From the Editor

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From the Editor

In This Issue . . .

Ali Ahmad Jalali, the former Interior Minister of Afghanistan, provides a pessimistic assessment of progress in Afghanistan during the six years following the US-led invasion. The author warns that there is a real danger of Afghanistan sliding back into instability and chaos. He views the revitalization of the Taliban-led insurgency, record drug production, deterioration of the rule of law, and the ineffectiveness of the central government as signs the country may be facing challenges it is currently incapable of overcoming. Jalali then counters this negative assessment with examples of institutional, social, and economic achievements during the same period. The author concludes with a call for domestic, regional, and international actors to partner with the government of Afghanistan in revising and strengthening the Afghan National Development Strategy and Afghan National Security and Economic Council. He sincerely believes that this revitalization, combined with the creation of an international coordination mechanism, is necessary to form the framework for successful stability operations and a democratic future for Afghanistan.

Steven Metz provides the first of four articles examining the future of the insurgent strategy in the thematic presentation “Beyond Insurgency.” His “New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency” is an insightful review of the role that insurgencies have played throughout history and what the strategy portends for the future. The author develops his thesis based on the belief that America erred in its look back to the insurgencies of the twentieth century when formulating counterinsurgency doctrine following 9/11. Metz believes that the United States has once again used the lessons from old conflicts to derive new strategies; in essence, again preparing to fight the last war. He challenges the military and the defense analytical community to reexamine the lessons-learned from the insurgencies of the twenty-first century. The author believes the lessons of Somalia, Bosnia, Congo, and Sierra Leone are much more applicable to today’s strategic environment than those modeled on Vietnam and Algeria. Metz concludes that whether counterinsurgency operations remain a primary mission for the US military or not, we should never again fall into the intellectual trap of confronting new security challenges with outdated ideas and old strategies.

Alexander Alderson, an infantry officer in the British Army, presents our second article on the theme of insurgencies, with his insightful analysis of America’s latest counterinsurgency doctrine in “US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally’s Perspective.” The author notes that throughout history counterinsurgency operations have been viewed as an arduous business, entailing tremendous popular support, political resolve, and resources. Alderson believes that the recent publication of US Army Field Manual 3-24 and US Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 does, for the first time, provide a slight glimmer of hope and a
reasonable degree of tactical momentum for the way America attempts to counter insurgent threats. Utilizing his “ally’s perspective” the author reviews the process associated with the drafting of the new documents and their application in Iraq and Afghanistan. Alderson concludes “we are at a historic turning point in the evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine.” From an ally’s perspective, he believes the new doctrine reflects sound theory providing the doctrinal underpinning for successful counterinsurgency operations. He believes the new doctrine is to be commended not just for what it says, but for how it translates to effective operations in the field. “Strategic Realignment: Ends, Ways, and Means in Iraq” by Bruce J. Reider contends that America has overly simplified the conflict in Iraq by defining it primarily as an insurgency. The author utilizes Clausewitz’s relationship of ends, ways, and means, the “paradoxical trinity,” to analyze the current situation. He concludes that America needs to refocus its strategy beyond counterinsurgency operations to address the low-grade, civil war and terrorist activities that continue to contribute to instability. It is only through this rebalancing of ends, ways, and means that the United States can realize an acceptable political end-state; achievable within the means the nation is willing to expend, and the ways we as a nation support. Our final article in this thematic presentation is Mick Ryan’s “The Military and Reconstruction Operations.” The author paints a revealing picture of the missions Provincial Reconstruction Teams are undertaking in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of counterinsurgency operations. The convergence of military and non-military tasks is creating an ever-increasing demand for military forces to participate in the conduct of humanitarian missions in support of these operations. Ryan believes that in many cases, the effects of reconstruction activities are much more critical to the success of counterinsurgency campaigns than tactical operations. The author does not minimize the necessity for robust combat forces, but rather, emphasizes the requirement for the proper balance between kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities.

David Szabo investigates the risks associated with the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during any preemptive attack or first strike in “Disarming Rogues: Deterring First-Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The author bases his thesis on the potential for intra-conflict deterrence when one state confronts another believed to be in possession of WMD. Szabo believes it is critical that the United States develop a theoretical understanding of the strategies most likely to deter any first-use. The author uses a case study derived from the Persian Gulf crisis of 1991 to examine the possibilities associated with deterring WMD in an operational environment. He analyzes the works of several experts in the field of deterrent strategy to develop a theory of intra-conflict deterrence. The author concludes that the strategic location of several states believed to currently possess WMD makes it imperative that America be able to confront any possessor should they act aggressively; having an executable strategy is crucial to that capability.

In “Stabilization and Democratization: Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance” Zachary Selden presents an insider’s view of NATO’s future. Selden,
programmed to be the Deputy Secretary General for Policy of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in January 2008, reviews the alliance’s recent history focusing on events that have strained relationships between member states, particularly the United States and European nations. The author contrasts these detractors with the mutually supported stabilization and democratization missions currently being executed by the alliance to argue that it is in the best interest of both the United States and Europe to recast the transatlantic organization based on support for such missions. Selden analyzes various national capabilities that might be provided in support of long-term stabilization and democratization campaigns to conclude that even after 60 years the alliance is still the natural nexus between North America and Europe for planning and executing large-scale operations. He does advocate, however, that it is necessary to significantly modify NATO’s infrastructure to take advantage of national capabilities. The author suggests that it is only through this transformation that Europe and the United States will be able to successfully reforge the alliance on a more equal basis.

Our final article in this issue is a thoughtful analysis of the Just War tradition and the doctrine of moral equality. Carl Ceulemans’ “The Moral Equality of Combatants” examines the question currently being voiced by various philosophers and legal experts: “Can combatants ever be blamed for unjust wars, and if so, under what circumstances?” The author reviews a series of hypothetical scenarios to conclude that the moral equality of combatants is never an absolute. Blaming soldiers who fight in an unjust war initiated by a legitimate government does, however, raise a number of challenging ethical and moral issues. Ceulemans concludes that those who sit in judgment will find it difficult to question the moral equality of the soldier on the ground, but much easier to recognize the possible complicity of senior military leaders.

Our Review Essay feature highlights Eric Wester’s “Rethinking Morality in War,” an analysis of five recent books adding to the genre associated with the morality of conflict. Of special interest is the reviewer’s analysis of the ethical challenges associated with bridging the chasm between America’s religious traditions and eastern beliefs. Additionally, Wester examines several books focused on reconfiguring the Just War tradition to accommodate the ever-increasing moral responsibilities associated with the ethical conduct of war.