Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures

Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

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MULTINATIONAL LAND FORMATIONS AND NATO:
REFORMING PRACTICES AND STRUCTURES

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In yet another incisive and detailed work focused on the changing face of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Dr. Thomas Young provided a unique perspective on a very timely issue—that of bi-/multi-national land formations within the Alliance. I say timely because, with recent Council agreement on the new command structure, implementation work on this structure will no doubt, in due course, result in a review of the NATO force structure. In this regard, Dr. Young's research and study provide an invaluable source of essential background reading for this subsequent phase of work.

The problems Dr. Young grapples with in this account have been exacerbated by a variety of evolving realities stemming from the new, post-Cold War security environment. Reduced national force structures, new NATO roles and missions emanating from the military implementation of Alliance Strategy and the rapid reaction requirements associated with the embryonic Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) Concept are but three of a multitude of inter-related issues which have driven the requirement to address NATO force structure requirements as a whole, as part of the ongoing internal adaptation of Alliance structures and procedures.

Dr. Young's basic, underlying premise cannot be challenged—embedded in the 1991 Strategic Concept is the pre-eminence of Alliance cohesion and solidarity. One of the most visible manifestations of cohesion in a new NATO will continue to be the willingness of member nations to contribute elements of their respective force structures to the Alliance, commanded by joint and combined, multi-nationally manned allied headquarters. Neither can the essential, ongoing requirement for multi-national land formations be contested—now more than ever before.

I distinctly remember the bold political decision of the early 1990's to transition from national to bi-national/multi-national corps within NATO. In Dr. Young's words: "As political manifestations of Alliance and European solidarity in an era of diminished force structure and strategic ambiguity, their creation at the end of the Cold War served a very important purpose." The reality is, as the author perceptively points out, that in the ensuing years, national force reductions, driven both by national expectations for the conclusions drawn from the evolving security environment with no direct threat to NATO and by the very tangible quotas imposed under the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, have resulted in the fact that "may current national force structures are incapable of conducting unilateral corps-level operations."

Hence, multi-national land formations are an essential component of NATO's future force structure and Dr. Young articulates three themes he sees as fundamental in making them more operationally effective—the empowerment of NATO corps commanders in peace, crisis and conflict, enhancing the operational effectiveness of the corps headquarters themselves and the rationalisation of
overall roles, responsibilities and missions in light of the newly-agreed command structure model which has no land component commands. With his usual insight, Dr. Young provides unique recommendations worthy of consideration by both NATO and NATO nations' planners. I should stress, however, that some of his recommendations clearly fall into the sole responsibility of nations, and no NATO authority would wish to infringe upon a nation's sovereign right to decide which forces a nation is prepared to contribute.

Thomas Young questions whether the current command authority of NATO corps commanders is consistent with the intent of the Strategic Concept and is sufficiently all-encompassing to permit the Alliance to undertake the full spectrum of new roles and missions. Whilst not challenging the use of existing terminology, he proposes greater delegation of authority on operations commensurate with the nature of the mission. He also urges the requirement for a more deliberate approach to standardised training through the use of such tools as mission essential task lists. In this regard, I am reminded of the introduction of battle task standards by CENTAG some years ago as a means of providing a measure for standardised training of the army group corps.

Dr. Young's concern with the operational effectiveness of the bi-/multi-national corps headquarters is one I personally share based on experience. Common field standard operating procedures and the use of Alliance operational/tactical-level doctrinal concepts are key building blocks in developing a basis for effective headquarters. However, even more importantly, it will be necessary to evaluate these headquarters by means of realistic and demanding computer-assisted command post exercises aimed at creating cohesive and competent staffs capable of supporting their commanders in the conduct of all missions—collective defence, peace support operations expansion of stability tasks and, where appropriate, contributing to counter-proliferation.

Finally, the author proffers the requirement for reviewing the roles and missions of some NATO corps to reflect those extant in the current military implementation of Alliance Strategy. The issues Dr. Young addresses are all topical and relevant—in the absence of land component commands, the necessity for retaining land warfare expertise at the appropriate level within the military structure; the balance between Reaction and Main Defence Forces and the requirement for the greater flexibility of employment of force structure elements in today's security environment; the sustainability of CJTFs, to include the viability of NATO corps headquarters in providing the basis for CJTF land component commands.

In his essay entitled "Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures," Dr. Thomas Young touches the very essence of force structure deliberations the Alliance will have to address as part of forthcoming work in the realm of internal adaptation. His experience in this field, together with his pragmatic balance between the visionary and what might be politically acceptable to member nations, makes this account necessary reading for those serious in the study of NATO force structure issues.
Multinational forces of all three services need to be retained since they form part of the glue which produces NATO's most important ingredients; cohesion and solidarity. It is nowhere better visible than in the multi-national forces which allow NATO to overcome more narrowly defined national perspectives and smoothly to integrate new members. To make these forces fully operational for a wider range of NATO nations to have a closer look at more NATO involvement in areas such as training and logistics. Dr. Thomas Young offers us most valuable insights and intriguing food for thought. I salute him for his outstanding work and I do hope that his paper will find the widespread attention it deserves.

General Klaus Naumann
Chairman of the North Atlantic Military Committee
December 1977
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFCENT</td>
<td>Allied Forces Central Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSOUTH</td>
<td>Allied Forces Southern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARRC</td>
<td>ACE Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Allied Tactical Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTAP</td>
<td>Allied Forces Baltic Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAOR</td>
<td>British Army of the Rhine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTAG</td>
<td>Central Army Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCENT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps LANDJUT</td>
<td>Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (to become: “Multinational Corps Northeast” in 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPX</td>
<td>command post exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR-CAST</td>
<td>Central Region-Chiefs of Army Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANBDE</td>
<td>Danish International Mechanized Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>Defence Planning Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROCORPS</td>
<td>European Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROFOR</td>
<td>European Rapid Operational Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROMARFOR</td>
<td>European Maritime Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAWEU</td>
<td>Force answerable to WEU</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTX</td>
<td>field training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>NATO Peace Implementation Force</td>
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<td>IMS</td>
<td>International Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSRC</td>
<td>Joint Sub-Regional Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANDCENT</td>
<td>Allied Land Forces Central Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANDSOUTH</td>
<td>Allied Land Forces Southern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Major NATO Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND(C)</td>
<td>Multinational Division (Central)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Major Subordinate Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>non-combatant evacuation operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHAG</td>
<td>Northern Army Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>Operational Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Principal Subordinate Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Strategic Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status of forces agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOI</td>
<td>standing operating instructions</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>standardization agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACOM</td>
<td>Tactical Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Tactical Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>transfer of authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>U.S. Army Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Acknowledgements

This essay is, in large part, the product of a discussion I had in January 1996 with Mr. Diego Ruiz Palmer, International Staff, NATO headquarters. Diego convinced me that I should investigate this important and overlooked issue. Mr. Paul Quintal, Deputy Chief, International Operations Division, HQ USAREUR, was intrigued sufficiently by the subject to fund most of the field work I needed to research this study. Mr. Jon Whitford, Chief, Policy Branch, HQ USAREUR, freely provided his encyclopedic knowledge of the subject of NATO multinational formations. Mr. Ruiz Palmer, Dr. William T. Johnsen and Colonel Michael Gonzales, USANG, of the Strategic Studies Institute, LTC(P) Mark Morgan, USA, assigned to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mr. David Harding of the National Ground Intelligence Center, Dr. Jed Peters of the RAND Corporation, Mr. Brian Lovatt of International Solutions Group, Ltd., and a land forces expert in the Policy/Requirements Division of SHAPE provided critically important comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Mrs. Mary Jane Semple once again rose to the occasion in preparing both text and graphics for publication.

In researching this essay, I was able to visit almost every multinational land formation in Europe. In those few which I was unable to visit, I held extensive discussions with senior officials in their superior headquarters—not always an ideal situation given the universally poor relationship enjoyed between superior and subordinate headquarters. Nonetheless, at every location I was exceedingly well-received and would like to express my sincere gratitude to the commanders and staffs of: Corps LANDJUT, I German/Netherlands Corps, Heeresführungskommando, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), Multinational Division Central (MND(C)), 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division, 3rd United Kingdom Division, 3rd Italian Division, European Corps, and the European Rapid Operational Force. I also held discussions with officials of the ACE Reaction Forces Planning Staff and the Policy/Requirements Division, SHAPE, Headquarters Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe, Ismir, Chief of Defence, Vedbæk, Etat-Major des Armées and Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques, Paris, Führungsstab des Heeres and Führungsstab der Streitkräfte in Bonn, Ufficio Generale Politica Militare, Stato Maggiore Difesa, Rome, Asuntos Internacionales de Defensa and Estado Mayor Conjunto de la Defensa, Madrid, Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armada, Lisbon, and the Permanent Joint Headquarters, Northwood.

I should stress that notwithstanding the assistance provided by the individuals, headquarters and offices cited above, all conclusions are solely mine own and in no way reflect the views or policies of their organizations. Moreover, I alone remain responsible for any errors of fact.

Thomas-Durell Young
MULTINATIONAL LAND FORMATIONS AND NATO: REFORMING PRACTICES AND STRUCTURES
Map 1.
Multinational Land Formations in Europe.
1

Introduction

To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary.

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept,
Rome, November 1991

The NATO Alliance has a long and varied history as regards multinational formations. From the failed effort to create a European Army during the early 1950s, to the creation of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force-Land in 1960, to the formation of the plethora of bi-/multi-national corps following the end of the Cold War, two generations of NATO officials have confronted the nettlesome difficulties of operating these formations. And, indeed, nettlesome their attending problems are. These problems range from balancing the command authority requirements of a multinational force commander and the reticence by nations to relinquish sovereign control of forces to a foreign commander, to effecting multinational logistics, where national laws and financial regulations have traditionally outweighed a foreign commander's requirements. In consequence, in NATO multinational formations today, to cite one of the best contemporary studies on the subject, “...a gap exists between planning, perceptions and reality.”

Yet, irrespective of the difficulties inherent in such units, their political value has become too important to dismiss. In an era of diminished NATO standing land force structures and a widespread desire to manifest a Western European historic reconciliation that transcends the end of the Cold War, these headquarters and their subordinated forces have a tremendous political cachet. In an era of continued pressures for greater European political and economic union, military integration will continue to be seen as a relatively low cost, high profile manifestation of greater assimilation. So compelling are the political pressures and incentives that since 1991, some European NATO partners have even created their own multinational land headquarters outside of NATO's integrated military structure.

Very strong military rationale also exists for creating the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps—ARRC (which contains one multinational and three framework divisions)
and five main defense bi-/multi-national corps since the announcement of the multinational formation concept in the spring of 1991.\(^3\) The principal military basis for forming these organizations revolves around the issue of diminished force structures. In 1990, the Alliance agreed to force reductions under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and, in 1993, this trend continued resulting in a 45 percent decrease in peacetime strength in the Central Region.\(^4\) In light of subsequent decisions by Central Region countries to restructure and field professional armies, the number of standing forces have fallen even further.\(^5\) Thus the creation of bi-/multi-national land headquarters serves the purpose of: 1) achieving maximum efficiencies from remaining forces, 2) preserving higher level command structures for smaller nations, and 3) maximizing residual military capabilities, especially of smaller nations.\(^6\)

While politically useful and possessing potential for significant military utility, the current state of these headquarters is quite “untidy,” to say the least. More specifically, what the Alliance has created in this wave of multinational enthusiasm is a number of bi-/multi-national headquarters which are too strongly oriented toward main defense, vice rapid reaction, missions. Some of them include subordinate units with different missions from their parent corps. Headquarters also have not been organized in a manner which would be conducive to cooperation with other land commands. Finally, the actual “mechanics” of cooperation, i.e., multinational command authorities and logistics predominantly, are still in their infancy due to the reluctance of nations to revisit such “nettlesome” issues. In effect, one of the objectives of the 1991 Strategic Concept, enhanced flexible force structures, has yet to be achieved by the creation of these headquarters.

In its broadest sense, the fundamental problem presented by bi-/multi-national land headquarters is a rather ineffectual relationship which exists between national general staffs, which must “raise, train and equip” forces, and the allied commanders who must command such forces in crisis and war. Even more daunting: how can Allied commanders plan to employ such formations in crisis and war, given the legal, political and financial restrictions placed upon them by sovereign contributors? Given that NATO strategy is based upon the cornerstone of flexible forces, NATO should examine whether these headquarters and formations support the objectives outlined in the New Strategic Concept.

Recent developments in NATO ought to lend immediacy to the review of the current state of bi-/multi-national headquarters themselves. First, the experience of the Alliance in the NATO Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina has seen three multinational divisional headquarters (i.e., American, French and British) conducting peace enforcement missions with a large number of forces with which they had no previous peacetime relationship.\(^7\) It would not be imprudent to assume that this type of \textit{ad hoc} arrangement; i.e., the assignment of forces to headquarters with which there has not been any previous associations, will be more likely in future operations than headquarters deploying with their wartime designated forces. While it is difficult to plan for such eventualities, the Alliance's experience in
Bosnia-Herzegovina should demonstrate that it needs to establish the clear requirement for bi-/multi-national headquarters to be standardized in terms of procedures and practices so as to enable them effectively to integrate *ad hoc* assigned forces.

Second, the Alliance is still in the midst of achieving the politically elusive goal of internal adaption, i.e., reforming its integrated command structure, in the form of the “Long Term Study.” While it is still not yet finalized, one proposal which appears to have been accepted is that the third level of Alliance command will be headed by Naval, Air and Joint Sub-Regional Commanders (JSRC). In other words, under current plans, at that crucial nexus where national forces are integrated into the command structure in wartime and where crucial peacetime planning takes place, there will be no *exclusively* allied land headquarters to oversee what has traditionally been a very vexatious task: the peacetime coordination and wartime command of multinational land forces. Thus, should this proposal be implemented, one could expect that bi-/multi-national land headquarters will take on greater importance than they do today in the area of acting as the necessary link between national land forces and the integrated command structure. However, before they can achieve this difficult challenge, they must first be reformed.

This essay has two rather ambitious objectives. First, senior political officials in NATO nations need a wider understanding of the problems which have surfaced from the creation of numerous bi-/multi-national land headquarters in Europe. The military cohesion the Alliance anticipated creating with these headquarters has yet to be realized. In effect, we have less integrated and less interoperable land forces. However, before a process of reform can be initiated, a sound understanding of the factors which have produced these centrifugal forces must be identified. While a number of excellent monographs have been written on, or are related to, this subject, there has yet to be published a comprehensive analysis of all NATO and European land bi-/multi-national headquarters above brigade level (see Chart 1), particularly from the perspective of ascertaining their individual and collective weaknesses through an assessment of their structures and the organization of their headquarters.

Second, in light of the organizational and resulting operational problems associated with bi-/multi-national structures which this essay will document, how should they be reformed the better to achieve the objectives of Alliance strategy, let alone contribute to an improved integrated command structure? Moreover, how should the conditions by which the Alliance and nations contribute forces to these formations be reformed? It is, of course, a facile task to propose militarily-sound changes to command structures and procedures in a political vacuum. However, one cannot ignore the truism that command is inherently a *political* act and, consequently, national political agendas frequently clash over command issues in NATO. Accordingly, *national* political factors must be taken into account when addressing the reorganization of bi-/multi-national structures *in Europe* and the manner by which multinational force commanders must command them. The
reader will not find, therefore, sweeping or radical recommendations for fundamental reorganization of structures in this essay. Bi-/multi-nationality in NATO has been an evolutionary and, at times, painful process. The prudent reformer must, therefore, work within this reality.

This essay is organized in the following manner. The first substantive chapter provides an overview of the conditions and issues which have an impact upon the ultimate flexibility of NATO bi-/multi-national headquarters. The objective of this section is to impress upon the reader that these headquarters have introduced into NATO political fora and military commands issues which before 1991 were largely national responsibilities. This is simply no longer the case. Whereas senior Alliance and national officials have been quick to embrace the concept of multinationality, they have been equally reticent to address the difficult financial, political, and legal challenges which must be solved if multinational forces are to be militarily effective beyond their political value.

The third chapter offers a brief description of the headquarters assessed in this essay. To avoid overwhelming the reader with too many organizational details, this section provides a concise overview of the formations and focuses on their political nuances, as well as problems in their ability to meet their mission statements. A
more detailed organizational description of each headquarters is found in individual appendixes.

The fourth chapter offers a number of observations concerning the need to reform the practices by which the Alliance currently “commands” multinational land formations. It also assesses the ability of various headquarters and formations to accomplish their stated missions and offers suggestions for improving their ability to meet their respective mission statements.

The fifth chapter contains concluding remarks and proffers a number of recommendations with the aim of improving the Alliance's ability to employ bi-/multi-national land headquarters, recommendations which, in their entirety, will provide a plan to reform how the Alliance currently envisages the operation of multinational land formations in peace, crisis and war. This reform plan has been developed with the view of not intruding too harshly upon national political sensitivities. And it is the near term which should drive the reformation of these headquarters. For it is surely sound policy to reform the manner by which NATO commands these formations before the Alliance begins integrating the armies of new NATO members following enlargement.
Factors Affecting Multinational Operations

It is not an overstatement to argue that, during the Cold War, NATO was ambivalent about multinational land formations below the corps level, and in fact those few which existed were never tested in action.¹ The Alliance's equivocation over multinational land forces was understandable: by allowing armies to operate according to their preferences, they were able to adhere to the important principle of war, simplicity. Thus, with the exception of the ACE Mobile Force-Land and Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (Corps LANDJUT), integration of NATO land forces in the Central Region was effected at the national corps level by two Army Groups: Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and Central Army Group (CENTAG). But these two Principal Subordinate Commanders (PSCs) had only limited peacetime authorities, and issues such as training, doctrine, logistics, rules of engagement (ROE), etc., were largely a national, vice Alliance, responsibility.² At a time when the mission was Article V collective defense, eight national corps, aligned in a “layer cake” fashion within established corps boundaries, and integrated at the Army Group level, were appropriate. By focusing at the Army Group level, NATO did not need to explore ways the better to effect cooperation in the politically sensitive areas of, for example, training, operational doctrine, and logistics.

NATO's hesitancy toward multinational land forces underwent a sea change in 1990 and 1991.³ By the time that the Cold War was officially declared over at the NATO London Summit (July 1990), Alliance states were engaged in competitive disarmament. At the same time, they were reexamining the need to maintain national corps forward deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Some even questioned their financial (as well as political) ability to maintain national corps structures.⁴ Defense ministers, therefore, determined that new force structure guidelines were needed to: 1) enable the Alliance to respond to the altered security environment, and 2) protect force structure through the integration of national formations into bi-/multi-national corps and divisions. So keen were ministers to protect force structure that the announcement of new force structure categories: 1) immediate and rapid reaction, 2) main defense, and 3) augmentation, actually preceded the public release of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept.⁵ The initial plans for multinational formations as established in Military Committee guidance
(MC) 317 were quickly overtaken by unilateral arms reductions. One corps was not created (a Belgian-led corps), two others were merged (the I German/I Netherlands corps), while another not initially envisaged was created (the European Corps—"EUROCORPS"), in addition to the now widespread practice of assigning forces to multiple higher commands, demonstrates that this effort to maintain force structure was only partially successful.

The following discussion assesses the key factors which now affect the organization and operation of bi-/multi-national land headquarters. While many of the problematic aspects of multinationality may appear self-evident, the political rationale opposing reform may not be so well known. The issues addressed are: 1) the altered Alliance integrated command structure as it has affected land forces, 2) new political oversight bodies, 3) new missions, 4) command authority requirements, 5) organizational models, 6) the legal status of structures, 7) standardization, and 8) logistics. The reader needs to be ever mindful, however, that political reservations over surrendering national sovereignty exact a cost in terms of operational effectiveness and producing inflexible military structures.

**Altered NATO Command Structure.** An important, but perhaps not widely appreciated factor which could influence command of bi-/multi-national formations in NATO is the altered and still evolving NATO command structure as it affects the Central Region. This is a particularly important point given that most bi-/multi-national land headquarters are located within the Central Region and would either fight in the region, or would be deployed and supported from there. As will be argued, the creation of new command arrangements has not resulted in clarity of command lines. Moreover, future fundamental change to the existing command structure can be expected should the Alliance ever find consensus to endorse the recommendations of the Long Term Study.

In January 1991, the International Military Staff (IMS) at NATO headquarters began work on reorganizing the NATO Command Structure, incorporating work done since the summer 1990 by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) Major Subordinate Commanders (MSCs), and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). During its meeting on May 26-27, 1992, the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) approved a new Command Structure for the Northern and Central Regions of ACE, which included a reduction in personnel by 25 percent. As part of this reorganization, the two Central Region Army Groups, NORTHAG and CENTAG (PSCs) were disestablished. On July 1, 1993, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), a PSC of Commander Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT), was established at the former CENTAG headquarters in Heidelberg. Commander LANDCENT's missions include:

1) contribute to the protection of peace and deterrence of aggression,
2) plan, prepare and direct operations of allocated land forces for the security and defense of his area of responsibility,
3) plan, coordinate, and conduct synchronized air/land operations in support of CINCENT's theater campaign, and
4) be prepared to conduct peace support operations (e.g., since December 1996, Commander LANDCENT has led the mission to stabilize peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina).10

Where command authority lines become muddled is in an interesting anomaly called Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP). Prior to the 1992 command reorganization, BALTAP was a PSC within Allied Forces Northern Europe. Following this reorganization, it was transferred to Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) as a geographically-defined and joint PSC, the only one in that MSC. While politically expedient from the perspective of a number of European allies, the arrangement has resulted in a lack of clarity as regards the multinational land component of Commander BALTAP, i.e., Corps LANDJUT.11 Notwithstanding the existence of provisions in MC guidance which foresees Corps LANDJUT being made available to Commander LANDCENT, as Commander LANDCENT is a functional PSC, he does not exercise coordinating or command authority over Commander Corps LANDJUT.12 In other words, the combination of geographic and functional command boundaries has resulted in a complex command relationship amongst the two PSCs and Corps LANDJUT.

Finally, although not endorsed as expected at the Madrid Summit, NATO command structures stand to undergo a fundamental restructuring in the future once the terms of the Long Term Study have been accepted by members.13 This study of the reorganization of the integrated command structure has been underway since autumn of 1994 and aims to reduce the number of allied headquarters and reorient those remaining the better to undertake future missions and support a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).14 For example, according to some reports, the number of NATO headquarters could fall from the current level of 65 to approximately 20. It has been reported that the existing levels of command will change from Major NATO Commander (MNC) to Strategic Commander (SC); MSC to Regional Commander (RC); PSC to JSRC or Component Commander; and Sub-PSC will be disbanded. Moreover, it would appear as though ACE will be divided into two RCs, North and South.15

It is uncertain how the Long Term Study will affect existing bi-/multi-national land headquarters. With the exception of the ARRC, Multinational Division Central (MND(C)) and Corps LANDJUT, all other bi-/multi-national land headquarters are not part of the integrated command structure and, therefore, not within the terms of this NATO study. Where there may be a negative impact on land bi-/multi-national headquarters is should LANDCENT be disestablished and a land component command in Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) not be established, as is currently envisaged by the Long Term Study.16 Should these eventualities come to pass, then NATO armies will have find it more difficult effecting closer ties at the critical nexus of where national land forces interface with the integrated command structure. This eventuality would also place greater responsibility on bi-/multi-national corps to integrate land forces and serve as a link
between the integrated command structure and national forces. In sum, the Long Term Study could result in the need for a reexamination of the role of bi-/multi-national land headquarters and their relationship with the integrated command structure.

New Political Oversight. One of the strengths of the NATO Alliance has been its standing political and military consultative structures which, once decisions have been made, allow for their rapid translation into military means. These structures also allow for constant political oversight over the execution of those decisions.\textsuperscript{17} The creation of bi-/multi-national formations has transformed the political relationship between Alliance political oversight and the forces themselves. Through the North Atlantic Council (NAC), every nation has influence over the lead up to, conduct over, and resolution of international crises affecting the Alliance. Many tactical and operational level issues related to land operations, which were formerly solely national responsibilities, are now of legitimate interest in the NAC because of smaller national contributions and a broader mission spectrum. In effect, a degree of political micro-management of military operations has been encouraged, particularly when the Alliance has undertaken peace support operations. While it is understandable that Alliance political oversight would be very close indeed when participating in such politically sensitive missions, that this senior Alliance political oversight can now reach down to the corps level and below is largely new. Albeit belatedly, the Alliance has responded to the call by some nations (e.g., France) for closer political-military coordination and consultation overseeing the conduct of peace support operations and the management of CJTFs through the creation of the Policy Coordination Group (making it permanent and dropping “Provisional” from its title), the Capabilities Coordination Cell, and the Combined Joint Planning Staff at the NAC’s spring 1996 meeting in Berlin.\textsuperscript{18}

Another new political factor affecting the operation of European multinational units is the creation of ministerial and general staff steering groups which oversee their operation and management. Most of these groups simply address themselves to the oversight of the headquarters. In one case, the 1 German/Netherlands Corps, its steering group has identified areas for greater integration, which has important political and legal implications.\textsuperscript{19} The realization of the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) in the form of European multinational formations has created ministerial oversight committees for these particular headquarters, which include strong representation from the political departments of foreign ministries. This point demonstrates the high degree of politicalization of these formations.

Apropos ESDI, the decision by Western European Union (WEU) allies to develop that organization’s operational role has resulted in the designation of military units that may be placed at the WEU’s disposal. Specified units and headquarters now have the ambiguous designation as “Force answerable to WEU” (FAWEU). Envisaged missions for these designated headquarters include peace support operations as defined by the WEU’s Petersburg Declaration (see below), and conceivably (albeit unlikely) collective defense. Outside of their notional use
in generic planning carried out by the WEU’s Planning Cell, specific WEU “requirements” of these forces do not exist.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{New Missions for Land Forces.} One of the most obvious, yet least appreciated, changes which now confronts NATO forces is the broadened mission spectrum: both for collective defense and peace support operations.\textsuperscript{21} Article V operations have always consisted of the collective defense of the territorial sovereignty of its members. In addition to recognizing the need to be prepared for new “risks” (weapons of mass destruction, proliferation and terrorism), what is new concerning the collective defense mission is that the Alliance must accomplish this by using largely bi-/multi-national formations and with a new focus toward the flanks, vice Central Europe. Thus, while the mission of collective defense has remained essentially the same, new “mission essential tasks” have arisen, i.e., to deploy and sustain forces outside of their traditional deployment areas.

How the Alliance intends to effect the collective defense mission is outlined in MC 400/1.\textsuperscript{22} In an era of strategic ambiguity and fewer standing forces, the Alliance abandoned the concept of a linear defense posture in favor of counter-concentration.\textsuperscript{23} Counter-concentration can take place at three distinct levels: strategic, operational and tactical. At the strategic level, counter-concentration includes the deployment of rapid reaction forces to the point of crisis. These rapid reaction forces could come from within the region, from other regions, or from rapid reaction forces controlled by the SACEUR. Main defense forces from within the region would deploy, if necessary, to reinforce the rapid reaction forces and counter-concentrate against an adversary. Augmentation forces, from within the region, as well as from throughout ACE (usually in the form of multinational corps), could counter-concentrate.

Counter-concentration at the operational level is established in the “Mobile Counter-Concentration Defense Concept,” largely developed at AFCENT. This concept calls for forces to possess greater mobility and flexibility than in the past to make up for smaller forces. The “Mobile Counter-Concentration Defense Concept” holds for rapid reaction forces to deploy to deter a threat, and failing that, screen an attacking force, while main defense forces (which have lower readiness requirements) will be deployed forward to block and/or counterattack the enemy.\textsuperscript{24} For the purpose of this study, “counter-concentration” pertains to the corps level and is a tactical maneuver, which could well be conducted within the operational and/or strategic context of Mobile Counter-Concentration.

The Mobile Counter-Concentration Concept has engendered controversy in the context of main defense multinational corps formations. At present, all four main defense corps in the Federal Republic of Germany possess a wartime structure of only two divisions. It has been argued that this is sufficient for a tactical blocking action, however, should operations require a convergent counterattack by an independent corps, a requisite third maneuver element\textsuperscript{25} is missing from the peacetime force structures of these main defense corps.\textsuperscript{26} Two problems become apparent at the tactical level apropos the Mobile Counter-Concentration Concept.
First, there are sufficient reaction forces in the Alliance (e.g., the ARRC has 10-divisions of which it plans to deploy no more than four) to provide additional forces to corps to carry out counter-concentration operations. However, the refusal by nations to preassign maneuver forces (let alone divisional troops) to these main defense corps mitigates against the development of habitual working relationships.

Second, with the exception of I German/Netherlands Corps, the other three main defense corps's commanding generals do not possess the wartime command authorities to task organize subordinated units for the purpose of creating an offensive force from existing peacetime force structure. Even if a corps commanding general possesses this particular command authority, task organizing a two-division force into three maneuver elements would have to be done at the expense of denuding divisions of a maneuver brigade and its logistics to support the necessary forces.

In the final analysis, these corps headquarters suffer from a lack of political commitment by nations in peacetime to meet their wartime missions, i.e., insufficient force structure. Supporters of these corps are justified in citing their inability to train adequately in peacetime for their wartime missions. However, given the ambiguous strategic environment, and as discovered in IFOR and SFOR where units were placed under the command of divisions with which they had no previous “habitual” relationships, it is clear that this may be “luxury” which few headquarters can expect in future. Therefore, there exists a tension between existing headquarters with their requirements to plan for main defense missions, and a reluctance among nations to provide the requisite resources and authorities to these corps commanding generals to achieve their stated objectives.

Another issue related to the viability of bi-/multi-national headquarters is the different mission orientations of the forces assigned by nations. For instance, the German contribution to the I German/Netherlands Corps (1st German Panzer Division) has a main defense mission (and is made up largely of conscripts), while Dutch forces (essentially the entire Royal Netherlands Army) have both main defense and reaction missions (to include peace support operations). Given that this command in 1996 was designed as a FAWEU, one wonders as to the mission priorities (main defense or reaction) of the command.

Following the June 1992 Oslo NAC Ministerial meeting, the Alliance agreed to the principle of participating in U.N.-sanctioned peace support operations on a case-by-case basis. As defined by MC 327, “NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations,” and “Bi-NMC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations,” the specific missions envisaged are:

1) conflict prevention;
2) peacemaking;
3) peacekeeping;
4) humanitarian aid;
5) peace enforcement;
6) peace building.
Shortly after this NATO announcement, an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council was held in Petersberg, Germany (June 1992), where the WEU announced that military units from WEU nations could be employed in what has become known as “Petersberg Missions”:

1) humanitarian and rescue tasks;
2) peacekeeping tasks;
3) tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peacemaking.

Significantly, in order not to interfere with NATO commitments by dual member states, the WEU declared, “The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defense of all allies.” At the 1996 NATO Berlin ministerials, in addition to endorsing the future development of the CJTF concept, the Alliance agreed to support with its assets CJTF operations led by the WEU.

In short, many NATO headquarters and national forces must be prepared to conduct a wider range of Article V missions and peace support operations, as well as contribute forces to, or take command of, multinational deployments outside of traditional areas of operation. These operations could be conducted by a CJTF, executed under either the political authority of NATO or the WEU. While perhaps seemingly obvious, this statement of fact has wide-spread implications for the structure and operation of these bi-/multi-national headquarters.

Command Authorities. In an era where “command” is increasingly thought of in terms of technological systems (i.e., “control”), one should remember that “commanders” remain, to quote a recently retired CINCENT, “personally responsible for the conduct of operations within their command.” Therefore, the command authorities granted to a multinational force commander will govern the degree to which he can successfully execute his missions. This particular issue has proven to be politically vexatious in that no multinational force commander of the formations assessed in this essay has the same command authority over subordinated foreign units as he would have in an equivalent national command. To be sure, issues related to administrative matters, or as referred to in NATO as “Full Command” (i.e., the power to “enforce”) are, and will always remain, within the purview of a sovereign state. Yet, no one would seriously challenge a national corps or division commander's professional responsibility to meet the training and readiness standards established by his higher authorities. Current command arrangements or practices in NATO hinder the achievement of these goals.

In NATO, a multinational force commander can be granted four levels of command authority: 1) Operational Command (OPCOM), 2) Operational Control (OPCON), 3) Tactical Command (TACOM), and 4) Tactical Control (TACON). Chart 2 provides the official NATO definitions of these terms, while Chart 3 identifies the particular authority under each command authority. An examination of NATO command authorities demonstrates a weakness in that their applicability is essentially limited to the operational employment of forces, as opposed to addressing crucial peacetime preparation activities (i.e., establishing training and
logistics standards and priorities). NATO multinational force commanders often have only “Coordinating Authority” in peacetime which, significantly, is not a command authority (see Chart 4). Command authorities, unto themselves therefore, do not reveal the true level of multinational integration. Rather, the establishing document and implementing agreements of the formations must be assessed to ascertain the peacetime authorities of the multinational force commander over subordinate units.34

At Chart 5 the current command authorities given to the multinational force commander of the formations assessed in this study are presented. The lack of uniformity of command authorities at similar levels of command underscores the fact that national political authorities and NATO have been unable to agree on what constitutes the basic command authority requirements of a multinational force commander to employ his forces effectively. In a qualified sense this is understandable given national sensitivities of allowing a foreign commander to influence, let alone have responsibility over, such areas as logistics and training.
The Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff (CR-CAST) became acutely aware of command authority problems for multinational force commanders, particularly during exercises. For instance, in May 1994, at the Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff Talks 1/94, General M. J. Wilmink, RNLA, Commander LANDCENT, related a recent exercise experience. He directed a subordinate force to reallocate forces to another national force to react to the battlefield situation. The time required for the subordinate commander to gain approval from his national authorities nearly cost Commander LANDCENT the battle. Experiences of Commander ARRC similarly highlighted limitations of his authority to direct and

<table>
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<th>Chart 3. Comparison of NATO Command Authorities.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assign Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign Tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassign Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Granted to a Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ Unit Components Separately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassign OPCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain OPCON</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegate OPCON</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegate to a Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior to TACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign TACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain TACON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate TACON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Direction &amp; Control of Movements and Maneuver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day-to-Day Direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support/Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics Control</td>
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Source: Command authority definitions are established in MC 57.3, “Overall Organization of the Integrated NATO Forces,” July 23, 1986, NATO CONFIDENTIAL.
task organize his forces to maintain control of his operational situation. Simply put, the two commanders did not possess the necessary command authorities to direct and organize subordinate national forces to accomplish their missions and react to changing circumstances.\textsuperscript{35} This experience in exercises presaged Commander ARRC’s difficulties during the force’s deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of IFOR in 1995/96.\textsuperscript{36}

### Chart 4.
**Definition of Coordinating Authority.**

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.

01/07/85


The members of the CR-CAST formed a working group to study the command authority requirements for a multinational force commander. Members of Central Region armies which participated in the working group were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Observers were present from SHAPE, AFCENT, BALTAP, and LANDCENT. A key task for the working group was to investigate command authority requirements for Article V (traditional defense of the Alliance) and non-Article V (peace support operations) missions.

The working group, delivered its findings in September 1994. Many of the conclusions and recommendations of the CR-CAST working group (both Phase I and Phase II) have been adopted by Bi-MNC working groups which have been developing the CJTF concept. The principal conclusions reached by the working group are as follows:\textsuperscript{37}

1) An assessment of Article V and non-Article V missions (and mission-essential tasks), the Alliance's new force structure, and the Alliance's New Strategic Concept indicates that a multinational force commander has a clear requirement for OPCON for five of the six non-Article V missions, and OPCOM for peace enforcement and Article V missions.

2) While there are no legal or constitutional proscriptions in any of the Central Region countries to prevent granting OPCOM to a multinational force commander, political sensitivities may preclude such a decision.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Command Authority</th>
<th>OPCON/OPCOM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Corps LANDJUT/&quot;Multinational Corps Northeast&quot;</td>
<td>OPCON/OPCOM* (in wartime)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2 | I German/Netherlands Corps† | OPCON (in peacetime)  
OPCOM (when employed) |
| 3 | V U.S./German Corps | OPCON (in wartime) |
| 4 | II German/U.S. Corps | OPCON (in wartime) |
| 5 | ACE Rapid Reaction Corps  
a) National Divisions  
b) Multinational Division (Central)† | OPCON (in wartime)  
OPCOM* |
| 6 | 1st United Kingdom Armored Division  
Danish International Mechanized Brigade | OPCON (in wartime)  
Coordinating Authority (in peacetime) |
| 7 | 3rd United Kingdom Division  
Italian Ariete Mechanized Brigade | OPCON (in wartime)  
Coordinating Authority (in peacetime) |
| 8 | 3rd Italian Division  
Portuguese Independent Airborne Brigade | OPCON (in wartime)  
Coordinating Authority (in peacetime) |
| 9 | European Corps (EUROCORPS)† | OPCOM (when deployed) |
| 10 | European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR)† | OPCOM (when deployed) |

* By agreement, Commander Corps LANDJUT has OPCON of forces under his command in wartime. However, in exercises, it has been the tradition for 30 years for Commander Corps LANDJUT to exercise OPCOM.

† “Force Answerable to the Western European Union (FAWEU)”.

‡ Headquarters Multinational Division (Central) is OPCOM to Commander ARRC in peacetime.

* Assigned brigades are under OPCON to Commander MND(C) in wartime.
3) The use of the standing integrated command structure in non-Article V missions may well encourage participating states to grant OPCOM. In this established command structure every nation has the ability to influence decisions at the NAC/DPC, which should provide added reassurance to countries granting OPCOM to a multinational force commander.

4) National ROE must be harmonized and made compatible with those of multinational force commanders, prior to transfer of authority (TOA), i.e., when a force is released from national operational command lines to a multinational force commander.

5) Significant differences in doctrine and terminology exist in NATO and leading allied forces regarding peace support operations, which could inhibit the successful execution of a NATO non-Article V operation.

In the final analysis, many of the problems which plague NATO multinational force commanders in the execution of their mission statements can be traced to inadequate, or ambiguous, command authorities and peacetime coordination arrangements. More structured guidance establishing the command authority requirements of NATO multinational force commanders would remove a significant problem inhibiting the effective operation of NATO bi-/multi-national forces. For, unless a corps level commander has the ability to task organize forces and change missions on deployment, let alone influence training objectives and establish logistics requirements and priorities for his subordinate units in peacetime, then one can question whether he is truly a “corps commanding general.”

Organizational Templates. The organizational structures chosen for the corps and divisions generally fall into three categories. First, there is the framework structure where a lead nation provides the legal basis for the headquarters. As such, the lead nation dominates the operation of the headquarters, to include providing the lion's share of the finances for its operations (see Chart 6). In consequence, the commander, often the chief of staff, and key staff officers of the headquarters are from the lead nation. Second, binational formations exist in two quite distinct manifestations (see Chart 7). There is the 1 German/Netherlands Corps which strives for complete integration on the basis of equal proportionality in peace, crisis and war. The two German-U.S. binational corps, on the other hand, are solely wartime arrangements with no meaningful peacetime integration. Third, there is

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), Mönchengladbach, Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division, Herford, Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 3rd United Kingdom Division, Bulford, United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 3rd Italian Division, Milan, Italy</td>
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the multinational structure where the headquarters is established upon the principle of multinationality and participating nations are represented in the headquarters proportionally to their overall contribution (see Chart 8).38

Bi-/multi-national headquarters do not strictly follow any particular template in their organization: each is *sui generis*. The I German/Netherlands binational

<table>
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<th>Chart 7. Binational Formations.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) I German/Netherlands Corps, Münster, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) V U.S./German Corps, Heidelberg, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) II German/U.S. Corps, Ulm, Germany</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corps has the ambitious objective of literally *merging* both armies. Conversely, the two German/U.S. corps have a very limited degree of integration while maintaining the rubric of “multinationality.”

One cannot make a case that one type of organizational structure is inherently more operationally effective or demonstrates more or less of a political commitment than the other. Each formation’s organization and the national interests of the participants must be examined individually. That said, there are operational and political costs associated with each model. For example, the ARRC, as a British framework organization, has strong British government support. As a result, it has proven its ability to deploy outside of the Central Region to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to command peace support operations in IFOR. However, that it is so overwhelmingly dominated by British officers in senior command and staff positions is a point of dissatisfaction often privately expressed by European defense officials. Additionally, should the British government decide not to participate in a specific operation, the Alliance would have to choose another corps headquarters or find replacement staff and headquarters support from a denuded ARRC headquarters; neither is an appealing choice.

<table>
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<th>Chart 8. Multinational Formations.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (Corps LANDJUT)/“Multinational Corps Northeast,” Rendsburg, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Multinational Division (Central), Mönchengladbach, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) European Corps (EUROCORPS), Strasbourg, France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR), Florence, Italy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Legal Status. An important, but heavily nuanced aspect of bi-/multi-national land headquarters assessed in this study is that they fall under different legal regimes. The type of legal status will dictate many of the fundamental aspects of how the headquarters operates and will affect its flexibility. For instance, the I German/Netherlands Corps is a binational corps, without international legal personality. Therefore, many questions relating to the operation of the headquarters must be addressed individually, e.g., whose national laws apply: those of Germany or the Netherlands? Conversely, Corps LANDJUT is a recognized NATO headquarters and, therefore, has international legal personality, despite the fact the headquarters no longer receives NATO infrastructure funding. One should recall, however, that except for the ARRC, MND(C) and Corps LANDJUT, all other land formation headquarters assessed in this essay are not formally part of the integrated command structure.

To complicate matters further, the creation of multinational headquarters amongst Western European nations outside of the NATO integrated structure has created unique legal problems. The EUROCORPS headquarters, for example, still lacks juridical status. Thus, while negotiation among the five participants continues, the nettlesome issue of the applicability of national laws and the question of the applicability of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) have complicated the operation of the headquarters. As this headquarters, as well as the European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR), is not part of the Alliance's integrated military command; upon establishment, the question arose whether separate status of forces agreements were required. Had the headquarters been established along the legal guidelines of NATO, these problems would have been simplified by the existence of the NATO SOFA, which can be modified by separate supplemental agreements between countries. While perhaps a seemingly minor matter, the varying legal statuses of these headquarters could complicate their effective operation. For instance, should a headquarters that has not been established within the auspices of NATO be deployed with other NATO armies, let alone with non-participating states, needless legal issues would have to be resolved before the headquarters could be effectively employed.

Standardization. NATO defines standardization as constituting effective levels of: 1) compatibility, 2) interoperability, 3) interchangeability, and 4) commonality in the areas of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs. Given the national political realities which govern weapons procurement, the NATO experience in this area has been spotty. Despite a diminution in defense procurement budgets after the Cold War, interestingly, a contraction in the Western armaments industry may, over the mid- to long-term, have a positive impact upon standardization of equipment as the number of systems diminish and countries are forced into cooperative armament programs.

If NATO political authorities expect bi-/multi-national land formations to be more than mere manifestations of political solidarity, operational compatibility at the division and corps level becomes a more immediate priority than in the Cold War. The degree to which interoperability has been achieved so far varies from
formation to formation. Not surprisingly, one tends to find financial resources and attention given to interoperability within national forces oriented toward reaction, as opposed to main defense, missions. These forces tend to have more funding to participate in command post and field exercises (CPXs and FTXs, respectively) with their counterparts, which enables the development and validation of standing operating instructions (SOIs). However, this is not an absolute rule. Again, the I German/Netherlands Corps is not designated as having a reaction mission, despite being a “FAWEU.” Nevertheless, the strong political commitment between The Hague and Bonn has resulted in emphasis being placed on achieving interoperability, even to the point of changing national laws where required.

Logistics. During the Cold War, the NATO logistics concept was based upon the principle that logistics are a national responsibility: each nation was expected to provide its own combat service support (CSS). That which was not available to armies forward deployed was contracted through Host Nation Support agreements. Since 1989, nations have reduced their combat structures, and to an even greater extent, their CSS structures. In view of the shortage of CSS capabilities, nations will only assign them to bi-/multi-national formations on a case-by-case basis and most emphasis is now being given to supporting peace support operations, thereby making the requirements for robust logistics even more immediate. As a result of these reductions in logistics, none of the main defense corps in the Central Region currently have all of their corps troops assigned in peacetime.

One might think that the attractions of effecting defense efficiencies through economies of scale within multinational formations; opportunities which did not exist during the Cold War, would be overwhelmingly attractive. Unfortunately, national laws (i.e., the title of property and restrictions regarding its usage and distribution) and the question of finances (i.e., can a foreign commander obligate national funds?), have confounded efforts to effect multinational logistics cooperative arrangements. Not surprisingly, absent an Alliance-wide understanding and agreement on multinational logistics, multinational force commanders have had to find solutions within narrow parameters. As a result, solutions have been individually crafted by NATO multinational force commanders which meet the political, legal, and financial constraints placed upon them by nations and have been limited to an admixture of role specialization and lead nation concepts, within the ever-available caveat that “logistics remain a national responsibility.” Given limited successes toward achieving a functioning multinational logistics concept, it is little wonder that the early multinational logistics record of IFOR was widely assessed as being less than successful.

To the credit of the Alliance, the establishment of bi-/multi-national formations has forced allied military authorities to revisit Cold War assumptions regarding logistics. MC 319, “NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics,” was approved by the DPC in September 1992, but has subsequently had to be revised due to the modification of MC 400, which provides greater specificity to the widened spectrum of NATO's responsibilities. A second edition of MC 319/1 (second revision, October 17, 1996) establishes new prerogatives over logistics by
multinational force commanders, to include recognition that logistics are not solely a national responsibility. Multinational force commanders also have been given the authority to “coordinate” logistics (N.B.: “Coordinating Authority” does not include the ability to compel) within their commands. Moreover, multinational land force commanders below the PSC level technically have the wartime authority to redistribute resources if required to redress unanticipated shortages, albeit this is not intended to overcome national stockpile deficiencies. Further specificity for multinational logistics was provided by Commander LANDCENT in his “Logistic Concept for Multinational Land Forces at the Component and Corps Level,” December 1995. However, a close reading of MC 319/1 and the LANDCENT concept demonstrates that the exceptions and caveats made in these documents leave much to be desired in providing the multinational force commander with the ability to influence the logistic requirements of subordinated units.

The CR-CAST, acutely aware of the logistic problems associated with multinational force commanders, established a working group in September 1993 to examine the logistic organizational responsibilities and authorities of multinational forces, particularly as they pertain to out-of-area peace support operations. Following the recommendations of this working group and a series of validation exercises conducted by CINCENT, a NATO General Officer Steering Group was established to assess these exercises and provide recommendations. Alas, the Group’s recommendations for the creation of Combined Logistics Centers and the establishment of Theater Movement Control Centers have yet to be accepted by nations and implemented.

Multinationality: A Capharnaum. From this précis of factors which influence the operation of bi-/multi-national formations declared to NATO, three major fundamental weaknesses become apparent. First, multinational corps commanders are being directed to command formations without sufficient peacetime command authorities to accomplish their wartime tasks. As a result, already difficult issues such as planning for logistic requirements are being inhibited by insufficient command authority. In short, NATO political authorities have created multinational “corps commanders” in name only.

Second, as each formation is, in effect, sui generis, due to the differing political objectives and degrees of national willingness to cede authority in peacetime to commanders by participating states, NATO finds itself possessing nine different corps and divisional bi-/multi-national land formation headquarters, and two different corps and divisional European-led headquarters which now, or could in future, fall under its wartime command. Each of these headquarters possesses its own particular political mandate, manner in which political and operational business is conducted, and some of which do not use both NATO official languages, etc. Many current practices relating to the conduct of operations and running bi-/multi-national headquarters need to be reformed and standardized if they are to be capable of operating as effective land component commands under a CJTF.
Third, as a result of these two key factors, it is difficult to accept the proposition that NATO has succeeded in creating a flexible multinational land component command structure as envisaged under the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Notwithstanding the impending revision of the New Strategic Concept, the fundamental requirement for flexible NATO force structures and headquarters will remain unchanged. A review of the efforts of many European allies to restructure their forces the better to undertake reaction missions indicates that national forces are moving toward achieving greater employment flexibility. This reform effort must now be accompanied by Alliance efforts to ensure that bi-/multi-national land headquarters have the necessary flexibility to command varied forces in a wide array of missions. In fact, once the Alliance expands its membership eastward, one would expect an increased need for greater flexibility in existing bi-/multi-national corps and division headquarters to facilitate the integration of these new allies. But, prior to the Alliance contemplating the integration of the formations of these new Allies into the integrated command structure, it is imperative that NATO first reform existing bi-/multi-national land headquarters.

Before we can turn to the important question of how the Alliance should reform its existing land formations and “European” headquarters, one must first become acquainted with the general and nuanced aspects of the formations addressed in this essay. To these fascinating manifestations of Alliance solidarity and political conciliation the discussion now turns.
3

Multinational Land Formations in Europe

In the interest of brevity and not wishing to overwhelm the reader with a mass of facts and data, the following descriptions of the bi-/multi-national land formations in Europe are purposefully general in nature. Detailed information on how the individual “new factors” addressed in the previous chapter have been applied and are now manifested in each of these headquarters is contained in Appendixes A-K. This chapter seeks to acquaint the reader with the political rationale behind the creation of these formations and to identify key weaknesses and problems. With this information in hand, the next chapter suggests reforms to improve their operational flexibility.

Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (Corps LANDJUT)/"Multinational Corps Northeast." (See Appendix A).

Corps LANDJUT was established in 1962 following the Oslo Agreement (November 1961), when NATO determined the need for a combined and joint headquarters to be responsible for the defense of the Baltic. As a result of its long lineage, Corps LANDJUT is the most highly developed multinational corps structure in the Alliance. NATO staff procedures are employed, and MC guidance, Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs) and Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) are followed. Despite the lack of native English-speakers, the headquarters's language is English.
On May 24, 1994, the German and Danish chiefs of defense and the SACEUR signed a new Memorandum of Understanding confirming the continued need for a corps-size main defense force in Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein. One could seriously question the continued military requirement for Corps LANDJUT: Schleswig-Holstein and the Jutland peninsula no longer need to defend against a rapid armored offensive through northern Germany. Yet, there is strong support in Germany and Denmark to continue this arrangement. At the political level, a combined corps whose remit is only operational planning manifests mutual reassurance and commitment between a unified Germany and a small Denmark. At the military level, the Danish army particularly benefits from the relationship since this enables it to maintain proficiency in corps level operations, which it would be unable to do unilaterally. As will be discussed in the next chapter, once Poland joins NATO, a Polish division is to join Corps LANDJUT and the headquarters will be moved to Szczecin (Stettin) in Poland on the Baltic coast.

On the problematic side of the equation, Corps LANDJUT suffers from a number of weaknesses:

1) Currently the corps has assigned one German and one Danish mechanized division. Consequently, it lacks in peacetime a third division which limits its ability to train for counter-concentration operations. (This is to be rectified once Warsaw becomes a member of NATO and the 12th Polish Mechanized Division will be committed to this corps).

2) The corps lacks assigned corps troops.

3) The U.S. and Canada no longer post personnel to Rendsburg. Corps officials feel this has limited the ability of the headquarters to achieve a wider operational orientation in an ambiguous strategic environment.

4) Commander Corps LANDJUT officially has only OPCON over subordinate forces for Article V missions despite the endorsed findings of a CR-CAST working group which found such missions required OPCOM.

I German/Netherlands Corps. (See Appendix B).

Initial planning for the creation of multinational formations in 1991 called for the I Netherlands Corps to be a framework arrangement with one Dutch division, one German division from I German Corps in Münster (which would have a second
Dutch division), and one British division (which would also be earmarked for the ARRC). By early 1993, however, emerging deep reductions in German and Dutch force structures required both countries to reassess the viability of maintaining two distinct framework corps. Unlike the decision by Denmark to maintain an existing corps structure whose mission is solely operational planning, German and Dutch defense ministers in March 1993 decided to fuse the I German and I Netherlands corps. By August 1993, a bilateral working group recommended an integrated, bilateral corps structure and the headquarters was officially declared operational in August 1995. Operating on the basis that the two countries share similar values and possess a common view toward European integration, the two governments have determined the objective of essentially merging the two armies in this corps structure. Notably, the Corps Commanding General is the only one in Europe who enjoys OPCON in peacetime.

This corps structure is different from any other bi-/multi-national formation in Europe. I German/Netherlands Corps staff have responsibility for both national, as well as binational, operational matters. Thus, the Corps Chief of Staff is apprised of all national business, before taskings are passed to the senior national officer for action, i.e., the Corps Commander or Deputy Commander. By working to “merge” the two armies within this structure, the two defense ministers have agreed, in principle, to seek to change national laws where necessary to achieve this goal. Accordingly, the two governments have the stated aim of providing the Corps Commander, irrespective of nationality, the ability of exercising the equivalent of Full Command over the corps headquarters and subordinate units. Significantly, I German/Netherlands Corps has been chosen to act as the land component command headquarters in the CPX ALLIED EFFORT in November 1997, which will begin the validation process of the NATO CJTF concept.

This ambitious military objective of creating a functional binational integrated corps structure has not been without its own operational and bureaucratic problems:

1) The mission of the corps is to plan and prepare for main defense operations. However, the Dutch contribution to the corps, the entire Royal Netherlands Army (minus the 11th Netherlands Airmobile Brigade which has a wartime assignment to MND(C)), also undertakes other missions, to include peace support operations. The wartime contribution from the German Army, 1st German Panzer Division, is part of the Field Army and is largely made up of conscripts. The different missions between Dutch (full spectrum) and German (main defense) forces have limited the corps’s exercise scope, let alone planning for its potential employment. German reaction forces within the Corps (7th German Panzer Division) are only attached for peacetime administrative purposes.

2) Like Corps LANDJUT, I German/Netherlands Corps has a main defense mission, but it lacks in peacetime a third division which limits its ability to train for counter-concentration operations.
3) The I German/Netherlands Corps has been designated a “FAWEU.” What effect this declaration will have on the mission orientation of the corps (i.e., will it become reaction, vice main defense?) is as yet unclear.

4) The Corps was established before the creation of the German Army's Heeresführungskommando (“German Army Forces Command”) in Koblenz whose mission is, *inter alia*, to ensure the “operational readiness of the major combined arms units of the Army.”\(^1\) \(^2\) Exactly who (i.e., the Corps Commanding General or the Befehlshaber Heeresführungskommando) has the ultimate responsibility for establishing training objectives over German units in the corps, as laid down in the “Authority and Responsibilities of the Commander of I German/Netherlands Corps,” has been a contentious issue.\(^1\)

5) The Netherlands Army Support Command is assigned (during peace and wartime) to the 1st Netherlands Mechanized Division. Conversely, almost all German Army support assets are consolidated into three logistic brigades and one medical brigade during peacetime and fall under the command of the Heerestunterstützungskommando (Army Logistic Command) in Koblenz and Mönchengladbach. This has had the effect of limiting integrated logistics planning.

V U.S./German and II German/U.S. corps. (See Appendixes C and D).

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\text{XX} \\
\text{Bad Kreuznach (Peacetime)} \\
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\text{XX} \\
\text{München (Peacetime)} \\
\text{XX} \\
\text{Mainz (Peacetime)} \\
\text{XX} \\
\text{Sigmaringen (Peacetime)} \\
\text{XX} \\
\text{Bad Kreuznach (Wartime)} \\
\end{array}
\]

N.B.: 1st US Armored Division is also assigned to the ARRC.
If the I German/Netherlands Corps stands as the apotheosis of binational integration at the corps level, then the epitome of non-integration is clearly the two German/U.S. corps. The “binational” corps structure\(^{31}\) chosen by these two countries is only a wartime cross assignment of one division each for main defense missions, primarily in the Central Region.\(^{35}\) The two corps headquarters remain national and cooperation is effected through the presence of a small number of exchange staff officers. The exchanged divisions must possess their organic combat support and CSS formations, while the lead nation provides all corps troops.\(^{36}\)

The rationale for adopting this structure was largely to protect existing force structure. A “shallow” binational template was clearly the most simple to effect and would cause the least amount of dislocation for both parties. One could argue that given the mission of these two corps, main defense missions in the Central Region (no matter how unlikely), such an arrangement is appropriate, i.e., the corps would never be employed. The problems associated with these formations are:

1) Both corps have only two divisions in wartime, and therefore lack an assigned third division in peacetime which limit their ability to train for counter-concentration operations.

2) On deployment, the corps commanding generals have only OPCON over subordinate forces for Article V missions despite the endorsed findings of a CR-CAST working group which found such missions required OPCOM.\(^{37}\)

*ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).* (See Appendix E).
The ARRC was created in the very early days of what has become known as the post-Cold War era. Britain led the move to create a reaction force headquarters capable for employment throughout ACE (operations outside of NATO territory had yet to be accepted by the Alliance). Coincidentally, because all of the British Army has not been stationed in the United Kingdom in modern times, there were fears privately expressed by British defense officials that unless a new (high profile) mission could be found for the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), the British Army would be eviscerated by Treasury. Therefore, even before specific NATO multinational formations were announced, the decision to create the ARRC, as a British-led framework corps in Germany, was agreed by the DPC in May 1991.

This decision was not made, however, without considerable controversy which spilled over into the press. Following British operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, where the British Army was able to deploy a division to the Persian Gulf, it was indeed remarkable that Bonn challenged London for command of this headquarters. Given Bonn's reluctant participation in the Allied Mobile Force-Air deployment to eastern Turkey in early 1991, the likelihood of Germany attaining a leadership position in the ARRC was problematic at best. Nonetheless, German defense officials continue privately to express criticisms of British domination of the ARRC. This does not seem to have improved despite the deployment of the headquarters to Ilizda in 1995 and 1996 as the land component command for IFOR.

And, indeed, the ARRC headquarters is unabashedly British dominated. Its headquarters is located on a British base at Mönchengladbach, Germany. The Commanding General, Chief of Staff, and sixty percent of the staff are permanently British. Significantly, the Deputy Commanding General is an Italian, not a German, general officer. Essentially, most of the British Army is earmarked for the ARRC and most of the corps troops are British. In addition to two British framework divisions, there are six additional divisions, the division-size Spanish Fuerza de Accion Rapida—FAR, and Multinational Division (South) (which has yet to be formed) earmarked to the corps, of which the ARRC would deploy not more than four in an operation. Given the British predominance in the ARRC headquarters and as the largest contributor of forces earmarked for the corps, it is difficult to imagine an operation carried out by the ARRC where London would not participate.

The principal weaknesses of the ARRC are:

1) The conceptual issue of its structure (i.e., framework) and its practical application (i.e., lead nation) have resulted in British domination of the corps, actual or perceived.

2) In the event that the British government decided not to participate in an operation, it would be very difficult for the Alliance to reconstitute the ARRC headquarters and, therefore, to employ it rapidly. Given that the ARRC is the preeminent reaction corps in ACE, and its mission is to demonstrate Alliance resolve in crisis, this is a troubling limitation.
3) Commander ARRC has only OPCON over subordinate national divisions for Article V and non-Article V missions despite the endorsed findings of a CR-CAST working group which found that Article V and peace enforcement missions required OPCOM.\(^\text{22}\)

*Multinational Division (Central) (MND(C)).* (See Appendix F).

The origins of MND(C) can be traced to the mid-1980s when NATO determined the requirement for creating a mobile force to block Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups. Feasibility studies were conducted by AFCENT just when the Cold War ended. Subsequent studies showed that the airmobile concept was valid for the post-Cold War era and a memorandum of understanding establishing MND(C) was signed by the defense ministers of Belgium, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands on January 15, 1992. The MND(C) headquarters was declared operational on April 1, 1994.\(^\text{23}\)

MND(C) officials claim that the division has successfully met its mission statement since it has achieved interoperability from the bottom up through an effective multinational staff and a series of FTXs and CPXs.\(^\text{24}\) Despite these accomplishments, some significant challenges have yet to be overcome:

1) Logistics remain a national responsibility, despite the fact that airmobile operations are heavily logistics dependent.

2) Commanding General MND(C) has only Coordinating Authority over logistics when deployed.

3) MND(C) lacks logistics and transport to conduct airmobile operations independently of the ARRC or outside of the Central Region. Indeed, tying MND(C) operationally to the ARRC is that some key British logistic formations committed to MND(C) are also dual-hatted for ARRC missions.
4) Despite the assignment of divisional troops, there remain deficiencies, e.g., airmobile divisional artillery.

*1st United Kingdom Armoured Division and the Danish International Mechanized Brigade.* (See Appendix G).

![Diagram](image)

N.B.: UK Bdes are organized for independent operations. They contain significant elements of logistic support.

By the early 1990s, it became apparent in Europe that, in the new security environment, reaction capabilities, vice main defense forces, were the new “coin of the realm” as defined in NATO’s political currency. One result of the post-Cold War restructuring of the Danish Army was the decision to create a reaction brigade (established July 1, 1994) which could be integrated into NATO. Danish and British Chiefs of Defense signed a letter of intent on December 13, 1994, affiliating the Danish International Mechanized Brigade with the 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division. The 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division remains a national framework division under which the Danish International Mechanized Brigade is subordinated when deployed. The Brigade’s missions are: defense of Denmark, the Danish contribution to the ARRC, U.N. peacekeeping, and Denmark's declared contribution to the U.N. Stand-By Forces High Readiness Brigade.

The task of creating a reaction brigade has been a major challenge to Danish defense officials. Denmark continues to base its army on conscription, yet, by law, conscripts cannot be required to serve abroad. To overcome this impediment, the brigade headquarters has only a cadre of 11 staff officers, and of its order of battle, only 20 percent are regulars, while the rest serve under a 3-year special contract. Of its planned wartime complement of 4,500, only 1,500 would be available in peacetime for external deployment at any one time. However, even attaining this modest peacetime strength of 1,500 has been difficult to achieve and resulted in postponing by a year the date that the brigade was declared fully operational. Given the difficulty Denmark has experienced in achieving peacetime manning objectives, it is not surprising that the unit has yet to undertake a brigade FTX.

It is difficult to criticize the Danish government for attempting to overcome the challenges of its national laws to create a reaction capability for Alliance missions. The decision to attach the brigade to the British Army is also noteworthy given the
latter's experience in deploying outside Europe for other than peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, one must not also be too uncritical of Danish efforts to date:

1) During peacetime deployments the brigade is no more than a reinforced battalion.

2) The degree to which the Danish Army takes its ARRC and British Army affiliation seriously can be questioned in that there is no permanent Danish Army presence in the 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division headquarters.

3) The lack of compatible communications links and different SOIs between the Danish International Mechanized Brigade and 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division continue to hamper the former's effective integration into the latter's order of battle.

4) Commanding General 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division has only Coordinating Authority in peacetime and OPCON on deployment and, therefore, cannot task organize Danish forces or change their mission.

5) Notwithstanding the official position that the Danish International Mechanized Brigade is "part" of the 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division's order of battle, British officials privately voice their skepticism of this statement.

3rd United Kingdom Division and the Italian Ariete Mechanized Brigade. (See Appendix H).

As the ARRC was being established, senior Italian and British military leaders agreed that a symbiotic relationship could be realized by the wartime assignment of an Italian mechanized brigade to the 3rd United Kingdom Division. As a result, the Ariete Brigade, a conscript unit, has been assigned to the 3rd United Kingdom Division. The Ariete Brigade brings a substantial contribution of firepower to the 3rd Division: 148 tanks with 120 mm guns which augment 100 British tanks. At the same time the Ariete Brigade, and indeed the entire Italian Army, have been exposed to British training and doctrine which emphasize force projection, areas in which the Italian Army heretofore has been weak.

Both armies apparently take the arrangement rather seriously. Each posts liaison officers (LNOs) to the other headquarters: the Ariete Brigade headquarters in Pordenone, the 3rd United Kingdom Division headquarters in Bulford, as well as

N.B.: UK Bdes are organized for independent operations. They contain significant elements of logistic support.
a British liaison officer at the 3rd Italian Division headquarters in Milan to coordinate ARRC business. On deployment, this liaison arrangement would expand significantly. Working groups also meet twice a year to address training and interoperability issues. The *Ariete* Brigade has even gone so far as to adopt the 3rd United Kingdom Division's SOIs.

On the negative side, a number of challenges to greater integration remain:

1) Both armies have very different equipment inventories and incompatible logistics.

2) The lack of British Italian-speaking officers and NCOs has been identified as an area of potential weakness on deployment.

3) There is also a different ethos as the British Army is a volunteer force (and heavily committed to operations), while the Italian Army remains based upon conscription, but is in the process of becoming a professional force.

4) Commanding General 3rd United Kingdom Division has only Coordinating Authority in peacetime and OPCON on deployment and, therefore, cannot task organize Italian forces or change their mission.

*3rd Italian Division and the Portuguese Independent Airborne Brigade.* (See Appendix I).

The Italian Army is in the midst of one of its most significant reorganizations. Announced in 1992, the army corps structure is to give way to divisional headquarters. An activation division staff was created on November 1, 1993, out of the 3rd Italian Army Corps staff in Milan. The corps has become the Italian Army's principal reaction divisional headquarters and is assigned to the ARRC.

Wishing to participate in the ARRC Portugal capitalized on its army's long-standing commitment to reinforce Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (LANDSOUTH) and its close relationship with the Italian Army, by earmarking its Independent Airborne Brigade for wartime assignment to the 3rd Italian Division. The Portuguese Army liaison arrangements with the 3rd Italian Division are significant. In addition to providing a Deputy Division Commanding General, there are 8 officers and NCOs integrated into the divisional staff. The Portuguese
participate in some of the division's CPXs and FTXs. On the negative side of the military capabilities ledger the current arrangement has the following problems:

1) There is a capabilities mismatch between the two Italian mechanized brigades and the Portuguese Independent Airborne Brigade.
2) There is as yet no Portuguese planned contribution of divisional troops to the 3rd Italian Division when deployed.
3) Commanding General 3rd Italian Division has only Coordinating Authority in peacetime and OPCON on deployment and, therefore, cannot task organize Portuguese forces or change their mission.

European Corps (EUROCORPS). (See Appendix J).

The EUROCORPS was conceived by senior German and French officials following French President François Mitterrand's July 1990 comments that impending German unification would result in the end of French military forces being stationed on German soil under a 1966 bilateral agreement. Subsequent French reflection and German opposition to the impending loss of French forces resulted in the announcement of the concept of a Franco-German corps following the Lille Summit in autumn 1991. Building upon the Franco-German Brigade created in 1986, an agreement to create a European corps, based upon the Franco-German corps agreement and open to all WEU allies (Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain subsequently have joined), was announced at the La Rochelle summit in May 1992. In brief, it is not an overstatement that the EUROCORPS was born out of a French desire to maintain a French military presence in Germany, as well as a German objective to move France closer to the NATO integrated command structure.

Assessing the EUROCORPS presents a paradox. It would be easy to dismiss the entire structure as constituting solely political, vice military, value. And indeed, there many aspects of the corps which gives one reason for skepticism: a profusion of almost ornate public relations materials (from what must be the largest public affairs staff section of any “corps” in the world), public parades and ostentatious photo “ops,” etc. Nonetheless, the forces earmarked by their
respective governments for this headquarters are far from being inconsequential and are oriented to carry out both main defense and reaction missions. Thus, while it appeared to some U.S. officials in the early 1990s that the creation of the EUROCORPS was potentially a challenge to the longevity of the integrated command structure, the fact remains that particularly France and Germany place high political value in the formation, and, therefore, one must accept the reality of its continued existence.

From an Alliance perspective, the EUROCORPS brings both advantages, as well as not inconsequential disadvantages. The corps can be transferred (OPCOM) to the SACEUR for both Article V and peace support operations, via the coordination agreement amongst the Chiefs of Defense of France and Germany and the SACEUR. This is the first time since 1966 that any French forces have been made available to NATO under OPCOM (vice OPCON) as established in the 1974 Valentin-Ferber agreement. Forces declared to the corps include the 1st French Armored Division, and in 1998, the 1st Spanish Mechanized Division; forces which otherwise would not fall directly within the NATO integrated command structure. At a time when it appeared that the Belgian Army would be without any corps affiliation (after the demise of the planned Belgian-led multinational corps) and the rebuff of its enquiries to join the I German/Netherlands Corps, its affiliation with the EUROCORPS was a well-timed development. For planning purposes, the corps has endeavored to adhere to some ACE guidance and is preparing to provide a corps-sized force for employment by CINCENT, a division for ACE-wide operations and a brigade-size force for operations outside of Europe. Interestingly, it is the only “corps” headquarters in the Central Region which is joint.

But just as the EUROCORPS brings some singular advantages to the Alliance, some important weaknesses remain to be addressed:

1) The headquarters (still) lacks juridical status and its legal relationship to the Alliance is too ambiguous. Except when dealing with main defense missions, unique staff procedures are being developed for peace support operations which are not entirely NATO compatible. How the headquarters could operate with other NATO commands and different subordinated forces could present legal and bureaucratic impediments to effective cooperation.

2) There are five official languages in EUROCORPS, although the headquarters languages are French and German. (NATO official languages are English and French; for practical purposes, the operational language of Alliance and the U.N. is English.)

3) The French government in 1996 decided to restructure the French Army and abolish its divisional structure. As part of this reorganization, Paris has announced that it will withdraw the 1st French Armored Division from Baden-Baden, Germany. Notwithstanding the French government's commitment to maintain a “divisional” commitment to the EUROCORPS, how this is to be effected has yet to be explained.
European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR). (See Appendix K).

EUROFOR has its origins in Italian anxiety that continuing Greek-Turkish disputes would foreclose establishing the proposed NATO Multinational Division (South) as part of the ARRC and a growing uneasiness in Rome over inadequate integrated NATO command coverage of the Western Mediterranean. AFSOUTH has traditionally focused on the Eastern Mediterranean (i.e., the Soviet threat) and this has not abated since 1991 (i.e., the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and continued Greek-Turkish tensions). Not to be discounted has been the Italian objective to counter-balance a strong Central Region/Central Europe focus (as represented by the creation of the EUROCORPS). Rome, acting a bit out of character for a country with such a long history of being a stalwart NATO ally, proposed creating the European Rapid Operational Force within the auspices of the WEU at the WEU Ministerial Council in November 1993. The agreement creating the EUROFOR (as well as the European Maritime Force–EUROMARFOR) was signed by Spain, Italy and France. Portugal, after examining the possibility of joining the EUROCORPS, requested joining the EUROFOR at this meeting.

Identifying precisely whether EUROFOR is a multinational formation or a planning headquarters is difficult. Headquartered at Caserma Predieri in Florence, Italy, the EUROFOR headquarters comprises 100 personnel from France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, represented in equal proportions. The staff's mission is to prepare plans for a force of up to division strength to undertake intervention missions as identified by the WEU Petersburg declaration. There are, however, no earmarked forces (this would depend upon the mission), only general national commitments of a brigade-size force. Although the EUROFOR has not conducted any exercises to date, Italy, Spain and France have conducted combined and joint non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) in the western Mediterranean almost annually since 1992.

Given its equivocal status toward NATO and a multinational headquarters with no earmarked forces, EUROFOR has similar weaknesses to that of the EUROCORPS:
1) The headquarters's relationship to NATO is, at best, ambiguous. A unique staff culture has developed not strictly within NATO norms, but rather with a distinct “Latin” character. Staff procedures have been heavily influenced by those created in the EUROCORPS. How the headquarters could operate with other NATO commands could initially present legal and bureaucratic challenges to effective cooperation.

2) The headquarters languages are French, Italian and Spanish, but it has been agreed that English will be used for operations.

3) The EUROFOR Commanding General does not have influence over training since mission planning is generic and there are no earmarked forces.

4) By not identifying specific units for EUROFOR missions, the headquarters's ability to engage in specified planning (and training of units) has been hampered.

5) Curiously, EUROFOR or an ad hoc derivation of the headquarters was not used to command Operation ALBA, the Italian-led humanitarian aid operation (a Petersburg task) in Albania in 1997.\(^6\)

6) Commanding General EUROFOR has only OPCON on deployment.

Summary. From the preceding assessment of bi-/multi-national formations in Europe, the following observations are offered:

1) Many formations suffer from a mismatch of force capabilities within formations.

2) Almost all bi-/multi-national corps and framework divisional commanders lack sufficient command authorities in wartime and possess at best only Coordinating Authority during peacetime.

3) There is a general lack of adequate logistics units and divisional/corps troops earmarked for these formations. This impedes the development of habitual working relationships which are essential on deployment.

4) There are insufficient rapid reaction headquarters and a surfeit of Central Region NATO headquarters oriented toward less relevant main defense missions.

5) European headquarters have not been developed with optimizing cooperation with NATO in mind.

The next task of this essay is to identify specific reforms of practices and organizational structures the better for NATO to meet the future challenges of the European security environment and beyond.
Structural Reformation:
Toward Greater Flexibility

Heretofore, this essay has addressed two main problems: first, the complex procedures with which NATO multinational force commanders must contend in the command of their corps/divisions; and, second, the numerous bi-/multi-national structures the Alliance and European allies have created over the years for operational and political purposes. The current writer now has the ambitious and acknowledged difficult challenge of merging the first section of this paper, the general, with the second, the specific, to produce persuasive arguments for organizational and procedural reforms. This chapter, therefore, is divided into two main sections. The first addresses general political-military conditions which must be understood and, if possible, changed when reforming bi-/multi-national headquarters. The second applies the principles outlined in the first section to reform the formations and headquarters studied in this essay. Let the reader harbor no illusions, however, of the imperative for the Alliance to reform procedures and structures (both within and outside of the integrated command structure.) For without reform in both areas, NATO will condemn itself to ill-structured and operationally-hampered land forces.

Political-Military Considerations.

At the outset, four general observations are offered because they will likely circumscribe the fundamental conditions which govern the reform of these bi-/multi-national land formations. First, one must recognize that the political objectives of the participating states have had a stronger influence in their creation and subsequent operation than their intended military missions. In view of the political capital that nations have invested in these headquarters, any recommended changes which do not acknowledge these realities are doomed to failure. Mindful of this admonition, recommendations for fundamental changes must be proffered judiciously if they are to be seriously entertained.

Second, recognizing national sensitivities over multinational command, the command authority requirements of NATO multinational force commanders needs fundamental review. It makes little sense to recommend organizational reform if commanding generals are not provide with the necessary peacetime and wartime
command authorities to meet their respective mission statements. Heretofore, the problem in this matter has been the lack of NATO guidance establishing a standard of command authority requirements for multinational force commanders. While leaving aside the issue of the command authority requirements of MNCs, MSCs, and PSCs (or whatever new nomenclature they adopt following the Long Term Study), NATO needs to address itself to the matter of establishing two distinct areas of responsibility for land multinational force commanders:

1) A multinational force commander must have more than merely “Coordinating Authority” in his peacetime relationship with subordinated units. In view of the fact that NATO command authorities (i.e., OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM, and TACON) do not address peacetime issues such as training, let alone logistics, they should be revised with the objective to include these important areas of responsibility in existing definitions or within new nomenclature.

2) On deployment, a multinational force commander should have the ability to conduct operations in the most efficacious manner possible. For example, a multinational corps commander conducting counter-concentration operations in an Article V mission should have the ability to task organize subordinated units down to the brigade level. Accordingly, MC guidance should be formulated establishing that on deployment corps and division multinational commanding generals should have OPCOM (without caveats) upon TOA for Article V and peace enforcement missions. For all other peace support operations, on deployment corps and division multinational commanding generals should have OPCON (without caveats) on TOA.

Third, with the exception of the three framework divisions and the militarily androgenous EUROFOR, the recent move to create bi-/multi-national land formations has been effected with a unified Germany predominantly in mind. The German government has been one of the strongest supporters of multinationality and the German Army finds itself (see Chart 9) in the position of participating in six bi-/multi-national corps and one multinational division. A humorous remark often heard in the Federal Ministry of Defense in Bonn since the early 1990s is that Germany should not participate in more multinational corps than it has divisions! As the German Army attempts to maintain a seven division structure, with varying degrees of success, this joke is quickly becoming a reality.

Participating in such a wide array of bi-/multi-national headquarters has created many difficulties for the Bundeswehr, given the sui generis nature of each headquarters. This is a price the German government has, to date, been willing to pay to prove its bona fides in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. But it would be unwise to conclude that German patience and resources dedicated to multinationality are without limit. The well-regarded German defense correspondent, Michael J. Inacker of Welt am Sonntag, has critically observed that smaller nations have disproportionately profited from multinationality in NATO and, "No other army in NATO has their units in such a confusion of attachments to other units as the Bundeswehr." In short, multinationality has not been without its own peculiar difficulty for Germany, and prudence dictates that its continuation...
must have important advantages for Germany if one is to expect Bonn to continue its support for: 1) the concept of multinationality, and 2) the presence of foreign “multinational” forces on German soil. In this regard, it would be politic if the Alliance were to address German dissatisfaction with British domination of the ARRC.

Fourth, the move by Western European states to create bi-/multi-national formations with Bonn was made with a key objective of reassuring their relationship with a unified Germany, and undoubtedly will be emulated by its eastern neighbors once they become members of NATO. Thus, just as in the case with the need to understand and accept the political realities which conditioned the creation of these bi-/multi-national headquarters, so, too, should one keep firmly in mind the issue of membership expansion when addressing the reorganization of these formations, particularly the assignment of forces. Fundamentally, the assignment of forces to these headquarters, while not an unimportant consideration, should not distract from the objective of ensuring that new member armies become part of commands which are flexible and operationally effective.
Creating More Flexible Headquarters.

Before offering recommendations for improving the operational effectiveness of each formation, a number of general recommendations are identified for achieving greater flexibility in the operation of their headquarters to support, for instance, a CJTF. As the reader will observe, there are few headquarters whose effectiveness and operational flexibility could not be improved by adopting the following reforms.

The over-arching premise upon which the following reforms are suggested holds that the NAC should have the ability to create CJTFs which are supported by land, air and sea component commands which conform to the political conditions of those states willing to participate and contribute forces. Thus, it is necessary to identify existing headquarters which are militarily able and could, political realities allowing, act as a land component headquarters in a CJTF. While not deprecating the need to maintain main defense capabilities, current mission assignments in the Central Region are too strongly-oriented toward main defense, as opposed to headquarters with rapid reaction capabilities. If a headquarters can undertake rapid reaction operations, it can also fulfill the requirements of main defense. As demonstrated by NATO experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Alliance needs more land component headquarters to undertake rotations of headquarters and staffs in peace support operations. The Alliance may not have the luxury in future of enjoying a benign security environment, thereby enabling it to deploy a PSC/JSRC or equivalent component commander and his headquarters, i.e., Commander LANDCENT in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to act as a land component commander in a peace support operation.

In short, headquarters which could undertake such future challenging missions require greater standardization in the following areas:

1) Legal status. All of the headquarters declared to NATO should have NATO international legal personality to facilitate their employment by the Alliance. Thus, headquarters should fall under the “Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set Up Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty,” Paris, August 28, 1952. The NATO SOFA should also serve as a basis to govern the status of foreign forces, which, of course, can be further defined on a bilateral basis. This would obviate the requirement for individual status of forces agreements, allow the employment of existing Alliance financial arrangements and standards and negate the requirement to effect new legal regimes should a “European” headquarters fall under the command of NATO. As current NATO guidelines do not allow sub-PSC headquarters to receive international funding, the financial impact of such arrangements would be minimal.

2) Language. Whether one accepts it or not, the fact remains that the official languages within NATO are English and French, while the international language of military operations (i.e., within the U.N. and most NATO headquarters) is English. The official language of multinational headquarters should be English, with greater provision for the use of French when requested. While there may be
many francophones who feel this recommendation is a Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, in reality, the requirement for the provision of using French in other corps headquarters would present their own attending difficulties. One objective of this initiative is to remove barriers (or “excuses”) to greater integration by France into NATO's land headquarters, as well as providing a conducive work environment for other than English speakers in these headquarters.

3) Standing Operating Instructions. Each headquarters assessed in this study has evolved its own particular manner of conducting business. This is not unusual, as many national division, brigade and battalion headquarters have their own means of conducting business. However, greater flexibility could be realized if all headquarters adopted as a minimum those procedures and practices established in MC guidance, STANAGs, ATP 35, and planning guidelines which are emerging from Bi-MNC working groups to support CJTFs.

4) Forces and training. Multinational land force commanders should have influence over the training of subordinate units. However, training remains largely a national responsibility. The Alliance needs to find a compromise. One possible solution would be the development of an agreed set of tasks, conditions and standards. Therefore, the MC should direct the development of a “mission-essential task list” for land forces (in both Article V and peace support operations) which could be used by multinational force commanders to validate established training standards. While perhaps not an ideal solution to the issue of training, at least it could serve as a first step in confronting this sensitive issue.

Related to training of forces is a peculiar problem associated with the training of battlestaffs. Many European armies adhere to an officer educational system which produces only a relatively small cadre of officers with experience in combined arms training. Almost all of the smaller countries' armies have limited opportunity to train battlestaff officers at the division and corps level. One should recall that the proposed CJTF concept will depend upon NATO officers who are capable of commanding and conducting battlestaff work for such units. Each NATO headquarters which deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of IFOR and SFOR (i.e., the ARRC, AFSOUTH and LANDCENT) went through (and paid for) intensive Battle Command Training Programs provided by the U.S. Army prior to their deployment.

NATO should capitalize on its experience in training staff officers for peacetime planning assignments in NATO headquarters and expand its focus, to include battlestaff training. In this respect, the Alliance would do well to emulate many of the courses conducted by the U.S. Army, e.g., Battle Command Training Program. Should finances preclude such a reform, the U.S. Warrior Prep Center at Ramstein should be altered (i.e., expanded to include allied personnel) and made available for the Alliance.
Map 2.
Integration of New NATO Armies into Multinational Land Formations.

- Corps LANDJUT/ Multinational Corps Northeast (in 1999)
- II GE/V US Corps
- EUROFOR/SOUTHFOR
- IV Korps (Multinational)
Reforming Existing Formations (See Map 2).

Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (Corps LANDJUT)/
"Multinational Corps Northeast." In view of its 35-year existence, Corps
LANDJUT is the most developed corps-level multinational headquarters in
Europe. Indeed, many of the corps assessed in this essay would do well to adopt the
principles and practices of Corps LANDJUT. With the decision by the German,
Danish and Polish ministers of defense to initiate the process to admit Poland to
what will become “Multinational Corps Northeast,” Corps LANDJUT stands well
situated to make a successful transition into an integral part of the Alliance's eastern
expansion. A working group has been established to address the details of this plan.
Multinational Corps Northeast will be defined by March 1998 and it is envisaged
that the new corps will be declared available to NATO in 1999 when Poland gains
admittance to NATO.12 The advantages of such a transformation are numerous:

1) The move does not contradict the ongoing Long Term Study, which is likely
to recommend the dissolution of the fourth level of allied command, to include
headquarters like Corps LANDJUT.

2) The Polish army will profit greatly from being exposed at the outset of their
admission to NATO to a corps which adheres strictly to NATO procedures and will
continue to use English in the headquarters and on operations.

3) Corps LANDJUT solves its current problem of possessing only two
divisions in peacetime, by gaining the 12th Polish Mechanized Division.

4) The plan to move the headquarters from Rendsburg to Szczecin (Stettin)
will demonstrate the Alliance's commitment to the security of its new member,
while not “officially” being part of the Alliance's integrated command structure.

5) Multinational Corps Northeast's Baltic orientation provides the Alliance
with an existing structure to integrate the land forces of addition new members, i.e.,
Sweden and the Baltic states.

Three aspects of this transformation require addressing. First, it would appear
that the orientation of this corps will remain main defense. Given the challenges
associated with integrating the Polish army into the Alliance, it would be prudent
for the Alliance to leave this headquarters to pursue this important objective within
the context of main defense. Over time, the Alliance might wish to revisit the
mission orientation of the command with a view toward including an enhanced
ability to conduct peace support operations, and perhaps later, designating it as a
reaction formation.

Second, heretofore Corps LANDJUT has fallen under the command of the
geographically-defined PSC, Commander BALTAP, while maintaining a
reinforcement role to Commander LANDCENT. This has acted to put distance
between Corps LANDJUT and developments among its land counterparts to the
south which fall under Commander LANDCENT. While the latter issue may well
be reformed in the ongoing NATO Long Term Study and notwithstanding the
likely continued existence of BALTAP as a JSRC as a recommendation of the Long
Term Study, nations must insist that Multinational Corps Northeast should fall
under a Land Component Commander or a JSRC which is “Land Heavy,” vice falling under the peacetime and wartime command of the JSRC which replaces Commander BALTAP. The armies of Denmark, Poland and other new NATO members need to be in peacetime association with other armies in the Central Region, vice in isolation within a JSRC.

Finally, it should be recalled that Corps LANDJUT is a multinational corps and, from the few details released by officials concerning its future expansion, would appear to remain so. Given the political sensitivity of moving this headquarters to Poland, NATO nations should make a strong effort to ensure that the headquarters enjoys strong international participation within its staff functions and not only seconded LNOs. In short, the transformation of this corps should not be seen as representing only German and Danish interests and policies. Thus, the United States and Canada, given their past participation in this headquarters, should restore their personnel postings to Corps LANDJUT/Multinational Corps Northeast.

IV Korps. The expansion of Corps LANDJUT to include a Polish division opens an interesting question as to the future role to be played by German IV Korps in Potsdam. One should not assume, however, that the German government would necessarily allow the establishment of a NATO headquarters on the territory of the former Democratic German Republic. The Federal Republic of Germany has heretofore attempted to play down the issue of NATO exercises on the territory of the former Democratic Republic, let alone the stationing of foreign forces there, out of concern over antagonizing Moscow. Interestingly, Article VI of the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” (the “Two-plus-Four” Treaty) states: “The right of the united Germany to belong to alliances, with all the rights and responsibilities arising therefrom, shall not be affected by the present Treaty.” Clearly, this treaty allows for the stationing of foreign forces on east German soil, or even the establishment of a NATO headquarters—should Bonn decide to do so.

At present IV Korps consists of two divisions: 13th German Panzergrenadier Division in Leipzig in wartime and 14th German Panzergrenadier Division in Neubrandenburg for peacetime administrative purposes and is transferred to Corps LANDJUT in wartime. The two following options would appear to be most feasible. First, Bonn might decide not to open the issue of the interpretation of the “Two-plus-Four” Treaty and retain IV Korps as a national headquarters. This choice would be a bit out of character for Bonn, given its past practice of participating in multinational formations wherever possible, but understandable in view of the difficulties such participation entails. It would also leave IV Korps as essentially a peacetime establishment with an unconvincing wartime structure, i.e., one division.

Second, should Bonn decide to create a multinational corps in the territory of its eastern Länder, the obvious choice would be to transform IV Korps into a German/Czech/Polish corps. Ideally, the corps should be reestablished along the lines of Corps LANDJUT (i.e., multinational). The corps could also integrate the land forces of Slovakia should it become a member of the Alliance. The mission of
this corps should be the main defense of the central European plain. As in the case with Multinational Corps Northeast, other NATO nations should participate in the staff elements of this command, to include the United States.

I German/Netherlands Corps. More so than any other corps in Europe, the political capital invested in the existence of this formation will ensure that it overcomes the organizational and operational challenges of achieving the difficult goal of binationality. No other headquarters can claim that defense ministers have committed themselves to the extent of changing national laws in order to achieve greater binational military integration. This political commitment does not, however, solve the immediate problem of mission dissimilarities. The Royal Netherlands Army is completely integrated into this corps in peacetime and must, therefore, be prepared to undertake rapid reaction, peace support, as well as main defense, missions. The lack of an assigned third division in peacetime complicates the Commanding General’s ability to train for counter-concentration operations in its main defense role, despite possessing OPCOM and the ability to task organize.

It is difficult to envisage under current political realities and financial limitations how either Germany or the Netherlands could expand their respective force structures to create an additional division. The most realistic solution would appear to be the assignment of the 7th German Panzer Division during corps main defense exercises to train the staff in counter-concentration operations. Specifically which division-equivalent force should be made available in wartime to the corps commanding general would be best left to the discretion of the Commander LANDCENT and nations.

The question of mission dissimilarities is an issue that could be resolved in relatively short order. By giving 1st German Panzer Division, in addition to its main defense role, a reinforcement mission as a Crisis Argumentation Force, the readiness and presence of professional/volunteer personnel in the division's brigades would be increased to enable it the better to participate in rapid reaction missions. (Where the resources would be found to finance this scheme will be suggested below.) Should such a transformation take place, one could expect the I German/Netherlands Corps to enjoy greater military effectiveness and would support both countries over-arching political objective of continuing the process of national reconciliation and achieving greater European integration.

V U.S./German and II German/U.S. corps. If the reader accepts the proposition that bi-/multi-national formations in Europe are an evolutionary, vice static, process, then one would be challenged to argue convincingly for the continuation of the current German/U.S. corps arrangement. Both militaries have exhausted any additional arguments to save force structure by their participation in the current arrangement. Fundamentally, the security environment in which the two “binational” corps were initially envisaged has changed and continues to do so. Most importantly, the domestic political conditions within Germany which relate to the use of military force for political ends exclusive of solely national defense have also fundamentally changed since the two corps were formally established in February 1993.
Under current arrangements, on deployment, the two corps are to exchange one division each. The mission of both corps in wartime is main defense in the Central Region (an unlikely scenario to be sure), but without either commanding general enjoying OPCOM and the ability to task organize an exchanged division to create a required third maneuver formation if required to undertake counter-concentration operations. Under such circumstances it is difficult to see what possible benefit both countries accrue from this arrangement. Either the arrangement should be discarded and both corps return to a national wartime orientation, or a new approach should be considered: the merging of the two corps and creation of a multinational headquarters, based upon multinational structures, with a rapid reaction and main defense planning focus.

Like Corps LANDJUT (and unlike I German/Netherlands Corps), the focus of II German/V U.S. Corps would be limited to operational planning and training for rapid reaction and main defense missions. Following the principles enunciated above regarding the structuring of headquarters, it should be international, its language English (with provision for French) and its staff procedures strictly based upon MC guidance, STANAGs, ATP 35, and planning guidelines emerging from Bi-MNC working groups to support CJTFs. The location of the headquarters should be that of II Korps in Ulm so as to give it geographic distance from HQ U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) in Heidelberg and the Heeresführungskommando in Koblenz. The key command billets, Commanding General, Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, etc., would be rotational. Making it a “multinational” headquarters (ideally with international staff participation) would simplify the addition of other forces in crisis.

Once transformed and the Alliance expands, the corps would be ideally suited to integrate contributions of land forces from Austria and Hungary. Focusing the integration of Central European land forces in an established international headquarters in Germany with significant American presence should assuage potential regional anxieties. This course of action, like in the case of Corps LANDJUT’s gaining Baltic forces from new members, would reduce any perceived German domination of Central European security and would obviate against the need to establish new allied land component headquarters.

There would be costs, of course. The United States should insist that the German division committed to the corps be at a minimum a Crisis Augmentation Force, and ideally a Crisis Reaction Force. At present, the two divisions in the German Army’s order of battle with this designation are the 7th German Panzer Division which is earmarked for the ARRC, and the 10th German Panzer Division which is the German commitment to the EUROCORPS. As indicated earlier, the means for paying for the costs associated with increasing the operational readiness and changing the mission orientation of the 1st German Panzer Division (which falls under the I German/Netherlands Corps) could include transforming one of the two German main defense divisions in II Korps (either the 1st German Mountain Division or the 5th German Panzer Division) into a Wehrbereichskommando (as was done with 1st Wehrbereichskommando in Kiel after the deactivation of the 6th
German Panzergrenadier Division) and transferring resources and professionals/volunteers to the 1st German Panzer and the remaining divisions. The United States, for its part, would commit itself to maintaining its current two divisions in Europe, which could be augmented from the United States.

The advantages of this reorganization would extend far beyond justifying American and German force structure. From a German perspective, notwithstanding the difficulties the Heeresführungskommando has in maintaining a semblance of order and efficiency in the German Army with its heavy multinational participation, the merging of these two corps into one with a reaction focus could help offset German dissatisfaction with the British domination of the ARRC. German military and defense officials privately acknowledge that British domination of NATO's preeminent land headquarters, on German soil no less, remains a point of sour contention. Yet, the same individuals will also acknowledge that British experience in expeditionary operations make it unlikely for Bonn to garner political support within the Alliance to revisit the framework basis of the ARRC.

From a U.S. Army perspective, the merging of the two corps would forge greater and more meaningful military ties with what remains the largest army in Western Europe; one which is becoming oriented toward undertaking force projection missions. Like the recent announcement of the possible creation of an integrated German-U.S. air defense unit, the merger of these two corps would be a manifestation of how the U.S. Army is in the forefront of preparing to conduct future coalition operations, as specified in the National Security Strategy. It could also serve a very useful purpose of familiarizing more U.S. Army staff officers in a multinational command environment. Commander-in-Chief U.S. Army Europe would need to remain in Heidelberg to manage all of the national business of the Army in Europe and to maintain a surge capability should there be a need for V Corps to conduct a national operation. The U.S. Army's Southern European Task Force at Vicenza should assume the task of providing a deployable national corps headquarters, after being augmented by U.S. Army personnel from Ulm and Heidelberg.

ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Assessing the ARRC is difficult since offering substantive criticism must contend with its success in Bosnia as part of IFOR from December 1995 through June 1996. Moreover, one cannot discount British experience in conducting expeditionary operations. Nor can one dismiss the fact that the ARRC is currently the only multinational reaction corps with dedicated corps troops. The fact, however, that the framework headquarters is so dominated by British officers and staff practices does open the force up for criticism by other Alliance partners. That this criticism is most pronounced coming from German officials should not be discounted, particularly since the ARRC, as well as 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division and a considerable amount of corps troops, are stationed on German territory.

Rather than suggest a fundamental reorganization of the ARRC, an expansion of reaction missions to other corps and the earmarking of reaction-capable forces to
support them should alleviate in time criticisms of British domination of rapid reaction missions in ACE. The addition of I German/Netherlands Corps and II German/V U.S. Corps to encompass reaction missions, in addition to reforming and incorporating into NATO the EUROCORPS and EUROFOR, which already have reaction missions, should provide the Alliance with additional choices of suitable headquarters to undertake these missions.

**Multinational Division (Central) (MND(C)).** From an organizational perspective, MND(C) meets the criteria established above for providing a flexible structure to the Alliance. This can also be explained by the fact that the division consists of NATO partners with long-standing experience cooperating in northern Germany. While the division’s mission may well have been validated (“to support SACEUR’s crisis management options, as well as to conduct peace support operations”), the division requires dedicated logistics and transport to meet this objective should it be called upon to conduct operations independently of the ARRC or outside the Central Region.

**Binational Framework Divisions.** The purpose of assessing the following three framework divisions is not to critique the divisions per se, but rather to judge the degree to which they are integrated and how this could be improved.

1) **Danish International Mechanized Brigade.** The key problem the Alliance must address with the Danish International Mechanized Brigade is that it is currently not deployable with the 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division, as a brigade. The decision by the Danish Army not to implement a permanent liaison arrangement with 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division (unlike the two other subordinated brigades with their framework division staffs) leads one to question the seriousness with which Copenhagen takes this arrangement. In short, one can provisionally conclude that the Danish Army has yet to achieve its ambitious goal of actually fielding its “International Mechanized Brigade.” In consequence, the Alliance should withhold recognition of the Danish government’s commitment of a brigade to the ARRC, with all of the attending political consequences associated with this action. This is not to suggest that the Alliance should disparage the efforts of Copenhagen to create a reaction capability for employment in the ARRC. That the British Army has been willing to assist the Danish Army as it endeavors to develop a reaction capability is commendable. Nonetheless, the Alliance needs to balance its encouragement while withholding giving Denmark full political marks.

2) **Italian Ariete Brigade.** The wartime arrangement of placing the armor-heavy Ariete Brigade under the 3rd United Kingdom Division’s control appears to be taken seriously by both armies. The recent British decision to scale back its liaison arrangement with the Italian Army is troubling, as is the lack of an Italian contribution of divisional troops. The SACEUR should encourage both armies to revisit these issues.

3) **Portuguese Independent Airborne Brigade.** Given Portugal’s long-standing force commitment to LANDSOUTH in Verona, the Portuguese Army has
developed a close relationship with the Italian Army. One can question the current applicability of this geographically distant cooperative relationship. However in light of Lisbon's historical suspicions of Spain, one can expect Portuguese governments to maintain for the foreseeable future that country's historic defense relationships with Britain, the United States and Italy, as opposed to creating new bilateral structures with Spain.

As such, the current Portuguese arrangement with 3rd Italian Division is likely to remain. From the perspective of the Alliance, two issues should be raised with both countries. First, the current Portuguese contribution of an airborne brigade to an Italian mechanized division is asymmetric. The Portuguese Independent Mechanized Brigade at Santa Margarida should be earmarked (mission depending) for the division. Second, the lack of any Portuguese contribution to division troops needs to be revisited.

**European Corps (EUROCORPS).** The continued existence of the EUROCORPS offers advantages to the Alliance. With the acceptance by the Alliance of the ESDI concept and France's inexorable, albeit grudgingly slow, return to the integrated command structure, this formation has the potential of becoming an important asset to the Alliance. If nothing else, the mere act of serving as a multinational corps headquarters with a reaction and main defense focus for the Belgian and Spanish armies, let alone serving as a visible manifestation of Franco-German reconciliation, establishes its value for the Western Alliance. Nonetheless, if its true potential value for NATO is to be realized, it, too, needs to adopt a number of reforms.

As currently structured, the headquarters itself does not merit passing marks. The five participants should end its legal ambiguity and make it a multinational headquarters declared to NATO (with a legal relationship to the Alliance) and subordinated to Commander LANDCENT in wartime. The insistence that the headquarters's languages be French and German is counterproductive. In keeping with NATO practice, English and French should be the headquarters's languages. This objective of evolving toward the use of English could be encouraged by the invitation to allied Northern European and Anglo-Saxon countries (to include especially the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force) to post personnel (not simply liaison officers) to the staff. Finally, whereas some NATO procedures have been employed in the headquarters's operation, greater adherence to them should be effected. Thus, adherence to MC guidance, STANAGS, ATP 35 and planning guidelines emerging from Bi-MNC working groups to support CJTFs should be effected.

**European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR).** The EUROFOR suffers from being no more than a planning headquarters with a reaction focus, but without earmarked forces. The decision by its participants not to use it in Operation ALBA in Albania in spring 1997 casts doubt over the commitment of all of its participants to employ it on intended missions. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake for the Alliance to dismiss the EUROFOR out of hand. The Southern Flank remains the most potentially troublesome region for the Alliance and existing command
arrangements in AFSOUTH are unsatisfactory. Additionally, there is a dearth of regionally-based and regionally-deployable multinational land component headquarters with a decidedly Southern Region composition and focus. Once modified, a transformed EUROFOR (which brings together the land reaction forces of France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) has the potential of making an important contribution to Alliance security objectives.

A modified EUROFOR could grow into an important NATO reaction force command. The Alliance would benefit from the existence of an indigenous land headquarters (even if only of division strength) which could act as SACEUR’s southern reaction land component headquarters and a suitable candidate as a land component element of a CJTF. Specific recommendations for its reorganization include:

1) EUROFOR needs to be declared to NATO (with a legal relationship to the Alliance) as part of its reaction forces under the SACEUR (to be renamed, perhaps, “SOUTHFOR”?). The current lack of the use of English in the headquarters (there are three official languages: French, Italian and Spanish) would be rectified by its inclusion into NATO structures. Staff procedures need to be reformed to employ MC guidance, STANAGs, ATP 35, and planning guidelines emerging from Bi-MNC working groups to support CJTFs. Such political and legal reforms might encourage the Southern Region’s northern allies to reassess some of their initial skeptical views of the headquarters.

2) While keeping the headquarters reaction orientation, participating nations should be encouraged to identify and even earmark some units for its employment.

3) Central Region and North American allies should be encouraged to participate in its exercises and post field grade officers which should be integrated into the staff. As a manifestation of the U.S. Government’s support for this “southern ARRC,” the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps should participate in its staff, as well as its exercises. This would present an excellent opportunity for the Army and Marines Corps to interact daily with the land component reaction forces of four key Southern Region allies. An obvious U.S. Army force for employment by the headquarters is the Infantry Brigade (Provisional) of the U.S. Army’s Southern European Task Force or other 7th Army units stationed in Germany, perhaps using the Theater Reserve Unit, Army Readiness Package South (TRARPS), equipment stored at Camp Darby in Italy.

4) Once reconfigured the headquarters would be ideally suited for the integration of reaction forces from new NATO members like Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria. At that point, the determination can be made whether the headquarters should become a corps level command.
Conclusion

While bi-/multi-national formations in Europe may be rather “untidy,” militarily-speaking, they are not fundamentally flawed. As political manifestations of Alliance and European solidarity in an era of diminished force structure and strategic ambiguity, their creation at the end of the Cold War served a very important purpose. But a new security regime in Europe is emerging, one that will bring new members to an Alliance which has demonstrated that without its leadership crises in Europe are likely to go unresolved. If the Alliance intends to have its land force structures transcend the current significant impediments to becoming operationally effective, three distinct reforms need to be instituted. These are: 1) the manner in which the formations are to be “commanded,” 2) the manner in which these headquarters are operated, and 3) the need to reorganize many of their current structures.

As to the first point, a most disturbing aspect about NATO and subsequent “European” initiatives to create bi-/multi-national headquarters has been the practice of not investing their respective commanding generals with the peacetime means to attain their wartime operational effectiveness. Recent experience by the ARRC in Bosnia also demonstrates that the Alliance and nations have yet to come to terms with the command authorities required by multinational force commanders on deployment. Thus, the Alliance, in a systematic manner, needs to revise the definitions of the command authorities it delegates to its commanders in war, as well as peace. Reform of NATO command authority definitions might influence in a positive way the operation of logistics, training, and staff procedures of these headquarters and forces. Concurrently with the reform of command authority definitions, NATO and nations should effect the following changes related to multinational force commanders:

1) Commanding generals of all bi-/multi-national corps declared to NATO should have the peacetime authority (not merely “Coordinating Authority”) to establish and validate training standards as established in a Military Committee-endorsed “mission-essential task list,” as well as establish logistical requirements to meet stated missions.

2) Commanding generals of all bi-/multi-national corps declared to NATO should be delegated OPCOM (without caveats) on deployment when conducting Article V missions and peace enforcement operations, with the attending authority
to change missions, task organize subordinate forces and direct the redistribution of logistics as required.

3) Commanding generals of all bi-/multi-national corps declared to NATO should be delegated on deployment with OPCON(+) for all other peace support operations; “+”: the authority to direct the redistribution of logistics as required.

4) Commanding generals of all framework divisions declared to NATO should have OPCOM on deployment for Article V missions and peace enforcement operations and OPCON for all other peace support operations. Commanding generals should also have the peacetime authority to validate the training standards established by Commander ARRC and influence logistics planning.

The above reforms of the command of multinational formations suggests a fundamental sea change in the manner by which Alliance and national authorities approach multinationality. While never a popular position, revisiting a politically-sensitive issue like command authorities is a sine qua non if Alliance members are ever to achieve the operational flexibility they established for themselves in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Notwithstanding NATO's impressive success in deploying multinational land formations to Bosnia in support of IFOR and SFOR, it would be erroneous to conclude that said deployment completely validated current command authority practices. The Alliance did not have to conduct defensive or offensive combat operations within this peace enforcement mission under the current restrictive command authority regime. The Alliance may not be so fortunate in future non-Article V missions.

As regards the second point, the Alliance needs to revisit the issue of how business is conducted in these headquarters with the objective of ensuring that they are indeed capable of operating together and with other than designated Allied forces. The Alliance would be well-served if MC guidance were promulgated which directs that bi-/multi-national headquarters adopt, in large part, the practices of headquarters Corps LANDJUT: possessing an international legal personality within NATO and declared to it, the use of English in the headquarters (with the important new caveat of the provision for French), and adherence to MC guidance, STANAGs, ATP 35, and planning guidelines emerging from Bi-MNC working groups to support CJTFs. Until such time that these reforms are instituted, the Alliance will suffer with headquarters that operate within their own distinct staff cultures, procedures, and lack of a standard language, etc.; qualities which are indicative of a less integrated, less interoperable Alliance, the opposite of what multinationality was intended to achieve.

In terms of the ongoing attempt to reform allied command structures, should land component commanders be abolished in favor of JSRCs, than the role and importance of bi-/multi-national land headquarters will increase. The integration of allied land (vice air and naval) forces into multinational units continues to be one of the most vexing challenges for allied commanders. Hence, why the Alliance has decided in the Long Term Study process that it will not require a land component commander at the third level of the integrated command structure to perform this difficult task is perplexing. However, should this eventuality come to pass, it will
fall to the bi-/multi-national land headquarters assessed in this study the responsibility of providing the critical linkage between national forces and a JSRC. Should nations endorse this provision in the Long Term Study, the Alliance and nations equally need to be mindful of the necessity of ensuring that these bi-/multi-national land headquarters are reformed with the aim of providing for their effective employment. As the Alliance appears intent upon divesting itself of the fourth level of command, there would be no additional financial claims made to the Alliance. Rather, these land headquarters should enjoy the same Alliance status as do reaction headquarters. What the Alliance would stand to gain if it were to effect these reforms, at essentially minimal cost, would be more flexible land component headquarters.

As to the third point, some NATO structures need to be realigned, while those two legally outside NATO need to be declared to the Alliance and aligned to NATO standards. Simply stated, the process begun in 1991/1992 to create new bi-/multi-national land headquarters is not completed. Formations which were envisaged in 1991 now have much fewer subordinated forces then initially envisaged. Most importantly, the Alliance needs additional capabilities to deploy forces outside the Central Region and this can safely be accomplished by shifting the orientation of certain headquarters to include rapid reaction missions.

In other words, the Alliance requires the transformation of some existing NATO and European bi-/multi-national headquarters to function as the land component commander for a CJTF. The change in the missions of these headquarters, it must be stressed, should be seen as complementing, vice supplementing, the already existing rapid reaction mission of the ARRC. The headquarters which should maintain a main defense while adopting rapid reaction missions are:

1) a I German/Netherlands Corps with German forces suitable for reaction missions,
2) a multinational II German/V U.S. Corps with German forces suitable for reaction missions,
3) a reformed EUROCORPS within NATO and subordinated to Commander LANDCENT,
4) a reformed EUROFOR (“SOUTHFOR”) within NATO, with a reaction focus and subordinated to the SACEUR.

The addition of these headquarters for the Alliance's rapid reaction missions should enable NATO to select the most politically-acceptable CJTF land component headquarters and forces (e.g., representing participating nations) for crisis management operations.

Notwithstanding the present array of command and structural problems which plague the effective operation of bi-/multi-national headquarters in Europe, they still offer the Alliance an effective means of integrating land forces. The recent experience of NATO in conducting peace support operations demonstrates the necessity for maintaining the ability to command multinational forces. In the event
of an Article V mission, many current national force structures are incapable of conducting unilateral corps-level operations, which speaks to the need to ensure that multinational corps must be effective on the battlefield. Finally, the need to effect these reforms has taken on an important immediacy: membership expansion. While acknowledging that the inclusion of new members in the Alliance from the former Warsaw Pact brings with it its own not insignificant risks, the integration of these forces into ineffective bi-/multi-national formations makes this contemplated move quite disturbing indeed.
Recommendations

1) NATO must address itself to reforming the conditions under which bi-/multi-national land formations are commanded, as well as reorganizing some of their structures.

2) This reorganization of practices and structures must be effected in a manner that will facilitate both the flexible employment of these formations, as well as preparing the integrated command structure for membership expansion and the integration of new armies.

3) In reforming the operation of NATO bi-/multi-national land component headquarters, the following should be adopted:
   a) All headquarters, to include the EUROCORPS and EUROFOR (“SOUTHFOR”), should be declared to the Alliance and enjoy international legal personality within NATO guidelines.
   b) All headquarters should use the English language in headquarters business, and improve their ability for the use of French when requested.
   c) All headquarters should adopt staff practices and procedures which are in conformity with existing MC guidance, STANAGs, ATP 35, and planning guidelines emerging from Bi-MNC working groups to support CJTFs.

4) SHAPE should be directed to developed an MC document which establishes an Alliance “mission-essential task list” specifically for land forces in both Article V and peace support operations.

5) Command authorities for multinational force commanders need to be reformed in the following areas:
   a) Commanding generals of all bi-/multi-national corps declared to NATO should have the peacetime authority (not merely “Coordinating Authority”) to establish and validate training standards as established in a Military Committee-endorsed “mission-essential task list,” as well as establish logistical requirements to meet stated missions.
   b) Commanding generals of all bi-/multi-national corps declared to NATO should be delegated OPCOM (without caveats) on deployment when conducting Article V missions and peace enforcement operations, with the attending authority to change missions, task organize subordinate forces and direct the redistribution of logistics as required.
c) Commanding generals of all bi-/multi-national corps declared to NATO should be delegated on deployment with OPCON(+) for all other peace support operations; “+”: and the authority to direct the redistribution of logistics as required.

d) Commanding generals of all framework divisions declared to NATO should have OPCOM on deployment for Article V missions and peace enforcement operations, and OPCON for all other peace support operations. Commanding generals should also have the peacetime authority to validate the training standards established by Commander ARRC and influence logistics planning.

6) Existing bi-/multi-national corps and divisions should be reorganized in the following manner:

a) Corps LANDJUT/"Multinational Corps Northeast":
   i) Should retain a main defense mission with a regional Northern Europe/Baltic Region focus.
   ii) Should be given the mission of integrating the armies of Sweden and the Baltic states, as well as the 12th Polish Mechanized Division, into the NATO command structure once/should they become members of NATO.
   iii) Should fall under the Land Component Commander of an RC or a JSRC which is “Land Heavy,” vice the peacetime and wartime command of the JSRC which replaces Commander BALTAP.
   iv) Should have greater NATO participation on its staff to include the U.S. and Canadian armies.

b) IV Korps:
   i) Should the Federal Republic of German agree, to make this corps headquarters one which will integrate the Czech, Slovak and part of the Polish armies once/should those nations become members of NATO.
   ii) Should have a main defense mission.
   iii) Should be declared to NATO and its headquarters invested with international legal personality within Alliance guidelines.
   iv) Should adopt English and French as the headquarters's official languages.
   v) Should continue the German practice of adopting SOIs based upon MC guidance, STANAGs, ATP 35, and planning guidelines emerging from Bi-MNC working groups to support CJTFs.
   vi) Should have greater NATO-wide staff participation in the operation of the headquarters, to include personnel from the U.S. Army.

c) I German/Netherlands Corps:
   i) Should retain its main defense and adopt rapid reaction missions as well.
   ii) The readiness level of 1st German Panzer Division should be raised to that of a Crisis Argumentation Force.

d) V U.S./German and II German/U.S. corps:
i) Should be merged into a multinational operational planning headquarters and located at Ulm with rotational key command and staff billets.

ii) Should have main defense and rapid reaction missions.

iii) Should be given the mission of integrating new member armies from Austria and Hungary once/should they become members of NATO.

iv) Either 1st German Mountain or 5th German Panzer divisions should be deactivated and transformed into a Wehrbereichskommando. Manpower and resources thus saved should be transferred to 1st German Panzer Division and 1st German Mountain/5th German Panzer divisions thereby enabling them to become Crisis Reaction or Crisis Augmentation forces. 1st German Mountain/5th German Panzer divisions will remain earmarked for II German/V U.S. corps.

v) HQ USAREUR should remain responsible for all national U.S. Army business and retain a surge capability to augment the U.S. elements in V Corps should a national corps deployment be require without allied participation. The U.S. Army's Southern European Task Force at Vicenza should assume the task of providing a deployable national corps headquarters, after being augmented by U.S. Army personnel.

e) ACE Rapid Reaction Corps should retain its rapid reaction mission.

f) Multinational Division (Central). The SACEUR should endeavor to obtain national commitments to support MND(C) in terms of transport and logistics for operations independent of the ARRC or outside of the Central Region.

g) Danish International Mechanized Brigade should not be recognized by NATO as constituting a “brigade” until such time that it is capable of fielding in peacetime a combined arms brigade with organic logistics which meet all of Commander ARRC’s training and support directives.

h) Italian Ariete Mechanized Brigade should maintain its relationship with 3rd United Kingdom Division, but Rome and London should:

i) Endeavor to earmark Italian divisional troops to the 3rd United Kingdom Division.

ii) Reconsider weakening existing liaison arrangements.

i) Portuguese Independent Airborne Brigade should remain earmarked for operations with the 3rd Italian Division, but Lisbon should:

i) Prepare plans for the deployment of the Portuguese Independent Mechanized Brigade as well as the Airborne Brigade,

ii) Earmark Portuguese divisional troops for all deployments with 3rd Italian Division.

j) EUROCORPS:

i) Should retain main defense and rapid reaction missions.

ii) Should be declared to NATO and its headquarters invested with international legal personality within Alliance guidelines.

iii) Should adopt English and French as the headquarters's official languages.
iv) Should adopt SOIs based upon MC guidance, STANAGs, ATP 35, and planning guidelines emerging from Bi-MNC working groups to support CJTFs.

v) Should have greater NATO-wide participation in the operation of the headquarters, to include the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.

k) EUROFOR:
   i) Should retain its rapid reaction mission.
   ii) Should be declared as a reaction force to NATO and fall under the SACEUR and renamed “SOUTHFOR.” Its headquarters should be invested with international legal personality as stipulated by Alliance guidelines.
   iii) Should adopt English and French as the headquarters's official languages.

iv) Should adopt SOIs based upon MC guidance, STANAGs, ATP 35, and planning guidelines emerging from Bi-MNC working groups to support CJTFs.

v) Should invite other NATO countries to earmark forces for its missions and participate in the headquarters's staff.

vi) Should be given the mission of integrating the rapid reaction elements of Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria should they become NATO members.

vii) The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps should earmark forces for its reaction missions and post officers to its staff.
Appendixes
Appendix A.
Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein
and Jutland (Corps LANDJUT)/
“Multinational Corps Northeast”

1. Headquarters Overview:
   a) Location: Rendsburg, Germany; to be moved to Szczecin (Stettin) in 1999 once Poland is admitted to NATO.
   b) Established: 1962
   c) Participating states: Germany and Denmark are active participants. United Kingdom posts one officer to the command who is integrated into the staff. From its establishment until the end of the Cold War, Canada and the United States service personnel were also integrated into the staff. Previous wartime plans held for the United Kingdom, United States and Canada to reinforce Corps LANDJUT. Poland will become a participant on its admission to NATO in 1999.
   d) Headquarters's description: Multinational
   e) Headquarters's legal status: International/NATO
   f) Headquarters composition: Peacetime establishment is 81; Emergency establishment is 167; Wartime Establishment is 248.
   g) Headquarters language: English
   h) Staff culture: “Germanic”/NATO. SOIs derived from MC guidance, STANAGs, and ATP 35.
   i) Staff rotations: Commanding General, Commanding General's Aide de Camp and the Chief of Staff. G-1, G-3 DIV and HQ CDT and CO HQ COY are always German officers; G-2, G-4 and CIS DIV are always Danish officers. The concept of staff rotations of key posts will remain after Poland joins the corps.

2. Missions: Main defense, without a designated area of responsibility, with the following extended area of planning responsibility:
   a) crises management operations
   b) peace support operations
   c) defense of NATO territory (Article V) Operations

3. Command authorities: OPCON in wartime. N.B.: For over 30 years it is practice in exercises that Commander LANDJUT has OPCOM.

4. Command relationships: Corps LANDJUT (along with Allied Land Forces Zealand) is a land component of Commander Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (Commander BALTAP). As of January 1, 1994, Commander BALTAP became part of the Central Region. According to ACE Directive 80-60, during exercises, crisis and war, the chain of operational command from the SACEUR flows through CINCENT for land forces. As established by MC 317, Corps LANDJUT could be used outside of the BALTAP area of responsibility as a reinforcement for Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe (Commander LANDCENT). As
Denmark is not a member of the WEU, Corps LANDJUT is not designated FAWEU. However, the Danish Parliament in 1994, decided that if the WEU were to request Danish forces assigned to NATO, it could rely on Danish units assigned to Corps LANDJUT.

5. Forces: Corps LANDJUT is solely an operational headquarters and it has no administrative or training responsibility for the divisions it commands:
   a) 14th German *Panzergrenadier* Division, Neubrandenburg
   b) German Headquarters Company
   c) German Signal Battalion
   d) Danish Jutland Mechanized Division, Frederica
   e) Danish Signal Battalion
   f) 12th Polish Mechanized Division, Szczecin

6. Logistical arrangements: The Corps Concept of Logistics is based upon national doctrines and the principles of MC 319/1 and the CR-CAST Logistics Study, which includes the provision for a Logistic Coordination Element in the main corps headquarters. The slow implementation of these principles by nations has limited their realization.

7. Training: Corps LANDJUT does not have training directive authority over its assigned forces, although it has been active in encouraging exchanges. A major live exercise, BOLD GUARD, is held every 4 years. CPXs in particular stress exercising reinforcement scenarios (e.g., CPX CRYSTAL FLARE). Due to Corps LANDJUT’s assignment to BALTAP, unique among Central Region land formations is the strong emphasis the Corps places on joint operations, particularly within an archipelagic environment.

8. Operational employment: None
Appendix B.
I German/Netherlands Corps

1. Headquarters Overview:
   a) Location: Münster, Germany
   b) Established: August 1995
   c) Participating states: Germany and the Netherlands
   d) Description: Binational
   e) Headquarters's legal status: Binational, without international status
   f) Headquarters's composition: 350 personnel; 150 in the Corps Support Group
   g) Headquarters's language: English
   h) Staff culture: Amalgamation of German and Dutch
   i) Staff rotations: Commanding General (A), Deputy Commanding General (B), Chief of Staff (B), Commander Corps Support Group (B), Deputy Commander Corps Support Group (A). G-1, G-4, Legal and Medical advisors are permanently German; G-2, G-6, Budget and Finance are permanently Dutch. Senior National Officers, who are responsible for all national issues, are the Commanding General or Deputy Commanding General.

2. Missions: Main defense to be employed in accordance with NATO strategy, with the provision that national forces and national elements of the corps headquarters can be used for national purposes. National missions are:
   a) Netherlands: Forces can be used for all missions, i.e., main defense, crisis management, NATO- and U.N.-sponsored peace support operations, Partnership for Peace dialogue.
   b) Germany: With the exception of 7th German Panzer Division, which has a wartime assignment to the ARRC, the remaining German forces are limited to main defense due to Field Army (i.e., conscript force) designation.

3. Command authorities:
   a) OPCON in peacetime; OPCOM in wartime. Peacetime authorities include administrative control, responsibilities for operational planning, training and exercises and logistic and medical support.
   b) As a result of the September 1994 meeting between ministers of defense, it was announced that integration should continue to the point that the Commanding General, irrespective of nationality, should have the ability to execute the equivalent of national command over the staff and subordinate units.
   c) I GE/NL Corps has been designated as a FAWEU.

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Letters A and B denote the nationality of the individuals. The rotational structure is designed to ensure a balance in national influence at the headquarters.

5. Forces:
   a) 11th Netherlands Airmobile Brigade, Schaarsbergen (peacetime administrative control, with a wartime assignment to Multinational Division (Central) in the ARRC)
   b) 1st Netherlands Mechanized Division, Apeldoorn
   c) 1st German Panzer Division, Hanover
   d) 7th German Panzer Division, Düsseldorf (peacetime administrative control, with a wartime assignment to the ARRC)
   e) Binational headquarters company
   f) Binational Command Support Group, Eibergen

6. Logistical arrangements: Corps staff are developing a corps concept on logistics and medical support. Netherlands logistic contribution (Netherlands Army Support Command) is assigned (during peace and wartime) to the 1st Netherlands Mechanized Division. Almost all German Army logistic assets are consolidated into three logistic brigades during peacetime and fall under the command of the Heerestunterstützungskommando.

7. Training: An effective corps training regime has been hampered by two factors.
   a) The different missions (Dutch [full spectrum] and German [main defense]) have limited the corps's exercise scope.
   b) As exercises are planned 2-5 years in advance, an effective corps-sponsored exercise program has been limited. IFOR and SFOR deployments have also been limiting factors.

8. Operational employment: none
Appendix C.
V U.S./German Corps

1. Headquarters Overview:
   a) Location: Heidelberg, Germany
   b) Established: Implementing Arrangement establishing the corps was signed February 10, 1993
   c) Participating states: Germany and the United States
   d) Headquarters's description: Framework (United States as the lead nation)
   e) Headquarters's legal status: United States national command
   f) Headquarters's composition: 5 German officers and 1 senior NCO, plus 6 additional personnel (who may be reservists) serve in specific functional staff areas. Six additional German personnel are to be posted to the corps HQ during exercises, crisis and war; an additional 3 more following TOA.
   g) Headquarters language: English
   h) Staff culture: American
   i) Staff rotations: n/a

2. Missions:
   a) Main defense
   b) Deployment in primarily the Central Region

3. Command authorities: OPCON in wartime


5. Forces:
   a) 1st U.S. Infantry Division, Würzburg
   b) 1st U.S. Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach (V U.S. Corps peacetime administrative control and dual-hatted wartime assignment to the ARRC and II German/U.S. Corps)
   c) 5th German Panzer Division, Mainz (II German Corps peacetime administrative control)

6. Logistical arrangements: The German-assigned division contains sufficient logistic and medical elements, as well as organic combat support. V U.S. Corps provides corps troops. Notwithstanding the national responsibility for logistics, a guiding principle of V U.S./German Corps is that wherever possible, unnecessary duplications and redundancies should be avoided through reciprocal cross-national support arrangements.

7. Training: Training and doctrine remain largely a national responsibility and units will train to national standards, as established by ATP 35. V U.S./German and
II German/U.S. corps exchange planning and training/exercise directives with the aim of developing joint and combined exercise programs.

8. Operational employment: none
Appendix D.
II German/U.S. Corps

1. Headquarters Overview:
   a) Location: Ulm, Germany
   b) Established: Implementing Arrangement establishing the corps was signed February 10, 1993
   c) Participating states: Germany and the United States
   d) Headquarters's description: Framework (Germany as the lead nation)
   e) Headquarters's legal status: German national command
   f) Headquarters's composition: 5 U.S. officers and 1 senior NCO, plus 6 additional personnel (who may be reservists) serve in specific functional staff areas. Six additional U.S. personnel are to be posted to the corps HQ during exercises, crisis and war; an additional 3 more following TOA.
   g) Headquarters language: German
   h) Staff culture: German
   i) Staff rotations: n/a

2. Missions:
   a) Main defense
   b) Deployment primarily in the Central Region

3. Command authorities: OPCON in wartime


5. Forces:
   a) 10th German Panzer Division, Sigmaringen (peacetime administrative control, with a wartime assignment to the EUROCORPS)
   b) 1st German Mountain Division, München
   c) 5th German Panzer Division, Mainz (peacetime administrative control, with a wartime assignment to the V U.S./German Corps
   d) 1st U.S. Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach (V U.S. Corps peacetime administrative control and dual-hatted wartime assignment to the ARRC)

6. Logistical arrangements: U.S.-assigned division contains sufficient logistic and medical elements, as well as organic combat support. II German Corps provides corps troops. Notwithstanding the national responsibility for logistics, a guiding principle of II German/U.S. Corps is that wherever possible, unnecessary duplications and redundancies should be avoided through reciprocal cross-national support arrangements.

7. Training: Training and doctrine remain largely a national responsibility and units will train to national standards, as established by ATP 35. II German/U.S. and
V U.S./German corps exchange planning and training/exercise directives with the aim of developing joint and combined exercise programs.

8. Operational employment: none
Appendix E.
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)

1. Headquarters Overview:
   a) Location: Mönchengladbach, Germany
   b) Established: Created as a result of the Defense Planning Committee decision in May 1991. The headquarters was officially activated on October 2, 1992.
   c) Participating states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
   d) Description: Framework (United Kingdom as the lead nation)
   e) Headquarters's legal status: National HQ with international personality as a NATO HQ
   f) Headquarters's composition: approximately 400 (in peacetime)
   g) Headquarters language: English
   h) Staff culture: British/NATO
   i) Staff rotations: Commanding General and Chief of Staff are always British, as well as 60 percent of the corps staff. Deputy Commanding General is an Italian.

2. Missions:
   a) Rapid reaction with the following roles:
      i. demonstrate Alliance resolve
      ii. reinforce main defense forces
      iii. combat role in sustained multinational operations
      iv. peace support operations
      v. monitoring, movement control or disarmament and verification tasks
   b) Deployment plans:
      i. readiness at 6 to 20 days deployability
      ii. deploy force under HQ ARRC of up to 4 divisions, plus corps troops

3. Command authorities: Commander ARRC has coordinating authority over “assigned” national divisions in peacetime and OPCON in wartime. Multinational Division (Central) headquarters is under OPCOM to Commander ARRC in peacetime. Spanish forces fall under special coordination agreements.

4. Command relationships: HQ ARRC is under the OPCOM of the SACEUR in peacetime.

5. Forces:
   a) 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division, Herford
i. Danish International Mechanized Brigade, Vordingborg
b) 3rd United Kingdom Division, Bulford
   i. Italian Ariete Mechanized Brigade, Pordenone
c) Multinational Division (Central), Mönchengladbach
   i. Belgian Para-Commando Brigade, Heverlee
   ii. 31st German Airborne Brigade, Oldenburg
   iii. 11th Netherlands Airmobile Brigade, Schaarsbergen
   iv. 24th United Kingdom Airmobile Brigade, Colchester
d) 3rd Italian Division, Milan
   i. Portuguese Independent Airborne Brigade, Tancos
e) 7th German Panzer Division, Düsseldorf
f) 2nd Greek Mechanized Division, Edhessa
g) Turkish Mechanized Division
h) 1st U.S. Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach
i) Spanish Rapid Action Force (FAR), Madrid
j) Multinational Division (South): Headquarters yet to be formed

6. Logistical arrangements:
   a) ARRC Logistics Concept has yet to be validated. Logistics, therefore, continue to be a national responsibility.
   b) Corps troops assigned to the ARRC:
      i. Reconnaissance brigade (United Kingdom, plus contributions from Canada, Italy, and Denmark)
      ii. Signals brigade (United Kingdom)
      iii. Artillery brigade (United Kingdom)
      iv. Air defense brigade (United Kingdom, plus contribution from the Netherlands)
      v. Engineer brigade (United Kingdom, plus contributions from Italy and Turkey)
      vi. Transport helicopter brigade (United States)
      vii. Helicopter brigade (United Kingdom, plus contribution from Italy)
      viii. Multinational medical brigade
      ix. Multinational repair unit
      x. Multinational logistics brigade

7. Training: HQ ARRC has no authority to train assigned forces; training is a divisional responsibility. ARRC exercises has includedARRCADE GUARD'94.

Appendix F.
Multinational Division Central (MND(C))

1. Headquarters Overview:
   a) Location: Mönchengladbach, Germany
   b) Established: Memorandum of Understanding between defense ministers establishing the formation was signed January 15, 1992; April 1, 1994, the formation was declared operational.
   c) Participating states: Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom
   d) Description: Multinational
   e) Headquarters's legal status: International/NATO
   f) Headquarters's composition: 50 officers and 54 NCOs and enlisted; German Headquarters company’s complement is 191.
   g) Headquarters language: English
   h) Staff culture: “Airmobile”/”Para”/NATO
   i) Staff rotations: Commanding General, Deputy Commanding General, Chief of Staff, and G-3 every 3 years. All other positions assigned by nationality on a permanent basis.

2. Mission statement: MND(C) is to support SACEUR's crisis management options, as well as to conduct peace support operations.

3. Command authorities:
   a) MND(C) headquarters is under OPCOM to Commander ARRC in peacetime,
   b) MND(C) is designated as a FAWEU.

4. Command relationships: Assigned brigades are under OPCON to Commander MND(C). In MND(C) maneuvers, Commander MND(C) exercises OPCOM.

5. Forces:
   a) Belgian Para-Commando Brigade, Heverlee
   b) 31st German Airborne Brigade, Oldenburg
   c) 11th Netherlands Airmobile Brigade, Schaarsbergen
   d) 24th United Kingdom Airmobile Brigade, Colchester
   e) German Headquarters company
   f) 11th Netherlands Signal battalion

6. Logistical arrangements: Support of maneuver brigades and divisional troops remains a national responsibility and is provided by national support groups.

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1 One should not discount the long-term influence of the MND(C)'s first chief of staff being a German.
Study to effect role specialization is underway. Commander MND(C) has Coordinating Authority.

7. Training: Despite numerous CPXs and FTXs, Commander MND(C) has yet to conduct an FTX with all four brigades and divisional troops.

8. Operational employment: none
Appendix G.
1st United Kingdom Armoured Division

1. Headquarters overview:
   a) Location: Herford, Germany
   b) Description: National framework division
   c) Legal status: national
   d) National maneuver units:
      i. 4th Armoured Brigade, Osnabruck
      ii. 7th Armoured Brigade, Hohn
      iii. 20th Armoured Brigade, Paderborn

2. Subordinate unit: Danish International Mechanized Brigade (DANBDE), Vordingborg, Denmark
   a) Higher national command: Danish Army Operational Command, Karup, Denmark
   b) Command authorities:
      i. OPCOM to Danish Army Operational Command.
      ii. OPCON to 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division in accordance within ARRC contingency planning.
      iii. 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division has Coordinating Authority for DANBDE in peacetime.

3. Operational procedures:
   a) Based upon MC guidance and Allied Tactical Publications (particularly ATP 35)
   b) DANBDE is adopting 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division's SOIs.

4. Operational relationships:
   a) DANBDE participation in/observation of 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division FTXs and CPXs.
   b) DANBDE attendance at 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division HQ study days.

5. Liaison arrangements: There is no permanent exchange of LNOs.

6. Training:
   a) Training remains a national responsibility.
   b) DANBDE participates in all 1st United Kingdom Division CPXs.

7. Logistical arrangements: Logistic resupply remains a national responsibility.

8. Incompatibilities:
   a) Equipment
   b) Ethos:
      i. British Army is professionally manned.
ii. DANBDE is made up of volunteers and special contract reservists from throughout Denmark. In peacetime, DANBDE can only deploy 1,500 of its 4,500 wartime complement. DANBDE training has only been at the company level and has yet to conduct a brigade FTX.
Appendix H.
3rd United Kingdom Division

1. Headquarters overview:
   a) Location: Bulford, United Kingdom
   b) Description: National framework division
   c) Legal status: national
   d) National maneuver units:
      i. 1st Mechanized Brigade, Tidworth
      ii. 5th Airbourne Brigade, Aldershot
      iii. 19th Mechanized Brigade, Catterick

2. Subordinate unit: Italian *Ariete* Mechanized Brigade, Pordenone, Italy
   a) Higher national command: 5th Italian Corps, Vittorio Veneto, Italy
   b) Command authorities:
      i. OPCOM to 5th Italian Corps.
      ii. OPCON to 3rd United Kingdom Division in accordance with ARRC contingency planning.
      iii. 3rd United Kingdom Division has Coordinating Authority for Italian *Ariete* Brigade in peacetime.

3. Operational procedures:
   a) Based upon MC guidance and Allied Tactical Publications (particularly ATP 35).
   b) Italian *Ariete* Brigade is adopting 3rd United Kingdom Division's SOIs.

4. Operational relationships:
   a) Biennial working group meetings
   b) Participation in divisional CPXs
   c) Subunit exchanges
   d) Small team visits

5. Liaison arrangements:
   i. Peacetime: 2 Italian LNOs at 3rd United Kingdom Division; 1 British LNO at Italian *Ariete* Brigade, 1 British LNO at 3rd Italian Division, Milan
   ii. Wartime argumentation: 12 Italian LNOs; 5 British LNOs

6. Training:
   a) Italian *Ariete* Brigade personnel have participated in 3rd United Kingdom Division CPXs and study days.
   b) Italian *Ariete* Brigade will conduct its first FTX in the United Kingdom in 1998.

7. Logistical arrangements:
   a) Logistic resupply remains a national responsibility.
   b) Upon deployment, the ARRC logistic concept would be implemented.
8. Incompatibilities:
   a) Equipment
   b) Ethos: Italian *Ariete* Brigade remains a conscript force while the British Army is professional.
Appendix I.
3rd Italian Division

1. Headquarters overview:
   a) Location: Milan, Italy
   b) Description: National framework division
   c) Legal status: national
   d) National maneuver units:
      i. Centauro Mechanized Brigade, Bari
      ii. Friuli Mechanized Brigade, Bologna
      iii. Legnano “Combat Support” Brigade, Bergamo

2. Subordinate unit: Portuguese Independent Airborne Brigade, Tancos, Portugal
   a) Higher national command:
      i. Administrative control: South Military Region
      ii. On deployment: Commander of Operational Ground Forces (“COFT”)
   b) Command authorities:
      i. OPCOM to “COFT.”
      ii. OPCON to 3rd Italian Division in accordance with ARRC contingency planning.
      iii. 3rd Italian Division has Coordinating Authority for Portuguese Independent Airborne Brigade in peacetime

3. Operational procedures: Based upon Italian SOIs, MC guidance and ATPs.

4. Operational relationships: Portuguese Army participates in 3rd Italian Divisional CPXs.

5. Liaison arrangements: 1 Portuguese General Officer (Deputy Commanding General), 5 officers and 3 NCOs.

6. Training: Training remains a national responsibility.

7. Logistical arrangements:
   a) Logistic resupply remains a national responsibility.
   b) Portuguese divisional troops are not assigned to 3rd Italian Division.

8. Incompatibilities:
   a) Equipment

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\[1\] The Legnano “Combat Support” Brigade comprises what would otherwise be considered divisional troops, to include “regiments” of: cavalry, self-propelled artillery, combat engineers and signals.
b) Despite over two decades of close cooperation between the Portuguese and Italian armies, to include the continued Portuguese commitment of a brigade to HQ LANDSOUTH, the effective integration of an airborne brigade within a mechanized division has proven to be problematic.
Appendix J.
European Corps (EUROCORPS)

1. Headquarters Overview:
   a) Locations Strasbourg, France
   b) Established: July 1992, provisional staff created; November 30, 1995 declared fully operational and activation ends.
   c) Participating states: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain
   d) Headquarters's description: Multinational/joint
   e) Headquarters's legal status: Limited legal personality, whose final status has yet to be agreed to by participating states.
   f) Headquarters's composition: 339 military and 23 civilian personnel (35 air force and 2 naval liaison officers); HQ and Service Battalion consist of 622 military and 37 civilian personnel.
   g) Headquarters language: French and German
   h) Staff culture: French/NATO
   i) Staff rotations: Commanding General, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Head, Press and Public Relations, Air Force and Navy liaison officers. Commanding General, First Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff are always of different nationality. Permanent national assignments are:
      i. France: G-4, G-6, Administration
      ii. Germany: G-1, G-3, Medical services
      iii. Belgium: Combat support; civil-military affairs
      iv. Spain: G-2

2. Missions:
   a). Specific:
      i. collective defense of the Central Region as a main defense corps and ACE-wide as a reaction corps
      ii. peace enforcement and peacekeeping
      iii. humanitarian operations
   b). Planned force size:
      i. AFCENT area: corps
      ii. ACE wide: division +/-
      iii. Beyond Europe: brigade +/-

3. Command authorities:
   a) OPCOM (minus task organization) when deployed.
   b) The EUROCORPS has been designated as a FAWEU.
4. Command relationships:
   a) EUROCORPS falls under the Direction of a Common Committee of the five countries' Chiefs of Defense and Political Directors of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs.
   b) SACEUR: Collective defense and peace support operations
   c) WEU Council: Peace support operations as defined by the Petersburg Declaration.

5. Forces:
   a) Wartime assignment:
      i. 1st Belgian Mechanized Division, Saive (which includes a Luxembourg Reconnaissance Battalion)
      ii. 1st French Armored Division, Baden-Baden
      iii. 10th German Panzer Division, Sigmaringen
      iv. 21st Spanish Mechanized Brigade, Cordoba (to increased to the 1st Spanish Mechanized Division in 1998)
   b) Peacetime assignment:
      i. Franco-German Brigade, Mülheim
      ii. 42nd French Signals Field Regiment, Achern
      iii. 10th French Engineer Regiment, Speyer
      iv. Multinational Headquarters and Service Battalion, Strasbourg

6. Logistical arrangements: In Article V missions, logistics remain a national responsibility, with the Commanding General charged with Coordinating Authority. Arrangements for logistics in peace support operations are still evolving.

7. Training: Commander EUROCORPS has peacetime authority to set training objectives, prepare and conduct exercises, conduct proficiency inspections and make suggestions to nations, e.g., apropos force structure. EUROCORPS is quite serious about exercising its forces regularly. It has so far conducted three main defense and three reaction exercises, as well as a number of logistic exercises.

8. Operational employment: The Franco-German Brigade deployed to Bosnia as part of Multinational Division Southeast in support of the NATO Stabilization Force and exercised OPCON over a Ukrainian Mechanized battalion and an Albanian security platoon.
Appendix K. European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR)

1. Headquarters Overview:
   a) Location: Florence, Italy
   b) Established: October 1, 1995 activation staff established; October 19, 1996 activation phase ended.
   c) Participating states: France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal
   d) Headquarters's description: Multinational
   e) Headquarters's legal status: International
   f) Headquarters's composition: 100 officers and NCOs
   g) Headquarters languages: French, Italian, Spanish and (for operations) English
   h) Staff culture: System is based upon the EUROCORPS, but the staff culture is evolving into a unique “latin” one.
      i) Staff rotations: Commanding General (2 star), Chief of Staff, G-3, G-4.

2. Missions: Peace support operations as defined by the Petersburg Declaration, but without compromising other commitments of forces to Article V collective defense within NATO:
   a) humanitarian and rescue (to include non-combatant evacuation operations)
   b) peacekeeping
   c) crisis management
   d) peacemaking

3. Command authorities:
   a) OPCON in wartime.
   b) EUROFOR has been designated as a FAWEU.

4. Command relationships: EUROFOR receives its operational directives from a “High Level Interdepartmental Committee” which comprises each nation's Chief of Defense and General Director of Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with one national defense staff designated annually to act as its executive organ.

5. Forces: EUROFOR can constitute up to a multinational division with nations contributing brigade-size forces each of approximately 5,000. Specific units for EUROFOR are not declared.

6. Logistical arrangements: Logistics remain a national responsibility.

7. Training: Training remains a national responsibility. EUROFOR has yet to plan and conduct any exercises. However, France, Spain and Italy have conducted a series of exercises which deal with Petersberg missions:
   a) FARFADET 92: NEO in France with FR, IT, SP
   b) ARDENTE 93: NEO in Italy with FR, IT, SP
c) TRAMONTANA 94: NEO in Spain with FR, IT, SP  
d) MISTRAL 95: NEO in France/cancelled  
e) EOLO 96: CPX in Italy for PSO with FR, IT, SP  
8. Operational employment: none
Notes

Chapter 1


3. See “Final Communiqué,” Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, Press Communiqué M-DPC/NPG-1(91)38, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, May 29, 1991, point 9. It should be mentioned that the initial plans for the ARRC included a Multinational Division (South) comprising Italian, Turkish and Greek brigades. This headquarters has yet to be formed due to Greek-Turkish disputes and is unlikely to be established.


6. For behind the scenes background on the creation of these formations, see Rob de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: The Battle for Consensus, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries, London: Brassey's, 1997, pp. 43-44. Dr. de Wijk has written what must be the most comprehensive and revealing assessment of the Alliance's evolution since the end of the Cold War. Its careful reading will become a requirement of any serious student of the Alliance.


8. See de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium, pp. 101-106; 128-130.


11. In consequence, the bi-/multi-national land formations not assessed in this study are: Franco-German Brigade, NATO Composite Force, ACE Mobile Force-Land, and the British-Netherlands Amphibious Force.

12. Under the rhetorical patina of Alliance solidarity which enshruds these headquarters, the North American observer is frequently visited with not so subtle pejorative comments by European officials about their “staunch” European allies; comments which harken back to a pre-1939 Europe.
Chapter 2


2. For an informative description of these now “historic” arrangements see, Robert B. Killebrew, Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986, pp. 21-53.

3. For an informative description of the political-military events in this crucial period of the Alliance's history see Richard L. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993, pp. 533-550.

4. Defense developments within the Alliance were well documented and analyzed in Jaime Gama and Rafael Estrella, “Redefining and Building Security Institutions in Europe,” AI 243, DSC/DC(91) 6, Bruxelles, North Atlantic Assembly, October 1991.


7. The rapid diminution in standing force structure and attending confusion in Alliance defense planning resulted in an Alliance force structure review, which had the objective of stopping the free fall in forces and structures. See, William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, Preparing for the NATO Summit: What are the Pivotal Issues?, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 8, 1993, pp. 7-18.

8. To understand the current NATO integrated command structure, let alone to appreciate the difficulties which impede any effort to effect reform, it is necessary to know the difficulties which surrounded its establishment. A superb historical account of these early political sensitivities is found in Gregory W. Pedlow, “The Politics of NATO Command, 1950-1962” in, U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970, Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds., Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 15-42.


22. MC 400/1, “MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, NATO CONFIDENTIAL, June 14, 1996. MC 400/1 contains “...a description of the security situation and pronouncements about the military contribution to the execution of the tasks of NATO, the classified document contained basic principles which the future command and forces structures would have to satisfy,... The most important part of the document was, however, devoted to the military contributions to Alliance roles and missions, the mission requirements and basic principles for the command and force structures.” The principal differences between the first and second iteration of this key planning document is that MC 400/1 has replaced the earlier document’s specific principal mission elements by more general principal mission areas. de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium, p. 105, as well as pp. 101-106. For an unclassified description of the first iteration of this document see ibid, pp. 40-44, BASIC Reports on European Arms Control, No. 20, February 19, 1992, pp. 6-7; and Ad HOC Group on Review of NATO’s Military Strategy, “Public Line to Take on Military Guidance for the Implementation of the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” SRG(91)59, Bruxelles, NATO, December 10, 1991.

23. “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” point 46 (b.)

24. The concept is part of the SACEUR’s operational planning and found in “ACE Land Concept,” SHPRL/May 16, 1995. For Background on this concept, see de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium, pp. 44-45.

that the Germans in particular have given considerable thought to the requirements for, and implications of, counter-concentration. See White Paper 1994, Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defence, April 5, 1994, p. 88, para 521.


31. See “Foreword by General Helge Hansen, Outgoing Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe,” Command in NATO after the Cold War, p.x.

32. For excellent documentation of how existing practices in NATO hampered, for example, Commander ARRC carrying out his assigned mission, see “Command and Control, IFOR Operations”, Final Analysis Report, Volume II, Northwood, Joint Analysis Team for IFOR Operations, March 26, 1997, NATO CONFIDENTIAL.

33. The definitions of these command authorities are established in MC 57/3, “Overall Organization of the Integrated NATO Forces,” July 23, 1981, NATO CONFIDENTIAL.

34. For greater analysis of the problem of the command authorities required by a multinational force commander, see Multinational Force Command Authorities Handbook; and, Jon Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young, “Multinational Command Authorities: the Need for Change in NATO,” Defense Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 1,1997, pp. 35.57.


36. “COMARRC theoretically enjoys OPCON over all three multinational divisions (MNDs) and Corps Troops. In reality, national interference prevents COMARRC from exercising this authority as formally defined. Thus the Divisions were resourced with five, two and four manoeuvre brigades, when their AOs covered 13,000, 20,000 and 16,000 square kilometres respectively,” Michael Walker, “ARRC into Action,” NATO’s Sixteen Nations, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1996, p.44.


40. Briefing, “Areas of Multinationality and Interoperability,” Corps LANDJUT. Note that Corps LANDJUT has only two nations actively “participating”; Germany and Denmark, but the United Kingdom and United States also “belong” to his command.

41. “European and armed forces,” Assembly of Western European Union, p. 7.

42. An interesting complication for the EUROCORPS in this matter is that German personnel serving in France are already covered by a bilateral agreement, (Accord de procédure du 26 février 1962). The three other nations participating, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg, do not have similar Intermediate Agreements.


45. See AAP-6(U), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), January 1995.


49. “During their talks both [Defense] Ministers and both CHODs’s [sic] agreed that the final objective of deep integration should be to enable the Commander of the I (GE/NL) corps to execute real command and control over his staff and subordinated units, regardless of his nationality.: “Draft Progress Report on Deeper Integration with the I (GE/NL) Corps,” April 9, 1996.

50. For an excellent assessment of logistic requirements in peace support operations and the important role which can be played by private contractors see Bruce e. Arlinghaus and Geoff Hopwood, “Logistic Support of Peace Operations: Challenge for the Twenty-First Century,” European Security Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 71-82.

51. Briefing, “Areas of Multinationality and Interoperability,” Corps LANDJUT.

53. “Even after 45 years in existence NATO has failed to make much progress in this field, despite the large number of standardization agreements that have been concluded successfully, a comprehensive coding system and the potential for interoperable command information systems.” Palin, “Multinational Military Forces,” pp. 45-46.


56. “...The NATO Commanders may direct the redistribution of national logistic resources to overcome unanticipated deficiencies; redistribution is not intended to redress national stockpile shortages.” MC319/1, “NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics,” NATO UNCLASSIFIED, 2nd revision, October 17, 1996, Annex A “Authority of the NATO Commanders to Redistribute Logistic Resources,” point 1.(b.)


59. De Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium, pp 141-145

**Chapter 3**


2. Briefing, “Areas of Multinationality and Interoperability,” Corps LANDJUT.

3. Note that as a Sub-PSC, current NATO regulations hold that the operating expenses of the headquarters have become the sole responsibility of the participants.


7. See Multinational Force Command Authorities Handbook, pp. 7-8. However, in exercises, it has been the tradition for 30 years for Commander Corps LANDJUT to exercise OPCOM.

9. It is interesting to note that all memoranda from ministries containing national taskings to the Corps must contain an English précis.


13. See “Authority and Responsibilities of the Commander of I(GE/NL) Corps (Terms of Reference),” Annex B.

14. The “Implementing Arrangement” and “Technical Arrangement” establishing these corps explicitly describe them as “binational.” However, it would be more accurate to describe them as framework corps with designated lead nations since there has been, for intents and purposes, no real integration.

15. See Article 2 of “Implementing Arrangement between the Chief of Staff Army of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Commander-in-Chief United States Army Europe and Seventh Army to Establish a German/U.S. Corps and a U.S./German Corps,” February 10, 1993. N.B.: This arrangement implements the January 4, 1993 agreement between the German Federal Minister of Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense to establish these two corps. The “Technical Arrangement between the Commanding General V US. Corps and the Commanding General II German Corps,” June 14, 1994, specifies the “terms, conditions, duties and relationships concerning the operation of the two binational corps during crisis and war...” See point 1.1.


18. See “Final Communiqué Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, May 29, 1991, point 9. For some of the early problems which confronted the ARRC headquarters as it was being established see Palin, “Multinational Military Forces,” pp. 56-57.

19. For an excellent analysis of Britain’s deployment to the Gulf War in the context of a wider analysis of its and other European nations’ future expeditionary capabilities, see John E. Peters and Howard Deshong, Out of Area or Out of Reach? European Military Support for Operations in Southwest Asia, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 1995, pp. 6-14; 32-42.

20. See Die Welt (Hamburg), May 27, 1991; and, “Britische Dominanz bei NATO-Eingreiftruppe: NATO-Streitkräftestruktur mit Fragezeichen,” IAP-Dienst, No. 11, June 6, 1991, pp. 4-6. Note that Germany got, as a “compensation,” the 3-star NATO position of Director, Reaction Forces (Air) Staff at Kolkar, Germany, the air equivalent to Commander ARRC.

der NATO, pp 17-18; Peter Sacacino, “AARC at the Sharp End: NATO’s Rapid-Reaction Emergency 
Information Office, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, Mönchengladbach, September 
1994.


23. Pieter Huysman, “Airmobility in NATO: The New MND(C),” The RUSI Journal, Volume 139, 
No. 2, April 1994, p. 45.

24. Manfred Neuber, “Die Multinationale Division (Central)—Ein multinationaler Grossverband 
im Rahmen des NATO-Krisenmanagements,” Österreichischer Militärische Zeitschrift, No. 6, 1995, 
pp. 635-637; and, “Multinational Division Central,” Public Information Officer HQ MND(C), n.d., pp. 
4-5.


26. See Stato Maggiore della Difesa, Sintesi del Modello di Difesa: Presentato in Parlamento il 26 
background on the New Defense Model and its acceptance amongst political parties see Paolo Bellucci, 
Studi Strategici/Rivista Militare, Gennaio 1994. Note that the New Defense Model is in the process of 
being accepted by Parliament and the number of forces is initially envisaged have been reduced. See Il 

27. See Le Monde (Paris), November 4, 1991; February 22, 1993; and, November 7-8, 1993; and, 
“Rapport des ministres de la défense français et allemand concernant la création du Corps européen,” 
adopté le 22 mai 1992 par le Conseil franco-allemand de défense et de sécurité après approbation du 
Comité du Conseil.

Multinationale Streitkräfte in der NATO, pp 57-61.

29. The EUROCORPS has even sponsored the publication of a lengthy book which focuses on its 
role as an instrument of European unity. See EUROKORPS und Europäische Einigung, Bonn: Kunst & 
Kommunikation Ernst Martin, 1996. For an example of public relations, vice substance, see Raymond 
n.d.

30. An interesting fact is that the EUROCORPS has the largest number main battle tanks of any 
corps in the Central Region: 645. See Le Figaro (Paris), March 28, 1996.

31. Then U.S. Ambassador to NATO William H. Taft IV stated that “Undermining the alliance’s 
inTEGRATED military structure in the uncertain process of developing a European security identity would be 
the height of folly.” Precisely how the existence of the EUROCORPS would contribute to this dire end 
was not explained by Ambassador Taft. See The Washington Post, May 23, 1992.

32. For a semi-official French view of this arrangement see, J-F Durant, “Les Forces 
Multinationales Européennes,” Les Cahiers de Mars, mai 1996.

Europäischen Korps im Rahmen Nordatlantischen Alliag (‘SACEUR-Abkommen’),” in 
EUROKORPS un Europäische Einigung, pp. 600-601.


39. See the editorial in *Il Sole-24 Ore* (Milano), September 18, 1996.


41. See Ministerio de Defensa, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, “EUROFOR Y EUROMARFOR,” Acuerdo por el que se Aproba la Participacion Española en la Eurofuerza Operativa Rapida (EUROFOR) y en la Fuerza Maritima Europea (EUROMARFOR) se Autoriza la Firma de sus Documentos Constitutivos, 5 de mayo de 1995.

42. The establishment for EUROFOR went from being an insignificant local news event to international headlines following its public unveiling at the end of its activation status when it was publicly denounced by Muammar Qadhafi as being an “imperialistic force”! See *La Nazione* (Firenze), November 12, 1996.

43. Durant, “Les Forces Multinationales Européennes.”


45. See “European armed forces,” Assembly of the Western European Union, pp. 7-9; and, Foster, *NATO’s Military in the Age of Crisis Management*, pp. 26-27.

46. For the decision to deploy this multinational force, see *L’Unita* (Roma), April 5, 1997. For details on the make up of the ALBA force see “Attualità ub breve...Operazione ‘ALBA,’” *Rivista Militare*, No 4, 1997, pp. 1-4.

Chapter 4

1. I.e., MC 57/3, “Overall Organization of the Integrated NATO Forces,” requires revision to make command authority definitions supportive of the new NATO multinational force structure. This point has been identified in British joint doctrine. “Many nations, in and outside NATO, recognize the NATO definitions of a number of command and control terms...Their use in more general multinational operations can be misleading. This paper proposes several new definitions...” See “Command and Control in Multinational Operations,” Director Joint Warfare, Ministry of Defence, UKAR, D/DJW/0504, August 24, 1995, p. 1, point 6, “Definitions,” and p. 8, “Annex A” for the proposed new
definitions. Cf., *Multinational Force Command Authorities Handbook*, pp. 8-9, which finds the current definitions of NATO command authorities to be valid.

2. This “general principle” of allowing the task organization of formations two command levels below a multinational force commander was determined by the CR-CAST Working Group on Command Authorities Required for a Multinational Force Commander. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

3. In fact, one hears the reoccurring rumor in Bonn—much to the consternation of defense officials—that there may yet be a German-Italian division made up German mountain troops and Italian *Alpini*. This was recently suggested during a visit to Germany by Italian Defense Minister Beniamino Andreatta. See DDP/ADN (Berlin), January 21, 1997 in FBIS-WEU/97-014, http://fbis.fedworld.gov.


5. It is interesting to observe the different manner by which European nations have chosen to effect these new military relationships with Bonn. In the case of Denmark, this has been accomplished through the continued Danish domination of the BALTAP command and within the framework of ensuring the best means to achieve national objectives vis-à-vis Germany is through the integration to the highest degree possible of both countries’ armies. Finally, the United Kingdom has chosen to maintain a significant military presence in Germany and through the domination of the most prestigious military command, the ARRC, while eschewing bilateral defense initiatives.


7. For a discussion of this subject see Palin, *Multinational Military Forces*, pp. 40-42.

8. ATP 35, “Land Force Tactical Doctrine.” To wit: “...priority must be attached to developing joint SOPs, and a revision of ATP 35—designed to harmonize definitions and procedures along the lines of NATO operation planning and operations—must be continued without delay.” Helge Hansen, “Training of Multinational Forces,” NATO’s Sixteen Nations, Vol. 38, number 1 (Special edition), 1993, p. 33.

9. See, for example, “MNC’s Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP),” 4 volumes, NATO RESTRICTED, draft, 1220/SHOP/96/63/100/3/1.

10. An initial (albeit unsatisfactory) first effort can be found in the Bi-MNC draft document, “NATO Task List,” 1st Draft, March 13, 1997.

11. I am indebted to Dr. Jed Peters for making me aware of this important lacuna in contemporary European military training.


13. Under its new structure called “Neues Heer für neue Aufgaben,” the German Army currently has five different levels of readiness: 1) crisis reaction, 2) augmentation crisis reaction, 3) active main defense, 4) not active main defense, and 5) partially active main defense forces. Note that no single division is completely made up of crisis reaction forces. Rather, two division headquarters (in addition to the 4th Division/ *Kommando Luftbewegliche Kräfte*) are designated for crisis reaction missions; but upon deployment, significant task organization from throughout the army would be required to field a two brigade maneuver force. See Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bundeswehrplan 1997: *Konzeptioneller Rahmen, Planungsergebnis, Bewertung*, Bon, n.d., pp. 2-7; and, Klaus Kuhlen, et al., “Das Neue Heer,” *Soldat und Technik*, number 3, 1996, pp. 164-179.

15. "An important element of our security preparedness depends on durable relationships with allies and other friendly nations. Accordingly, a central thrust of our strategy is to strengthen and adapt the security relationships we have with key nations around the world and create new structures when necessary." See A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1997, p. 2.

16. For an excellent analysis of the ARRC’s deployment capabilities see Peters and Deshong, Out of Area or Out of Reach?, pp. 97-109.

17. One imagines that the ARRC may well have performed much better in Bosnia if it had enjoyed a clearer command relationship with U.S Army commands. See “Bosnia-Herzegovia After Action Review,” pp. 5-7; 21-24.

18. For background on “ESDI” and how NATO might support a “European” campaign, see Forster, NATO’s Military in the Age of Crisis Management, pp. 34-48.

19. For a critique of the EUROCORPS’s capability to deploy outside of Europe, see Peters and Deshong, Out of Area or Out of Reach, pp. 109-117

Chapter 5.

1. Michael Walker, “AARC into Action,” p. 44.

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