of the northern Kyrgyz slopes of the Alay and Zaalay ranges to Tajikistan.
15. Transfer of part of the Kyrgyz section of the Fergana basin to Uzbekistan.

16. Transfer of the northern districts of Kyrgyzstan adjacent to Lake Issyk-Kul to Kazakhstan.

17. Transfer of a section of the Tashauz oasis of Turkmenistan adjacent to the Amu Daria to Uzbekistan.

18. Transfer of the middle Amu Daria oasis of Turkmenistan to Uzbekistan.


21. Transfer of part of the Mangyshlak peninsula of Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan.

22. Transfer of lands between the Syr Daria and Arys Rivers from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan.

23. Transfer of the northern slopes of the Transily Alatau mountains and the Kungey-Ala-Too district of Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan.

24. Creation of German national territorial areas in northern Kazakhstan.

25. Creation of an autonomous republic in the Russian-speaking areas of northern Kazakhstan.

26. Transfer of northern Kazakhstan to Russia.

27. Transfer of districts in the southern Urals and southwestern Siberia to Kazakhstan.

28. Creation of an Uighur autonomous territory in Kazakhstan.
ENDNOTES


7. For example, the titular nationality of Uzbekistan is Uzbek, of Kazakhstan is Kazak, etc. Because ethnic Kazaks comprise less than half of the population of Kazakhstan, care is taken to use the adjectival form “Kazakstani” rather than “Kazak,” when referring to that state. Ethnic Uzbeks form over 70 percent of Uzbekistan, so there “Uzbek state” is admissible.


12. Tajikistan also legalized dual citizenship in October 1995.


15. Ibid, pp. 234.


17. Ibid, p. 256.


25. Kolstoe, p. 211. This statistic is from the Russian Federal Migration Service. They were not alone. European nationalities, Uzbeks and Tajiks also fled. The exodus of Russians actually began three years earlier following the proclamation of the Tajik language law in July 1989 making Tajik the sole state language. Kolstoe, p. 213. In 1989 there were 560,000 Russian-speakers in Tajikistan; that year 41,000 left. After the Dushanbe riots in 1990, another 81,000 left. By 1994 the number of Russians had dropped to 70-80,000. CDPP, Vol. XLVI, No. 18, June 1, 1994, p. 13. Sources estimate that more than 450,000 Russians left Tajikistan by 1996; those who remained were often pensioners and the poor who could not afford to leave. With this migration "both by physical ejection and by force of circumstances, Tajikistan lost the mass of its highly skilled professors, engineers, technical personnel, etc." CDPP, Vol. XLVIII, No. 33, September 11, 1996, pp. 13-14. Tajikistan finally adopted dual citizenship in October 1995, but by then it was too little, too late. CDPP, Vol. XLVII, No. 36, October 4, 1995, p. 25.

26. Subethnic tensions also exist within Kazakhstan relating to the three Kazak Hordes: Big, Middle, and Little. Since geographic mobility has been so low, in any given region the great majority of local Kazaks can trace their ancestry back to one of the three Hordes which are centered in separate geographical regions. As provincial political and economic cliques divide Kazakhstan, therefore, they reflect these Hordes.


migrating from outside Kazakhstan and permitted Kazaks to hold dual citizenship (if their country of residence allows it). Almaty has not allowed dual citizenship for ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan.

32. After the ethnic Kazak General Secretary and Politburo member Dinmukhamed Kunyaev was summarily replaced (by Gorbachev) with an ethnic Russian, Gennady Kolbin, groups of youths, mostly students, gathered on December 17th, converged on the central square, and demanded an explanation. Kunyaev and Kolbin were ordered not to meet with the crowd; so three officials (including Nazarbayev) tried to reason with them; the crowd pelted them with snowballs. Kolbin then met with a small delegation, but the crowd grew more restive and fighting broke out (spontaneous or provoked by KGB?). The leadership either panicked or was waiting for such an excuse; tanks were sent in and an unknown number were killed. Demonstrators were arrested and some received long prison terms.

33. Akiner, p. 56.

34. Ibid., p. 69.

35. Ibid., p. 71.


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<td>76,302</td>
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Slater, p. 42.

37. A 1995 public opinion survey in Kazakhstan revealed that nearly 75 percent of Russians interviewed expected ethnic conflict between Russians and Kazaks; only 25 percent of the Kazaks foresaw such an escalation of violence. CDPP, Vol. XLVII, No. 48, December 27, 1995, p. 16. Russians cited social and economic conditions, the threat of ethnic conflict, and the Kazakhstan government’s domestic policy (e.g., language laws) as key problems. Those remaining are forming groups such as the Congress of Russian Communities and pushing human rights. One activist, Boris Suprunyuk, charged Kazakhstan is

38. Slater, pp. 42-43.

39. The Tsarist, then Soviet, heritage matches the pattern of most 19th century colonial armies. The purpose of Soviet forces based in Central Asia was not to fight beyond Soviet borders, but to maintain internal security and pacify the non-Russian populace. Therefore, Soviet forces stationed in Central Asia at the time of independence were ethnically recruited and organized for reliability rather than fighting ability. This is especially true of the officer corps which remained overwhelmingly Slavic with little commissionsing from the ranks. Those titular nationalities within the Soviet officer corps were usually Russified and gave little allegiance to a administrative republic which had never existed before Soviet rule. While other colonial states had a period to prepare for self-government, the Central Asians were thrust from the realm precipitously and with little warning. They had to make do with whoever and whatever was within their borders on the day of independence. Horowitz, p. 446.


recruited by ethnic lines but with a higher concentration of the titular nationality than ordinary units.


44. Jones, p. 45.

45. Proponents claimed troops in construction battalions had less strenuous duty, discipline was laxer, and they usually received an additional wage from the civilian project they were building far above the token five roubles a month military pay. Central Asians took a dimmer view. After independence, Turkmenistan stated that they would no longer provide men for construction battalions because they were “clearly abnormal.” A Turkmen delegation to Moscow reported that essentially, “people have been left to their own devices, commanders had practically no control over them, and the arbitrary rule of barracks hooligans reigns in subunits.” Sick soldiers were left untreated. Ashkhabad, Frunzevets, in Russian, April 16, 1992, pp. 1,3, in J PRS-UMA-92-021, June 10, 1992, p. 36. Such segregation was not
all due to ethnic prejudice; inability of many Central Asian recruits to speak Russian and understand verbal orders rendered them ineffective in combat.


47. Martin Heisler argues that this conflict goes beyond coping with stress and frustration to include “the pursuit of such values as equality and equity; the efficacy of parties and other political channels in dealing with cultural as distinguished from economic or class aspirations; ways for governments to circumvent or amend principles of legitimacy regarding distributional policies; and myriad other factors.” Martin Heisler, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in the Modern West,” in Joseph Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, p. 28.


49. Rumors that Armenian refugees fleeing the pogroms in Azerbaijan would be given preference in housing assignments sparked a wave of unrest. The initial demonstrations were not so much against Armenians as an ethnic group, but the result of general dissatisfaction over the standard of living and unresponsive government authorities. When security forces fired on demonstrators, rioting broke out; 37 people were killed. Muriel Atkin, “Tajikistan: reform, reaction, and civil war,” in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., New States New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations, Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 610, 628.

50. Ro’i, p. 23.


52. Ro’i, p. 23.

52

54. Ro’i, p. 23.

55. Ibid., p. 43.

56. Ibid., p. 45.

57. Olcott, “Nation Building and Ethnicity,” p. 224. Samarkand and Bokhara were inhabited predominantly by Tajiks in the 1920s when they were given to the new Uzbek SSR, and have remained predominantly Tajik ever since.


59. In December 1994 General Kasymov noted that the outflow of Russian officers continued due to their low pay and uncertainty over whether continued service would jeopardize their Russian pensions. He argued, however, that some progress was being made at the junior officer level by calling back those who had transferred to the reserves and persuading graduates of higher schools with military departments to enter the service. “The problem is with staff officers. It will be years before officers rise to the proper level, and these are precisely the people leaving Kazakhstan’s military—experienced specialists of middle and higher rank.” Almaty, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, in Russian, December 24, 1994, p. 1, in JPRS-UMA-95-001, January 11, 1995, pp. 21-22.


61. General Nurmagambetov argued that such ethnic hazing was not an issue in Kazakhstan. Bullies there were equal opportunity. “There is hazing as such. Unfortunately...Kazakhs are beating up their own Kazakhs.” Almaty, Karavan, in Russian, September 2, 1994, p. 6, in JPRS-UMA-94-038, September 14, 1994, p. 17.

62. Horowitz, pp. 535-536. One need only examine the history of Azerbaijan to realize that military intervention in domestic politics was a real threat to newly independent states of the Former Soviet Union.

64. The Military Balance 1997/1998, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997, pp. 156-157; 162-163. Numbers include indigenous forces only; Russian forces in Tajikistan are estimated at 25,000 Frontier Forces and 6,000 Army forces.
Uzbekistan's Border Guards are not differentiated from Regular Army forces.


65. Woff, p. D6-9. Once the Uzbek Defense Ministry was formed on July 2, a presidential decree placed former CIS formations and units (e.g., a fighter bomber regiment and an airborne brigade) under Uzbek jurisdiction “in accordance with Agreements of the CIS Heads of State” signed in Tashkent on May 15, 1992, and affirmed at the July 6 meeting of CIS Defense Ministers. Ibid, p. D6-10.

66. Uzbekistan’s Border Guard Force was first established on March 24, 1992 as the “Border Protection Troops.” The presidential decree created a Main Border Troops Directorate headed by a Deputy Chief of the Republic’s National Security Service (the former Uzbek Committee on State Security or KGB) and transferred all units of the Central Asian Border Troops District to the jurisdiction of the Uzbek National Security Service. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state with which Russia does not have an agreement on joint protection of its “external borders.” The 156-kilometer, riverine border with Afghanistan is patrolled by Tashkent’s Termez border detachment and a border brigade with patrol boats. At independence the Border Guards’ officer corps was overwhelmingly Slavic; the Uzbeks soon organized special junior officers’ courses in which ethnic Uzbek privates, NCOs, and warrant officers underwent accelerated training and a special border cadet group was created at the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School. Missions include fighting smuggling, drugs, and illegal transit of emigrants from Asia to Europe, especially in the region where Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan meet. Woff, p. D6-17; Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, August 4, 1994, in JPRS-UMA-94-035, August 24, 1994, pp. 58-59. Agreements concerning border guards troops were signed at the Kiev summit on March 20, 1992.

67. On paper the National Guard is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, but in reality the brigade-size force has always been under the de facto control of the President. As with other National Guards, it protects the president, guards important installations, conducts
anti-terrorist operations, assists disaster relief and provides a ceremonial guard. Woff, p. D6-17.


69. For a Russian point of view, see Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 22, 1994, in JPRS-UMA-94-046, November 9, 1994, p. 22. While the situation matches many issues described in the Central Asian military press, notice the underlying attitude that these problems are intractable unless the ethnic Russians are coerced to remain to solve them.


71. Bishkek did establish a State Defense Committee in late 1991; in January 1992 a State Committee for Defense Affairs was formed to advise President Akaev, which included a “Main Staff.”

72. The October 1992 call-up produced too many recruits, and in early November over 3,000 conscripts had their service deferred.


74. Philip Petersen, “Security Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” European Security, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 173. This telegram was also apparently sent to the Kazakks because the commander of the 40th Army, who was a First Deputy Defense Minister of Kazakhstan, sent a telegram to Bishkek telling the republic to take control of the forces on its territory because the 40th Army would no longer be paying for them.


76. Interview by author with Kyrgyz defense officials, July 1997, Bishkek.

77. Petersen, p. 174.

78. Within a year he was replaced by an ethnic Russian; one of his first duties was to negotiate with Moscow over defense cooperation, joint use of Soviet military installations on Kyrgyz territory, and the status of Russian servicemen serving in Kyrgyzstan. He states, “only with the help of Russia can we hope to solve our military problems.” Woff, 1995, p. D3-5.
79. In March 1996, the Kyrgyz legislature amended the constitution to make the Russian language the official language in territories and workplaces where ethnic Russians predominate. Such efforts have not helped retain ethnic Russian officers in the Armed Forces.


85. National Guard recruits were to be competitively selected to serve 17 month terms. One of their initial tasks was to disarm the illegal paramilitary formations emerging on the wake of the Tajik civil war. Woff, p. D4-2. They failed.

86. Woff, 1995, p. D4-5. The 201st MRD, formerly part of the 40th Army transferred to Tajikistan following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, was headquartered in Dushanbe with two regiments located in Kurgan Tyube and Kulyab. Richard Starr estimates that about 90 percent of the 201st MRD is comprised of ethnic Tajik in the enlisted ranks. Starr, p. 145.

87. Starr, p. 145.


94. Starr, p. 145.


97. The Agreement on Collective Peacekeeping Forces signed on September 24, 1993, by Russia and four Central Asian states (Turkmenistan abstained) formally established the Joint Command of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces. Tajikistan’s Central Asian neighbors agreed to send ground forces to assist Russian and Tajik forces, but their participation was limited by regional dynamics and ethnic fears. It took almost a year (Autumn 1992 to Autumn 1993) to set up a collective peacekeeping contingent. At a January 1993 CIS summit Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan each decided to allocate a 500-strong troop battalion to reinforce Russian forces guarding the Tajik-Afghan border. Uzbekistan sent forces, but the Kyrgyz and Kazak contingents never fulfilled their purpose.

98. Woff, 1995, pp. D4-8-9. With a strength of 25,000 men, the force comprised the 201st MRD, an Operations Group from the Russian Border Troops under Russian command, and contingents of ground forces, border guards and internal troops from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Technical infrastructure, to include air
defense, aviation, logistics, engineer, communications, space satellite, and ELINT support elements, was provided by Russia.


100. Woff, p. D4-4.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid. The former Soviet KGB was replaced by a Tajik Committee of National Security in 1992.


104. Woff, p. D5-5.

105. The Chief of the Main Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense, a Turkmen, was not appointed until September 1992.

106. These included the former Soviet Army Corps headquartered in Ashgabat, redesignated the Independent All-Arms Army (August 1992) with two all-arms divisions and an air defense brigade. Of the remaining ex-Soviet units, approximately 70 remained under Russian control and constituted an Air Defense Group and Air Force Group of the Russian Federation. A small number were disbanded or transferred back to Russian territory. These so-called Joint Forces in Turkmenistan would “not separate but rather join our efforts in maintaining the troops with Russia. Financing and logistics support will be provided by proportional participation of each side.” J PRS-UMA-92-023, p. 41. After the breakup, Turkmenistan systematically disposed of excess Soviet equipment deployed or stockpiled on its territory; it has disposed of some 500 of the 1,000 aircraft held in storage. The Military Balance, 1995/1996, p. 152.

107. Petersen, “Security Policy,” p. 187. In a 1992 interview Deputy Defense Minister Niyazov admitted that the majority of officers and warrant officers performing service on the territory of Turkmenistan were Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians while the majority of enlisted were Turkmen.

As a result of this, certain difficulties have recently emerged in the training and education of soldiers and, we might as well admit, in the preservation of military equipment. Yes, and the
very mutual relations between commanders and subordinates have not always been distinguished by their friendliness... In some places, even threats of physical reprisals have been heard toward officers in response to demands to comply with the observance of regulations and, as a consequence, a high-strung atmosphere is developing in some military collectives.


108. CDPP, Vol. XLV, No. 35, September 29, 1993, p. 26. Non-ethnic Turkmen officers on contract are not required to take Turkmen citizenship or take the oath of loyalty to President Niyazov. By agreement about 2,000 Russian border guards (separate from the armed forces) help man the 2400 kilometer border with Iran and Afghanistan. They man 32 of 140 border posts. Russia pays, clothes, and feeds them; Ashgabat provides logistical and technical support. They fall under the Treaty on the Joint Protection of Turkmenistan’s State Border and the Status of Servicemen of the Russian Federation Border Troops on the Territory of Turkmenistan. CDPP, Vol. XLVII, No. 2, February 8, 1995, p. 29.

109. Ashgabat, Neytralnyy Turkmenistan, in Russian, July 4, 1996, pp. 1-2, in FBIS-SOV-96-178-S, September 12, 1996, pp. 86-87. Kenneth Starr argues that most of these contract officers are unhappy with pay and living conditions and will probably return en masse to Russia when their contracts expire. Starr, p. 145.


111. Ashgabat, Turkmen Press, in Russian, April 9, 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-071, p. 55. Turkmenistan claimed that this membership did not violate Turkmenistan’s new policy of neutrality because other neutral states such as Austria and Finland had joined Partnership for Peace.

112. Niyazov appointed himself brigadier general and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Turkmenistan in October 1991, even before they had been created. He later had himself promoted to Army General in December 1992.

113. Woff, pp. D5-6 - D5-10.

115. Ibid.


118. The Caspian Sea Flotilla was subdivided among Russia (50 percent), Azerbaijan (25 percent), Kazakhstan (12 percent) and Turkmenistan (12 percent). A Presidential Decree of April 2, 1993, formally established a Kazakhstani Navy under the Naval Department within the Main Armed Forces Staff. Naval missions target smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal immigration. The force itself more closely resembled a Coast Guard than a Navy. Woff, p. D2-16. In March 1995 it was agreed to create a Naval Border Patrol headquartered at Astrakhan comprising elements from Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, formed from regular national naval units and remnants of the Caspian Flotilla. Richard Woff, “Kazakh-Russian relations—an update,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 12, December 1995, p. 567.


120. Starr, p. 142.


125. General Nurmagambetov downplayed the importance of languages in a September 1994 interview. “We conduct training in Russian. And we give commands in Russian. Ultimately, the language is not decisive. If a command is given in Kazakh and tomorrow combat readiness rises, I would order a switch to Kazakh today. This is not the issue.” Almaty, Karavan, in Russian, September 2, 1994, p. 6, in JPRS-UMA-94-038, September 14, 1994, p. 17.


129. Ibid., pp. 135-136.
