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NATO STRATEGY IN THE 1990s:
REAPING THE PEACE DIVIDEND OR THE WHIRLWIND?

William T. Johnsen

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FOREWORD

Each April the Strategic Studies Institute hosts a conference that addresses key strategic issues facing the Armed Forces and the Nation. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation in times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.

Dr. William T. Johnsen, Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College and a former NATO staff officer, examines The Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Released in November 1991, the Strategic Concept represents NATO's response to the dramatically changed security environment in Europe, and the intense desire to reap the resultant "peace dividend." Dr. Johnsen argues that a close reading of the strategy and subsequent implementing initiatives refutes critics who claim that NATO has failed to respond adequately to Europe's new security conditions. The Strategic Concept dramatically expands the scope of the Alliance's security objectives and functions, takes NATO "out of area," and lays the foundation for massive forces cuts, as well as for a fundamental restructuring of Alliance military forces and command structures.

In Dr. Johnsen's opinion, however, the Alliance has been less than successful in the practical implementation of its Strategic Concept. These difficulties stem predominately from confusion within the Alliance over NATO's ultimate function: Should it remain a collective defense organization or should it evolve into a collective security body? Dr. Johnsen argues that for the foreseeable future NATO must remain focused on collective defense. This recommendation has a number of consequences for the Alliance, most notably for the pace of expanding its membership, NATO's future role in crisis management and conflict resolution—especially peace operations, the conduct of other "non-Article V" operations, and the degree to which nations can garner the peace dividend.

For policymakers to grasp successfully the thorny strategic issues facing them in an era of increasingly constrained resources requires informed debate. The Strategic Studies
Institute, therefore, offers this report as part of its contributions to the ongoing discussions.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1991 and currently serves as an Associate Research Professor of National Security Affairs. He has also held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies of the U.S. Army War College since 1994. An infantry officer before retiring from the U.S. Army, Dr. Johnsen served in a variety of troop leading, command and staff assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division (Light). He also served as Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has authored or coauthored numerous Strategic Studies Institute studies, as well as articles in a variety of policy journals, that focus on U.S.-European security issues.
INTRODUCTION

In November 1991, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization released "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" (hereafter Strategic Concept), the first significant revision of NATO strategy since the Alliance adopted the strategy of Flexible Response in 1967. In this new document, NATO acknowledged the dramatic improvements in the European security environment, and positioned the Alliance for the post-Cold War era. Since 1991, the Strategic Concept has guided NATO as it absorbed a unified Germany, massively reduced allied forces, partially overhauled its command and control structures, undertook peace operations in the former Yugoslavia under the aegis of the U.N., conducted combat operations for the first time in its history, and started to tackle the difficult question of enlarging the Alliance.

Despite these accomplishments, pundits have subjected the Alliance to a constant barrage of criticism. While individual critiques fall across a wide spectrum, an overarching complaint is that the Alliance has not adapted sufficiently to the changed conditions in Europe. Because the Strategic Concept sets out the basic principles of the Alliance and serves as the guide for NATO's future direction, these criticisms also call into question the validity of the Alliance's current strategy. This monograph, therefore, will examine the elements of "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," to include its implementation and follow-on initiatives, and assess whether these efforts adequately prepare NATO to meet the 21st century.

This assessment begins with a brief description of the key elements of the Strategic Concept to inform those who may have been unable to examine it in detail because of the press of other international and European crises. The study next assesses NATO's numerous political and military initiatives for implementing the Strategic Concept, with emphasis on evaluating their success. Particular emphasis will be devoted to the issue of NATO's growing participation in collective security activities, and the inherent contradiction this holds for NATO's continued existence—specified in the Strategic Concept and routinely reiterated thereafter—as a collective defense organization. The report
closes with conclusions and recommendations for further Alliance action.

KEY ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Before outlining the critical provisions of the Strategic Concept, several preliminary points need to be raised. First, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" is NATO's first unclassified strategy; no small point. Second, previous strategic concepts were published by the NATO Military Committee (MC). As a consequence, while past strategies touched on political issues and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the documents, they had a decidedly military thrust. In "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," on the other hand, the political element clearly predominates. Third, because of the considerable political content, France participated in the strategy review and approved the Strategic Concept despite not belonging to the Alliance's integrated military structure. Again, no small accomplishment for the Alliance. Finally, while the strategy reflects significant changes from the past, a number of continuities remain.

The Strategic Context.

The Strategic Concept opens with "The Strategic Context," which chronicles the significant changes in Europe and assesses their effects on the Alliance. This section contains three major conclusions. First, the changed security environment alters neither the purpose nor security functions of the Alliance. Second, while the Alliance no longer confronts a massive, specific threat (i.e., the Warsaw Pact), it still faces risks, albeit unspecified. Third, the new security conditions offer "... new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security." In short, this section provides the contextual and philosophical underpinnings for the principles of NATO strategy that followed.

These conclusions have important consequences for the Alliance. On the one hand, unspecified risks extend well beyond traditional threats to the territorial integrity and political independence of its members, and now include "Alliance security interests [which] can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, ... proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Protecting those interests implies that the Alliance must be prepared, for the first time, to operate outside the traditional NATO Treaty area. These consequences, in turn, justify NATO involvement in crisis management and conflict prevention. Finally, participation in crisis management and conflict prevention activities provides the rationale for NATO rapid reaction forces. Thus, this portion of the Strategic Concept establishes precedents for expanding dramatically the scope of the Alliance's security objectives and functions, takes NATO "out of area," and lays down the requirement for a fundamental restructuring of NATO forces; points that many observers apparently have overlooked.

Alliance Objectives and Security Functions.

Despite establishing new missions for the Alliance, NATO members strongly reaffirmed the essential purpose of the Alliance originally laid out in the Washington Treaty (1949): "... to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." To achieve these objectives, the Strategic Concept reaffirms NATO's long-standing policies of credible deterrence and, if necessary, an effective defense. Reflecting the new emphasis on crisis management, the allies added the requirement to "... [maintain] an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members." To achieve these objectives, NATO members reiterated the fundamental security tasks facing the Alliance:

• To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

• To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
• To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

• To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.\textsuperscript{10}

A Broad Approach to Security.

To fulfill these tasks, the Alliance has broadened its approach to security to include dialogue, cooperation, collective defense, and crisis management and conflict prevention. Granted, these elements have their roots in the concepts of defense and dialogue first articulated in the Harmel Report (1967), but key differences exist.\textsuperscript{11} On the one hand, the Strategic Concept reverses the priority of Alliance functions; i.e., political means henceforth will predominate over military considerations. More profoundly, provisions for crisis management and conflict prevention took on new meanings.

Some might argue that NATO has long practiced crisis management procedures. While true, the new call for participation in crisis management and conflict prevention differs vastly from Cold War procedures intended to avert a full-scale conventional and, perhaps, nuclear confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The new provisions establish that security is no longer a matter of the 16 NATO members only, but is intertwined with Europe as a whole. While this was true during the Cold War, the critical difference is that the collapse of communism and the Warsaw Pact now makes it possible for NATO to exercise its security functions outside NATO territory. This circumstance allows NATO to work in conjunction with regional (e.g., European Union [EU], Western European Union [WEU], Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] [formerly CSCE]) or international (e.g., U.N.) organizations.

But, this new "opportunity" to cooperate with these frequently duplicative security organizations has not been without its problems. The critical issue concerns: Which institution is responsible for what? The short answer is that no one knows.\textsuperscript{12} Worse yet, no one appears to be working out the details that will delimit roles and responsibilities, eliminate unnecessary overlap, or close the gaps between these supposedly interlocking institutions. As a result, crisis management
activities are cobbled together inefficiently (e.g., the WEU/NATO maritime enforcement of the Yugoslav embargo), are confused (e.g., the U.N. and NATO in Bosnia-Hercegovina), or simply fall through the gaps (e.g., EU and OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova, or Chechenya).

If NATO is to defend its interests (e.g., European stability, resolving crises on NATO's periphery thus preventing spillover onto NATO territory) effectively through crisis management activities, then NATO must take the lead—now—in defining the parameters of organizational roles and responsibilities of the various European security institutions. To do so, requires answers to the following questions:

- What shall be the current division of labor between NATO and the EU/WEU?
- Will NATO continue in the future to act as a security arm of the OSCE?
- What shall be the role between NATO and a future European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)?
- Given the NATO experience in Bosnia-Hercegovina, under what conditions will the Alliance be willing to cooperate with the U.N.?

Certainly, answers to these difficult questions will be neither simply nor quickly found. Ideally, NATO would first build internal consensus on its future role, and then on how NATO would interact with other European institutions. After hammering out its internal difficulties, NATO would then work out comprehensive definitions of responsibility with each European institution having a stake in security issues.

But these are not ideal times. Many NATO members have differing views on these issues, as well as differing national agendas and objectives for the various competing institutions that will further complicate consensus-building efforts. Furthermore, NATO will have to handle these prickly issues concurrently—in terms of dealing with institutions, as well as responding to crises. If NATO is to succeed in these efforts, then the Alliance will have to take the lead. No other
institution has the degree of necessary consensus or the apparent willingness to confront these issues. Equally important, within NATO, the United States must take a stronger role and resolve the many differences among the major European powers, as well as between the United States and its NATO allies. This will require the United States to demonstrate forethought, patience, and improved leadership qualities.

Guidelines for Defense.

*Principles of Alliance Strategy.* Despite an increased reliance on political means, the Strategic Concept retains a significant military component. The Alliance remains purely defensive in purpose, and retains deterrence, and, if necessary defense, as key military elements of NATO strategy. The enduring role of Alliance military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of NATO members. The collective nature of NATO continues to apply to the equitable sharing of roles, risks, and responsibilities. Lastly, collective defense remains the best means to preclude the renationalization of defense policies.\(^{14}\)

One strategic principle has drawn remarkably little comment, especially given the usual sensitivity of nuclear issues in Europe. The Strategic Concept retains the Alliance's reliance on an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear weapons, and reaffirms the continued importance of nuclear weapons in supporting the Alliance's policy of deterrence. Moreover, NATO allies remain committed to continued modernization of its nuclear systems, another issue that usually has generated considerable controversy.\(^{15}\)

The Alliance's New Force Posture.

*The Missions of Alliance Military Forces.* While Alliance military forces must remain capable of conducting large-scale warfare that provides the final insurance against a general war, NATO authorities consider such an outcome highly unlikely. As a result, the Alliance posed additional missions for NATO military forces. And, in keeping with the Alliance's increased participation in crisis management and conflict prevention, as well as defense of Alliance interests, NATO forces would no longer have solely a wartime role. Forces would be required to
perform different functions in peace, crisis, and war.\textsuperscript{16} In peace, NATO forces would promote stability and provide strategic balance, as well as contribute toward dialogue and cooperation. In crises, Alliance forces "... can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management of crises and their peaceful resolution."

How NATO forces will accomplish this difficult task has not yet been answered. To ensure that the use of military force contributes to, rather than detracts from, crisis management and resolution requires detailed military strategic guidance and operational level planning. Before such comprehensive planning can occur in NATO, members must reach a political consensus on such key points as; NATO versus national interests involved, the degree of military participation nations are willing to underwrite, funding provisions, and command and control arrangements, to name only a few.

NATO members, however, traditionally have been averse to obligating themselves militarily in advance of a crisis. And, as the NATO experience in the Balkans clearly indicates, nations may be equally reluctant to commit when the fuller parameters of a crisis are unknown. Until such time, therefore, that realistic military planning and capabilities, and, more importantly, the political will to employ those capabilities, provide credible muscle to the lofty rhetoric of the Strategic Concept, the words will remain little more than empty promises.

This conclusion does not imply that the Alliance should simply shrug its collective shoulders and wait for the next crisis to catch it unaware and unprepared. Alternative steps are available for the Alliance to pursue. First, NATO nations must face up to the fact that the Alliance is not likely to underwrite substantial preplanning for military participation in crisis management. Second, to compensate for the absence of preplanning, the Alliance--individually and collectively--must provide capabilities such as those suggested below that will ensure a rapid response to an emerging crisis:

- Subordinate headquarters that will likely be charged with carrying out such missions must receive detailed military strategic and operational level guidance that is essential for
effective planning.$^{18}$

- Increased intelligence gathering capabilities and staffs to monitor conditions, track emerging events, and provide rapid assessments of an emerging crisis. Because of the importance of political issues in crisis management, intelligence efforts must go beyond strictly military intelligence functions and provide for a thorough understanding of political-military issues.

- Sufficient communications capabilities (e.g., strategic level communications, mobile ground stations, access to satellites) to ensure adequate command and control of operations.

- Planning staffs in the various Major Subordinate Command (MSC) and Principle Subordinate Command (PSC) headquarters need to be augmented to provide the "surge" capability necessary to respond to a quickly rising crisis, as well as to keep pace with rapidly changing conditions and contingencies. This may especially apply to logistics planning staffs, who habitually have been under-represented in many NATO headquarters because logistics has always been a national responsibility.

- Mobile, deployable staff cells need to be created within the various headquarters. These cells must be physically and intellectually capable of responding to rapidly changing situations. Personnel readiness requirements may have to be altered in some nations to comply with these requirements.

- Redundancies need to build into staffs to provide for sufficient numbers and types of personnel in the event a nation chooses not to participate in an operation.

- Redundancies also need to be integrated into each headquarters to ensure that in the event of a deployment, sufficient personnel are on hand within the primary headquarters to perform daily requirements, as well as to ensure rotation of deployed personnel.

Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture. To fulfill their charge to support political efforts to manage or resolve crises, NATO forces must "... have a capability for measured and timely responses . . . ; the capability to deter action against an Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to
respond to and repel it as well as establish the territorial integrity of member states." Consequently, the Strategic Concept stipulates that the size, readiness, and deployment of Alliance forces would vary according to their geographic locality, their mission, and their deployment requirements. The overall size of NATO forces has been greatly decreased and, in many cases, readiness has been significantly (perhaps imprudently) reduced.

The idea of "Forward Defense" along Alliance frontiers, particularly the linear defense of the Central Region, has been replaced with a reduced forward presence. That said, the Strategic Concept acknowledges that the northern and southern tiers of Allied Command Europe (ACE) face greater risks and shorter warning times, and that national and NATO force postures must reflect these differences.

To ensure that lower residual force levels would be capable of participating effectively in crisis management and conflict prevention, as well as fulfilling their traditional defense missions, the Strategic Concept provides more detailed guidance. Specifically, the Alliance would require "... limited, but militarily significant ... ground, air, and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable." Importantly, these forces also must be able to deter a limited attack, and, if necessary, defend Alliance territory until additional forces arrived.

To provide those additional forces, the Strategic Concept establishes the requirement to build up forces through mobilization, reinforcement, and reconstitution, and deploy them quickly. Interestingly, the Strategic Concept notes that such forces must also possess the ability to draw down "... quickly and discriminately ... [through] flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions." Finally, while acknowledging the long-held tradition of close political control of crisis management actions, the strategy calls for a review of crisis management procedures in light of the new security environment.

**Characteristics of Conventional Forces.** In addition to immediate and rapid reaction forces mentioned above, the Strategic Concept calls for the Alliance's military structure to include main defense and augmentation forces which are composed
of active and mobilizable elements. It also describes the requisite capabilities of ground, maritime, and air forces, which largely reiterate traditional requirements. Of greater interest is the recognition that significantly reduced force structures would require increased reliance on integrated military structures, as well as the establishment of multinational formations—particularly among ground forces.25

The Allies also articulated the capabilities—to be maintained or created—necessary to underwrite crisis management and rapid reaction capabilities: effective surveillance and intelligence, adequate command and control organizations and procedures, strategic mobility between regions—to include units capable of rapid deployment, the air and sea assets to transport them, and improved logistics capabilities. Further, NATO authorities underscored the requirement that forces from all three elements—reaction, main defense, and augmentation—must be prepared for intra-European reinforcement roles.26

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces. The Strategic Concept also outlines the characteristics of NATO's future nuclear forces. First, nuclear weapons would remain political instruments "... to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war."27 Second, to demonstrate Alliance solidarity and strengthen nuclear deterrence, nations would continue to share burdens, roles, and responsibilities—to include collective defense planning in nuclear roles, as well as peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory.28 Third, NATO nuclear forces would "... need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies strategy for preventing war."29 In short, nuclear forces will remain the deterrent force of ultimate resort.

At the same time, the Alliance recognized that the changed security environment in Europe permitted radical changes in the Alliance nuclear force posture. As a result, they agreed to maintain nuclear forces at "... the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability," to reduce significantly the number of sub-strategic nuclear systems, and to eliminate all nuclear artillery and ground launched short-range nuclear missiles.30 While these provisions seem a radical departure from past NATO strategy, they nonetheless reflect continuity with more recent
IMPLEMENTATION AND FOLLOW-ON INITIATIVES

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept represents a beginning, not an end. Thus, despite the charges of some critics, the Alliance has not sat on its collective hands since November 1991. To the contrary, NATO not only has implemented its Strategic Concept, it has undertaken a number of significant political and military initiatives to effect the letter and intent of its strategy. The report next turns to an examination and assessment of these efforts.

Political Initiatives.

- Dialogue and Cooperation.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). On the political side, NATO has widened significantly the scope of cooperation and dialogue that has been long underway. In December 1991, for example, the NACC convened for the first time. Composed of all NATO members, Central and Eastern European states that formerly belonged to the former Warsaw Pact, and the successor states to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the NACC is a forum for the Atlantic Alliance and its new partners. Although criticized by some as a mere "talk shop," the NACC provides an essential interface between NATO and its former adversaries. Within the NACC, members can raise and explore issues of mutual interest in a common forum that promotes confidence building and trust. Additionally, the NACC has undertaken a substantive yearly work program that has addressed such issues as policy and security, defense planning, defense conversion, economics, science, and air traffic management. Most important, perhaps, the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping has sought to harmonize peacekeeping doctrines, practices, and procedures.

- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). NATO allies have continued to be the driving force in the OSCE (formerly CSCE) process begun in Helsinki in 1975. OSCE signatories implemented the provisions of the Charter of Paris (November 1990)—to include the new structures and institutions of the OSCE process—and the Vienna Document 90 on Confidence and
Security Building Measures (CSBMs) (November 1990). Implementing the Vienna Document 92 on CSBMs signed in March 1992 has enhanced these efforts. Follow-on OSCE conferences in Helsinki (1992) and Budapest (1994) that set forth additional initiatives to improve trust, confidence, and stability in Europe have reinforced Alliance efforts at enhancing dialogue and cooperation within Europe.

- **Arms Control Initiatives.** The Alliance also continues its arms control efforts, and with considerable success. NATO allies and their partners in Central and Eastern Europe are in the midst of implementing the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) that is on track to eliminate nearly 70,000 items of treaty limited equipment by the end of 1995. The Alliance and its Central and East European interlocutors also concluded the CFE IA agreement that set national limits on the personnel strength of conventional armed forces in the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) area (July 1992). NATO has also taken up the important cause of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, although they are bilateral U.S.-Russian initiatives, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) enjoy Alliance support.

NATO's intense focus on arms control treaties and their implementation had unexpected, but significant, consequences for the Alliance's ability to respond to the post-Cold War security environment. Because of the massive reductions in force structures and the reorganizations which they generated, national and NATO military planners were absorbed in revamping national and NATO force structures and command and control arrangements. Consequently, they were neither well-prepared for events in the Balkans nor were they able to devote the attention necessary to respond effectively to the demands of the accelerating crisis. Had NATO military authorities been able to devote their full attention to this issue, the Alliance probably would have responded in a more effective manner.

- **Partnership for Peace (PfP).** NATO further reinforced its commitment to cooperation and dialogue at the January 1994 Summit in Brussels, when the Alliance established the PfP program. In the words of the official invitation, PfP will "... expand and intensify political and military cooperation within Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build
strengthened relationships . . . ." Under the authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and within the framework of the NACC, NATO invited new partners, on an individual basis and at their own pace, to participate in key political and military activities within NATO headquarters. Such activities include but are not limited to peacekeeping exercises, increased transparency of defense budgets, democratic control of armed forces, cooperative military relations, ". . . and the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance." Significantly, the PfP invitation also stipulated that the Alliance would ". . . consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security;" effectively extending, de facto, provisions of Article IV of the Washington Treaty to those states that join PfP. Importantly, this consultation would take place at "16 +1" (i.e., with NATO and the affected state), rather than at 36 (NACC) or 53 (OSCE) where efforts to arrive at a rapid solution obviously would be more complicated.

Despite the charges that PfP does not go far enough, PfP must be recognized for what it is: the best means, to date, to prepare states for potential NATO membership. By offering, implicitly at least, a potential pathway to NATO membership to those nations committed to joining the Alliance, PfP represents a significant step beyond simple cooperation and dialogue. And, when PfP is viewed together with other Alliance initiatives, there can be little doubt that the Alliance has more than fulfilled its commitment to increased dialogue and cooperation.

- **Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention.**

The Alliance took another significant step in implementing the Strategic Concept when NATO foreign ministers agreed at Oslo in June 1992 ". . . to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise." More importantly, the Alliance quickly turned theory into action, as NATO undertook support of U.N. efforts to resolve the ongoing crisis in the former Yugoslavia.
NATO participation in efforts to mitigate the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and to assist in crisis management has been extensive, if not entirely successful. In conjunction with the WEU, NATO began conducting maritime operations in support of U.N. mandates in July 1992 (currently named Operation SHARP GUARD). In October 1992, the Alliance began monitoring the air space over the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, in November 1992, NATO had dispatched a substantial portion of Headquarters, Northern Army Group to serve as the core of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) command and control structure in the former Yugoslavia. In April 1993, air monitoring operations turned to enforcing the U.N. "no-fly" zone over the former Yugoslavia (Operation DENY FLIGHT). Shortly thereafter NATO's role expanded to include providing close air support to defend UNPROFOR, as well as U.N. "safe areas" in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Alliance later expanded its efforts to include close air support of humanitarian assistance operations.

On February 28, 1994, NATO involvement deepened significantly when Alliance aircraft shot down four fixed-wing aircraft violating the "no-fly" zone. Close on the heels of this event, NATO aircraft responded to the first UNPROFOR request for close air support on March 12, 1994 (although the aircraft attacked no ground targets). NATO participation continued to escalate as the threat of NATO air strikes was used to halt ethnic Serbian attacks on U.N.-declared "safe areas" in eastern Bosnia. In August and September 1994, NATO aircraft attacked ground targets, as Bosnian Serbs refused to abide by U.N. resolutions regarding the "heavy weapons exclusion" zone around Sarajevo. Continuing Serbian violations of U.N. resolutions resulted in NATO aircraft, at the request of UNPROFOR, attacking the Bosnian Serb air base at Ubdina, Croatia, on November 21, 1994. Finally, on November 23, 1994, NATO aircraft struck surface-to-air missile sites that had illuminated NATO reconnaissance aircraft with their target acquisition radars.

By this point, however, serious strains had been growing within the Alliance for some time, and internal consensus over the Alliance's further role in conflict management in Bosnia-Hercegovina broke down. On the one hand, the United States advocated tougher military action, especially air strikes (but without offering to provide U.S. ground troops), to retaliate against ethnic Serbian acts, and to force the pace of
negotiations to end the conflict. On the other hand, the principal providers of UNPROFOR forces (especially key NATO members France and Britain) supported a more restrained approach. Tensions built for several months until the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from enforcing U.N. maritime sanctions openly split the Alliance, perhaps most seriously since the Suez Crisis (1956), and shattered the fragile consensus for muscular NATO support of U.N. operations within Bosnia-Hercegovina. Moreover, it called into question NATO's support of peace operations in general.

This result should come as no surprise. NATO may have rushed to judgement on the issue of participation in peace operations, pushed too early into a decision by the advocates of "out of area or out of business." As a result, NATO engaged in peace operations before its members had fully debated and agreed on its future role, much less on its function in peace operations. Indeed, little consensus exists within key Alliance countries about their participation in such efforts. For example, within the United States (despite Presidential Decision Directive [PDD] 25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations"), the Executive Branch and Congress continue to debate the extent of future U.S. engagement in peace operations. Similarly, within Germany the constitutional issue of German forces conducting operations outside of national territory has been legally resolved, but the extent of future German participation in peace operations is a political question that remains unanswered. Moreover, France and Britain, two critical actors in Bosnian peacekeeping efforts are reviewing their potential future roles in peacekeeping operations. Finally, for many of the smaller members of the Alliance, force structure cuts and reduced readiness may render moot the question of participating in peace operations.

Thus, while the situation in Bosnia may be unique, the strains resulting from NATO participation in the crisis go beyond the bounds of this one issue, and strike at the core of whether NATO members, individually or collectively, possess the political will to participate in peace operations. Moreover, the Alliance is spending too much time and effort on this issue that should be spent on more compelling concerns facing the Alliance. The Alliance should, therefore, defer further participation in OSCE or U.N. peace operations until such time that it can reach
internal consensus on the extent of NATO support for peace operations, as well as a more precise division of labor between the various interlocking European security organizations.

**Military Initiatives.**

- **Defense Policy Guidance.**

  NATO military authorities also have been actively engaged in implementing the Alliance's strategic vision. In conjunction with the publication of the Strategic Concept, the NATO Military Committee (MC) announced the December 1991 promulgation of MC 400, Military Guidance for the Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept. The guidance stipulated the requirement for highly mobile forces that had access to timely and accurate intelligence, and were supported by adequate transport, logistics, and infrastructure. Without going into specifics, the document outlined reinforcement, mobilization, and reconstitution requirements, addressed peacetime positioning of forces, and framed readiness and training requirements and responsibilities.

- **Restructuring Alliance Forces.**

  *New Force Structures.* In accordance with the Strategic Concept, Alliance forces have been divided into reaction forces, main defense forces, and augmentation forces. Reaction forces are composed of active duty formations maintained at high levels of readiness that give NATO military authorities the capability to respond quickly and flexibly to crisis developments on land, in the air, and on the sea. Reaction forces consist of immediate reaction forces (IRF) and rapid reaction forces (RRF). Immediate reaction forces include the ACE Mobile Force (AMF)--Land and Air (long-standing NATO forces, but augmented from their past structures), and, for the first time, Standing Allied Naval Forces: Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), Minesweepers (STANAVFORMIN), and Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), a new organization. (See Figure 1.)

  Rapid reaction forces also contain air, sea, and land elements. Air and maritime components needed beyond those available in the IRF will be provided by nations on an as-required basis. Land rapid reaction forces will come from the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) (See Figure 2). Commander, ARRC can
draw from a pool of national units, but current plans anticipate that no more than four divisions plus corps troops would be deployed at any one time. The composition of the deployed force would depend upon the mission, the geographic area for deployment, and the forces that nations make available.  

Main defense forces provide the bulk of NATO's force structure. These forces are charged, in conjunction with the Reaction Forces, with the immediate defense of Alliance territory.  

Built around a combination of national and multinational units, main defense forces would consist of a mixture of active and mobilizable formations. On NATO's northern and southern borders, the size and readiness of main defense forces could vary considerably--smaller forces in the north and increasing numbers as one progresses from west to east along NATO's southern tier. Within the Central Region, main defense forces--reduced significantly from Cold War levels--will rely more heavily on mobilizable units with longer readiness times, and are organized into five multinational corps and one German national corps in eastern Germany that falls under NATO command and control (Figure 3).

Augmentation forces provide operational and strategic reserves for the Alliance, and, therefore, are not dedicated to a particular region. These forces consist largely of national forces not charged with rapid reaction or main defense missions, and will be capable of reinforcing rapidly from less threatened areas of the Alliance. Formations are held in varying states of readiness, but NATO will depend heavily on mobilizable forces. And, while augmentation forces could come from anywhere within the Alliance, NATO will continue to rely heavily on the United States.

As indicated earlier, multinational formations will play an important role in Alliance force structures. In the case of reaction forces, multinational formations promote cohesion, reinforce transatlantic links, and demonstrate Alliance solidarity and commitment to collective defense. For main defense forces, NATO leaders envisaged that the establishment of standing multinational formations would manifest continued Alliance solidarity. Moreover, they hoped to demonstrate that the Alliance had moved away from the Cold War alignment of national corps along the now defunct Inter-German Border.
Finally, an unstated but fervent hope of many NATO planners was that reliance on multinational forces might impede the "force structure free fall" already underway, particularly in the Central Region, as nations sought to maximize the peace dividend.

While the merits of multinationality are appealing, one should not forget the difficulties inherent in transforming political initiatives into military reality. Differing languages, force structures, doctrines, readiness requirements, training standards, and organizational cultures can severely complicate the role of the multinational commander and his subordinates. Moreover, reliance on multinational formations will only exacerbate the nettlesome problem of interoperability of procedures, equipment, communications, repair parts, and ammunition that has long plagued NATO. Finally, the always sensitive issue of command and control arrangements—particularly the differences between Article V and non-Article V operations—will require resolution. This is not to argue against the use of multinational formations. The intent is simply to ensure that NATO authorities understand the time, energy, and resources that will be required to ensure such units are capable of implementing the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

**Force Reductions and Their Implications.** Concomitant with establishing new structures, military authorities have overseen significant reductions in Alliance forces (at aggregate, as well as national levels). To a large extent, these reductions turned necessity into virtue as the Strategic Concept simply ratified arms control agreements and the changed security environment. Under the terms of the CFE Treaty, Alliance reductions amount to: tanks (18 percent); artillery (7 percent), and armored combat vehicles (7.7 percent). Furthermore, provisions of the CFE IA Treaty (in which nations declared ceilings on the number of personnel in their respective armed forces) reinforced equipment reductions.

Many nations, however, have taken cuts much deeper than required under the CFE Treaties in an effort to reap the maximum possible peace dividend. By 1997, according to NATO sources, the overall military strength of the Alliance will have fallen 25 percent from 1990 levels. But this figure conceals significant disparities. Norway, for example, will cut its total mobilizable ground strength from 160,000 to 100,000 personnel, and reduce its
ground force structure from 13 to 6 brigades. In the Central Region, air and ground forces will realize reductions of about 45 percent. Across NATO's southern tier, Spain will cut its armed forces by approximately 44 percent and Italy plans a reduction of roughly 25 percent. Portugal plans moderate reductions, while Greece will make little or none, and Turkey will reduce significantly personnel strengths (620,000 to 350,000 personnel) while increasing items of modern equipment.

While these reductions may make sense from a national perspective (i.e., the reduced threat in Europe and, in some cases, the perceived diminished need to employ forces outside Europe), the magnitude of the cutbacks may not make sense given the requirements outlined in the Strategic Concept. In short, because military forces ultimately guarantee key provisions of the political element of the strategy (e.g., deterrence, crisis management and resolution), insufficient forces call into question the viability of the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

Indeed, as early as December 1992, the severity of planned reductions in main defense forces, particularly in the Central Region, precipitated the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) to order "... a review of the implications of changing force levels for the new force structure." A year later, Defense Ministers noted the defense savings achieved, but emphasized that NATO members must provide the financial means necessary to underwrite defense plans. Specifically, the DPC highlighted the importance of "... modernization and improvements in strategic mobility, command and control, and sustainability ... [as well as forces] properly trained and equipped for the full range of missions and tasks they may be called upon to fulfill."

The DPC has been concerned because, in designing their post-Cold War force structures, nations have failed to take into account other demands that could require larger national contributions than apparently envisaged. For example, Central Region countries must retain sufficient forces to meet their NATO requirements for main defense units in Central Europe. At the same time, they must maintain forces to meet national objectives inside (e.g., the UK in Northern Ireland; or the UK, France, Netherlands, and Spain in Bosnia), as well as outside Europe (e.g., Belgium and France in Africa; or any number of European states in the Middle East). Finally, NATO members, for the first
time, must be prepared to dispatch reinforcements from their normal peacetime deployment locations to areas where risks exceed the capabilities of national and ACE Rapid Reaction Forces. Failure to provide forces sufficient to achieve these goals not only calls into question the ability of NATO to execute its Strategic Concept, but also the fundamental purpose of collective defense.

The size of residual forces is not the only concern. In December 1994, the DPC "... noted shortfalls in certain capabilities, especially related to support for reaction forces, ground based air defense, and strategic mobility, which could have important implications for the implementation of all aspects of Alliance strategy." To ensure these capabilities, units from many nations will have to be structured differently than in the past to meet new and challenging deployment and sustainment requirements. This may be especially true of Central Region formations that habitually have lacked adequate combat support elements (e.g., artillery, air defense, intelligence). Moreover, many of these countries relied on area support commands and civil resources that have resulted in units with inadequate internal logistics capability to support a prolonged deployment away from home territory.

Finally, these numerous changes must be accomplished in a time of increasing fiscal austerity. But restructuring, especially if it entails substantial reorganization, acquisition of new equipment or capabilities, or repositioning of peacetime stationing, can be very expensive. At the same time, day-to-day operational costs are rising, as the employment of national and NATO forces has increased significantly over Cold War levels. Moreover, many nations failed to comprehend the considerable hidden costs in force reductions (e.g., severance or early retirement payments, destruction of equipment, increased unit costs of equipment, and environmental clean up) that must be added to normal operating costs. Thus, caught in the squeeze between force restructuring costs, daily operational expenditures, and shrinking defense budgets, many NATO nations may be mortgaging the future in order to pay current bills. This holds the significant potential, over the short- and long-term, to frustrate implementation of the Strategic Concept. More importantly, it holds the potential to undermine the long-term viability of the Alliance.
INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In a simple, but not simplistic, sense, the art of strategy constitutes the continuous balancing of objectives, implementing concepts, and resources (also known as ends, ways, and means). Thus, while significant, NATO's promulgation of its Strategic Concept represents only a first step. Equally important are the implementing concepts that provide concrete ways to achieve strategic ends, and, especially, the human and fiscal means—and as importantly, the political will to expend those means—that breathe life into those options. An assessment of these points, and their critical interrelationships may provide, therefore, a helpful construct for assessing whether NATO's Strategic Concept can meet the demands of the 21st century.

Ends.

Numerous critics complain that with the demise of the Soviet Union, the rationale for NATO has disappeared.\(^3\) Granted, members founded the Alliance in response to the threat posed by communism, but the principles of the Washington Treaty are more enduring than many critics admit. NATO, undoubtedly, will have to respond to changed strategic circumstances; but the requirement is to adapt, not to dissolve a vital element of European security. The question that should be the focus of attention, then, should not be whether NATO should survive, but how shall the Alliance adapt? This, in turn, leads to the issue of what, in the absence of the Communist threat, should be NATO's primary purpose?

The Strategic Concept began the process of answering that question by reaffirming the principles of the Washington Treaty, and stipulating that NATO shall remain a collective defense organization. But the Alliance's New Strategic Concept also indicates that NATO increasingly will be involved in collective security type tasks which can undermine the ability to perform collective defense functions. To complicate matters further, numerous influential commentators have posed additional roles for the Alliance to consider that, together, offer a broad and frequently contradictory menu of choices for the Alliance to pursue:
• A collective defense organization;

• A collective security organization for Europe: e.g., the military arm of the OSCE (loosely, the "out of area or out of business" option);

• A regional collective security organization for the United Nations;

• A means to unite the two former adversarial blocs.

Recent events, predominantly the imbroglio over NATO's role in the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia, indicate that a NATO role as a collective security organization or the military arm of the OSCE or the U.N. is becoming less likely. Nor do shrinking budgets, and increasing distractions from other demanding issues (e.g., national preoccupation with economics and demographics, EU expansion, war in the Balkans, perceived risks from the Mediterranean, or the rising crises in the former Soviet Union) auger the rapid development of a consensus for the Alliance becoming a purely collective security organ. That said, pressures for NATO to assume a collective security role are not insignificant and could continue to vex NATO for some time.

Using NATO as a means to unite the former adversarial blocs is equally problematic. For example, does NATO want to expand significantly its membership? How does the Alliance ensure adherence to the membership criteria specified in Article II of the Washington Treaty? At what point would the Alliance cease to be a collective defense organization and become a collective security organization? How does the Alliance ensure that each former adversary is fully prepared for NATO membership? How does the Alliance incorporate former constituent parts of the Soviet Union without offending Russia? Finally, uniting former adversaries implies addressing possible Russian membership in NATO. How the Alliance could absorb a state the size of Russia, with its security concerns far beyond the bounds of Europe (i.e., the Middle East, Central Asia, and Asia) is a very difficult question.

Almost by default, logic leads one to conclude that NATO should remain focused solely on its collective defense dimension. But such a conclusion does the Alliance an injustice, for even in
the absence of the massive threat that spawned it, NATO can play a number of vital continuing roles. First, the Alliance can sustain stability in Western and Southern Europe that will promote continued economic well-being--no small contribution. Second, it can extend the stability and improved prosperity that usually flows from a sturdy security environment into the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Third, the Alliance can continue to perform its long-standing internal collective security function at the political level: e.g., integration first of West Germany into Cold War Europe, and then a united Germany into the new Europe; denationalization of defense and security policies; and dampening of tensions and conflicts between member states (the most notable example being Greece and Turkey).

The Alliance must decide quickly the fundamental nature of its future role. Current debates over NATO's role in Bosnia-Hercegovina, future participation in peace operations, and the precise boundaries between NATO and the other security institutions in Europe sap considerable NATO energy and divert the Alliance from other critical issues. NATO, therefore, must squarely confront the issue of whether it will remain a collective defense organization, and devote the time and effort necessary to achieve consensus. This may require the Alliance to defer, for the foreseeable future, participation in peace operations or other missions that fall outside the parameters of collective defense. Nor does this argue for strict limits of territorial defense. In keeping with the precepts of the Strategic Concept, the defense of NATO interests should guide discussions, not simply the traditional mission of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Alliance members.

Ways.

In an ideal sense, the various concepts proposed to implement the Strategic Concept appear highly suitable. For example, dialogue and cooperation continue apace. The Alliance continues to implement arms control and disarmament treaties or agreements, most notably the CFE Treaty and the various Vienna CSBM documents. The NACC has expanded its responsibilities and, more importantly, increased the results of its labors. The PfP Program now includes 25 members. Finally, the Alliance is examining potential pathways and timings for expanded NATO
membership for those partners that meet NATO's as yet unforeseen criteria.

But reality intrudes. PfP participation and expanded membership have run into obstacles that may delay expansion of the Alliance. Importantly, these hurdles result not from the lack of commitment of potential members to adapt to NATO requirements, but from the Alliance's inability to forge a short-term consensus over the parameters for, or even the desirability of, adding new members. Indeed, efforts to date have been more effective at undermining NATO than in buttressing the security of the Alliance.

How enlargement proceeds also hinges significantly on the type of organization the Alliance will remain or become. If the Alliance continues to add new members, it will at some point cease to be a collective defense organization. Where or when that point might be reached cannot be forecast with any accuracy, but some indicators include:

- Expanded membership that retards or precludes rapid consensus-building and decisionmaking;

- Addition of Central and East European states that have intramural conflicts (similar to Greece and Turkey) which constrain or paralyze Alliance decisionmaking; and,

- Russian membership which, given the size of Russia, would dwarf the remaining European members, as well as add massive additional NATO defense commitments along Russia's turbulent frontiers.

Thus, key questions about who is offered membership, under what conditions, when, and with what timetable will have to be answered after NATO has decided the strategic objectives and purpose of the Alliance. These conditions, therefore, argue for a slower NATO expansion that contributes to the continued stability of the Alliance and Europe rather than rapid incorporation of new states that may add little beyond burdensome security requirements. Moreover, this implies that NATO membership should be kept small for the foreseeable future.

As part of this procedure, the Alliance must assess how new
members might affect the equilibrium within NATO, upon which hinges the stability of the remainder of Europe. This process may require more time than many currently anticipate or desire. Until NATO sorts out these issues, however, progress will necessarily be slow, and PfP will likely remain a holding pen for aspirants. This result is not entirely negative. While delays will not assuage the security concerns of potential members, they will permit them time to prepare for the rigors and responsibilities of membership, while granting NATO a needed respite to forge the consensus required for 16 separate and sovereign nations to be able to ratify--individually or collectively--any accessions.

One final point on expanded NATO membership. Russia's leaders have become vocal in their opposition to NATO adding new members, particularly former Warsaw Pact countries. In responding to these concerns, the Alliance must first take note of and assuage Russian fears, but without giving Moscow a droit de regard over NATO membership or policies. Second, regardless of how membership increases, new lines will be drawn in European security. The question should be not whether there will be new lines, but how to prevent those lines from becoming impermeable. And, even if these lines harden, that result may be preferable to a security vacuum that leaves Central and Eastern European states twisting in the wind. Finally, notwithstanding NATO actions, Russian leaders will make the final decision on how to respond. Given this fact and the historical failure of appeasement, NATO should carefully consider the cost-benefit calculus of placating Russia on this issue.

Efforts to engage the Alliance in crisis management and conflict prevention also have been problematical. Indeed, ongoing NATO efforts in the Balkans have caused the greatest crisis in the Alliance since NATO's "dual track" nuclear decision in the early-1980s or, perhaps, since the Suez Crisis (1956). If press reports are to be believed, fissure lines between major allies run long and deep. And, there are no signs that these issues will abate anytime soon. Thus, despite the rhetoric of involving NATO in such operations as a means to promote European stability, recent events have not borne out that assumption. Moreover, the animus created by these efforts indicates that such operations will not be easily undertaken in the future. As a result, the concept of crisis management and conflict prevention will likely remain unfulfilled for the foreseeable future.
In summary, although adequate in an ideal sense, NATO implementing concepts need to be tempered with reality. Most importantly, NATO, whether at the national or Alliance level, must create the internal consensus necessary to provide the requisite political will to proceed with the new tasks contained in the Strategic Concept. Until such time that such consensus becomes more manifest, the Alliance should heed the following admonitions:

- Proceed with enlargement, but at a measured pace. While recognizing that there may be some urgency in adding new members, NATO should not move precipitously. Those who advocate "enlarge or become irrelevant" may kill the Alliance if membership is expanded so rapidly that the ability to achieve consensus on critical issues is destroyed, and with it the Alliance's effectiveness.

- Continue the PfP process, which represents the best methodology, in terms of preparing potential candidates, as well as the Alliance, to accept additional members.

- Defer collective security missions for OSCE and the U.N. until such time as the Alliance has achieved consensus on the parameters for these difficult missions. After having been pushed into the decision by the "out of area or out of business" crowd, it is time to reconsider that choice in light of the evolving European security environment, and the apparent unwillingness of some members of the Alliance to underwrite such operations. This does not argue that the Alliance should forego peace operations, only that it must take the time necessary to debate the issues more fully, and establish a firmer Alliance consensus on what NATO is or is not willing to do.

- Postpone non-Article V missions until a greater consensus can be achieved within the Alliance on how to proceed with such operations. This is not to say that non-Article V missions should be shelved or that the Alliance should ignore the issue. But, before NATO undertakes such operations, increased consultation is necessary to work out the basic issues of Alliance participation and to establish procedures for the conduct of operations.

- If NATO decides to engage in crisis management and
conflict prevention operations, the Alliance should clearly delimit how far it is willing to go—before it engages in such a mission. For instance, should NATO only engage in peacekeeping operations to enforce a settlement, or should it undertake all forms of peace operations, to include peace enforcement? Conversely, should the Alliance only undertake humanitarian support operations? If the Alliance fails to consider this calculus before intervention, it runs the risk of mission failure, if not the collapse of Alliance consensus.

Means.

Whether sufficient resources are available to turn concepts into reality is also an open-ended question. Despite the end of the Cold War, cuts in NATO force structure may have gone too deep. Moreover, force reductions have not been spread evenly, and nations in the Central Region may have taken a disproportionate share. At the same time, the Alliance has taken on new missions: peace operations in support of OSCE or the U.N., non-Article V missions, defense of NATO interests vice strictly NATO territory. Such operations tend to be ground force and personnel intensive. Further, several nations maintain national commitments that are stretching their militaries. Thus, while individually "minor" (relative to the Cold War threat), the cumulative demands of these operations may stress residual force structures beyond their ability to fulfill their numerous and diverse missions, thereby undercutting the credibility of the Alliance.

To prevent such a result, the Alliance must fix the mismatch between its stated objectives and concepts and its force structures. This admonition does not advocate stopping payment on the "peace dividend" by halting force reductions. It may require revising or restraining implementation of certain elements of the Strategic Concept. And, it calls for a more rational expenditure of national and Alliance funds for force structure. Individual nations and the Alliance will be better served if they fund adequately a smaller amount of remaining forces tailored to more limited objectives, rather than maintaining larger force structures that cannot be adequately supported and, therefore, are incapable of fulfilling the Strategic Concept.

While nations may reduce their forces overall, some states will have to restructure their armed forces to be more deployable
and sustainable. Others will also require greater capabilities in their combat support and combat service support units. In these reorganizations, priority should go to rapid reaction forces, even if this means reductions in the size and readiness of main defense forces in the Central Region, many of which have been stripped nearly bare.

To compensate for overall reductions in forces and readiness of main defense and augmentation forces, the Strategic Concept stipulated the requirement for interregional reinforcement. To fulfill this condition will require more mobile forces, capable of rapid strategic transport to the point of crisis. This may require the purchase of, or the ability to "rent," strategic lift assets, particularly aircraft. Furthermore, interregional reinforcements must be highly interoperable and possess logistics capabilities sufficient to sustain prolonged operations. They also will require a greater capacity for combat support and combat service support units. To achieve the capability of rapid interregional reinforcement will also require a combination of prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and improved infrastructure--particularly in the Southern Region--to support the receipt, storage and forward movement of forces and supplies.

In short, to effect the interregional reinforcement missions laid out in the Strategic Concept will require the Alliance, individually and collectively, to undertake a number of painful initiatives:

• Ensuring strategic mobility, including aircraft and shipping, sufficient to transport reinforcements to the point of crisis in a timely fashion.

• Adequate infrastructure within the Central Region to facilitate the rapid dispatch of forces, and on the flanks, particularly NATO's southern tier, to permit the rapid receipt, forward movement and sustainment of reinforcing formations.

• Strategic level command and control structures--at the theater of war and theater of operations level, as well as operational command and control headquarters (e.g., CJTF, ARRC) that can be deployed to supervise operations anywhere in or out of the NATO area.
• Improved intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities at the strategic and operational levels of war.

• Improved Host Nation Support capabilities, particularly to support operations along NATO's southern tier, whether in or out of NATO area.

• At the operational level of war, NATO military authorities need to ensure common, or at least compatible doctrines; standardization and rationalization, interoperability and interchange-ability of equipment and spare parts. The formation of a new NATO Standardization Organization is a good start, but nations must demonstrate the political will that permits these efforts must bear fruit quickly.

• Reorganization of residual formations to provide adequate combat support and combat service support units and capabilities. This is especially true for many nations in the Central Region, which heretofore relied upon area support commands that were once suitable for operations in the Central Region, but which are tied to a geographic area and are not capable of being deployed outside Central Europe.

• Nations must not only provide their combat formations with suitable levels of combat support and combat service support, they must also construct logistics systems capable of sustaining those forces after they have been deployed beyond national boundaries. The high expenses entailed in creating such systems and the constrained defense budgets of most NATO nations argue for the creation of a NATO logistics command and support structure. This would overturn the longstanding--and ineffective--dictum that logistics are a national responsibility. It would also require increased standardization and interoperability of equipment and resources. Undoubtedly, such a suggestion will generate considerable controversy, but if the Alliance is serious about the capability to execute inter-regional reinforcement, such steps must be taken.

CONCLUSIONS

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept represents a dramatic departure from past strategies, and, in an ideal sense, offers an excellent starting point for preparing NATO for the considerable
demands of the 21st century. But lofty goals and idealistic implementing concepts ring hollow without the military means to bring the Strategic Concept to fruition. This conclusion does not imply that a focus on military forces will rectify NATO’s strategic dilemma. Inadequate force levels and capabilities and an absence of detailed military planning are not the core problem; these are merely manifestations of the lack of political will--individual and collective--necessary within the Alliance to undertake the painful steps needed to turn rhetoric into reality.

Creating the requisite political will is a progressive process. First, the Alliance must firmly decide on its fundamental purpose. While the Strategic Concept and subsequent pronouncements have reaffirmed that collective defense remains the core function of the Alliance,\(^9\) core does not mean sole, and the Alliance has increasingly looked to assume a collective security function in Europe.\(^9\) But simply put, NATO can no longer straddle the fence between collective defense and collective security. Collective security missions run the risk of fatally undermining NATO's ability to carry out its collective defense function:

- Limited residual force structure may well be consumed with peace support operations, and may not be available to respond to collective defense requirements (e.g., an Article IV mission that suddenly spills over into an Article V mission).

- Limited funds being spent on collective security operations could result in long-term modernization being postponed in order to pay for short-term collective security operations.

- Most importantly, internal political conflicts over NATO's role in peace support operations (e.g., the current row over Bosnia-Hercegovina) could destroy consensus within the Alliance.

The Alliance, therefore, must focus on and protect its stated core function of collective defense. But this is not the collective defense of the Cold War. As the Strategic Concept indicates, NATO must now protect not only its territorial integrity, but also its interests. This will require NATO to retain adequate forces that possess the capabilities to execute key provisions of the Strategic Concept, specifically: adequate
numbers and types of forces able to conduct modern operations, the ability to transport those forces to the point of crisis and to sustain them, and a command and control organization that ensures effective and efficient application of Alliance military power to achieve desired strategic aims. Most importantly, it will require the political will to provide, employ, and sustain these forces. Without these requisite means and the political will to employ them, the lofty rhetoric of the Strategic Concept will remain exactly that and NATO will slip into irrelevancy.

Notes:


3. Ibid., pp. 11-12. France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966 as part of the debates over adoption of the strategy of Flexible Response.


5. Ibid., paragraph 13. Emphasis added in the text.

6. The stipulation that "Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their
efforts including their responses to such risks," reinforces this conclusion. Strategic Concept, paragraph 13.

7. Ibid., paragraph 14.

8. Ibid., paragraph 16.

9. Ibid., paragraph 20.

10. Ibid., paragraph 21. NATO foreign ministers first articulated these tasks at Copenhagen in June 1991. See NATO Press Communiqué M-1(91)44, June 7, 1991. Again, it bears repeating that the political element of the strategy predominates.

11. Strategic Concept, paragraphs 24-26, and Legge, "NATO's New Strategic Concept," p. 12. "The Future Tasks of the Alliance" (or the Harmel Report after its principal drafter) was issued in December 1967 in conjunction with the NATO's adoption of Flexible Response. Harmel argued that the Alliance should take a dual-tracked approach to ensuring its security: defense and dialogue. The report has guided NATO since 1967, and obviously continues to exert a strong influence on Alliance security thinking. A copy of the report may be found in The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989, Appendix 1, No. 7.


13. For example, widening versus deepening of the EU, the future role of the WEU, and what role for the ESDI.


15. Ibid., paragraph 39. One need only recall the controversies surrounding the "Dual Track" decision to field
cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in the early 1980s. The lack of attention paid to the nuclear portions of the concept may have been due to previous Alliance announcements that it would cut its nuclear stockpile by as much as 80 percent. NATO Nuclear Planning Group, NATO Press Communiqué M-NPG-2(91)75, October 18, 1991, paragraph 5.

16. Ibid., paragraph 41.

17. Ibid., paragraphs 42-43. Quote from paragraph 43.

18. MC 400, "Military Guidance for the Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept," December 1991, for example, offers only extremely general guidance, bordering on platitudes, that are of little practical use to planners charged with detailed planning.

19. Strategic Concept, paragraph 43.

20. Ibid., paragraphs 45-46.

21. Ibid., paragraph 47.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., paragraphs 48-52.

26. Ibid., paragraph 53.

27. Ibid., paragraph 55.

28. Ibid., paragraph 56.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., paragraph 57.

31. See, e.g., the series of announcements concerning reductions in the Alliance nuclear weapons stockpile:


undertaken and accomplished. See, also, NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(93)38, June 10, 1993, paragraph 7. While these steps indicate major progress, the equally important task of developing militarily significant planning that implements these principles remains to be accomplished.


38. By the end of 1995, total cuts in treaty limited items of equipment (TLE) will amount to 69,928. See SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook, 1991, p. 423.


43. Ibid., p. 3.

44. Paul R.S. Gebhard, The United States and European Security, Adelphi Paper 286, London: International Instituted for Strategic Studies, February 1994, p. 73. This is no small offer,
and refutes those critics who have chided the Alliance for failing to take seriously Central and Eastern European security concerns.


46. NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(92)51, June 4, 1992, paragraph 11.

47. NATO provision of portions of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) headquarters to supplement the U.N. Protective Force in Bosnia-Hercegovina is found in NATO Press Communique M-DPC-2(92)102, December 11, 1992, paragraph 3. For a chronology of NATO air activity, see AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, Operation DENY FLIGHT, March 30, 1995. Maritime operations are summarized in AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, Operation SHARP GUARD, March 30, 1995. NATO and WEU Maritime operations began as MARITIME GUARD and SHARP FENCE, respectively, and were combined into Operation SHARP GUARD on June 15, 1993. NATO air monitoring began as Operation SKY MONITOR, and became Operation DENY FLIGHT on April 12, 1993.


49. This chronology is taken from AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, Operation DENY FLIGHT, March 30, 1995. Commentary and analysis of the implications of these events may be found in any of the major U.S. or international media on dates surrounding these events.

50. This chronology is taken from AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, Operation DENY FLIGHT, March 30, 1995. Commentary and analysis of
the implications of these events may be found in any of the major
U.S. or international media on dates surrounding these events.
For operations against Ubida, see NATODATA, Press Briefing,

51. For a concise description of various positions within
NATO, see Craig R. Whitney, "A Testing of NATO," The New York
Times, November 2, 1994, p. A8. For U.S. withdrawal from maritime
operations and its consequences, see Douglas Jehl, "Clinton
Defends Halting Arms Embargo Enforcement," The New York Times,
November 15, 1994, p. A12; "Patching Up NATO," The Economist,
November 19, 1994, p.18; Laura Silber and Bruce Clark, "UN
Condemns Fighting in Bihac," London Financial Times, November 14,
1994, p. 4; and Ed Vulliaym and Peter Beaumont, "US Spells Out
Ban on Intelligence Sharing with NATO," Sunday Observer (UK),
November 13, 1994, p. 16. Examples of reporting of the rifts in
the Alliance in the wake of the bombing attacks may be found in
William Droziak, "U.S. and Europe in Serious Rift Over Bosnia
Joffe, "Bosnia: From Farce to Tragedy?," U.S. News and World
Report, December 5, 1994, p. 69; and Richard W. Stevenson,
"Britain and France Criticize U.S. on Bosnia Positions," The New
only a tiny fraction of the reporting.

52. For example, Asmus, et al., "Building a New NATO," and
Senator Richard G. Lugar, "America's `Near Abroad' and NATO's

53. For examples, see Senator Robert C. Byrd, "The Perils of
Rubin, "It's too soon to put U.S. troops under foreign U.N.
Commanders," The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 20, 1993, p. 23;
Eric Schmitt, "Military's Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts
Concerns" The New York Times, July 31, 1994, p. A3; and Dana
Priest, "GOP Split Surfaces on Bosnia War," The Washington Post,
December 6, 1994, p. 34.

54. Rick Atkinson, "Court Rules Constitution Allows Sending
Continued German hesitance is reflected in, e.g., "Kinkel:
Foreign Action Last Resort," in FBIS-WEU-94-134, July 13, 1994,
pp. 19-20; and Craig R. Whitney, "Bonn Ponders Air Support for


57. BASIC Reports on European Arms Control, No. 20, February 19, 1992, pp. 6-7.


59. The force posture was originally announced in NATO Press Communiqué M-DPC/NPG-1(91)38, May 29, 1991, paragraph 9. The Alliance formed AMF Air and Land in 1960. STANAVAFORMIN is the former STANAVFORCHAN. STANAVFORLANT (1967) and STANAVFORCHAN (1973) have long existed, but have not been part of any reaction forces. STANAVFORMED replaced the On Call Naval Forces Mediterranean that has existed since 1969. For a brief synopsis of these forces, see NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992, pp. 111-113.

60. For a brief description of the ARRC, see, for example, Peter Saracino, "ARRC at the Sharp End," International Defense Review, Vol. 27, No. 5, May 1994, p. 33.

62. The ultimate ratio of national and multinational formations, as well as active and mobilizable forces, would depend on specific circumstances. Within the Southern Region, larger numbers of active duty forces would be supplemented with smaller numbers of mobilizable units. In the Central Region, main defense forces would consist of largely conscript and reserve formations with longer mobilization times than was previously the case during the Cold War. In AFNORTHWEST, Norway, for instance, will continue to rely on almost total mobilization.


64. Weissleder, "NATO's Future Force Structures," p. 21. It is also worth noting that U.S. and limited Canadian augmentation forces are the only NATO forces not restricted by the CFE Treaty.

65. Strategic Concept, paragraph 54.

66. See, "JDW Interview, General John Galvin," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 29, 1991, p. 1196; and, Roy Wilde,


68. For example, the Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff have grappled with this thorny issue and produced The Multinational Force Commanders Command Authority Report, August 1994. However, a variety of command and control arrangements were developed to accommodate national positions (i.e., the United States and the nations participating in the Multinational Division Center [Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, and United Kingdom]).

69. These reductions were due, in part, to requirements mandated by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (1990), as well as the changed security environment in Europe. It is also important to point out that these reductions took place simultaneously, and in a coordinated fashion, with the development of the Strategic Concept--no easy task.

70. Fixed wing combat aircraft (1.7%), and combat helicopters (0%) are the other two items. Figures derived from data contained in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London: Brassey's, 1992, p. 244.


72. As reported in, La Liberation (Paris), May 28, 1993. For a somewhat dated, but still pertinent description of planned reductions in the Central Region, as well as throughout the
remainder of the Alliance, see Rafael Estrella, North Atlantic Assembly Report AK 229, DSC/AF (93)2, "Military Trends Within the Atlantic Alliance," October 1993, pp. 10-27.


74. NATO Press Communique M-DPC-2(92)102, December 11, 1992, paragraph 9. Two years later, these efforts are still ongoing. See NATO Press Communique M-DPC/NPG-1 (94) 38, paragraph 13.


76. Ibid., paragraph 8.

77. Nor is the DPC alone in this concern, See Michael Inacker, Welt am Sontag, January 1, 1995, pp. 1,2 in "SACEUR Concerned About NATO Strength," FBIS-WEU-95-001, January 3, 1995, pp. 2-4.

78. "Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of critical importance." Moreover, the New Strategic Concept stipulates that "The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them . . . ." [emphasis added]. Strategic Concept, paragraphs 47(b) and 36, respectively.


81. By way of example, the U.S. Department of Defense estimates that environmental clean-up will eventually cost approximately $41 billion. "Pentagon's Cleanup Bill Is Escalating," The Washington Post, March 27, 1995, p. 17.


88. See Jeffrey McCausland, "Dual Track or Double Paralysis?", Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1986, pp. 431-452. Reference to Suez Crisis is from Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now."


90. For example, the UK in Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia; Belgium in Africa; France in Africa and the former Yugoslavia; Spain and the Netherlands in Bosnia-Hercegovina; and the United States throughout the world.


92. Strategic Concept, paragraphs 16 and 31; and, for example, NATO Press Communique M-1(94)3, January 11, 1994, paragraph 7 (Brussels Summit).

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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