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**HAMAS AND HIZBOLLAH:
THE RADICAL CHALLENGE TO ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES**

Stephen C. Pelletiere

November 10, 1994

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FOREWORD

More and more Arab societies are being buffeted by economic forces their rulers cannot control. Until recently the Arab populations largely have submitted to these economic stresses. Lately, however, they have become more active in protest. This study argues that in a large measure the increased activism is due to the appearance of radical religious groups that have exploited the popular discontent, focusing in particular on the youth. Unable to find jobs, young people lack hope. Even the prospect of a fulfilling family life is remote as long as they are unemployed.

Hamas and Hizbollah are the two most famous of the religious groups--Hamas operating in the Israeli occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank; Hizbollah, in southern Lebanon. Recent publicity has spotlighted Hamas because of terrorist attacks it has perpetrated inside Israel. But, as the study argues, both Hamas and Hizbollah are significant far beyond any isolated kidnappings or terrorist bombings. They are part of a movement that is attempting to radicalize the whole Arab world.

This study seeks to alert U.S. policymakers and military leaders to the larger potential danger posed by the groups. The U.S. military, in particular, should take heed, the study finds, because of a recent proposal to station U.S. forces in the very center of the radicals' area of operation.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE received his Ph.D. in Middle East politics from the University of California, Berkeley. In the early 1960s he served in the Middle East as a foreign correspondent, during which time he was based in Beirut. Dr. Pelletiere returned to the Lebanese capital in 1970, for a stay at Shemlan, the Arabic language school of the British government. In 1975, when the Lebanese civil war erupted, Dr. Pelletiere was in Cairo, Egypt, conducting research on a Fulbright Fellowship. He interviewed refugees fleeing Lebanon to Egypt, including many United Nations professionals. Dr. Pelletiere has taught at the University of California, Berkeley; at Ripon College, in Wisconsin; and at Union College, Schenectady, NY. From 1982 until 1987, he was an intelligence officer in Washington monitoring the Iran-Iraq War. He came to the Strategic Studies Institute in 1988, and became a full professor in 1991. He has written two books on the Middle East: *The Kurds--An Unstable Element in the Gulf*, and *The Iran-Iraq War--Chaos in a Vacuum*. He is currently working on a book on the war in Kuwait.

SUMMARY

This study argues that Hamas and Hizbollah, the two main religious groups fighting Israel, probably are more threatening to U.S. interests than is generally believed. It discusses the various openings that the groups were able to exploit to advance themselves, and particularly how they profited from errors on the Israelis' part.

At the same time, the study contends, there has been a corresponding rise of religious radicalism in Israel. This means that on both sides of the struggle--Jewish as well as Arab--extremism is gaining strength. It is going to be difficult, the study concludes, to avoid a decisive confrontation between the two forces.

To be sure, the Israelis have now begun peace talks with the Arabs. However, the study points out, the talks are not proceeding as well as might be hoped. In line with this, a proposal has been put forward to overcome the present impasse. This suggestion involves stationing U.S. troops on the Golan Heights as guarantors of security.

The author believes that this idea should be scrutinized carefully. The plan may result in the United States becoming bogged down in the territories for an extended period. Moreover, the level of violence in this area is such that positioning U.S. troops there could jeopardize their safety.

**HAMAS AND HIZBOLLAH:
THE RADICAL CHALLENGE TO ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES**

Introduction.

Hamas and Hizbollah are two groups that are well-known and generally feared throughout the Middle East. They are the ones most actively striving to bring about the destruction of Israel. Beyond seeking the destruction of the Jewish state, they are part of a movement that aims to destroy the Middle East state system.

The primary weapon with which the groups hope to accomplish this is ideology. The radicals have formulated a call to action that is extraordinarily persuasive to communities in despair. Unemployed youth in particular respond to the notion that violence is empowering and that to exist one must fight. This is the essence of *jihad*, a concept that westerners consistently misconstrue.

This study focuses on communities where the radicals have had their greatest successes: the Palestinians living under Israeli domination and the Shias of southern Lebanon.¹ It shows how misguided policies instituted by the Israelis helped Hamas and Hizbollah to put down roots in these communities and eventually to flourish.

What the West is confronting, the study warns, is a regional Islamic revolution, brought about by Hamas and Hizbollah, with the aid of other radical groups similarly inspired.

The study examines this unique species of radicalism so that U.S. policymakers and military leaders can defend against it. It first considers Hamas and conditions of life in the Gaza Strip, Hamas's principal base of operations.²

The Genesis of Hamas.

The Gaza Strip, located on Israel's western boundary, is a panhandle of land that juts from the Sinai Desert (see Figure 1). It was, until 1967, a part of Egypt, but then Cairo lost it to Israel in the Six-Day War. Unlike Jordan, which retains a claim to the West Bank (similarly seized by Israel in that war), Egypt subsequently renounced Gaza, meaning that, today, those Palestinians living there are stateless. This significant fact bears on the psychology of the Gazans. Were they to be forced to leave the Strip their situation would become dire; they have no internationally recognized status which they can claim.

Of the areas seized by Israel in the Six-Day War, Gaza clearly is the most disadvantaged.³ It is a relatively small place, measuring only 132 sq. miles (27 miles long and 3.5-6 miles wide). Of this, Palestinians inhabit a little over half; the rest belongs to Jewish settlers. Roughly 800,000 Palestinians

live in the Strip, one of the most densely occupied areas on



Figure 1.

earth.⁴ Of the total Palestinian population, about 600,000 have been designated refugees by the U.N., and of that number 55 percent live in refugee camps, constructed for them after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Scant improvements have been made in the camps since the war. Most have no sewage systems or street lighting. The roads are not paved, and many of the buildings are

little more than shacks. Along with the camps, there is a major city in the Strip, Gaza Town (see Figure 2). Unlike the camps it is quite built up, with many highrises, and, in those neighborhoods fronting on the Mediterranean, some charming homes, although inevitably they are rundown.



Figure 2.

Much is made of the dreadful living conditions in the Strip, and they are bad, certainly; but relatively speaking they are not

so bad. To begin with, Gaza has an ideal location, on the Mediterranean. It boasts a fine climate, 68°F to 95°F in summer, and around 35°F to 48°F throughout the winter months (November to March). In appearance, Gaza Town is superior to many neighborhoods of our larger cities. (It is about on a par with Bulaq or Imbaba, two poor sections of Cairo.) Gaza appears to be reasonably clean, with attempts made to remove the clutter in the streets. This, however, is a difficult chore, due to the constant rioting. One sees a great many burnt out cars lying about. The Gazans use them for barricades when riots erupt.

The Palestinians comprise one of the most youthful populations on earth.⁵ The U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in a 1991 publication listed 2,334,637 Palestinian refugees worldwide, of which 469,385 were in Gaza, and 60 percent of these, according to the agency, were under 18 years of age. This youthful element constitutes the core of Israel's security problem. The youths foment riots; they lay ambushes for Israeli patrols, and they commit dreadful collaborator killings, of which more presently.

Practically all of the youths are unemployed because the Rabin government in March 1993 closed off the territories from Israel proper, preventing the Palestinians from journeying to jobs there. Before the Gulf War, in 1990, 80,000 Palestinians commuted to work in Israel.⁶ Then, through restrictions imposed by successive Israeli governments, the number dropped to 35,000; and, after the closure, it fell to zero. The number of Palestinians working in Israel has now begun to creep up again.

Effectively this means that the youths of Gaza have nothing to do. When they are under strict curfew, they cannot even leave their homes. They, and their families, subsist on relief from the United Nations. Prior to 1990, they could also count on remittances from relatives working in the Persian Gulf. Now, however, the number of Palestinians in the Gulf has fallen to practically nothing, so that source of aid has disappeared. There is plenty of food in Gaza (and on the West Bank) because Palestine is a rich agricultural region. Unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly difficult to market area produce commercially. Previously, the Saudis and Kuwaitis were major purchasers, but here again, because of the Gulf War (and complications we will go into below), that no longer obtains. The loss of income, the desperate crowding; these things are bad, certainly. But more disturbing to the Palestinians is the threat of expulsion. They are continually having to confront the prospect of one day being dispossessed. Since 1990, the number of Jewish settlers coming into Gaza and the West Bank has risen sharply. According to one Israeli commentator, after 20 years of occupation, the West Bank and Gaza Strip have essentially been annexed, as a result of settlement drives initiated by the Israeli government.⁷ The number of Jews living outside the so-called Green Line (the line dividing the occupied territories

from Israel proper) is now about 100,000 and climbing steadily.

The settlers not only appropriate the land of Gaza and the West Bank (not to mention East Jerusalem), they seek to take over the scarce water resources. In Gaza, the water table has been badly exploited; water has become briney and predictions are that by the year 2000 there will not be enough to sustain the population, Arab and Jewish.⁸

The contrast between Gaza Town and the camps (that is, the Arab section) and the areas reserved for the Jews is striking. There are an estimated 5,000 Jewish settlers in the Strip, most of whom live in the southern half, the so-called Gush Qatif sector (see Figure 2).⁹ Here there are white beaches, rolling sand dunes, and vast empty spaces (Gush Qatif resembles the Pacific coast around Monterey, California). It is heavily patrolled by Israeli Defense Force (IDF) units. Whenever the settlers wish to travel, they do so escorted by the IDF, usually a jeep forward, and one behind. At least one of the Israeli settlements is ringed with an electrified barbed wire fence, the rest with razor wire.

This protection is essential, given the high incidence of violence. Arab children routinely stone the settlers' cars, and there have been ambushes laid with firearms.¹⁰ Activity of this sort is probably to be expected. However, there is violence of another kind, more difficult to fathom--that of Palestinians against themselves. Each day, it seems, Palestinians kill their own; if they do not kill them, they may maim them.¹¹ Knifings predominate, although there are some shootings; knee cappings are common.

The Israelis tend to lump all such actions under the heading of "collaborator" incidents. They claim that they are carried out by groups, like Hamas, bent on eliminating sympathizers of the occupation. Some western aid workers in the territories dispute this however, convinced that many of the outrages are, in fact, crimes with no politics connected to them.¹² In a situation where no law and order exists, people take advantage of the fact to harm each other. Be this as it may, conditions inside the territories--and particularly this is the case in Gaza--are truly Hobbesian, as will be brought out in greater detail below.¹³

One of the goals of the study will be to investigate how these dreadful conditions came to be. For a long time the Palestinians under the occupation seemed content. Their mood changed, however, with the outbreak of the *intifadah*.

Intifadah.

Hamas is a product of the *intifadah*, that eruption of popular feeling that occurred in the territories on December 9, 1987, and which is going on to this day. Prior to the outbreak,

Hamas did not exist. It grew directly from the revolt, and was only able to make itself felt as a political force because of it. If we are to understand Hamas, we must know something about the *intifadah*.

The term *intifadah*, in Arabic, means "spasm" or "frisson," a rather mild way of describing an event that has proved so bloody and destructive.¹⁴ Arabs could have called the *intifadah* a *thawrah*, or an *ingilab*. The first term means revolution, the second, upheaval. Both are more serious than *intifadah*, which is rather a dismissive term.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) first coined the phrase *intifadah*. The PLO leadership in Tunis, caught off guard by the riots, tended to downplay them, but then the leaders--realizing that something unusual was going on--decided an *intifadah* had occurred.¹⁵ The Palestinian community, they said, was going through a phase of violent convulsions. The implication was that this would soon diminish.

In fact the PLO did not want a revolt in the territories; tactically, in its eyes, it made no sense. Something like this could only end in disaster; Israel was not about to tolerate an uprising, and could quite easily put it down, or so it was felt at the time. Along with this, the PLO had virtually no cadres inside the occupied territories who were prepared to take charge of such an event, much less direct it over a sustained period.

As for the Israelis, they too were surprised.¹⁶ The ferocity of the affair stunned them. It began over an incident that was relatively trivial. An Israeli truck driver rammed two cars loaded with Arab laborers, four of whom died. The Israelis claimed this was an accident; the Palestinian community saw it as an act of willful mayhem. In their view, the driver deliberately rammed the cars.

Demonstrations broke out, which the IDF put down. There, the matter might have ended. However, the demonstrations re-erupted, turning into full-scale riots which went on for days. The IDF escalated its response; but quelling the riots was not something that it could accomplish easily. Israel had relatively little trouble with the territories previously. Not having had to deal with serious riots, the IDF was not prepared to practice riot control; it had little riot gear, and few units trained in coping with determined rioters.¹⁷ Many IDF units came under intense pressure. They had live ammunition to defend themselves, but had been ordered not to use it. However, as pressures mounted, they did use it, and a number of Palestinians were killed.

This inflamed the passions of the Palestinians yet further. More units were challenged, and more killings occurred. In this way the *intifadah* gathered strength. Rage on the part of the Gazans produced the initial escalation; the unsure handling of the IDF aggravated conditions to the point of lost control. The

question is why, after such a long period in which the Palestinians had seemed docile, did they revolt in this way? Why did this come in December 1987? It is impossible to say definitely, but a number of factors clearly were influential.

The Likud Factor.

One of the biggest influences on the *intifadah* would appear to have been the takeover of the government in Israel by the Likud Party. Whereas Likud's successor, the party of Labor--particularly its leader Shimon Peres--tended to be conciliatory toward the Palestinians, most Likud politicians were hawks. The most committed hawk was Housing and Development Minister Ariel Sharon. Sharon advocated settling as many Jews as possible in the occupied territories, even if this meant displacing Palestinians, a violation of international law. Under the terms of the Geneva Convention an occupying power cannot radically alter arrangements in territories it has seized.

Many Jews contend that the Geneva Convention does not apply to the occupied territories.¹⁸ They argue that Jews are perfectly free to settle there, and, moreover, that God has given this land to the Jewish people. This argument, based on religious principles, has had an unforeseen (and unfortunate) sequel, as we shall see.

Sharon did not merely hold these views, he sought to implement them through an ambitious settlement program. To be sure, at the time few Jews wished to live in the territories. However many zealots did. They were members of groups like Gush Emunim and Kach, and Kahane Hay. Individuals who belonged to such organizations were involved in the Hebron massacre, and Rabin has described them as Jewish "terrorists." The individuals think of themselves as settlers; to the Palestinians they are paramilitarists.

As may be imagined, the upsurge in Israeli ultra-nationalism upset the Palestinians. Prior to the mid-1980s, when most of the agitation commenced, the territories were peaceful, or at least relatively so. Indeed, the Israelis looked on them as a buffer, a shield against hostile elements on their borders.¹⁹ Going beyond that, the Israelis had discovered a pool of cheap labor in the Palestinian community.²⁰

The Palestinians possessed significant job skills. They had a long tradition as artisans, and their schooling was excellent, thanks to UNRWA. They were not disposed towards unions, there being no dearth of other Palestinians waiting to take their places should they be fired.

Given all of this, few Israelis wanted to disturb arrangements beyond the Green Line. The advent to power of the Likud Party changed this, however; Palestinians began to fear a

fundamental policy change was taking shape, one spearheaded by Israel's religious establishment. Many religious leaders in Israel are firm upholders of the concept of greater Israel.²¹

Defeat for the PLO.

Something else troubled the Palestinians during this period--the outcome of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The invasion was undertaken to drive the PLO from bases on the Lebanese-Israeli border, and, although costly to Israel in terms of lives, it largely succeeded. The PLO was driven off, not only from the border, but out of Lebanon to Tunis, across the Mediterranean.

As a consequence, the PLO lost its military option, seriously compromising its credibility. The loss became quickly apparent when the Arab Summit convened in Amman, Jordan, in 1987. The Palestinian problem was virtually sidelined.²² Whereas in previous years Palestine had dominated the agendas of the Arab heads of state, in 1987 the Iran-Iraq War became the focus. Palestinians were shocked to find themselves ignored, if not abandoned.

Difficult Times in the Gulf.

And finally there was the economic factor--after years of prosperity in the Gulf, the price of oil, in the mid-1980s, dropped precipitously. This immediately affected the fortunes of the Palestinians, inasmuch as their economy depended--along with jobs in Israel--on regular receipt of remittances from family members working in the sheikhdoms. Indeed, under a plan previously worked out by the PLO, the salaries of expatriate Palestinians were taxed by the Gulf monarchs, and the revenues deposited directly into the PLO's coffers.²³ This tithing continued in the mid-1980s, but, as there were fewer Palestinians working in the Gulf, proceeds decreased.

Al Jihad.

All of these are what might be called macro-factors affecting the mood of the Palestinians prior to the *intifadah*, which disposed them toward violence. Another, more prosaic, event also seems to have touched the population, at street level, as it were.

In August 1987, six Palestinians escaped from Israel's Ansar II prison in the Gaza Strip. The Israelis assumed the escapees had slipped over the border into Egypt, but subsequently, masked gunmen killed an Israeli officer in a daring daylight attack. Later the IDF announced that the killers themselves had died in an exchange of gunfire with Israeli security forces. Among the dead was one of the escapees. He had not fled to Egypt, but had gone underground to await an opportunity to shoot the officer,

who, it subsequently was brought out, was the chief interrogator at Ansar.²⁴

Many Palestinians were thrilled by this incident. After a depressing string of setbacks, here was a certain morale booster. The community held a massive funeral, attended by thousands of mourners. Two points are important about this: first, the incident exerted great appeal on youth (this was evident from their behavior at the funeral); and second, it related to religious support for the *intifadah*. The original Ansar escapees were all jihadists, members of a movement that played a significant role in the uprising.

For some time individuals who proclaimed themselves to be jihadists had been operating in the territories.²⁵ These men were unique, in that practically without exception they were former inmates of Israeli jails. They had adopted an extremist position toward the occupation, looking on it as an abomination which they were bound to oppose on religious grounds. No hope lay in the Arab leadership which, they felt, was irredeemably corrupt. Moreover, the Prophet had enjoined Muslims to act independently, as could be seen from reading the Koran.²⁶ To be sure, revolt seemed hopeless, given the power of the Israeli state, but Muslims must accept martyrdom; the religion was nourished on the blood of martyrs.

The jihadists were among Israel's most stubborn foes, largely because of their desperate situation. A Palestinian who had served time in an Israeli jail faced a bleak future. The Israeli government issued special identity cards, noting the holder's prison status.²⁷ An ex-convict could not be employed, and since few Palestinians emigrated in the 1980s, such individuals were seriously compromised. Having not much to look forward to, many ex-convicts embraced a movement built on despair. When the *intifadah* erupted, members of the jihad movement came quickly to the fore. In the initial stages they virtually led it; whenever it appeared set to expire, they, by their wild exhortations, whipped it to life again.

At the same time, however, for the *intifadah* to turn into a full-scale revolt something more was needed, namely a means of sustaining it past the initial enthusiastic phase; an ideological justification was required to continue the uprising. The jihadists certainly were ideological, but, being a minuscule group, they lacked authority. We now see one of the most respected religious groups in the Middle East enter the struggle. This was the Muslim Brotherhood, the progenitor of Hamas.

The Brotherhood.

Hamas did not really become active in the *intifadah* until August 1988, eight months after the trouble had begun.²⁸ Prior to that, unknown individuals, calling themselves Hamas members,

distributed leaflets urging this or that action in the name of the *intifadah*. However, before the eruption and immediately afterward, except for the aforementioned leaflets, no one had heard of Hamas, nor knew what it stood for.

Hamas was a spinoff from the Society of Muslim Brothers, a traditional Islamic organization well-known and powerful throughout the Middle East. The society sprang up in Egypt in the 1920s to fight the British occupation there.²⁹ The Brotherhood was staunchly conservative, and, as might be expected, hostile to communism. This inevitably brought it into conflict with the regime of Egypt's first republican ruler, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who made Egypt a client of the Soviet Union. Nasser purged the society in 1954, jailing thousands of its members and sending thousands more into flight overseas.

Having been driven into exile, many Brothers went to the Gulf where they forged close ties to the oil sheikhs (and where, thanks to these associations, many amassed fortunes). Eventually, the society migrated to Jordan and Syria. However, in Syria it ran afoul of local Ba'thists who purged it, perhaps more ruthlessly than Nasser.³⁰ As a consequence the Brotherhood's base became Jordan, where its conservative stance complemented the royal rule of the Hashemites.³¹

As already noted, prior to the 1967 war, the West Bank was part of Jordan, and King Hussein cherished the hope that it might one day be returned to him. His hopes were dashed, however, when, at the Arab Summit in Rabat in 1974, Arab heads of state decreed the PLO to be the official representative of the Palestinians; any land returned to Arab control would be administered by it. King Hussein was forced to forego his claim. He did so publicly, but in fact continued to be involved with the territories, and the Brotherhood was a part of this.³²

The Brotherhood established a religious center in Gaza, the *al Mujamma'a al Islamiya*, from which it conducted a number of charitable functions.³³ It ran hospitals and schools and appropriated funds for the establishment of mosques. It paid the salaries of *imams* (the equivalent under Islam of Christian priests) to serve in these mosques. The Israelis permitted this, apparently in the belief that, because of its conservatism, the Brotherhood was not a threat to them. To be sure, the Brotherhood, in its propaganda, opposed Zionism and Western imperialism (like Khomeinism, which did not develop until 1979, the Brotherhood looked on both the Soviets and the West as enemies of Muslims); however, it also foreswore violence. Having been purged in Egypt and Syria, it avoided premature revolt. Muslims must first make themselves strong in the faith, the Brothers believed, and, then, when conditions were ripe, they could act militarily.³⁴ This was a line that the Israelis could accommodate, and so they did not object to the Brotherhood-sponsored activity.

Then, in 1987, the *intifadah* erupted, which gave the Brotherhood an opportunity to assert itself. The PLO, as we said, was caught off guard by the revolt, and thus not prepared to deal with it. The Brotherhood was not affected this way because--unlike the PLO cadres, who were underground--the religious forces operated in the open and had numerous agencies they could convert to action groups. At the same time, however, the traditionally cautious society was not anxious to get involved in an armed revolt.

In the end, the society adopted a somewhat devious stance. It created a new organization, Hamas, which quickly entered the fray. Interestingly, however, Hamas made no attempt to conceal its ties to the larger organization. When, in August 1988, it issued a charter of its goals, Hamas identified itself as the society's "military wing."³⁵ This means that almost from the first the Israeli government was aware that Hamas, and the Brotherhood, were active participants in the revolt. Yet it took no action against them. Why?

A Policy of Sowing Dissent.

It appears that the Israelis tolerated Hamas believing that in this way they could harm the PLO. As mentioned above, the PLO prior to the *intifadah* had no infrastructure in the territories prepared to assume a leadership role.³⁶ Once the *intifadah* started, however, the PLO sought to make up for this. It began contacting people, ordering them to perform this or that activity, and--in carrying out the orders of Tunis--the PLO cadres clashed with Hamas. These initial clashes seem to have determined the Israelis' course of action, which was to pit Hamas against the PLO for control of the *intifadah*. They let the two vie, anticipating that, in the process, they would destroy each other.³⁷

Why did the two not join forces? To begin with, they served different masters: Hamas was the client of the Brotherhood; the PLO belonged to Yasir Arafat. But beyond that, they opposed each other on ideological grounds. Hamas deplores the spread of secularism in the Middle East, which it views as a Western plot to undermine Islam. In addition Hamas rejects the idea of the nation-state, as antithetical to the *ummah* (the worldwide community of the faithful which existed in the days of the Prophet Mohammad). The *ummah*, Hamas believes, is the bedrock of Islam's greatness; once Muslims allowed the *ummah* to be broken down into separate states Islam faced decline. Of course, the PLO is a secularist organization, and its aim precisely is to create a nation-state for the Palestinian people.

Thus the two organizations are basically at odds, and thus the Israelis were persuaded to pursue their strategy, which essentially was one of divide and conquer. But, in September 1989, the Israelis did an about face, and outlawed Hamas. Why the

sudden reversal?

Killing Collaborators.

In the beginning Hamas and the PLO behaved as the Israelis hoped that they would--they fought each other, fiercely. Indeed, the fight was not restricted to these two factions only. All of the groups in the territories, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Communists, the original jihadists--all took up arms against each other.³⁸

Moreover, apparently encouraged by Hamas, elements from within the community began meting out vigilante justice against other community members. For example, persons alleged to be drug traffickers and individuals accused of sexual crimes were killed.³⁹

It was impossible to stop this sort of thing, because, with the outbreak of the *intifadah*, the whole judicial and security apparatus in the territories collapsed. Palestinians who had previously worked as police in the territories quit *en masse*.⁴⁰ Palestinian lawyers, too, had struck, refusing to try cases in the Israeli courts. The Israelis might have appointed new officials, however they did not do so. For a time they let matters drift, until something happened, which to them must have been truly alarming.

Radicals began attacking alleged collaborators.⁴¹ Early in the occupation the Israeli authorities set up so-called Village Leagues, ostensibly to help administer the territories; this, the Israelis said, was a form of self-rule. In fact, the Leagues functioned more or less as paramilitary forces, assisting the IDF in its policing. Alongside the Leagues, the Israelis developed informants, who kept them abreast of what was going on in the territories. This made sense, from a security stand point--enabling the Israelis to control the territories without being heavy handed. With a disaffected population, it does not do to maintain a high profile; better to stay out of troubled areas and only intervene in force in emergencies.

The radicals were now silencing the individuals who supplied the Israelis with their information. This, of course, raised the stakes immensely for the occupation authorities; without a constant stream of informed communication from inside the territories, they could not keep control. Dreadful situations began to develop. For example, in one instance radicals took over a village, convened a kangaroo court in the town square, passed sentence on an alleged collaborator and killed him-- without the Israelis ever knowing.⁴² That this sort of thing could occur was outrageous.

Clearly the Israelis had to act, and yet action entailed sacrifice. For the Israelis to change policy, and go into the

territories in force, would incur financial and psychological costs. The Israelis had only just recovered from Lebanon; they did not want more casualties. A policy of direct control would practically ensure that such casualties would occur.

The author believes that the Israelis' decision to outlaw Hamas ultimately was determined by events *outside* the territories, in the international arena. Something unforeseen had occurred in 1988 that the Israelis did not like. The Iraqis had beaten the Iranians in the 8-year long Iran-Iraq War.

One of the features of that war was the solid support Iraq received from Jordan's King Hussein. Now, Jordan stood to benefit from its steadfastness. There was talk of Iraq and Jordan forming a union, raising the possibility of Iraqi interference in the territories through Amman.⁴³

Whatever motivated the Israelis, in September 1989 they outlawed Hamas, and indeed changed their whole occupation policy. Until this point, the Israelis' handling of the *intifadah* was, in the author's view, fairly astute. They had made some mistakes early on in the trouble, but exhibited an admirable recovery capability. However, as we moved into 1990, we saw them begin to lose control; they no longer appeared as confident. Events simply overtook them.

1990 and All That.

1990 was rife with setbacks for the Palestinians. First, the Soviet Union collapsed; this development clearly had an impact. We said earlier that Housing Minister Sharon's settlement policy suffered from lack of available immigrants. Suddenly in 1990 a mass of these appeared--literally hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews were applying to leave Russia. In the eyes of many Israelis, the natural destination of these people was the Jewish state, and so plans began to be formulated to receive them.

Also in 1990, Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait, an extraordinarily misconceived operation which, among other things, compromised the Palestinians. By supporting Saddam, they alienated their major financial backers, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In the eyes of many western observers, this action on the Palestinians' part was foolish; however, there were extenuating circumstances for what they did.

For example, Saddam, in an attempt to extricate himself from Kuwait, offered to withdraw if the United States would take up the Palestine problem in the U.N. Then-President Bush refused, but did pledge to act on the matter once the crisis was resolved. The Palestinians were grateful for support from the Iraqi leader, and believed he was concerned for their interests. Further, once the war started, Saddam launched Scud missiles against Israel, and the Palestinians--even though they lived in the same target

area--applauded the attacks. Nonetheless, whatever emotional satisfaction the Palestinians might have gained from the invasion, practically it was a terrible blow for them.

Not only did the PLO suffer, but the religious forces as well. Initially, when Saddam went into Kuwait, the Brotherhood and Hamas condemned him. But then, when Saudi Arabia's King Fahd invited the U.N. forces into the Saudi peninsula, many pious Muslims around the world recoiled in horror.⁴⁴ The peninsula is supposedly *haram* (forbidden) to unbelievers. Confusion developed among the religious groups as they tried to sort out their sympathies. In the end, significant elements of both the Brotherhood and Hamas supported Saddam.⁴⁵

All in all, the Palestinians--secular and religious--suffered because of events of 1990. However, they did recoup in one department. An event occurred that worked against the Israelis--the so-called *al Haram al Sharif* incident.

Al Haram al Sharif in Jerusalem is the site of Al Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest shrine in Islam, the place from which the Prophet is believed to have ascended to heaven. In October 1990 a Jewish group called The Temple Mount Faithful announced that it would "lay a cornerstone" in the mosque area.⁴⁶ The organization had called for the destruction of the mosque, because it is built over the Third Temple, holy to Jews.

When Muslims rushed to Al Aqsa to defend it, Israeli troops opened fire on them, killing 21. The United Nations ordered an investigation, with which the Israelis refused to cooperate. They initiated their own inquiry, which subsequently absolved the police, or anyone connected with the government. Predictably the Arabs saw this as a "whitewash."⁴⁷ The Muslim community genuinely feared for Al Aqsa, ever since a 1969 attempt had been made to burn it down.⁴⁸

The *al Haram al Sharif* incident boosted the status of Hamas among the Palestinians. We said earlier that the PLO became involved in the *intifadah* belatedly, and when it did it was not to perpetuate the revolt but to defuse it. PLO leader Yasser Arafat called for a "white" *intifadah*.⁴⁹ He wanted the Palestinians to practice civil disobedience--withhold their taxes, stay home from work in the civil administration, that sort of thing. Hamas disdained this course as cowardly.

Once the *al Haram al Sharif* crisis occurred, it appeared to many Palestinians that Hamas, not the PLO, was pursuing the proper course. Indeed, some groups inside the territories (and the jihadists were foremost in this) called for an actual armed insurrection.⁵⁰ Until this point the *intifadah* had been waged with rocks and burning tires and slingshots--but no firearms. The PLO responded to this call with horror. "...our instructions (said one PLO official) are not to use firearms, because we know to use them is childish...Why should we give Shamir (the Israeli Prime

Minister) a chance to kill more of us ?"⁵¹

It is not important how the PLO responded, but how Israeli officials took the appeal for an armed revolt. Their response, in the words of one Israeli commander, was "to fight fire with fire."⁵² They increased their patrolling of the territories, and, along with that, debated changing the rules of engagement to permit firing indiscriminately at the rioters. They also announced a new policy of using "special undercover units."⁵³ It was not specified what tasks the units would perform, but implied was that they would not be to the Palestinians' liking.

The incidence of demonstrations increased dramatically, as the Palestinians confronted Israeli units with rock throwing demonstrations.⁵⁴ At the same time, however, the IDF was not specifically targeted. To be sure, more IDF patrols were assaulted, but then more patrols were entering the Palestinian neighborhoods. It was the confrontational policy that fueled the violence. One could conclude that the call for armed insurrection by the Palestinians had merely been rhetoric.⁵⁵

Then, in 1992 a border patrolman disappeared, kidnapped according to the government. When this man's body was found, Prime Minister Rabin blamed Hamas. He ordered the immediate deportation of 418 individuals, whom he described as Hamas operatives.⁵⁶

Several weeks after the deportations, however, Israeli security revealed there had been an error.⁵⁷ Hamas was not responsible for the "kidnapping"; rather four Palestinians (no connection with Hamas) had run over the patrolman-- apparently on impulse--after which they drove the body around the territories until they dumped it. By labeling Hamas as the perpetrator of this crime, the Israelis elevated the organization's status, crediting it with an operation that it did not perform.

Actions like the deportations aggravated misgivings being felt throughout the Palestinian community. After the Kuwait affair, the United States made good its pledge to convoke a peace conference. However, when Arafat agreed to attend, many Palestinians faulted him.⁵⁸ To take the step, he had had to perform certain ameliorating acts--recognizing Israel, and foreswearing violence. To many, this was toadying to the West.

Actually, Arafat did not have much choice. After Kuwait, the Palestinians were virtually bereft of support in the international community. The United States held out hope of redress. For Arafat to have refused the offer would have been a loss of opportunity for the Palestinians and possibly the end of Arafat's control of the movement.

Thus we can argue that a combination of circumstances promoted Hamas' cause. Arafat's moves to conciliate the West came just as Israel was stepping up pressure on the Palestinians in

the territories. In particular the activity of the special squads, mentioned earlier, provoked many. These units went about the territories in disguise. When they spotted a suspected terrorist, they executed him on the spot.⁵⁹ Muslims who rejected such treatment sought the path of armed resistance, which now had practically been taken over by Hamas.

A western aid worker told the author that the Israelis, by their heavy handedness, raised the paranoia level of the Palestinians astronomically.⁶⁰ The community was already strung to a high pitch of tension. By the beginning of 1993, hostility inside the territories toward the Israeli government had surpassed all previous bounds.

The Reason for the Switch.

The Israelis' decision to intensify their repression seems to have been dictated by several concerns. First, something had to be done about the collaborator killings; these could not be allowed to continue. Along with this went the problem of the settlers living inside the territories. They were pressuring the government for protection, and some, on their own, had begun attacking the Palestinians. Indeed, there appeared to be a correlation between the opening of peace talks in Madrid and the rise in anti-Arab violence by the settlers.⁶¹

And finally there was concern over the future of Soviet Jewish immigration. Once Moscow allowed Jews to immigrate, it became a matter of some urgency to end the *intifadah*. The Israeli government feared that the rioting would keep the Russians away.

The repression must be seen, then, as an attempt to end the *intifadah* by any means necessary, and the mass deportations of alleged Hamas members was an aspect of this. This was a way of destroying the infrastructure that the Israelis believed made the revolt possible. The Israelis wanted to strip the territories of potential leaders, by rounding up as many adults as possible.⁶² The repression, however, had unfortunate consequences, of a sort that the Israelis probably could not have foreseen. In the absence of adult leaders, Palestinian children took over the *intifadah*, and, in the process, transformed it into what it is today.

The Situation Today.

Before the announcement of the Declaration of Principles--the agreement between Rabin and Arafat to commence formal peace talks--a visitor to Gaza would encounter IDF personnel everywhere. They patrolled in jeeps, the windshields covered with wiremesh to protect against missiles. IDF units stood along the main thoroughfares, conducting security checks. Soldiers were posted on the roofs, observing the streets. At certain intersections they had erected watch towers, from which they

trained machine guns on passing vehicles.

The IDF inspected everyone. It was impressive how many roadblocks there were. Some were quite substantial, huge blocks of stone set down in the road. Others clearly had been set up sporadically, to catch people by surprise. Most unexpectedly, the IDF stopped U.N. cars, even though these were clearly marked.

This restless, constant search activity was mandated by the repression. One assumed that with so much security violence would be reduced. This, however, has not been the case. Violence continues, mostly in the form of rock-throwing attacks. A western aid worker told the author, "The rock attacks are like summer storms. One minute the street is calm. Then, *zut*, rocks! Everywhere rocks, and you must flee. Then, *zut*, it's over. In a minute it's passed." The rock attacks are the work of children, some as young as 8 or 9 years. Some may be older, in their late teens, but certainly not much older than that.

Children always have been involved in the *intifadah*, but not until recently have they taken charge. We can see this from statistics, a steady lowering of the age of individuals arrested for *intifadah*-related crimes. This appears to have come about in connection with Israel's repressive arrest policy. In December 1992, the chief of staff of the IDF, Lt. Gen. Ehud Baraq, revealed that 100,000 Palestinians had been detained since the start of the *intifadah*. With something like this occurring, only children would be left to lead the movement.⁶³

Some argue that children do not control things, but rather adults operating undercover are the actual leaders. This does not seem possible. To be sure, adults headquartered outside the territories, in Jerusalem, Amman or in Tunis, issue communiques on behalf of the *intifadah*. However, it is unlikely they supervise events. The hold of the IDF over the territories is much too tight for that; it would be impossible for anyone, based outside the area, to calibrate events inside it.⁶⁴

In 1989, an Israeli commentator speculated as to how the *intifadah* was structured.⁶⁵ A so-called parlor leadership existed (he said), which resided inside the Green Line. Comprising well-known figures, this leadership spoke in the name of the *intifadah*, and--at the time--actually did control things. The parlor leaders, known for their long service to the cause, were respected, and, as a consequence, could command obedience. Under them, a second echelon of leaders inside the territories operated underground. And below them, a third echelon of "street leaders," comprising thousands of youths, led the riots, performed acts of sabotage against the occupation authorities, and, in effect, were the foot soldiers of the *intifadah*.

The author believes that the second echelon has now disappeared, wiped out by the IDF arrest campaign. This leaves the movement essentially in disarray. The crucial link between

the leadership and the cadres has been severed, and now the cadres are virtually on their own.⁶⁶ In other words, the erstwhile discipline has gone out of the movement, that discipline which was supplied by mature adults.

This would explain some of the more dismaying developments that have occurred in the *intifadah* recently. For example, many disreputable practices have surfaced, such as instances of merchants being shaken down by the youths and young women subjected to sexual attacks. (This latter situation is extraordinary in a predominantly Muslim society.) It is, of course, difficult to determine the authenticity of such allegations, but certainly much is occurring that has nothing to do with the *intifadah*, i.e., advancing the cause.

In fact, one could argue that the character of the *intifadah* has changed, until today it is no longer a political movement, in the sense that it is attempting to realize a specifically political agenda.⁶⁷ Political activity is carried on by groups in planned, coordinated fashion; very little of what is going on in the territories today is like this. There is nothing planned or deliberate about the rock throwing. This is mere rioting; indeed, it is a form of mob violence.

Very well, if all of this is mob activity, merely, why has the *intifadah* persisted for so long? One would think that, for the *intifadah* to sustain itself, it would need a strong, tightly controlled organization. In the author's view the *intifadah* goes on because of conditions inside the Strip. For example, there seems to be a correlation between heightened violence and the imposition of curfews. When rigorous curfews are imposed, the level of violence escalates. Conditions, which are bad, then become intolerable, with increased violence the inevitable result. There is also the factor of settler harassment.⁶⁸ The Hebron massacre was carried out by an extremist Jew connected to one of the settler groups. The Palestinians believe the massacre was a deliberate act of provocation, and they feel themselves to be in danger of such attacks constantly. Therefore the community must be prepared to defend itself whenever an attack appears imminent.⁶⁹ At the slightest rumor of trouble, the community turns out into the streets.

If the *intifadah* is more or less out of control, can it be at all effective? In a perverse way it does seem to be so. It has caused the Israelis to expend considerable resources, both human and material. It was estimated that, prior to the Declaration of Principles, 5,000 IDF troops stood guard in the Strip. This is one soldier for every settler (assuming that there are, in fact, 5,000 settlers; the United Nations believes that the settler population in Gaza is much smaller than this). Besides personnel, the IDF had a considerable investment in technology dedicated to the *intifadah*. Tanks, jeeps, helicopters, various intelligence devices--all had to be maintained. Now that the Declaration has been signed, the Israelis have been able to withdraw some of

their units. However, the IDF has not completely withdrawn. Units remain to guard the Jewish settlements, so expenses continue to be borne.

All this is a great drain on the Israelis, one they are hard put to keep up.⁷⁰ Therefore they have had to look for some other way of operating--apparently this is what the Declaration of Principles is about. Rabin and Peres want the PLO to do the job for them, i.e., use Palestinians to police Palestinians.⁷¹ The PLO has agreed to this, apparently in the belief that since the Israelis are in need they will be prepared to make concessions.

To be sure, Rabin and Peres (who made this deal) do not speak for the whole of Israel. The Likud Party is very much against sharing power with the PLO. However, Likud is not the main source of worry here; it is Hamas, and the religious forces. Just recently Hamas killed 23 Israelis using a suicide bomber who struck inside Tel Aviv. What was the organization aiming for with this strike? We will postpone speculation on this matter until after we have discussed Hizbollah.

Hizbollah.

Hizbollah is a product of the Lebanese Civil War and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon which followed it.⁷² It is beyond the scope of this study to recapitulate the history of Lebanon's recent troubles. However, to understand Hizbollah something of this background must be understood. We will provide an overview of occurrences during the period, at least as they affected the Shias, the community from which Hizbollah has sprung.

Lebanon's Sectarian Struggle.

Lebanon is a country of sects, each traditionally occupying its own discrete area (see Figure 3). The Shias are a sect along with the rest, and their principal territory is located in the south adjacent to the Israeli border.⁷³

From 1975 until 1982, Lebanon was engulfed in a civil war in which all of the sects fought each other--the Maronite Christians, the Druze, the Sunnis, the Palestinians, even the Shias, although the Shias, initially at least, were the least involved.

Prior to 1982, Lebanon's Shias were the most politically backward group in the country. Partly this was due to their being repressed by their leaders, wealthy landowners and clerics uninterested in raising the political consciousness of the masses. Moreover, the Shias were oppressed by the Palestinians. In 1970 the PLO was driven out of Jordan and settled in southern Lebanon in the Shias' area.⁷⁴ It chose this region because from there it could conduct raids--which Lebanon's weak government was powerless to curtail--on Israel's northern settlements.

In 1982 the Israelis decided to end the depredations by invading the Palestinians' southern enclave. Operation Peace for Galilee had as its declared goal to push the Palestinians 40 kilometers away from the Lebanese border. Thus they would not be able to shell Israeli settlements and would find it hard to carry on their cross border raids. The incursion of Israeli forces was headed by Ariel Sharon, the same Sharon, who, as Housing Minister, later reshaped Israel's settlement policy. At the time,




Figure 3.

he was Defense Minister of Israel under the Likud Party.

According to Robert Fisk, author of *Pity the Poor Nation*, Sharon had a hidden agenda. He sought not only to push the Palestinians from the border area, but to alienate Lebanon from rest of the Arab states.⁷⁵ Lebanon was at this time (and indeed remains today) a member of the Arab League and an enemy of Israel. However, Sharon aimed to exploit discontents within the dominant Maronite Christian community. The Maronites had close ties to the West, particularly to France and the United States. They hated the Palestinians, whom they wished to see driven from their midst. In Sharon's mind, the Christians were natural allies of Israel.⁷⁶ Tel Aviv would undergird the Maronites' power position in Lebanon; in return, they would take Lebanon out of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Thus Sharon planned to invade Lebanon on the pretext of cleansing the border of guerrillas, but, then, continuing to Beirut, invest the capital and strike a deal with the Maronite president of Lebanon whereby he would conclude a separate peace with Israel in return for Israel's withdrawal from the country.⁷⁷

The plan was flawed in a key area--Syria has traditionally considered Lebanon part of *its* sphere of influence, and, once it perceived what Sharon was up to, it mobilized to block the invasion. The Syrian army was outclassed by the IDF; however it did slow the momentum of the advance, and, as a consequence, Operation Galilee bogged down.⁷⁸ Sharon's forces found themselves outside Beirut in a standoff with the Syrians, and a ragtag army of guerrillas, including the PLO.

Since the IDF did not want to engage the Arab Muslim forces hand-to-hand inside the ghetto areas of the city, and since the Maronite Christians would not undertake to do this for them, a way out had to be found. This was supplied by U.S. President Reagan, who, in effect, offered to broker a withdrawal of the Israeli forces.⁷⁹

Reagan agreed to dispatch U.S. troops as part of a Multi-National Force (MNF). The MNF interposed itself between the warring Israelis and Syrians. Then an American envoy began shuttle diplomacy between Tel Aviv and Damascus, attempting the removal, not only of the Israelis from Lebanon, but of the Syrians and PLO as well.

Those negotiations proved unexpectedly difficult, and, as a consequence, the MNF could not pull out of Lebanon as planned. When the forces were finally withdrawn, they were immediately brought back after Lebanon's president was assassinated. After this return the MNF came under attack, from--of all groups--the Shias. They bombed the U.S. Marine barracks in south Beirut, killing 241 U.S. servicemen. They committed many other outrages, but this was the most infamous.⁸⁰

The atrocity astonished U.S. policymakers, because (as noted

above) heretofore the Shias had been the most docile, tractable people in Lebanon, if not the Middle East. What had brought about this change?

Growth of a Movement.

To comprehend the change that overcame the Shias one must go back to the early 1970s, when disruptive influences first began to impinge upon them. The Shias' backward condition, as stated, was a function of corrupt leadership. However, in the 1970s, a Lebanese Shia cleric, Musa as Sadr, formed a movement, *Harakat al Mahrumin* (Movement of the Deprived). This, he proclaimed, would uplift the Shias, making them into a politically significant force.⁸¹

Sadr was a naturalized Lebanese, born in Iran. A man with a shrewd political sense, he attacked the sectarian basis of Lebanese government, which he found to be incompatible with democracy. Under confessionalism (Lebanon's system of rule), leadership positions and jobs are proportioned on a quota system. Each sect gets so many jobs, supposedly based on its actual numbers in the community.

Sadr claimed that the Shias, the largest sect in Lebanon, consistently received the fewest patronage spots,⁸² and this, he said, was a function of their low economic status. Sadr called for an end to confessionalism--let Lebanese officials be elected, as in a true democracy; let real political parties form, instead of personality cliques around local warlords.

This call of Sadr's resonated widely in Lebanon, and attracted many followers. By 1975--when the Civil War commenced--the *Harakat* had begun to be a significant social force. In part this was due to the message Sadr was promoting, but along with this he had launched a program of social welfare, administering to the needs of the southerners.⁸³ And then, in 1978, he disappeared after a visit to Libya. His followers believe--to this day--that Libya's Muamar Gadhafi had him murdered.

Nabih Berri and Amal.

The movement to empower the Shias might have perished with Sadr had it not been for another individual, Nabih Berri. Berri led the *Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya* (better known by its acronym Amal). Basically this was a militia formed during the period of communal warfare, when the Shias needed a fighting arm to survive.

When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, Amal was just in the process of growing and developing. Probably the mass of the Shias welcomed the invasion. It was a way, they felt, of getting rid of the Palestinians. Berri, however, called on his people to resist.⁸⁴ He had a number of reasons for this. For one, he was

then (and remains to this day) a strong Lebanese nationalist. He believed the Shias' future was tied to Lebanon, and hence, to him, the invasion was an unacceptable breach of Lebanon's sovereignty.

Along with this, however, Berri had--prior to the invasion--become a client of Syria's President Hafez Assad. In those days, every militia in Lebanon was either pro- or anti- Syria, a requirement since Damascus continually intrigued in the Civil War.

Unexpectedly, Berri's stand on the invasion proved prescient because Sharon alienated the Shia sect. The Israeli did this by forming ties to various Christian communities, who populated the south along with the Shias.⁸⁵ The Shias suspected Sharon aimed to turn the Christians into Israeli surrogates, and let them take over the administration of the predominantly Shia territory. Having just gotten rid of the Palestinians, this was not a move the Shias could support. As the Shias turned more and more against Israel, Berri's Amal movement attracted more and more recruits.

Berri might have become the foremost power broker in Lebanon, had it not been for a totally unexpected development--abruptly, without warning, Iran decided to play in the Lebanese arena.

Iran.

To this day it is not clear why Iran decided to enter Lebanon.⁸⁶ It did so, however, and this had a great impact on the Amal movement. The Iranians are Shias, as are the followers of Berri. However, the ideologies of the two movements--Khomeinism and Amal--could not have been further apart. Khomeini stood for a regional Islamic revolt; Berri's Amal for working within the Lebanese system. Iran wanted to mobilize the Lebanese Shias to fight the United States. Berri vehemently opposed any such move as ruinous.

As long as Amal remained opposed, Iran's strategy in Lebanon was hamstrung. However the clerics got around this by forming a movement of their own, Hizbollah (the Party of God). Initially, they attracted mainly devout Shias, inspired by Khomeini's revolution. In time, however, members of Amal switched to Hizbollah, lured by the Iranians' subventions. This, naturally, deepened the hostility between the groups,⁸⁷ until ultimately they came to blows, each trying to eliminate the other. For a time, the fight was carried on in the area around Beirut. However, actions taken by Israel caused the battle to shift to the south.

In retreating to the south, the Israelis had repeated a pattern of previous years. Their 1982 invasion actually was the second time they had entered Lebanon. In 1978, they conducted a

similar operation, on a smaller scale. After that affair, the United Nations stationed observers throughout the southern region. Even so, the Israelis did not entirely withdraw. They maintained IDF units between the Litani River and Lebanese border, and these cooperated with the aforementioned Christian communities. (See Figure 4). Now, in 1982, they not only expanded their area of control in Lebanon, they institutionalized it, announcing that this was their "security zone." In addition they formalized their association with the Christians by creating the so-called South Lebanese Army (SLA). All of this was a great blow to the Shias, who saw their homeland becoming the permanent fief of the Christians. Clearly, some action had to be taken. But what? Berri would not go to war with Israel. This was Hizbollah's crusade, and, by joining it, Amal would become subservient (however indirectly) to the Iranian clerics.

For awhile Berri enjoyed support for his nonaggression stand from Syria. Damascus had gained by forcing Israel out of Beirut, but it had to consolidate its position in the north. Assad did not want the Israelis reinvading the south, as that could force a resource-draining confrontation. Nonetheless, conditions were deteriorating at an alarming rate all over Lebanon. The intra-communal fighting was clearly out of hand. (As one observer remarked, civil wars were erupting inside of civil wars.) There had to be an attempt to reimpose authority.

Damascus, then, brokered the so-called Greater Beirut scheme whereby the various militias would call off their vendettas in return for guarantees from the Syrian government.⁸⁸ In regard to the Shias, Assad importuned Berri and the Hizbollahis to, in effect, divide up their territory; Berri got control of southern Beirut, while Hizbollah withdrew to the far south, there to take up arms against Israel.

This occurred in 1989, and it is from this date that Israel's war in the south derives. Berri's forces were now effectively out of action. Hizbollah, however, virtually took over the south to carry on the fight against the SLA and Israel.

The Shias and The Peace Process.

Assad has a reputation for being one of the shrewdest politicians in the Middle East. In the present instance, he was not only shrewd but lucky. In 1991, two years after he had "unleashed" Hizbollah, the United States agreed to sponsor the peace conference, as it had pledged to do at the outset of the Kuwait crisis. Assad now saw that the situation in southern Lebanon could benefit him, in relation to the role Syria might play in the negotiations.

Assad went into the peace talks in a weak position. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, he had lost his principal patron. In addition, the decision of Egypt to sign a separate peace with

Israel had taken away Syria's military option-- without Egypt, Syria cannot possibly hope to fight the Jewish state.



Figure 4.

To give himself leverage, Assad thought to make use of the Shias. He had always viewed the creation of the security zone as a mistake: once having taken the step, the Israelis had to defend the area, regardless. By stepping up assistance to the

Hizbollahis, Syria could challenge Israel's hegemony in the south. This would put the Israelis on notice that, to ensure stability on their northern border, they must make concessions to Syria in the negotiations.

Israel has so far refused to accede to Syria's strategy. It has rather tried to defeat Hizbollah militarily. For every ambush carried out by the group, Israel has retaliated with extreme severity. For awhile it appeared that this counter-strategy would be effective, but then, in 1993, the Hizbollahis began to show surprising efficiency in their attacks. Moreover, they had been equipped with extremely sophisticated weapons, with which they took a high toll on both the IDF and SLA.

The Israelis then undertook their most devastating assault on Lebanon since the 1982 war. In July 1993 they launched Operation Accountability, in which they fired some 25,000 rounds of artillery into southern Lebanon. They kept this up for seven days, causing some 250,000 Shias to flee the south to Beirut (with civilian casualties of 150 killed, over 500 wounded).⁸⁹

In effect, the Israelis have opted for a policy of firmness, the same strategy that they used in Gaza and on the West Bank. In the author's view this is a mistake. Force does not work against the radicals; excessive force is counterproductive.

We are now in a position to assess Hamas and Hizbollah. What is it about the two groups that makes them so troublesome? Why is it that policies that have proven successful in other, similar circumstances, do not seem to work against them?

The Secret of the Radicals.

Israel meant Operation Accountability to teach the Hizbollahis, and the Shia community, a lesson. By launching a devastating military riposte it believed it could break the community/radical tie.⁹⁰

The strategy did not work. The Hizbollahis waited, and when the IDF had pulled back across the border, they reinfiltated the zone. Within weeks they carried out another ambush, in which nine IDF soldiers were killed.⁹¹ This was the most the Israelis had lost in a single engagement since the 1982 invasion. Significantly, the local community of Shias made no objection to this; it did not condemn the Hizbollahis for taking the action they did.

Israel should have seen that the local Shias are not a factor in this equation. To be sure, many young Shias are allied with Hizbollah. However, even if *all* the local youths were to abandon Hizbollah, it could still carry on its war against Israel.

Hizbollah is the only option available. After the end of the Lebanese Civil War, the militias of all sects became inactive. This means that large numbers of erstwhile militiamen no longer have anything to do. Lebanon's economy has never recovered from the devastation of the war; there are no jobs. It would be a rare youth who would turn down Iranian pay for fighting the Israelis. Thus, all that is required to keep the fight going is a core of true believers (*mujahadeen*) to direct the conflict, and recruits can be had in practically endless supply.

And so the situation has unfolded. The Hizbollahis have mounted continuous ambushes, both against the IDF and SLA. Periodically, the Israelis retaliate. But this does not resolve anything, as the Hizbollahis soon attack again. It has so far proven impossible to break the cycle of violence.

The ability of the Hizbollahis always to find recruits is the secret of their power, and this goes for Hamas as well. Conditions in the occupied territories feed revolt. Widespread unemployment, general insecurity, enormous numbers of youths with nothing remunerative to occupy them--these are factors that drive desperate measures. The religious forces have seen the potential of this situation and exploited it. They have brought the struggle down to the street, turning it into a mass phenomenon, where formerly--if anything--it was an elite affair.

That certainly is the way it was under the PLO. The PLO has a leader, Arafat. He is surrounded by counselors who are all--as he is--professional revolutionaries. These men give orders, which they expect to be obeyed. The organizations of Hamas and Hizbollah are not at all like this; they are much more loose.

Indeed there is very little hierarchical about either the Hamas or the Hizbollah movements.⁹² The author was struck by how many times he was told this while in the area. In Gaza particularly, people would comment that Hamas has no bureaucracy, and they would say this with obvious wonderment, as though this were a fact of tremendous importance. Moreover, the implication appeared to be that, not having one, meant that Hamas was not corrupt.

If Hamas and Hizbollah have no structure (or at least none that is very complex) how have they been able to achieve all that they have? Ideology. They have formulated--in terms that the youth can comprehend--a rationale for going on with the struggle.

The message of Hamas and Hizbollah is direct and compelling: the armed struggle is everything, and everyone is in the struggle. One makes the revolution by the simple expedient of joining up, or (which amounts to the same thing) by taking the gun.

The fundamental concept driving all of this is *jihad*, a fertile idea, which few westerners seem capable of understanding.

Jihad--as the radicals construe it--is a way of personally empowering oneself. The jihadists take the position that Muslims are *obliged* to fight enemies of the faith, and they do it without either the support or hindrance of a higher authority. In other words, defending the faith is something that one does on one's own authority.⁹³

To this basic concept, the radicals have wedded a corresponding idea of the *ummah*. The *ummah* is the worldwide community of the faithful, which, the radicals say, is under assault by the West. Thus the combined message of the radicals is to defend the faith by preserving--and where possible--enlarging the boundaries of the *ummah*.

Thus the youths who pour into the streets of Gaza and the West Bank hurling rocks at IDF units could be said to be performing *jihad*, because they are denying the Israelis access to the *ummah*, or rather, to space claimed by the community of the faithful. That space may be only a neighborhood, a quarter, a *qasbah*, but it is *Muslim* ground, and as such sacred and worth defending, even unto death.⁹⁴

This seems a justified interpretation based on what is occurring in the territories. We have discussed the rock-throwing attacks, and described them as more or less spontaneous events. There is something else going on that is more complicated, but which seems to be of considerable importance; that is stabbings. Next to rock-throwing attacks, stabbings comprise the largest category of incidents in which the Palestinians engage. Individual Palestinians perpetrate knife attacks on Israelis in broad daylight, frequently making no attempt to defend themselves--or even to flee--after the attack has been performed.⁹⁵ Western aid workers, on the spot, describe these attacks as motivated by extreme frustration. Who can tell, one such worker told the author, whether the knife-wielders are doing this because they have lost their jobs, or been humiliated by an Israeli settler, or what?

This may be, but the radicals inside the Strip do not view it this way. To them, the knifings are a defense of the faith, and, indeed, when one takes the broadest possible view of the matter, there does seem to be an element of this involved. For example, early in the *intifadah*, a Palestinian, riding a municipal bus, wrested the wheel from the Israeli driver and drove it over a cliff, killing 11 of the passengers aboard, himself included.⁹⁶ Was he frustrated over a job loss? He may have been, but he took a purposeful and determined way of assuaging his distress.

Another instance--in 1991, a Palestinian drove his truck into a two Israeli cars, killing one of the Israeli drivers, and then he dismounted from his vehicle and attempted to kill another Israeli with a tire iron. Ultimately the man was shot to death by bystanders.⁹⁷

Indeed, the incident in December 1992 that set off the deportation of 418 alleged Hamas members (the alleged kidnapping of the border patrolman), can be seen as *jihad*, inasmuch as it too was apparently done on inspiration.

Until 1992, instances of impulse killings were rare and could be dismissed as aberrations. However, by 1993 the toll from such incidents had increased alarmingly. By March of that year 15 Israelis had died at the hands of knife-wielders. This so disturbed Rabin that he ordered the complete closure of the territories; henceforth no Palestinian could enter Israel to work. Indeed, the very day that Rabin announced the ban, an Arab youth, armed with two knives, stabbed nine passersby (killing two) in south Tel Aviv. This was a particularly unsettling incident because it took place in Israel proper, i.e., inside the Green Line.⁹⁸

The objection has been raised that stabbings and such cannot possibly be *jihad*. After all, *jihad* is a concept with which the West has some familiarity. Western scholars have discussed it in terms of an actual holy war, something that conjures up the picture of massed tribes sweeping across the desert, a la Lawrence of Arabia and the march on Damascus. In the author's opinion this is an out-of-date view; *jihad*, as it has come to be practiced throughout the Middle East today, is a much more complex phenomenon. At any rate, this is part of the problem: we know far too little about Muslim practice; if we are to cope with mounting violence in the region, we have to better understand what is going on there.⁹⁹

One last point to be made in this connection: Hamas seems definitely to be part of the jihadist movement. Hizbollah is a more problematical case. Inasmuch as the Hizbollahis identify with the Iranians this would be natural. The Iranians have had a successful religious revolt, and they have done it within the context of Shia Islam. Therefore, the Iranian experience, and indeed, the experience of all Middle Eastern Shias, is somewhat set apart from that of the predominant Sunni community.

But in the long run the Sunni community is potentially the greater threat to the West (if only because of the enormous numbers of Sunnis worldwide). At present there seems little likelihood of a Sunni revolt, on the order of that carried out by the Iranian Shias in the late 1970s. At the same time, however, the appearance of so many of these jihadist organizations, among so many widely separated Sunni communities in the Middle East, is disturbing.

The Islamic groups in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in Algeria--these are all pursuing a course remarkably like that of Hamas and the original jihadists in the occupied territories.¹⁰⁰ How all these groups came to be, and why they are all coming into being now, are questions which will have to be answered. One

thing seems certain, however; it does not appear that the activity is being masterminded by a controlling entity. It would be convenient if this could be proved, but, on the basis of the evidence produced to date, this has not been shown.

At the same time, it should be stressed that moderate opinion among the Arabs is apparently abhorred by the jihadists. The middle class throughout the Middle East and the Magreb, the Arabs of the Gulf, and the traditional leadership of the PLO are all very much against this developing radicalism. And this brings us to the final section of the study, wherein we recommend ways of combatting the phenomenon. We will focus here on ways to counter Hamas and Hizbollah, the subjects of the study.

Recommendations.

After the announcement of the Declaration of Principles, Hamas and Hizbollah kept a low profile, allowing the peace process to unfold without obstruction. Clearly this was a stance imposed on them by their followers. The Palestinians and the Shias in southern Lebanon want the talks to succeed because, they feel, this will improve their economic situation, and for them this is the only thing that matters.

As long as it appeared that the talks were on track, and matters were progressing smoothly, the radicals made no attempt to interfere. They were mindful of the popular will that wanted to wait and see how things would develop. Sabotaging the peace process, which the people were banking on, was not a step which anyone on the radical side wanted to take.

However, just recently Hamas perpetrated an outrageous series of attacks. In one instance two young militants shot wildly into a Jerusalem street, killing two passersby. Right after that, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a bus in Tel Aviv, killing 23 people. The Israeli government reacted to this with intense anger. It broke off talks with the PLO, believing (erroneously as it turned out) that the PLO indirectly had contributed to the atrocities.

Subsequently, Rabin issued his official explanation of what Hamas was trying to accomplish. It was, he said, trying to sabotage the peace talks. We might have expected him to say something like this; he is, at the moment, focussed on the talks, and is doing all that he can to bring them to fruition.

But, if one reads the statements of the various Hamas leaders--particularly those issued right after the bus affair--they are saying something quite different.¹⁰¹ They are expressing satisfaction that, by the attacks, the honor of the Palestinian community has been redeemed, after the Hebron massacre. It appears that this is what is motivating Hamas. Hamas has taken on itself the responsibility of avenging the community for attacks

by the Jewish settlers. Indeed, at the time of the Hebron affair, Hamas said it would retaliate, and it would not be satisfied with a single retaliatory action; it would deliver repeated blows to the Jewish community.

The resistance against Israel has called forth a counter-resistance among the Israeli religious forces. The two groups are fiercely engaged in pursuing their personal vendettas, unmindful--or disdainful--of attempts by the peace makers to resolve this bitter struggle.

It seems to the author that the fight between the religious forces has taken on a life of its own. It is not that the two sides--settlers and Hamas operatives--are deliberately trying to sabotage the talks; it is that, for them, the talks are secondary. What really counts for the radicals--on both sides--is destroying the enemy, or at least paying the enemy back for every blow that has been inflicted.

In line with this, the recent kidnapping of an Israeli soldier--and his subsequent killing--can be seen as activity unrelated to the peace process. The Hamas operatives that seized the Israeli were not--as Israeli officials maintained--trying to derail the talks by their action. They wanted Israel to release jailed Hamas members. Israel, after initially having promised to let them go as part of the Declaration of Principles, then reneged, and, since Arafat seemed incapable of inducing Rabin to make good on his commitment, Hamas took this way of trying to force the issue.

Ultimately, the real danger that the peace makers must face is that this struggle will degenerate into a religious war. If that happens, it will become vitually impossible to control events. Already some quite elemental passions have been let loose. The Temple Mount Faithful, Hamas, and groups like these, are not receptive to reasoned argument. If they come to dominate the struggle, chances of peace will fade away to nothing.

U.S. policymakers should be alert to this possibility, and do all that they can to keep this from happening. This means supporting the responsible forces, primarily the PLO. Americans must see that the PLO stands for compromise, and ultimately, hopefully, a peaceful solution. The alternative to it is Hamas, and violence. This brings us to another related matter, which bears upon the ability of the PLO to defuse the violence.

A major area of vulnerability in the process involves the youth, particularly the gang leaders who took charge of the *intifadah* under Israeli domination. If the PLO is to pacify the areas under its control, it must take care of this element; it needs to co-opt the youngsters, and to do so in a way that they will accept. The youths want permanent jobs with some status connected to them. Arafat is moving toward supplying this need. However, a complication has arisen which could block his efforts.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is financing the PLO administration, insists that Arafat submit detailed project statements, which the IMF officials intend to scrutinize carefully.¹⁰²

From a good-government standpoint this may make sense, but it is not the way things are done in the ghetto. It would be more practical to allow Arafat to proceed however he deems fit. Let him pay whomever he believes is worth supporting, whether that individual is performing any useful labor or not. This type of behavior is something the street understands, i.e., deferring to the community's true leaders, those who by their actions can ensure the success or failure of an undertaking.

U.S. policymakers must appreciate the role that the PLO has agreed to play in pacifying the territories, something that not even the Israelis could accomplish. It is a really dirty job that Arafat has taken on. The only standard he should be held to is to succeed; how he does it should not be an issue. If, later, it develops that Arafat cannot do the job, other arrangements will have to be made. But to expect the PLO to perform while under close supervision by the IMF (or anyone else for that matter) is unrealistic. This is not the sort of activity that can be micro-managed from IMF headquarters in Washington.

In line with this, another proposal has been put forward that needs consideration. It has been suggested that a way be found to entice Hamas and Hizbollah into the talks. Some western commentators believe that this is possible. They think concessions to the radicals will induce them to act responsibly.

The author does not see the point in this. If the theory outlined here is correct, the radicals are incapable of acting responsibly. Only if they had control of the territories could they do so, and we have seen that they do not have anything like this authority. The radicals can enflame the mob to violence, but that appears to be about the limit of what they are capable.

Moreover, why should they get involved, when to do so would mean abandoning a strong position, which to date has proved immensely successful? The radicals are seen as the alternative to the PLO. To join the peace talks they would have to give up this role; they would have to concede the direction of affairs to Arafat, and this would virtually end their usefulness to the community. U.S. policymakers should forget the radicals and keep their focus on the PLO; that is the key to success. Any hope of involving the radicals is a delusion.

The above recommendations relate specifically to the role of Hamas and Hizbollah in the peace process. Clearly, however, the groups have a significance beyond the immediate concern of the talks. They can have an enormous impact on U.S. interests in the whole Middle East area.

Hamas and Hizbollah are true radical organizations, in the sense that they are out to destroy the system. They do not seek to reform it. They may want to step into the shoes of the present rulers, but they certainly will not maintain their pattern of rule, should they take over.

To the degree that America's security position is buttressed by having strong, friendly states in the Middle East, Washington has an interest in preserving present arrangements. Just now, there seems little likelihood of a widespread revolt. This is because of factors alluded to above, namely the repugnance of middle class elements for what is going on.

If, however, economic conditions in the area continue to deteriorate, the attitude of the middle class will cease to count for a great deal. Indeed, the class is growing increasingly restive. The middle class in Algeria, for example, is apparently set to emigrate to France, should the violence there continue. Egypt recently witnessed a most ominous development. It was shown that elements of the army have become implicated with the radicals.¹⁰³ It must not be forgotten that religious conspirators in the army killed former president Sadat.

It would be a catastrophe if one of America's allies succumbed to the religious forces, as did the Shah of Iran in 1979. This would provide the radicals with a base from which to expand their influence. Moreover, should the radicals take over anywhere in the area, this would enhance their credibility; the prospect of a radical religious government might then not seem so remote to many.

In analyzing this situation, U.S. policymakers must be aware that among the Muslims there are elements that are peaceable and disposed to the West, and those that are unalterably opposed to western influence. The latter category comprises groups like Hamas and Hizbollah. The subversives are not like the conservative sheikhs of al Azhar in Egypt, or the *ulama* of Saudi Arabia. Whereas the latter could easily be led to cooperate with the United States, the radicals would never do so. In the radicals' eyes America is the Great Satan, and now--with the Soviet Union gone--the principal enemy of the faith.

One other matter, which directly involves Americans, should be considered. The Israelis appear to have developed a fail-safe option to try if the PLO does not succeed in taking control of the territories. By way of concluding the study, we will discuss that now.

Americans on the Golan.

Recently the Israelis proposed that the United States consider stationing troops on the Golan Heights, as a way out of an impasse in the peace talks.¹⁰⁴ It appears that Syria and Israel

are deadlocked on the question of Israeli troop withdrawals. Syria wants the Golan returned immediately; Israel appears to want to hand it over in phases, and only after Syria has agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the Jewish state.

Since, apparently, neither side will budge on this, Israel has suggested putting U.S. forces on the Golan. Supposedly this would overcome Syria's fear that Israel, after initially having agreed to withdraw, would later change its mind. U.S. troops on the Golan would also reassure the Israelis that Syria would not attack from there, the American forces serving as a trip wire. The stay of the Americans would be prolonged, perhaps as long as 20 years, and, although they might be part of a U.N. force, they would be the centerpiece, probably in brigade strength.

There is some controversy over this proposition. There are those who contend that such talk--of a U.S. force serving as a tripwire--is meaningless. Should the Israelis and Syrians decide to make peace, they certainly will do everything in their power to see that it succeeds. The likelihood of Americans being at risk from either side is not worth considering. Indeed, an American presence on the Golan would be merely symbolic, a sign of superpower backing for a deal that both sides know to be in their best interest.

At the same time, however, others contend that American peacekeepers would be exposed to danger, given the volatility of local conditions. For example, President Assad apparently had a heart attack in 1983, and subsequently fears have been expressed about his continued good health.¹⁰⁵ Were he to die, would his successor be disposed to cooperate with Tel Aviv, or would he seek to reassert the traditional enmity of Damascus towards the Jewish state? No one knows the answer to this, because there does not exist at present any clearly designated successor to Assad, should the aging leader pass from the scene.

A similar problem exists on the Israeli side. Israel is divided into two opposing political camps. There is the nationalist Likud Party, and the dovish Laborites. The leader of Likud has said, publicly, that he does not feel bound by any concessions made by Labor to Damascus, and, were he to be elected Israel's prime minister, he might seek to renegotiate the terms of a Labor-brokered agreement.¹⁰⁶ Were that to happen, what would be the reaction of the Arab populations in the occupied territories? Might they not take out their rage and frustration on the American troop units in the area, as they did in 1983 in Lebanon? After all, Washington has sponsored the peace process from the very first, and is, in the minds of the natives at least, responsible for its implementation.

The author believes an American force on the Golan is nearly inevitable, given the apparent willingness of the Administration to support the proposal.¹⁰⁷ Therefore American military commanders should prepare themselves for this eventuality. At the same time,

however, the modalities of the operation should be carefully considered, with the idea of safeguarding U.S. forces kept uppermost in mind.

The author feels that a commitment to station American troops on the Golan should not be open-ended. A definite period should be specified, preferably not too long. In addition, it should be possible to withdraw the troops quickly and completely without causing the peacekeeping force to disintegrate.

There are at present United Nations forces in place throughout the region. It would seem desirable to exploit this situation. For example, an American contingent on the Golan could become part of UNDOF (the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force). The Americans would be there to support UNDOF, but would not take over. Then, should the U.S. Congress--for whatever reason--decide to bring the troops home, this could be done expeditiously.

Moreover a small, truly symbolic, U.S. force would be desirable from another angle: it would impress the parties that more needs to be done to bring about peace than simply disengage the opposing armies. This brings us to the last matter that needs to be discussed.

In the author's view the Israelis' policy on the territories is badly conflicted. They want to in-gather hundreds of thousands of Jews, turning Israel into an exclusively Jewish enclave. At the same time, they want to trade within the region, since this is a way of becoming self-sustaining economically.

The continued incorporation of Jews means making more Arab refugees (after all, the land of Israel is only so large; if hundreds of thousands of Jews come in, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians must leave). As additional refugees are dispersed throughout the area, countries neighboring Israel will become destabilized (as occurred with Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s); countries that are disintegrating politically do not make good trading partners.¹⁰⁸

The area cannot afford to perpetuate the present violent conditions. Stability must be achieved, and this can only come about through some sort of economic union between Israel and its neighbors. This is possible, but not until the refugee problem is resolved and a peace settlement reached with the approval of key Arab states.¹⁰⁹

Ultimately it comes down to the problem of unemployed youth. The mass of young people has to be accommodated. Youths who have no hope of leading secure lives, who are deeply embittered against authority, and who can only support themselves by hiring out as mercenaries are always going to make trouble for the Israelis--and indeed for the entire West.

Also, the Palestinians and Shias of southern Lebanon need to have their status clarified: Who are they? What are they? To which country do they belong? As long as such basic questions are not answered, the radical religious forces will continue to gain strength. These groups have found a formula to keep the region in turmoil. Effectively, then, we are in a race to find a solution before the area erupts into a holy war.

Earlier we mentioned the argument of the religious forces in Israel, that God gave the land to the Jews, and we said that this was to have unforeseen consequences. What has now happened is that the Muslims have found a counterargument-- that the *ummah* is sacred, and that no portion of it can ever be alienated from the Islamic community.

It does not appear there is much time left to avoid a great calamity. The author's final recommendation, therefore, is this-- policymakers must not believe that the radical movement can be neutralized by cutting off support from the Arab states. The radicals will capitalize on setbacks to step up their recruiting drive. Indeed, these groups have shown, over and over, that they benefit from adversity, winning more converts.

Hamas, in particular, has proven extraordinarily resilient in this respect; it has managed to keep itself going when seemingly bereft of formal support from the Arab governments. Hizbollah, on the other hand, is very dependent on both Iran and Syria, but this does not mean that it could not emulate Hamas and develop similar innovative strategies to survive. Recently, Hizbollah ran candidates for Lebanon's parliament and was impressively successful. The organization seems to be positioning itself to continue as a political force in the area, even if Damascus--and Tehran--withdraw their aid.

Summing up--in the end, making peace in the Middle East is a problem of economics. The region cannot remain stable as long as there are growing numbers of unemployed youths who not only do not have jobs but--in the case of the Gazans--do not even have recognized political status. Efforts to resolve the socio-economic problems connected with this struggle must not be ended once a formal peace treaty has been achieved. Peace is a process that will not conclude until the area is on the road to economic recovery, after the terrible devastation to which it has been subjected for almost a half century.

ENDNOTES

1. Throughout this study the author refers to the Shias. Along with the Sunnis, they comprise the two major sects of Islam. The Shias, which are by far the smaller of the two, are also the more radical. Practically all of Iran and probably not quite half of Lebanon are Shia.

2. Hamas is an acronym standing for *Harakat al Muqawame al*

Islamiya, the Islamic Resistance Movement. Until this year there was no scholarly work devoted to Hamas. This was remedied with Ziad Abu-Amr's *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994.

3. The areas seized by Israel were the Sinai Desert, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. The Israelis returned the Sinai to Egypt after the 1973 War, and they have annexed Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

4. Sara Roy, in an article in *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, "Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration," Summer 1993, says, "The immense economic pressures imposed upon the Gaza Strip become even more acute in light of Gaza's extremely high population growth of 4 percent per annum. Last year the refugee community alone, which comprises 73 percent of the total population, grew at a rate of 7.3 percent, giving the territory one of the highest population densities in the world. In 1992, according to conservative estimates, density levels exceeded 9,300 people per square mile when measured in terms of lands available for use by the Arab population. Density levels among the Jewish settler community in the Gaza Strip, by contrast, averaged 115 people per square mile of available land."

5. *The Middle East and North Africa, 1992*, 38th edition, 1991, London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1991. Also Roy, "Perhaps the most telling and frightening indicator of Gaza's growing fragmentation and imminent breakdown is the traumatization of the youth. Close to 70 percent of the Gaza Strip population is twenty-five years of age and younger, and have known nothing but occupation. Just under 50 percent are fourteen years or less, and have spent their formative years during the uprising."

6. Statistics cited from bulletin of the Public Information Office, United Nations Relief and Works Agency-Gaza, which quotes the *Registration Statistical Bulletin, Third Quarter 1993*, Relief Services Division, UNRWA Vienna. Also see "Further Arabs Banned," *The Jerusalem Post*, November 12, 1990, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Near East and South Asia-90-220*, November 14, 1990. This article says that as of this date 110,000 Arabs from the occupied territories were working in Israel.

7. See Don Peretz, *Intifadah: The Palestinian Uprising*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, p. 27. Also "Bethlehem Mayor on Intifadah, 'Bad' Conditions," Paris Radio Monte Carlo, December 8, 1990, *FBIS-NES- 90-238*, December 11, 1990. In this interview with Bethelhem Mayor Ilyas Frayj the interviewer claims the number of settlers (Jewish) has passed 100,000 in the territories. Frayj responds, "...the truth is that the settlements in the West Bank are cities, built in the most modern way with stone and cement. They are built to last." Also see "Reportage on Soviet Immigrants' Status, 1,600 Live in Territories," *Tel Aviv Yedi'ot Aharnot*, April 24, 1991, *FBIS-NES-91-084*, May 1, 1991. The article points out that 0.7

percent of new immigrants who have come to Israel over the past 15 months currently reside in the territories, most of them in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Also see "Age, Educational Breakdown Given," *The Jerusalem Post*, April 26, 1991, FBIS-NES-91-084. This article says that during the first quarter of 1991, 38,400 immigrants arrived, and "from the beginning of last year until the end of last month" some 237,900 immigrants arrived in Israel.

8. See Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *The Intifadah: The Palestinian Uprising--Israel's Third Front*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989, p. 89. This was also reported to the author by aid workers in the Middle East.

9. The actual number of Jewish settlers in the Strip is under dispute. U.N. officials believe it may be as low as 1,000. They contend that many who claim residency are actually what are called "speculative settlers"; that is, individuals who have moved into the area to claim property, which they plan to realize a profit on later, either by selling it, or by allowing the Israeli government to buy them out, should the land ever be returned to the Arabs. These speculators do not necessarily live in the Strip, but elsewhere.

10. Attacks are also reported on the Israeli side. The author was told by aid workers that residents of one settlement are known to stone cars of passing motorists. According to the officials, these were American immigrants, from New York City.

11. For example, during the period the author was in the Strip the body of a man was found hanging in a tree across from the entrance to the Islamic University. There was no note or anything to indicate why he had been killed. There would not be an investigation, the author was told, and so this would enter the books as a collaborator killing.

12. This problem of whether indeed these are political crimes is difficult to sort out. They may, in fact, be crimes of passion, or inter-family feuds. At the same time, however, it is clear that many persons believed to be collaborators are being murdered. Two anecdotes will suffice to show this. The author was told of the case of a man dumped in front of UNRWA headquarters, on the point of death. When an ambulance was summoned, the driver asked why he had been called--"This man is a collaborator." When the driver was compelled to take the man to the hospital, the doctors there treated him, but professed surprise that the UNRWA officials would be concerned over a known collaborator. In another instance, a teacher in a school in Gaza was killed, and, when a U.N. official suggested counselling for the teacher's pupils, the school's administrators said that this would not be necessary--the man was a collaborator; the children knew it, and hence they were not in the least surprised. Such tales would appear to show that among the Gazans collaborators are known, and when killed not generally mourned.

13. Thomas Hobbes, English political theorist who maintained that man's life was "short, nasty and brutish," and that conditions in society resemble a jungle. To escape this anarchy, Hobbes said, men submit to an authority who will maintain law and order.

14. Schiff and Ya'ari discuss the origins of the word *intifadah* in *The Intifadah*, p. 45. As for the cost of the disturbances, obviously this is difficult to pinpoint because the toll changes daily. However, the last published count the author saw was in *The Washington Post*, on March 16, 1994: "According to Betselem (sic) (the Israeli human rights group) 1,112 Palestinians living in Israel were killed by Israeli security forces from 1988 through January, and 61 Israeli civilians and 45 security force members were killed in the territories by Palestinians. Inside Israel, 56 Israeli civilians and 19 security force members were killed by Palestinians in that period, and 33 Palestinians were killed by Israelis." This compares with Betzelem's count for the 1990 period. Then the death toll stood at 712 Palestinians killed by the IDF and settlers. See "Betzelem Report Sums Up Three Years of *Intifadah*," Tel Aviv *Ha'aretz*, December 5, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-239, December 12, 1990.

15. *The Intifadah*, pp 45-50.

16. That the Israeli leadership was not prepared for a popular revolt is indisputable. However, several Israeli authors claim there were ample signs of trouble brewing, which the authorities deliberately chose to ignore. See Chapter One of *The Intifadah*. Here Schiff and Ya'ari cite statistics to show an appreciable rise in incidents just before the outbreak--"133 percent in the number of demonstrations and riots, 178 in the burning of tires (487 incidents up from 172), 140 percent in the throwing of stones, and 68 percent in the blocking of roads." Aryeh Shalev in *The Intifadah: Causes and Effects*, Jerusalem: The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 1991, pp. 38-43, gives additional evidence as to the unexpectedness of the revolt. Also see Peretz, *Intifadah*, p. 40.

17. To be sure, the IDF had experienced trouble with the Palestinians from the first days of the occupation. However, the scope of events was considerably smaller than what occurred after December 1987. Shalev discusses this (on p. 74): "The extent and numbers of participants in the riots was far greater than in the pre-*intifadah* era, when a few dozen or at most a few hundred demonstrators would take to the streets. Some of the early *intifadah* riots involved thousands of people--including one riot in the Gaza Strip in which more than 10,000 people took part." This also would account for the difficulty experienced by the IDF trying to control events. The army did not consider the great growth in population, and how difficult it would be to cope with the resultant density. See also *The Intifadah*, p. 26, 32, 34.

18. The argument (that Israelis are free to settle anywhere in the occupied territories) is based on the fact that, since Jordan and Egypt themselves seized the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1948, they had no legal status in regard to the areas, and thus, when Israel acquired them it was not as an occupying power. Under international law, however, the rights of the inhabitants, not the rulers, are meant to be safeguarded. The Palestinians lived there when Israel took over; therefore they must be accorded the status of legal residents, and given the protection that this status implies. See Department of the Army Pamphlet, *Treaties Governing Land Warfare*, Department of the Army, December 1956, pp. 150-1: "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power, or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased."

19. See "Commentary Analyzes Intifadah's Effect on Security," Tel Aviv, *Ha'aretz*, December 4, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-239*, December 12, 1990.

20. See *The Intifadah*, p. 80-87.

21. The greater Israel concept holds that modern day Israel should encompass the original borders of Biblical times. This would include the West Bank and Gaza.

22. See *The Intifadah: Causes and Effects*, p. 33.

23. See "Goren on Financial Distress in Territories," Jerusalem, Israel Television Network, August 24, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-168*, August 24, 1990.

24. For details of this see Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, p. 107, and *Middle East International*, "Fundamentalists on the march," October 24, 1987.

25. *Jihad* is a complex concept that we will discuss in detail below. Simply stated the term in Arabic means "struggle." Hence, the jihadists were individuals committed to struggle in the way of the faith. See Abu-Amr; also *The Intifadah*, pp. 52, 69.

26. Among the majority sect of Sunnis, there has always existed a tendency toward extreme conservatism. The community is expected to defer to the opinions of religious scholars, the *ulama*, in matters spiritual and often temporal as well. The idea

of an individual Sunni taking on the responsibility for correcting community morals is not at all usual, and yet increasingly (perhaps as a result of this jihadist movement) we see this happening. Among the Shias, on the contrary, such action is not unusual at all.

27. *Ha'aretz* has this to say about the identity cards: ". . . we are trying to escape reality. . . . we hope that the problem will be resolved by issuing identity cards to the 'good Palestinians' allowing them to work in Israel, while we forget that most of the knife attackers captured until today had no record of security offenses." "Commentary Analyzes Intifadah's Effect on Security," *Ha'aretz*, Tel Aviv, December 4, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-239, December 12, 1990.

28. See *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, p. 63.

29. For a discussion of the founding of the Brotherhood, and its present situation in Egypt, see Stephen C. Pelletiere, *Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt: The Dilemma Facing President Mubarak*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 1994.

30. The most recent purge by the Ba'thists occurred in 1982. This was the infamous affair in Hama, a city in Syria, where supposedly some 20,000 inhabitants were killed by Assad's security forces. The city had allegedly been turned into a base for revolt by the Brothers.

31. The Brotherhood provided crucial support for the King in 1957, when his regime appeared on the point of being overthrown by nationalist forces. At a time (1989) when Islamic fundamentalists were causing grave concern to governments in the Middle East, King Hussein permitted the Brotherhood to run as a party in parliamentary elections, and they won 22 out of 80 seats. The King then permitted the Brothers to take their seats, and by-and-large they supported the monarch.

32. See *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, pp. 5-10.

33. The Israelis, who were always looking for ways to cut the costs of the occupation, would have welcomed the takeover by the Brotherhood of the various social welfare functions. See *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, p. 15.

34. See *Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt*.

35. This question of why the Brotherhood acted as it did is puzzling. It would make sense for the society to set up a front group (i.e., Hamas), if it wanted later on to claim plausible deniability for actions taken by the radicals, actions that the

Brotherhood did not feel it could condone. But clearly it could not do this once Hamas published its charter and identified itself as the society's "military wing." In his book, Abu-Amr claims that there was more to it than this; that, in fact, the Brotherhood was forced to create Hamas because of dissension in its ranks, with younger Brothers demanding the society get involved in the revolt. This is convincing, since the same thing happened in Egypt. There, however, the dissatisfied younger cadres formed completely separate groups, which the older, established Brotherhood subsequently denounced. To the author's knowledge, the Brotherhood in Jordan has never repudiated Hamas. For the situation in Egypt see *Shari'a Law, Cult Violence, and System Change in Egypt*. For Abu-Amr's comments see *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, p. 59.

36. The PLO had cadres in the territories. However, it has long been at issue as to what role these people performed. There is evidence that, in fact, they were functionaries, people who accepted stipends from the PLO in return for being loyal adherents. They were not, in other words, activists, constantly working underground to provoke a popular revolt.

37. We have considerable evidence for this. For example, *The New York Times* reported the Israelis were providing funds to the fundamentalists to strengthen them against the PLO. (Quoted in Don Peretz' *Intifadah*, p. 104). Shalev says that the Israelis did not move against the Brotherhood, viewing it as a religious movement (p. 27). This seems disingenuous.

38. For the background to this dissension see *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, p. 70 f. The PFLP, the Communists, and other secular groups had been operating in the territories before Hamas arrived. These were radical groups, who believed that revolt was possible. However, none of them had a very large following and hence their effectiveness was minimal.

39. Interviews with aid workers in Gaza.

40. For background on this see Sara Roy, "Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration."

41. This is a point that needs to be more thoroughly researched. We need to know, did Hamas initiate the collaborator killings? The author believes that it probably did not. Hamas's contribution to the *intifadah* appears to have been to release energies (Peretz calls them "negative energies") latent in the community. The youth of Gaza and the West Bank clearly were frustrated, if not actually seething with rage over their situation. Hamas came along and justified their anger--in religious terms--and then counselled violence as a corrective. Moreover, it influenced the *imams* to urge the youths into adopting this course of action (which Hamas could do, owing to the immense prestige that it enjoyed through its association with the Brotherhood). At that, the violence fairly exploded. We then

see the killing of collaborators, fighting with the IDF, and also the killing of "morally corrupt" individuals. It may be that Hamas did instigate all of this. Nonetheless, it seems more likely that Hamas fostered the commission of these acts by providing justification to individuals who sought release from their own troubled psychological condition through violence.

42. See "Black Panther Squads Reorganizing in Nablus," *Ha'aretz*, December 15, 1989, *FBIS-NES-89-240*, December 15, 1989.

43. It should not be overlooked how quickly the Iraqis moved after the end of their war with Iran to involve themselves in the politics of the Levant. They threw their wholehearted support behind General Aoun, who at that time was attempting to oust Syria from Lebanon. They even sought to supply Aoun with military weapons. Also Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Yeman agreed to set up an economic union, and had begun to move in this direction.

44. In fact, Hamas and the Brotherhood vacillated over this. In the case of Hamas, in particular, there appears to have been considerable confusion as to where it stood. This relates to a point we will make later in the study, that the religious organizations are not hierarchical, and thus do not behave as do organizations like the PLO, where a line is decided upon and everyone expected to adhere to it. See "Palestinians Support Initiative, Hamas Cited," *Paris Radio Monte Carlo*, August 13, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-156*, August 13, 1990; "Jihad Publication Calls for Confronting U.S.," *Tehran International*, July 7, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-131*, July 9, 1990; "Hamas Urges Jihad, Severing Links With U.S.," *Al Quds Palestinian Arab Radio*, July 9, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-132*, July 10, 1990; "Hamas Criticizes U.S., USSR Support for Israel," *Beirut Al Quds*, July 23, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-145*, July 27, 1990; "Mufti Sanctions Killing of U.S. Supporters," *INA*, August 9, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-155*, August 10, 1990; "Muslim Groups Denounce Iraq," *Jerusalem International*, August 10, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-160*, August 17, 1990; "Hamas Calls for Anti-U.S. Holy War," *Jerusalem Radio*, August 13, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-160*, August 17, 1990; "Muslim Council Condemns Arabs," *Davar*, August 13, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-160*, August 17, 1990; "Conflicting Reports on Arab Views on Iraq, PLO," *The Jerusalem Post*, August 28, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-168*, August 29, 1990; "Hamas Calls on Iraq to Withdraw From Kuwait," *The Jerusalem Post*, August 30, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-169*, August 30, 1990; "Paper Welcomes Khamene'i Call for Jihad," *Al Dustur*, September 13, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-178*, September 13, 1990; "Muslim Brotherhood Welcomes Call for Jihad," *Amman Al Sawt Al Sha'b*, September 16, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-184*, September 21, 1990; "Muslim Brotherhood Leader on U.S. Aggression," *Tehran Radio*, September 26, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-188*, September 27, 1990.

45. For a discussion of Arab reaction to Saddam's invasion see Stephen C. Pelletiere, *Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Revolt of the Brooms*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 20,

1992.

46. For the official report of the Israeli government on this incident see "Summary of Zamir Commission Report," Jerusalem Government Press Office, October 26, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-209*, October 29, 1990.

47. See "Palestinians Characterize Report as `Whitewash,'" *Jerusalem Post*, October 28, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-211*, October 31, 1990. Also for the general mood of the Palestinians see "Jerusalem Mayor Reviews Tensions, UN Commission," Vienna, *WOCHENPRESSE*, October 25, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-208*, October 26, 1990.

48. In connection with the 1969 incident, the Israelis tried and imprisoned an Australian for this. The Australian presumably was mentally unstable.

49. See "Intifadah Call No. 59 on `International Protection,'" *Sanaa Voice of Palestine*, July 5, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-130*, July 6, 1990.

50. See "More on Islamic Jihad Decision To Use Firearms," *Amman Al Ray*, October 26, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-208*, October 26, 1990.

51. See "Abu Sharif on Peace Process, Intifadah," *Tel Aviv IDF Radio*, July 1, 1991, *FBIS-NES-91-126*, July 1, 1990.

52. See "IDF To Fight Fire With Fire," *Tel Aviv IDF Radio*, December 6, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-236*, December 7, 1990; "To Use Painful Blows Against Firearms," *Jerusalem Radio*, December 6, 1991, *FBIS-NES-90-236*, December 7, 1990; "Intifadah Seen Becoming More Violent," *Ha'aretz*, July 28, 1991, *FBIS-NES-144-91*, July 30, 1991, and "Sharon: Intifadah Must Be Stopped, Not By-Passed," *Jerusalem Radio*, July 11, 1991, *FBIS-NES-91-133*, July 11, 1991.

53. "Border Police Chief Discloses Undercover Units," *Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el*, June 21, 1991, *FBIS-NES-91-127*.

54. See "Arens on Efforts To Foil Further Murder Attempts," *Jerusalem Radio*, October 23, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-205*, October 23, 1990; "Police Minister Endorses Deadly Use of Force," *Tel Aviv Radio*, October 21, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-204*, October 22, 1990, and "Intifadah Extremists Said Controlling Violence," *Ha'aretz*, December 7, 1990, *FBIS-NES-90-239*, December 12, 1990.

55. See "Soldier Killed; `Code' on Arms Said Broken," *Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el*, September 15, 1991, *FBIS-NES-91-179*, September 16, 1991.

56. See "Israeli Court Blocks Expulsion of Arabs," *The Washington Post*, December 18, 1992; "Manhunt For Israeli

Underway," *The Washington Post*, December 14, 1992, and "Palestinian Rivals Make Joint Appeal," *The Washington Post*, December 21, 1992.

57. See "Israel Arrests Four In Police Death," *The New York Times*, June 7, 1993, and "Israelis say policeman's murder in '92 was misinterpreted," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 8, 1993.

58. See Ziad Abu-Amr, " Hamas: A Historical Background," *The Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Vol. XXII, Number 4, Summer 1993, p. 17.

59. See "Increased IDF Activity in Territories Reported," *The Jerusalem Post*, January 19, 1992, FBIS-NES-92-015-A, January 23, 1992.

60. Conversations with aid workers in Gaza.

61. See "Reportage on the Aftermath of Yafo Murders," *Jerusalem Radio*, December 14, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-242, December 17, 1990; "Ami Popper Sentenced for Rishon Leziyyon Murders," *The Jerusalem Post*, March 17, 1991, FBIS-NES-91-053, March 19, 1991; "Officials Comment on Settler's Actions in Ramallah," *Tel Aviv IDF Radio*, December 16, 1991, FBIS-NES-91-242, December 17, 1991; "Arens Asks Settlement Leaders to Urge Restraint," *Jerusalem Radio*, December 18, 1991, FBIS-NES-91-243, December 18, 1991; "Settlers Enter Arab Village Past IDF Roadblock," *Jerusalem Radio*, December 18, 1991, FBIS-NES-91-243, December 18, 1991; "Settlers Form 'Security Patrols,' Mark Arab Homes," *Ha'aretz*, December 18, 1991, FBIS-NES-91-243; and, "IDF Encourages Arabs to Report Settler Violence," *Ma'ariv*, December 29, 1991, FBIS-NES-92-002-A, January 3, 1992.

62. At the peak of the *intifadah* (the end of 1990), 9,972 residents of the territories were being held in military detention facilities. Of this number 4,401 had already stood trial, 1,332 awaited trial, 3,477 were being held until legal proceedings were ended and 762 were administrative detainees. Approximately 4,000 others were imprisoned in the Prison Service installations, of which 1,173 were being held until legal proceedings were completed. At this time there were four main detention centers. They were the installation on the beach in Gaza, which held some 1,025 Palestinians; Zahiriyah Prison, holding 493 prisoners; two large detention centers inside Israel, one holding 5,915 Palestinians and another 1,532. Statistics taken from "Betzelem Report Sums Up Three Years of *Intifadah*," *Ha'aretz*, December 5, 1990, FBIS-NES-90-239, December 12, 1990.

63. For the Barraq interview see "Chief of Staff Defends Deportation," *Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el*, December 17, 1992, FBIS-NES-92-243, December 17, 1992. In another interview, in April 1993, Baraq was asked whether he believed the original deportations were a good idea. He answered: "It was correct and extremely effective. The blow to the Hamas infrastructure was

very significant." This would bolster the argument that the aim of the Israelis was to eliminate all adults who might serve to direct the uprising inside the territories, whether by deportation or imprisonment. Although imprisonment, the Israelis came to realize, had its drawbacks. Baraq again: "Detention camps are . . . ineffective because the detainees exploit the opportunity to study the modus operandi and to organize. . . . It is like a training school. Some of the people you arrest, with whom you have clashes, have been in the prison three or four times, and they simply learn to be better terrorists."

64. One approaches the Strip along a four-lane highway from Tel Aviv. That highway dead ends, blocked by a formidable barricade. On either side of the road machine guns are trained on the narrow entry to the Strip through the barricade. All cars queue up and each one is searched before being allowed to pass. Each car carries a special license plate, distinguishing whether the driver is an Israeli or a resident of the territories. Once inside the Strip, one must go everywhere under escort. Even visitors to the U.N. station are escorted by U.N. officials. The day before the author arrived in the Strip, a U.N. car had been stoned. In addition to this, the entire Strip is ringed with barbed wire fence. And finally 5000 IDF soldiers in the Strip are maintaining constant surveillance. As to the allegation that adults direct the activity, it has been claimed that they do so from jail. An Israeli commentator declared ". . . the Palestinian movement is perhaps the only one in which prisoners form the backbone of all activity. What they call the imprisoned movement is the most important component of their national struggle. The prisoners have moral authority and hence possess political power with the public, whether still in prison or already released." *Jerusalem Israeli Television*, October 11, 1992, *FBIS-NES-92-198*, October 13, 1992. This may be, but the fact remains that ad hoc actions, occurring at street level are all carried out by children. In a sense, this is similar to what occurred in the United States with drug dealing. After penalties for dealing were sharply increased, children took over the deal making, knowing that they could not be tried as adults under the law. See Felix M. Papilla, *The Gang as an American Enterprise*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993, p. 15.

65. See "New Leadership in the Territories Analyzed," *Ha'aretz*, February 12, 1989, *FBIS-NES-89-030*, February 15, 1989.

66. This seems evident from the tone of extreme exasperation which Palestinian leaders express in regard to what is going on in the territories. For example, Abdel Shafi, head of the Palestinian negotiating delegation to the peace talks, commenting on internecine fighting between the various gangs: "The people in general feel that there is no justification for the killings. The offender can be punished in another way, in which the punishment does not end in murder, because this method creates problems in society. Hence the general feeling is that this process must be discontinued." Interviewer: "Why do the national figures not

issue a public call for an end to this phenomenon?" Abdel Shafi: "We have made such public calls at mass gatherings. I say frankly that our society is distressed and dissatisfied with the continued use of this method. . . ." Interviewer: "Dr. Haydar, does the fact that the killings continue mean that the Palestine leadership inside has lost control of the situation?" Abdel Shafi: "First of all, the political leadership abroad, as you may recall, issued an appeal by (Yasir Arafat) to stop the killings. There has been no response to this demand. . . . Its continued usage, therefore, leads one to the conclusion that the leadership inside is not in complete control of the situation." Similarly, Faysal Al Husayni, another leader of the Palestinian team to the peace talks, said, "Members of hierarchical organizations have for some time stopped killing collaborators. However, small gangs operating outside such organizations continue to kill." Interviewer: Could you estimate how many of the killings are perpetrated by these gangs?" Al Husayni: "Most of them are perpetrated by unorganized men. Youngsters decide they belong to this or another organization; they act and then place responsibility for their actions on the organization." See "Abdel Shafi Urges End to Internicene Killing," *Jerusalem Israeli Television*, May 30, 1992, *FBIS-NES-92-106*, June 2, 1992, and "Al Husayni on Ending Killings," *Tel Aviv Ha'aretz*, June 1, 1992, *FBIS-NES-92-106*, June 2, 1992. Another sign of this--in the author's view--is the recent name changes many of the organizations have undergone. For example, the youths associated with Hamas now call themselves the Izadeen Qassem Brigades; those with the PLO, the Hawks; those with the PFLP, the Red Eagles, and another PLO-connected group which now goes by the name the Black Panthers. The names seem the sort adolescents would choose, strengthening the theory that they are, in fact, whole new outfits, with only the slightest tie to the original, "hierarchical" organizations.

67. There is also the matter of what a specifically political movement seeks to achieve. In the author's view the aim is to take power. It wants to displace the existing authority with an authority that it (i.e., the movement's leadership) controls. The Hamas cadres in Amman and Jerusalem certainly fit the description of dedicated political activists pursuing such a course. But the rock throwing youths? Those inside the Strip? Are they calculatedly working for the seizure of power, or are they merely responding to alarms, rioting to work off their frustrations?

68. Recently matters took a particularly troubling turn as there appeared to be a self-proclaimed Jewish Underground in operation. This was dedicated to combatting the Palestinians with vigilante action. See "Settlers Form 'Gun Squads' To Strike at Arabs," *Ma'ariv*, June 2, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-108-A*, June 8, 1993; "Shin Bet Believes Settlers Stealing Weapons From IDF," *Ma'ariv*, June 2, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-108-A*, June 8, 1993; "Police Minister Comments on Riots, Detainees," *Cairo, Al-Ahram*, December 1, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-234*, December 8, 1993; "Settlers' Pamphlet Encourages

Open Fire, Promises Legal Aid", *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, June 6, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-107*, June 7, 1993; "New Jewish Underground Reportedly Planning Attacks," *Hadashot*, June 4, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-106*, June 4, 1993; "Creation of 'Armed Jewish Police' Detailed," *Jerusalem Radio*, May 10, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-088*, May 10, 1993, and "Shin Bet, Army To Prevent New Jewish Underground," *Jerusalem Radio*, May 10, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-088*.

69. The media in the West, by-and-large, did not dispute the view of the Israeli authorities that the massacre was the work of a lone gunman. The author could find no one in the area who believed that. Disbelief was based on the conviction that the widely accepted figure of 29 persons dead inside the mosque was incorrect; the claim was that it was closer to 50. That being the case, it would have been physically impossible for a lone gunman to have killed so many without himself being overwhelmed by the crowd. The idea was that someone had to be there with him, supplying him with ammunition; someone who then withdrew as the situation inside the mosque became untenable.

70. Rabin, in a speech in December 1993, reminded his audience that Israel had one quarter the number of troops deployed along the Lebanese border that it had in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Also in 1993, the Israeli government expanded the budget for the Civil Administration, which handles civil affairs in the territories, by 315 percent over the previous year. The reader is also reminded that during this period the Israelis were also rounding up Arabs in Lebanon, and interning them, which added to the prison population. See "Rabin Addresses Newspaper Editors 8 Dec.," *Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el*, December 8, 1993, and "Civil Administration Budget Expanded by 315 Percent," *'AL HAMISHMAR*, April 13, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-069*.

71. Rabin also has to worry that, as the *intifadah* polarizes Israeli society, the major benefactor is the Likud Party, the opponents of Rabin's party of Labor. Likud is demanding harsh action, and this has a certain appeal for a population continually traumatized by events inside the Green Line.

72. The author regards the period between 1975 and 1982 as that of the Civil War. With the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Sixth Arab-Israeli War commences, and it ends in 1985.

73. There are also large concentrations of Shias in the Bekka Valley in the northeast of Lebanon and in Beirut.

74. An account of the circumstances leading up to this crisis can be found in George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980, pp. 494-495.

75. See Robert Fisk, *Pity the Poor Nation*, London: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 386. Fisk is not the only one to take this position. Patrick Seale is another. In his recent biography

of Syrian President Assad, he writes: "(Sharon) intended to instal Bashir Jumayil (sic) as president of Lebanon, a Maronite vassal who would sign a peace treaty with Israel." See Seale, *Asad*, (sic), Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988, p. 374. Also see *Washington Post* reporter Jonathan Randall's *Going All the Way*, New York, NY: The Viking Press 1983, p. 250.

76. The Maronites' close association with the French dates to the end of World War I when the victorious Allies carved up the empire of the defeated Ottomans, and France was instrumental in creating Lebanon as a largely Christian enclave dominated by the Maronite community. In 1958, Lebanon embraced the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the Maronite Christian President welcomed the dispatch of U.S. troops there to suppress an alleged communist takeover. For details on this see Lenczowski, p. 366. As for the Palestinians, it must be kept in mind that they are mostly Muslims, and therefore their presence in Lebanon threatened the Maronites' power position by weighting the Christian-Muslim balance even farther against the Christian side. At the time of the Civil War there were an estimated 200,000 Palestinians in Lebanon.

77. See Fisk, *Pity the Poor Nation*, p. 391; also Augustus Richard Norton *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon*, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987, pp. 96-97.

78. See Fisk, *Pity the Poor Nation*, pp. 228-229.

79. See *ibid.*, pp. 372, 333-334, 268, 205, 444-445. The Israelis lost about 500 soldiers in the whole Peace for Galilee Operation. Estimates of Lebanese dead run as high as 10,000. On the surface, therefore, it would appear to be a great victory for the Israelis. However, a significant portion of the Israeli public opposed the operation, and was shocked at the carnage, on both sides. In short, the Likud leaders were mindful that further casualties could bring down their government and so they had to find a way out. See Fisk, *Pity the Poor Nation*, pp. 270, 296.

80. Along with the Marine barracks bombing, they also blew up the American Embassy in Lebanon and, of course, they were principally responsible for seizing western (primarily American) hostages, which they held under brutal conditions for so many years.

81. See Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, Chapter 2, "The Sources of Meaning and Change among the Shi'a of Lebanon."

82. See *Ibid.*, pp. 45, 47.

83. Norton in *Amal and the Shi'a* does not give us figures for actual membership of the *Harakat*. However, he does discuss the issue of public support, and, in the process, makes some revealing comments about how movements like this one should be assessed. He says (p. 63), "In the south, as a result of the

absence of a well-integrated organization, the label 'Amal' (which we will discuss below) was sometimes free for the taking. For many Shi'a villagers, the movement's name was merely a synonym for any collective self-defense activity carried out in the village. . . . The name Amal was adopted, in at least a few cases, by local *shabab* (youths) who found it provided them and their activities a certain legitimacy that they could not otherwise have." This obviously relates to what we were discussing in the section on Hamas. It seems likely that many youths in Gaza claim Hamas membership when in fact they have no formal connection to that organization. There is another interesting aspect of this question (of the *Harakat's* growing influence in Lebanese politics). According to Norton, one of the first significant acts of Sadr's welfare program was to build a vocational school in the south at the cost of \$165,000. This begs the question, where did he get the money? Norton does not say, however he makes some interesting revelations which may relate to this. According to him, the *Harakat* was devilled throughout its history by two charges: one, that it was a creature of the Shah of Iran, and, two, that it worked closely with the security forces in Lebanon. Norton also says that at the time the *Harakat* was formed, the Communist Party in Lebanon was making significant inroads to the Shias. It is entirely possible that the Shah did put up funds to bankroll Sadr, with the aim of countering the Communists, and that the conservative (Maronite-dominated) government in Lebanon cooperated in this. This would be significant for the line that we are developing in the study. It would mean that both these movements (Hamas and Hizbollah) began as reactionary attempts to undercut the work of already established movements (the PLO in Israel; the Communists in Lebanon), and that both movements, after establishing themselves, went on to threaten the governments that had assisted in their creation. See Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, pp. 34-42.

84. Fisk, *Pity the Poor Nation*, p. 227.

85. See Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, p. 139.

86. The author in "Turkey and the United States in the Middle East: The Kurdish Connection" (Chapter 3 in *Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 1993), discusses Iran's involvement in Lebanon. His theory is that Iran and Syria saw the MNF as an arm of NATO, and feared that Israel and the United States were seeking to establish a Pax Americana whereby Washington would incorporate Lebanon into its sphere of influence. To head this off, Tehran and Damascus joined forces in defeating the operation.

87. See Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, p. 139.

88. Actually Berri did not do badly. He was made Speaker of Lebanon's Parliament.

89. See "Shelling Will Continue Until Rocket Attacks Stop," *The Washington Post*, July 30, 1993, and "Israeli Warplanes Pound Guerrillas," *The Washington Post*, July 26, 1993.

90. See "Israel Continues to Blast Villages in South Lebanon," *The New York Times*, July 28, 1993; "Israeli Offensive Draws Criticism," *The Washington Post*, July 29, 1993; "Israeli Campaign to Continue Until Rocket Attacks Stop," *The Washington Post*, July 30, 1993; "Israel Bombards Guerrilla Targets in Lebanon," *The Washington Post*, July 27, 1993, and "A blow for compromise and conciliation," *The Financial Times*, July 31, 1994.

91. *Ibid.*

92. For example *Ha'aretz*, commenting on the deteriorating security situation, says, ". . . the great difficulty faced by the Israeli defense establishment in the present wave of terrorism is that the identity of the gunmen and knife-wielders is not always clear as far as the political and organizational affiliation is concerned. In the past, when the PLO directed the 'armed struggle' against Israel, every terror attack had an address. There was always a Palestinian faction with a certain ideological or political orientation which took upon itself the responsibility, boasted about it, and gave out all the details. . . . Nowadays the situation has changed. A large <-%-2>proportion of the knife-wielders as well as those using firearms are not affiliated with any group or organization." <MI>Ha'aretz<D>, March 31, 1993, <MI>FBIS<D>-NES-93-061, April 1, 1993. Similarly, in an interview with <MI>Yedi'ot Aharonot,<D> Israel's head of army intelligence, MG Uri Sagi, was asked, "Where are the Hamas headquarters located?" His answer: "There is no hierarchical organization. The Hamas does not have one central command operating the squads at field level. The Hamas was clever enough to organize itself in a very decentralized manner. Even if there is some sort of leadership abroad, it is not in charge of the operational side." Specifically talking about the PLO, Sagi said: "The overseas PLO leadership is still the dominant body, which dictates the moves of the Palestinians wherever they may be, especially on the political level. There are institutions, people, a hierarchy, and decision-makers. For the time being, this is Arafat. At the same time, the PLO does not have absolute control over everything connected to the operational aspect in the area here. . . . The PLO can enflame spirits, but it cannot calm them down." "Army Intelligence Chief on Terrorism," <MI>Yedi'ot Aharonot<D>, April 5, 1993, <MI>FBIS<D>-NES-93-064, April 6, 1993. (The author would dispute Sagi's claim that Hamas "cleverly" arranged to decentralize. It would appear rather that this situation developed without intent on anyone's part.) Meanwhile, in Lebanon Israel is facing a much similar situation. Maj. Gen. Yitzhaq Mordekhay, commenting on the fight with Hizbollah, made the following observation--"In the past we had clear targets to strike, because the terrorists had bases, installations, and semimilitary networks which were established in the area. Today there is a Lebanese government and a Lebanese

Army which is in control of large areas of Lebanon, even if under the auspices of Syria, and with the assistance of other elements. There is a certain area left open between the area under Lebanese Army control and the security zone--we call this the grey zone. In this grey zone residents of south Lebanon live, and the Hizbollah squads come out of this population. The partial targets that we have are located within the villages, the casbahs, and the mosques. The terrorists behave as civilians for all intents and purposes and carry out a sort of guerrilla warfare of strike and run and of planting roadside bombs . . . "<%0> "Modekhay Comments on Security in South Lebanon," *Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el*, April 17, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-074*, April 20 1993.

93. For a discussion of this issue, see *Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt*. The author points out that the jihadists (and long before them, the original members of the Muslim Brotherhood), drew on the sayings of the Prophet to justify the practice of individual Muslims acting to oppose enemies of the faith. The issue is further discussed in Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969; also Robert Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth Century Egypt*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 200-204, and Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam*, London: Routledge, 1991, p. 44.

94. The same phenomenon can be interpreted psychologically. For example, in Mediterranean cultures males regard public space as peculiarly their own. Squares, main thoroughfares, these are areas of "male space." The Israelis, by refusing to allow the Palestinians to congregate on the thoroughfares or in the squares, are taking away a fundamental right, as the males see it. Further, by subjecting them to strict curfew, i.e., forcing them to remain at home, they are humiliating them, inasmuch as "home space" is female space. For a discussion of this see Robert C. Davis, *The War of the Fists*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 110; also *Political Islam*, Chapter 2, "The politics of sex and family, or the 'collectivity' of Islamic morality."

95. Israeli Maj. Gen. Matan Vilna'i, Southern Command commander, was asked about the knife-wielders in an interview with *Qol Yisra'el*. "As for the knife-wielders," he said, "these are people whose names do not appear on lists of suspects; they simply get up one morning and decide to kill Jews out of extremist motives." *Qol Yisra'el*, March 20, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-053*, March 22, 1993.

96. See "11 Dead in Bus Incident, Arab said Responsible" *IDF Radio*, July 6, 1989, *FBIS-NES-89-129*, July 7, 1989.

97. See "Arab 'Deliberately' Crashes Bus Into Cars," *IDF Radio*, January 4, 1991, *FBIS-NES-91-003*, January 4, 1991.

98. See *The Washington Post*, March 31, 1993, "Under Attack,

More Israelis are Angry and Armed," and "Two Killed, Seven Wounded in Aviv Attacks," *Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el*, March 1, 1993, *FBIS-NES-93-038*, March 1, 1993. For reporting on occurrences in Egypt and Algeria see *Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt*, and *Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism*.

99. In the West the term *jihad* is almost always translated as "holy war." In fact, as we stated above (see endnote 25), it means to "strive in the way of the faith." Thus, it can have a pacific connotation, in the sense of trying to be a better Muslim and to advance the cause of Islam. This is the what Arafat claimed he meant when he called upon Muslims to enroll in a *jihad* to reclaim Jerusalem. At the same time, it also has this other connotation of individuals performing violent acts in the belief that they are thereby promoting Islam. What is required, obviously, is a thorough investigation of the whole concept. However, for that one would have to explore the Arabic sources, and this is beyond the scope of the study. A good source in English is Ayubi's *Political Islam*. A word of warning, however; many of the Arabic materials, on examination, do not make a great deal of sense, at least to a Western audience. One has to consider that the potency of the appeal is diluted by being rendered in print. Its real power only comes through verbally. In this regard it would be interesting to know how many of the knife attacks occur after the Friday prayer sermon, when the *imams* have enflamed the worshipers against the authorities.

100. In Egypt, there has long been a pattern of stabbings and individual attacks on foreigners. It has been alleged that this is a strategy to harm the tourist industry. However, it is just as likely the Egyptians who perpetrate the assaults are trying to defend their territory against unwanted invasions. Most of the attacks have taken place in Asyut, an area of upper Egypt which has been more and more opened up to the tourists. As a result, the natives' lifestyle is under assault, and they in turn have reacted with violence. At the same time, in Algeria, the Armed Islamic Group has also adopted stabbing as a tactic. Most recently, in July radicals stole aboard an Italian freighter anchored in Algiers harbor and slit the throats of the entire crew.

101. See "21 Killed in Terrorist Bombing of Bus in Tel Aviv; 46 Wounded," *The New York Times*, October 20, 1994.

102. See "In Gaza, Palestinians are Now Yearning for Prosperity," *The New York Times*, July 24, 1994.

103. See "Muslim Militants Open Fire on Egyptian Train," *The New York Times*, February 20, 1994, in which the reporter discusses the trial of an Egyptian officer and two enlisted men who allegedly were plotting to kill Mubarak.

104. See "Americans on the Golan," *The New York Times*, November 30, 1993; "Christopher and the 'Big Banana,'" *The*

Washington Post, December 2, 1993; "Americans on the Golan," *The New York Times*, June 28, 1994; "U.S. Troops on the Golan? It Worked in Sinai," *The New York Times*, July 8, 1994; "Israel Seeks Stepped-Up Syria Talks," *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1994, and "U.S. Establishes a Peace-Keeping Policy," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 6, 1994.

105. For a discussion of Assad's health see Patrick Seale's *Asad*, p. 419.

106. See "Likud Leader Puts Accord in Doubt," *The New York Times*, January 5, 1994.

107. See "Christopher and the 'Big Banana,'" *The Washington Post*, December 2, 1993.

108. For some time Likud politicians have been advocating a so-called transfer of populations. This is a euphemism for driving the Palestinians out of Israel and the occupied territories into Jordan. See Don Peretz, *Intifada*, p. 31.

109. One of these states, if not the most important one of all, is Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, if the peace settlement is to work, Saudi Arabia must be willing to finance a good portion of the relief work which will have to be carried on.

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