Book Reviews

Parameters Editors

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This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.
Richard Haass has written an illuminating book, although the light cast by War of Necessity, War of Choice differs from what the author likely intended. Currently the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Haass has for decades rotated in and out of government, rising to the level of senior functionary. This memoir focuses on two particular periods of service, the first during the administration of George H. W. Bush when Haass handled the Middle East portfolio for the National Security Council, the second during George W. Bush’s first term, when Haass presided over the State Department’s policy planning staff.

For Haass, the main event during Bush I’s tenure was the Iraq War of 1990-91. Under Bush II, the main event was the Iraq War that began in 2003 and still continues today. The first of these two conflicts, in Haass’s estimation, qualifies as a “good” war; the second—unnecessary, ill-advised, and grotesquely mismanaged—qualifies as anything but good. Here in a nutshell lies Haass’s thesis, which may possess some merit but falls well short of being revelatory.

A conviction that, as he puts it, “I had a significant role in shaping significant history” moved Haass to offer this memoir of these two wars. Yet the account he offers fails to sustain this claim, especially when it comes to Haass’s own role. He offers little evidence of having shaped policy or having personally affected crucial decisions. True, Haass sat in on Oval Office meetings, jetted around the world on diplomatic missions, and penned memos that passed across the desks of top-ranking officials. Whether or not things would have turned out differently absent such exertions is not at all clear. Unhappy with the policies that produced the second Iraq War, Haass’s wife chided him for being an “enabler.” As an assessment of her husband’s overall contribution to US foreign policy, the term is an apt one.

Haass describes his participation in these events as “quite a journey.” During the course of that journey, he “learned a great deal.” The reader hungers to share in that education. Yet the tidbits of learning offered up turn out to be thin and pedestrian. The author reveals no secrets and drops no bombshells. In bland, if serviceable, prose, Haass for the most part affirms what we already know from newspaper accounts and documentaries. Suspicions that the younger Bush never rendered a formal decision to invade Iraq—that “there was no meeting or set of meetings at which the pros and cons were debated,” with alternatives to war examined—are correct, he writes. The decision for war simply “happened. It was cumulative.” That the Bush Administration lunged into Iraq intent on “transforming not just a country but the region” as a whole—that serious strategic analysis had given way to a presidential hankering “to change the course of history”—is also true, according to Haass. That Condoleezza Rice was completely out of her depth as National Security Adviser; that in the rush for war Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld out-maneuvered the risk-averse State Department at every turn; that Rumsfeld, having
achieved the “effective silencing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” shaped the war plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom with one eye fixed on advancing his personal vision of military “transformation;” that the Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, a “clever, manipulative self-promoter,” seduced naïve Pentagon officials into embracing him as the George Washington of democratic Iraq; that the early weeks and months of the US occupation of Iraq amounted to amateur hour on the Euphrates: Sadly, all these too are true. But we hardly need Richard Haass to tell us any of these things.

History acquires value when it offers us fresh perspectives. On that score Haass’s memoir possesses negligible value. His assessment of the events that he witnessed is relentlessly conventional and devoid of imagination. Ironically, however, here is where his book achieves a sort of perverse significance, documenting the cramped and sterile mindset that defines the present-day American foreign policy establishment.

Committed to his good war/bad war dichotomy, Haass cannot bring himself to recognize that the two Iraq wars actually form parts of a single episode, with the ambiguous outcome of round one creating conditions from which round two emerged. Nor, seemingly, does Haass possess the capacity to place our Iraq misadventures in a larger historical and strategic context that might suggest that Bush I’s war was just as unnecessary as Bush II’s—both of them stemming at least in part from follies perpetrated by earlier administrations, all of them populated by people who would see Richard Haass as a kindred spirit.


The Sunday after 11 September 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney told the late Tim Russert on Meet the Press, “We will have to work the dark side . . . . A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies . . . . That’s the world these folks operate in. And, uh, so it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal . . . to achieve our objectives.”

Dick Cheney is rightly regarded as the most influential Vice President in American history. No previous Vice President had the policy and personnel clout that Cheney had in the George W. Bush White House, especially during Bush’s first term. Bush may have been “the decider,” but it was Cheney who mastered the details, framed the issues, vetted Cabinet and sub-Cabinet appointments, and, in alliance with his old sidekick, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, steered foreign policy novice George Bush into the greatest American strategic blunder since intervention in the Vietnam War. Quickly relegated to bystander status was National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, who always seemed more determined to mirror rather than shape Bush’s opinions. Unlike Secretary of State Colin Powell, she did not question the wisdom of the war or the bogus intelligence that justified it.

What made Cheney’s influence so pernicious was the combination of his profound panic over the 9/11 attacks (and the mysterious anthrax “attacks” in the follow-
ing month) and his absolutist view of presidential prerogatives. The attacks apparently unnerved Cheney to the point of his imagining Saddam Hussein to be undeterrible, an al Qaeda collaborator, and brimming with weapons of mass destruction. “I don’t know him anymore,” said Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser to George H. W. Bush. According to Lawrence Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff, “Cheney was traumatized by 9/11. The poor guy became paranoid.” Having underestimated the al Qaeda threat before 9/11, Cheney overcompensated; in the weeks following the attacks he traveled with a doctor as well as a duffel bag containing a gas mask and a biochemical survival suit.

If the attacks scared the wits out of Cheney, they also provided the opportunity to reestablish the “imperial” presidency first embraced by Richard Nixon, who famously said, “When the President does it, that means that it is not illegal.” Cheney believed the post-9/11 terrorist threat to the United States was so existential as to justify any means deemed necessary to prevent future attacks—including torture, unwarranted surveillance, arrest and detention without trial, and violation of congressional statutes and international treaties restricting the behavior of US military forces. He was also a firm believer in the unitary executive theory, which interprets the US Constitution’s Article II vesting of executive power in the President as granting the President complete control of the executive branch and its declared functions, including the use of force as commander-in-chief. For Cheney, in time of war there was no legitimate legislative or judicial check on presidential power. Simultaneously terrorized and emboldened by 9/11, Cheney and such legal extremists as Cheney’s chief of staff David Addington and the Justice Department’s John Yoo manipulated the White House into a massive overreaction that not only trampled the Constitution but also played into al Qaeda’s hands by lowering America’s moral standing in the world and converting Iraq into a recruiting and training ground for Islamist terrorism. (The US military diversion in Iraq also permitted the Taliban’s recovery in Afghanistan.)

All this and more are detailed in Jane Mayer’s *The Dark Side*. Mayer is a Washington-based staff writer for *The New Yorker* and best-selling author (*Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984-1988* and *Strange Justice: The Selling of Clarence Thomas*). Her book reveals, among other things, the personal reasons that drove Cheney to so many undisclosed locations after 9/11; the single-minded campaign, born in Cheney’s office, to legalize torture and empower the President to do virtually anything as commander-in-chief; US reliance on KGB methods of interrogation; the poor record of torture as a means of obtaining actionable intelligence; and how the White House granted itself the power to abduct anyone in the world and imprison them indefinitely.

*The Dark Side* is a gripping, meticulously researched, and deeply disturbing book that vindicates the observation of the great Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis that “the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” Mayer notes that the Bush Administration was repeatedly warned by experts in the military and the FBI as well as by loyal Republican lawyers inside the Administration that “the short-term benefits of its extralegal approach to fighting terrorism would have tragically destructive long-term consequences for both the rule of law and America’s interests in the world.” Instead of heeding this well-intentioned advice, the Administration “invoked the fear flowing from the [9/11] attacks” and “sanctioned coerced confessions, extrajudicial detention, and other violations of individuals’ liberties that had been prohibited since the country’s founding.”

Provoking governments to overreact is a common objective of terrorist organizations. If that was what al Qaeda sought to do on 9/11, it hit the jackpot.
This is the story of the longest serving and one of the more famous divisions in the American Army. The 1st Division has served continuously and fought in all our nation’s wars, except Korea, from World War I to the Persian Gulf. But this tome is more than a history of “The Big Red One.” It is a larger chronicle of the modern American Army in the twentieth century. In this book we find the exploits of soldiers ranging from private to the famous, such as George Marshall, Lesley McNair, Terry Allen, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., William DePuy, and Alexander Haig. So while it is a unit history in the traditional sense, the author examines the 1st Division’s achievements in the context of the political and strategic situation of the time.

To author this ambitious study, the Cantigny First Division Foundation and the McCormick Tribune Foundation selected a distinguished soldier and scholar, James “Scott” Wheeler. His flattering account of the nation’s most venerable division does not disappoint. As noted by Rick Atkinson on the book jacket, it is a “compelling yarn” written with a storyteller’s verve.

In May 1917, soon after US entry into WWI, the 1st Expeditionary Division was constituted from existing Regular Army units and transported to France the following month. The division was not only the first born and the first to Europe, but also the first to enter battle. Throughout the war, the 1st Division played a key role in all American offensives, serving more time in combat than any other division and suffering more than 21,000 casualties. The author carefully presents the unit’s weaknesses and failures but concludes that the 1st Division, primarily under the command of Generals Robert Bullard and Charles Summerall, paved the way in training and combat for General John Pershing’s American Expeditionary Forces. After the Armistice, the division led the American army of occupation across the Rhine and was the last US division to leave Germany in 1919. They had earned the nickname “Fighting First.”

With the same critical analysis, the author traces the unit’s accomplishments in the interwar period when it was one of the first divisions to convert to the “triangular” structure and the first to train for amphibious warfare. The Big Red One deployed to England in 1942 and conducted the first major American offensive against the Axis powers in North Africa. The division was also in the initial assault wave for Sicily in 1943 and Operation Overlord the following year. In Normandy, the 1st Division pushed farther inland than any other Allied division and broke through the gap in German lines created by Operation Cobra. Under the leadership of General Clarence Huebner, the 1st Division raced across France with Joe Collins’s VII Corps, breached the Siegfried Line, and captured Aachen, the first major German city taken by the Allies. The Big Red One slogged through the difficult fighting in the Hurtgen Forest, held the north shoulder in the Battle of the Bulge, and led the final offensive across Germany. For five years after World War II, the 1st Infantry Division was the only US combat division stationed in Germany and the first to “Gyroscope” back to the United States.

In 1965, the 1st ID was the first full Army division committed to combat in South Vietnam, where for the next five years it fought in the critical area between
Saigon and the Cambodian border. The author concludes that the division did not win every battle, but under the innovative leadership of men such as Generals Bill DePuy and Orwin Talbott, the 1st ID drove the Communists away from the population centers and played a major role in the successful pacification efforts from 1968 to 1970.

For the next two decades, the 1st ID was stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, and participated in numerous Reforger exercises to Germany, where one brigade and the Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division (Forward) were permanently stationed. In Operation Desert Storm, the Big Red One once again fought with VII Corps during the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s forces and the liberation of Kuwait.

Scott Wheeler’s study is an impressive presentation of the exploits of the Army’s first division. But it is not definitive, and by the author’s admission, is unfinished. Considering the scope of the work, this was perhaps inevitable. A revised edition will need to fill in some gaps and correct minor editorial missteps. The post-Desert Storm coverage will need to extend the division’s accomplishments in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

During this revision some of the difficult maps will require replacement and appendices added that provide division organizational diagrams for critical periods. Another useful appendix would list the tenures of all division and assistant division commanders. But most importantly, the same critical analysis of individual leaders, soldiers, and units that the author applies to the 1st Division in WWI needs to be applied to later periods and wars. The author is somewhat delicate in his evaluation of the division’s performance in places like the Kasserine Pass, Hurtgen Forest, and Vietnam.

Until we see a revision, The Big Red One will remain the standard for all division histories. It will hold the attention of not only past members of the division, but also those with an interest in twentieth-century American military history.


If the Queen gave Victoria Crosses to authors for courageous choices of subjects, Carlo D’Este would surely win one for writing a biography of the Prime Minister. William Manchester took two volumes to cover Churchill’s life through World War II. The “Churchill and . . .” books are legion. Author of three lasting books on World War II and biographer of Patton and Eisenhower, D’Este has served an apprenticeship that qualifies him as a serious student of Churchill’s wartime leadership. For depth Warlord does not replace the seven volumes by Randolph Churchill and Sir Martin Gilbert, but it certainly takes less campaigning.

A biographer’s challenge is to establish character and motivation, and subjects worth a book because of their historical importance are seldom simple studies. Just ask the biographers of Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Hitler, Mao Zedong, and Stalin. An author needs some high ground of interpretation, Freudian, Maslowian, Spockian, or whatever. D’Este decides that Churchill always saw himself as a military commander or politician-strategist like the Duke of Marlborough or the Duke of Wellington. Warlord is an apt title since Churchill was an anti-organization leader (much like Hitler and FDR) who never favored the rational side of conducting military operations. The list of
botched adventures that showed the Churchill touch is well-known: Gallipoli, Norway, Dieppe, Greece, Malaya, and Crete. As D’Este shows, Churchill could only be persuaded to accept sound professional military advice from generals whom he respected for secondary personal and military virtues, such as “Jumbo” Wilson and Harold Alexander. Another option was to be as eccentric and self-centered as the PM himself, a rare breed that included Alanbrooke, Montgomery, Harris, Mountbatten, and Wingate. Pity the “normal” senior officers such as Hugh Dowding, Hastings Ismay, John Dill, William Slim, George C. Marshall, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Churchill’s basic tool of mastery was not his constitutional position, unchallenged during the war, but his tireless hectoring, inexhaustible self-confidence, and sense of historic mission.

D’Este does not fall victim to Churchill’s selective charm and selective writing. Instead, he relies on the accounts of Churchill’s most intimate observers, many of whom the PM bullied or tried to. Warlord is not a book for Churchill lovers. For all his flaws, the PM held his job because no one else wanted it in 1940-42, and by 1943-44 Churchill and the British people saw victory ahead, thanks to the Soviet Union and the United States of America. As D’Este wisely observes, Churchill kept a vision of Allied triumph alive when rational men thought otherwise. The author also wisely discounts Western Front post-traumatic stress disorder as Churchill’s driving strategic motivation. The real Churchill was far more bloody-minded than his admirers admit, and he could be as risk-insensitive as Adolf Hitler. Fortunately, Great Britain was not a nation of sycophantic generals.

D’Este will, no doubt, be set upon by British historians, who will argue that an American cannot possibly understand the social, political, and military culture that produced Winston Churchill. Perhaps. Great Britain, however, has a history of being saved by eccentric rebels in a time of crisis. Was Churchill more improbable than David Lloyd George or the Pitts? The paradox of Churchill’s life is that the times found the right man because he was rooted in Britain’s pre-industrial, romantic, imperial past, not the centuries in which he lived.

D’Este’s brave attempt to find the real Churchill in Warlord is a major contribution to the PM’s literary legacy. Since D’Este focuses on Churchill’s relations with his generals, air marshals, and admirals, Warlord has a worthy complement in Raymond Callahan, Churchill and His Generals. Neither book will be the final word on Churchill the Warlord, but for now they are the best studies, with Warlord holding a slight edge due to D’Este’s analysis of Churchill’s prewar experience. The air of mystery and wonder that hangs around Churchill like the PM’s cigar smoke remains intact.


Anyone reading or hearing contemporary discussions on strategy can readily understand the need for this book. As Colin Gray observes, students of strategic studies know too little history while the historians and political scientists know too little about strategy. One need only attend an academic convention to be persuaded of the truth of this melancholy observation. Therefore, this book fills a need, and one hopes that
it and successor attempts at melding history and strategic studies will be thoroughly introduced to the academic and military arenas.

As readers of Gray’s earlier works might readily expect, this book bears all the hallmarks of his labors in the field: immense erudition, an appealing and no-nonsense style which pulls no punches and does not equivocate, and a strong authorial voice. As with Gray’s previous works, it takes an unabashedly Clausewitzian or slightly amended Clausewitzian point of view with regard to strategy; the use or threat of force for achieving the ends of policy, as one of its main theses. It focuses on the great transformative wars of the modern epoch: the French Revolutionary or Napoleonic wars, World War I, and World War II. Gray insists on the importance of major wars as transformative events in world history. Throughout the book the author highlights three major themes. The first is what he calls the rich interplay between strategic continuity and discontinuity, i.e., what does and does not change. Second comes the relationship between politics and war; this is where Gray insists that war is and must be fought for political ends. As he notes, when states, the United States being among them, insist that they are not fighting for mere “political” objectives, they are suffering from a strategic deficit. The third and final thesis is the difference between waging war, which essentially is the tactical warfighting side of the business, and warfare entailing the strategic conduct of the war. For example, General George Washington, though not unduly gifted at waging war, was outstanding at warfare.

Based on this framework, Gray examines the nature of strategy, Clausewitz’s thoughts on strategy (which serve as the foundation of the author’s point of view), and strategic history since 1789. Throughout the book there are Gray’s usual and customary insights, often debunking myths that surround the historiography of leaders of various armies or the wars in the modern epoch. The author’s discussions and clarity of thought and expression make this work ideal as a textbook for introducing civilian students and prospective military officers of the various military academies to the subject. The reviewer would hope that it will not be Gray’s final words on the subject because there are a number of areas that could be more fully addressed.

As Gray’s colleague Jeremy Black has repeatedly shown us, strategic history should not be confined solely to the study of major wars in European history, no matter how consequential they may have been. Gray’s discussion of what he calls irregular warfare is one such chapter, although somewhat cursory. He addresses the subject in greater detail in his 1999 work, Modern Strategy. But the fact remains, there is a rich body of historiography addressing the strategic importance of the colonial wars waged by Europeans and Americans during the last 300 years that needs to receive greater analysis. This applies to America’s Civil War, which receives little mention in the book despite its significance for the conduct of modern war. Readers need to remember that the Middle Eastern theater in World War I, the Chinese civil wars, the Algerian conflict, the Arab-Israeli wars, and contemporary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan contain considerable lessons for any study of strategic history. They deserve greater analysis than the author accords them in this book.

The same caveat applies to the question of modern technologies and warfare. Again, the author has written masterfully on the subject, but not in sufficient detail. While this reviewer may share Gray’s skepticism regarding the Revolution in Military Affairs, in a book written as a primer for those who may not have made their minds up on the question, it needs to be presented and analyzed in much greater depth than is the case with this book. For these reasons alone there is room for other authors to
follow the path blazed by Colin Gray in *War, Peace, and International Relations*. This reviewer hopes that the author’s positive achievement in this work will stimulate others even if and when they disagree with him. It is only through such endeavors that true learning with regard to strategy can proceed.


I was excited to be asked to review this book. It is an interesting subject, and one covered only peripherally in typical military history texts—usually as necessary background material to introduce the Greek, Macedonian, or Roman enemy. An entire book on the military history of ancient Persia promised to be both valuable and intriguing. *Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War* fulfilled some of these expectations but left others unsatisfied.

A good starting point is to clarify what Dr. Farrokh means by Persia or Persian. As is common in modern usage, he uses the terms interchangeably with Iran or Iranian, but in almost all cases he uses Iranian to refer not to a geographic or political entity centered on the Iranian plateau, but to a linguistic and cultural heritage. He starts his story with the Indo-Aryan culture from which the Iranian (Persian, Mede, Saka or Scythian, Alan, etc.) culture split off. Dr. Farrokh then traces an essentially continuous Iranian and Persian dominance over a variable area that included at different times and to differing degrees of control parts or all of modern Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Turkey, Greece, Georgia, Egypt, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and much of Eurasia and the eastern and southern rim of the Arabian Peninsula. By so doing, he addresses the entire span of Persian history—from preliminary background material on Neolithic times to the destruction of the Sassanian Empire by the Arab Muslims in 651 A.D. This expansive definition contrasts with more traditional approaches such as Lindsay Allen’s 2005 work, *The Persian Empire*, which limited itself to the Achaemenid period—roughly 550 to 330 B.C. Thus, Dr. Farrokh’s subject is conceptually both gigantic and inclusive.

Overall, three things stand out about *Shadows in the Desert*. First, it is a good basic book for the historian. Because of its broad scope, depth is necessarily limited. If readers are interested in the details of any specific battle or military theme, they probably will be disappointed. This is equally true regarding any other specific aspect of ancient Persian history, culture, religion, etc. For those seeking a broad survey of ancient Persian political and military history, however, this book is a good source. Like all historical texts but especially evident with works on the ancient period where the problem is most severe, the availability and reliability of sources limit the author’s possibilities. For example, the entire story of Darius III’s epic and eventually unsuccessful struggle against Alexander the Great is covered in 15 pages (of which three are pictures). The majority of the sources Dr. Farrokh used for that section are from Macedonian or later western periods rather than Persian. That reflects the realities of the lack of evidence and sources, not poor scholarship.

The author’s specialty is Sassanian heavy cavalry, so the book is best as two factors converge: Persian sources become more plentiful, and the story reaches the
Sassanian period. This logical and normal aspect of scholarship means the book improves as it progresses.

Finally, this reviewer was struck by how defensive Dr. Farrokh appeared to be concerning Iran. The subtitle of the book, *Ancient Persia at War*, is almost deceptive. One gets the sense the author is more interested in how Iranian and Persian culture, art, religion, and architecture spread and influenced the rest of the world than in Persian military history. For example, there is a discussion about how Iranian culture spread through the Alans to the Celts and eventually influenced English Arthurian legends. I have no idea about the validity of that argument, but it has little significance for a book on Persia at war. That portion of the book was a fairly short discourse, but it is not an isolated case. The entire last chapter is on the Persian influence on their Arab conquerors’ science, art, and culture, and thus their influence on the entire Muslim world. While very interesting, it is a huge digression from the advertised thesis of the book. Similarly, there are frequent discussions of Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, and Manichaeism, and their interaction with Christianity and Judaism. Again, interesting but extraneous material. In another example, Dr. Farrokh claims some degree of Persian influence on most European depictions of dragons. While there certainly may be some truth to this claim, it has nothing to do with the Persian military. Conversely, some militarily significant aspects of Persian culture such as the development of feudalism and the Pahlavan (knighthly) tradition receive scant (about a page) attention. The treatment of military architecture is superficial, and coverage of military organization, institutions, and logistics is spotty at best.

As to technical issues, the book is well-illustrated with hundreds of color pictures; in that sense, it is almost a “coffee table-book” in standard book size. It is, however, inadequately supported by maps. Even knowledgeable readers will get lost in the names of ancient places that are not on a map in the book. The maps that are provided show the Persian Empire at various stages of development with little detail. Overall, the book is a useful overview, but depending on his need, the military historian may wish to look elsewhere.

**Borrowed Soldiers: Americans under British Command, 1918.**

Having read an earlier version of this book in draft and reacting with enough reservations to expect the author to be an enemy for life, this reviewer now has to say that Mitchell Yockelson has provided a highly competent piece of work that belongs in every World War I historian’s library. It has a place as well in the libraries of those who, not too many years ago, were shouting that Americans never have and never will serve under the command of foreigners.

Yockelson’s conclusions are an appropriate, well-balanced, and supported critique of comparative inadequacies in the operations and sustainment of purely American forces operating under purely American command. As John Eisenhower notes in the Foreword, American soldiers serving in the 27th and 30th Divisions were routinely better fed than their counterparts in the American Expeditionary
Forces serving in the 1st American Army, but they were not without their complaints. Americans are coffee drinkers; Englishmen drink tea. Englishmen eat light breakfasts; Americans prefer ham, eggs, toast, etc.—and if you look at the typical menu for American soldiers, you have to wonder where breakfast and lunch divide. This culinary cultural difference was an enormous irritant to the Americans serving with the British forces, but, as Yockelson points out, one that was overcome.

The undercurrent in this book returns in various forms to the ahistorical posturing noted above, which forms the title—*Borrowed Soldiers*. When the United States entered the war, both the French and British made strong appeals for US manpower to be integrated into their armies. Americans are seriously touchy on such matters, and the French were quick to sense that the American government and people were simply not going to allow foreign command and quickly changed their approach. The British were not so perceptive. After all, weren’t “we” all of Anglo-Saxon origin? As Stephen L. Harris makes abundantly clear in *Duffy’s War: Fr. Francis Duffy, Wild Bill Donovan, and the Irish Fighting 69th in World War I*, “we” were anything but, and Irish-Americans were seriously ambivalent about fighting with the hated British under any circumstances. As the war ground on through the remainder of 1917, both the British and French returned to the entirely logical argument that the American Expeditionary Forces lacked the experience, in their hugely expanded structure and particularly in their greatly increased staffs, to manage effectively. But General Pershing had a mandate from President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker to create a uniquely American Army. There were political reasons beneath the mandate, but Pershing was not about to deviate substantially from it and only reluctantly permitted these two divisions to remain under British command.

It was refreshing to read Charles Messenger’s abridged version of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg’s *The Great War* in which the old Field Marshal noted that the prewar Americans could become a problem, that Europe’s diplomats erred by allowing them to become a potential problem, and finally that matters should have been brought to a conclusion before the Americans arrived, as they had indeed become a problem. Yockelson relates that Field Marshal Haig wished he had more US forces and was privately bitter when Pershing reclaimed the divisions then training with the British, excepting the 27th and 30th.

All of this is relatively good reading, but when the narrative begins to describe the actual conduct of operations, many of the same ills that bedeviled American forces in WWI emerge with depressing familiarity. Training, even under British supervision with all the accumulated expertise of years of trench warfare, cannot “take” in a short time. Offensive operations, which the Allied armies were obliged to undertake, required extensive coordination of all arms, excellent small-unit leadership, and ingrained initiative and imagination. Pershing condemned the British and French instruction in trench warfare tactics because he felt it sapped the initiative of Americans, especially the officers. It is an unhappy fact that many American unit histories of this period report initial successes in combat followed shortly thereafter by sharp withdrawals. The 27th and 30th Divisions’ baptism under fire was not any more successful, as chaos was combined with a very able enemy that had just stymied the advances of some rather good British units. In the end, however, the American divisions improved markedly.

In addition to exceptionally thorough research of a number of primary sources, abetted by the fact Yockelson works at the National Archives, one of the more delightful aspects of this book is the maps. The supporting maps are clean of clutter.
and clearly depict the essentials of ground, boundaries, and unit organizations. The photography collection is likewise a well-chosen set of illustrative shots. Buy and read Borrowed Soldiers, or at least read it.

Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century.  
Reviewed by Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, a Fellow with the Center for Advanced Defense Studies and a member of the Royal United Services Institute. His latest book is Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War.

Terror and Consent offers unique and topical insight about this protracted and unorthodox conflict with no single name. The book represents excellent scholarship at the intersection of history, strategy, and law. To be sure, Philip Bobbitt is well-qualified to write such an analysis of this perennial war as he is the Herbert Wechsler Professor of Federal Jurisprudence and the Director of the Center for National Security at Columbia University. His curriculum vitae includes many years of US government service in key positions, including associate counsel to the President, legal counsel to the Senate Select Committee on the Iran-Contra Affair, and senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council. His previous book, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History, was an outstanding historical study of the confluence of strategy and law as manifested during what Bobbitt frames as epochal wars, beginning with the Thirty Years’ War and concluding at the beginning of the war on terrorism. In essence, Terror and Consent is a sequel to The Shield of Achilles. Both are commendable works and should be on the reading lists of strategists, scholars, and senior leaders as they represent extremely useful perspectives on this long irregular war of the twenty-first century.

Terror and Consent examines the threefold interaction of the changing nature of terrorism, the mounting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the increasing vulnerability of the infrastructure of developed states. The author postulates that these three factors are the consequences of the interplay between the constitutional and international change that characterizes the twenty-first century.

This book is comprised of three main parts that examine these factors. The first part explores the idea of a “war against terror” and includes an analysis of the war our enemies wage against the West with complete disregard for the law of war. The second part examines how strategy and law intersect within the domestic political arena. This portion of the book also includes a comprehensive analysis of how American and United Kingdom government bureaucracies and processes still engender impediments and seams that preclude the optimum actualization of intelligence. In other words, we are still prisoners of programs and processes that, for the most part, remain wedded to the last century. The third portion of the work elucidates the nexus of strategy and moral rectitude in the international area. This part includes a chapter that amplifies the imperative of legitimacy in the context of prosecuting a war. It is really about whose ideas will animate and underpin the international community. This last segment and the conclusion are pertinent for any assessment of what many perceive as a long war of ideas, due mainly to its emphasis on the centrality of moral and legal rectitude in time.
of conflict that witnesses states of consent facing off against nonstates of nonconsent. The latter promote dogma and theocracy in lieu of sovereignty and secularism.

In *Terror and Consent*, the author observes with perspicacity that “it is becoming increasingly apparent that al Qaeda is not only a reaction to globalization, but that it is a manifestation and exploitation of globalization” and that “this looming intersection of an innovative organization and a novel means of terror will require a fundamental rethinking of conventional doctrines in international security and foreign policy.” The same factors that facilitate the evolution of nation-states into market states devoted to maximizing the opportunity of individuals also permit the evolution of terrorism by increasing the vulnerabilities of democratic societies, thereby jeopardizing the notion of consent as the key component of state legitimacy. With the emergence of al Qaeda and the accelerated internationalization of terrorist networks, Bobbitt posits that terrorism has “become the extension of diplomacy by other means.” The author also notes, as have others, that counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are now conflated. In this sense, al Qaeda and its affiliated movements are orchestrating a revolution within a revolution because they perpetrate acts of terror to foment insurrection and overthrow the regimes of near enemies, while at the same time they undermine the Westphalian system of states and the United States, the de facto leader of the system.

Bobbitt ultimately prescribes a strategy of “preclusion” whereby the United States and like-minded allies would apply a full range of military and nonmilitary instruments “to preclude hostile acts and the development of capabilities in hostile hands.” Such capabilities once acquired are unlikely to be voluntarily surrendered and are more likely to be employed against the populations of America and its partners. He advises that the central doctrine for states of consent and legitimacy should be “preclusion,” the aim of which is to protect civilians and their duly elected or appointed officials, so that “the political development of governance based on consent can take place outside a climate of terror.” This doctrine of preclusion will stress the tenets of moral rectitude, credibility, and the protection of civilians. The author’s perspective on protecting civilians is a broad one that encompasses the protection of civilian populations around the globe that may be subject to threats by terrorists, WMD, natural catastrophes, and even actions that any government may undertake that are inconsistent with domestic and international law. In the end, one of the real risks that Bobbitt consistently accentuates in this excellent book is the possibility that the democratic states of consent will change into states of terror by reacting to terrorist attacks in such a manner as to violate their own constitutions and political cultures.


Long before the events of 9/11 and the realization of the general depths of American ignorance with regard to Islam, John Kelsay of Florida State University was laboring away on Islamic thought regarding the conduct of war. In 1993, he published *Islam and War: A Case Study in Comparative Ethics*, one of the first and clearest expositions ever to compare Islamic thought about just war with the dominant European, Christian, and international law models familiar to American scholars and lawyers.
In this new work, Kelsay provides a clear and essential contribution to deepening our understanding of the intra-Islamic conversation. He opens the book with quotations from President Bush that “Islam is peace” and by the Rev. Franklin Graham that “[Islam] is a very evil and wicked religion.” Clearly, if these characterizations were to set the frame of our national conversation about these issues, little clarity indeed would arise.

The author proceeds to review the whole of Islamic history from the Prophet Mohammed forward to identify themes, events, and narratives that set the terms for Islamic conversations about the legitimate use of military force. From its origin, Islam was a religious movement and a political entity, with the Prophet both a religious and apolitical leader; necessarily the interaction between various elements of the tradition have always been complex. Kelsay skillfully leads the reader through an analysis of the reasoning process which Muslim scholars engage in the ongoing interpretation of the meaning and guidance of Islamic law. He notes the diversity of the tradition and the range of possible interpretations.

There is one central issue that cannot be avoided, and Kelsay takes it on squarely: From the beginning Islam saw itself not only as a religio-political force but also as the successful and dominant one. Nothing in that early history provided guidance for, let alone acceptance of, a status as a subordinate or even co-equal member of a pluralistic society. So there is a real basis in the tradition for various Islamic movements to attempt to restore that superior status, even on the part of groups and thinkers who do not endorse al Qaeda’s violent and indiscriminate means.

Classically, interpretation of Islamic law was thought to reside in a recognized community of the “learned” (‘ulama), but the spread of literacy and the forces of the information age are breaking down that system of authority in Islam, just as they are in all other areas of life in modernity. Kelsay’s embrace of this point moves his analysis beyond the often “true but irrelevant” observation that some of the more radical interpretations of Islam offered by al Qaeda and similar movements are at variance with that notionally authoritative tradition. In the modern age, virtually anyone can offer his or her own interpretation of the “real” meaning of a tradition and, if it is accepted by enough adherents, it becomes de facto at least a part of what the tradition now means.

So the real struggle is an intellectual one within the Islamic tradition regarding what it does mean. Kelsay reviews the arguments of a number of Islamic reformers who are attempting to reinterpret Islam in such a manner as to make it more compatible with pluralist democracy and equal human rights for all regardless of religious affiliation, etc. In other words, to give Islam an intellectual basis for making its peace with the modern world, at least as the West understand it. And even those reformers, he points out, draw attention to the number of ways in which we are pursuing “the war on terror” exacerbates rather than addresses the legitimate concerns of the Islamic world.

But, Kelsay notes, all the voices calling for such reinterpretation live and work outside the Islamic world, and those who have attempted similar arguments from within predominately Muslim societies have not fared well. Will these new voices be successful in persuading a significant fraction of their co-religionists to accept such interpretations? Obviously, from the perspective of the United States and western nations, that is an outcome devoutly to be hoped for, but hardly one to be assumed.

One of the more interesting sections in the latter portion of the book offers an analysis of Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s open letter to President Bush—something widely held up to derision in our press and public. Kelsay, by contrast, takes it seri-
ously and offers a thoughtful exegesis of the document. This effort also powerfully illustrates that we fail to “get inside the head” of our opponents at great peril.

Kelsay’s volume is perhaps the single best introduction for those wanting to learn to think in Islamic terms about war, peace, violence, and terrorism. It is essential reading for anyone who wants to truly understand how this discussion is usually framed in our national conversation. Objectively understanding how these issues are framed by Muslims is the first step to grasping the problem. In the author’s discussion of the criticisms of current policies offered by “Islamic democrats,” such an understanding is essential to policy formulation if there is to be any hope of crafting realistic courses of action that, at a minimum, do not make our relations with the Islamic world even worse.


Kenneth Moss makes it clear in his work, Undeclared War and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy, that with respect to war powers, the President has become far too powerful and the Congress has not upheld their constitutional responsibility to limit these powers. The author takes the reader on a constitutional, definitional, and historical journey to drive home his point that something must be done to restore a measure of balance between these two branches of the United States Government.

Moss starts by addressing the issue of legal authority. Who, according to the Constitution, has the authority to commit the armed forces of the United States into conflict? Moss’s research shows that the answer to this question was intentionally kept nebulous by the Founding Fathers because of their fear of centralizing power in the hands of either branch of the government. The Constitution does not clearly define what it means to be commander-in-chief, nor does it delineate the authority vested in the Congress. Moss argues quite effectively that the intent of the founders was to increase accountability. Not only to ensure there are checks and balances between branches but, more importantly, to increase the exposure to public scrutiny. While Congress initially reigned supreme, time has resulted in the ascendancy of the Executive branch as the “decider” over how and when to employ force in pursuit of national interests.

The author next lays out a truly exhaustive account of this change of responsibility between Congress and the President. The first challenge to the Founding Fathers’ hopes that the United States not be embroiled in offensive war with external enemies, and how to deal with the idea of limited war, came in the form of a “quasi-war” with France in the late 1790s. America’s declaration of neutrality angered France who responded by capturing American trading vessels. President John Adams drafted a declaration of war he intended to present to Congress but did not, allowing Congress to fulfill their role related to the use of force. This resulted in a “half-war” in which American naval vessels and privateers captured French vessels close to American shores, without a formal declaration of war. This experience established Congress’s prominence in deciding when, where, and how the United States would use force; however, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this power gradually eroded.
By the end of World War II, it was clear that presidential war powers had eclipsed those of the Congress. The nature of the Cold War meant the United States had to find alternative means of achieving national interests, and often the option chosen was limited warfare. While Congress did not sit idly by (the 1973 War Powers Resolution was an attempt to reassert congressional authority), presidential powers continued to be solidified through the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks, and the invasion of Iraq. The reliance on limited war was a result of a number of diverse events. The totality of war experienced during the two World Wars caused states to realize that perhaps total war was not the preferred path and that there might be an alternative. Limited war provided that alternative and permitted a President to influence world events in a manner consistent with how the office’s responsibility was viewed.

Moss asserts that the struggle between the branches of government over assertion of war powers will continue in the future based on a variety of factors. Military special operations forces, covert operations, private military companies, and the desire to leverage information to reduce casualties all present challenges to congressional accountability. Not satisfied to simply present these issues, the author outlines a series of steps that may be implemented to reestablish the predominance of Congress in the decisionmaking process. While he acknowledges the difficulty of this task—especially faced with a guaranteed presidential veto of any legislation increasing congressional powers—Moss argues strongly that if adhered to, his recommendations could improve the current system and restore a sense of balance.

There is no argument that this book is worthwhile and relevant to senior members of our defense community. Our commitment to the Constitution requires all Americans to understand the development of the relationship between the Congress and the President. It also entails an understanding of the challenges Moss outlines for the nation when considering the use of military force. Moss points out that the evolution of the relationship between the Congress and the President has made it easier to employ military forces.

Undeclared War is not to be devoured by the novice in the study of war powers and foreign policy. Moss’s writing is dense and packed with facts, quotes, and references that require careful note-taking to fully appreciate and comprehend. Scholars and others vested in the field will find the author’s work to be invaluable. Full of historical references and supported by more than 40 pages of footnotes, this book is a treasure trove of research material.


Michael Neiberg’s The Second Battle of the Marne is a refreshing monographic study of an often-neglected battle near the end of an equally overlooked conflict. Good Great War studies are a rarity, and English-language studies of this six-week turning point have been even rarer. The author fills these voids on both counts.

Neiberg skillfully sets the Second Marne operations within the dual contexts of the Great War at large and the course of that war as it neared its eventual conclusion. National perspectives of the Allied nations (France, the United States, Great Britain,
and, by this time, Italy), and the pertinent Central Powers (Austria-Hungary and Germany) are thoughtfully examined through the lens of their respective political leaders and field commanders.

The author explains the presidential mandate under which the Americans operated, as a manifestation of President Woodrow Wilson’s “desire to stand apart from his European allies” by establishing an American-only command. While field commander General John Pershing did his best to implement the commander-in-chief’s wishes, he and his superiors in Washington readily saw the futility of untried American troops in the field in the face of the latest German offensive. They agreed to insert American divisions into the British sector under British control and into French corps and armies to face the anticipated all-out German assault on the Marne.

Of particular utility to current leaders is the author’s analysis of the French senior leadership, most notably Marshal Ferdinand Foch. As supreme Allied commander, he successfully unified the diverse methods, heritages, and interests of American and British forces with those of his own nation, to deliver a decisive blow against the Ludendorff offensives of 1918. Neiberg mined published and unpublished French accounts to introduce the reader to the embattled ally at every level, from the supreme field command down to the men in the ranks and their civilian counterparts. President Georges Clemenceau rallied the populace with an inspirational speech on 4 June; the Allies were successful against the German offensive at Noyon-Montdidier from 9 to 11 June; and American forces attacked at Belleau Wood throughout the entire month. During this period, Foch worked to amalgamate the components of his subordinate elements, including some dissent against his advocacy of the offensive within his own French high command, into a fighting force capable of a counteroffensive.

The nature of the beast virtually demands a battle history be contained in a detailed recount of combat operations, not always a page-turner for either the sophisticated or the casual reader. The author navigates these waters masterfully, combining the detail of combat operations within his contextual framework in a fashion that encourages the reader to complete the book rather than close its covers in frustration due to the overwhelming and painful detail. Neiberg devotes four of his eight chapters to the actual battle, using a combination of British, American, French, German, and Italian sources for his succinct yet vivid description of actions and their implications for the overall campaign. By 3 September, “A relative calm descended over the Aisne-Marne region, and within just over two months the war would be over. The Allied counterstroke on the Marne had made possible something few on the Allied side even dared to dream in early July: the end of the war in 1918.” Foch had managed to turn the offensive into an Allied initiative.

Despite its stellar presentation of the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of the Second Marne battle, this volume does have two shortcomings. Its maps are extremely generic, failing to offer the reader either contextual or tactical details at the same level as the written text. Neither is the index as detailed as one would like in an academic publication. Whether the author’s doing, or that of an editor seeking to alienate the casual reader (or a publisher interested in production costs), these shortfalls do compromise an otherwise stellar offering.

This reviewer’s complaints notwithstanding, Neiberg’s work may well stand as the seminal English-language study of the pivotal action that, for the first time on the Western Front, simultaneously included forces of all major belligerents on the battlefield. The Second Battle of the Marne turned the tide of Western Front operations
in favor of the Allies, introduced American troops onto the battlefield in substantive numbers, steeled French resolve to seek a victorious conclusion to the war, and introduced the German psyche to the reality of defeat. Neiberg’s *Second Marne* should stimulate debate and discourse on the viability of Great War studies as a pathway to understanding the creation and sustainment of successful alliances, as well as encourage additional scholarship and study of a time period that has such great bearing on the current world situation.


*The Pentagon* is simply one of the best books I have read in a long time. This is the fascinating story of the design, construction, and life of one of the most recognizable buildings in the world. But *The Pentagon* is more than just a history of an iconic building. It is a tale of brilliant, if flawed, leadership, close cooperation between industry and government, innovative project management and construction techniques, a host of fascinating personalities, and a brief history of the defense establishment of the United States since 1941. Journalist Steve Vogel is uniquely qualified to tell this intriguing story. As a long-time reporter for the *Army Times* and *The Washington Post*, he understands the military and the military culture.

The hero of the book is Brigadier General Brehon B. Somervell, and not, as many readers will probably assume, Colonel Leslie R. Groves, who would go on to fame as the head of the Manhattan Project. Somervell was chief of the Army’s construction division and the driving force behind the design and construction of the building. It was only Somervell’s vision and dynamic personality that ensured that the Pentagon would be built. Groves, one of Somervell’s talented subordinates, was critically important as the officer Somervell hand-picked to oversee the Pentagon’s construction. But the true father of the Pentagon, as Vogel carefully demonstrates, was clearly Somervell.

When World War II began in Europe, the War Department was bursting at the seams in a “temporary” Great War-era building on the National Mall. Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson declared that the department’s need for more office space “has become one of the greatest urgency.” Enter Somervell. While some officials wanted to build a series of temporary buildings for the duration of the emergency, Somervell was thinking big. He envisioned “a building big enough to house the entire War Department—a nerve center for the enormous military force gathering to fight a total war.”

Once he got the go-ahead, Somervell tasked his talented staff on a Friday afternoon to come up with preliminary plans and a suitable construction site by Monday morning, a scenario familiar to generations of officers who have worked in Somervell’s creation. They came through with their innovative design, pentagon-shaped to fit the chosen site, and in a matter of days Somervell had almost single-handedly secured the funding for the massive building from a skeptical Congress. After President Franklin Roosevelt ordered Somervell to move the original, and
very controversial, site from the west end of the Memorial Bridge to its present location, ground was broken on 11 September 1941. Less than eight months later, the first War Department employees moved into a still unfinished building.

In Vogel’s capable hands, the story of the actual construction reads like a novel. Conflicts between the Army officers and the contractors occurred on a daily basis, but leaders on both sides never lost their commitment to the mission. An aircraft hangar full of draftsmen toiled ceaselessly to ensure that the necessary detailed drawings were available when required. Finally, after only 17 months of exhaustive effort by a host of dedicated individuals, the largest office building in the world was completed in February 1943.

The chapters relating to the design and construction of the building are the strongest in the book. Vogel clearly explains and makes interesting such topics as congressional funding and the intricacies of engineering and construction. The author describes the techniques used to overcome the myriad challenges due to weather, unending design changes, labor problems, the press, and clashes of strong personalities. A series of highly competent Army engineers, civilian employees, and contractors is portrayed as vivid characters in this drama.

The Pentagon’s story from the building’s completion to 2001 is covered concisely including the creation of the Defense Department and the move of the other services to the Pentagon along with the infamous antiwar protests of the 1960s. The book’s pace picks up again with Vogel’s account of the horrific terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, exactly 60 years after construction began. The story of the attack, the many moving acts of heroism and sacrifice that took place that day, and the miraculous rebuilding effort are all related with great skill. The dedicated workers who vowed to complete the rebuilding effort in 12 months were amazed at the strength and resilience of the building. A lesser structure would have suffered much greater damage and many more lives would have been lost had the original designers and builders not been as capable as they were. The Pentagon, concludes Vogel, “was wisely designed and constructed well. Somervell’s building had proven itself one for the ages.”

Vogel’s prodigious research is evident throughout the book. The volume boasts a number of useful maps and diagrams that clearly illustrate the Pentagon’s evolving design and the controversial issues surrounding the building’s site. Photos of key personalities are also included, not the least of which are fascinating vintage images of the most important character in the book, the Pentagon itself. This is a wonderful book. It is an absolute must for anyone who has ever served in “The Building,” and it will also appeal to readers interested in engineering, construction, and twentieth-century American military history.


By the time this review is published a new President of the United States will have been elected. Regardless of whom the winner is, one of the major questions they will confront is whether to continue the Bush Administration’s policies in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Two members of the faculty of the University of London,

Lynch and Singh are unapologetic supporters for the proposition that whoever succeeds George W. Bush as President not only should but will continue the previous administration’s foreign policy. They base that conclusion on two points. First, the United States and the democratic West are involved in the early stages of what the authors characterize as a Second Cold War. They argue that as in the case of the First Cold War, in order to achieve victory American foreign policy must be consistent from administration to administration. Not unexpectedly, the authors draw parallels between the Truman and the Bush administrations. Both administrations confronted an unexpected conflict for the control of the world, constructed a basic strategic architecture to fight that war, and were vilified at the end of their terms. Second, the authors argue that the policies implemented by the Bush Administration are within the mainstream of previous American policy and all subsequent administrations will generally stay within that same mainstream.

Before this reviewer analyzes the authors’ various arguments, there are some general observations that need to be made. While the case Lynch and Singh make for continuity of policy has merit, they fail to distinguish between those policies that need to be continued by future administrations, regardless of their political persuasion, and those policies that have proved to be dysfunctional and thus require modification or rejection. Collateral to this approach is the authors’ tendency to delegitimize criticism of the Bush Administration’s policies. Too often critics are quoted or referenced only so they can be used as a stalking horse for the authors’ arguments or to present a target, in some cases gratuitously, for criticism. This tendency is particularly troubling in the manner the authors treat international critics of the Administration’s Iraq policy when many of the same critics are supporting America’s operations in Afghanistan; and internal critics who decry the loss of America’s international status and respect.

Possibly the most interesting portion of the book is the authors’ analysis of the Iraq War and US Middle East policy. The authors admit that the Bush Administration mismanaged many operational aspects of the war and succeeded in others, while maintaining that the Administration’s policy goal to reform the Middle East was essentially correct. In many ways this is the centerpiece of the book. If one accepts this argument, then their case for continuity falls logically into place. In making this claim, this reviewer is struck by the authors’ effort to consistently separate what they admit were inept operational decisions from the underlying policy. While this effort to decouple operational strategy in Iraq from the Administration’s grand strategic view is a rhetorical success, it is an analytical failure. For example, while the authors criticize the failure to supply sufficient forces at the outset of the war, the disbanding of the Iraqi army, and the de-Baathification of the bureaucracy, they are not willing to admit that there is a relationship between those decisions and the neoconservative belief that overwhelming military force would not be required because stability and democracy would prevail. Similarly, the authors criticize the failure of international support for the Iraq rebuilding effort while being unwilling to entertain the possibility that the Administration’s quasi-unilateralism may have impacted that effort. The authors also attempt to separate the Administration from neoconservatism and argue that the Administration was, in fact, realists. This reviewer finds it difficult to square a number of the operational decisions as well as the rationale for going to war with that approach. In fact, the authors’ conflicted viewpoint between neoconservativism and realism as

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well as whether hard or soft power is the best vehicle to achieve reform pervades much of their discussion of Middle East policy. All of this raises fundamental questions as to which policy the authors actually recommend continuing.

With regard to the argument that the Administration’s policies fall well within the mainstream of American tradition, again the authors claim too much. Lynch and Singh are correct that America’s foreign policy tradition has been driven by a strong idealistic strain bordering on a messianic desire to expand democracy and capitalism. In many ways this is the heart of neoconservative foreign policy. What the authors fail to appreciate is the conflicted nature of that foreign policy tradition. In reality there are two sets of contending traditions: realism versus idealism and unilateralism versus internationalism. The fact that the Bush Administration can be characterized as exhibiting realistic/unilateralism prior to 9/11, realistic-idealistic/internationalism when it went into Afghanistan, or idealistic/quasi-unilateralism in Iraq, tells us little about which of those traditions the next administration should follow. An example of an issue where the authors seem to claim too much is with regard to the Administration’s approach to constitutional rights. There clearly is an American tradition of yielding power to the executive in times of crisis, and the GWOT requires a robust executive. That is not necessarily the same thing as the Bush Administration’s ideal of the unitary executive with its potential for unlimited inherent executive power. Again the authors’ uncritical acceptance of the Administration’s approach to constitutional issues undermines their argument for continuity.

In spite of criticisms of this book, I do recommend After Bush to those involved in political, military, and foreign policy decisionmaking. The issue of whether to continue the Bush Administration’s policies is going to be central to American foreign policy for years to come, and Lynch and Singh make arguments that cannot be ignored. Moreover, the authors are correct that the George W. Bush Administration has forced subsequent administrations to focus on the Middle East. My caveat to this book is that it must be carefully read. This is a very sophisticated book. The authors’ arguments have an internal consistency and logic that are very enticing. A casual reading of this book can easily lead the reader to accept, uncritically, all of the authors’ contentions.


Brian McAllister Linn challenges all of us who participate in the debate over the changing conduct of war. His challenge, offered through the lens of history, is to define a concept of war that is appropriate to the century we live in and the range of adversaries we face. I agree with Linn’s assertion that senior military leaders are not certain what war means and thus cannot explain war to policymakers and the public. His thesis is the way a military force conducts war depends upon how it prepares for war, and the American Army’s preparation for war is based not so much on what happened in previous wars, but what military intellectuals believe they learned from the wars, in the echo of battle as Linn puts it. What these military intellectuals may have learned, according to Linn, is dependent on to which school of thought they belonged.
Through his extensive study of nineteenth-century warfare, Linn derived three schools of thought that run throughout the history of the US Army: Guardians, Heroes, and Managers. I found these schools of thought intriguing, and while Linn makes a good argument I am not certain that the three schools of thought are germane to the quest of defining a concept of warfare relevant to the twenty-first century.

Linn links the rise of the Guardians to the Coast Artillery and the War of 1812. The Coast Artillery was the most scientific of the branches of the US Army. The leaders of this branch advocated the view that scientific principles could be applied to warfare, much like a gunnery exercise to hit a ship at sea, and thus predict the outcome of war and a guarantee of success. The good side of the Guardian school advocates the application of rigorous study to a complex topic, with the down side supporting the belief that the application of principles is the key to victory. The author links the discussions of antiballistic missile defense and homeland security to the school of thought supported by the Guardians.

The Heroic school of thought dismisses the notion of predictability in war, as war is a human endeavor encompassing armed violence directed at achieving an end. Heroes emphasize the human element of war, again providing the intellectual and practical framework for successful operations. The tradition's down side is a tendency to posturing and elitism. Linn states it can produce "muddy boots fundamentalism" and anti-intellectual sloganeering.

The final school of thought is the Managers. Linn identifies Eisenhower and Marshall as examples of the best strategic leaders of this school of thought. War, for the Managers, is an outgrowth of political and economic competition among nation-states. Modern warfare requires national mobilization. The down side of the Managers' view of warfare, according to Linn, is an indifference to unconventional warfare and post-conflict operations.

Linn develops his thesis through a tour of American military history, citing the influence of the various boards that formed at the end of World War I and World War II that were designed to determine the lessons learned from those wars. He also cites the lack of similar boards to identify the lessons from Korea and Vietnam.

Linn rather skillfully develops his schools of thought, especially when he plays to his strength in the early history of the Army, which is the period from the beginning of the Spanish-American War to WW I. These broad categories serve to focus the reader and caused this reviewer to reflect and cross-check previously held beliefs. I did not know, for instance, that Pershing overrode the findings of his own boards following WW I. There really is some great history in this work.

The model Linn develops for analysis, the three schools of thought in the Army, needs to be tested. If Heroes, Guardians, and Managers influenced Army thinking in the nineteenth century, then a review of professional journals could support or refute the efficacy of the model. Linn could have added this level of detail to his book, as well as continuing it into the twentieth century when the Army faced a wider range of adversaries. A model for analysis should stand the test of time.

This reviewer does agree with Linn's assertion that the extreme focus on unit performance at the National Training Center (NTC) over time developed into an almost exclusive objective at the tactical level; a focus that precluded successful Army officers from developing strategic skills and the ability to interact with policymakers. The emphasis on success at the NTC set the basis for a checklist mentality in the officer corps. In this portion of the book Linn loses his own thread of which school of
thought dominated in the late 1970s and early 1980s as we developed our officer education system.

On the dust jacket Andrew “Skip” Bacevich proclaims that Linn, in this work, establishes himself as the “preeminent military historian of his generation.” I am not sure I can echo that praise. I do think that serious professional soldiers should read this book. Linn makes his readers think, which is always good for the profession. There are numerous areas that those in uniform and out need to engage in the debate regarding war. Linn’s proposed schools of thought can help focus those arguments and discussions.


“Old enemies and new friends” is the theme binding We Are Soldiers Still, as old soldier Moore and veteran journalist Galloway march together down Memory Lane. General readers will enjoy the book. Old soldiers will share the authors’ pride in soldier courage and remorse for lives lost, noting that in the twilight of their lives, sadness trumps pride. Several chapters meander from the central theme, reconciliation, but effective prose saves the day as crisp descriptions of combat become reverential reflections about young men who died before they raised families, indeed, before they cast their first vote.

Hal Moore commanded rifle companies in combat in Korea before he became famous as the battalion commander in the fight in the Ia Drang Valley at landing zone (LZ) X-Ray in November 1965. He went on to higher commands and retired as a lieutenant general and revered officer. Joe Galloway was a foreign correspondent for 20 years and a senior editor and writer for U.S. News & World Report for another 20 years. His 29 October 1990 cover article on the 25th anniversary of the Ia Drang battle won U.S. News its first National Magazine Award just as the United States was poised to enter the Persian Gulf War, “but had not yet dealt with how it felt about the last war—Vietnam. [The article] touched a nerve and brought bags of mail to the magazine.” Galloway and Moore answered the mail with a book that became a film.

We Are Soldiers Still is a sequel to the authors’ best-selling We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young and to the blockbuster film that premiered in Hollywood and at the White House. Remote battlefields in Vietnam became a part of our Army’s folklore. The first book describes the costly success under Moore at X-Ray and the extremely costly failure of a sister battalion near LZ Albany. The film omits the shocking ambush and execution of American soldiers near Albany. (See Larry Gwin’s Baptism, a magnificent memoir that includes actions at LZ Albany.)

We Are Soldiers Still is a catharsis. Its melding of pride and remorse rings true. The authors search for words to convey sadness, affection, and memories of violence and valor that are receding to the distant past as veterans grow old. Words surrender to shameless tears, a more effective expression of deep feelings. Moore and Galloway meet annually in Washington with the men who shared the battle experience with them, a meeting more devotional pilgrimage than secular reunion. That is the essentially American catharsis.
Reconciliation is fully realized as the authors return to Vietnam to meet those on “the other side of the hill.” It took a while to make it happen, but when face-to-face meetings are arranged, all parties seem gratified in nurturing shared humanity with former foes once determined to kill them. Among the luminaries on the North Vietnamese side was Lieutenant General Nguyen Huu An, Moore’s opposite number in the battle, when both were lieutenant colonels. The authors met at length with General Vo Nguyen Giap, architect of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and hero of Dien Bien Phu, who was puzzled that the Americans did not learn of NVA tenacity from the French experience.

Three of the chapters are tangential to the book’s purpose, reconciliation. “Walking the Ground at Dien Bien Phu” is an interesting but unnecessary retelling of the French quest for a set-piece battle that resulted in French defeat in 1954. The rationale for the chapter is to show determination, a point already made in describing Vietnam’s many wars with China and its more recent wars with the French, Japanese, and Americans. “Lessons on Leadership” is ordinary stuff. Moore’s strength is in the doing, not in verbalizing in cookbook fashion on leadership. Precisely being himself was Moore’s strength. The last chapter, “On War,” denounces “the insanity that is war.” It is a scalding criticism of civilian leadership: “[Iraq] is not worth the life of even one American soldier;” Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld “made Vietnam-era Defense Secretary Robert McNamara look good by comparison.” The Preface describes how “a generation of political leaders who studiously avoided service in our generation’s war seemingly learned nothing . . . thus consigning a new generation of soldiers to ‘preemptive’ wars of choice, condemning them to their own memories of death and dying through their lives.”

Authors may air views on any subject. The portions cited above, and an Appendix that is an ode to Moore’s wife, Julia, and the heroic and colorful Rick Rescorla, are awkwardly placed, perhaps unnecessary. They could have been more gracefully integrated into the narrative. But, flaws and nit-picks aside, the book held this reviewer’s interest from beginning to end.


Sometimes a book comes out that itself changes or adds to the events it chronicles. *The Wrong Guys* may be such a book. Its publication date was 11 November 2008, Veterans’ Day. On that date *The Washington Post* published an article referring to the book and outlining the basics of the case it describes, the conviction of four sailors who came to be known as the “Norfolk Four,” for the rape and murder of another sailor’s wife. Simultaneous with the news article, the *Post* ran an editorial calling for Virginia Governor Timothy M. Kaine to grant the clemency petition filed by the sailors and supported by 30 retired FBI agents who studied the case. As the *Post* espouses, these agents “concluded that a ‘tragic mistake’ had been made.” So it is possible that the case will, by the time this review appears in print, have reached a different outcome. Yet the issues this case raises will remain over time.
The four sailors did confess to murdering 18-year-old Michelle Moore-Bosko in 1997. The claim of the authors is that these confessions were forced: “Innocent men were cajoled and pushed into saying things detrimental to themselves that were not true.” Not only were these four sailors convicted on the basis of false confessions, Wells and Leo believe that many other people have been as well. The authors want to make it more difficult in the future for such—as they see them—perversions of justice to occur.

The reader’s initial response may well be: “Hooey.” As Maureen Evans, the detective who obtained the first confession, from Daniel J. Williams, put it: “Innocent people don’t confess to crimes they don’t commit.” The book’s thesis is a refutation of this “common-sense” view.

The publication date of this book and the Post’s coverage, all set for Veterans’ Day, suggests that the case is intrinsically related to the military culture. This reviewer believes that is so, but on a more abstract level than first appears. To be sure, all of the men involved were sailors, including the husband of the murdered woman (they had married secretly, and her parents did not know she was living with him). That is pretty tangential. The case gains more military currency, however, when we consider the question of forced confessions more generally—in relation to the value, or lack of value, of confessions forced by interrogators from terrorism suspects held in custody by the US military.

Its greatest resonance to the military may be at an even more abstract level yet. Many people in the military tend to agree with the detective. The conservative worldview (the view most people in the military hold) is that the primary aim of justice is to punish perpetrators, not coddle them. People are to be held accountable, so if they admit they did it, that is the end of the story. The idea that bad guys need to be protected against themselves is one that will be deeply repugnant to most people in the military, further evidence of the lily-livered, bleeding-heart, namby-pambyism that has led to what seem to be viable cases thrown out in court for what seem to be technicalities.

Such cases are the daily bread of right-wing talk radio and blogs, which, as Institute for Advanced Study professor Danielle Allen has recently researched, tend to use military terms and concepts to express even nonmilitary content, in an apparent attempt to appeal to their military and military-friendly listeners and readers.

The authors’ response to this view appears most succinctly in their counter to Evans’s “common-sense” view: “What Evans did not know, and what most people who would become involved in this case did not know, is that false confessions occur regularly in the United States and are among the leading causes of miscarriages of justice.” The authors bring something new to the table other than the usual right-wing/left-wing doctrinal squabbling: DNA evidence, hard science that few people, left or right, will be able to easily brush away. The authors continue: “Some 15 to 20 percent of cases in which innocent prisoners have been exonered by DNA evidence involved a false admission or confession.” If DNA exonerates someone who confessed under pressure, most of us would say the only possible conclusion is that confessions can, indeed, apparently be forced.

Were they in this case? That is the specific issue on the table, whose resolution will not lay to rest the larger question. The authors and lawyers for the “Norfolk Four” maintain that DNA found at the scene implicates another man entirely, Omar Ballard, who (in the words of the Post) “wrote a letter to a friend admitting that he had committed the crime. His DNA matched that left at the scene, unlike that of the other seven men, and he pleaded guilty and said he acted alone. Forensic experts have said
the crime scene is consistent with a single attacker.” Even conservatives have to love the fact that retired FBI agents are speaking up.

Facts are facts; new means of detection require new ways of looking at old cases. Many readers will remember reading Sherlock Holmes stories as adolescents and marveling at a world that could not tell animal blood from human, or either from paint, and that did not seem to know about fingerprints. This particular case will, one hopes, be decided on the merits. So far no one, liberal or conservative, questions that having access to DNA evidence is as great a step forward for the pursuit of justice as the discovery that each person had individual fingerprints was in its day. The larger issue remains: Everyone needs to take on board that badgering and lying to addled or unintelligent witnesses can produce false confessions. The authors note that investigators are legally allowed to lie to suspects, claiming that there is hard evidence to convict them when in fact there is none at all. Investigators too are fond of suggesting that suspects can have “suppressed the crime from [their] memory.”

The press release for the book points to “the failure of the U.S. legal system to deliver justice.” This will not go down well with most people in the military, who tend to believe that systems of authority are basically good and deserve our respect. But we do not have to reject the US legal system on a wholesale scale to conclude that DNA, hard science, trumps what people say under pressure—and to question the assertion that “innocent people don’t confess to crimes they didn’t commit.” Apparently they do. Not all, of course. But some. Who knew?


The acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by a terrorist group is the most feared scenario in the Department of Homeland Security’s portfolio of threats against the United States. Yet, too few in the national security community fully appreciate the complex nature of such a threat and the best means for countering it. Michael Levi takes on these two challenges and provides readers one of the most comprehensive and informative analyses of nuclear terrorism available today. Without this appreciation, an effective defense is nearly impossible to mount, given the amount of tax dollars lost on ill-focused and uncoordinated programs.

Informed readers will find only a limited number of new facts in this book, but they will find a comprehensive examination of the technical, strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of nuclear terrorism from the terrorists and the defenders’ perspective. In this regard, the book provides one of the more realistic and easily understood analyses of the technical challenges required to construct and detonate a nuclear weapon—an understanding critical to any successful defense. The author’s succinct assessment of the various levels of warfare that are impacted by such a nuclear threat is equally revealing. The true value of the book, however, is in the manner in which the author makes a holistic and systematic analysis of the threat of nuclear terrorism, along with the insight provided for an effective defense. The author believes that if the cliché is in fact true that defense must succeed every time against nuclear terrorism, in any given terrorist plot the terrorists need to succeed only once. From this paradoxical truth he
advances the case for a systemic defense founded on systemic analysis of a wide range of potential nuclear threats, the opportunities available to terrorists, and the obstacles that can preclude their success. Based on this analysis, he develops a capabilities-based planning approach focused on the entire threat spectrum and a realistic US objective to prevent such attacks while minimizing the damage if any attack should succeed. In the concluding chapter the author provides a compelling and substantiated recommendation for a number of policy goals to be pursued by the US government; policies that would significantly enhance our defenses against nuclear terrorism.

Levi’s systemic approach is strategic thinking at its best and makes this succinct work one of the more thoroughly developed studies related to the challenges confronting both the nuclear terrorist and the threatened state. It is a well-written and deftly organized book, conveying complex technical data and strategic analysis in an easily understood style. For both the novice and experienced policymaker or strategist interested in a comprehensive and unvarnished assessment of nuclear terrorism and the appropriate responses, On Nuclear Terrorism is certain to be of great value.


If journalists are going to write history, then perhaps historians deserve to receive a set of rules of engagement for reviewing their books. It would be insulting to many fine books to tar all journalists with the same brush, but one wearies of repeating concerns about lack of historical methods and fears that complaints will be dismissed as pedantry—or as the sour grapes of one who will never make a best-seller list. So let us play nicely.

Relying heavily on their own words as captured in letters and diaries, Cokie Roberts’s Ladies of Liberty describes key moments in the presidencies of Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams as they were experienced—or shaped—by influential women, thereby illustrating the profound impact of the wives and daughters of American leaders on political events at home and abroad. Many of the stories are eye-opening validations of Roberts’s claim that “history looks very different when seen through the eyes of women.” Letters between men and women—and between women about men—greatly expand our vision of these important Americans and their shared world.

In addition to their remarkable insight into political events, the women’s writings offer touching descriptions of family relationships in an age when geographical separations of spouses or children often lasted years, loved ones were not a mere phone call away, departure for a distant posting might easily prove to be a final parting, and childbirth was a frequent—and frequently fatal—event. We also learn about the diplomatic difficulties created by inadequate wardrobes, and sense the challenge of catering to the requirements of 50 unexpected houseguests. Female solutions to women’s legal impediments included selecting only spinsters as treasurers of charity organizations as a married woman could not protect the group’s assets from her husband. Arguments among women about etiquette had such serious political and diplomatic consequences that President Monroe had to convene a Cabinet meeting to discuss which women were required to pay calls and on whom.

Spring 2009
The chapters are organized by presidential term, but the need to follow the lives of many different women leads to repeated coverage of events. Dates rarely appear in the text, and readers without a firm grasp of chronology will soon be lost. The sudden diversion west of the Missouri River with Sacagawea suggests the need for a stronger organizing theme than “cool things done by women.” That the politically connected women of the early Republic did important things is a story worth telling, but it is fair to ask whether their actions were truly novel.

The pleased astonishment with which readers have greeted the idea of women who read, wrote, ran households, and advised their husbands on affairs of state in addition to bearing and nurturing children makes one wonder what they thought women were doing before in the new United States and elsewhere. Roberts seems to share with her readers the bizarre assumption that societies in which women suffer legal and political disabilities did not expect them to be productive, even in the household economy. Why does the author think it “unusual” that Dolley Madison played a major role in setting up the presidential residence? For that matter, does she think American women unique in their influence on the men in their lives? Studies of farm economies and of European court life might provide her some useful perspective.

The *Ladies of Liberty* were remarkable, just as their male relatives were remarkable, because they participated in remarkable events. They seem, however, to be more exceptional than they were because they wrote great letters. Most women, like most men, have left no letters, but that does not mean that they were not also busily filling active, if prosaic, roles in the social order. Given the connection between letter-writing and social status, one has to ask whether the conclusions Roberts draws in *Ladies of Liberty* are about gender or about class.

Potential readers need to understand the consequences of the author’s unscholarly approach to evidence. For example, Roberts misspeaks in claiming that Mercy Otis Warren “documented” the practice of rape by mentioning British soldiers’ “barbarous abuse of the hapless females who fell sacrifices to their wanton and riotous appetites” in her history of the American Revolution. Warren’s narrative, like a newspaper report referring to women “abused in the most shameful manner” during the War of 1812, is evidence of a sort, but not all evidence is documentation.

Even if Roberts’s delight at Google’s ability to answer questions “in seconds” is not intended to deny the obligation to discriminate good sources from merely accessible ones, it ought to make readers suspicious of the book’s amateurish documentation. What Roberts calls “footnotes” are actually endnotes. They are not flagged in the text, and sources for material other than direct quotations are not identified.

Less serious than any factual errors but irritating nonetheless are editorial comments unnecessarily underscoring points better left to the original voice. The gripping tale of Louisa Adams’s fraught 40-day coach ride from Saint Petersburg to join her husband in Paris during the Hundred Days ends with her safe arrival and discovery that her husband “was perfectly astonished at my adventures, as everything in Paris was quiet.” Even as the reader savors Louisa’s charmingly ironic pleasure in achieving “the protection of a husband” who had enjoyed the Parisian theater during her own desperate passage, Roberts explains the joke, hammering in the point with an exclamation mark. Elsewhere, sarcastic interjections such as “ouch,” “right,” and “charming” come between the reader and the story. The story rivets attention where the writing is smooth. Much, however, is wordy and colloquial, and there are some jarring solecisms.

It is neither academic snobbery nor incompatible with good journalistic prac-
tice to insist on precise language; the cost of carelessness becomes clear in the first page of the introduction, where Roberts grasps at the reader’s attention with a promising anecdote about the influence of Dolley Madison. After quoting a letter from John Jacob Astor thanking the First Lady for her “assurances” that his cargo ships would arrive safely in port, Roberts observes that “the First Lady had been the one to guarantee his ships’ safe passage.” Instead of exploring the nature of the “assurances” offered and their implications about Dolley Madison’s role, Roberts casually transmutes what could have been mere encouragement into power. But was that guarantee legal, political, naval, or meteorological? That Roberts inflates rather than investigates Dolley Madison’s apparent influence illustrates the contrast between the potential utility of her sources and the fragility of the historical edifice constructed upon them.

If this book encourages people to understand that nothing happens without women, then Roberts has done something of value. It is sad, however, that the historical importance of women is still news to anyone.

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