From the Editor

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From the Editor

In This Issue . . .

We continue our examination of the shift in America’s strategic priorities with our first thematic feature, “A New Afghanistan.” Ali Jalali, the former Interior Minister of Afghanistan, leads this feature with his insightful presentation of a new strategy for Afghanistan that incorporates the efforts of international and domestic actors alongside those of local Afghan communities and tribes in “Winning in Afghanistan.” The author details the measures necessary for an effective and accountable Afghan government capable of providing the rule of law and security for its citizens. Jalali believes that such a government will be capable of forming an effective partnership with neighbors and the international community in efforts to stabilize the region. He concludes with a warning that long-term stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved through measures directed at changing the current divisive national environment, not simply by pursuing solutions at the local level of government in an expeditious effort to accomplish more immediate and temporary gains. Following on the theme of the need for renewed success at the local level of Afghan government is “Enhancing the Footprint: Stakeholders in Afghan Reconstruction” by Bas Rietjens, Myriame Bollen, Masood Khalil, and Sayed Fazlullah Wahidi. We are indeed fortunate that two of the authors are Afghans and members of nongovernmental organizations working with various local, national, and international groups within Afghanistan. Their article provides readers with greater understanding of the reconstruction mission of the International Security Assistance Force that is so essential to the process that bridges the gap between conflict and stabilization. The authors caution that reconstruction projects that overlook the dynamics associated with the local population are doomed for failure because they ignore the basic rationale and understanding of individual needs that support the requirement for peace in Afghanistan.

Our second thematic offering, “Ethics in War,” highlights the work of one of America’s renowned ethicists, Dr. Michael Walzer. He provides a sobering and persuasive analysis of conflict and warfare in “Responsibility and Proportionality in State and Nonstate Wars.” The author’s thesis is built on the belief that the one dominant lesson we should take away from the twentieth century is that there has been too much killing. Walzer then examines the reality of war, recognizing that whether the conflict is termed as just or unjust, innocents will die. He then presents an engaging examination of contemporary conflict to determine that the critical factor in assigning
justice in war is the concept of “responsibility,” a factor that trumps the “proportionality” argument in any analysis. Whether the reader agrees with Walzer or not, the argument presented is certain to fortify one’s ethical foundation. Jonathan Keiler continues our examination of the doctrine of proportionality in “The End of Proportionality.” Keiler believes that prior to Israel’s 2006 campaign into Lebanon, in general, the proportionality doctrine was largely ignored by modern-day scholars, media, and international decisionmakers. The author examines four contemporary case studies to conclude that the real problem with those who assert that there are violations of the laws of land warfare based on proportionality are confused by the fact that the rule itself is widely misinterpreted. The extent of this confusion is so great that it severely limits any argument based on the traditional law of war concept. Keiler’s analysis leads to the determination that because the theory of proportionality is so ambiguous it is nearly impossible to interpret and enforce. The author believes it would better if the United States dropped the doctrine of proportionality from the lexicon related to the law of war.

Roger McDermott’s “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War” provides readers with detailed insight regarding the status of the Russian forces that conducted the seemingly successful incursion into the nation of Georgia in August 2008. Although much of the author’s analysis is at the tactical and operational levels of warfare, the strategic consequences are blatantly obvious. The author determines that the rapid defeat of Georgia’s armed forces was more the result of military weakness, poor management, and limited combat capabilities on the part of the Georgians, than anything attributable to the prowess of Russian forces. His thorough survey of Russian weapon systems and tactics supports the assertion that the Georgian war was the last war of the twentieth century for Russia’s armed forces; due mainly to the fact it was fought using tactics, formations, and equipment from the last century. McDermott concludes that the Russian military and political leadership perceive the Georgian war as a setback to their aspirations of projecting an image of a “resurgent Russia.”

W. Andrew Terrill provides our final article in this issue, “Deterrence in the Israeli-Iranian Strategic Standoff.” The author addresses the future of the Israeli-Iranian relationship given the assumption that the latter will continue its nuclear adventurism. Terrill presents the possibility that Israel, as a potential Iranian strategic adversary, will be able to successfully establish a system of deterrence based on its current and programmed missile defense technology, supported by its extensive civil defense initiatives. The author then turns his attention to the history of the relationship between the two belligerents, an analysis that leads to the conclusion that much of the current
posturing regarding Iranian nuclear capability is in fact an attempt to deter the United States from any thoughts of regime change in Tehran. Terrill suggests that the new US Administration’s reputation for seeking diplomatic solutions to strategic challenges may be the catalyst required to resolve this nuclear dilemma.

The “Review Essay” feature in this issue is Larry Wortzel’s “North Korea and Failed Diplomacy,” a detailed look at five recent books examining North Korea’s strategic future. The authors of several of the works share a common theme that the reviewer identifies as the Bush Administration’s “Axis of Evil” approach to foreign policy. Additionally, they share a view that the 1994 “Agreed Framework,” that has served as a basis for negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, might be salvaged, despite the North’s continued pursuit of its highly enriched uranium program. Wortzel draws on experience gained during two tours of duty as a military attaché in China to provide readers with an insider’s perspective on what the United States and its allies might do to limit North Korea’s nuclear pursuit. Given the reviewer’s Chinese perspective, he concludes that the most realistic of the five books is Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea, by Bruce Bechtol. Wortzel supports the conclusion of Bechtol and that of Yoichi Funabashi in his work, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, that it may be impossible for the United States to create any circumstance under which North Korea would abandon its nuclear weapons program. The reviewer saves his more critical assessment for fellow Army officer and experienced Asia hand, Charles “Jack” Pritchard’s book, Failed Diplomacy. Wortzel finds much of his contemporary’s work sadly naïve and tainted. In Nuclear Endgame Jacques L. Fuqua offers four premises he believes should be the foundation for any strategy for dealing with North Korea. Wortzel wonders where Fuqua has been for the past 15 years. Most of his suggested initiatives have already been tried and failed. Mike Chinoy’s Meltdown is a view of America’s relationship with North Korea that reflects more of an “edge” than the other offerings in the review essay. Although Meltdown contains a few minor flaws and omissions, Wortzel believes it provides the broadest view of the relationship, based on the number of interviews and extensive research the author undertook. The “Book Reviews” section includes an eclectic array of some rather provocative works. In the lead is Andrew Bacevich’s review of War of Necessity, War of Choice by Richard Haass; Jeffrey Record looks at the recent best-seller by Jane Mayer, The Dark Side; Barrie Zais reviews Scott Wheeler’s The Big Red One; Allan Millett examines Carlo D’Este’s Warlord, and many more. — RHT