From the Editor

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Recommended Citation
Robert H. Scales, Jr., explores the proposition that trust is far more important to success in coalition operations than doctrinal and materiel compatibility among participating states. He suggests that US regional commanders-in-chief need "geostrategic scouts" to serve as their eyes and ears, developing trust during peacetime with the armed forces of allied and friendly forces while steeping themselves in matters of direct concern to the shaping of US regional strategy.

P. H. Liotta and Anna Simons explore connections among kinship, religion, and politics in the Balkans. If there is to be stability in the region, they conclude, "NATO forces cannot leave Bosnia," raising the possibility of adding another open-ended peace operation to the list of those that are already decades old.

Max G. Manwaring describes and analyzes five key topics from after-action reviews of US involvement in the Balkans: doctrine, force protection, the meaning of a "total Army," the complexity of peace and stability operations, and ad hoc arrangements in strategic planning and coordination. The last topic has led to end-state confusion and to uncertainty about strategic objectives and the role of the military once the crisis abates.

Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood describe a relatively new process developed in response to concerns over ad hoc US responses to complex emergencies. The process is established by Presidential Decision Directive 56, which provides direction to the US interagency community for conducting certain kinds of interventions.

Glenn Bowens identifies the legal and strategic justification for US participation in peace operations and uses examples from UN and NATO involvement in the Balkans to illustrate the key features of such interventions. The article provides a comprehensive overview of issues that US commanders and staffs must understand if they are to comply with national and international law and policy while carrying out the mandate for a UN peace operation.

Ralph Peters suggests that successful states in the next century will have adapted the Clausewitzian trinity of "the state, its people, and the army" by replacing the last term with "information." States that remain intolerant of information beyond their power to control or manipulate, he concludes, will resort to "forcible exclusion of threatening information and the propagation of comforting myths," suppressing change that could, paradoxically, lead to free and prosperous societies.

Kurt E. Müller advocates greater participation by civil affairs planners to help prepare for and conduct interventions, including peace operations. Such a policy, he suggests, would provide strategic guidance to commanders "so that operations will shape [the] environment" for the transition from military control of an intervention to "achievable political end-states" in the crisis area.

Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore review organizational theory and the US interagency process in their effort to improve US civil-military coordination at the theater level. They conclude that an interagency team assigned to the headquarters of each regional commander-in-chief could enhance planning and execution of US interventions during complex emergencies.

James H. Wyllie identifies some "debilitating consequences" of NATO expansion, including the influence of Russia within the Alliance. He analyzes "contrary objectives" of the United States, the UK, Germany, and France, concluding that evolving national interests and the concessions believed essential while enlarging the Alliance may have jeopardized NATO's "traditional collective defense function of [maintaining] a zone of peace in West Europe."
Thomas Cooke evaluates NATO's efforts to transform a national concept for command and control--the joint task force--into an international variant known as the combined joint task force. Before proposing an alternative to the latter, he describes several obstacles to establishing and deploying an ad hoc headquarters (requiring hundreds of personnel from 16 [19] NATO nations) that could operate effectively outside of NATO's traditional area of interest.

Review Essays in this issue include Alan Cate's comparison of Gerald F. Linderman's The World Within War: America's Combat Experience in World War II with texts covering Vietnam and the 1990-91 Gulf War. Jonathan Shay also reviews Linderman's book, comparing it to a new translation of the Iliad and noting similarities in each text related to leader behavior and trust between leaders and led. Jeffrey Record looks at recent material on Vietnam, and Bonnie Jezior offers an annotated bibliography of materials related to the Army's force of 2020 and beyond, the Army After Next.

Connections . . .

Several articles in this issue refer to the need during an intervention to provide coordinated policy and resource guidance to the US regional commander-in-chief or to the commander of a US joint task force. None of the authors set out to examine the matter; each came to it in the course of other research.

Max Manwaring records key findings of two high-level after action reviews of US involvement in Bosnia, which concluded that "ad hoc arrangements in strategic planning and coordination" had posed serious problems to the deployed force. Kurt Müller looks at strategic planning by civil affairs specialists, remarking on the difficulties they encounter in shaping strategic guidance so that US military operations can foster conditions favorable to "achievable political end-states" in the intervention area. Mark Walsh and Mike Harwood examine Presidential Decision Directive 56, a recent attempt to clarify government requirements and standards for committing and sustaining expeditionary forces in certain kinds of peace operations, and Glenn Bowens includes PDD-56 as he establishes the legal and policy basis for US involvement in such operations.

Starting from the perspective of a regional commander, Gibbings et al. identify the problem to be information "stovepipes" between federal agencies in the US and the US country team responsible for the area in which a peace operation is occurring. They conclude that an interagency element should be permanently assigned within the headquarters of each US regional commander in chief to ensure that coordination would occur in the theater among responsible federal agencies before directives and resources were given to the US commander for execution. Sounds fanciful perhaps, but so did PDD-56 until it became policy . . . in the aftermath of our intervention in Somalia. -- JJM

Reviewed 6 November 1998. Please send comments or corrections to carl_Parameters@conus.army.mil