East Asia is the most dynamic area of the world in economic terms and quite possibly in terms of foreign policy developments. This status is more than simply the influence of China, India, and other Asian states’ economic growth, though certainly that factor is of critical importance. One key indicator of such dynamism is the evolution and transformation of existing regional security organizations. Hitherto most analyses of the region have invariably commented on the lack of authoritative or even vital regional security organizations. The editors and contributors of this volume challenge this assumption by reexamining the development of new organizations, the evolution of existing groups to assume new tasks and missions, challenges to the process of regional integration embodied in these organizations, formalization of their charters and missions, development of new forms of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, and the extent to which local associations are succeeding in realizing either their old or new tasks and missions.

The resulting picture is one of flux, with new security institutions being created or evolving to meet new challenges and doing so in an environment where cooperation is largely driven by the competitive motives of the key great powers, particularly the United States and China. Beyond the editors’ overall conclusion, Amitav Acharya declares that the sovereignty norm, contrary to many studies, is quite well and alive in the region, especially among middle and smaller powers that have taken the lead in setting up the new organizations. Like many other analysts, he finds that another important motive for the regionalism embodied in these institutions is the pervasive uncertainty regarding the drift of Asia-Pacific international relations and states’ corresponding desire not to be left out or marginalized by these unforeseeable trends. Victor Cha, on the other hand, finds that the future of the US alliance system is considerably more robust, even though he thinks it will change from cooperation based on shared strategic interests to alliances based increasingly on values held in common. In a different vein, David Kang takes issue with the whole idea that a balance of power exists in East Asia. Instead, he sees a hierarchical security system dominated by Washington which in fact does not (contrary to much of the commentary in this volume) act as a stabilizer against China. Indeed, he sees states such as South Korea and Vietnam increasingly moving to accommodate China or at least to not take actions that might antagonize it.

In other words, Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is not one of those bland academic collections where everyone more or less agrees with the editors and produces articles that plow the same disputed acre over and over again. Quite the opposite, the disagreements are out in the open, and they relate to vital issues and our understanding of them. Is security cooperation based on regional integration around economies and values possible in this region, the most dynamic in the world? If so, on what basis? If not, why? Is the US alliance system in danger of erod-
ing and, if so, why? Do organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Plus Three organization, ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Council genuinely contribute something positive to security and regional integration? How do they do so? Will regional integration develop in such a way that Asian security organizations will exclude the United States? Can the existing or evolving Asia-Pacific security organizations effectively meet the challenges posed by terrorism, criminal networks, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the possibility of global or regional financial crises like that of 1997-98?

All of these issues are vital questions for policymakers as well as analysts. They are among the most debated issues in academic studies and at meetings of these governments or organizations. For that reason this book is a highly valuable and recommended study. It is blessedly free from jargon, though the arguments are very sophisticated. Those arguments are based on years of scholarship by top specialists in the field of Asia-Pacific studies and thus reward the reader’s careful attention. This might have been an even better study had there been more attention paid to new actors who are exercising an ever greater role in Asian security, such as India and Australia. Russia’s relations with its Asian-Pacific neighbors, China, Japan, and the two Koreas, also are neglected, as unfortunately is the case with far too many studies on Asian security. Nonetheless, anyone who wishes to follow the evolution of current Asian security trends should read this book and ponder its arguments.


The late Speaker of the House of Representatives, Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, was perhaps best known for his incisive pronouncement, “All politics is local.” In *China: Fragile Superpower*, Susan L. Shirk has shown herself, maybe inadvertently, to be O’Neill’s disciple. She has traced with convincing skill the connections between China’s internal politics and Beijing’s security stance, especially toward Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. A scholar at the University of California, San Diego, Shirk set out to reach “a broader audience beyond academia” and has succeeded admirably in this lucid volume.

On the central issue of Taiwan, Shirk contends, “The roots of the Chinese fixation on Taiwan are purely domestic, related to regime security, not national security. The public cares intensely about Taiwan because the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] has taught it to care—in school textbooks and the media.” Shirk, who was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State engaged in Sino-US relations during the Clinton Administration, quotes an unnamed Chinese source: “Public opinion about Taiwan has been created by 50 years of CCP propaganda.”

“China’s posture on Taiwan is not about territory,” she writes, “it’s about national honor.” Shirk reiterates the connection with internal politics. “Every statement or action China’s leaders make about Taiwan is aimed first at the Chinese audience, second at the United States, which they hope will restrain Taiwan, and only third at Taiwan itself.” She quotes a professor in Shanghai: “Leaders can’t lose face with any of them.”
That is true, but Taiwan’s strategic position should not be overlooked. The island sits astride shipping lanes that run from Northeast Asia south through the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca to the Indian Ocean. For China to control Taiwan would be to put a power potentially hostile to Japan, Korea, the United States, and the West in a position to dominate those shipping lanes.

“The worst nightmare of China’s leaders is a national protest movement of discontented groups—unemployed workers, hard-pressed farmers, and students—united against the regime by the shared fervor of nationalism,” Shirk concludes. “Chinese history gives them good reason to worry. The two previous dynasties fell to nationalist revolutionary movements . . . . No wonder China’s current leaders are obsessed with the fear that the People’s Republic of China could meet the same fate.”

Critical to staying in power, the CCP needs to keep the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) onside. As the revolutionary leader, Mao Zedong, said repeatedly, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” China’s politicians insist, especially when a new leader comes to office, on reminding the PLA that the army must be guided by the party. PLA officers swear allegiance to the party, in contrast to American officers whose oath is to the Constitution.

In external relations, Shirk lists Taiwan as being of most concern, Japan not far behind, and the United States next. Relations with America are a matter of saving face and national interests, while Japan evokes strong nationalist feelings. But Taiwan, a Chinese academic said, “is a question of regime survival—no regime could survive the loss of Taiwan.”

Shirk, however, introduces a skeptical note. “People rarely specify how they think a Taiwan crisis would bring down the Communist Party—it takes more than a lot of angry unhappy people to overturn a government,” she writes. “And, in fact, once you get beyond the power elite in Beijing, you may find a ‘silent majority’ who care more about economic progress than Taiwan.” She cites a local government official who said, “The people don’t really care much about Taiwan. It’s the government that cares.”

Of the three issues confronting China’s leaders, Shirk says, “Japan is the one that is the most difficult to handle.” She quotes a Chinese student: “Japan is the most emotional issue. It is the one issue on which public opinion really matters to the government.” Shirk herself says, “Chinese politicians use Japan-related issues to mobilize support for themselves as strong leaders or to divert attention from difficult domestic problems. The less confident the leaders, the more they fan the fires of anti-Japanese nationalism.”

Concerning America, “China’s leaders confront a difficult dilemma,” Shirk says. “On the one hand, China’s success, and the leaders’ own power, depends on cooperation with the United States. If the United States declared China the enemy in a new Cold War and tried to tie an economic noose around it, China’s economic growth and job creation would be slowed and domestic problems would mount.” That may be understated as China, when the figures are finalized, acquired a $260 billion surplus in trade with the United States in 2008. If Washington slowed imports from China, that would put the Chinese economy into a significant slump.

On the other hand, the author says, “Other leaders, the public, and the military expect Chinese leaders to stand up to the United States. Nationalist ardor runs high, fanned by government propaganda and the commercial media and Internet. The United States, as the dominant power in the world, is the natural target of suspicion.
and resentment in China.” She asserts, “A Chinese political leader who takes a principled stand against the United States always wins more points than the one who gives in to it. Compromise is likely to be viewed as capitulation.”

“China’s leaders face a troubling paradox,” Shirk concludes. “The more developed and prosperous the country becomes, the more insecure and threatened they feel. The PRC [People’s Republic of China] today is a brittle, authoritarian regime that fears its own citizens and can only bend so far to accommodate the demands of foreign governments.” The Secretaries of State and Defense in the new administration, the new US ambassador to Beijing, and American military officers would do well to read this book.

**China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach.** By Richard D. Fisher, Jr. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008. 344 pages. $82.95. **Reviewed by Dr. Larry M. Wortzel (Colonel, USA Retired)**, who served two tours of duty as a military attaché at the US Embassy in China.

In this book, Richard Fisher focuses primarily on “hard power,” the hardware and military strategies that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is bringing to bear on the Asia-Pacific region and world military affairs. He also does an excellent job discussing the doctrine, training, and operational plans to use this hardware.

For many years, Fisher’s main interest in assessing the PLA has been hardware acquisition and systems development. From 1996 to 2008, he attended almost two dozen military exhibitions, gathering information on what China’s armed forces displayed and what Chinese defense industries tried to buy from other nations. During the 20 years this reviewer has known Richard Fisher, some China policy specialists have accused him of “hyping” the threat posed by China’s weapons and equipment to the United States and its armed forces. For the most part Fisher has been correct in his projections of what the PLA would field and in his discussion of the challenges that such weapon systems pose for the United States and its allies.

Fisher has amassed a solid record related to military systems analysis, considering he has no military service, has not worked in the intelligence community, and is not an engineer. He started analyzing Chinese military systems because he enjoyed it, and he has been quite good at the work. He has been a policy analyst at a number of conservative think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, Jamestown Foundation, and, presently, the International Assessment and Strategy Center.

*China’s Military Modernization* features an excellent discussion of advances in technology and doctrine to promote China’s regional and global military ambitions. Fisher highlights space warfare and the space information architecture of the PLA; its development of directed-energy weapons; antiballistic missile defenses; nuclear submarines; and new nuclear weapons. His book is well-documented with extensive citations from the US government’s Open Source Center and abstracts from the PLA’s technical journals. On United States-China military cooperation, he is quite pessimistic regarding the chances of developing sound, bilateral, confidence-building measures between the US armed forces and the PLA, citing a strong penchant for secrecy in China’s military tradition and in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He is probably correct on this point.
The book adequately covers the Party-Army relationship, with a sophisticated discussion of the legitimacy problems faced by the CCP. Unlike some academics, Fisher does not see the PLA changing into a “national army” along the lines set out by Samuel Huntington. He sees it as the main bulwark holding the Communist Party in power.

Fisher has provided useful tables showing the functions of the main state-owned corporations in China and how they are involved in arms production and foreign sales. There is also a brief but solid discussion regarding how the PLA is acquiring new technology and weapon systems through espionage and reverse engineering. Here, the author’s experience working for the congressionally mandated Cox Commission, which examined Chinese espionage in the United States, is invaluable. From a politico-military perspective, he has done a reasonable job of discussing China’s foreign security relationships, especially those with North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran.

On arms proliferation, however, Fisher could do better in drawing distinctions between China’s conventional arms sales and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery methods. China’s conventional arms sales often frustrate US foreign policy goals and American values; weapons frequently go to countries that may be a threat to the United States, but such sales do not violate existing arms control regimes. With regard to WMD, according to most United States government and nonprofit watchdog agencies, China’s behavior with regard to proliferation has significantly improved over the past few years.

Fisher makes a strong case that the mid-term goals of the CCP and the PLA are to dominate the military sphere in the Asia-Pacific region and deny access to areas around China’s periphery to any potential adversaries. He does not evaluate, however, some of the key Communist Party documents that outline China’s general defense orientation for the next decade, such as the “historic missions of the People’s Liberation Army” mentioned by CCP Chairman Hu Jintao in a 2004 speech. Nor does Fisher discuss the broad timelines set for the PLA to achieve military-strategic objectives by mid-century, such as the “three-step process of military development” put in place by then-Party Chairman Jiang Zemin.

A few aspects of the book will frustrate the reader. There is a rich discussion of nuclear doctrine in the body of the text, but the index does not lead the reader to that subject. The same is true of other aspects of military doctrine. Instead of finding topics in the index, the reader has to scan each chapter. The book would have been better had Fisher, or his editors, used good commercial indexing software with a more inclusive list of key words. Another serious frustration is the cost of the book. This is an excellent volume that should be on the shelf of any serious analyst of China’s military. At $82.95 a copy, however, it is more likely to be sold only to libraries or military college collections.

Read this book. Buy it if you can afford it; but at least get your librarian to order it. Fisher has produced the best comprehensive study of China’s military modernization in a decade.

Think of a Scandinavian “Band of Brothers” with a scientist’s eye for detail and analysis and you have got an intellectual snapshot of Knut Pipping’s *Infantry Company as a Society*. Contemporary military audiences will appreciate Pipping’s insightful analysis of formal and informal social groups within a single small unit. The work follows a machine-gun company of the Finnish Army’s 12th Infantry Regiment during its brief activation in combat against Soviet forces, 1941-44. The company was drawn from Lapland, a northern and rural hinterland even today. The company’s platoons were nearly always undermanned, and leaders worked to maintain warfighting effectiveness in difficult and austere conditions. The author, then a young Finnish doctoral candidate in sociology, served as a noncommissioned officer and made meticulous observations of movements, contact with the enemy, looting, periods of calm, and above all interpersonal relationships among soldiers.

For those who have been through the “academic hazing” of the doctoral dissertation writing and defense process, the typical goal is to make the dissertation just readable enough to impress the members of the advising committee. Precious few dissertations gain the attention of a broader audience. Fewer still are considered to have an impact on the field of study. Knut Pipping’s 1947 doctoral dissertation had a considerable and lasting impact on the field of military sociology in his native Finland, and his work is now being introduced to an ever-expanding, worldwide military audience. The fact that Pipping’s observations were of a company in the now-obscure War of Continuation against the Soviet Union makes the growing popularity of this brief and eminently readable work that much more impressive.

*Infantry Company as a Society* fills a considerable gap in the sociology of the wars of the twentieth century and makes an overdue contribution to military sociology, history, and small-unit leadership. The works of more famous sociologists such as Durkheim, Stouffer, Huntington, Coates, Janowitz, and Moskos primarily target a somewhat narrow academic audience. Conversely, the best-selling books of historians such as Stephen Ambrose target military practitioners and civilian enthusiasts alike. Pipping brings the two approaches together in a thoroughly readable manner. That readability will appeal equally to students of sociology and fans of entertaining military literature, but its greatest appeal will be to those currently facing the challenge of commanding in combat.

Certainly, the Finnish Army of the 1940s was far more homogenous than today’s US military. The dilemmas contained in *Infantry Company as a Society* are far less complex, for Pipping and his mates were defending their home soil using basic, conventional tactics. Those looking for direct lessons for small-unit leaders in the exceedingly complex operating environment of insurgency, nonstate actors, and information operations, complete with civilizational and political challenges, will be disappointed. The book speaks to soldiers and was written by a soldier. Simplicity and clarity add to its appeal. The fact that Pipping was also a sociologist gives his work depth and rigor and, as such, it serves alternately as a textbook, diary, and novel. In all of its forms it serves to educate as well as entertain.

The Finnish team that translated the work into English was made up of career military officers, a psychiatrist, military sociologist, and military historian. Each lent his expertise to ensure the accuracy of terms and concepts. While the original Swedish and Finnish versions have long been out of print, the English version has recently been made mandatory reading for Finnish cadets and serves as a principal text in required military sociology courses. That *Infantry Company as a Society* is strik-
ingly similar to a wildly popular Finnish historical novel and movie makes the book’s allure in its native country all the more complete.

Ultimately, the American audience will be drawn in by Pipping’s deep insight into small-unit functioning. He effectively avoids the overly technical descriptions of group dynamics that are so common among contemporary military sociologists and organizational psychologists. In this style, Pipping is writing to the military audience at large, rather than fellow social or behavioral scientists. Anyone who has led units at the platoon, company, or battalion level will recognize the social patterns that emerge quite naturally. Understanding subcommunities within military organizations lends critical insight into influences on climate, morale, ethics, and mission effectiveness. In many ways, organizations are driven by informal leaders exercising unsanctioned authority to the detriment or benefit of that unit’s formal leadership team. Understanding and influencing that dynamic can make the difference in the success or failure of the unit. For this reason alone, today’s officers should add *Infantry Company as a Society* to their professional libraries. Doing so may not qualify the reader as an amateur military sociologist, but it certainly will help develop a more effective and insightful leader.


As the last of the World War II heroes grow old and pass on to their well-earned rest and reward, it is fitting that new generations become acquainted with the sacrifice, selfless courage, and valor of these men. Bill Sloan has penned a gripping, fast-paced history that will do just that. From the opening vignette of a young tank lieutenant cutting off his own mangled arm with a Ka-Bar combat knife, so that it would be easier for others to treat his wound, to the joy and relief of soldiers and Marines upon the dropping of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki successfully. Sloan recasts both the horror and the honor of this last campaign of the Pacific theater during the Second World War.

Sloan tells the history of the battle of Okinawa in exhilarating style, providing enough historical detail to adequately illustrate the political-military context of the campaign while reserving his primary emphasis for the personal stories of participants themselves, often in their own words. This rapid alternation of perspective and personalization proves fascinating and irresistible, pulling the reader into the Okinawa experience in a way that supplies emotional connectivity as well as intellectual understanding. The technique is common to many recent historical narratives, but Sloan executes it exceptionally well, so the reader can visualize the actions as they happened on those muddy Pacific slopes.

The book is panoramic, covering the planning phase of Operation Iceberg in late 1944 to the Japanese surrender on board the battleship USS *Missouri* on 2 September 1945. Sloan recounts the unopposed landing on the north shores of Okinawa, and the quietness that prevailed until the advancing soldiers and Marines encountered the assiduously prepared defensive belts of Japanese forces occupying the southern portion of the island. He vividly portrays the stubborness of Japanese soldiers and their complete commitment to their cause; the determination and fortitude the Americans demonstrated in weeks of desperate, rain-soaked, yard-by-yard advanc-
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\[\text{Sloan's focus is on the soldiers and Marines actually engaged in ground fighting. He spends much less time developing the naval and air aspects of the campaign, adding just enough detail to ensure that these functional elements of the operation are not overlooked. Likewise, in concentrating on providing as personal and credible a portrayal of the fighting on Okinawa as possible, he glosses over the nuances of command relationships and campaign design that modern students of joint doctrine find so prescient. Operation Iceberg was truly a relevant and exemplary joint campaign before the term even gained doctrinal status. Perhaps deliberately, the book does not provide battlefield graphics, staying with one map of Okinawa and the surrounding seas, with a second providing a more detailed view of the contested southern half of the island. While this limitation may annoy professional historians, it serves an expository purpose in that it forces the reader to understand the account of the conflict from the limited perspective of the soldier or Marine actually doing the fighting, highlighting what he can see and hear and where he can march or crawl.}

The Ultimate Battle is soundly researched, but it is not likely to provide readers with new historical insight. That does not appear to be Sloan’s intent. He relies heavily on E. B. Sledge’s classic memoir, With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa and other well-known and prominent histories, but augments these writings with fresh, invigorating interviews from scores of battle survivors. In doing so, Sloan captures the sense of commitment and passion exemplified, and that empowers his narrative and overcomes any lack of detail or background and analysis. Senior members of the defense community looking for modern joint and combined parallels to set a context for twenty-first century joint planning may wish to look elsewhere. If they are seeking a ripping good read about heroic men in battle, however, this is the book.

\text{Philip II of Macedonia. By Ian Worthington. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008. 336 pages. $35.00. Reviewed by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomewes, Jr., Professor of Military History, US Army War College.}

Ian Worthington has made a career studying and writing about ancient Greece and Alexander the Great. In Philip II of Macedonia, he turns his considerable talent to a biography of the extremely important and often overlooked figure who links those two subjects. Philip was, of course, Alexander’s father, and anyone with even a passing knowledge of or interest in Alexander will be familiar with at least some aspects of Philip’s life and significance. It was Philip II who unified Greece under Macedonian hegemony, reformed the Macedonian army, and proposed the invasion of Persia—all of which later provided the basis of his son’s fame. Philip turned Macedonia from a backwater into a regional power militarily, economically, and even
diplomatically. His integration of a disciplined, sarissa-armed infantry with effective cavalry was unique for its time. He campaigned against implacable barbarian foes such as the Scythians and the great Greek powers of his day, Athens and Thebes. But he was assassinated before he could exploit the fruits of those labors. His son used the economic and military base Philip forged to conquer an empire and eclipse his father’s reputation. Only a historian of Worthington’s stature could rebalance the two Macedonian kings’ reputations.

Worthington faces a common problem for historians of the ancient world, the paucity of sources. In many cases we do not even know what happened, much less why it happened. As everyone must, Dr. Worthington fills in the blanks with evidence from the best peripheral sources available, and when that is inadequate, he makes educated guesses. Thus, because during this period many of the best records available are Athenian, we often learn about Philip’s plans and actions through debates in Athens or oratory at Athenian trials. The most plentiful contemporary Athenian source was Demosthenes, who was a bitter enemy of Philip. Because Professor Worthington is a biographer of Demosthenes and has published and commented on several of that ancient politician’s speeches, he has extensive expertise on this subject and uses Demosthenes with caution. He constantly reminds his readers of the political bias of his source and places the evidence in proper context. That kind of careful handling of sources to exploit their fullest potential is to be expected from good scholarship.

In the case of Philip II of Macedonia, Ian Worthington occasionally goes farther and uses his years of study on the era and the actors to speculate about causation and motives. As one example, he makes an interesting case that Philip instigated or fomented the Social War (356 to 355 B. C. E.) between Athens and its empire. Worthington admits there is absolutely no supporting evidence or an acceptable alternative explanation for this conclusion, but since weakening Athens would have been to Philip’s benefit, he may have exploited the situation. In at least one instance this reviewer believes the author reads more into a statement than is justifiable. Worthington asserts Philip’s statement to the Athenians in 341 B. C. E. that “I shall deal with you about these matters” is a declaration of war. The author later admits that was a subtle distinction, and the Athenians might be excused for failing to recognize its meaning. That supposition is key. If the statement was a declaration of war, it was not direct enough to fulfill its purpose. The real issue may be why we need to identify a formal declaration—that a state of war existed at least in Philip’s mind is irrefutable.

Such nitpicking, however, should not be allowed to obscure the tremendous value of this book. Worthington uses his expertise to address all the significant issues of Philip’s life. He is comfortable with ancient Greek and Macedonian culture and politics and able to explain otherwise puzzling events in their contemporary context. His descriptions of battles, especially Chaeronea, which is by far Philip’s most famous victory, are as complete as possible. He is able to explain such diverse phenomena as the differing treatment of Athens and Thebes after Chaeronea, the estrangement of Alexander from his father, and Philip’s multiple marriages. He makes clear to the reader both the strategy and the tactics of the seizure of the Athenian grain fleet in 340 B. C. E. None of these is particularly startling of itself, but the consistent ability to deal lucidly as Worthington does with a broad range of social, political, and military topics is a notable talent.

Philip II of Macedonia is a well-crafted book. It flows nicely and is very readable. Five general maps, a diagram of the Battle of Chaeronea, and a good chronology keep the reader oriented. Sixteen pages with more than 30 black-and-white
photos add interesting detail. Six very interesting short appendices deal with issues from the sources to the archaeology of Pella. Plentiful notes, a bibliographic essay, and a healthy selected bibliography provide rich resources for future study. The editors seem to have skimmed on indexing to provide these other amenities; if so, it was a good editorial decision. Overall, Philip II of Macedonia is well worth reading and will surely become an authoritative biography of the ancient king.


Fasten your seatbelt and put your tray in the upright and locked position, because you are about to take off on a fantastic journey that explores how science fiction has become science fact in the emerging world of robotics. Read how robotics will impact war, culture, and humanity itself. Peter W. Singer has amassed a huge compendium of references about this technology which is already revolutionizing how we are waging our current wars. He also imagines how future wars may be fought through the use of autonomous machines.

The book first provides a glimpse of Singer himself and his interests as a youth. He is a product of the 1970s and, like many of his decade, has had a full dose of movies and television that arguably had a profound influence on the X-generation. Singer's many references to filmography may leave baby boomers (i.e., today's senior military strategists and generals) a bit perplexed. These references, however, score his underlying premise, that failure to grasp the emerging science will lead to a cultural rejection of it and thus failure to control it once the genie is out of the bottle. To help in this matter, there is a “Robotics for Dummies” chapter early in the book. Although somewhat fanciful, it acquaints the uninitiated reader with such terms as “haptics” and “strong AI” (artificial intelligence), which will be helpful in the chapters that follow.

Encompassing more than robots in war, this book also provides a general education in the rapid pace of scientific achievement. Singer has been thought of as a protégé of the noted inventor Ray Kurzweil, who champions the concept of the Singularity (when machines become as intelligent as humans and beyond). The author explores the exponential rate at which technology is advancing, Kurzweil’s so-called Law of Accelerated Returns. Moore’s Law and Murphy’s Law are also included. This examination is essential for the lay reader to understand the prediction that twenty-first century technology will be a thousand times more powerful than all the technology of the twentieth. To explain this expansion mathematically, Singer demonstrates why it is more advantageous to take a magic penny which doubles every day for a month rather than a lump sum of $1 million.

If you have been intrigued by the ideas presented in the first four of 22 chapters, then you are likely to stay with the author for the remainder. The journey continues with a barrage of mentions of many organizations that are producing the robotics revolution today: Intel Corp., Army Research Laboratory, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Carnegie-Mellon University, National Science Foundation, and IBM for starters. It includes a virtual “Who’s Who” of those researchers advancing robotics in warfare and envisioning where it is likely to lead us. With more than
1,500 endnotes, Singer provides ample documentation on the influence of the robotics revolution in military affairs as well as an in-depth resource bound to inspire the curious to do further research. There are quotes from both soldiers with boots on the ground and the new generation of airmen and junior officers who are flying drones from a continent away. Their insights (seemingly too often quoted with earthy expletives) are about the precision of their trade and the paradigm shift in combat where the distant warrior is removed half a world away from seeing the whites of the enemy’s eyes.

The book then transitions from the science to the philosophy of robotics in war. These sections are when Singer is at his best. Until now, you were likely entertained and enlightened by the chapters about the advancements, applications, and even resistance to using robots in the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Going forward, you become immersed in the final eight chapters in the more sobering aspects of what effect military robots are having on people, ethics, and the law of war.

To be sure, there is a psychological aspect in commuting to war where one fires Predator drone missiles in Iraq from a desk in Nevada and then returns home for dinner and a PTA meeting. There is emerging evidence that post-traumatic stress disorder occurs even in distance warfare. The “tactical general” also becomes a presence in an environment of new technologies which compress the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of battle into a single entity. To confound the problem, Singer adds the Geneva Conventions and the Law of Armed Conflict as they might apply to the contractors who maintain, operate, and perhaps even shoot from robotic weapons platforms. We are not done yet. Soldier cognitive implants and cyborg physical enhancements may be on the horizon. Some people will reject the new paradigms as a result of fear of this science future or the recognition that one’s own job and culture are at risk. The author’s closing ideas are not comfortable, but that is exactly the point Singer strives to make; that it is not wise to stagnate in a culture of war that is comfortable.

During your journey through this book, you may have put it down to rest, thumb through the in-flight catalog, or walk around the cabin a bit. Now the captain has indicated that it is time to land. So make sure your seatbelt is fastened, put the tray upright, and read the final chapter. This will not be an easy landing. The challenges of a robotics revolution in warfare are immense, and there is a “vacuum of policy, law, doctrine, and ethics” for which there is yet no architectural framework. American computer scientist Allen Kay stated that “the best way to predict the future is to invent it.” Read this book to complete your journey. Develop your own predictions before the law of accelerated returns makes them and this book obsolete as well.

Twilight at Monticello: The Final Years of Thomas Jefferson. By Alan Pell Crawford. New York: Random House, 2008. 322 pages. $27.00. Reviewed by Brian Steele, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Alabama at Birmingham.

Alan Pell Crawford’s marvelously crafted narrative of Thomas Jefferson’s retirement years cannot mask the ugliness or ultimate tragedy of the story. When he left the presidency after a life of public service, Jefferson described his joy at the prospect of a final return to what he truly loved: “my family, my books, and farms.” But as Crawford shows in vivid detail, fulfillment in each area would elude him—his
farms unproductive and continually losing value; his unparalleled and painstakingly accumulated library sold to pay down his enormous debts; his land, and Monticello itself, offered in a public lottery in an effort to raise cash; and his growing family wracked by internecine conflict, despair, and violence.

Historians already know a good deal about Jefferson’s continually botched attempts to make the fields at Monticello turn a profit. They know even more, perhaps, about his debts and sale of the library, which is usually turned into a virtue—the patriotic and sacrificial founding of the Library of Congress—rather than the sad necessity Crawford describes. But Crawford’s description of the troubles in Jefferson’s household will surprise and fascinate many historians otherwise familiar with his public career and thought. Jefferson had known tragedy, of course. Several children, including the adult Maria, had died in the years prior to 1809, and his prolonged and terrifying grief at the death of his wife, Martha, is legendary. But it is difficult to convey the pall of gloom, the air tainted with a hint of the unsavory, that hangs over Jefferson’s family relations in his final years.

Things began pleasantly enough, with his favorite (and only remaining) daughter Martha with children in tow moving to Monticello along with other members of the extended family, including eldest granddaughter Anne and her new husband, Charles Bankhead. But the peace was soon shattered. News came in 1811 that Jefferson’s nephews Isham (to whom Jefferson had taught surveying) and Lilburn Lewis had been indicted for murder in Kentucky. After entering a mutual suicide pact, in which Lilburn died, Isham absconded, never to be heard from again. Closer to home, Charles Bankhead had taken to drinking, fighting for pleasure, neglecting his affairs, and abusing his wife. Eventually, Bankhead stabbed, and nearly killed, Jefferson’s favorite grandson, Thomas Jefferson Randolph, in a street brawl in Charlottesville. Fleeing his indictment for attempted murder, Bankhead left the country, taking his wife and children with him. Eventually, even Martha and Thomas Mann Randolph, Jefferson’s well-educated but underachieving son-in-law, became largely estranged under the pressure of financial collapse and, perhaps (Crawford only hints), a psychologically debilitating and consistently unfavorable comparison with his father-in-law, who was unmistakably first in Martha’s affections.

If there is a hero of this tale, it is T. J. Randolph, who was called home from his studies at the University of Pennsylvania because the family could no longer afford his absence (or the tuition), and who ran Jefferson’s farm operations, co-signed the patriarch’s loans, and sacrificed his own pursuit of happiness, education, and material comfort to the well-being and reputation of his famous grandfather. Crawford deftly suggests the irony of a grandson of Thomas Jefferson being denied the education of a republican gentleman. But, as Crawford notes, Randolph eventually did gain the admiration of his peers through his own hard work and merit. In other words, he became a truncated version of the “natural aristocrat” his grandfather was theorizing about at the very same time he ruined Randolph’s chances to finish university and shifted his own financial burden onto him.

It is a wonder that Jefferson emerged from any of these episodes with his almost cosmic optimism intact, either a tribute to his remarkable sanguinity, or, as Crawford sometimes suggests, his less admirable ability to ignore or imagine away unpleasantness. As with his land, Jefferson’s ability to control events in his family was largely illusory, though he did take great (and effective) pains to purchase their affection, indulging his grandchildren in the present while mortgaging their futures. The bills for all the “musical instruments, silk dresses, fancy saddles, and vacation

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trips,” Crawford notes wryly, “would not come due . . . for many years, when their
grandfather died, and they inherited not wealth . . . but debt.”

All of this is enough to make readers forget why they venerate Jefferson, ex-
ccept as a case study in how not to run one’s personal affairs. Though Crawford inter-
sperses the tale with Jefferson’s public engagements during these years (especially
his nearly inexhaustible efforts on behalf of the University of Virginia) and reflects
wisely on many of Jefferson’s most famous political proposals (for example, see the
particularly insightful chapter on Jefferson’s “ward republics”), this book is a history
of the personal or private life. What we are left with at the end is a very human—and
very bankrupt—patriarch, ill much of the time, desperate to minimize his grief, and
frankly, unable to do anything to achieve peace in his home life. Jefferson cries a lot
in this tale.

But there is another sense in which all of this is irrelevant. Jefferson’s legacy
and words will matter as long as America endures, and Americans will remember Jef-
ferson for exactly why he hoped to be remembered: his enduring commitment to hu-
man freedom. The remarkable decline in his own fortunes and family—and even in
his reputation among scholars—will likely never entirely replace that legacy.

The author has used, to great effect, multiple manuscript collections that
most historians who write on Jefferson overlook, though he often accepts too un-
critically the testimony of Jefferson’s family. But permit a small criticism. Craw-
ford largely ignores, or at least does not acknowledge his debt to, a significant body
of secondary scholarship. The book is a narrative, not a scholarly monograph with a
sustained argument (though Crawford does disperse gems of insight throughout), and
this, perhaps, explains some of the omission. But the book’s unwillingness to engage,
or even acknowledge, the deep and ongoing scholarly conversation in an explicit way
mars an otherwise admirable and highly recommended work. Herbert Sloan’s mas-
terful study on Jefferson’s debt, Lucia Stanton and Annette Gordon-Reed’s pioneer-
ing reconstructions of Monticello’s slave community, and Jan Lewis’s complex and
provocative analysis of Jefferson’s domestic life and the memories of his white fam-
ily, to mention only a few examples, go unnoticed. Crawford’s analysis of Jefferson’s
thinking with regard to race and slavery owes an obvious debt to Peter Onuf’s inter-
pretation, which is more or less recapitulated here. Why not cite Onuf’s work?

In any case, joining the conversation should be easy. Crawford’s impressive
and engaging book has definitely earned him a seat at the table.

Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking
$59.95. Reviewed by Robert H. “Robin” Dorff, Research Professor
of National Security Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College.

In this concise yet conceptually rich book, Harry R. Yarger brings his many
years of experience in teaching strategy out of the classroom and into the hands of
those whose interests lie especially in the practice of formulating and implement-
ing strategy. The author specifically chooses not to focus on assessments or cri-
tiques of current national security strategy, nor on promulgating a new strategy for
the twenty-first century, both types of documents which exist in abundance. Instead,
Yarger tackles the challenge of identifying and explaining a framework for under-
standing strategic theory, strategic thinking, and strategy formulation, and addressing important differences among policy, strategy, and planning. The mission—and there is something of a missionary zeal for the science and art of strategy in Yarger’s work—is to inform and perhaps elevate the understanding and therefore the practice of strategy in the United States today. Although the book eschews an overt critique of current policy and strategy, the argument in favor of a more careful, thoughtful, and rigorous understanding of what strategy is, how it is formulated, and the forces acting on its formulation in the United States today is also intended to inform and influence development of the policy that ultimately should and must guide strategy. The examination will, in the author’s own words, “contribute to better policymaking.”

Yarger states his intentions clearly up front. This book “is written specifically to expose senior leaders, strategists, and other members of the national security community to the vocabulary, ideas, and concepts that make strategy a discipline so that a common framework exists for developing and debating different policy and strategic perspectives in regard to the trends, issues, opportunities, and threats confronting the United States as a nation-state in the twenty-first century.” Although he defines his target audience several times as the practitioner community, the reader will quickly see that this is also a book with considerable classroom potential, especially for graduate and professional student audiences. Those already familiar with the Army War College “strategy model” will certainly know Yarger’s fundamental point of departure. But there are interesting ways in which he broadens the discussion, going beyond the basic ends, ways, and means framework to include discussions about the relationship of strategy to planning, the application of theory to the “real world,” and the environmental influences (domestic and international) that impinge on the ideal rationality of any strategy formulation process. It is in these aspects that the book moves beyond a basic primer on what strategy is to become a much broader and therefore more significant contribution to informing the strategy-making processes.

Readers should also understand that the “strategy” Yarger writes about is national security strategy, as the title implies. While this approach is more comprehensive than a treatment of military strategy, it is not about strategy writ large. This fact does not diminish the work in any way, but interested readers should be aware of the distinction.

Readers should also know there are times when Yarger appears to have adopted the writing style of one of the historical icons of strategy, Carl von Clausewitz. This is most apparent in the author’s frequent restatements of arguments or points made earlier, sometimes worded slightly differently, but nonetheless readily recognizable as something “that’s been said before.” In fairness to Yarger, he does apologize in the preface for the “frequent redundancy and complexity of my work” and attributes that to the fact that “strategy is a complex subject that is better understood when examined from different perspectives.” Although lacking some of the heavily Germanic structure and Hegelian philosophical tone of Clausewitz’s own formulations, those readers even somewhat familiar with On War will recognize the pedagogical similarity. Occasional formulations like the following can take more than a little breath away from even the most patient reader: “Strategic thinking is about thoroughness and holistic thinking. It seeks to understand and affect the whole positively by a comprehensive appreciation of the synergistic interdependence of the parts and the interactions among them—the effects they have on one another in the past, present, and anticipated future.” Whether by conscious design or less-conscious adoption,
there are moments in the narrative that can have an occasional Clausewitzean-like quality of confounding more than informing.

Nevertheless, this is a book that deserves the attention and relatively modest investment of time that readers should give it, because the return on that investment is high. In the end, Yarger accomplishes two very important objectives. First, practitioners and students of national security affairs will find *Strategy and the National Security Professional* a very useful and informative treatment of a complex but vitally important subject matter. Second, Yarger brings a vast volume of dispersed and wide-ranging material together in a reasonably concise, single source, thereby ensuring easy access to important thought and material. While the book may not be everyone’s cup of tea, national security practitioners, military and civilian alike, and faculty and students in graduate-level, practitioner-oriented national security programs should find it a most welcome addition to the literature. The author ultimately succeeds in delivering an accessible, informative, and thought-provoking book intended to be “a single source reference for the political appointee, national security professional, or others who participate in the formulation, evaluation, and execution of policy and strategy or those who study and follow national security debates.” Yarger makes an important contribution to the field with this synthesis of a broad and complex topic in a concise and useful format.


In December 1965, McGeorge Bundy, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s national security adviser, cajoled his deputy, Robert Komer, to accompany him to LBJ’s ranch in the Texas Hill Country ostensibly to brief the President on a subject in Komer’s portfolio. Bundy had another reason for the invitation, and it was transparent to Komer; he wanted Komer more involved in the Vietnam War, an assignment Komer had previously fended off. Bundy prevailed, and the next day, the two men, along with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, sat with Johnson in the living room of the ranch house. Komer quickly disposed of his topic, and the conversation turned to the main agenda item, a pause in the US bombing of North Vietnam. Komer observed for several minutes the thrust and parry between Johnson and his advisers, with LBJ persistently asking if he would run into any problems if he had to restart the bombing later. Komer sat silent while the trio of advisers assured the President that he would have no difficulties. Johnson’s doggedness perplexed Komer. Of course, the three were right. It was obvious. Ultimately, Johnson assented to the bombing pause. This meeting constituted Bundy’s last one on Vietnam. He left the administration a few weeks later to become president of the Ford Foundation.

Years later, Komer recalled that Johnson was right and his advisers wrong. Johnson did not get any credit from his domestic audience for the pause, and Hanoi ignored the diplomatic signal. The object lesson, Komer stated, was that advisers who do not have the political instinct could go wrong. Gordon Goldstein’s lesson is even more apt: Advisers lacking strategic judgment are a millstone.

As the author reveals in the introduction to this book, Bundy, with Goldstein’s help, set out to write a book on his role in advising Johnson and his predecessor, John
F. Kennedy, on Vietnam policy. The impression Goldstein gives is that this undertaking would not be an apology. During their collaboration, however, Bundy died, and his widow withdrew her support. Goldstein shelved the project for years until he felt compelled to write the story from a different perspective. The result is an illuminating book, an accessible study in policymaking during wartime, and a worthy addition to the Vietnam literature.

Goldstein’s goal is to offer a sympathetic but fair-minded rendering of Bundy’s performance as an adviser on Vietnam using official documents, incisive interviews he conducted of the protagonist, and Bundy’s notes about policy proposals he had provided decades earlier. It is a difficult task because Bundy’s words and actions often sabotage the effort. Kennedy once said about Bundy, “You can’t beat brains,” but as Goldstein demonstrates, Bundy was so cerebral he was insensitive to the plight of others, his moral compass so awry at times that it provided no legitimate bearing on which to base policy. The clearest case is the decision by a few members of the Kennedy Administration to promote a coup d’état against its ally, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, by his own generals. Following Diem’s assassination, Bundy dismissed the event without a hint of remorse, as a necessary step. It was an odd position for a man who modeled his foreign policy views on former Secretary of War Henry Stimson, an adherent of the “legal-moralistic approach” in international relations.

Goldstein’s decision to use the word disaster in the title rather than tragedy is also revealing. Each of the six chapters is a lesson that Bundy should have learned as he advised Johnson and Kennedy, and all are relevant for not only national security advisers but also students of strategy and policymaking. Bundy’s errors are manifold, but Goldstein makes it glaringly apparent that Bundy’s severest sin was ultimately scapegoating Johnson for the failed US strategy. As Goldstein underscores, Bundy not only acquiesced to Johnson’s blinkered emphasis on the 1964 presidential campaign but also was derelict from the principal task of an adviser during war—critically assessing the military and political objectives on behalf of the commander-in-chief. Even if Bundy had played the role of “king’s sentinel,” the outcome would likely have been the same. He and the men around him generated numerous, often superficial, policy options, but no clear-cut strategy, no vision of the way ahead. This is not surprising. After going “eyeball to eyeball” with the Soviets during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, McNamara, flush with success, articulated the trio’s preference for crisis management by declaring, “There is no longer such a thing as strategy.” This blind spot would ultimately undo them and the nation, and that is the saddest lesson of all.

**Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century.**

Marc Sageman’s new book, *Leaderless Jihad*, provides the reader with much to ruminate. The lofty goal of Sageman’s work is to develop solid insight into the radicalization process leading to terrorist activity and to provide “clear and direct practical implications.” The author should be commended for attempting to rigorously examine his thesis and for his explication of the importance of proper social scientific
investigation, which he so eloquently and powerfully provides in Chapter 1. He should also be commended for pointing out the major shortcoming of his study, namely that it is an examination of a limited number of al Qaeda operatives and “its findings may not be relevant to other types of terrorism.” In other words, it may lack general applicability. Having said this, Sageman’s claim at the end of Chapter 1 seems suspect when he states that his sample of more than 500 al Qaeda members is fairly representative of the overall group, as the “social movement consists at most of a few thousand people.” This claim without citation to a source appears to be an attempt to bolster the validity of his sample and flies in the face of other reports on al Qaeda’s overall size and strength, such as the 17 July 2008 National Intelligence Estimate.

Sageman’s study leads him to conclude that radicalization is a four-stage process beginning with moral outrage, an interpretation of the outrage as a larger attack against Islam, personalizing it as emanating from one’s own experience or perceived outrage emanating from the perception of discrimination and mistreatment of other Muslims, leading finally to mobilization through networks. This line of argumentation is an extension of Sageman’s previous work, Understanding Terror Networks, where he first argued that individual terrorists are recruited and largely motivated through strong personal friendships they developed in small cliques of like-minded people. His analysis of the terrorist mind is no less compelling in this latest book.

What is new and controversial in his current work is his claim that “the al Qaeda central [core] in particular was neutralized operationally.” He adds that the core does not effectively operate beyond the Pakistani province of Waziristan and that Internet chatrooms have become the engine driving modern Islamic terrorists. Sageman asserts that “the true leader of global Islamist terrorism is the collective discourse of the half-dozen influential jihadi forums. It provides general guidance to participants in the absence of physical command and control found in traditional terrorists organizations.” Osama bin Laden and the rest of the central leadership cease to exist as a primary threat while amorphous al Qaeda-inspired groups, perhaps seeking only to make use of al Qaeda’s reputation, spring up spontaneously around the world. If this assertion proves to be true, then these new groups provide an even less coherent, less easily recognizable and addressed threat than the flatly hierarchical but still loosely organized traditional manifestation of al Qaeda.

Sageman rightly criticizes previous authors who have relied on a single variable to explain terrorist activity. He provides some cogent statistical analysis (although no charts, tables, or graphs) to support his assertion that terrorists are not primarily radicalized as a result of poverty, poor education, or religious extremism. Some readers will surely find irony in the fact that Sageman provides such clear evidence that religion plays an ancillary role in the radicalization process, yet the title of his book is Leaderless Jihad.

While the evidence provided in the first half of the book is solid, when Sageman attempts to argue that Internet chatrooms are the locus of radicalization and that al Qaeda is no longer much of an organized threat, the statistical analysis is conspicuously absent. Further, it is disturbing that no appendix or online replication dataset is provided. This void seems to fly in the face of Sageman’s own statement that “openness to peer review and challenge is a cornerstone to scientific research.”

The author’s conclusions that leaderless jihad is best fought through policies of shoring up homeland security, mitigating the glory of terrorism, countering the enemy’s appeal, eliminating discrimination against Muslims, and defeating terror networks are all on target, but they seem a bit utopian. Several do not seem to be clear,
direct, and practical. Eliminating historical and current discrimination against Muslims solely in Europe, for example, is an interstate, intergovernmental, intercultural, wicked problem, let alone eliminating such discrimination worldwide. Having said this, Sageman’s findings do fit into an overall trend of research, similar to that found in Robert Pape’s *Dying to Win: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, which increasingly dispels the myth that terrorists are poor, uneducated, or irrational religious fanatics.

In the end, the reader is faced with a conundrum. There is much that is novel and potentially useful for scholars, students, and policymakers in *Leaderless Jihad*, and dismissing this book and its findings out of hand would be an injustice. Accepting the evidence and all of the claims the author presents, however, without a great deal of circumspection might also prove dangerous.


The Japanese-American war of 1941-45 was a rarity among great-power conflicts because its outcome was certain from the moment it began. The Japanese could have advanced into Southeast Asia in late 1941 without attacking American territory. Indeed, had they left the Americans alone it is far from clear that President Franklin Roosevelt, besieged by isolationists on Capitol Hill and preoccupied with events in Europe and the North Atlantic, could have led the United States into war with Japan on behalf of British and Dutch imperial interests on the Malay Peninsula and in the East Indies. In attacking Pearl Harbor, however, the Japanese enraged an America that not only lay beyond Tokyo’s military reach but also possessed a tenfold industrial superiority over Japan. After 7 December 1941 it made no difference what the Japanese did or did not do; they were doomed to catastrophic defeat within five years at the most. As strategist Colin Gray has observed, the Pacific War was a war that Japan “was always going to lose.”

But it was not a war the United States was ever going to win easily, quickly, or cheaply. The vast distances separating the United States and Japan’s East Asian empire, combined with Japan’s initial naval superiority, possession of Micronesia, rapid conquest of Southeast Asia, and—above all—ferocity of resistance, condemned America to a long and bloody slog across the Pacific. The story of how the United States went about defeating Japan is recounted by William B. Hopkins in his very readable and convincing *The Pacific War: The Strategy, Politics, and Players that Won the War*. Japan’s defeat may have been inevitable, but it had to be engineered by individual civilian and military leaders employing a specific strategy within the context of the domestic and international politics of the wartime Roosevelt Administration.

Hopkins, author of the critically acclaimed *One Bugle, No Drums: The Marines at Chosin Reservoir* (1986), is a retired lawyer, former Virginia state senator, and former Marine Corps junior officer who served in the Southwestern Pacific and later in Korea. He has a keen grasp of the politics of the Pacific war, much of which revolved around Roosevelt’s accommodation of the vain, insubordinate, albeit highly popular General Douglas MacArthur, notwithstanding his poor military judgment and performance in the Philippines in 1941-42 and his dismissal of any strategy for Japan’s defeat that did not vindicate his personal pledge to return to the Philippines.
MacArthur craved the Republican Party’s presidential nomination in 1944 (and in 1948 and 1952). Roosevelt, who regarded MacArthur as a potential usurper of democratic governance in America, was prepared to give the strutting general what he wanted to keep him out of politics: independent command of US forces in the Southwestern Pacific and authorization to retake the Philippines via an advance through the Solomon Islands and along the coast of New Guinea.

But it was Admiral Chester Nimitz’s drive through the Central Pacific, culminating in the seizure of the Marianas and Okinawa, that set the stage for the destruction of the Japanese home islands via strategic bombing. There was never any convincing strategic argument for reconquering the heavily defended Philippines, which could simply have been bypassed and left to wither on the vine, like the large Japanese garrisons at Rabaul and Truk. Formosa (Taiwan) and the Marianas were much closer to Japan than the Philippines, and the whole point of advancing toward Japan was to bring American military power close enough to attack Japan directly from the air and sea. Yet, as Hopkins points out, a presidential decision to halt MacArthur’s drive short of the Philippines in favor of a single axis of advance on Japan in the Central Pacific would have been hard to explain to the American public and also would have reduced MacArthur’s—and the US Army’s—role to that of bit players in Japan’s defeat. This was something neither Roosevelt nor Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall was prepared to countenance. Moreover, by mid-1944 the United States had the resources to conduct simultaneous offensives in the Central and Southwestern Pacific. Strategic choices are usually dictated by a scarcity of means, but plentiful resources permitted Roosevelt to avoid the necessity of choosing between MacArthur and Nimitz. Nevertheless, but for MacArthur, would Roosevelt have authorized an invasion of the Philippines, and if not, would Japan have surrendered any later than it did?

Hopkins is persistently sympathetic to Roosevelt, the Central Pacific campaign, and the US Navy and Marine Corps. *The Pacific War* is an impressive study of the interaction of politics, plans, and personalities that crushed Japan in less than four years following Pearl Harbor. It persuasively details the influence of interservice rivalry on US prosecution of the Pacific war. While Hopkins has no use for MacArthur, who claimed far more praise for Japan’s defeat than the facts warrant, he rightly gives the US Army due credit for its indispensable contribution to Nimitz’s success in the Central Pacific. (The Army supplied four of the ten divisions available to Nimitz as well as four of the seven divisions employed in the April 1945 invasion of Okinawa, the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War.) Though *The Pacific War* is hardly definitive, Hopkins succeeds admirably in his declared objective of presenting “to the nonspecialist reader a condensed account of the fighting highlights with emphasis on the personalities, politics, and strategy that caused each to take place.” The reader is compelled to note that *The Pacific War* may be among the last books on the war to be written by someone who fought in it.


Henrik O. Lunde, a retired Army colonel, brings relevant professional and personal qualifications to his comprehensive, detailed, and original study of the clash be-
tween Germany and the hastily established coalition of Britain, France, and Norway during the 1940 Norwegian campaign. His experience includes combat command and operations at the tactical level, political-military assignments, and teaching strategy at the US Army War College. Native fluency in Norwegian, German, and English, to which he added French, enabled him to examine sources in those languages.

This large book will fuel debate, particularly in Britain and Norway. Exhaustive research and intellectual detachment enable the author to bring objectivity and a fresh interpretation to a subject that has been until now laden with national self-justification. He is scrupulous in basing his analysis on what was known to the actors at the time of decision. Lucid presentation allows the reader to absorb, without conscious effort, the details essential to Lunde’s story. He holds the reader’s interest while progressing seamlessly from political and strategic decisions to theater operations and tactics of the various national forces engaged, including describing and analyzing combat on land, at sea, and in the air.

Norway, in 1940 a nation-state for less than four decades, was initially stunned and then overwhelmed by simultaneous events in the Baltic and North seas as it became the setting for a clash of Great Powers. When awakened in the middle of the night to be informed that Norway was at war, the King of Norway asked, “With whom?” Since both Germany and Britain had already violated Norwegian territorial waters, the question was fair enough. Inability to grasp what was happening on 7 April 1940; slow mobilization; a centralized, bureaucratic command authority; lack of combat experience; archaic weapon systems; and delayed appreciation of the speed at which modern combat occurs put Norway at a fatal disadvantage. Courageous and often effective fighting by Norwegian forces late in the campaign was too little, too late. Norwegian historiography and pride ascribe defeat to the Fifth Column represented by Vidkun Quisling’s cooperation with the Germans, a thesis debunked by Lunde. “I was stabbed in the back,” he suggests, is ever preferred to “I was incompetent.”

The author’s comprehensive account of events uncovers British dithering in the Cabinet and at the Admiralty. London’s orders and counterorders recall the ditty about the Duke of York; who had 10,000 thousand men; he marched them up the hill; and then back down again. Complicating the Norwegian campaign were an unclear chain of command, absence of Army-Navy coordination, and failure to coordinate with Allies. These and other mistakes were generally accompanied by condescending and frequently deceptive treatment of the Norwegians. Particularly shocking is the bad behavior of reputedly elite British infantry regiments. A grace note on the British side, however, is the courage of destroyer commanders who did their duty in the best Nelsonian tradition. The record of floundering in Norway in 1940 has been lost in the cascade of other British calamities in the 1939-45 war.

German performance presents a sharp contrast. A bold strategic plan, considered “lunatic” by some senior Germany military planners, was executed with audacity and relentlessness at the operational and tactical levels. Despite usually fighting outnumbered in arctic conditions that made the simplest tasks extremely difficult, German soldiers performed in an extraordinary manner that demands explanation. Lunde concludes that the German command and staff system derived from a military culture in which initiative and responsibility are features of leadership throughout the chain of command, not least at the small-unit level. Despite three service chains of command, service differences, and the increasingly paramount role of Adolf Hitler via the OKW (Supreme Command, Armed Forces) in military decisions, senior Germans en-
sured the cooperation of professionals. Their success is owed to the expectation that leaders, from corporal to general, always seize the initiative. Unrelenting operational pressure against Norwegian forces was augmented by innovation, including Germany’s use of airborne infantry to seize airfields and other objectives in the enemy rear.

Lunde is very effective in conveying a sense of being on patrol on cross-country skis, at the helm of a destroyer racing into a fjord to engage the enemy, or in a firefight in critical and difficult terrain. His major achievement in this book, however, is an objective account of a campaign that reveals serious incompetence, a revelation that will not be warmly received by the Allied side, comfortable with the accepted wisdom that blames Norway’s defeat on Quisling, spies, and sabotage. The truth in this big and important book is less comforting. That is why its publication had to wait 70 years after the events described. This book is a gem.

The publishers have not done their due diligence, however. In several places the reader is referred to maps on “page xxx”; the intended page numbers were not put in the place-holder. There are many typographical errors; spelling, tense, repeated words, and unintended blank lines. Chapters 5 and 8 through the Epilogue do not begin on the page indicated in the table of contents. These production errors mar the author’s otherwise splendid work.


This book’s title derives from David Perry’s youth in the Pacific Northwest, where the weather is often overcast. People, he suggests, desire the sun of clarity but, instead, often have to work in the cloudiness of ambiguity. “Our moral choices on the whole,” he writes, “are only partly cloudy.” Political theorist Glenn Tinder, whom Perry does not quote, wrote elegantly about “humane uncertainty,” and this is the point Perry repeatedly labors to make throughout the book. He does so especially well in the chapters on “Espionage” and “Covert Action.”

To compress his thesis into a single sentence, it would be this: Leaders have to cultivate moral wisdom, but “there’s no shortcut, no simple prescription or comprehensive fix for that; it’s a lifelong, complex quest.” Still, there are some things—Aristotle called them “foundational”—which we are obligated to understand; these are concepts which, in essence, we cannot not know, as writer J. Budziszewski likes to put it.

Philosophical gobbledygook? No. Even the \textit{Manual for Courts-Martial} tells us that orders will be obeyed unless “a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful.” A reason we can and must try soldiers for war crimes is the defensible idea that, in committing violations of the laws of war, they knew what they were doing (and it would be for a jury to determine mitigating or exculpatory circumstances). In brief, we strive to have officers who are psychologically and philosophically mature.

Perry advances a list of seven propositions that he regards as prima facie concepts with which people of different faiths or no religious faith would concur. Among them are that it is wrong to target innocent civilians and that war should be
a last resort. We begin to see in this context some of the strengths and weaknesses of Perry’s book. In about 20 pages, he examines “Comparative Religious Perspectives on War.” Although an atheist scholar would likely challenge some of what Perry writes in the chapter, theists would find his analysis largely unexceptionable, if much too simplified.

Some years ago, baseball player Curt Flood, in a hitting slump, begged the great hitter Stan Musial for advice. Musial was reported to say, “Get a good pitch, and hit the crap out of it.” Professor Perry makes the “Musial Reduction.” He is sometimes too brief—too “sunny” and not “partly cloudy” enough—in discussing issues of immense complexity.

Perry begins by suggesting that we can examine right from wrong using what this reviewer once alliteratively called “rules,” “results,” or “realities.” Try as we might, however, to set up some framework for moral analysis, we inevitably come back, regardless of our theological differences, to the character of the commander and the need for wisdom. Tony Hartle does. Tim Challans does. David Perry does. Such agreement is not surprising: That is what “Athens” taught (e.g., Plato’s *Laws*) and what “Jerusalem” has taught (e.g., the book of Wisdom 8:7) under the heading of the “cardinal virtues.” The implicit theme appears, too, in such divergent analysts as Cohen, Hanson, and Kaplan.

Until the military services and professional military education institutions are willing to tolerate courses in which emphasis is placed upon deductive theories of moral reasoning instead of insisting upon materials and results which can be quantified and measured, we will have continued jejune moral training. Until—with apologies to Plato—soldiers are philosophers, or philosophers are soldiers, we may expect continued ethical trouble and trauma in military ethics.

If Perry’s book is sometimes too synthetic, too truncated, it is a serious and not at all cavalier work. The chapter notes display wide learning, but there is no bibliography. The book is well organized, although chapters on the Central Intelligence Agency and KGB are a bit dated and, frankly, procrustean—that is, they appear to be jammed into the framework of the book. A review of Shakespeare’s *Henry V* is, similarly, well done but arguably an add-on in this volume. Perry’s chapter on torture is concise, but his conclusion that he does not “feel qualified to [judge] the likely consequences of prohibiting or permitting torture” leaves the reader unsatisfied. The absence of an index is unfortunate, as is the lack of a glossary, which would be helpful especially to undergraduates, for whom the book will be particularly useful and interesting.

The book has limited value for senior members of the defense community, but is nonetheless a useful contribution to military ethics writing and a good general introduction to the field. It is recommended in that context.


Anyone seeking to write an original analysis of Carl von Clausewitz’s classic *On War* is undertaking a daunting task because the book has generated so much scholarly attention and extensive controversy. The new book by Jon Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War*, adds to this literature and claims to provide the most accurate interpretation to date. Dr. Sumida says his analytical per-
spective is unique in three ways: his belief that Clausewitz did in fact complete editorial work on the book; his emphasis on Clausewitz’s view that in war, defense is superior to offense; and his assertion that On War can only be understood as a theory of practice and not as a theory of a phenomenon.

Dr. Sumida argues that most scholarship concerning Clausewitz is inaccurate because it is based on the underlying assumption that the manuscript was unfinished. In a note thought to have been written in 1830, the year before he died, Clausewitz states that he was dissatisfied with most of the manuscript and would have to rewrite it entirely. Sumida believes the note was from 1827, which would have allowed Clausewitz ample time.

The consequence of the assumption that On War was unfinished distorted subsequent scholarship on Clausewitz. Sumida believes that scholars felt justified to pick and choose parts of the manuscript for analysis rather than engage it as a coherent whole. His criticism does not seem totally fair because it is surely legitimate for scholars to choose to narrow their focus regarding any classic work as complex as On War. For example, Sumida summarizes the work of Walter B. Gallie by suggesting that his assessment of Chapter 1 of On War is incomplete. As evidence, Sumida cites Gallie’s own statement regarding his intention to resolve the problems associated with the definitions of absolute and real war. Yet surely, for someone like Gallie who is primarily a scholar of philosophy and not a military historian, narrowly confining his analysis in a way to highlight philosophical issues is a justifiable academic approach.

The second analytical perspective that Sumida puts forward as unique is that Clausewitz saw defense as superior to offense. Sumida argues that the “great majority” of scholars ignored Clausewitz’s analysis of the defense and that as late as 1976, even with a revival of Clausewitz scholarship, his views on the defense were not well understood. On this point there is some credence to Sumida’s claim, because twentieth-century interpretations of Clausewitz were shaped by two factors. The first historic factor was the experience of the two World Wars, both of which were viewed as prompted by the German military implementing Clausewitzian doctrine. The second factor, related to the first and reinforcing it, was the popularity of the writings of Basil Liddell Hart that tended to characterize Clausewitz as a proponent of the Napoleonic offensive battle.

Despite these two factors and the strand of analysis that did emphasize the offensive doctrine of On War, it is not really accurate to say that the great majority of scholars ignore Clausewitz’s analysis of the defense. Sumida himself notes that even Hart recognized Clausewitz’s view that “the defensive was the stronger form of action” in his book The Defense of Britain, published in 1939. Moreover, this point was also disseminated through an essay by a German-American scholar, Hans Rothfels, published in the 1943 edition of Edward Mead Earle’s classic, Makers of Modern Strategy. Rothfels highlights Clausewitz’s views on the defense—specifically noting the advantages that Clausewitz believed to accrue to the victim of an attack.

The last perspective offered in Dr. Sumida’s decoding is that On War should only be understood as a theory of practice and not as a theory of phenomenon. Several points should be noted. It is not clear that one can neatly separate what constitutes a theory of practice from a theory of phenomenon. At a minimum, one would seem to need some sense of a theory of war as a phenomenon in order to derive a theory of practice. Sumida claims that the problem with interpreting On War as a theory of phenomenon is that by definition such a theory provides instruction on how to behave
and is thereby prescriptive and alien to Clausewitz’s purpose. Yet scholars who view *On War* as a theory of phenomenon do not conclude that the book is prescriptive.

The strategy that Sumida follows to bolster his case concerning the kind of theory to be found in *On War* is to examine scholarly work that Sumida claims Clausewitz anticipated. The work of Charles Sanders Peirce, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and R. G. Collingwood is summarized to show how ideas expressed in *On War* fore-shadowed subsequent philosophical developments. Especially important for Sumida is Collingwood’s notion of historical reenactment that Sumida believes parallels Clausewitz’s methodology for psychological reenactment of decision-making by the high command. Sumida believes that Clausewitz’s method is obscured by his use of inaccurate nomenclature and using the term “critical analysis” rather than “historical reenactment.” On this point, one might do well to apply a version of Occam’s razor that the simplest explanation is the best and that perhaps Clausewitz used the term “critical analysis” because that is what he meant to say. Sumida then goes on to summarize the similarities between Clausewitz and the three subsequent thinkers:

Like Clausewitz, all three thinkers problematized language with respect to communication of meaning about matters involving human behavior, distrusted the invention of technical vocabularies, were skeptical of the utility of theory that was based upon rules, and believed that experience can convey meaning in ways that language cannot.

Given Clausewitz’s life story and his own statements about his purpose for writing, it is hard to imagine that he saw his task as the one described by Sumida. Besides the fact that linkage with Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Collingwood seems a little forced, Sumida falls into a trap that is an occupational hazard for all Clausewitz scholars. Namely, that although much scholarship may indeed contribute to our body of knowledge and has academic value on that level, the analysis may not make *On War* more accessible to the general reader or military professionals. It was the latter audience that Clausewitz himself was most concerned to address. In the final analysis, *Decoding Clausewitz* is a useful reminder that Clausewitz’s great work is always worth rereading and is likely to continue to spark interest and controversy central to debates about war.

**Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency.**


In war, timing is everything. Brigadier General John Buford secured the ridges north and west of Gettysburg on the fateful first day of July in 1863 moments before Harry Heth’s division arrived. Had Buford been an hour later or a touch less decisive, the Confederacy would have fought from the good ground—and American history might have been very different.

Timing is not everything when writing about war, but it certainly matters when making judgments about wars that are still in progress. Dr. James Corum’s *Bad Strategies,* written in 2007 and published in 2008, examines French counterinsurgency efforts in Algeria, the British in Cyprus, and the American campaigns in Vietnam and Iraq. While drawing conclusions about the first three did not require much fore-
sight, evaluating the US war in Iraq in 2007 was a bit like a sportswriter reviewing the Super Bowl at halftime and publishing a complete report before the fourth quarter had begun. Corum’s penultimate chapter is titled “American Counterinsurgency Strategy in Iraq, 2003-2007.” It seems churlish to harp on this point, but the war was not quite finished then.

That is the biggest, but far from the only, problem with Bad Strategies. As Dennis Showalter notes in his Foreword to this volume, “The chosen case studies appear to resemble not merely apples and oranges but the entire contents of a fruit salad.” Algeria, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Iraq are very different conflicts in many ways, from the objectives of the counterinsurgents to the nature of their relationships with the countries in which they intervened. It is thus immensely difficult to conduct what Alexander George called a “structured, focused comparison” between “cases of both success and failure in order to identify the conditions and variables that [seem] to account for this difference in the outcome.”

Corum, a retired lieutenant colonel in the US Army Reserve who has taught at the Army’s Command and General Staff College and the Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Power Studies, certainly has the qualifications to pull off a comparative work of this sort. The four cases he examines—all failures, in Corum’s view—contribute to a series of lessons for counterinsurgents present and future that are worthy of discussion and study. Good strategic decisionmaking processes, the application of appropriate resources, understanding the context in which force is applied, gathering reliable intelligence, moving toward political rather than purely military solutions, training local forces as an exit strategy, and above all maintaining domestic political support are all best practices in counterinsurgency. Each one was violated to some extent by the French in Algeria, the British in Cyprus, and the United States in its long war in Vietnam—and during the first four years of the war in Iraq.

The author served in Iraq in 2004, when describing US efforts there as “bad strategy” can only be described as a dramatic understatement, and it is perhaps unsurprising that personal experience colored his view of the prospects for counterinsurgency success in Iraq. Ironically, he later became an important part of the writing team that helped General David Petraeus pen the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. That manual, the man who wrote it, and the strategy he implemented based on its precepts would change the course of the war in Iraq even as Corum was writing Bad Strategies. Ironically, it is in no small part due to Corum’s work on the field manual that this book could now be retitled “Three Bad Strategies and One Good One,” or perhaps “Bad Strategies Except for One Which We Corrected in the Nick of Time.”

Corum concludes Bad Strategies with an analysis of mistakes made in the strategic leadership of each of the counterinsurgency campaigns he studied. This is the right focus of analysis, and his assessments are spot-on, including the argument that “George Bush created a policy system that was so closed that it failed to provide him with a realistic picture of the situation.” Corum is incorrect, however, when he concludes that “we will only definitively know the answer when the policy documents of the Bush Administration are declassified.” In fact, with the publication of Bob Woodward’s State of Denial, we have a reasonably faithful account of just the problem Corum hypothesizes as decisive. Woodward’s successor volume, The War Within, then provides an inside story of the struggle to change US policy that ultimately resulted in a new Secretary of Defense, a new commander in Iraq, and the new counterinsurgency strategy that fundamentally changed the course of the war.
This tale is told well in Linda Robinson’s *Tell Me How This Ends*, Bing West’s *The Strongest Tribe*, and Tom Ricks’s *The Gamble*, as well as Bradley Graham’s definitive new biography of Donald Rumsfeld, *By His Own Rules*. Competition for readers’ attention on analysis of Iraq is intense, and a book that concludes in 2007 is unlikely to hold the high ground for long.

Timing matters, in war and in writing about war. Corum is to be commended for trying, like Buford, to be the firstest with the mostest, even if he chose the wrong ground on which to make his stand.


After almost eight years of economy, improvisation, and neglect, there is now an unprecedented amount of national focus, outstanding senior civilian and military leadership, additional military forces, and more civilian experts converging in Afghanistan. *In the Graveyard of Empires* provides a timely and insightful account of what has happened or failed to happen in the last several years. The work answers the author’s central question—why did an insurgency recur in Afghanistan?

The book has 18 chapters and offers a useful historical chronology of key events in Afghanistan, beginning with the first Anglo-Afghan War. The Greeks, Persians, Mauryans, Moghuls, Kushans, Huns, Sassanids, Arabs, Mongols, British, Soviets, and now, Americans and our partners confronted the challenges of establishing acceptable governance and security in a place where geography, terrain, borders, and tribal ways in warfare combine to create an ideal venue for guerrillas and an exceedingly difficult one for those seeking to defeat them. The seemingly impossible, however, can be surmounted by the unprecedented. Indeed, the second half of 2009 and the year 2010 will likely see favorable changes in Afghanistan.

Among the Soviets’ difficulties was their failure to establish control of the rural areas. Other problems were cumbersome command and control arrangements, lamentable civil-military integration, a dearth of forces trained in counterinsurgency, and the excessively indiscriminate use of airpower. These factors, combined with the Soviet military’s tendency to concentrate near population centers, generally saw them forfeit their freedom of action and maneuver. The insurgents targeted and impeded the movement of Soviet forces when they ventured away from the population centers, employing the classic guerrilla tactic of the ambush. The inexorable historical irony of great-power occupations of Afghanistan was also manifest for the first seven years of the US-led Coalition effort there, as many of the same problems were evident but to a lesser degree. Jones’s choice of the title for this book reflects the doom and gloom associated with most previous attempts to subjugate the Pashtuns. Few great powers have succeeded in pacifying the tribal areas for very long. The Persians even coined an epithet, “Yaghestan,” for Afghanistan, which roughly translates as the “land of the incorrigibly ungovernable.”

Jones attributes the resurgent insurgency in Afghanistan to a “perfect storm of political upheaval” that stemmed from the convergence of three crises. First, Pakistan emerged again as a sanctuary for al Qaeda and the Taliban, enabling an increase in cross-border support and operations from bases on the Pakistani side of the Durand
Line. Second, governance in Afghanistan became increasingly ineffective and less legitimate as corruption continued to metastasize throughout the central and provincial governments. Third, the diversion of US focus, leadership, forces, and resources to the Iraq War made Afghanistan a parsimonious effort, with the result being an insufficient force presence to counter the escalating violence and insurgency. For this latter rather colossal strategic misstep, the author rightfully castigates a cast of characters, principally naming Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, who served in top positions in the Rumsfeld Pentagon during the first several years of the war.

The author adroitly captures another factor initially driving the strategy in Afghanistan, and preceding the Iraq War, the Pentagon’s decision to invade Afghanistan with a “light footprint.” Jones’s cogent analysis of this decision attributes it to the fact that the Rumsfeld Pentagon misconstrued the Soviet experience in determining that a light footprint was the way to avoid becoming mired down like the Soviets did. The Soviets failed, however, not because they employed too many forces, but because they employed too few of the right combination of forces, using extremely inappropriate methods. Too few troops; exceedingly cumbersome command and control arrangements; a reliance on airpower that resulted in civilian deaths; and initial concentrations near population centers also generally characterized the American-led NATO effort in Afghanistan for the first several years. Fortunately, the current leadership there is remedying these shortcomings and focusing on protecting the population, establishing local security, empowering local governance, and rooting out the Taliban infrastructure.

This book is recommended as a readable primer for this war of necessity. Though it will not precipitate an epiphany among military and civilian security professionals, the concluding chapter does provide some sensible prescriptions for the way forward in Afghanistan. Jones’s prescriptions include curbing corruption, establishing governance from the bottom-up, and eliminating cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan. Establishing security with and through indigenous security forces is the obvious precursor condition to go forward. Fortunately, the war in Afghanistan is finally receiving the attention that was previously diverted to the other war of choice, in Iraq. Afghanistan is, to be certain, the most crucial effort for the next decade simply because both past and potential attacks planned, funded, or executed against the homelands of the Coalition nations from the Pashtun tribal lands remain among the gravest of threats.

The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century. By George Friedman. New York: Doubleday, 2009. 272 pages. $25.95. Reviewed by Colonel Robert B. Killebrew, USA Ret., who served in Special Forces, mechanized, air assault, and airborne infantry units and held a variety of planning and operational assignments during his 30-year Army career.

Geopoliticians, rejoice! The spirit of Halford Mackinder is alive and well in this delightful book by George Friedman, the founder of Stratfor, a private intelligence and forecasting company. Friedman has written an absorbing and entertaining “history” of this century through 2090, using the familiar lens of great-power competition. Thinking in 50-year cycles, Friedman explains that he “tried to imagine what 2030 and 2080 would look like” in general terms.
This book offers some geopolitical surprises that, in retrospect, should not have been surprises at all. The American war with radical Islam will subside, for a number of reasons, and will be replaced with a mini-Cold War with Russia, while massive internal pressures and population displacements divert China. After a relatively brief standoff with the West, Russia continues to decline due to well-known reasons—a plummeting population, massive public health issues, a shaky economy based on one or two exported commodities, and other factors. What is not expected, though obvious to the author, is the rise of Poland as a central European powerhouse. Eventually, writes Friedman, Poland will seek security by expanding its frontiers, absorbing Slovenia and Croatia. “The Polish bloc will essentially be the reincarnation of the former Soviet Union.” Likewise, the remilitarization of Japan can be fairly confidently anticipated, as that nation struggles for its share of raw materials and market share in a very competitive part of the world. But the star of the overseas show is Turkey, already an economic powerhouse straddling the Bosporus Strait and boasting the largest economy in the region. As Turkey expands in the 2030s, it begins to look a lot like the late Ottoman Empire, even more so as Saudi Arabia and other oil states begin to decline.

Friedman’s view of America’s future is optimistic. “If there is a single point I have to make in this book, it is that the United States—far from being on the verge of decline—has actually just begun its ascent,” he writes. When the United States finds itself in 2030 at the end of a cycle that began with the Reagan Revolution, historic tax-cut policies fail to boost productivity because of a basic shortage of labor. A new 50-year cycle begins when reforms result in a flood of immigration, boosting output and leading to a new “golden age” of American economic and cultural dominance.

Naval power, Friedman thinks, was the key to America’s strategic dominance since World War II. He forecasts that space capabilities will supplant surface navies throughout the increasingly dangerous twenty-first century, and that US superiority in space will enable dominance on the oceans, and thus of trade. Controlling trade will thereby ensure that the North American continent becomes an even larger hub of world commerce.

Readers who hope for a gradually more pacifistic world will be disappointed, just as traditional geopoliticians will be dourly affirmed, by the continued dominance of nation-states and their competition for power, resources, and status. There is no brotherhood of man in The Next 100 Years, no emergence of a stabilizing world parliament, no technological millennium. Neither, though, is much narrative given to climate change or global drought. There is appropriate, but not excessive, discussion of the impact on geopolitics of genetics, which will continue to improve and extend human life, with the resulting challenges to traditional and cultural norms that will continue to roil the world just as happens today.

If the book has a shortcoming, it is that Friedman is perhaps a little too much of a geopolitician, and not enough of a social scientist. Though he nods to social and cultural issues, he is at heart a classical balance-of-power scholar, and this book is almost exclusively devoted to pure great-power politics. The pervasive and prying eyes of the computer age, that would seem to make impossible Friedman’s predicted secret moon bases, get little or no analysis. Likewise, there is little attention paid to the growing influence of transnational corporations, crime rings, or international organizations. Some of the author’s concepts regarding previous US policies seem a little strained; for example, his claim that following the Cold War the United States worked to prevent any Eurasian power from building a navy requires further explanation. But all that detail is passed over in the sweep of his narrative. In sum, this
is a thought-provoking and enjoyable book, one that any history-minded Bismarkian scholar will be happy to have on his or her bookshelf.